BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

    Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action

    Gergely, G. and Csibra, Gergely (2003) Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7), pp. 287-292. ISSN 1364-6613.

    Full text not available from this repository.


    Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the ’teleological stance’ to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance – a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.


    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Science > Psychological Sciences
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 15 Oct 2019 14:33
    Last Modified: 15 Oct 2019 14:33


    Activity Overview

    Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.

    Archive Staff Only (login required)

    Edit/View Item Edit/View Item