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    Independent agencies: hierarchy beaters?

    Everson, Michelle (1995) Independent agencies: hierarchy beaters? European Law Journal 1 (2), pp. 180-204. ISSN 1351-5993.

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    The business of modern government is efficient policy‐formation, regulation and implementation. In common with conventional Governments, the European Union may be facing a serious mismatch between the increasingly specialised functions of government and the administrative instruments at its disposal. Arguably, independent European Agencies might aid in combatting this mismatch, and in establishing efficient administration. Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome seems severely to curtail the possible use of independent agencies within Europe. Nevertheless, American constitutional experience may yet serve to demonstrate how this barrier might be overcome in the European setting: the development of novel and flexible means of governmental oversight might secure the independence of European agencies, whilst at the same time laying renewed emphasis upon traditional ‘constitutional’ principles such as the control of power and public accountability.


    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Law > Law
    Research Centres and Institutes: Innovation Management Research, Birkbeck Centre for
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 10 Dec 2018 10:53
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2022 12:36


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