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Chapter 6

Europe's multiple security strategies towards Africa

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Introduction

The European Union's attempts to 'strategize' its actions in Africa are frequently contradictory, largely because the formulation of strategy has occurred retrospectively. Strategies have been crafted to encompass a wide range of often pre-existing policy instruments and agencies, each with its own broad range of specific means, goals and ends. This is true for each of the three geographic dimensions - global, continental and regional - for which the EU has now formulated strategies in Africa. Thus a key challenge in examining security strategy in Africa is making sense of what lies beneath this thin spray-on 'strategy sheen'. Has a semblance of strategic coherence simply been wafted across a myriad of competing European foreign policy objectives, loosely linked to the notion of 'security'?

This chapter argues that relations between the European Union and African states occupy a unique position in Europe's ambitions to devise a credible 'strategy', when compared with the EU's strategy towards other parts of the world. This is due to three specific characteristics of EU-Africa relations. The first is that EU-Africa relations have spawned a uniquely dense, yet frequently contradictory, series of strategies. This is true both sectorally, in terms of the EU's diverse policies on aid, trade, security, and governance, and geographically insofar as the EU deploys a different combination of programmes and policy instruments to diverse sub-regions within the African continent. The second unique characteristic of EU-Africa security ties arises from the reality that since 2003 Africa has

served as an experimental theatre for many of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military missions. Thus interventions in several civil wars in Africa have become Europe's favoured terrain for joint-military experimentation and innovation; what we might term the 'military laboratory' characteristic of Brussels' CSDP.¹ The EU's embryonic forces have invariably acted in conjunction with other military actors. These include United Nations peace-keeping troops, as well as French, and increasingly United States' forces². French influence, both as the European power with by far the most extensive on-going military presence in Africa, and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, means that the EU clearly does not operate in Africa as an independent security actor, autonomous of its member states. Indeed, a key feature of EU strategy and actions in Africa is France's centrality to many CSDP military initiatives in Africa, notably in the former French colonies of Chad, Mali and Central African Republic. The third unique characteristic of EU security strategy in Africa is that it is explicitly, repeatedly and insistently presented in Brussels as being the product of a 'partnership' of equals with African governments, however implausible that claim may be in reality.

Before examining the broader context of the EU's African strategy, I will briefly explore each of these characteristics in more detail. Firstly, strategic incoherence stems from the profusion and complexity of diverse strands of multiple priorities and strategies. It is not possible to evaluate EU-Africa strategy in the singular; there are numerous strategies and multiple policy priorities which frequently overlap and are often contradictory. The unwieldy policy circles of preferential trade and aid – which are the historical bedrock of EU-Africa ties – do not provide a stable foundation for the subsequent, post-Cold War policy edifice encompassing issues of political conditionality, governance and rights. Nor can the European's more recent concerns with security, border control and outward migration from Africa be easily squared with previous strategies of aid, trade or governance. Thus the fluidity

of relative strategic priorities is a key factor when it comes to assessing either the long-term coherence or effectiveness of EU strategy. Such incoherence is exacerbated by the shifting priorities and short shelf-life of Brussels' strategies. Most recently, in the 2016 *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)* (EEAS 2016a), the EU adopted a strategic policy goal of stalling irregular migration across the Mediterranean and facilitating the forcible return of migrants; this goal was bolted onto a pre-existing broad array of policy objectives.

The second reason that EU-Africa relations hold a unique place in any practical evaluation of European strategizing is that the majority of actual CSDP military missions since 2003 have been staged on the African continent. To evaluate the effectiveness of the *European Security Strategy (ESS)* since its inception in 2003, one must therefore examine Europe's dozen or so military engagements in Africa. The very first EU military intervention, Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was triggered even before the *ESS* was published in 2003. The subsequent decade brought a steady expansion of such operations; by 2016 there had been 14 CSDP missions in Africa. These included seven actual military missions, plus, since 2007, the large-scale, EU-funded African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM reflects a central aspect of the evolving EU strategic *practice* in Africa whereby Europe increasingly finances the subcontracting of security work to African troops (Tardy 2016).

The third reason why Africa occupies a unique place in EU strategy is the manner in which EU-Africa ties are invariably, and somewhat ostentatiously, presented as reflecting a 'partnership'. Here the repeated insistence that the strategy is the outcome of consensual negotiations between equal partners serves largely to highlight precisely the opposite. The legacy of two centuries of colonialism reflects the historic imbalance of power, financial wherewithal and influence between the two continents. This is most pressing in terms of the

practical overhang of what has been for most African states their main institutional policy link to the EU, the Lomé accords (1975) and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement (2000). They provide the framework for both the principal aid transfers to Africa, via successive European Development Fund mechanisms, as well as shaping trade ties between the two continents. They are currently the subject of protracted re-negotiation in the form of the (often controversial) WTO-compatible ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’.

The current emphasis on ‘Strategic Partnership’ is explicitly an attempt to efface the highly unequal donor—recipient relationship which continues to characterize post-colonial ties between Europe and Africa. Stark economic realities mean that strategy is written and above all financed in Europe. This is most explicitly evident in relation to the ‘African Peace and Security Architecture’ dimension of the new security division of labour (see below).

This chapter is largely an exploration of the tensions and contradictions surrounding the three core characteristics of the EU strategy for Africa. It is structured in three substantive sections. Part one presents the context, scope, genesis, and evolution of EU strategies towards 54 African states and their 1.2bn inhabitants. It analyses the shifts in European strategic approaches towards Africa between the original 2003 *ESS* and its latest iteration, the 2016 *EUGS*. Part two then briefly examines selected aspects of actual strategic practices of CSDP in Africa. It focuses on the specific regional policy towards the Horn of Africa, where the EU’s longest running, most substantial CSDP mission, the EU’s anti-piracy maritime force EUNAVFOR operates. At the same time, the EU trains and finances within Somalia and neighbouring states the 20,000 African Union troops staffing the AMISOM mission. It also runs two additional CSDP missions of its own in Somalia. The Horn of Africa thus arguably represents the largest and most tangible aspect of ‘security partnership’ between Africans and Europeans. The third and final substantive section then evaluates the outcomes of these strategic interventions framed by two questions: Does the EU strategy in

Africa attain its declared goals? Is it likely that the formulation or implementation of grand strategy will make either Africans or Europeans more secure as the 21st century progresses?

The context, scope, genesis and evolution of EU-Africa strategies

The EU itself defines its ties with the African nations in the following manner:

EU-Africa relations are based on the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which grew out of the 1975 Lomé Convention. Africa-EU relations are framed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted by 80 African and European Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit in 2007. This Strategy encompasses the Africa-EU Partnership, the political framework which defines bilateral relations. Its goal is a partnership between equals that will jointly tackle issues of mutual concern. It was reaffirmed with a positive spin at the 4th EU-Africa Summit held in April 2014 in Brussels (European Commission 2005).

The need for a new ‘positive spin’ reflected lacklustre progress on meaningful cooperation post-Lisbon, and was the impetus for what was effectively a relaunch of the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’ in Brussels in 2014. Those at the summit adopted a “2014-2017 roadmap” to attain the new strategic objectives established at the Brussels summit. This established five “strategic policy priorities”: peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth; and finally, continental integration.

It is the first priority that has occupied much strategizing since 2014 and is the main focus here. The bulk of expenditure in this area is channelled via the African Peace Facility (APF) and the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). These ‘African-led’ peacekeeping operations ostensibly function within an overarching policy framework of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The

strategic aim of coordinating between EU and African Union agencies in order to boost African capacities and mechanisms with the aim of preventing and managing conflicts and crises is examined in relation to the broader notion of ‘partnership’ below.

Even this surface view of EU strategic priorities highlights the challenge of forging a comprehensive or coherent overarching ‘strategy’ to encompass and structure very diverse activities. This is further complicated by the fact that in practice there are a series of distinct security strategies vying for Brussels’ attention in several distinct geographic dimensions. The European Union’s ties with African states are inscribed within multiple, interlocking strategic frameworks. Schematically these can be seen to operate on three distinct geographic dimensions; global, continental and (sub-)regional.

Before detailing this diversity of strategies towards Africa, we should not lose sight of the fact that in reality, there is a *fourth* dimension which in practical policy terms is rather more important. This is the country-specific strategy framework which shapes the European Commission’s bilateral ties with individual states. In practice most EU finance, which underpins EU-Africa security strategy, passes via individual African exchequers, i.e. they are spent at the national level. National spending priorities, in turn, are outlined in mutually agreed upon a ‘National Indicative Programme’ (NIP). However, given that each NIP is the outcome of complex bi-lateral bargaining between donor and recipient, usually involving hundreds of detailed domestic budget lines, the overarching ‘security strategy’ is invariably absent from such NIP documents³.

This level of *domestic* policy and expenditure is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, when considering broader security strategy discourses, it is important to note that, as highlighted at the outset, most aspects of EU peace and security policy and finance towards individual African states continues to be funnelled through what was originally an aid and trade frameworks. As such, the underlying politics and power relations between the

two regions largely reflect the tensions of what John Ravenhill (1985), in his original analysis of the politics of EU-ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific states⁴) trade deals, termed “collective clientalism” (see also Whiteman 1998). The underlying contradictions between European trade protectionism, notably against Africa’s agricultural producers, and Europe’s professed economic liberalism remains at the heart of such tensions (Taylor 2016).

What are the multiple strategies the EU operates at each geographic dimension in Africa? Globally, Africa features prominently in successive elaborations of Europe’s global strategy towards neighbouring continents with which Europe has extensive exchanges (Council of the EU 2003, EEAS 2016a). There are then several distinct strands of ‘Africa Strategies’ defined at a continental level. Here the key document is the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)’, endorsed by 80 African and European governments at the Lisbon Summit in 2007. This over-arching strategy encompasses the Africa-EU Partnership and is examined in more detail below. Finally there are elaborate EU strategies towards selected sub-regions of Africa, notably for the Sahel and Horn of Africa.⁵ Since 2011 a separate Sahel Strategy has sought to partially provide a framework for EU actions towards the states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (EEAS 2011). Each is a former French colony with on-going close ties to Paris. France, like the US, has considerably increased its military presence in these states, particularly since the 2012-13 Islamist insurgency in Mali, and remains the principal bilateral donor to the region. As such Paris tends to be the dominant actor in terms of both EU and other multilateral initiatives in the Sahel. However, the Sahel Strategy covers programmes on such as security, migration, terrorism as well as humanitarian and long-term development issues and since 2015 has had an associated ‘Regional Action Plan’. The second principal sub-regional policy for Africa is its Horn of Africa strategy, adopted in 2012. Both strategies are overseen by Special Representatives in Brussels.⁷ The

genesis and role of the Horn of Africa strategy is examined in more detail in section three below.

As noted earlier, the third notable factor characterising ties between the EU and Africa is the notion of ‘partnership’. In 2007, the specific intercontinental EU-Africa partnership agreement was signed. This reflected the gestation of a reformed set of EU-Africa relations that occurred during process of reformatting the Organisation of African Unity via its metamorphosis into the African Union between 1999-2002. These included the (donor-steered) ‘New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)’ and the inaugural EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000.

The notion of partnership was prominent in the 2005 EU ‘Strategy for Africa’ documents, subsequently endorsed as the ‘JAES’ in Lisbon. It reflected, indeed earnestly promoted, the view prevalent among European elites that bilateral ties between European and African states and continents might rest on mutually beneficial foundations. This Lisbon document declared:

The purpose of the EU’s action is to work in partnership with the nations of Africa to promote peace and prosperity for all their citizens [...] The strategy will further reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, *most prominently equality, partnership and ownership...* (European Commission 2005, emphasis added).

This notion of ‘partnership’ has become even more prominent in the discourses, actions and strategies concerning security that have evolved in the decade since the 2007 ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’ was signed in Lisbon. As Thierry Tardy (2016: 1) notes, the term partnership sought to reflect a new “Euro-African consensus on values, interests and strategic objectives”, replacing the donor—recipient ties of dependency with at least notional economic equality and political parity. As noted already, in the security domain partnership is

embodied most tangibly in the EU's backing of the 'African Peace and Security Architecture' via its funding of the APF to the tune of €1bn in recent years. The idea of it originated in 2003, and came to embody the tangible aspect of the EU's commitment to "peace and security" subsequently sketched in its 2005 'Strategy for Africa' document (European Commission 2005).

Above all the APF has funded African Union (AU) military missions in Somalia, Mali, and Guinea Bissau – essentially by covering contributing states' operational costs. From 2015 similar EU funding mechanisms were adopted under the APF for missions in the Central African Republic and the Lake Chad basin. In addition it provides military training and 'capacity building' for a range of defence activities as well as for existing Regional Economic Communities in Africa, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Sahel and west, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa. It also is the key vehicle for European financial support for the AU Commission itself.

Viewed objectively, this appears to be more an emerging division of labour and finance rather than 'partnership'. Europe pays to train and maintain the executive of a regional body in its own image – the African Union – which in turn organizes military peacekeeping on the African continent, staffed by African troops, which the European Union agrees to bankroll. Thus it is far from clear to what degree this division of labour, effectively an EU policy of subcontracting security roles in the Horn of Africa, can be accurately viewed either as a partnership between equals or to reflect a joint-strategy. This arrangement prompts Tardy (2016: 3) to argue that that "the notion of strategic partnership that implies convergence on interests and methods cannot be easily applied to EU-AU relations", a point we will return to when assessing the strategic outcomes of such a strategy.

The EU's shifting strategies towards Africa: 2003-17. How have multi-level security strategies towards Africa evolved and what is their content? The previous section schematically divided EU strategizing towards sub-Saharan Africa into three distinct geographic spheres. In this section we focus primarily on the manner in which the EU has incorporated African issues into the first - global - policy sphere, via successive iterations of its global strategizing.

Africa features in diverse ways in the evolving series of EU global strategy documents, which ostensibly seek to align strategy towards Africa within the broader context of CSDP's goals. We will briefly examine coverage of Africa in the two key strategic documents, the 2003 *ESS* and the 2016 *EUGS*. However, it is worth noting that the July 2016 document was preceded by a longer, and on Africa slightly more detailed, 2015 discussion document (European Union 2015). This was adopted by the European Parliament after debate in April 2016 and contains greater detail on African policies.⁸

A preliminary observation is in order for each of these strategy documents. Firstly, the key characteristic is that the often tortuous language of each reflects the acute tensions between the essentially normative, liberal aspirations of the EU on the one hand, and the need for practical strategic prioritization, guidance and legitimacy for its growing number of military actions on the other. It is hard not to conclude that such tension is particularly acute between EU actions in sub-Saharan Africa, where the bulk of military missions is located, and the liberal aspirations dominating the language of those strategy documents.

As such this tension reflects what Adrian Hyde-Price (2008) has termed the tendency of the EU to act as "neurotic centaur" revealing the limitations of the EU as a strategic actor. On the one hand, the EU foreign policy beast views the unstable world through a cold and rational *Realpolitik*. This viewpoint acknowledges that an effective external policy requires the willingness to use military power in the service of broader diplomatic objectives when

necessary. Yet the EU's rhetoric reflects the view offered by its normative, rose-tinted liberal eye that flatters its domestic European audience. This means that strategy all too often is, in Hyde-Price's words "ham-strung by stuff on soft power" and inhibits the development of a viable grand strategy based on "a common strategic culture which goes beyond the platitudes of the [2003] ESS" (Hyde-Price 2008: 154).

Wading through strategy documents attempting to discern what strategy towards Africa actually consists of, one is tempted to extend Hyde-Price's image and argue that when it comes to policy in Africa, the EU centaur shows disturbing signs of bipolar disorder compounded by schizophrenia. What does the 2003 *ESS* actually say about Africa and from where does the confusion stem? The succinct document was drafted shortly after the September 2001 attacks upon the United States and the EU's manifest failures in the Balkans. As such it focuses on both terrorist and military threats to Europe. On Africa, it opens with the observation that African "countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty [and that] security is a precondition of development" and later notes the threats arising from regional conflicts in Africa's Great Lakes Region and state failure in Somalia and Liberia (Council of the EU 2003). The *ESS* lauds the role of regional bodies in strengthening global governance and explicitly mentions the AU. The document also pointedly calls for the EU to develop "a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention" (*ibid.*). Lastly, it also argues that if strategy is to be successful, there must be greater policy coherence across EU overseas policies, including coordinating of the European Development Fund priorities with CSDP (Council of the EU 2003: 9, 11 and 13).

A dozen years on, the much anticipated *EUGS* was published in 2016 just weeks after the referendum in the United Kingdom. As such it differs somewhat from the draft discussion version published in late 2015 and debated by the European Parliament in April 2016.

Frederica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, notes in her forward to the *EUGS* that “Global” refers not simply to geographical scope but also the broad array of policies and tools at the Union’s disposal, emphasizing that the projection of ‘hard’ military power is as central to the Union’s work as the ‘soft’, civilian aspects of EU policies. The 2016 strategy defined five priority objectives for future EU action; three of these relate to African states, albeit often somewhat nebulously. The first, tellingly, is the desire to “develop more effective migration policies” for the EU and its partners. Secondly the Union aspires to prioritise “an integrated approach to conflicts. Later the document refines this to the notion of a “comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises” (EEAS 2016s : 34); Libya is mentioned explicitly, but this priority clearly encompasses the EU’s active military missions in Africa [see Table 6.1].

[Table 6.1 here]

Thirdly, the 2016 strategy stresses the importance of “Cooperative Regional Orders” (EEAS 2016a: 9-10). It is under this ‘Regional Order’ rubric that the few specifics of policy towards Africa feature in the body of the sixty-page document. Under the characteristically aspirational heading of “A peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa” (ibid.: 34), where, after referring to numerous conflicts in the Middle East, the document notes the “growing interconnections between both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and the states of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East“ In both cases, on closer inspection these appear to be thinly veiled references to migration corridors: notably those between Niger-Libya and between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

Alongside the new catch-all aid industry nostrum of ‘resilience’, migration controls feature extensively in the final version of the 2016 *EUGS*. The term ‘resilience’ has been widely embraced by the development industry since 2015, when the Millennium

Development Goals were replaced with a new set of ‘sustainability’ targets. Thus in the section entitled ‘State and Societal Resilience to our East and South’, the EU claims that

Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. [...] Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States (EEAS 2016a:23) ED: ~~Section 3.2, page 23~~.

Since the 2014 launch of the ‘JEAS’ and its associated policy roadmap, the issue of migration control has becoming increasingly prominent in EU policies towards Africa. These are often conveyed uneasily in a ‘migration-development’ vocabulary, reflecting the dissonance between two realities: that remittance flows from overseas workers are now crucial to the economic functioning of many African states and that European leaders seek to stem the migrant flows which generate them. Thus post-2014 the EU launched various ‘migration and development’ policy initiatives, notably the Rabat and Khartoum processes, which aim to combat irregular migration from west and east Africa respectively. These were reinforced by an emergency EU-Africa ‘migration summit’ held in Valetta in 2015. This was prompted by the sharp increase in deaths of migrants crossing the Mediterranean in 2014-15. Valetta marked the launch of a new ‘Emergency Trust Fund for Africa’ aimed at stemming migration.

The new migration focus has clearly influenced the 2016 *EUGS*, where migration and resilience tropes occasionally converge:

A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. [...] Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. Through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation we will work with countries of origin to address and prevent the root causes of displacement, manage migration, and fight trans-border crime (EEAS 2016a: 24).

As a strategy this is contradictory, particularly in its fudging of the benefits of migration upon household and national economies via the enhancement of mobility, and the fact that the Trust Fund mechanism appears designed primarily to deter and control migrant flows, rather than promote and better regulate them. What is the link between ‘resilience’ and migration; does more migration enhance it? It is equally unclear what exactly African states are supposed to be ‘resilient’ against (drought, war, or indeed migratory pressures themselves...?). The *EUGS* appears to assume a link between ‘conflict’ and migration:

The EU will therefore pursue a multi-phased approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity (EEAS 2016a: 24).

As in 2003, the EU’s emphasis in partnering in Africa with regional bodies is also a prominent feature of the 2016 strategy. Claiming “[T]he EU will intensify its support for and cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa [...] and will [...] invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We will

intensify cooperation with and support for the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa, and the East African Community, among others “ (EEAS 2016a: 34). Finally, the economic and trade dimensions do feature in the *EUGS*, albeit now somewhat overshadowed by concerns of migration and crises. Thus claiming that the EU has a duty to “enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa” EEAS 2016a: 36, via Cotonou’s chosen successor policies, Economic Partnership Agreements. These the *EUGS* suggests;

can spur African integration and mobility, and encourage Africa’s full and equitable participation in global value chains. A quantum leap in European investment in Africa is also needed to support sustainable development. We will build stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, energy and climate, science and technology, notably to improve food security. We will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counter- terrorism and organised crime, migration and border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional strategies (EEAS 2016a: 36).

Trying to map this latest iteration of EU grand strategy to actual actions in Africa is problematic. The 2016 Strategy’s exhortative conclusion, a string of gerunds— *reforming, investing, implementing, deepening widening, developing, partnering...*—reads as aspirational waffle. Indeed, it is tempting to view the document’s reliance upon imprecise terms such as ‘resilience’ as reflecting a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach, a disconnect between the EU’s myriad policy presence, with multiple programmes and expenditures in African states, and the broad justifications of them among policy makers and strategists in Brussels. It is, to

adapt a very old view of European Political Cooperation in Brussels, as if the procedure of drafting strategies acts as a substitute for policy itself or at least practical policy coordination (Allen and Wallace 1977: 227-248).

Strategic Practices: the regional strategy for the Horn of Africa.

How has the EU sought to formulate strategy at a regional level within Africa? This section briefly examines regional strategic practices of CSDP by focussing on policies in the Horn of Africa. Regional strategizing seeks to coordinate multiple European foreign policy and military initiatives in neighbouring states. However, on critical inspection, the relatively recent adoption of regional EU strategies for specific regions within Africa – as for the Horn or Sahel – still risks veiling a spurious façade of cohesion over what are often disparate actions by different EU agencies within one region.

The Horn is the location of the EU's longest running, most substantial CSDP mission; the anti-piracy force EUNAVFOR's Operation *Atalanta*, patrolling the coasts of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile in Somalia itself in recent years the EU has run two CSFP missions of its own, its Training Mission Somalia (EUTM), and coastguard training via EUCAP Nestor. Between 2012 and early 2017 EUCAP Nestor provided 'Regional Maritime Capacity Building' for states of the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean. Brussels additionally invests €250m per annum to pay for the 22,000 troops participating in AMISOM. Currently this is by far the largest and most tangible aspect of 'security partnership' between Africa and Europe and is at the heart of EU-AU military ties. This practical manifestation of the EU- AU partnership functions via the APSA and related African peace-keeping operations. Its finance, via the APF has been funded from the European Development Fund (EDF) since 2004. In addition to AMISOM, since March 2015

this funding model, whereby some aid flows can be channelled into military activities, has also funded an EU Military Assistance Mission - EUMAM – in Central African Republic.

In terms of EU security practice in Africa, one can thus discern a strategic shift, with expenditure on the earlier, stand-alone CSDP military missions being replaced by EU funding for capacity building, training and – in the case of AMISOM – directly paying the wages of African troops. While the term is not used in EU strategy circles, this practice flags the emergence of a sub-contracting model. The EU prefers to bankroll African forces in the hope they can shore-up fragile state structures, as in Somalia or the Central African Republic, rather than send European troops.⁹ This shift complements recent attempts to better coordinate strategy and policies at a regional level within Africa. There are two geographic areas for which the EU has adopted sub-continental strategy documents and region-specific policy frameworks. The first relates to the Horn of Africa. This policy, agreed in 2012 and four years after the start of the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy mission off Somalia, aimed to lend coherence and direction to disparate EU missions and budget lines in Ethiopia, Somalia and neighbouring states (European Council of the EU 2011).

The second principal sub-regional strategy in Africa relates to the Sahel, with a Sahel strategy adopted in 2011 that is designed to frame EU relations with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. A Sahel Regional Action Plan (RAP) was adopted in 2015. Both the Horn of Africa and Sahel regional strategies have European External Action Service (EEAS) Special Representatives attached to them. In the Horn of Africa, since 2012 EU policies have in theory been coordinated within a ‘Comprehensive Approach’, which provides a wide array of humanitarian, developmental and military assistance; its expenditure and actions operating within an overarching ‘Strategic Framework’ (Council of the EU 2011).

In terms of the formulation of strategy towards the multiple CSDP activities and missions in the Horn, the anchor of the strategy is EUNAVFOR’s Operation *Atalanta*. This

was the first EU naval mission and has been in continuous operation since late 2008, with its mandate now extended to 2018.¹¹ As such, it is both the largest and longest CSDP mission related to Africa. It is tasked with both anti-piracy operations and the escort of World Food Programme food aid deliveries to Somalia.

In terms of EU security strategy, it is important to note that Operation *Atalanta* is simultaneously the central element in the 2014 ‘European Union Maritime Security Strategy’ (MSS) (Council of the EU 2014). The debate informing the MSS is instructive for the wider concerns of this volume in that it explicitly engaged with the hard power question of where do Europe’s strategic interests lie in terms of its frontiers? Clearly if CSDP is about strategic interests, the EU needs first to define such interests, and then seek the means to defend them. The MSS does precisely this, unlike the EU’s diverse terrestrial military missions and Africa strategies discussed here.

Some argue the innovative nature of Europe’s anti-piracy force off the Horn of Africa is precisely this; the pursuit of the EU’s strategic interests expressed in the naval idiom of dispatching surface combatants to protect the shipping lanes through which the bulk of Europe’s oil supplies and consumer goods pass. As such the EU is explicitly defining and defending militarily its core interests. This is quite distinct from pursuing ‘humanitarian’ or other normative objectives, the so-called Petersberg tasks, which have been the primary rationale of other EU CSDP missions in Africa.¹² Germond (2011: 573) argues that “[t]he EU’s own security now strongly depends on the security (or securing) of others and the securing of areas where threats originate and where the EU’s interests are threatened”. This implies that the EU’s first line of defence is often extra-European, thus the security implications of the EU’s maritime borders are exceedingly elastic. It also means that “[t]he maritime margins represent an ideal opportunity to extend the EU’s competences and power, because no direct interference with another sovereign state’s territory or its politics and

policies is required” (Council of the EU 2011: 574). When the MSS was launched in 2014, EUNAVFOR in the Horn was the sole EU naval operation. As such it provided a template for the subsequent sea-borne migration control mission: Operation Sophia, the EU naval force in the Mediterranean in 2015.¹³

In terms of the EU’s *regional* concerns of the Horn of Africa, EUNAVFOR should be placed within a broader perspective of integrated European policy towards Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Viewing the anti-piracy mission as one element of a European regional policy towards the Horn of Africa as a whole, it is far from clear to what degree the diverse policy actions are successfully coordinated. CSDP operations in the Horn have three primary dimensions: two maritime, one terrestrial. To that end, the other two main CSDP missions in region have been EUCAP Nestor and the EUTM. However, the framework and the Special Representative have a far broader remit than just these maritime and training missions. They aim to improve liaison and coordination between these three CSDP missions and the far broader EU aid and associated programmes in the Horn as well as coordination with the myriad of other leading multilateral actors implementing aid, civilian and military programmes in the Horn of Africa.¹⁴

In terms of intra-EU bureaucratic politics, the key strategy issue here is that such aid programmes are the prerogative of the longstanding and powerful Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO). This, at least nominally, is under the relatively new umbrella of High Representative Mogherini, who has responsibility to coordinate all Commissioners with external relations portfolios, in part via the Commission's Group on External Action, which aims forge a common strategy for EU actions globally.¹⁵ However, DEVCO’s structures are older, better funded and partly autonomous from the embryonic EEAS.

This begs the broader question as to the purpose of strategy: To what degree are the EU's *military* missions integrated with wider EU regional objectives, including aid and development spending via DEVCO, in Africa? This question can be posed for any of the EU missions in Africa, be it in Congo, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR) or Mali, but is particularly intriguing for EUNAVFOR, as a maritime mission that solely addresses the negative externalities—piracy and interference with food aid to the region—of the collapse of the Somali state. Violence in Somalia in turn has severe implications for the Horn of Africa as a whole, where the EU itself, as well as several of its larger members, have significant stakes as major donors of both civil and military aid to states such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Southern Sudan.

Policy coordination and coherence issues are even more complex when we turn to the broader EU presence in the Horn of Africa, which in financial terms is far larger than the CSDP programmes.¹⁶ On the aid front, the Commission floated in 2012 a new 'Action Plan for the Horn of Africa', dubbed 'Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience' (SHARE). SHARE envisaged that the Strategic Framework's would shape policy coordination between the other key European actors, including the EU's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) as well as DEVCO, and link thereby short-term humanitarian aid with longer-term development agencies. Highlighting the EU's operational organisational complexity further, this in turn built upon the 'Instrument for Stability', a coordination and finance structure dating from 2007, which aimed to harmonise the Commission's work on conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building more broadly and coincided with the launching of the 'EU-Africa Strategy'.

Since 2012, the EU has elaborated complex coordination mechanisms across the diverse CSDP and other programmes through which it is present in the Horn of Africa. Despite the elaborate Strategic Framework and appointment of the Special Representative, in

the Horn it is not clear whether there is an effective, clear sub-regional strategy. Indeed the EU itself is mindful of this; having experimented for five years with its regional strategy, in early 2017 Brussels announced a reformatting of CSDP activities in the Horn, EUCAP-Nestor becoming EUCAP-Somalia, concentrating solely on Somali coastal capacity.¹⁷

Multiple initiatives: strategy and security impact

This final section evaluates a few outcomes of selected strategic interventions. The previous sections have highlighted the breadth and diversity of the EU's various policies and goals in Africa, suggesting that in practice a unified, and largely retrospective, 'Security Strategy', such as that sketched in the *EUGS* of 2016, cannot meaningfully encompass such a wide range of EU programmes and objectives. This makes any generalised evaluation of goal attainment inherently problematic. However, we can attempt a brief and partial assessment in three policy domains related to security strategies in policy areas where the EU has significant financial investments in Africa: peacekeeping; anti-piracy activities and the management of irregular migration.

In terms of peacekeeping, two aspects stand-out; the French role and the shift to training and funding of African armies. The first is the degree to which the origins and outcomes of successive individual CSDP military missions in Africa reflected the policy priorities of France. France is both the EU state with the largest on-going bi-lateral military engagement in Africa, and the UN Security Council member most often charged with the military stabilization of successive 'complex emergencies' in African states.¹⁸ These include missions in Chad, the CAR and Mali. As such the EU's security priorities in significant parts of Africa can be seen as reflecting the national policy preferences of Paris, and to promote pan-European military peacekeeping forces in order to complement United Nations multilateral forces. Paris remains tied to many former colonies in Africa via defence accords.

As such, it has a financial and strategic interest in devolving some of its historical African security responsibilities to the EU or UN. There are several examples of it having done so. In 2008, for example, the EU deployed 3,000 troops to its EUFOR Chad-CAR military mission. This mission aimed to improve security for refugees along the Chad-Darfur border, while complementing longstanding military support for Chad's President who faced rebel insurgents from the border region. While the EU force comprised significant Irish and Polish troop contingents, in reality it was spearheaded and facilitated by French troops and logistics based permanently in Chad. After two years it handed authority to a short-lived United Nations mission, which was equally dependent on France. In terms of outcomes, the presence of EU and then UN troops made little significant difference to the security or humanitarian situation in Chad (Styan 2012; Grevy, Helly and Keohane 2009). However, what was at the time the EU's largest military expedition was hailed in both Brussels and the UN as a resounding success in terms of military cooperation and force deployment by a pan-European force able to operate in coordination with UN peacekeepers. Five years earlier the EU *Artemis* mission in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo had in reality played a similar 'bridging' role enabling the subsequent deployment of a larger UN force. More recent EU military training missions, in Somalia from 2010 and then Mali in 2013, effectively allowed the EU to provide finance and military expertise to support African national and multilateral forces. In both cases, these operations were French-led from its base in neighbouring Djibouti in the case of Somalia, then as the lead force combating Islamist forces in Mali under its Operation *Serval*.

These examples relate to the second aspect of EU peacekeeping and the attainment of strategic objectives; the EU's growing role as a trainer and financier of African armies involved in multilateral missions on the continent. This role does not feature prominently in the official presentation of EU strategy in Africa, as we have seen. In practice, it is the EDF's

financing of the APF since 2004 which – alongside the EU’s own military missions such as those outlined above - has been the most tangible manifestation of Brussels strategic military intent in Africa. Thus, the financing of AMISOM in Somalia and the more recent and smaller military assistance mission in CAR both meet the EU’s headline “peace and security” strategic objectives, as well as providing a tangible manifestation of “partnership” and the principle of “African ownership” (EEAS 2016).

The twin areas of anti-piracy and maritime strategy provide a rare policy domain in which unambiguous success can be registered. The incidence of piracy declined dramatically in the region after the launch of EUNAVFOR in 2008. While this joint-EU naval mission is just one of several multilateral initiatives to secure shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, the EU force has played a central role. Although enforcement is not the sole reason for the decline in piracy, this EU mission can be said to have fulfilled its declared strategic objectives. In addition, EUNAVFOR has demonstrated Brussels ability to mobilise, coordinate and deploy pan-European naval resources over a sustained period, enhancing the coherence and credibility of CSDP. EUNAVFOR’s success is recognised as a major factor underpinning the EU’s MSS (Germond 2011; Styan 2016), which as noted above is in part premised on the argument that the EU’s strategic interests extend well beyond the EU’s frontiers and encapsulate extra-European strategic interests such as shipping lanes.

In terms of the links between migration and *ESS* in Africa, the evidence is both thinner and less conclusive. The 2014 EU-Africa Summit did adopt a ‘Joint Declaration on Migration and Mobility’ and an associated ‘Action Plan for 2014-2017’. These included initiatives to reduce the costs of remittances, boost labour mobility and enhance cooperation on irregular migration and trafficking. These initiatives were also accompanied by a ‘Migration and Mobility Dialogue’. However, these broad migration objectives and initiatives were largely eclipsed by the sharp increase in illegal migration and deaths across the

Mediterranean from Libya's lawless coastline as well as by the migrant flows from Syria and Turkey. A sense of escalating crisis in 2015 triggered a series of *ad-hoc* EU actions to boost surveillance, rescue and control of African migrants. An *ad-hoc* Africa-Europe Summit on Migration held in Valetta in November 2015 prompted further policy changes, including a €1.8 bn Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.¹⁹ This initiative aimed "to tackle root causes of irregular migration" and in mid-2016 the EU signed an associated 'Partnership Framework' for projects in five African states (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia) under the Trust Fund. Speaking in late 2016 Federica Mogherini claimed some success for the partnership and associated 'Framework'.²⁰ However, strategic policy coherence towards questions of migration and asylum, either in Brussels or among EU members, was strained and limited post-Valetta. Greece and Italy continued to bear the brunt of migratory pressures; Italy eventually signed its own bilateral deal with Libya to try and stem irregular African migration in February 2017.

Conclusion

It is illusory to expect that the EU could formulate a coherent, unitary strategic approach to Africa's diverse states, peoples and regions. EU strategies towards its direct neighbours, for example the Balkan or Mediterranean states, provide the basis for focussed, feasible policy approaches. Each neighbouring geographic area is relatively well-defined and EU states have clear, contingent policy interests there. Africa is different. Whereas the nine states of the Western Balkans have around 35 million inhabitants with a shared history, Africa's highly disparate 54 states contain well over a billion people. In recent decades, intra-state warfare has scarred several regions of Africa. In the Great Lakes, Darfur-Chad, Somalia, and both the broader Sahel and Lake Chad regions, warfare has triggered complex security, humanitarian and developmental crises, prompting extensive multilateral assistance. The

historical context is similarly dissimilar: two EU states, the UK and France, created the boundaries of the majority of African states and retain, at a minimum, a paternalistic interest in their welfare. Paris, continues to maintain a substantial range of military and economic ties on the continent. Consequently, EU security policy towards Africa is necessarily complex, even before taking into account the ties of individual African states with major powers such as the US and China, both of whom have significantly increased their military presence in Africa recently.

Do the EU security strategies for Africa exhibit the characteristics of internal consistency or comprehensiveness? The short answer is no. This negative assessment is largely owed to the wide range and complexity of the policies that the EU undertakes in Africa. Certainly in terms of successive strategy presentations, common themes are apparent, notably those of ‘partnership’ and the promotion of regional cooperation *within* Africa. The latter occurs via regional bodies such as the IGAD in the Horn or via the AU itself. The EU invests considerable resources in supporting the AU Commission in general, and AU peacekeeping missions in particular. However, given the wide range of other EU actions, notably in the realms of aid and trade, cross-programme consistency is often lacking, despite the adoption of regional strategies and the appointment of Special Representatives. As noted both at the outset and in discussion of the impact of EU policies on the continent, the addition of a growing number of EU migration monitoring and control policies, particularly since 2015, generates additional contradictions.

Does the EU have an autonomous security presence in Africa? Again, the response appears to be negative, despite the fact that the majority of CSDP military missions have been in Africa, launched principally under the Petersberg tasks of crisis-management and humanitarian support. In most cases EU forces have intervened within a multilateral framework, most often at the behest of France. Indeed, the central political and logistical role

of France in CSDP military missions in Africa, such as in those in Chad, Mali and CAR, is clear.²¹

However, two exceptions suggest an emerging degree of autonomy from individual member state interests. The chapter has highlighted recent strategic shifts towards EU support for African security actors, via its APSA and APF financing. This has seen emphasis on the training of African forces on the continent, supporting AU forces in Somalia (AMISOM) and similar initiatives in Mali (AFISMA, from 2013), Central African Republic (MISCA, from 2014), and the Lake Chad basin. In all of these cases, the EU *has* emerged as an actor of some substance though in financial rather than military terms. A second area where the EU has established a degree of real autonomy has been via its pooling of naval resources in the anti-piracy patrols of EUNAVFOR *Atalanta*. Here the longevity and relative precision of the mission's objectives have helped create a degree of real operational autonomy and cohesiveness. EU naval patrols in the Indian Ocean, as those subsequently begun in the Mediterranean, also indicate the translation of the EU Maritime Security Strategy into practice is re-defining operational spectrum of CSDP tasks beyond those agreed upon at Petersberg.

Given the scale of EU expenditure in Africa, is the EU itself treated as if it were a state actor on the continent? While not unambiguously so in a security sense, clearly both its putative and actual capabilities as a humanitarian and development actor are globally significant. Thus CSDP missions in fragile, aid-dependent African states, alongside those by DEVCO or DG ECHO, give the EU a significant profile alongside other multilateral aid actors, including various UN agencies, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. In terms of its professed strategy towards Africa, several obvious ambiguities and specificities remain. While the notion of 'partnership' has been particularly prominent in strategy discourse since the 2007 JEAS, the idea that the term genuinely reflects a strategic

“consensus on values, interests and strategic objectives” (Tardy 2016:1) between EU and African leaders seems tenuous at best.

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Endnotes

1 While CFSP is the formal title of the post-Maastricht ‘pillar’ of EU foreign policy, in practice much of what is discussed here relates to Common Security and Defence Policy (formally a sub-component of CFSP). For consistency, the acronym CSDP will be used throughout this article.

2 In January 2017, over 80 percent of the UN’s 117,000 peacekeepers deployed globally were in its nine on-going missions in Africa. Figures available via:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>.

3 For example the EU-Rwanda strategy is contained in the 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme for Rwanda, available via: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pin-rwanda-fed11-2014_en.pdf. That of Ethiopia, covering 2014-2020, is available via:

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-ethiopia-20140619_en.pdf. While the latter opens with a paragraph on ‘strategy’, peace and regional security get only a perfunctory mention.

4 The ACP grouping comprises 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific states under the ‘ACP-EC Partnership Agreement’; 48 states are from Sub-Saharan Africa.

5 The EEAS also has a Gulf of Guinea strategy, since 2013, spurred by maritime and piracy issues. Also Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) exist for Central Africa and West Africa. The latter are available via: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/328/africa-and-the-eu_en#Central+Africa+and+the+EU

7 Mr Angel Losada has been European Union Special Representative for the Sahel since November 2015; Alexander Rondos, Special Representative for the Horn of Africa since 2012.

8 Details the April 2016 parliamentary debate are available via:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1432400&t=d&l=en>

9 Tardy 2015 provides a concise overview of CSDP actions in Africa. For other case studies, see Grevy, et al. 2009.

11 In November 2016, the European Council extended Atalanta's mandate to December 2018. Details are available via: <http://eunavfor.eu/european-unions-counter-piracy-operation-atalanta-extended-by-two-years-to-help-ensure-pirate-attacks-on-seafarers-off-coast-of-somalia-remain-suppressed/>

12 Styan (2016) drawing on Germond and Smith (2009?).

13 Details on Operation Sophia are available via:

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eunavfor_med_-_mission_14_february_2017_en.pdf.

Operation Triton, a second EU Mediterranean naval policy, is run by Frontex as part of EU Home Affairs policy.

14 These include the substantive US military presence; both AFRICOM's Djiboutian base and its extensive outreach activities. See Styan 2013 for the interaction between French, US and EU militaries in the Horn.

15 Details are available via: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/relations-eeas-eu-institutions-and-member-states_en

16 Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013: 31) note that the CSDP's budget is under five percent of total EU external relations' expenditure. This in turn is barely 0.2 percent of total EU expenditure.

17 Details available via: www.eucap-som.eu. Problems outlined in Tejpar and Zetterlund 2013 continued through much of Eucap-Nestor's lifespan. The revamped mission operates within the Horn's 'EU Comprehensive approach' alongside Navfor-Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), under the auspices of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

18 By convention the head of UN Peacekeeping Operations has been French.

19 The Valetta initiatives can be found via:

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/>

20 Details available via: http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/12336/managing-migration-effectively-hrvp-mogherini-reports-progress-5-key-partner-countries_en

21 The United Kingdom, both as the other lead ex-colonial power and the only other EU military force with significant power projection capacity in Africa, has by contrast taken a far less prominent role in either recent external military intervention in Africa or the EU Security strategy. The sole major CSDP role has been as host the Operational HQ of the EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* anti-piracy force. The UK has been active diplomatically over multilateral diplomacy and assistance towards Somalia.