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    Getting it right

    Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Getting it right. Philosophical Studies 166 (2), pp. 329-347. ISSN 0031-8116.

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    Abstract

    Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of ??getting it right.?? The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
    Date Deposited: 14 Jan 2021 11:53
    Last Modified: 14 Jan 2021 11:53
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20134

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