In defense of Veritistic Value Monism
Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) In defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1), pp. 19-40. ISSN 1468-0114.
Abstract
Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jan 2021 11:52 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:36 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/20135 |
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