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    Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity

    Cowie, C. and Greenberg, Alexander (2018) Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In: Kyriacou, C. and McKenna, R. (eds.) Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 173-196. ISBN 9783319933696.

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    According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.


    Item Type: Book Section
    Additional Information: This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available at the link above.
    School: Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies
    Depositing User: Alexander Greenberg
    Date Deposited: 04 Jun 2019 11:15
    Last Modified: 02 Aug 2023 17:40


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