BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

    Logical pluralism and logical normativity

    Steinberger, Florian (2019) Logical pluralism and logical normativity. Philosophers' Imprint 19 (12), pp. 1-19. ISSN 1533-628X.

    [img]
    Preview
    Text
    Logical pluralism and logical normatiivity Phil Imprint.pdf - Published Version of Record
    Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

    Download (217kB) | Preview

    Abstract

    This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I argue that inasmuch as pluralism draws its motivation from its ability to defuse logical disputes—that is, disputes between advocates of rival logics—it is unable to provide an answer: pluralism collapses into monism with respect to either the strongest or the weakest admissible logic.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Florian Steinberger
    Date Deposited: 21 May 2018 14:16
    Last Modified: 11 Jun 2021 06:30
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/21798

    Statistics

    Downloads
    Activity Overview
    379Downloads
    297Hits

    Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.

    Archive Staff Only (login required)

    Edit/View Item Edit/View Item