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    Non-propositional intentionality: an introduction

    Grzankowski, Alex and Montague, M. (2018) Non-propositional intentionality: an introduction. In: Grzankowski, Alex and Montague, M. (eds.) Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198732570. (In Press)

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    Abstract

    Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent the world. This book explores an important assumption about representation, namely, that when we represent things in the world, we represent them as having properties, and in this way our representations have "propositional" structure. The contributors examine what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; illuminate why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and consider ways in which one might depart from propositionalism. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of how the mind and world are connected.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Book Section
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2018 07:48
    Last Modified: 28 Jul 2020 09:43
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/21876

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