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O, The Roast Beef of Old England! Brexit and Gastronationalism

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Abstract

‘Gastronationalism’ is the idea that there are distinctive and authentic national food cultures that are threatened by the forces of ‘globalisation’. It is a myth: there are no unique or authentically distinctive national culinary cultures. But the idea of gastronationalism is a powerful one that can have important political effects, as Brexit shows. In this article I chart the rise of British food with regard to Britain’s historical relationship with Europe and the EU. I consider how different understandings of British food culture – one more nativist, one more cosmopolitan – have played a symbolic role in the debate on Brexit, before considering the broader relationship between contemporary populist nationalism and Gastronationalism.

Keywords: Gastronationalism; food authenticity; food imaginaries; Brexit; populism

Introduction

In 1748, while awaiting embarkation on a ship to return him to London after a trip to Paris, the artist William Hogarth was detained by the French authorities at Calais on suspicion of being an English spy. Hogarth had been passing the time sketching a gate that had been constructed by the English when they still held Calais two centuries earlier. Proving his credentials as an artist (rather than engineer) to the city’s Governor, execution was averted only for him to be placed on guard and roughly manhandled onto the ship back to England. No sooner had he landed, Hogarth, already a noted Francophobe, set out on his revenge. The product was the painting, *The Gate of Calais*, later given as an alternative title the name of a popular patriotic song of the time: *O, The Roast Beef of Old England!* In the painting, the French are lampooned as scrawny and servile, huddling over bowls of thin potage while gazing on in awe as a boy lugs a huge sirloin of beef towards an English tavern in the city; meanwhile a portly Catholic friar pokes enviously at the blanket of thick fat that lards the massive joint. When the French came to call the English *les rosbifs*, a look at *The Gate of Calais* might seem to tell us it was borne more out of envy than scorn for the uniformity and blandness of the English diet.¹

Of course, Hogarth was peddling a myth: that the French had a terrible diet made up primarily of insubstantial and malodorous foods (most notoriously, garlic) and that in contrast, the English were made robust because of their love of roast beef and beer. Englishmen were corrupted and enfeebled by foreign food and drink (ideas illustrated vividly in Hogarth’s most famous pair of images, *Gin Lane* and *Beer Street* (1751)). In fact, the common people of France and England in the eighteenth century did not have significantly different diets, for the most part being based around starchy staples, mainly bread and after 1800, potatoes; if meat was consumed at all, it was more likely to come from salted pork or

mutton rather than from beef. The middle-classes of England were no strangers to foreign food – Samuel Pepys’s burial of his wheel of Parmesan during the Great Fire of London providing famous testament – and to foreign ways of eating. The advance of these ways became ever more pronounced in the nineteenth century, with elaborate home cooking and service for the bourgeoisie taking its queue from famous French chefs, such as Alexis Soyer and Auguste Escoffier at the Ritz.

Nonetheless, the kind of mythical identification of a nation with the food it eats and – as important, the food it does not eat but its enemies do – made by Hogarth has played a significant role in forming and reproducing national identity in the modern world. But as an important marker of national identity, ‘gastronationalism’ is relatively new.

Gastronationalism is not simply the idea that particular kinds of food or drink are exclusive to certain nations, but that nations possess distinctive and authentic food *cultures* that need to be preserved and protected from foreign emulation or assault. The notion of gastronationalism has come to the fore in recent times, associated with ideas and movements around cultural authenticity and food sovereignty, such as the slow food movement and the *via campesina*. In Britain, the idea of a distinctive British national food culture has grown up only in very recent times, indeed in a period that largely coincides with the UK’s membership of the European Union. There is an obvious irony here, but it appears less so when it is acknowledged that the EU itself has played a key role in encouraging the idea of distinctive national food cultures. At the same time, it is not a coincidence that the emergence of British gastronationalism has taken place alongside the flourishing of identity politics, and in particular a kind of politics that places *cultural* identity to the fore. In Hogarth’s day, food was often regarded as a marker of a *public* or civic identity; today food has shifted into the sphere of culture, both in the sense that it has come to be regarded as a cultural commodity to be consumed much like other objects of cultural consumption (popular music, films and TV shows, video games, etc.), but also in the sense that it acts as a marker of cultural (rather than political) identity. If Brexit is a manifestation of the ‘populist’ turn, then it is also a manifestation of a turn towards the ‘politics’ of cultural identity that has carried the new wave of populism. Brexit shows signs of how populism and gastronationalism go hand-in-hand.

The Gastronationalist Imaginary

‘Gastronationalism’ refers to the symbolic representation of national identity in supposedly distinctive national styles of food and drink production, preparation, and consumption. It culminates in the idea that there are particular national food cultures, or cuisines, each of which possesses a unique history.² Today, we tend to take the existence of national cuisines for granted – French, Italian, Chinese, Mexican, Indonesian, and so forth. These cuisines possess distinctive national dishes, drinks, and styles of eating and drinking, and we can test any reproduction of them according to their degree of ‘authenticity’ – the extent to which

they comport with a given, traditional standard of ingredient, recipe, style of eating etc. But any serious scrutiny of the proposal that there are distinctive and inclusive national food cultures, soon sees it crumble. Take Italian food, for example. It has become commonplace in the UK to sneer at ‘Spaghetti Bolognese’ because it is *not* Italian food. Nothing like that, it is claimed, would be served up in Italy. But in fact, while *spaghetti* served with a minced-meat *ragu* is unlikely to be served up in Bologna, across Italy a large variety of meat sauces made from pork, beef, veal, and even turkey, with many different kinds of pasta are served up. Each of these dishes is no more, or no less, Italian than the others. A great deal of time could be spent on figuring out exactly what are the criteria of genuine authenticity – perhaps authentic Italian food has to be cooked by Italians (but then are these Italian citizens, the offspring of Italian citizens, those with Italianate tendencies?) – but this would be a very academic exercise. As John Dickie has argued, what we know as ‘Italian’ food today is a recent historical construct: the history of Italian food is in reality one based on Italian cities and regions and the political and economic connections and conflicts between them.³ There is no such thing as an Italian national cuisine, and it is certainly not represented by pizza, a kind of dish far from exclusively Italian. In so far as we treat the authenticity of national cuisines in terms of compliance with a clearly stated set of principles that embody a national identity, it does not exist. There are no authentically national cuisines, only forms of cooking and eating that are *claimed* to be representative of national identity.

National cuisines, then, are contingent symbolic representations of national identity made by different people in different times and places. In the modern world – that is the world created out of the major political, economic, and cultural transformations in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards – the connection of national identity and a national cuisine has taken place in various times and places. But there are two things to note here. First, there are many nation-states that have not seen a strong emphasis in their own culture on the idea of a shared national cuisine. Until recently, Britain was one of these. Second, where strong claims for a national cuisine have been made, they have tended to be so only in circumstances where the question of the formation or reinvention of national identity comes to the fore. Looking back to Hogarth’s Calais painting, there is something of an irony that only a few decades later it was the French, rather than the British, who set the template for the modern notion of a national cuisine. The main vehicle for the idea of French cooking was the French restaurant practicing the art of *haute cuisine*, but as an institution this did not become firmly established at the centre of French culinary consciousness until well into the eighteenth century.⁴ But it did form part of the effort, in the wake of the French Revolution, to constitute a new bourgeois national culture under the aegis of a state that led the way in prescribing key aspects of cultural life.

We might conclude, then, that gastronationalism is a ‘myth’. There is no such thing in modern nation states (perhaps with the exception of some microstates) as a distinctive

national cuisine that is shared by all members – or even a majority – of the nation. There are, rather, only kinds of food and styles of eating that relate to region and locality, and that are mediated in diverse ways by class, religious, and ethnic identity. It does not follow, however, that the *idea* of a national cuisine does not have important effects on the character of political, economic, and cultural life within a nation. A ‘myth’, like that of a national cuisine, is best understood not so much as a false proposition about the existence of something, but rather as an ‘imaginary’. Benedict Anderson’s seminal contribution to our understanding of nationalism portrays it less as an ‘ideology’ – that is as a reasonably well-formed and consistent set of statements about the way the world is and how it should be – and more as a cluster of narratives, images, and shared practices that act as collective representations of the nation.⁵ This is what can be called an ‘imaginary’. Kinds of food and drink and ways of eating and drinking, then, can be seen as part of this imaginary, that which allows us to identify with other people in the nation even when we will only ever meet and interact with a small proportion of them. The consumption of particular ‘national’ drinks and dishes, and distinctive ways of consuming these, provide us with a given national identity.

‘Roast beef’ is an important element in the imaginary of British gastronationalism, not because it is today (or was even in Hogarth’s day) widely eaten – *per capita* consumption of red meat in general and of roast dinners in particular in the UK has fallen considerably in recent years. Its importance is as a symbolic marker of British national identity, but only in relation to that which it is not. Other European nations, of course consume beef but not in the style of roast beef – in France, Spain, and Italy the choice way of cooking and presenting beef is as a grilled steak (sometimes over wood and/ or charcoal) on the bone – *côte de bœuf*, *chuletón*, *bistecca*. British national identity has been formed in relation to a mythical other – Europe or ‘the Continent’ – in ways that extend to the imaginary of British cuisine. This is evident in recent times in the juxtaposition of ‘modern British’ restaurants with ‘modern European’ restaurants; how that distinction is reflected in ingredients, dishes, and styles of cooking is much less evident than the symbolic importance of the distinction.

How Britain has come to distinguish its cuisine from ‘European’ or ‘Continental’ cuisine relates to the formation of contemporary British identity in relation not just to its European, but to its colonial other. British national identity is a matter of the entanglements of Empire and the central role the country has played in the politics of the European continent for the last four-hundred years. The origins of British gastronationalism are, in this regard, international. But British gastronationalism, like British nationalism, can also be seen as a product of imperialism; Britain as an imperial project was pulling England away from Europe a long time before Brexit.

The Rise of British Food

The idea of a distinctive British national cuisine is very recent, only seriously emerging since the 1980s. Prior to that, although the term 'British cuisine' or 'British cookery' was fairly frequently used, no-one really used it to mean anything other than the kinds of food cooked in Britain and the various ways of eating and drinking in the country. The idea that there was a distinctive national culinary tradition was never really aired. There were certainly British cooks who had wide public recognition – such as Hannah Glasse in the eighteenth and Isabella Beeton in the nineteenth centuries. But they were considered, first and foremost as cooks and advisors on household management, rather than as being consciously taken as inventors of a British cuisine.

When we come to twentieth century reflections on the character of British cuisine, there appears a great deal of imprecision in setting out in what it consists. Take George Orwell. In an article written in 1945 in defence of English cooking, Orwell wrote that British cuisine was not simply, as often surmised, a poor imitation of French; on the contrary, for Orwell, dishes such as kippers, Yorkshire Pudding, muffins, crumpets, and Christmas Pudding, are distinctively English, and hard to find outside 'the English speaking countries'.⁶ Yet in another, unpublished piece, written a year later, while again providing a list of typical 'British' (not now 'English') dishes, he reports more extensively on diverse meal-times, table habits, and favoured dishes by class and region, demonstrating the arbitrariness of any claim for a uniform British cuisine.⁷ The widely-held foreign impression of British cuisine as distinctive only in the diversity of its dreadfulness continued to hold sway at the time of Britain's accession to the EU in 1973. But significant changes in the food culture of the country were taking place at this time, partly as a result of the exposure of the middle-classes in the 1950s and 1960s to French, Italian and Mediterranean cooking by food writers (and later on TV cooks), most notably Elizabeth David. There was a growing popularity of eating out in 'foreign' restaurants, principally Italian and Indian. At the high-end of restaurant eating, there was a continuing influence of French and pan-European chefs such as Michel and Albert Roux, Pierre Koffmann, Nico Ladenis, and Raymond Blanc, an influence that would later be translated into more informal, middle-range restaurants, and the broad appeal of celebrity chefs and cooks such as Jamie Oliver and Nigella Lawson. There was also a new informal style of eating pioneered by the 'Gastropub'. The first of these, The Eagle in Farringdon, London, had a Mediterranean-oriented menu, though, particularly in London, a number of the most well-known gastropubs would adopt a style of 'British' cooking associated with the chef-proprietor of St John in Clerkenwell, Fergus Henderson.⁸ At the same time, the 1980s and 1990s saw a growth in European holidays and travel. Common knowledge of the variety of 'Continental' food in the UK reached new peaks as did a growing consciousness of the importance of ideas about authenticity and 'natural' food in the face of the onslaught from fast food and global agribusiness. In no small part this was down to the slow food movement emerging out of Italy and France.

Nevertheless, the turn to Europe in the formation of British cuisine in the 1980s was of considerably less weight than the persistent influence of Empire. The consciously 'multicultural' character of British cuisine was a key element in its emergence.⁹ 'Multiculturalism' here appears not in the sense of a set of distinct and self-contained unit cultures, which would form a barrier to the development of a distinctively national food identity. There is a good reason for this: the history of food illustrates very clearly that there is no such thing as self-contained food cultures. There is widespread blurring of the boundaries between supposedly distinct food cultures that takes the form of shared ingredients, cooking instruments and methods, styles of eating, and so on. What is distinctive about British cuisine is the extent to which this hybridity was consciously highlighted and celebrated *without* abandoning some conception of authenticity. Authentic British food, in that sense, just is multicultural, reflecting the importance of the Britain's colonial heritage. In 1990s and 2000s this is the popular reputation British cooking gained, reflected in the considerable flourishing – and celebration – of hybrid cuisines invented by immigrant cooks, most obviously British Indian cookery (possibly Bangladeshi, but more on that below). Continuity could be claimed, in this regard, with the tradition of Anglo-Indian cuisine.

The late crystallisation of a British food culture in the 1980s and 1990s reflects a broader global trend towards the importance of food authenticity for questions of national identity. But this trend was carried largely culturally rather than politically, particularly through popular cookery books, TV, and later the internet. These were the vehicle for media-friendly chefs who actively sought to 'revive' British food traditions, such as Gary Rhodes and Rick Stein. What they were doing was not to orchestrate the retrieval of an authentic historic British food culture, but inventing it for largely commercial purposes. Of course, this involved drawing on elements of 'traditional' British cuisine, or more accurately, local and regional ingredients, dishes, and styles of eating and drinking. But these early traditions were not the traditions of a singular British food culture, contributions towards a distinctive national cuisine, but rather formed around distinctions of class and region. Orwell in his two articles seamlessly transitioned from a discussion of 'English Cooking' to 'British Cookery' without a hint of irony; how much more wary he would have no doubt have been of lumping 'Catalonian Cooking' in with 'Spanish Cookery'.

What Kind of Brexit do you Eat?

Debates about food and Brexit have centred on questions of food trade, sovereignty, and safety. But it is important to recognise that these matters are tied up in the sentiments of gastronationalism. For example, there are reasonable objections to importing chlorinated chicken from the US (post-mortem cleaning in chlorine tends to mask rather than eliminate harmful bacteria and it discourages farmers from adopting better practices to reduce levels of infection in their living flocks), even though there is no evidence that the consumption of chlorine at the levels present on chlorinated chicken is in itself harmful to human health.

But of course, most people object to chlorinated chicken just because it sounds awful: it is a symbol of a cruel, cynical, profit-hungry, global agribusiness that deals with a side-effect of one of its horrible practices by introducing another horrible practice. People may appeal to EU standards on food safety as a bulwark against this sort of thing, but at base there is a visceral response to it because of a long-standing aversion and fear of the food of others as polluted and poisonous. That aversion is overcome either by prohibiting the food of others or by incorporating it (usually, though not always, surreptitiously) into our own food system.

Here are the origins stories of two dishes that have vied in recent years to be recognised as the British national dish. First, there's fish and chips. The story usually goes that fried fish and fried chips came together in London (or perhaps Lancashire) at some point in the 1860s. Before this, both were sold independently, fried fish primarily by Jews in London (drawing on a tradition taken from the Sephardic Jews of Iberia of frying fish in olive oil), and chipped potatoes (drawing perhaps on the influence of France and Belgium) in London, Lancashire, and in other industrial centres in the north and midlands. Fish and chips became widely eaten, indeed perhaps even a staple, of the industrial working classes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, as with most dishes that carry the label 'national', the story of the birth of fish and chips is much more incremental and contingent. As Panikos Panayi claims, fried fish was first likely served with bread, then boiled or baked potatoes, before it came to be put together with chips. What influenced this course of events, far from any emerging consciousness of the development of a national food culture, were changes to the availability of certain ingredients, most obviously fresh fish, but also the considerable amounts of cheap cooking oil required for deep-fat frying. Important here was the development of a national railway system, the advent of refrigeration, and the increasing industrialisation of farming. But what was also significant was changes to working-class lifestyles as industrialisation became established. The regularisation and routinisation of the working day, the setting of a clear sexual division of labour in the household, and a growth in disposable income from the 1870s, were all necessary pre-conditions for the proliferation and commercial success of the fish and chip shop.¹⁰

In 2001, the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, pronounced Chicken Tikka Masala (CTM) as 'a true British national dish'. CTM is often held as a bastardisation of Indian cuisine, apocryphally said to have been dreamt up one wet night in 1971 in a Glasgow restaurant to satisfy the demands of a customer who had complained of the dryness of his chicken curry. The compensating sauce was produced by mixing the half-finished dish with some of the tinned tomato soup the proprietor was eating for his dinner, along with a dash of spice and a splash of cream. The dish may have been invented several times over, however, in the 1960s by 'Bangladeshi' chefs, even if Bangladesh did not gain independence till the same year of its putative invention in the preceding story. That qualification is significant. As Lizzie Collingham has pointed out in rebuffing modish dismissals of CTM as 'inauthentic' Indian food, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, and Sri Lankan cooking can all be reasonably regarded

as falling into the sphere of 'Indian cuisine'. But the crucial differences are regional rather than national: between Bengali, Punjabi, Gujarati, Goan, Kerala, etc. dishes and ways of eating. But there are also widespread differences *within* these regions based on locality, and of course India's religious diversity has an important cross-cutting effect on region and locality in the form of prohibitions on the consumption of certain animals, and indeed in the inducement of vegetarianism and veganism.¹¹ CTM is no more or less authentic as the dishes it resembles, such as butter chicken, 'invented' in Delhi by Punjabi cooks, but now eaten much more widely.

Both fish and chips and CTM, then, give lie to the idea of authentic national cuisines. They both stem from 'foreign' food practices, practices themselves that are the product of food hybridities. But it is the *symbolic* value of fish and chips and CTM that are important in considering the role that these dishes play in two quite distinct Brexit narratives. For ethno-nationalists, fish and chips is an authentically British dish, exclusive to these islands and the fuel of a glorious past. Fish and chips sometimes appears as the favoured dish of the kind of Brexit promoted by the nationalist right: ethno-nationalist, strongly anti-immigrant, and seeking the restoration of a cultural Britishness that is supposed to pre-date our membership of the EU. It tends towards the idea of economic self-sufficiency, not least in the area of food. We have plentiful fish in British fishing waters (which will be reclaimed after Brexit by leaving the Common Fisheries Policy, CFP) and we grow potatoes in abundance. The best fish and chips are fried in beef dripping and we have more than plenty of this available too. If we leave the CFP, then we are no longer bound by the EU fishing-quota system; we can maintain a policy of sustainable fisheries, but keep our stocks largely for ourselves, encouraging the development of a domestic market that looks beyond cod and haddock as the main fishes in fish and chips. But a fish and chips Brexit is sought not just because it allows us to be economically self-sufficient, but because it reinforces our cultural identity by protecting and promoting the national dish.

In contrast, a CTM Brexit might be thought symbolic of a hyper neo-liberal Brexit, advocated by those who want a 'Global Britain' contributing to the production of lucrative food commodities for both domestic and export markets but also prioritising Britain's trade and finance networks established under Empire, importing ingredients key to the national dish that cannot be grown successfully in our climate, i.e. rice and spices. It also acknowledges that, in terms of immigration, we need to continue to allow entry to people who are well versed in the ways of cooking CTM, mainly Bangladeshi chefs from Sylhet. Global Britain advocates don't want the EU dictating to us the direction of evolution of our national dish. We might still be eating CTM with Bombay Duck if the EU had not restricted the import of dried fish from outside the European Union.

The current division of the British electorate into 'Leavers' and 'Remainers' is largely arbitrary, but it reflects well the populist *zeitgeist* that suggests political identity to be a

reflection of authentic cultural identities. The problem, of course, is that Leavers themselves are divided by age, class, and region, as well as by their conscious reasons for wanting to exit. Some consider themselves as reasonably cosmopolitan and open to multicultural influences, and indeed may themselves be from mixed cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Pinning down the cultural identity of a Leaver (or a Remainer for that matter) is about as simple an exercise as predicting what kind of Brexit people want based on whether they prefer fish and chips or CTM. Nigel Farage is, after all, renowned for his love of curry.

Gastronationalism and Populism

Brexit has been widely portrayed as a manifestation of a 'populist' politics said to be sweeping the world. Whether this politics is indeed 'populist' is questionable, but it is undoubtedly the case that a significant number of parties and leaders in ostensibly democratic states have over the course of the last couple of decades turned towards more assertive and exclusionary forms of nationalism. What is distinctive about this turn is a move away from the kind of nationalism that underpinned the post-war international order – a nationalism of national economic interests obtained through intergovernmental compacts – towards a nationalism of ethno-cultural interests asserted against international economic and political governance. The contemporary populist's enemy is globalisation, but that enmity is not born out of the concerns that old-fashioned European social democrats had about globalisation in the 1980s and 1990s: that it erodes the capacity of democratically elected national governments to act in concert in order to promote mutual national interests in economic stability, social justice, and peace. Rather, the populist rejects globalisation because of its corrosive effects on cultural coherence, its withering of the *ethnos*, and out of a desire to retrieve an authentic culture lost in the pursuit of the interests of a cosmopolitan economic and political elite.

The UK has fallen into the wider pattern. Brexit was preceded by efforts through the 1980s and 1990s following the end of Empire, de-industrialisation, and the end of the post-war settlement, to re-invent British national identity. This culminated, first under New Labour and then the Coalition, in a widespread view of the importance of upholding British 'values'. But the idea of authentic British values is about as vaporous as the idea of authentic British cuisine. National food cultures and national values are both abiding myths; the power of such myths rests on the capacity of institutions to realise them through concrete, material practices. In the absence or decay of such institutions, populism flourishes by disposing of the idea that we require institutions for collective life. We simply require leaders who know who and what the people are, and how best to deliver what they want. Brexit was made possible by the deep distrust in our political and public institutions that has developed over the last forty years, but also by the decline of public institutions and spaces more generally.

With respect to Britain's (possible) exit from the EU, the irony here is that the EU itself has done much to encourage the myth of national food cultures and food authenticity, partly

through its schemes of geographical indications and traditional specialities. To be sure, these tend to mark out and protect local and regional rather than national produce, but the general principles comport with the notions of nation-specific foods and the authenticity of origins. Critics of EU ‘protectionism’ in this regard, fail to see how these schemes work alongside processes of neo-liberal globalisation in which value is added by branding and goods are made accessible to global markets (just as they are made increasingly inaccessible to those who produce and used to consume them). As Michaela de Soucey pointed out in coining the term ‘gastronationalism’, the EU has played an important part in its genesis. But that idea – as part of the emergence of a nationalist populism that focuses on cultural identity and integration – now threatens the future of the EU, regardless of the UK’s future relationship with it. As gastronationalism marches on, public cultures of consumption grounded in shared spaces of public engagement continue to decline or be commercialised and gentrified. Hogarth’s beef, remember, was on its way to the English tavern in Calais. Today, Brits loitering at the Gare du Nord find such commensal pleasures much harder to come by.

¹ Jenny Uglow, *Hogarth: A Life and a World*, London, Faber & Faber, 1997, pp. 464-7. For general reflections on the role of beef in the formation of English and French national food identities, see Ben Rogers, *Beef and Liberty: Roast Beef, John Bull, and the English Nation*, London, Chatto and Windus, 2003, and Christel Lane, *From Taverns to Gastropubs: Food, Drink, and Sociality in England*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018.

² Michaela de Soucey, ‘Gastronationalism: Food Traditions and Authenticity Politics in the European Union’, *American Sociological Review*, 75, 3 (2010): 432-455. See also Atsuko Ichijo and Ronald Ranta, *Food, National Identity and Nationalism: From Everyday to Global Politics*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

³ John Dickie, *Delizia! The Epic History of Italians and their Food*, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 2008.

⁴ Rebecca Spang, *The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2000.

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso, 1991.

⁶ George Orwell, ‘In Defence of English Cooking’, *London Evening Standard*, 15th September 1945.

⁷ George Orwell, ‘British Cookery’ (1946), <https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/british-cookery/>

⁸ Note the subtitle to Henderson’s book, *Nose-to-Tail Eating: A Kind of British Cooking*, London, Bloomsbury, 1999.

⁹ Panikos Panayi, *Spicing Up Britain: The Multicultural History of British Food*, London, Reaktion Books, 2010.

¹⁰ John Walton, *Fish & Chips & the British Working Class, 1870-1940*, London, Leicester University Press, 2000. Panikos Panayi, *Fish and Chips, A History*, London, Reaktion Books, 2014.

¹¹ Lizzie Collingham, *Curry: A Tale of Cooks and Conquerors*. London: Vintage, 2006.