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Shiite Patterns of Post-Migration in Europe

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Abstract This brief reflection treats the reactive relation between the dispersions of (post-)migration and the integralism of religion in selected cases of European Shiism. It reconsiders reports on Twelver Shiism and Shiite Muslims in Europe in order to discern the main institutional and demographic tendencies in Shiites' European settlement history in Britain, France, and Germany, and to explore such settlement in light of mega-theorizations of European Islam that juxtapose 'integration' and 'separation'. The presentation focuses on Iranians in Britain and argues for the centrality of two complicating variations on the pattern: Integration-Retention (as in the case of blood donation practice) and Separation-Appropriation (as in the case of reformist Islamism in the *Ettehādiye* Society). Each type stems from heightened Self-Other reflection, triggered by migration and defined more precisely in terms of boundary setting. Such thought is double-scaled for differentiation (d) and reciprocation (r), contrasting jurisprudential treatments 'there' (+d/-r) and organizational engagement 'here' (-d/+r). Identity formation in European Shiism often involves the rebalancing of these elements.

Hierarchy is at the heart of the unthought (l'impensé) of modern ideology
(Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus*)²

In the European encounters of Shiite Islam, two sets of social forces have gnawed at its lived creeds. The first of these is the diversity of settlement trajectories in various Western European countries, with distinct organizational patterns, state relations, population build-ups and institutional concentrations. In a profounder sense, the status quo ante of Shiite communities has been challenged by secularism, cultural liberalism and individualism enshrined by law. The way that the newly emerging field of studies on Shiism in Europe has made its object is perhaps consistent with this context of formation defined by systemic diffusions. That is to say, studies of Shiism in Europe have tended to compartmentalize their object and, de facto, autonomize the parts. Following from the prescriptive

preoccupations of the contemporary human sciences, their subsidiary studies organize around lateral, cross-sectional and secular themes such as generation and authority, ritual and emotion, or gender and occupation. While often valuable, these contributions barely venture to interrogate the substance of 'European Shiism' – in unifying understandings, in other words, whether with reference to, for instance, intra-sect clerical bridging, cross-ethnic lay networks, interlocking organizations or pivotal discursive threads. Should 'European Shiism' be conceived of as a residual category, then, or as a signifier only 'floating' (Lévi-Strauss 1950:XLIX) over the centreless multiplicity of Europeanized Shiite life?

In order to explore these questions, or rather to build a case for their negation, this article starts with a brief overview of the main institutional and demographic tendencies in Shiites' European settlement history in Britain, France, and Germany. The article proceeds with selected assessments of Shiite post-migration, following the classic divide in migration studies between international migration on the one hand and migrants' incorporation on the other (Castles & Miller 2009:20ff.). These case-studies aim to help lay bare some of the elementary templates for self and other relations, above and beyond the local particularities of settlement context, in Shiites' engagement with Europe. They help substantiate a different conception of Twelverism in Europe, broadly rooted in the Dumontian structuralist perspective, i.e., as an integrative tradition which itself is generative of social meanings and facts (e.g., see Rio & Smedal 2008; Dumont (1966) 1980).

The two post-migration patterns to be elaborated below borrow their elementary terminology of integration-separation from Berry's immigrant acculturation model (1997), but are divided further into sub-types in Wimmer's classification of rudimentary (ethnic) boundary making (2008). The sub-typing has its rationale in the avoidance of hierarchical phrasing in the modeling of integration and separation, while ranking questions central to the selected boundary settings are significantly reflected in the Shiite-European acculturation here studied. The first pattern concerns balances of social *integration* and religious *retention*. In other words, seemingly opposed tendencies, which, however, may also go together in stable patterns (and correspond, for instance,

with ‘collective re-positioning’ within a hierarchy). The so-called ‘blood drives’ organized transnationally by young Shiites provide an eye-catching example. The second tendency shows the near mirror image of integration-retention: how even in organizations with an outlook geared overall towards *separation*, the local context may still impact on religious identity through its *appropriation*. The evolution of an Iranian Islamist student organization named the *Ettehādiye*, active across Western Europe in particular, is explored to illustrate this pattern (which corresponds with the boundary taxonomy’s ‘normative inversion’ of a hierarchical order). The caveat applies to this portrayal that it gravitates towards Britain-based and Iranian examples, even while signifying the larger European-Shiite situation.

The last part of the text reflects on identity formation through hierarchization in all sketched cases of boundary modification. The threefold task is to identify situations from which such hierarchization springs, to explore its scaling along the two axes of differentiation and reciprocation, and within that framework, to generalise on socio-religious roles involved in the formation of European Shiism.

The dispersions of settlement

The Twelver Shiite presence in (Western) Europe is recent and stories of Shiite settlement before the Second World War are typically of individuals. Among these were Iranian envoys between 1811 and 1819 of the modernizing Qājār crown prince ʿAbbās Mirzā (Green 2015), who are likely to have been Twelvers,³ but whose sectarian backgrounds remain unreported, and South Asian students to Britain in the late nineteenth century (Shubbar 2006; Ansari 2004:31-32). In the early twentieth century, notable Shiite settlers have included the Iranian intellectuals Mohammad ʿAli Jamālzāde (d.1997) and Hoseyn Kāzemzāde Irānshahr (d.1962). They lived extensively in France and Switzerland and published their respectively iconoclastic and reformist key works (the *Yeki bud yeki nabud* short stories collection and *Irānshahr* journal) in interbellum Berlin.

Three developments since - institutionalization, mass migration and religious dissemination - have affected Shiism's larger European story. Landmark institutions have included the Imam Ali (Emām ʿAli) Mosque of Hamburg, originating in 1953 from a building society of local Iranian traders in consultation with their religious guide or 'Source of Emulation' (*marjaʿ al-taqlid*), the Grand Āyatollāh Hoseyn Borujerdi. The foremost Britain-based organizations, as shown below, had similarly transnational religious embeddings. The particularizing effects of mass immigration are seen, for instance, in the association of Shiism's advent in the Netherlands with Turkish labour migrants in the 1960s and Pakistani or Indian migrants seeking either work or political refuge (Shubbar 2006). In the 1970s, Shiite seminary (*hawza/howze*) graduates from the Islamic heartlands started missionary work in Europe, thought to have expanded in the 1980s (see Sindawi 2007:846). But the main demographic and institutional figurations of Shiite life in Europe emerge only from the late twentieth century, and from country specifics - sketched here for the British, French and German settlements.

As the most globalised European country, Great Britain was from the onset a primary destination for Shiites' migration to Europe and has remained so. The bulk of the Shi'a is thought to have arrived from the early 1970s, with the Khojas' expulsion from Uganda, followed by Iraqi, Iranian and Afghan migrants in the late 1970s.⁴ By then, the *marjaʿs* Bāqer al-Sadr and Golpāyegāni had initiated The Muslim Arab Youth Organisation for Great Britain and Ireland (currently known as the Muslim Youth Association) and the World Islamic League or Islamic Universal Association (*Majmaʿ-e eslāmi-ye jahāni*), which were established in 1967 and 1974, respectively. Britain's London heartland evolved into a microcosm of Shiism – although not always, necessarily, its European centre of gravity. The virtual absence of transnationally interlocking boards spanning Dutch and British Shiite organizations, for instance, provides a counterpoint (see van den Bos 2012b). London's long shadow nevertheless shows institutionally through its hosting the primary foreign representations of *marjaʿs* since the late 1980s and early 1990s and since somewhat longer, the late 1970s, the Twelver Khojas' World Federation of KSIMC (Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities).

The Khoei Foundation, Imam Ali Foundation and Dar al-Islam Foundation, founded in, respectively, 1989, 1994 and 1993, have been among the primary foreign hubs of the late Abu'l-Qāsim al-Khu'ī (d.1992), 'Alī Sistāni and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallāh (d.2011). In terms of population numbers, the estimates for Shiites in Britain have similarly been without European equivalent. The numbers and percentages provided have varied widely but are usually within the range of 10 to 15 per cent of the total British Muslim population, implying 200,000 to 300,000 persons by 2008 and 279,080 to 418,620 at the time of the 2011 census.⁵

France has not witnessed Shiite landmarks with a global stature equalling the mentioned British or German examples, but Shiite institutions with transnational appeal or acclaim have emerged there. Among these, in 1994, was *Association al-Ghadir* in Montreuil, Paris, led until recently by Sadreddine, nephew of the late Lebanese Grand Āyatollāh Fadlallāh. Before that, a claim to Shiites' European representation had surfaced from the Iranian Āyatollāh Dr. Mehdi Ruhāni (Rouhani, d.2000) (Legrain 1986:8) who founded the *Centre culturel et religieux chiite en Europe* in the 1960s (cf. Camus 2004). While his brothers, the Grand Āyatollāhs Sādegh and Mohammad Ruhāni (d.1997), became *causes célèbres* for clerical dissidence in the Islamic Republic, his Parisian centre came under the influence of a Khomeinist tendency (Legrain 1986:20). By 1984, a network of Shiite mosques had emerged throughout France whose founding imams would reappear among diplomatic personnel of the Iranian embassy (cf. Legrain 1986:21). *Centre Zahra*, situated around Dunkerque and founded in 2005,⁶ attained national notoriety through its association with the far right activist Alain Soral and the anti-Semitic comedian 'Dieudonné' (see Thiolay 2009; Camus 2007:74). Related institutions such as *Fédération Chiite de France* have similarly profiled themselves politically, systematically defending the regimes of Tehran and Damascus (Frégosi 2014:233). In sum, the French context is very different from the British, marked by ideological oppositions between Shiite organizations and the statal order at large. Its demographic profile captures a different order as well, with estimates from several thousand – which is certainly too low -, to 150,000.⁷

Germany shared the coincidence of a migration wave and resurging Shiite religious activity since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Böttcher 2007:213) with the United Kingdom. There has been a degree of commonality with the British situation since somewhat longer, furthermore, as regards the main ethnic-national profiles of Shi'a migrants from the Greater Middle East and those of their formal organizations, which have featured Iraqi, Iranian and to a lesser extent Afghan markers. The main ethnic-national constituents of Shiism in Germany are thought to consist of Iranians (some 120,000) and Afghans (some 80,000), besides smaller groups chiefly from Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon (Mohagheghi 2007:123). Britain's imperial history shines through the large primary representation of South Asians, Pakistanis especially, among British Shiite organizations, but these were trailed by Iraqi and Iranian bodies, with 'Afghan' among a host of minor ethnic-national labels (see van den Bos 2012b:574). There are no apparent equivalents in either Germany or Britain, lastly, of starkly particularistic phenomena such as the Twelver *Karanes* in France, who relocated from politically unstable Madagascar to the Indian Ocean departments of Mayotte and Réunion (see Camus 2007:72). Two of the main Twelver centres in the Paris region, affiliated with the Khojas' World Federation, counted in the majority as *indo-réunionnaises* (cf. 2007:73-4).

The German setting contrasts the French and British ones especially in regard of the highly developed institutionalization of its Shiite organizational life. Whereas the mentioned French 'Federation' is one among several organizations pivoting especially on a single mercurial individual named Yahia Gouasmi (cf. Thiolay 2009) and national umbrella bodies in Britain have never bridged ethnic and generational divides simultaneously, the German IGS or *Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden Deutschlands* represented over a hundred '(local) mosque communities' (*Moscheegemeinden*) in 2009, the year of its establishment, while claiming in 2015 to represent 'over 96%' of all Shiite associations in Germany.⁸ While organizations under the IGS umbrella represent different ethnic-national, ideological and *taqlid* tendencies, moreover, it is striking that the IGS leadership thus far, has been Iranian, of the Islamic Republican kind.

Integration-Retention

Distinct country profiles surface when considering Shiites' settlement in Europe. When exploring what happens structurally in encounters of Shiism and Europe, however, geographical borders often fade to the background. To the foreground come boundaries of a different kind: those involved in the establishment of Shiite identity and organization. Specifically, the paradox runs through many examples of a Shiism in Europe that often appears socially integrative while also revolving around religious retention. This is a duality representing a distinct possibility in Berry's dispositions model of acculturation: 'integration' is the double affirmative on the two scales of cultural maintenance and societal relations (see 1997:9-10).

Two other positions on cultural maintenance and societal relations which are often involved in discussions of integration - that where the first is devalued and the second are emphasized, and that, inversely, where the second are de-emphasized and the first is valued - are 'assimilation' and 'separation' (see 1997:9-10). Neither assimilation nor separation is currently a dominant professed orientation among key Shiite representatives in Europe. Assimilation might show, for instance, in the endorsement of secularism as an enabling condition for religious freedom. The foundational argument has been heard since the 1990s from religious intellectuals in Tehran (Jahanbegloo 2011:16-19), but seems almost beyond the pale, ironically, in European Shiism's London microcosm. Speaking at the Shaheed Sadr Conference in Cricklewood in April 2009, Shelina Zahra Janmohamed exceptionally ventured that it was secularism which allowed for the construction of alternative visions, and that while secularism (culturally) was problematic for Muslims, it was particularly in secular settings that Islam nowadays thrived. Her comment served as a retort to another panellist who had remarked that the secular order of the West was taking away from the sacred, desacralizing what came into its touch, and negatively affecting the ability of Muslims to be religious persons. Active separation in the current era, as in the call on Muslims in the United Kingdom in November 2009 by Āyatollāh Khāmene'i's then representative in Britain, Āyatollāh °Abdolhoseyn Mo°ezi to quit the British

armed forces - service in Afghanistan or Iraq was 'forbidden by Islam' - is similarly rare.⁹ The tendency has been associated particularly with an earlier day and age, in the 1970s and 1980s, when trans-sectarian societies such as Siddiqui's London-founded Muslim Parliament (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins 2002) and the 'Kaplan Gemeinde' in Cologne (see Schiffauer 2000) thrived on confrontational Islamic supremacism. Among Shiites in Europe, these registers have often faded.

While the acculturation model provides a useful first orientation on integration, its definition is limited by mutuality in engagement and acceptance, the assumption of unambiguous values, and uncharted sub-forms (1997:10-11). The mentioned IGS, for instance, has been led since 2010 (Zentrum [...] n.d.) by Hojjatoleslām Khalilzāde, an advocate for Shiites' societal integration.¹⁰ His IGS profile fails to mention, however, that he is also a member of the Tehran-based, Iranian state-led *Majma'e-jahāni-ye ahl-e beyt* organization (e.g., see "Ta'sir-e goruhak-e da'esh" 1394/2016), whose main objective has been 'to gain control over the political, social and religious affairs of the Shii communities throughout the world (and) to centralise them under the leadership of the Iranian walī-ye faqīh 'Alī Khāmene'ī' (Buchta 2001:351; cf. van den Bos 2018). It may be more accurate, then, to conceive of integration in encounters of Shiism and Europe as forms of hierarchical rebalancing, more suitably assessed through the language of boundaries. Wimmer's taxonomy of rudimentary boundary making distinguishes initially between 'shifting,' either contracting or expanding definitions of group membership, and 'modifying' the meaning of boundaries (2008:1037, 1044). The first kind associates more readily with the emphasis on rapprochement in Berry's characterization, while Khalilzāde's apparent entryism resonates with the second.

Of the two main meta-positions on European Islam, one is deeply sceptical, underlining the failing integration of Muslims in Europe, often implying their separation (e.g., Tibi 1995 [1992]; Caldwell 2009:129-32, 108, 139), while the other emphasises integration and, especially, assimilation (e.g. Cesari 2003; Moss 2008) – where conceived sociologically as an integration sub-type (e.g., Schunck 2014:9) centred on increasing similarity (Brubaker 2001:534). As indicated above, the separation register has receded in the public discourse of Shiites in

Europe. Whereas the sceptics focus legitimately on religious retention, moreover, affirmative societal relations may steadily accompany cultural maintenance. Wimmer's elaboration of boundary modification is instructive to further scratch the surface of such 'integration-retention.' Where changing an hierarchical order ('transvaluation') is not an option for a non-dominant group, it may attempt 'positional moves' within (2008:1038). Such are seen, too, in several Shiite cases.

Many Shiite organizations in Britain show an interest in relating with non-Muslim others, evolving through a range of often ritualised exchanges. Among these are public *iftars* (e.g., by Gulf Cultural Club in Marylebone¹¹ and The KSIMC of London in Stanmore); blood donation drives (initially via the Islamic Unity Society (IUS) of Birmingham, currently the apparently de-localized 'Who is Husayn Campaign'); and 'visit my mosque' days (e.g., in the Hyderi Islamic Centre of Streatham, London and Masjid al-Husayn in Leicester). Other, ostensibly more secular examples of civic engagement are found, for instance, in Shiites' outreach to non-Muslim audiences for lectures or celebrations by an array of religious organizations such as Noor Youth (Moss 2008:45); in the officers of the Khoei foundation who held 'monthly meetings with the metropolitan police on police/youth interactions' (Leichtman 2006:6); or the spectacular design of Salaam Centre in the service of a diverse local community in Harrow, North London for SICM, the Shia Ithna'ashari Community of Middlesex (Dwyer 2015).

An assessment of these engagements cannot but realise, however, their state of exception – contrasting the parallel lives of Shiite summer camps (Akhtar 2014:33), elementary schools (see, f.i. Bdaiwi 2010), youth or student clubs (e.g., the *Ettehādiye*), elderly forums (see 'London Jamaat and CoEJ - Part III' 2012:19-21) and graveyards (e.g., Bagh-e-Zahra cemetery in Woking).¹² The plans for Salaam Centre position Shiites collectively in society, involving challenging outreach, community consultations and planning permissions (e.g., Royston 2010). Simultaneously, the Centre is aimed at integrating the outside world within its own religious universe, inverting the hierarchy of self-other relations. It envisions serving diverse local communities and functions (among which a sports facility and a nursery) but will not tolerate alcohol on the premises (Kirk 2007).

The second, assimilationist view holds later-generation Muslims in Europe subject to a global sociological transformation that sees their religious authority decentralised and religious practice or belief individualised. This portrays Europe as a hegemonic cultural transformer, in other words, which arguably fails, however, to adequately capture its encounter with Shiism. A different perspective surfaces when scrutinizing case credibility (cf. Tezcan 2003:257, questioning alleged individualisation in German Muslim case studies) and the containing variable hierarchy (where what meets the eye at lower levels of an organization may be encompassed at higher levels by its contrary (cf. Dumont (1966) 1980)). Among Moss's showcases for youthful, individualising British Shiism, for instance, was Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission (AIM) (2008:44), which recast Imam Husayn away from the battlefield as 'a symbol of love,' but from whose website also emerges disciplined message mobilisation for the Islamic Republic and Khāmene'i.¹³ Erricker described intergenerational tensions in Western Khoja circles, where 'authoritarian' parents did not connote 'authoritative' upbringing anymore, as part of a collective 'spiritual emergency' (2008:16-8). Their World Federation, meanwhile, has since 1976 presided over the global integration of regional Ithna-Asheri Khoja assemblies, retaining until today a leadership of mostly august elders and a collective orientation towards Āyatollāh Sistāni's *marja'iyat*.¹⁴ Individualisation in these examples is offset by and subsumed within larger structures of organization that show not later-generation assimilation but religious retention, albeit in contexts of integration, whether professed or factual.

The salience of retention is equally a striking counterpoint to the subgenre of assimilation literature that deems local political context decisive to Islamic organization in Europe. This literature gives explanatory privilege to national institutions (e.g., 'state-church regimes' (Fetzer & Soper 2005)), societal conditions (such as the variant strength of populist parties (Koopmans et al. 2012)), or supranational governance (see Parker 2005:2 on 'the EU' as 'a causal factor' for Islam's continental integration). The crux of Khalilzāde's above-sketches case, however, leads one in another direction, to suggest that none of the mentioned variables are decisive to profound religious organization. Three cases

substantiate the point: the transnational branching of single societies, replications abroad of organizational templates and *marja'iyat* recalibrations of societal order.

The Europe chapter of the Twelver Khojas' World Federation, the Council of European Jamaats (CoEJ), is in its turn the steering body for continental Khoja communities in individual countries and cities. It holds intervention rights to enforce conformity, irrespective of societal particularities.¹⁵ The Federation itself developed international relations beyond the confines of European Union interest, amplifying remnants of the Khojas' proto-statal religious functions on a world scale. These have included the commitment to help their entire community in Yemen resettle in Djibouti;¹⁶ the provision of religious aid and resources from Europe (Kosovo (Lachaier 2007:116)) to Iran;¹⁷ and country offices functioning 'as de facto embassies negotiating directly with a host country for passports and visas for its members or political and economic dispensations' (Akhtar 2014:33).

Irrespective of the variation in socio-political contexts, one finds intensive transnational collaborations of Shiite organizations in Europe and replications of their operational templates. The Head of the Islamic Centre of England (*Markaz-e eslāmi-ye Englis*, or ICEL) represents Khāmene'i in Britain (van den Bos 2012a:66). The organization is organically connected with other British extensions of his *marja'iyat* (in Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester and Newcastle)¹⁸ and in Europe. There are kindred centres in Stockholm, Vienna and Hamburg (Hesse-Lehmann & Spellman 2004:144): the English-named Imam Ali Islamic Centre, *Islamisches Zentrum Imam Ali Wien* (IZIA), and the *Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg* (IZH). Several of these Centres have rotating leaderships. For instance, Mo'ezzi headed the Viennese Centre before taking the helm in London (cf. IP/07/670) between August 2006 and June 2014. In 2009, Dr Rezā Ramazāni left the IZIA to succeed Āyatollāh Seyyed 'Abbās Qā'em-Maqāmi (Ghaemmaghami) as leader of Hamburg's IZH, which has 'played an exceptional role as Iran's ideological centre for the dissemination of Iranian-type Islamism among Muslims [...] in Western Europe' (Grünwald 1995). Moreover, the IZH and ICEL engaged occasionally in effective exchanges of experience, where '[b]est practices are mutually adopted' (Hesse-Lehmann & Spellman 2004:148).

In each country studied, lastly, whether ‘laicist’ or with an ‘established church’ regime among other models (cf. Joppke 2014:1324), key Shiite institutions retain strong *marja'iyat* ties - for instance, Association al-Ghadir in Paris through a family extension of Āyatollāh Fadlallāh and Husayniyat al-Rasul al-A'zam in Cricklewood, London, to members of the Shirāzi family.¹⁹ Such ties, whether ‘formally emulative’ or ‘sentimentally affinitive,’ may authoritatively define friend and foe *within* sub-state communities and *across* national spheres. In other words, such bonds bring their *own* politics, as seen in Khāmene'i's heightened campaign since several years against local Shirāzis - rendered variously under ‘British,’ ‘Londoner,’ or ‘MI6 Shiites’ (Azizi 2015) -, where simmering strife over *tatbir* ritual and religio-political authority, resonating from British to German environments,²⁰ is overlain with the foreign geopolitics of Iran-West relations.²¹

Whereas Salaam Centre was aimed only in the limited space of its self-funded private property at integrating the outside world within its religious universe, inverting the societal hierarchy of self-other relations, the three cases here testify to grander-scale practices of transvaluation, across and beyond sovereign national realms and European space. The ambivalent sub-type of ‘normative inversion’ (Wimmer 2008:1044) in the third case leads to the threshold of what can still count as ‘integration.’ While Khāmene'i's erstwhile representative in Germany, the Āyatollāh Qā'em-Maqāmi, has ruminated on mutuality and integrative ‘European Islam’ (Ghaemmaghami 2010) and there is no explicit call to separation in the anti-Shirāzi polemic, that is, the latter also asks of Muslims, in the voice of a foreign state, to turn on co-religionists, whether citizens or not, and declares null and void the moral order of the societies in which they are situated.

Separation-Appropriation

The lure for Shiites in Europe of Islamic ideologies devaluing external relations while emphasizing cultural maintenance has been associated with a particular historical moment, but important organizational representatives of ‘separation’

remain. As in the discussion of ‘integration-retention,’ Berry’s acculturation quadrant provides an instructive first orientation on ‘separation’ (1997:9-10) but is less useful as a guide to account for its ambiguities and defining sub-forms, which come to the fore in practices of boundary modification (e.g., Wimmer 2008:1044). The case here explored is of a long-standing Twelver society with an often sectarian attitude to ideological purity, which has mostly shunned outside engagement in Europe, but whose religious identity was nevertheless molded through local interactions in Germany and Britain. The organization typifies the post-migration pattern of ‘separation-appropriation,’ in other words, which both resembles and contrasts ‘integration-retention’ in this puzzle of Shiism in Europe.

The Union of Islamic Students Associations (In Europe) or *Ettehādiye-ye anjomanhā-ye eslāmi-ye dāneshjuyān dar Orupā* (from here: UISA or *Ettehādiye*) has modest local origins but now stretches from France to Ukraine and testifies to salient religio-political evolution. Before moving to West-Germany for study, the *Ettehādiye* initiators Mostafā Haqiqi and Asadollāh Khāledi had participated in the sessions of Sheikh Halabi (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:349), the founder of the ultraconservative Anti-Bahā’i Society in Iran. In Germany, the students added a robust political accent to this original orientation, surfacing, for instance, during a six-day hunger strike in front of a courtroom in Hanover, protesting Khomeini’s exile to Turkey in 1964 (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:98). The *Ettehādiye* held its first gathering in March 1966 in Giessen, in the federal state of Hesse (see UISA [...] 2008; cf. Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:48-9) and developed into ‘the loudest voice of the Islamic movement of Iran abroad’ (Beheshti, 1386/2007-2008:10ff.).

The advancing Persian-language documentation of their movement, some of it cited above, does not signal orders from abroad and it appears that the seven founding students in Germany took the initiative for the *Ettehādiye* by themselves. An obvious clue in what distinguished the European UISA and its American parallel organization from Islamic Student Associations in Iran involved not pro-clericalism or anti-Westernism but the fact that the former had been more overtly political ‘from their very inception’ (see Algar 1987:81). While Islamic student organization, whether or not it conceived of itself as political, was under state

pressure in Iran (1987:81), moreover, Iranian student organizers faced few obstacles in the West - despite their targeting of an allied regime. For the Iranian expatriates in the *Ettehādiye*, it was the liberal German state and society which provided their brand of Shiite political activism with, in terms of social movement theory, a conducive 'political opportunity structure' (e.g., cf. Wiktorowicz 2004).

The students liaised with Khomeini and other Shiite activists such as Musā al-Sadr, the Shiite cleric of Iranian descent in Lebanon, through Sādeq Tabātabā'i (d.2015). Tabātabā'i was Sadr's first cousin and his mediation was further facilitated, one speculates, through descent from a highly respected religious family in Qom, in addition to the marriage of Khomeini's son Ahmad to his sister Fāteme in 1969 ("Khānevāde [...] 1386/2008) . The *Ettehādiye*'s relation with Khomeini, in other words, was 'indigenous.' Vital to their incorporation into the Khomeinist orbit, however, was the revolutionary cleric Mohammad Beheshti, since 1969 their 'ideological advisor' (*moshāver-e ide'olozhik*) (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:43-4, 47-8, 63, 70), who urged the students to strive for a world Islamic order (see Beheshti 1386/2007-2008:16-17, 30). By 1970, the *Ettehādiye* had branched out beyond Germany, with chapters in Paris, Brussels, and London.

During the 1978-9 revolution, the *Ettehādiye* turned up the level of its activism. After Khomeini's entry into Paris in October 1978 they started publicity campaigns in over 25 European cities to expose the Shah's regime through lectures and exhibitions about events in Iran, among which 'Black Friday' - the killing of dozens of anti-regime demonstrators on Tehran's Jaleh (Zhāle) Square on 8 September 1978 (see Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:128). Numerous members of the London *anjoman*, reportedly, went back to Iran when the revolution unfolded (Kanoon Towhid ISA-London, Kanoon Towhid ISA-London 2008). Tabātabā'i, the *Ettehādiye* prominent from the German realm, accompanied Khomeini on his return to Tehran in February 1979 and was appointed as the spokesman of the provisional government (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8:128). After the revolution, many 'former members [of the European and American Unions] rose to positions of prominence in the Islamic Republic' (Algar 1987:82).

After the revolution, the E^tt^eh^ādⁱy^e remained in the public eye. For instance, they were involved in organizing the yearly Qods Day demonstrations in European cities,²² Berlin and London in particular. (These had been called by Khomeini in August 1979 to decry Zionism and non-Muslim rule over Palestine. French authorities banned the first Jerusalem Day in Paris, which had been initiated by anti-Israel groups to take place in 2008). By the same token, the E^tt^eh^ādⁱy^e played a part in events in London in April 1980 surrounding the seizure of the Iranian embassy by Ahvazi separatists. Two of ‘the martyrs of Kanoon-e Towhid London,’ one of whom an affiliate of the London *anjoman*, had worked at the Embassy and were killed by the hostage-takers. A UISA flag covered the coffins of their repatriated bodies in Tehran (Nurafzā 2005).²³ In 1989, the E^tt^eh^ādⁱy^e issued a statement declaring that all would be done to effectuate Khomeini’s *fatvā* against Salman Rushdie, which led to the deportation of UISA members from Britain.²⁴ Their organizers in Germany, too, collaborated with Iran’s overseas operations, including those of the Mykonos affair in Berlin.²⁵

The firm regimist orientation of the E^tt^eh^ādⁱy^e is reflected in the structure of their organization. The Islamic Republic affects the UISA most visibly through a ‘Representative’ (*nemāyande*) dispatched from Iran. During Khomeini’s lifetime, Āyatollāh Mohi’eddin Fāzel-Harandi was appointed by the former’s deputy, Āyatollāh Hoseyn ‘Ali Montazeri, as ‘Representative for [the] Affairs of Iranian Students Abroad’ (cf. Iran Almanac 2008) and as the Islamic Republic’s Representative in the E^tt^eh^ādⁱy^e.²⁶ The UISA, in turn, has a ‘Representative of the Union in Tehran’.²⁷ After Khomeini’s demise, and reportedly, immediately after his assumption of office, Supreme Leader Khāmene’i appointed a new Representative to the UISA, reflecting old ties: Beheshti’s son-in-law, Hojjatoleslām Dr. Javād Ezhe’i.²⁸ Ezhe’i remains the ‘Representative of the Leader in the Union’ (*nemāyande-ye maqām-e rahbari dar ettehādiye*) to the present day.²⁹

After the revolution, Iranian students came to Europe on state studentships that might be ended if they were deemed insufficiently deferential.³⁰ The message that unconditional loyalty to the Islamic state was required for membership was reinforced in speeches by embassy personnel in the E^tt^eh^ādⁱy^e. Iran’s ambassador

to France, for instance, Dr. ʿAli Āhāni, conveyed this message at the annual gathering in October 2006 of the French Islamic student associations.³¹ In Britain, the Iranian state purchased the so-called Hammersmith ‘Imāmbāra,’ after which, in 1984, it became known as ‘Kanoon Towhid’ - the Eṭteḥādiye’s flagship building. Many of their additional British gathering places (e.g., in Cardiff, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle) were also owned by the Islamic Republic.³² Thus, while the *Eṭteḥādiye* was a vanguard of Shiite Islamism before the revolution, afterwards they related to the Islamic state as a Western extension.

Despite the UISA’s championing of regimist orthodoxies, the evolution of the organization has been more complex than their dependencies suggest. An internal briefing shows that space had also emerged for the critique of the Islamic state. Divisions came to the fore from the mid-1990s, when the religious reform movement came up in Iran, over the Kanoon Towhid lectures of the reformist former regime ideologue ʿAbdolkarim Soroush. In June 1996, the British branch stated their duty to ‘dissociate’ (*tabarrā*) themselves from Soroush - i.e., a practice usually reserved for the cursing of the enemies of the Ahl-e Beyt - in light of Khomeini’s call to ‘be a supporter of *velāyat-e faqih* so that harm will not come to our country’ (UISA-UK1375/1996). By then, however, Kanoon Towhid was a relatively liberal island in the organization, visited by key reformists such as the imminent president’s brother, Mohammad-Rezā.³³ In the late 1990s, reformist students obtained President Khātami’s consent for a yearly salutation to the UISA, in an apparent attempt to countervail the Leader’s annual message.³⁴ Reformists were at the helm of the Eṭteḥādiye from 1999 until into the Ahmadinezhād era.³⁵

Kanoon Towhid’s vanguardist role was enabled by its longstanding relation with Soroush in preceding decades, and the latter’s encounter with Western thought, especially that of Popper and Popperians - their epistemological as well as political writings (see Paya 2003:57). Soroush’s lectures in Kanoon Towhid were later published in Iran,³⁶ feeding into the Shiite reformism of political Islam. A similar point applies to Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari in Hamburg, who was, like Beheshti before him, an ideological advisor of the Eṭteḥādiye. A hard-line modernist at first, who presented ‘Weststruckness’ as ‘a dangerous illness’ to

the Iranian Islamist students in Germany (Bāqer-Nezhād 1386/2007-8 91, 211), he changed course by relating *kalām* to Western oeuvres such as Karl Rahner's, undermining Islamic Republican political *feqh* (see Arjomand 2003). Mojtahed-Shabestari's reformist hermeneutics led him to reject the Islamist state in Iran and, by the 1990s, explicitly embrace liberal citizenship (Badamchi 2017:63-4; 74ff.).

The London front of the Ettehādiye presaged the religious reform movement in Iran, which is reminiscent of the organization's role in propagating political Islam before the revolution. The European setting in both cases provided the UISA with extraterritorial outposts: safe havens in which ideological-identitarian orientations could gather strength that would in a later phase enter the political centre stage in Iran. Within the organization proper, however, the 'public declaration of the hidden transcript' (Scott 1990:202-27) remained an act of insubordination within systemic bandwidth. The backlash to its critiques of despotic conduct, interviews with associates show, caused *innere Emigration*, but they do not indicate secession for counter-organization. This suggests, beyond downright repression, the remnants of legitimacy for the reformists of the Islamist state project in Iran.

It remains to typify Shiite-European encounters in the evolution of the Ettehādiye. The organization's reformist interlude represented a softening of 'separation' - a relaxation of identitarian rigidity and a greater preparedness to engage with outsiders. These recalibrations, however, did not evolve into the integrative repertoires noted in other European organizations of Shiism - e.g., public *iftars*, blood donation drives, or outreach to non-Muslim audiences. The subordinate 'appropriation' process in the core of these recalibrations, however, would not be duly acknowledged either in the acculturation idiom of cultural self-detachment. The ambiguity of 'separation-appropriation' does stabilise into a post-migration pattern when conceiving of the Ettehādiye as a hierarchy of values resulting from practices, internal as well as external, of boundary modification.

The pre-revolutionary situation of the Ettehādiye was defined by its independent organization in liberal, lightly policed European states, which developed anti-Western, Shiite identitarian ideology. Its subsequent incorporation into the Islamic Republic changed the organization's authority flow, now running

East-West, and imposed narrowed regimist boundaries on its Shiite identity. Its Leader-oriented hierarchical order, nonetheless, saw 'normative inversion' (Wimmer 2008:1044), inspired, in Europe, by varieties of Western thought, aiding to the critique of the Islamic Republic. Unlike the case of the anti-Shirāzi polemic that was projected onto an external world in order to transform it, however, the 'transvaluation' of the incorporated organization remained internal and contained.

Shiite-European Hierarchizations

The last rudimentary part of this reflection is concerned with the hierarchizations that recur in all sketched cases of boundary modification. The threefold aim is to identify situations from which hierarchization springs, to explore its scaling along the two axes of differentiation and reciprocation, and within that framework, to generalise on socio-religious roles involved in the formation of European Shiism.

At the outset is the observation that encounters of Shiism and Europe provoke questions of relative order, similar to those in Bowen's case of Muslims' marriage in French secular city halls. *Maqāsid* ('purposes') reasoning justifies it by scripture's objective - 'to make marriage a stable contract,' in this example - but in so doing, defines the Republican space as Islamic (see 2010:155), inverting the overt value hierarchization of a Western state institution (cf. Joppke 2014:1330).

Increasing or intensified religiosity has been theorised as a significant Muslim response to perceived exclusion in Western settings (e.g. Connor 2010:394; Voas & Fleischmann 2012:532), but for 'reactive religiosity' more generally to surface, Shiites' relatively recent, and often overlapping minority status in Europe - ethnically, on the sectarian plane (facing Sunnism), relative to establishment religion (varieties of Christianity) and in regard of an encompassing secularism - is sufficient ground alone. In the face of such complex, encompassing alterity, Shiism's challenge has often seemed to its adherents as one to remain integral (cf. Arfi 2010:237-38; Roy 2006:132-33 for 'purity discourse' in broader contexts of European-Islamic exchange), which has implied simultaneously, the necessity to

encompass 'Europe' (or Western identity more broadly) within its religious universe. In other words, the European migration context itself, or the mere idea of it, has often triggered heightened reflection in Shiism, on self-other relations.

'Hierarchy' in the Dumontian tradition is an infamously intricate concept, applied variably, furthermore, in his own work (e.g., see Kolenda 1976). It is not to be taken as 'social stratification,' for instance (Dumont (1966) 1980:247-66), although vertical value differentiation is essential to it ((1966) 1980:241-44). Neither is hierarchy a contradiction of 'reciprocity,' whether in the Dumontian or wider structuralist anthropological understandings (e.g., see Lévi-Strauss 1944). Indeed, both reciprocity and ranking are involved in Dumont's foundational idea of hierarchy as 'the encompassing of the contrary' ((1966) 1980:239ff.). Among contemporary applications of Dumontian thought (e.g., Haynes & Hickel 2016; Feuchtwang 2016), one teases out processual meanings of hierarchy beyond holist ideas of social order, as a generative principle 'drawing in social matter' (Rio & Smedal 2008). Building on the latter approach, hierarchy is recast additionally here as a scaled phenomenon, i.e. with differentiation and reciprocation as its tabular axes, allowing one to assess and compare hierarchization *kind* and *degree*.

Readjusting the theoretical view on the vertical organization of self-other ideas to examine how hierarchization plays out socially, different elementary actor classes come into focus: starting with high religious authorities abroad, followed by their representative organizations in Europe, European spokesmen, the bulk of lay Shiite European organizations, and prominent Shiite individuals that participate in European public spheres in, especially, personal capacities. These are not cast-iron, self-contained categories, and overlaps are legion - e.g., in the case of Mohamed Walji, who has acted both as a Twitter opinionist, journalist for Press TV, and SICM board member. Most 'players,' moreover, cannot but relate in some way to the jurisprudential master discourse. Despite these caveats, however, each actor category associates with distinct registers, or register types.

Among the most dedicated Shiite *feqhi* treatments of emigration (Darwish 2014:84) are the well-known ones by Sistāni (al-Hakim 2001) and Fadlallāh (2004:191).³⁷ Although quite distinct in their overall tenor, each reveal a view on

Western Muslims generally that tends to oppose the West to Islam, conceives of each on different levels of worth and regards their interaction as fraught with moral peril (e.g., see al-Hakim 2001:39). For this reason, no conception apparently emerges from their writings that sees transformations of Muslim identity in Europe as legitimate (cf. Darwish 2009:103-4, 128-9).³⁸ Both, indeed, organise parts of their discourse around the key rubric of ‘loss of faith after the emigration’ (*al-ta^carrub ba^d al-hijra*), stated by Sistāni as a major sin (al-Hakim 2001:40). ‘Faith’ in these juristic discourses is defined top-down and East-West, tied up importantly with *taqlid* (e.g., see al-Hakim 2001:49-50). Fadlallāh’s idea of engagement was to make Shiites’ citizenship conditional on their creation of so-called Islamic ‘incubators’ (*muhādīn*), and on their involvement in local political institutions that would help defeat the West (see 2004:191, 1998/1419:123).³⁹

The hierocracy of Middle Eastern *marja^s* itself incorporates representatives in Europe, on the other hand, who may play down hierocratic reach while emphasising Shiite settlers’ smooth local convergence or ideational room for manoeuvre. The differentiation of identities, in this case, associated with collective Shiite self and native European other, is muted or remains tacit, while social reciprocation becomes better conceivable. The cases of Qā^oem-Maqāmi and Ramazāni were cited above, and it was equally striking in an interview with Israfil Demirtekin, a pivotal personality among Shiite organizations in the Netherlands, who claimed Dutch citizenship and Turkish descent and presented himself as a *moqalled* (‘emulator’) of Khāmeneⁱ’s. While he expounded on his adherence to unitary religio-political leadership in Shiism, Demirtekin also embraced his secular Dutch citizenship, paradoxically, with reference to *marja^siyat* directives, stipulating respect for the laws of the land (i.e., a rule of Khāmeneⁱ’s consistent with Sistāni’s Code). ‘I am now living in Europe, in the Netherlands, and thus [...] my political and military leader is first the queen and then the prime minister.’ (Which order was that of the Dutch Constitution, before the reform of 1983). But which would be his position were these sovereignties to collide, where ‘Āyatollāh Khāmeneⁱ would say X and the Dutch government Y?’ Demirtekin retorted with hypotheticals of his own,

consistently leaving his stance open, i.e., bracketing hierarchization - while it is the *moqalled* (that is, a category of believer upon whom *taqlid* is incumbent), central to the conversation, whose voice is audible between the lines. In case of colliding sovereignties, there was an excluded path and an elementary choice: 'I can't stay here and [at the same time] follow X, because: I've signed something' - that is, pledged loyalty to the Dutch state. 'If I wish to live here [I will be obliged to follow] Y, but if I want to listen to my *marja*^c, then I have to emigrate [...]'.⁴⁰

As the mentioned treatises diverge from substantive meanings of citizenship in Western contexts and ambivalence marks the statements of *marja*^s' spokesmen, it is perhaps not surprising to observe other accents in practical approaches to public engagement among many lay Shiite organisations in Europe. (It is not thereby implied, *inter alia*, that lay Shiite organizations would be opposed to the clergy - as emerges below). The cited phenomenon of blood donation, for instance, is anchored in different articulations of Shiite thought more amenable to a unitary view of humanity, as in the *Nahj ol-Balāghe* instructions letter 53 that famously speaks of others 'like you in creation' (*Nahj* [...]: 231).⁴¹ The yearly Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign was first launched in 2006 by the Islamic Unity Society (IUS), an ethnically mixed although predominantly Arab organization catering for students and young professionals in Britain,⁴² and is currently associated, in particular, with the Europe-wide and transcending *Who Is Hussain* [sic] initiative. Promotional footage for the Unity Society's 2007 drive (featured on its 2008 campaign site) hosted two prominent Shiite scholars, Āyatollāh Seyyed Fādhil al-Milāni and Seyyed Mahdi al-Modaressi giving religious backing for blood donation. Modaressi mentions Quran 5:32, containing the 'universalizing' phrase (cf. M. Pregill in Azaiez et al. 2016:109), often invoked in claims to Islamic peacefulness, that 'whoever saves one life, it is as if he had saved the whole of mankind.' Milāni presents blood donation as *isār* - altruism/sacrifice. Asked for his opinion on giving blood to non-Muslims, he adds: 'Nothing wrong [with] that, no' (www.ius.org.uk/giveblood-CAMPAIGN).

Compared with these words of religious authority, the emphasis has been more affirmative and societal in IUS statements. Haidar Abdali, representing the 2008

campaign, stated that '[l]ooking at the number of donations [...] this year, giving blood is obviously a sentiment that is growing in the Muslim community. It is a generous act and is one positive stance towards community integration'.⁴³ The IUS website mentioned in 2007 (and has subsequently) that '[t]he campaign strives to bring people from various ethnic groups together to give their valuable blood.' The universalising, ethnic and faith group transcending context is made explicit in the next sentence: 'Another reason that relates this act to [...] Imam Hussain is that the members of his group came from every walk of life and the cause he died for served the whole of mankind'.⁴⁴ The organization's National Community Officer Dr. Marwan Al-Dawoud, lastly, voiced the hope that through blood donation, 'members of the Muslim community will be more encouraged to contribute to British society and [...] members of the British society will recognize the Muslim community's efforts in taking active steps to participate'.⁴⁵

A last cohort of Shiite actors manifests itself in the public sphere on a mostly personal basis, while often attached to creedal leaders or institutions - as seen in the mentioned itinerant public speaker, scion of the Iraqi clerical family and founder of London-based Ahlulbayt TV, Mahdi Modarresi. They are a category only in the nominal sense, defined especially by their variation, although the place of Islam in the West often figures in their discourse. The sketched assimilationist and separationist positions at the Shaheed Sadr Conference testify to variations within the pattern. A third, integrationist position was taken by the community leader Muhammad al-Hilli, who remarked that he often came across Muslims who, when asked if they felt British, would exclaim, indignantly, 'British? No, I'm Muslim!' (Whereas there was nothing wrong, al-Hilli emphasised, with 'British-Muslim'). The bandwidth of such variation is limited by the fact that these Shiite actors often speak from settings of actual engagement, although sharp vertical differentiations and rejections of reciprocation exist here as well. The first show, for instance, in the fundamental censure of 'the West' by the Islamist ideologue Iqbal Siddiqui,⁴⁶ while the second are seen in the central London mothers who sent their daughters to an Iranian primary school on the Islamic Republican model that oversaw the *jashn-e ebādat* ceremony – an invention of the

Islamist state, marking the requirement for nine-year-old girls to permanently don the *hejāb* (Spellman 2004:156). Asked ‘if they were concerned that their children were not interacting with non-Iranian and non-Muslim children [...] [t]hey stressed the need to follow the Iranian state’s school curriculum’ (2004:157).

The sketched scale of hierarchizations with corresponding socio-religious roles is one among several cases touched upon hitherto that show Shiite Islam ‘drawing in social matter.’ The dispersions of settlement, then, have their counterpoint in organizations of Shiism as an integrative tradition that itself is generative of social meanings and facts in Europe. Among the other cases are the post-migration patterns of integration-retention and separation-appropriation above and beyond settlement context. While suggestions of Shiite-European reciprocity and common cause recur among clerics’ spokesmen, their institutions may integrate organically across European lands for an at times divisive spiritual leadership, as when friend and foe are pinpointed among local believers and foreign geopolitics conditions their citizenship. Even while the terrain affected its religious framing and leadership struggles, the Etehhādiye ‘contained Europe’ within its trans-European authority flow. While this essay, as indicated, is limited in its focus on selected Iranian and Britain-based material, the cited resemblances elsewhere of its self-other demarcations add to the case for ‘recentring’ the study of Shiism in Europe.

Notes

- ¹ [Author affiliation].
- ² Dumont, L. (1966) 1980. *Homo Hierarchicus. The Caste System and Its Implications*. Chicago [etc.]: University of Chicago Press, xvi.
- ³ Email correspondence with the author, 12 December 2016.
- ⁴ Interview Yusuf Al-Khoei, on <https://static.guim.co.uk/audio/Guardian/Islamophonic/2007/03—/21/Islamophonic21032007.mp3> (accessed 13 December 2016).
- ⁵ By April 2008, the Home Office thought there might be around 2 million Muslims in the UK (*The Guardian*, 8 April 2008). The 2011 census counts 2,790,800 Muslims in Britain (https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf, accessed 11 April 2018). The 10-15% estimate for Shiites is given, for instance, in a Pew report (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life and Pew Research Center, 2009, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population* 41).
- ⁶ See <http://www.partiantisioniste.com/journal-tv/pas-l-interview/marche-vers-jerusalem-apres—la-premiere-conference-yahia-gouasmi.html> (accessed 19 January 2016).
- ⁷ Estimates for numbers of Shiite Muslims in France have varied widely between Ruhāni's broad range of 120,000 to 150,000 (Durand-Souffland, J.-M. 1984. "Aux yeux de l'islam, la terreur est formellement interdite" nous déclare le docteur Mehdi Rouhani, chef de la communauté chiite d'Europe. *Le Monde*, 4 January: 10) and Camus's low measured 'several thousands' *en metropole* in addition to several hundred families in *La France d'outre-mer* (Camus, J.-Y. ›Les chiites de France face à l'influence iranienne‹. *L'Arche*, October 2007, 72).
- ⁸ *Die Vielfalt des organisierten Islam in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Die Verbände des dialog forum islam und weitere islamische Zusammenschlüsse stellen sich vor*, 2015, 47.
- ⁹ <http://www.euro-islam.info/2009/11/14/muslims-must-quit-british-forces-says-iranian-envoy—to-britain/> (accessed 28 October 2016).
- ¹⁰ 'Da es sich die IGS besonders zur Aufgabe gemacht hat, die Bürger dieses Landes und die Gesellschaft durch soziale, politische und wirtschaftliche Teilhabe zu stärken und weiterzubringen, ist es zugleich ihr Ziel den schiitischen und allen Muslimen diese Teilhabe zu ermöglichen' (Islamische Gemeinschaft [...] 2015).
- ¹¹ <https://www.azf.org.uk/single-post/2015/06/21/Interfaith-Iftaar-breaking-the-fast-Fasting-Spiritual-Moral-empowerment> (accessed 13 February 2018).
- ¹² <http://www.bagh-e-zehra.com/about.html> (accessed 13 February 2018).
- ¹³ See <http://www.aimislam.com/> (accessed 7 June 2016).
- ¹⁴ E.g., <https://www.world-federation.org/news/president-nominates-councillors-term-2014-201—7> (for an indication of councillors' age, accessed 8 June 2016); http://www2.world-federation.org/Secretariat/Articles/Archive/Update_Ayatullah_Seestani.htm (World Federation Secretariat message of 6 February 2004, referring to 'our *marja*^c,', accessed 13 December 2016).
- ¹⁵ Its Constitution allows the CoEJ, for instance (5.1.8) '[t]o coordinate religious schools within the Member Jamaats and through this to encourage and promote Islamic education.' Other stipulations conducive to conformity include: '5.1.9 To promote and facilitate the performance of Hajj within the Member Jamaats' and '5.1.10 To assist Member Jamaats by coordinating movement and employment of Aalims and assist in harmonising and standardising contracts and conditions of employment of Aalims' (<https://www.coej.org/constitution>, accessed 14 February 2018).

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- ¹⁶ <https://www.world-federation.org/content/yemen-appeal> (accessed 31 October 2016). This was only the most recent of several such Federation interventions.
- ¹⁷ After the Bam earthquake of December 2003, ‘plans were initiated for the building of a hawza in the devastated area, particularly to fill the vacuum left by the numerous deaths of learned scholars within the area’ (<http://www2.world-federation.org/Misc/History/>, accessed 30 October 2015).
- ¹⁸ Interview former UISA president, 21 February 2008 (for the Manchester centre as ‘part of the *marja‘iyat*’); http://www.ic-el.com/about_us.asp (for the Islamic Centre of Manchester, Islamic Centre of Newcastle, Islamic Centre of Birmingham, and Islamic Centre of Glasgow rendered as ‘the other Islamic centres’ on ICEL’s ‘about’ page, accessed 29 May 2017).
- ¹⁹ The Husayniyat generally is widely perceived to be ‘Shirāzi’ in orientation and specifically, has been directly guided by the late Grand Āyatollāh Muhammad al-Shirāzi’s son, Āyatollāh Sayyid Murtadhā al-Shirāzi (interview Sheykh al-Habib, 1 May 2009; cf. <http://www.cyco-online.co.uk/forums/index.php?showtopic=14324&st=0>, accessed 1 May 2009).
- ²⁰ For a propagandistic statement on Shirāzis in Britain, see <http://wilayah.info/en/ayatollah-araki-shirazi-circles-get-support-from-britain-and-saudi/>; for a German version: <https://archiv.offe-nkundiges.de/schirazi-gruppen-in-deutschland-und-ihre-agenda/> (accessed 14 February 2018).
- ²¹ E.g., <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-shia-shirazi-movement-secteria-n.html>; <http://english.khamenei.ir/news/4164/No-Shia-is-allowed-to-insult-Sunnis-Ayatollah-Khamenei> (accessed 27 September 2016).
- ²² Cf. the statement by a central committee member of the Etehhādiye, in Hamāyesh-e chehelomin sālgard [...] 1385/2006. *Āfarinesh*, 25 mordād/16 August.
- ²³ The UISA flag shows on a photograph presumably taken at Tehran airport that was appended to the cited internal document — further information on its provenance is unavailable.
- ²⁴ Interview UISA central committee member and communication director, 26 January 2009.
- ²⁵ One of the UISA leaders in Germany, Kāzem Dārābi Kāzeruni, was an organiser in the Mykonos affair in Berlin in 1992 in which four Kurdish opposition politicians were murdered (IHRDC Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 2007, *Murder at Mykonos* 7, 18, 25). As late as 2008, the British *Etehhādiye* omitted this fact while speaking kindly of him (UISA (Union of Islamic Students Associations (in Europe)), 2008, *Statement 42/1098/6*, <http://www.islamicsa.com/manchester/files/20080124-uisa-2008-programmes.pdf> (accessed 4 February 2008).
- ²⁶ Interview former UISA president, 21 February 2008.
- ²⁷ https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.uisa.ir:80/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=163&Itemid=1 (accessed 29 June 2017); <http://www.farsnews.net/printable.php?nn=860906-0727> (accessed 5 November 2008). The page had apparently disappeared from the Internet by 29 June 2017).
- ²⁸ See Interview Hojjatoleslām Doktor Ezhe‘i, on https://web.archive.org/web/2009021100121-7/http://www.uisa.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=58 (accessed 29 June 2017, first 20 January 2009); interview former UISA president, 16 January 2008.
- ²⁹ The most recent newspaper clipping I found confirming Ezhe‘i’s function was dated 26 July 2016 (<http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13940505000-189>, accessed 29 June 2017).
- ³⁰ Interview Kanoon Towhid central council member and activist, 8 January 2009.
- ³¹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20130718150123/http://www.roozneveshtha.com/2006/11> (accessed 24 July 2017).
- ³² Interview former UISA president, 16 January 2008.
- ³³ Interview UISA central committee member [...], 26 January 2009.
- ³⁴ Interview Kanoon Towhid central council member [...], 8 January 2009.

³⁵ Interview former UISA president, 16 January 2008.

³⁶ Interview UISA central committee member [...], 26 January 2009.

³⁷ Al-Hakim's 'Code' translates Sistāni's *al-Fiqh li al-mughtaribin*; 'Lanterns' is selected from several of Fadlallāh's works, among which *al-Hijra wa al-ightirāb*.

³⁸ Thus, Fadlallāh 'treats *fiqh al-aqalliyāt* from the perspective of universal Islamic citizenship and seems hesitant to recognize the validity of local expressions of Islamic identity' (Darwish, L. 2009, *Texts of Tension, Spaces of Empowerment: Migrant Muslims and the Limits of Shi'ite Legal Discourse*, 103). Although it is noticeable that Sistāni, focused especially on believers' inner fortitude, is less concerned than Fadlallāh with the faith-eroding qualities of the West, this does not imply relativism as to the definition of what constitutes faith (ibid., 128-9, cf. below).

³⁹ 'We want to raise, in the awareness of Muslims in the West, a realistic cultural movement to understand the background to the arrogant reality in its stance towards our reality. This is because the arena there (among the arrogant) may be more suitable for understanding the foundations of the stance of the arrogant who represent, in international politics, the decision-making powers, so that they (the Muslims) move, through this political observation, towards a deep and realistic study that uncovers all plans, methods and decisions which operate within the arrogant attack on our supreme causes. In this way, we can acquire wider knowledge that enable[s] us to reduce its (the attack's) dangers through a confrontation that has a counter-plan and clear view.' [addition MvdB] (Fadlallāh, M.H. 2004. *Islamic Lanterns. Conceptual and Jurisprudence Questions for Natives, Emigrants and Expatriates*. Beirut: Dar Al Malak, 191).

⁴⁰ Interview Sheykh Israfil Demirtekin, 17 October 2008.

⁴¹ 'Know that people are of two types: they are either your brothers in religion or your equals in creation.'

⁴² Email correspondence IUS National Community Officer Dr. Marwan Al-Dawoud, 23 February 2008.

⁴³ NHS National Blood Service, News Release, 28 January 2008.

⁴⁴ <https://web.archive.org/web/20070222151637if/http://www.ius.org.uk:80/giveblood/about.html> (accessed 20 October 2017).

⁴⁵ Email correspondence IUS National Community Officer Dr. Marwan Al-Dawoud, 23 February 2008.

⁴⁶ In his contribution to a London conference organized in the Islamic Centre of England by its affiliated Sun Cultural Foundation in collaboration with AhlulBayt Islamic Mission on 6th June 2009, for example, Siddiqui ventured that whereas the West continued to misapprehend Islam and mistreat Muslims, Khomeini had understood the West very well, and like him, Muslims needed to reject Western civilization, which was a system that stood opposed to its core values.

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