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“Dance Like Nobody's Watching”: The Mediated Shame of Academic Publishing

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In 1987, Susanna Clark and Richard Leigh composed a set of lyrics for their country song, “Come from the Heart”, that have subsequently found a mass-audience afterlife in several internet memes: “You’ve got to sing like you don’t need the money / Love like you’ll never get hurt / You’ve got to dance like nobody’s watchin’ / It’s gotta come from the heart if you want it to work”. For academic scholarly communications, however, the well-known humorous Twitter persona of @NeinQuarterly (Eric Jarosinski) perhaps reformulated this best when he cynically wrote: “Tweet like nobody's reading. / Because: / They're not”.¹

Indeed, in recent years the open-access movement has sought to broaden the potential audiences for scientific and scholarly publications by removing price and permission barriers for readers.² This has often been rationalised through critiques of the limited readership of paywalled journal articles and expensive scholarly monographs that are disseminated only to academic

libraries.\textsuperscript{3} In many ways, the goals of the open-access movement are noble in their quest to ensure that as many citizens of the world as possible can access and read high-quality research and scholarship.

Yet, as Clark and Leigh knew just as well as Foucault, the belief that one might be being watched can trigger a shame reaction that inhibits practices, from dancing through to publishing writing, even though both are acts that intrinsically call for attention. In this chapter I examine a set of theoretical questions surrounding observation, readership, and openness for niche, esoteric research practices across a range of disciplines. These include: What behavioural changes might we expect to see in a world of mass readership? How does a new set of publics sit alongside emergent managerial practices at institutions focusing on public “impact”? And might there be a certain ‘shame’ that cuts both ways here: a shame at exposing our work to an imagined plurality of gazes that may misunderstand, misconstrue, or simply interpret the work differently to our authorial intentions, even while feeling ashamed at hiding our writings? Is there even a shame in the act of writing when one believes that the potential audience is disinterested?

As a launch pad for the work in this chapter, I take the autoethnographic, self-writing approach of Elspeth Probyn in her well-known piece, “Writing Shame”.\textsuperscript{4} Of particular interest to me here is the opening portion of Probyn's work, in which she writes of the shame of writing within an academic framework alongside the physical, embodied shame-response that she has in considering her own inability to convey interest to others. This is split in Probyn's piece across structural academic anxieties, self-nervousness about the relationship of writing to reality, bodily responses, shame and glory, the importance of proximity and distance, and the specific case of the writing of Primo Levi.\textsuperscript{5} While Probyn's work in this piece – and indeed more broadly in her book on the subject, \textit{Blush: Faces of Shame} – is brave and self-exposing, I also feel critical of how it disregards


\textsuperscript{5} Probyn, ‘Writing Shame’, pp. 71–76.
the *media* through which academics communicate, within a piece that is fundamentally about a shameful inadequacy of communication.

For if there is any truth in the assertion that the media is still the message, then it is important that we consider, within a variety of contexts of “shame”, how the structural elements of scholarly communications condition different types of shame. As Juliet Jacquet has framed it, “[e]ach time communication was transformed, shaming was as well”. For the niche modes that have historically developed to facilitate the communication of academic ideas have done so in a way conditioned by economic and material systems that drastically limit the audience for academic writing. If shame in writing is, as Probyn contends, “sheer disappointment in the self” amplified “to a painful level”, then it is much easier to be content with one’s self-performance if the audience for the work is limited to those pre-disposed to receive it well; fellow academics. Of course, there can still be shame in writing for peer review and academic colleagues; especially if one makes an oversight or gets something wrong. However, as I will go on to discuss, the fears around a broader, unknown public audience, particularly for some of the humanities disciplines, carries a far greater potential for the amplification of shame.

**Observation, Discipline, and Societies of Control**

Before it is possible to venture any remarks upon shame in academic publishing and readership, it is first necessary to give some definition of shame that could work within the scholarly communications context and to explain how it would be linked to observation and visibility, the subjects focused upon by the open-access movement. This is at least in part because, in recent years, shame has been tightly coupled to being *seen* within social contexts. Indeed, as has been noted elsewhere in this volume, Jacquet has explicitly defined shame as a fear of reputational

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7 Probyn, ‘Writing Shame’, p. 73.
damage through exposure to the specific, but historically mutable, social conditions within which an individual exists. Yet, for Jacquet, this socialized experience of shame is contrasted with guilt as a personal and unsociable experience, which she claims is a more prominent affective experience within a highly individualized society (drawing on the earlier anthropological work of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead).

If we acknowledge, then, that Jacquet's definition of shame as opposed to guilt is incomplete, but functionally well-suited to her project's goal of using shaming as a social-justice tool, we can still agree that observation has a role to play in the emotion of shame. Indeed, Deleuze's account of shame in T.E. Lawrence, for example, uses the Spinozean concept of autonomous corporeal responses as being linked to shame. For Deleuze's Lawrence, “the body never ceases to act and react before the mind moves it” and these involuntary weaknesses make the mind – which is nonetheless perceived as inseparable from the body – ashamed for the body. Most tellingly, though, these reflexive bodily actions that the mind cannot condition (in this case an erection) make Lawrence wish to “crawl away and hide until the shame was passed”, implying that the observation is here key. Yet the way in which Probyn extends Deleuze's observed bodily shame is also to frame shame as a productive force that can be seen through intersubjective interest. It may not quite be that “in shame we are reduced to being an object only for the other's jurisdiction”, as framed by Jennifer Biddle, but it does nonetheless seem true that, as Probyn puts it, unless you care about the an observing or observed object, there can be no shame: “only something or someone that has interested you can produce a flush of shame”.

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8 Jacquet, p. 9.
9 Jacquet, pp. 11, 36.
10 I also have extreme reservations about the positive spin that Jacquet puts on shaming as a tool for transforming corporate practices since the practice seems to me to more often be used to prey upon specific, often gendered, groups in the online space.
12 T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1935), iii, p. 188.
Alongside many other commentators, however, Gilles Deleuze rightly recognizes that “Foucault located the disciplinary societies” of regulatory observation, “in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” and that they “reach their height at the outset of the twentieth”. 15 The system of individualisation and discipline by enclosure, in other words, is a historically localized, not contemporary, phenomenon. Foucault himself saw this, stating that “[p]ower is not discipline; discipline is a possible procedure of power” and that “[c]onsequently these analyses can in no way, to my mind, be equated with a general analytics of every power relation”. 16 While this implied injunction against using discipline as a catch-all description of contemporary power relations has not been thoroughly heeded, Deleuze himself proposes a successor: the societies of control.

Societies of control, for Deleuze, are not like disciplinary societies. Where disciplinary societies must individualise by segregation, Deleuze claimed in 1990 that we are “now in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure”. 17 The replacement of factories (as spaces of disciplinary enclosure) in the contemporary West by “gas”-like corporations that permeate the entirety of society instigates, for Deleuze, a mode of control. In other words, the society may be open not enclosed, apparently free not imprisoned, but thanks to your smart phone your boss’s emails can reach you wherever you are. Schooling is replaced, in Deleuze’s societies of control, by a “permanent training” of corporations, a continuing professional development, in which the young are “motivated” to request such training. 18 From a prescient viewpoint of 1990, Deleuze successfully described the dominant power mechanisms of the early twenty-first century, at least in abstract terms. It is the open prison that matters, less the total surveillance mode.

Shame then may be an “experience of the self by the self”, as Silvan Tomkins put it in the 1950s, but it still is about that self “increas[ing] its visibility” in order to generate “the torment of

15 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 59 (1992), 3–7 (p. 3).
18 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, p. 7.
self-consciousness”. For Tomkins, this is located within a contemporary “taboo on looking” that acts as an amplifier of shame-humiliation affects. This focus on a shame affect engendered by surveillance and systems of watching also links to one of the core things that “theory knows today”, in the (ironic) words of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, namely that “[t]he bipolar, transitive relations of subject to object, self to other, and active to passive, and the physical sense (sight) understood to correspond most closely to these relations, are dominant organizing tropes” for theory “to the extent that their dismantling as such is framed as both an urgent and interminable task”. In other words, if we sit within societies of control with disciplinary cores, we should expect the taboo on looking to create a heightened web of shame, a network of internalised humiliation based on internalised societal norms.

Yet, before moving back to publishing, it does seem that the society of control is less effective than the disciplinary society. This can be seen by the fact that, when individuals do not succumb to the control society’s mechanisms of media for self-surveillance, a disciplinary regime is re-instigated. We still have supermax prisons that isolate ‘deviant’ individuals under intense surveillance by a relatively scarce number of guards in order to bring prisoners into line. Put otherwise: although the broader societies of control have replaced a mass disciplinary movement, the panoptic, isolating, and individualising mechanisms of Foucault’s disciplinary societies – supposed, we are told, to have vanished into the past – exist as a subform of the contemporary. What we actually seem to have are societies of control that house societies of discipline.

**Academic Publishing**

We can see some of these sub-societies of discipline at work in contemporary institutions. Hospitals have disciplinary teams, prisons have disciplinary regimes, and the university has disciplines. While

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the shackles of disciplinarity have been under threat from demands for interdisciplinary approaches for many years, these have not fully been shrugged. Indeed, as Alexander R. Galloway recently put it, interdisciplinarity has a skewed benefit away from a home discipline that usually takes an Other discipline and merely uses it, creating an asymmetric relationship of benefit: “[u]ltimately it comes down to this: if you count words in Moby-Dick, are you going to learn more about the white whale? I think you probably can — and we have to acknowledge that. But you won’t learn anything new about counting”. Medical humanists might argue differently, claiming that the hermeneutic approaches of the humanities could bring benefit to both medics and humanists (in the reading and interpretation of radiograms for instance), but many instances of interdisciplinarity are more of the type sketched by Galloway. The disciplines – which bring professionalization and specialization through isolation – are well and alive in the academy.

These disciplinary sub-societies also have strictly codified and, from the outside at least, bizarre sets of disciplinary practices to which the inside denizens must adhere. These curious practices range from the wearing of traditional robes and gowns to arcane graduation ceremonies but, I think, find an important locus in the systems of dissemination of research material produced by the academy.

Academic publishing is a space where intellectual freedom must be key and this accounts for some of the eccentricities of the academic remuneration system when compared to other endeavours. For universities are among the last contemporary places where researchers are paid to produce work to which they own the copyright and that they are free to give away to whichever publisher they wish. Peter Suber believes that a system like this may emerge in any advanced research ecosystem, since it gives a form of academic freedom to those who work beneath it. This

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22 And the debate has raged for some time. See, for instance, Stanley Fish, ‘Being Interdisciplinary Is so Very Hard to Do’, Profession, 1989, 15–22 [https://doi.org/10.2307/25595433].
24 Suber, p. 10.
freedom is specifically a freedom of researchers from certain types of market practice. Researchers are not dependent upon a market of selling research to make their living (although in many higher education environments, they are dependent upon a market of so-called 'student recruitment' through teaching). This freedom from the market is good for research, though, because it allows the investigation of niche and esoteric areas that would not find a large-scale market audience but that are important for the sake of knowledge.\textsuperscript{25} Long before the discourses of marketisation entered widespread circulation, the university designed structures for the production of speculative knowledge, even if such structures were bound within other elitist educational models of liberal humanism.

Such freedom is also important because the markets that might form in academic publishing are strange and not necessarily like other markets. Firstly, although the potential audience is small, at maybe 200-250 copies for a humanities monograph, the audience is somewhat captive. Because universities demand field mastery from academics, they must have read all relevant material. This means that the relatively small audience has a relatively high incentive to purchase material. Secondly, as novelty is usually a criterion of academic publishing, there can be little genuine competition between items. If an academic needs to read a specific research article or book, then no substitute good will achieve that purpose. One cannot suggest reading a different article or book since the research work within the originally sought piece holds a micro-monopoly on that knowledge. Both of these measures – the small but motivated audience and the micro-monopolistic situation – conspire to frustrate any price-setting mechanism of a market based on downwards price pressure. At the same time, these measures make it difficult or impossible, in many disciplines, for an academic to make a living purely by selling research work.

\textsuperscript{25} It is also important to add that various government and funding agendas can also have a type of market-like soft-power effect on the choice of research topic. For instance, the UK's 'impact agenda' rewards institutions with funding when they can demonstrate that the research work that is undertaken has resulted in behavioural change outside of the academy. This, to some extent, then incentivizes both a choice of popular research topic and late-stage translational work. Both of these aspects leads to a type of populism that is similar to a market-based system. However, the point that I seek to make here is that there remains, at least in theory, a system of remuneration for producing research in the university that is different to other spaces.
Yet, the problem here is that while researchers are free to investigate niche topics through their university salaries, even when soft-power mechanisms may be used to drive researchers towards “impactful” topics, publishers are not in the same position. Publishers must usually work within this unusual market, selling the work of academics to which they have contributed. For there are many different forms of publisher labour that stretch from commissioning, typesetting, copyediting, proofreading, (digital) preservation, printing, distribution, marketing, finance, legal, among others that must be remunerated. While academics may be more free from some specific market pressures to make a living, then, publishers are not. This is part of the reason why some have suggested that open access – in which researchers and publishers disseminate material online in a way that is free to read and reuse – should be paid for by universities; it would offer, then, the same type of freedom to publishers.

As a result of this strange market, the academic publishing environment is also somewhat twisted. The market, estimated to be worth about £10bn per year, is dominated by a relatively small number of players (Elsevier, Wiley, Sage, Taylor & Francis, Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, Nature), the most commercially aggressive of which makes approximately 36% profit per year, with the long-tail of the market dwindling to a set of smaller mission-driven publishers who sit perhaps only one lawsuit away from bankruptcy. This dysfunctional market, with a few very large players and a captive audience, whose monopolistic elements derive from the micro-monopolies inherent in the novelty that academia requires, sits at the heart of university-level research.

The Shame of Limited Circulation

As mentioned above, there are a number of reasons why academic material has limited circulation. The first is that research material is niche and esoteric, usually highly segregated into a disciplinary

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silos, and therefore often of interest to a limited number of parties. This is not to say that there will not be other interested audiences who should have access, it is to point out that the main readers of research articles and books are academics and students. The challenge, though, is that we do not have good evidence that this would be the case were there no paywalls to access research worldwide.

That said, in the Latin American context, where a great deal more research is born both digital and open, Juan Pablo Alperin has shown that 9% of access to the SciELO platform (the major publishing platform there) is by those outside the academy; the general public. Furthermore, in that demographic survey, 50% of users of SciELO were students, of which 20% were most likely still in high school. Indeed, more broadly, the “Who Needs Access?” site has made its mission to chart the demographics and stories of people who do not have access to the research from publicly funded research but would benefit from it. Among the categories of people they list are: translators, research organizations, small businesses, people working with the developing world, doctors and dentists, nurses, teachers, politicians, consumer organizations, patients, patient groups, amateur palaeontologists, astronomers and ornithologists, Wikipedia contributors, bloggers, unaffiliated scholars working into their retirement, professional researchers, independent researchers, publishers, and artists. In fact, even if only 1% of the general public wanted access to research material (a low estimate, as above), rounding a 2013 approximation of a world population down to seven billion, this would have been 70,000,000 people. Taking this figure at 10% and this 70 million becomes 700 million people.

That said, anecdotal conversations with researchers (particularly in the humanities) lead to denials of this claim. The biggest shame, I have been told by face-to-face peers and peer reviewers,

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28 80% of respondents who claimed only to having completed a high-school education also claimed they were undergraduate students, leaving 20% who were students but not undergraduates claiming the lowest tier: high-school. Alperin, p. 50.

comes from indifference and the fact that many researchers know that they are producing work that few will read. I still refuse to believe that this is entirely the case, though. Indeed, on the open-access journal platform that I founded and run, the Open Library of Humanities, the 909 articles that we published in our first twelve months were viewed 118,686 times (counting unique views). That is an average of 131 views per article, although clearly the spread is not even and what a 'view' really means (we mean: they stayed on the page for more than 20 seconds) could be divided from the idea of a 'reader'.

So the question that I return in the face of the shame that nobody wants to read such work is: how do you know?

Indeed, to deny access to between the aforementioned 70 million and 700 million people for research that we have allowed researchers to give away (in some limited senses) seems to be a shame. Sites such as “Who Needs Access?” are meant to foster a self-aware shame in academics and publishers through an amplification in visibility. As well as providing narrative evidence, it is clear that the site is meant to shame academics for squandering their claimed freedom. Yet the move to make research material openly available meets with continued resistance and scepticism for a variety of reasons. David Wojick, previously a consultant with the Office of Scientific and Technical Information at the U.S. Department of Energy in the area of information and communication science, noted in early 2016 on the conservative scholarly communications blog The Scholarly Kitchen that “I personally doubt that there are large numbers of people who (1) have the expert knowledge required to read and benefit from the scholarly literature but who (2) cannot find a way to access what they need”.

To the first of these points, approximately 40-50% of the populations of Canada, the UK, the USA, Norway, Australia, France, and Sweden have attended university and therefore almost half of the national populations have the expert knowledge required

<https://about.openlibhums.org/2016/09/12/the-open-library-of-humanities-year-one/> [accessed 10 October 2016].

to read and benefit from the scholarly literature. The second point is harder to query but centres around ideas of discoverability in scholarly communications that merits one further detour here.

With many types of goods, it is possible to know whether or not they are wanted before purchase. If I dislike mushrooms, for example, then I am unlikely to buy mushrooms. I must, at some point in my life, have eaten a mushroom to know this, though. This usually means that on one occasion I will have bought mushrooms, but probably on one occasion only. With research material, this is, again, not possible. Every single article or book is different and unique. I cannot usually have enough foreknowledge of an article's content and use to me to merit the $30 single article price or a yearly subscription in advance. There are, of course, other goods that are a little like this. Music sold on compact discs, for example. Except that usually record stores will allow potential customers to listen to the CD in advance. The same does not go for the micro-monopolistic world of research material.

The specific form of shame that is shaped within the context of limited circulation of research material here is of a political and negative historico-charitable nature. To understand this, we must properly conceive of education (and higher education research) in the Western tradition, at least, within a backdrop of a liberal humanist theory of education. Such a stance would see education as necessary for the creation of a enlightened population, capable of participating coherently within a democratic system. We see this continued to this day in several aspects. The first is the continued defence of the humanities system against marketisation using this very logic. Indeed, as Michael Bérubé charts it, recounting a letter from his Dean, “[a] traditional liberal arts education has theoretically affirmed the belief in the existence of a certain kind of knowledge or wisdom – as opposed to information, or content – that is timeless and universally valuable to the human spirit”. Bérubé does not himself hold this view, but there is something enduring about the

33 Of course, a range of other socio-cultural factors may also influence supposed 'market' choices in this respect, such as class, upbringing, unconscious associations and more.
34 Michael Bérubé, ‘Value and Values’, in The Humanities, Higher Education, and Academic Freedom: Three
liberal-humanist myth, even while humanists cannot claim this viewpoint explicitly “in good conscience”, since the anti-historicism and universality of the claim is opposed to most humanistic discourse.\textsuperscript{35}

More broadly, though, in the early twenty-first century, the collapse of the (nonetheless false) liberal humanist myth is at least partially linked to a history of charity law and its undoing through privatization initiatives. In most jurisdictions with charity laws, the advancement of education has been set aside as a legitimate charitable purpose. Indeed, in the USA, section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code specifies the “advancement of education or science” as a valid claim for federal tax relief and in the UK the Charity Commission has a similar clause.\textsuperscript{36} These laws are rooted in a history of “public benefit” that also finds an etymological and theological locus in the term caritus. Most importantly for the way in which education is framed, however, there is supposed to be a relationship of superiority of the giver over the receiver in a charitable transaction. Indeed, charity is often framed as giving to the unfortunate and there is meant to be an element of humility, or even shame, in accepting charity; at least under present discourse. Yet, religious organizations and universities, alongside private schools, are often charitable organizations that can accept donations or state funding. These educational organizations, claiming a public benefit, are now all but private in many parts of the world, though. The well-known descent of publicly-funded higher education substituted for fees and income-contingent repayment loans can lead us to question what the public benefit of the university might actually be.\textsuperscript{37}

There is a good argument that the continued public benefit of universities lies within their research function, even as teaching is commodified into an income-generating service. However,


\textsuperscript{35} Again, see Bérubé, p. 29.


\textsuperscript{37} For more on this, see Andrew McGettigan, \textit{The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of Higher Education} (London: Pluto Press, 2013).
when that research is behind expensive paywalls and largely inaccessible to the general public, this charitable history is demolished. Thus, while profiting from tax relief for public benefit, institutions of higher education can become shameful recipients of charity that are also unable to make good on any publicly available benefit. This is a shame of un-repaid debt. Researchers, of course, can change this through making their work open access. However, as I will now discuss, the combination of a symbolic economy and a shame linked to visibility often makes this less likely.  

**Shamed in the Public Gaze**

Let us assume, though, that researchers do begin to make their works publicly available. What are the risks here with respect to shame and visibility? What behavioural changes might we expect as works are made more broadly accessible? And what do tabloid media norms about certain disciplinary practices do to shape a space of shaming?

The first point to note is that open access has met with vociferous resistance from some academic researchers in respect to public access. Robin Osborne, for example, states that it is the case that (and should be the case that) “the primary beneficiary of research-funding is the researcher” and that “[a]cademic research is a process – a process which universities teach (at a fee)”. For Osborne, a Cambridge-based classicist writing about the humanities, the risks are that making the end-publication available neither captures the act of performing the research itself nor exposes the research to an informed audience since “academic research publication is a form of teaching that assumes some prior knowledge”. This line of attack misses the fact that there is a public appetite for research publications and a large number of university-level educated readers who cannot afford access. It also, though, strikes me as betraying a shame, centred around notions of observed norm violation. In fact, Osborne closes his piece with the adage that “[m]uch more will be downloaded; much less will be understood”, which I will argue fits well with many of the

38 See Eve, chap. 2.
observational-related shame paradigms that I outlined earlier in this piece.\textsuperscript{40} For there is certainly an intra-academic norm for reception here; what Osborne frames as understanding. The violation of that norm leads to a fear that research – especially from the humanities disciplines – will be misused and re-contextualised within a culture where it does not make the same sense. If that norm is more broadly held and the piece is seen as nonsensical by a broader population, it is likely to trigger a shaming reaction.

Indeed, there have been a number of occasions where various right-wing tabloid newspapers have picked up on research stories – often on the advice of so-called think-tanks – in order to attempt to ridicule and shame the research and researchers. Examples include the UK's \textit{Daily Mail} attacking research into human-chicken interactions and \textit{The Times} and \textit{The Telegraph} both running stories attacking research into “why cookies crumble” and “why don’t woodpeckers get headaches”.\textsuperscript{41} Of course, within a university context, such questions can easily be re-framed: “how are the musculoskeletal systems of woodpeckers able to withstand intense, repetitive shock without the onset of cephalalgia?” or the surely useful to the biscuit industry: “what causes particular disintegration of some baked goods over others?” These research questions, which are totally valid, are here taken by the press and de-normalized/ridiculed. By crafting a new norm for the soundness of research, through ridicule and humiliation, in order to serve the paper's and think-tank's political goals of cutting public funding of higher education, such news publications are attempting to use shame as a mechanism to de-legitimate the academy.

These examples of the popular press decontextualising serious academic research are often in the sciences or social sciences. However, the humanities are also at risk in an open-access world.

\textsuperscript{40} Osborne, p. 105.

Should the tabloids get their hands on various poststructuralist readings of literary texts – as one example – they would easily be able to cause a storm of ridicule and shame for the institutions and researchers that they targeted. Sometimes, though, this shaming comes from within the academy itself. The philosopher Denis Dutton’s “Bad Writing Contest” famously pointed to the prose of William V. Spanos and Judith Butler as models of obscurantism. It is possible, though, that such intra-academic shaming (also seen in areas of quality control, such as that in the Sokal affair/hoax) is more prevalent in a culture of closed publication, since there must be an element of revelation for the humiliation to work. Dutton’s contest held general public appeal because there was no way for the general public, usually, to see academic writing and the levels of opacity that such prose can reach, even if those writing, such as Butler, might claim that the opaque prose is more expressive and truthful than a populist writing style. Shame of opacity through revelation and exposure does seem to be a risk of open access.

In turn, this potential for public shame may prompt behavioural changes among researchers and universities. Indeed, institutions now employ press managers and public-relations consultants to attempt to manage the way in which work is displayed in popular venues. As such institutions become ever-more dependent upon donations from wealthy alumni, it is certainly the case that such management is financially prudent. However, researchers have become accustomed to working within a symbolic economy that is somewhat altered by an open-access world. What I mean by this is that the system of patronage that constitutes academic remuneration (where researchers, remember, are not tied directly to the need to sell their work to live) is one that is founded on a system of prestige. Traditionally, this is accrued by researchers who can pass the toughest peer-review procedures and produce the most, high-quality work, thereby affiliating themselves with the “brand” name of respected presses and journals. As with all of Pierre Bourdieu’s symbolic economies, however, those who can fare well in the medium of prestige can translate that back into

a salary in cold, hard cash through job appointments, promotions and more.

General public exposure of these venues (presses and journals) changes the norms by which academics are usually evaluated. When the situation is one of talking to one's peers within known contexts, the arguments can be nonetheless intensely fierce. When such work is re-contextualised to a broader public for evaluation, the standards and background contexts that are brought to bear on the work are different. This is why phenomena such as the impact agenda in the United Kingdom – implemented for the Research Excellence Framework in 2014 – have come under fire from various parties. “Impact” is here defined (loosely by the Higher Education Funding Council for England) as a desirable causal effect outside academia that can be attributed to the reach and significance of research outputs.43 While the panels that evaluated such “impact” were composed of academics, the evidence base that must be marshalled in order to score highly in this exercise must include members of the broader public who will not necessarily share the academic contexts within which the original research was conducted. In some disciplines, such as translational biomedicine, this is not so problematic. Developing drugs that can change people's lives is fairly easy to demonstrate, even if the original work was hard to do. On the other hand, the educational benefits of humanities research are often harder to slot into such a rigid paradigm. In any case, the kickback against this was again one of academic freedom. If it is necessary to satisfy a broader cross-section of the public in terms of impact then there are implicit restrictions placed upon the research topics that researchers may wish to prudently investigate.

The same can be said for open publication. It is not known what effects we might see from widespread access to academic research and a new set of norms forming around its evaluation. That said, there may be no harm whatsoever in insisting that the university speak beyond its own walls, in an effort to integrate an otherwise sealed academy back into society. In terms of the observational paradigms under which this might fall, I would suggest that the academy currently remains a

disciplinary structure sitting within a broader society of control. Open publication practice de-normalizes the disciplinary procedures via which research work is usually read and understood, extending evaluation throughout a societal totality. Of course, it is well known that if you want to change behaviour, the easiest thing to do is to measure the aspect that you wish to alter. In a society of control and open-publication, academic unease can often be expressed as a fear of shaming. For in order to know how to behave, one must know how one is to be evaluated. In a society-wide system of evaluation, it is far harder to predict how such norms will coalesce.

**Publish Like Nobody's Reading?**

In this chapter, I have examined two opposed sets of shameful practice in the academy, both centred around access. For the first part, I have set out the reasons why the current limited circulation of academic material can be considered shameful, rooted in a history of charitable education meeting a set of new technologies that reconfigure the labour practices of publication. The fact that the means exist to disseminate material globally at near-unlimited levels, but go unused, despite the patronage-like structures within the academy that permit academic ownership, triggers a type of shame that is akin to being seen to be hiding. The shame of being found to be trying to be invisible when one is nonetheless sought. On the other hand, widespread circulation of academic material recontextualises the norms of reception for a previously insular conversation. In the tabloid press, for instance, this can lead to challenging personal and institutional situations that do not understand the purpose of work. On the other hand, the broad spectrum of individuals among the general population who possess academic degrees and can understand research work is frequently underestimated. Indeed, the potential for shaming can be undone by researchers working for a better understanding of their own fields among wider publics. For it strikes me that as the shame of hiding is intensified and visibility is sought, the risks of public shaming will only increase. Academics must, therefore, work to foster norms throughout society that are accepting of good research
practices and to ensure that we can publish like nobody is watching, even when the whole world actually is.


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