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Political stabilization by an independent Central Bank

Salsano, F. (2018) Political stabilization by an independent Central Bank. Working Paper. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK.

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Abstract

The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the general interests of society.

Metadata

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: BWPEF 1805
Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Monetary Policy, Central Bank, Partisan politics.
School: Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School
Depositing User: Administrator
Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2019 11:21
Last Modified: 29 Jul 2025 18:49
URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26850

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