Psychoanalytic Judaism, Judaic Psychoanalysis*

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Abstract

In this article I will briefly review some thinking on the relationship between Judaism and psychoanalysis before making the claim that there is something about Jewish 'lived ethics' that is directed towards interruption by otherness – and that this speaks to a progressive mode of psychoanalytic consciousness.

The article begins with a summary account of some major trends in the co-location of psychoanalysis and Judaism, relating particularly to: the origins of psychoanalysis; antisemitism directed towards, and within, psychoanalysis; links between Jewish mysticism and psychoanalysis through notions of 'tikkun' and reparation; hermeneutics and interpretation; and the transmission of knowledge through intense personal relationships. Psychoanalytic interpretation has also been applied to some Jewish (especially Biblical) texts. I have been arguing recently that there is something 'barbaric' in Judaism that is also present in psychoanalysis, and that this offers possibilities for decolonial activism and solidarity. But there are many complexities, including the tendency to understand religion in 'Christian' terms as a set of beliefs, rather than in Jewish terms as primarily a set of practices.

The article then offers an account of Jewishness as rooted in ambivalence and contradictory ties – and particularly as a way of being that is fundamentally interrupted by otherness. I give an example of this and try to show that what one author I draw on calls 'the backward pull of love and accidental attachment' is constitutive of Judaism and of psychoanalysis as well. As such, it is a powerful ethical claim to say that 'Judaic' psychoanalysis exists.

Psychoanalytic Judaism, Judaic Psychoanalysis

Jewish Origins

The Jewish origins of psychoanalysis are well recognised and widely rehearsed and are a clear sociological fact.[1] However, this does not mean quite the same thing as it might have done if the origins of psychoanalysis were, say, 'Christian'. In that case, we might be talking specifically of a *religious* source for psychoanalysis, perhaps for instance related to Christian notions of grace and forgiveness, or something embedded in the confessional relationship – a wiping clean of the bad conscience in the conviction that one has been forgiven by a divine power. To claim that psychoanalysis has Jewish origins is not a statement of this kind, or at least not necessarily so; it might simply mean noting that the person who invented it, Sigmund Freud, was Jewish and that so were most of the early European psychoanalysts. Though of course this is insufficient as well. Saying that psychoanalysis was Jewish is no more neutral than saying it was 'European' or 'German-language' in origin, both true statements and both relevant to understanding psychoanalysis' history and core concepts: the assumptions of European colonialism and of science and the traditions of German philosophy, literature and romanticism, were powerful influences on how psychoanalysis emerged and the form it took when it did.[2] One could even argue that it had 'occult' origins, given the intense interest in forms of hypnosis, suggestibility, 'spirit-possession' and telepathy that surrounded and to some degree permeated early psychoanalytic thought.[3] Without the notion of the occult, would a mysterious 'unconscious' be imaginable, even in the material form that psychoanalysis gives it? There were many sources, then, and many justifiable claims can be made for their influence on psychoanalysis.

Despite this, there is something peculiar and especially complex about the Jewish connection to psychoanalysis. In part this is because, in comparison to the relationship with the German language or bourgeois Europe of the period, it was especially strongly affectively loaded: throughout Freud's lifetime, and since (though that is another story), Jews and Jewishness were targets more for denigration than approbation; antisemitism was rife and grew rather than faded with the advances of scientific rationality (which turned out to be all too precarious, at least ethically); Jewish identity was a prominent marker of difference; and the negative associations of Jewishness (for instance, deceitful, poisonous, sexualised, secretive…) were all too easy to connect with the products of Jewish thinkers – especially when, as was the case with psychoanalysis, what they produced was in many people's view unsavoury. In particular, the fascination of psychoanalysis with sexuality and its tendency (by no means universal, but real) towards social criticism that placed it on the side of 'progressive' politics, fed the association with Jewishness as contaminating, unpatriotic and corrupting. 'Poisoning the wells' and poisoning the mind are not unrelated ideas, at least emotionally; think for instance of the effect of postulating infantile sexuality, as Freud did, as well as the early trauma theory represented in the so-called 'seduction hypothesis', abandoned in 1897 but continuing to haunt the psychoanalytic archive.[4] My point here is simply that whist there are many genuine 'origins' to psychoanalysis which have effects and are of importance, its Jewish origins are uniquely significant because of the political, historical, social and emotional baggage that they brought with them, and which psychoanalysis has never been able to escape.

A lot of work has been done tracing these connections, but among the various difficulties in sorting through the strands is the complicated signifier 'Jewish' itself. It refers to an

ethnicity, or maybe multiple ethnicities (Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Mizrachi…); it is often cast as 'peoplehood', implying a shared sense of identity and possibly of culture; it is internally designated through a matriarchal line of descent with the possibility but relative infrequency of inward conversion (i.e. it is mostly defined by birth but not necessarily so); it is characterised even religiously as a set of practices more than of beliefs. This last point is crucial in the context of Judaism, the religion of the Jews: being Jewish does not depend on holding any particular beliefs or even really on self-definition, but rather it is a matter of community acknowledgement of one's belongingness and heritage. In this way it diverges from the predominant assumption of a (secular-)Christian way of thinking, that religious affiliation is a matter of belief, freely entered into as a kind of choice (though it may *feel* impelled and inarguable). Indeed, from a Jewish point of view, the idea that the sphere of the religious is a spiritual one is oddly limited and fails to take account of the many ramifications of what is nowadays termed 'lived religion' – the set of personal and communal practices and affiliations characterising individuals and groups that may have little or nothing to do with belief at all.[5] Celia Brickman describes one effect of this in relation to what she sees as Freud's own tendency to unite Judaism and Christianity under the general heading of 'religion', in this way obscuring the specificity of Jewish affiliations:

> Because Judaism has always held a particular and necessary place within Christianity – what from a Christian perspective would be called the place of superseded origins – Judaism has often been subsumed as part of so-called 'Judeo-Christian' religious culture, which is then shortened to the seemingly universal term 'religion'… With this common and general use of the term religion, Freud – and his followers – obscure the structural differences between the two religions, as well as what we might call the

> political differences between them – the vast differences in the social and political locations of Christian and Jewish communities and their experiences in European countries leading up to and including the times in which Freud wrote.[6]

Whilst Brickman has a point about Freud's use of the term 'religion' in such texts as *Totem and Taboo*[7] and *The Future of an Illusion*,[8] I do not think she is quite fair to his continued assertion of his own non-religious Jewishness throughout his public life. One can be, as Isaac Deutscher famously put it, a 'non-Jewish Jew',[9] meaning those who have no religious beliefs or observances, yet can feel themselves drawing on their Jewishness to inform their view of the world and their actions within it. Freud was exemplary here. I will restrict myself to the most famous quotation, drawn from his 1930 preface to the Hebrew edition of *Totem and Taboo*:

> No reader of the Hebrew version of this book will find it easy to put himself in the emotional position of an author who is ignorant of the language of holy writ, who is completely estranged from the religion of his fathers – as well as from every other religion – and who cannot take a share in nationalist ideals, but who has yet never repudiated his people, who feels that he is in his essential nature a Jew and who has no desire to alter that nature. If the question were put to him: 'Since you have abandoned all these common characteristics of your countrymen, what is left to you that is Jewish?' he would reply: 'A very great deal, and probably its very essence.' He could not express that essence in words, but some day, no doubt, it will become accessible to the scientific mind.[10]

Jacqueline Rose's comment on this is that 'Freud offers here one of the most striking self-definitions of the modern secular Jew – that is, the Jew for whom shedding the trappings of

linguistic, religious and national identity – paradoxically, by stripping away its untenable and, one might say, most politically dangerous elements – does not make him less Jewish, but more.' [11] It is worth underlining again that being 'secular' does nothing to stop Freud from seeing himself and being seen as Jewish, any more than it did for the first officially secular Jew, Spinoza, who remained 'the Jew' in the eyes of the world even after he was excommunicated and mainly ceased thinking of himself that way.[12]

But anyway, the point is clear: one might accept that psychoanalysis has a Jewish heritage, but this says nothing specific about any religious connection it may or may not have. Even the 'religious' works of early psychoanalysis, again with Freud's as exemplary, are at most suggestive rather than drawing directly on Jewish religious thought. *The Future of an Illusion* is an examination of religion as a psychological phenomenon that takes for granted its illusory status, its function as a fantasy. *Moses and Monotheism*[13] is different, resolving into a rather surprising defence of Judaism even as it universalises and secularises it, and best understood as a critique of identity (which is Edward Said's reading)[14] and/or a vigorous response to the emerging barbarism of Nazism. In this book, there is a defence of a certain kind of religion – abstract monotheism – against other religious expressions (especially Christianity, seen as a 'regression' to the maternal), but once again there is little to recommend it as a *religious* text, profound though it is in many other ways.

Judaic Psychoanalysis

None of this has stopped many commentators exploring the possible links between Judaism – the religion of the Jews – and psychoanalysis. I will go over this very briefly here, leaving aside some highly speculative work on the possible religious influences on Freud himself, especially in relation to Jewish mysticism in which it is occasionally claimed he was steeped

– some of which sees him, as in a relatively recent book, as a 'hidden' Jew,[15] bringing to mind associations with the conversos or crypto-Jews hiding from the Inquisition. Quite a lot of the discussion has centred on the idea that there are parallels between Judaism and psychoanalysis and that, given the obvious timeline, this indicates how the former infiltrated the latter (though as Emmanuel Levinas[16] suggests, only half-jokingly, there is evidence that the rabbis of Talmudic time knew their psychoanalysis). One clear example of this is the claim that 'tikkun olam', the doctrine of 'healing the world' that arises with the emergence of Lurianic mysticism after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century, parallels the Kleinian psychoanalytic notion of *reparation* in that it makes destruction primordial and sees the task of humans (or Jews in the kabbalistic case) as finding a way to restore the brokenness that this fundamental state creates.[17] The parallels are indeed striking: vessels that are broken by the strain of containing the divine light and that can only be repaired through the good deeds of humans; paranoid schizoid fragments resulting from envy (the 'death drive') that are brought together into a whole through the reparative actions of people who can understand and feel their own capacity for doing damage and can overcome this through practices of loving gratitude. This model of destruction and repair is, however, a very widespread and prominent one, not just in psychoanalysis or Judaism, so to say that it demonstrates a causal link between the two approaches is to my mind stretching things. I would rather argue that just as Jewish mysticism responded to the devastating event of the fifteenth century Spanish exile by interrogating how evil can exist and what might be done to restore the broken shards of hope, so psychoanalysis in its Kleinian vein responded to the enormous destruction in Europe of the two twentieth century world wars (the concept of reparation was introduced by Melanie Klein in 1929 but more fully developed after the Second World War)[18] by

examining the effects of violence and loss and developing a moral account of what might be required to do restitution for these – to make good the damage that we do to ourselves and to one another. Both these are deeply felt responses to terrible suffering and could be said to have a 'religious' element to them, though I would prefer to call the psychoanalytic variety an *ethical* impulse rather than a religious one, with its implication of divinity and belief. I am sure they draw on the same human impulse to keep on going in the face of pressure to despair, and to imagine the possibility of a newly restored world, but I doubt that Klein had Lurianic kabbalism in mind when she developed the theory of the depressive position and of reparation.

A somewhat more convincing set of parallels seems to me to derive from the Jewish emphasis on textual study and hermeneutics, which I can accept might have helped shape psychoanalysis' conviction that the stories told by its patients might not be taken at face value but had hidden meanings that should be subjected to interpretation.[19] This is of course the characteristic Jewish approach to the texts of Judaism, from the Bible with its supposed 'seventy faces' to the study of Talmud and commentaries that can – and indeed, according to orthodox Judaism, *should* – take a lifetime and still remain unfinished at the end. In Judaism, this is a divinely ordained task: studying the Torah is the purpose of life and the way one comes close to God. The texts themselves are imbued with divine meaning, which makes them inexhaustible given the limitations of human understanding. This is not quite the psychoanalytic version of things, but the notion of an inexhaustible unconscious, the interpretation of which is the central task of an analysis, is not far-fetched; and the idea that the 'good life' is one governed by, and dependent upon, this kind of continuous self-examination is present in the psychoanalytic literature.[20] Religiously, this hermeneutic

approach is bound by belief in the existence and unity of God, and more prosaically by the law as outlined in the Torah and promulgated in the interpretations of the rabbis – that is, faced with complex material one is encouraged to think freely, considering alternative readings, but always to come back to a particular source and set of authoritative renderings of the text. The same might not be true of psychoanalysis: there is no absolute set of laws that one must in the end obey. And yet… there is certainly pressure to find confirmation of all readings in Freud, and a reluctance to move outside the agreed parameters of psychoanalytic interpretation, as developed over a century and more of practice and argumentation. Even transference has its place here: loyalty to the rabbis of the past and to one's rabbinic masters, loyalty to one's supervisors and one's analyst, are very prominent characteristics of Judaism and psychoanalysis respectively – and even include emotive reactions *against* these predecessors, which psychoanalysts would still interpret as transference based. I doubt this is due simply to the Jewish influence on psychoanalysis, but maybe the hermeneutics-bound-by-law tendency of psychoanalysis felt familiar to those who came from a religious culture where the same approach applied, as did the esteem in which charismatic teachers might be held.

Relational Ethics

So far I have been arguing that whilst the connection between psychoanalysis and Jews is real, pervasive and significant in terms of the history, sociology and approach of psychoanalysis, the links between psychoanalysis and Judaism as a religion are more tenuous, with the claims made being mostly unsustainable except as indications of parallel solutions to the question of human suffering and perhaps a proclivity towards interpretive versatility that comes from generations of work on 'sacred' texts. I have in addition recently

become interested in the idea that the supposed 'barbarism' of Jews in the eyes of European Christian and racial antisemitism might provide important links with decolonial struggles, and that this might also be reflected in some possibilities for psychoanalysis as a 'Jewish science' to contribute to the solidarity of anti-racist, postcolonial and decolonial activism.[21] The argument here is that the reclaiming of a radical Jewish tradition allied with other movements of the oppressed may provide resources for 'barbaric thinking,' using 'barbaric' here in the positive sense to mean that which confronts the hegemony of European colonial thought.[22] Psychoanalysis, despite its roots in colonial thinking and its ambiguities over 'race' and racism,[23] also reinserts 'barbarism' into the supposedly civilised psyche by hypothesising an unconscious that is in principle wildly antagonistic to constraint. Freud summarises the characteristics of the unconscious as '*exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process* (mobility of cathexes), *timelessness*, and *replacement of external by psychical reality*,'[24] suggesting a mode of 'primitivity' that lies in each of us; more directly, it is notable that he is acerbic about what he calls in *The Future of an Illusion* 'our present-day white Christian civilization,'[25] mistrusting it – partly because of antisemitism – and linking some of its practitioners with what 'under a thin veneer of Christianity, […] their ancestors were, who worshipped a barbarous polytheism.'[26]

Once again, however, I do not think this link between psychoanalysis and Jewishness is a specifically *religious* phenomenon; it has to do more with the historical positioning of Jews as marginals, their relationship with the 'barbaric other' of the exclusionary and colonial imagination, and the prospects for recovering this position as an assertion either of the value of such barbarism or as a riposte to the *actually* barbaric practices of the colonial and racist West. That said, however, there is an issue that may connect Jews, Judaism and

psychoanalysis not in the sense that it makes psychoanalysis a religious phenomenon, or applicable to Judaism or vice versa, but as a characterisation of a shared ethical project. This is the idea that Judaism, like psychoanalysis, trades in ambiguities and ambivalence, and never allows for a settling of the human subject into an integrated whole, however much paranoid-schizoid to depressive movement there might be (that is, in a slightly different psychoanalytic vocabulary, however much is 'worked through'). I am referring here to the notion that both psychoanalysis and Judaism see the human subject as fundamentally *interrupted by otherness*. It will be obvious that I risk slipping back towards identifying Judaism and Jewishness; but part of my case is that this is characteristic of Jewish religiosity (i.e. that it does not reduce to a theology), that Judaism is the lived life of Jews and not a separate order of experience or belief.

The argument I am making here is around how attempts at clarity and rationality are always obscured by the interruptions of our relations with others; and that this is a perception of psychoanalysis that is also central to Jewish cultural and religious life. *Psychoanalytically*, it is not difficult to make this claim. The unconscious disrupts everything, in the sense that all our relations with ourselves and with others are mediated by impulses, wishes and desires that have the quality of coming from 'somewhere else'. Where is this elsewhere from which they come? Whatever might be the supposedly 'constitutional' elements of the unconscious, for instance as envisaged in classical drive theory, the observation that *relational* or *intersubjective* encounters fuel the formation of supposedly 'inner' realities is not specific to British object relations theory (for instance in the perennially influential work of Donald Winnicott),[27] nor even to the 'relational' school of psychoanalysis now well established in the USA.[28] Edward Said remarks on it in his reading of *Moses and*

Monotheism:[29] Freud's insistence on Moses as *outsider* (Moses was an Egyptian, in Freud's reading) is seen by Said as a way of fragmenting identity so that no one can claim its purity, but it also enacts metaphorically the idea that one's identity is given from outside oneself, by those who announce it even before one is born. Jewish historical identity is founded on an interruption by an outsider, an Egyptian; psychic identity is formed out of the reiterated naming practices that the social world, and specifically the parents, imposes on the subject – a rendering famously conceptualised by Judith Butler through the lens of 'performativity'.[30] More psychoanalytically, whilst object relational as well as intersubjectivist thinking is important here, with their emphasis on the internalisation of object relations as constitutive of psychic structure, even more so is the Lacanian idea of 'extimacy' – the external scaffolding of unconscious life[31] – and Jean Laplanche's unremitting focus on the decentring of the subject, the so-called 'Copernican' move that makes the other primary in the foundations of the unconscious.[32] For Laplanche, it is the untranslatable 'message' that comes from the unconscious of the early caretaker that creates within the infant subject a sensation of something important that cannot be known; and this sensation is the kernel of the infant's own unconscious life, something implanted from outside (hence connected to Freud's 'seduction' theory) and radically *other*, disrupting the possibility of a fixed, ego-centric identity.

I won't dedicate space now to re-describing Laplanchian theory, as it is increasingly well known and has been taken up by many contemporary psychoanalysts.[33] What I would stress is the idea that the subject is formed in response to the other; or put more forcefully, to adopt Judith Butler's phrase, the subject is '*interrupted prior to the possibility of any continuity*,' always inhabited by something originally external to itself.[34] The immediacy of

the other is therefore both an ethical demand and an ontological claim: there is no subject without the other. Butler writes, 'I find that my very formation implicates the other in me, that my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others.'[35] Note here one echo in Butler's emphasis on 'foreignness' from Otto Fenichel's early psychoanalytic account of antisemitism. Fenichel makes a poignant identification between the Jew as foreign and uncanny, and the site of foreignness within: 'It can be expressed in one sentence: one's own unconscious is also foreign. Foreignness is the quality which the Jews and one's own instincts have in common.' [36]

It will be obvious that there are resonances between this Laplanchian psychoanalytic account and the Jewish philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, with its emphasis on the primacy of the other in determining the subjectivity of the self.[37] There is a lot that could be said about this, but I have chosen to stick with Butler (who also engages profoundly with Levinas) for the specific reason that she has worked both on the issue of relational ethics (through her writings on 'ethical violence') and of Jewish philosophy. For example, presenting Jewish thought as linked with 'alterity', Butler begins her book on Jewish ethics discussing the move away from 'ontology' and towards 'relationality' that posits the other as central to formations of the human subject. She notes about this that,

> It establishes the relation to alterity as constitutive of identity, which is to say that the relation to alterity *interrupts* identity, and this interruption is the condition of ethical relationality. Is this a Jewish notion? Yes and no.[38]

'Yes and no' is a familiar Jewish answer to a question like this. Butler is highlighting here what she sees as an opposition between Western ontology with its focus on the self and its knowledge – hence 'identity' – and a 'Jewish' emphasis on the interruptive presence of the

other, which has subversive (of identity) and transgressive possibilities. She derives this from Levinas, but also from Arendt; that is, not so much classical Jewish sources but modern Jewish philosophy. Butler begins this passage with an exclamatory moral statement: 'Relationality displaces ontology, and it is a good thing too.'[39] Her argument is a subtle one, and she gives a lot of space to what she refers to as the 'opacity' of the subject[40] – the necessity of a certain kind of respect for the other born out of the recognition that each of us is fundamentally unknowable at some point, as a centre not just of consciousness but also of an unconscious that makes us opaque to ourselves. But my point here is to note that whenever we see ourselves as 'settled' in our identities or knowledge of ourselves, however secure we might seem to be, something disruptive occurs, usually because of other people. This can also be said of the history of the Jews. Indeed, it can be summarised nicely in one of my favourite comments by Rashi, on the attempt by the patriarch Jacob to 'settle down' in Canaan, only to find his life unravelling. Chapter 37 of Genesis famously begins as follows: 'And Jacob was settled in the land of his father's sojourning, in the land of Canaan. These are the progeny of Jacob. Joseph, being seventeen years old, was feeding the flock with his brothers' (1-2). Rashi's note on this is:

> Jacob wanted to live at ease, but this trouble in connection with Joseph suddenly came upon him. When the righteous wish to live at ease, the Holy One, blessed be He, says of them, 'Are not the righteous satisfied with what is stored up for them in the world to come that they wish to live at ease in this world too?'[41]

What can be seen at work in this passage is the idea that we become 'settled' only at the great price of relinquishing our awareness of our deeply 'unsettled' nature, the way a certain kind of 'trouble' or disturbance is a condition of our being. This trouble comes from

our necessary relationships with others: the problem for Jacob is that the wish to put an end to turbulence ('to live at ease') cannot be fulfilled when you have a seventeen-year-old son. The turbulence of Joseph and – crucially – Jacob's *love* for Joseph, puts paid to that wish. Human relations, that is, are uncontrollable and yet cannot be somehow bracketed out from the question of being in the world. Irresistibly, the elements of strangeness and disruption encroach on us all.

My argument then is that the 'Jewishness' of psychoanalysis, framed religiously as well as culturally, lies in the promotion of a relationally muddied vision in which it is the intrusions of others, marked by our deep involvement and emotional connections with them, that makes it impossible ever to find a truth that is univocal and settling. In some recent work[42] I have deployed Rebecca Goldstein's magical examination of the story of Lot's Wife to explore this more deeply – a 'modern midrash' that has affected me deeply and is tied up with the sudden loss of a close friend at an unaccountably early age and so itself is set in a personal relational context.[43] I will not repeat the account here, save to note that Goldstein draws together a radical reading of the text with a meditation on her relationship with her father, with a crucial moment for my current purpose being the following description of the dispute they had over western versus Jewish ways of doing philosophy. Goldstein is seduced by the rigours of western thought; her orthodox Jewish father is not.

> My father never could work up any enthusiasm for the luminous vision of the life of pure reason I tried to paint for him. I argued that it was the life that was the most consistent and thus right. He agreed with me that it was consistent, but he wouldn't agree that it was right. In fact, he thought it was all wrong. He thought it was right for

> human life to be subject to contradictions, for a person to love in more than one direction, and sometimes to be torn into pieces because of his many loves.[44]

The 'torn into pieces' reference is an association, probably deliberate, with the Jacob story: his response to the news of Joseph's supposed demise. It is also a more general statement about the nature of Jewish 'lived life': thrown into the actualities of relationality rather than the abstractions of spirituality. This perception is visible in some contemporary Jewish responses to psychoanalysis, for instance Avivah Zornberg's incisive re-readings of Biblical texts through psychoanalytic lenses, producing new versions of moral engagement,[45] as well as Levinas' brilliantly yet subtly subversive Talmudic readings from the 1960s.[46] There is also *psychotherapeutic* relevance. For instance, Philip Cushman claims that the Jewish midrashic tradition might inform contemporary relational psychoanalytic practice – indeed that it often does so unawares, as 'In ways that we may not realize, Jewish therapists might be moved by deeply felt, embodied ways of being and thus moral commitments that have their origins in ideas and social practices hundreds or even thousands of years old and socially transmitted to us in ways implicit and constitutive.'[47] The substance of this influence is to promote certain values ('engagement, historicity, interpersonal interaction, the dialectic of absence and presence, the prohibition against idolatry') and develop 'a process of study and authorial creation that seems structured to encourage learners to engage with and enact those values, which are among the most important concepts in Jewish thought.'[48] Cushman's focus is on how these values are congruent with relational psychotherapy, and indeed this may be one way in which some of the issues raised here have psychotherapeutic effect. The Butlerian claim that Jewish ethics promotes relationality and openness to alterity (Cushman might say, even in the *process* of Jewish learning, which is traditionally dialogic) is

in some respects well aligned with psychoanalysis, especially but by no means solely in its contemporary relational and intersubjectivist forms.

My final suggestion, in summary, is to link psychoanalysis and Judaism through the insistence on interruption by the multiplicities and muddles of one's attachments and loves. To me, this is an important ethical point, and one consonant with both Jewish tradition and with psychoanalysis, despite the investment both these systems of thought also have in reason. 'The backward pull of love and accidental attachment,' as Goldstein puts it,[49] is something I recognise as causing problems but also filling out the sense of being alive. The idea of being 'subject to contradictions,' 'loving in more than one direction,' and 'sometimes being torn into pieces because of one's many loves' is precisely what we see being dealt with in psychoanalysis, and it is also core to Jewish tradition, identification and religious practice. Finding ways to live with contradictions, I guess, is the usual way of thinking about this, but what is central to these relational contradictions is that they never cease tearing you apart. This must have to do with the wish to hold together all one's 'loves', to 'love in more than one direction' even when that puts other loves at risk. Judaism, with its insistence on the relational nexus in which religion exists – its formation in the history and its preservation in the culture of a people – has a lot to say about such loves. Maybe, though I would not want to claim this too grandly, that is a genuine way in which Judaism as well as Jewishness is at the source of psychoanalysis.

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