Markov perfect equilibria in an n-player war of attrition

Kapur, Sandeep (1995) Markov perfect equilibria in an n-player war of attrition. Economics Letters 47 (2), pp. 149-154. ISSN 0165-1765.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00532-7

Abstract

A symmetric finite-player war of attrition is studied in discrete time using the notion of Markov perfect equilibria. Considering the limit of the discrete time model as the decision interval becomes arbitrarily small allows a simple characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
School:	School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
Depositing User:	Sarah Hall
Date Deposited:	07 Jul 2020 12:00
Last Modified:	07 Jul 2020 12:00
URI:	https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32473

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