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    In defense of Veritistic Value Monism

    Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) In defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1), pp. 19-40. ISSN 1468-0114.

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    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence.


    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
    Date Deposited: 14 Jan 2021 11:52
    Last Modified: 14 Jan 2021 11:52


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