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    Propaganda to persuade

    Yu, Tinghua (2019) Propaganda to persuade. Political Science Research and Methods , pp. 1-7. ISSN 2049-8470.

    Propaganda_to_Persuade_Tinghua Yu .pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript

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    I analyze a model in which an incumbent ruler designs a rule for propaganda disclosure that reveals infor- mation about her competence to her allies and opponents. A message that increases beliefs about the incumbent’s competence is considered as propaganda. I show that for propaganda to be persuasive, it must be limited in frequency. I also demonstrate how various features of the environment affect the fre- quency of propaganda. Propaganda increases in frequency as the incumbent’s allies become more depend- ent on her and as her opponents become weaker. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of the conflict of interest between both her allies and her opponents and the frequency of propaganda. As conflict increases, the frequency of propaganda decreases up to a threshold beyond which increased conflict is associated with more frequent propaganda.


    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Tinghua Yu
    Date Deposited: 01 Jun 2020 10:51
    Last Modified: 10 Jun 2021 09:38


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