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    Political stabilization by an independent Central Bank

    Salsano, F. (2018) Political stabilization by an independent Central Bank. Working Paper. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK.

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    The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the general interests of society.


    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: BWPEF 1805
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Monetary Policy, Central Bank, Partisan politics.
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2019 11:21
    Last Modified: 15 Jun 2021 19:09


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