Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action
Gergely, G. and Csibra, Gergely (2003) Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7), pp. 287-292. ISSN 1364-6613.
Abstract
Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the ’teleological stance’ to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance – a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
Date Deposited: | 15 Oct 2019 14:33 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:54 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/29501 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.