



ORBIT - Online Repository of Birkbeck Institutional Theses

Enabling Open Access to Birkbeck's Research Degree output

After the republic : an analysis of the duality of 'man' in Rousseau

<https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40153/>

Version: Full Version

Citation: Wilcock, Neil (2015) After the republic : an analysis of the duality of 'man' in Rousseau. [Thesis] (Unpublished)

© 2020 The Author(s)

All material available through ORBIT is protected by intellectual property law, including copyright law.

Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law.

[Deposit Guide](#)
Contact: [email](#)

**After the Republic:
An Analysis of the Duality of 'Man' in Rousseau**

Neil Wilcock

Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophical Studies

Birkbeck College, University of London

I confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own and the work of other persons is appropriately acknowledged

Neil Wilcock

Abstract

In his *Second Discourse* Rousseau's analysis of the state of man is damning. We have been led astray by our inflamed *amour-propre* and exist as corrupted and denatured people within a coercive and corrupting social framework. Solutions to this social problem are given by Rousseau in both *Emile* and the *Social Contract*. However, the two solutions appear to be in conflict with one another. On the one hand we are told how to create free individuals who exist independently of the state. On the other hand, we appear to be offered a society formed by the alienation of the individual's private identity.

This thesis explores whether these two narratives can be reconciled. Through a close reading of the texts and an analysis of competing interpretative theories, I conclude that they can. Developing the recent work of Frederick Neuhouser, which places *amour-propre* at the centre of Rousseau's political theory, I argue that the most prominent obstacle to accepting Neuhouser's solution to the conflict is his failure to distance himself from the deeply ingrained misogyny of Rousseau's philosophy.

To deal with this limitation, I argue, we need to draw out the centrality and importance that Rousseau attaches to education. The solutions provided in *Emile* and the *Social Contract* are useful narratives of the changes that we have undergone and what we aim to achieve. The role of these fictions is to serve as models that we can employ in our continual education and re-education. Rousseau, therefore, provides the tools for a reflexive theory of political philosophy that can most accurately be described as a theory of *paideia*.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to my supervisor Susan James who has provided me with support and advice on occasions too numerous to count since I started at Birkbeck seven years ago. I know that any attempt to express the gratitude that I owe to her will sound hollow. I can but say thank you and hope that my words carry with them the weight of the appreciation that I feel.

I would also like to thank those people that have suffered me talk about my project and kept me sane over the course of the last three years, especially Charlotte Knowles, Karl Egerton, Tom Quinn, and Adam Ferner. I fear that I shall miss the happy distractions, loose segues, and over-enthusiastic Pokémon nostalgia more than I care to admit. They have given me what I most needed whenever I began to get lost inside my mind.

Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Elena and our daughter Leila. I do not know where I would be without them by my side, but I know that I would be the worse off for it. They give me the strength that I need to challenge myself and continue to push forward. I know that we are about to begin another big chapter in our lives together, and I know that we shall struggle, but I also know that I would not have it any other way. Here is to that next chapter. I dedicate this thesis to them both.

I love you all and thank you.

Contents

Abbreviations...	6
Introduction...	7
Section One - The Social Problem...	15
Section Two - Dissolution...	31
Section Three - Negative Resolution...	46
Section Four - Positive Resolution...	61
Section Five - Critical Reconstruction...	78
Conclusion...	94
Bibliography...	97

Abbreviations

- CB** Christopher Brooke, *Philosophic Pride* (Princeton, 2012)
- CCR** Patrick Riley, 'Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns', Patrick Riley (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge, 2001) 78-93
- CWR** *Collected Writings of Rousseau*, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, (University Press of New England, 1992)
- DJ** David James, *Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence, and Necessity* (Cambridge, 2013)
- E** *Emile or On Education*, (Penguin, 1979)
- FN** Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love* (Oxford, 2008)
- JC** John Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau* (Cambridge, 1974)
- JS** Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1969)
- ND** N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social and Political Theory*, (Blackwell, 1988)
- LM** *Letters Written From the Mountain*, in *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 9*, 'Letter to Beaumont,, and related writings', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- SC** *The Social Contract* (Penguin, 1968)
- SD** *Second Discourse*, in *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 3*, 'Discourse of the Origins of Inequality (Second Discourse) Polemics, and Political Economy', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, (University Press of New England, 1992)

Introduction

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was an accomplished novelist, botanist, composer of opera, political theorist, and pedagogue. What he is most remembered for today are his political ideas, in particular those expressed within the *Social Contract*.¹ Within Rousseau's political theory there appear to be two distinct directions of thought. In one direction Rousseau devises a social and political system that is organised around the notion of a citizen, and in the other he develops a theory of the free individual divorced from the corrupting influences of society and its institutions. What, if any, is the relationship between this model of a citizen and the model of a free individual man? Can one be both, or are we at an impasse? If we are at an impasse there appear to be two possibilities: either we have to choose between the path of man and the path of citizen; or we fail to be either man or citizen. I shall trace a way of reconciling these possibilities through a close reading of Rousseau's primary works of political philosophy; the *Second Discourse*,² the *Social Contract* and *Emile*.³ I shall also rely on the secondary literature, in particular the works of John Charvet,⁴ Judith Shklar,⁵ and Frederick Neuhouser.⁶ I hope to offer an analysis of Rousseau's position that drags Rousseau into the twenty-first century by showing that the most unpalatable convictions that Rousseau upholds - namely his unsatisfactory treatment of women - can be sacrificed without compromising his theory of freedom and equality.

The story of the citizen is presented most clearly in the *Social Contract*. This book is a bold attempt to envisage social and political institutions that will protect and uphold the rights of the individual without imposing any limiting factors upon his freedom. Put very crudely, Natural man inhabits the state of nature and possesses natural freedom, but in order to ensure the safety of his

¹ SC

² SD

³ E

⁴ JC

⁵ JS

⁶ FN

person and the security of his possessions he must eventually form some social organisation. The person who sacrifices his natural freedom and enters a social contract becomes an equal member of the governing body. As a member of this sovereign power this person will find that, although much freedom has been lost in entering the state, a superior form of freedom has replaced it. However, this freedom will exist and flourish only if the participants, who comprise the sovereign power express what Rousseau calls the general will when making decisions for society. The person who lives to uphold the values and interests of society is a citizen. Citizens are contrasted with what Rousseau calls, somewhat unhelpfully, man.

The free individual is the subject of Rousseau's pedagogical novel *Emile*. Often overlooked within political philosophy, *Emile* presents the foundations of child-centred educational theory. The project of *Emile* is to create a man free from the corrupting influences of society. This is achieved under the direction of Jean-Jacques, Emile's tutor and guardian, who controls Emile's environment, providing conducive parameters in which natural education can have its positive effect. He allows Emile to develop and learn at the child's own pace and through direct interaction with the world around him.

The *Social Contract* and *Emile* appear, at first sight, to propose two completely different approaches to the problem of the corrupting influence of society, a problem that Rousseau develops in the *Second Discourse*. In the *Social Contract* Rousseau takes men 'as they are' and constructs what is in part a genealogical account of the origins of a social pact among men, and in part an account of how things could be if our societies were still small and the people within them not so beholden to inflamed *amour-propre*. It is at once a cautionary tale and a blueprint for the future, but one primarily constructed through social and political institutions. *Emile*, on the other hand, represents the other side of a distinction that Rousseau makes between a public education, where one is educated to be a citizen, and a domestic education, where one is educated to be, at first, a man. Just as the *Social Contract* blends the real and

the imaginary, so too, does the story of Emile and his tutor Jean-Jacques.¹ We, therefore, have two seemingly distinct stories that claim to provide an account of a better future that is similarly a blueprint and a fiction; one offering a model of social and political institutions, the other focussing on the development of the individual.

How, then, are the two texts related? This overarching query raises further questions about the character of Rousseau's larger project. One way of understanding Rousseau's political project is as a unified whole. The two seemingly distinct strands of thought that Rousseau expresses in *Social Contract* and *Emile* can and should be read together, because they represent two different, but equally necessary, ways of controlling *amour-propre*. If, however, the arguments of the *Social Contract* and *Emile* are not compatible, Rousseau's project takes on a different feel altogether. It could be that the project dissolves or, alternatively, that he offers two distinct utopias, one of Natural man and one of Civil man, between which we must choose. What is at stake here is whether to understand Rousseau as primarily a utopian thinker who postulates a faraway or unrealisable perfect future, or whether there is an immediacy to his project that demands action if we are not to succumb, irreversibly, to the corruptions of modern society. These three views of Rousseau's political theory can be found in the works of Frederick Neuhouser, John Charvet, and Judith Shklar.

Charvet, argues that Rousseau's project is inconsistent. The problem for Rousseau, as he understands it, is “how to conceive of a society and social relations between men in which ... corruption is avoided and the potentialities in human nature for virtue are fully developed.”² It is this problem that the *Social Contract* and *Emile* are designed to answer. Charvet believes that Rousseau fails in this project because the conceptions of man that he develops

¹ Rousseau writes, “How is it possible that a child be well raised by one who was not well-raised himself?...But let us suppose this marvel found” (E, p.50) For the project to get off of the ground it must be conceded that the tutor have some kind of privileged knowledge and has not succumbed to the corrupting influence of society himself. Rousseau recognises his project is best expressed as a hypothetical for this reason, but in doing so he hopes to lay the groundwork for some future practice. (E, pp. 49-52) I shall return to this point in the final section.

² (JC, p.1)

are inconsistent with one another. As a result the project is incoherent. In arguing against this dissolution of Rousseau's political project I present a fuller picture of the differing conceptions of man and freedom that exist in these three texts.

Judith Shklar, in her book *Men and Citizens*, argues in favour of the view that Rousseau develops two distinct utopian worlds. His utopias are not consistent and do not pretend to be. They are two roads, one taken through the model of a Spartan city, and the other through a Golden Age. According to Shklar, “the two [utopias] were meant to stand in polar opposition to each other.”¹ She suggests that there is “nothing astonishing”² in the fact that Rousseau proposes two models of utopia rather than one, and there is no need to struggle to reconcile them as some authors have attempted to do. She suggests that Rousseau followed the lead of Fénelon, an author with whom he was well acquainted, in developing two mutually inconsistent models. In his book, *Télémaque*, Fénelon offers us *Bétique* and *Salante*. The first is “the utopia of spontaneous rural simplicity”³ and the latter “a model of organised civic virtue”.⁴ In Shklar's view these utopias mirror the two developed in Rousseau's own work. His *Emile* provides a “quiet village, and golden age,.... [and] held a message addressed to all men, while his Spartan city was a damning mirror held up to the elite of Paris.”⁵ In and of itself this is an entirely plausible account of Rousseau's seemingly divergent works of political philosophy. However, Shklar must also show, not just that they are inconsistent, but that they were intended to be read independently of one another.

One way that Shklar defends her position and draws the two worlds apart is by referring to a specific passage in *Emile*. In this key passage Rousseau writes that, “one must choose between making a man or a citizen for one cannot make both at the same time.”⁶ Shklar interprets Rousseau as directing

¹ (MC, p.3)

² (MC, p.3)

³ (MC, p.3)

⁴ (MC, p.5)

⁵ (MC, p.5)

⁶ (E, p.39)

us to choose between the two models of utopia. Either we choose the Spartan city and become a citizen, or we choose the Golden Age and become a man. What is most interesting about Shklar's position is that, according to her reading, this choice that we must make is one that we will not make, so that we are destined to inhabit our "present disorientation and inner disorder."¹ By not choosing we remain stuck in between the two worlds; and the consequences of this are "war between men, conflict within each soul. Above all, because they are incompatible, the attempt to pursue both enhances the strain under which men actually labour."² It is in not choosing between the two models that leads to the destruction of both.

In reading Rousseau's political thought in this way, Shklar interprets his project as one of damage limitation. In her eyes the picture that Rousseau paints is one of necessary failure, a consequence of our irreversible and inevitable error in not choosing between the two paths offered, coupled with the fact that neither path can be successfully followed. "That is why it is so demoralising.... Each has its rewards and penalties, but the two cannot be reconciled. That is why one *ought* to choose, even if no one has, or is likely to do so."³ Shklar seems to be saying that Rousseau's two utopias are not merely incompatible with one another but ultimately destroy the possibility of either of them being realised.

A recent alternative to this understanding of Rousseau is offered by Frederick Neuhouser in his book *Theodicy of Self-Love*. According to Neuhouser, the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract*, and *Emile* can, and should, be read as compatible and complementary texts. Neuhouser places central importance on the concept of *amour-propre* within Rousseau's political thought and his interpretation of Rousseau's political thought as a whole is informed by this. *Amour-propre* is a rich and complicated concept that is impossible to define simply, but is roughly 'self-love', a self-love that is self-interested and fuelled by the need for recognition from one's peers. Neuhouser's aim is to provide an

¹ (MC, p.5)

² (MC, p.6)

³ (MC, p.6)

account of Rousseau's political thought that shows how, “the social and political world, together with the characters of those who inhabit it, must be configured if the dangers posed by *amour-propre* are to be avoided or minimised.”¹ This account is separated into two overlapping systems; in the first Neuhouser focusses on how the dangers of *amour-propre* are controlled through good social and political institutions, and in the second on how such control is achieved through the domestic education of Emile.

Neuhouser assumes that the different remedies for *amour-propre* proposed within the *Social Contract* and *Emile* are “offered in earnest in order to see what a straightforward examination of their merits reveals about the possibility of a human world where the harmful potential of *amour-propre* is for the most part held in check.”² He therefore takes a “two-pronged approach”³ to averting the dangers of *amour-propre*; one through social institutions, and the other through individual character. Neuhouser believes that this approach is necessary because neither a society's structure and foundations, nor the rearing of children into adulthood is sufficient on their own. Therefore, Rousseau's political theory must be taken as a complete whole. Contrary to Shklar, Neuhouser believes that Rousseau intended *Emile* to be educated in two stages; first as a man, in the form of domestic education, and then in Book V, as a citizen and a husband. On this understanding Emile would become a man-citizen, and not merely a man as opposed to a citizen.

Two major points are being made within this interpretative debate. One concerns how to interpret the texts being discussed, primarily the *Social Contract* and *Emile*. The other concerns the interpretation of Rousseau's project. My thesis will attempt to resolve both these disputes. In the first section I shall begin with a close reading of Rousseau's political text, focusing primarily on the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract* and *Emile*. I shall then survey the competing interpretations presented by John Charvet, Judith Shklar, and Frederick Neuhouser. I shall show that, on balance, a close textual analysis

¹ (FN, p.155)

² (FN, p.155)

³ (FN, p.154)

supports Neuhouser's interpretation. However, Neuhouser fails to distance his interpretation from Rousseau's treatment of women, and unintentionally transports patriarchal themes into his reconstruction. The final section will ask what this reading tells us about Rousseau's project.

Contrary to both Shklar and Neuhouser, I contend that the correct interpretation of Rousseau's project is not one of inevitable destruction and damage limitation. Nor is it centred around the goal of controlling the dangers of inflamed *amour-propre*. Instead, I argue, the education of man, where education is understood as a lifetime pursuit, is the central theme in Rousseau's political philosophy. It is to be understood as a continual learning or becoming.

I believe that, by interpreting Rousseau in this way, one is able to overcome his misogyny while remaining otherwise true to his texts. As important as it is to understand Rousseau's political theory as he intended it to be understood, and as important as it is to identify the strongest interpretation of it, it is equally important to ask how the best ideas expressed therein are relevant and applicable today. I believe that the most prominent obstacle to accepting any interpretation of Rousseau's political theory lies in his treatment of women. The role of women in Rousseau's philosophy is a supportive one. Women are not citizens, and they are not taught to be free in the way that men are. A woman is a wife; a woman is an object of affection for properly directed *amour-propre*; a woman is not a man's equal. I shall turn to Rebecca Kukla and her analysis of gender relations in Rousseau to draw out these strands of his theory.

If Rousseau's political theory is dependent upon the roles played by people who do not enjoy full citizenship, then we must either accept the lesser role of women within society, or, examine whether Rousseau's model can be redeveloped to incorporate contemporary attitudes toward gender equality. There are two parts to this. First one must show that Rousseau's political theory is dependent upon this partialism and that it is at odds with the principle of equality that Rousseau promotes. Secondly, one must show that it is preferable to hold on to Rousseau's principle of equality and ask what a

modified account of his political theory would look like. I conclude by arguing that the solution to the social problem is the education of man over time. Rousseau provides a series of genealogical fictions that provide narratives of the changes we have undergone and what we aim to achieve. The role of these fictions is to serve as models to use in our continual education and re-education.

Section One - The Social Problem

The purpose of this section is to draw out the conflict between the *Social Contract* and *Emile* with regards to the type of freedom that they develop as ends and the type of person that constitutes their respective societies. Despite the prominence of this conflict and the fact that Rousseau wrote *Emile* and the *Social Contract* at same time – publishing them both in 1762 - Rousseau claims that his political thought can be read as a unified whole.¹ As such, it is interesting and important to ask how this conflict can be resolved, if it can be resolved at all. In this section I give a fuller account of Rousseau's political theory and in sections two, three, and four I shall focus on the debate surrounding it.

The stories told in *Emile* and the *Social Contract* are quite distinct. In the first we have the story of a baby taken away from the corrupting influence of society and educated, under the tutelage of Jean-Jacques, to become a free man. In the latter, Rousseau presents an account of the becoming of society where the men of the state of nature sacrifice their natural freedom. An act done in order to protect one's possessions and self from harm, to guarantee the civil freedom of a citizen, and to become member of a sovereign power. In these two books Rousseau appears to give, on the one hand, a blueprint of how to become free from the coercion of the state, and, on the other, an account of how to construct a state where the individual sacrifices their natural freedom in the name of the collective good. The problems that these books are designed to answer are first raised in Rousseau's previous works, the *First*² and *Second Discourse; Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, and *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* respectively.

In Rousseau we seem to have three different types of freedom and three distinct persons. There is the natural freedom which is found, and remains in, the state of nature with Natural man. Then there are the two freedoms developed in the *Social Contract* and *Emile* – the freedom of Civil man and of

¹ Confessions (2008)

² CWR vol.2

the free man respectively. In this section I shall establish the problem that Rousseau identifies in the *Second Discourse* by drawing out the concept of Natural man and the freedom that he possesses in the state of nature, compared with the unfreedom of Social man once we have become corrupted by society. Then I shall look at the two solutions that Rousseau offers for this problem. First in the *Social Contract*, and second in *Emile*.

In the *Second Discourse* Rousseau describes Civil man as a denatured individual, bearing little in common with the man of the state of nature. It is not simply the arts and sciences, as described in the *First Discourse*, that lead to the corruption of man but the coercive force of society as a whole. Rousseau's task is to identify Natural man in order to identify the source of inequality between men. He asks, "how can the source of inequality among men be known unless one begins by knowing men themselves? And how will man manage to see himself as Nature formed him, through all the changes that the sequence of times and things must have produced in his original constitution, and to separate what he gets from his own stock from what circumstances and his progress have added to or changed in his primitive state?"¹ It is in identifying Natural man that we can come to know Rousseau's conception of natural freedom. However, in order to discover Natural man Rousseau must recognise the limitations of his position. As a member of the corrupted and denatured citizens there is a problem of legitimacy in any claim that he may make about what Natural man was.

This obstacle is overcome, or at least sidestepped, by recognising that it is an obstacle. Rousseau makes a distinction between two types of inequality, one of which is political inequality. This is the inequality that results from societies corrupting influence. Rousseau distinguishes this from natural inequality which consists in the differences in mind and body natural to individuals. Political inequality, "consists in the different Privileges that some men enjoy to the prejudice of others, such as to be richer, more honoured, more Powerful than they, or even to make themselves obeyed by them."² It is

¹ (SD, p.12)

² (SD, p.18)

political inequality that Rousseau is primarily interested in, in that it is political inequality that is a consequence of, and fuel to further corruption of the individual. It is political inequality that Rousseau is attempting to look behind in order to catch a glimpse of man in his natural condition.

Rousseau argues that progress emphasises these political inequalities and leads man away from his primitive state. The farther away man is from that state the more difficult it is to see which inequalities amongst men are the result of natural and which political considerations. He writes, “the more new knowledge we accumulate, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of acquiring the most important knowledge of all; so that it is, in a sense, by dint of studying man that we have made ourselves incapable of knowing him.”¹ It is the moving away from Natural man that limits our understanding of him. This does not mean that change or progress are bad in themselves, only that they limit our ability to understand Natural man, and thereby limit our ability to understand what went wrong. If we allow the change to continue without correcting our mistakes these injustices may become so a part of man that they are assumed to be intrinsic features and therefore justifiable.

This method of approaching the state of nature is, in part at least, a response to those philosophers who have projected an idea of 'Savage' man prior to Rousseau, people such as Locke, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. Rousseau believes that those before him have not described the true state of nature in their hypothesis because they are transposing ideas from society into the state of nature without explaining why they would exist prior to society. In asserting that ideas such as property, justice, natural rights, and the authority of strength existed in the state of nature, and in “speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression, desires, and pride... they spoke about savage man and they described Civil man.”²

Rousseau instead uses his idea of a state of nature as an heuristic device. It is a hypothetical tool “better suited to clarify the Nature of things than to

¹ (SD, p.12)

² (SD, p.19)

show their genuine origin”.¹ Rousseau recognises that one cannot assume privileged knowledge as the author of these ideas. His task as he sets it up is to “form conjectures”² to show “what the human Race might have become if it had remained abandoned to itself.”³ Rousseau then attempts to access this hypothetical position and recount the history of man with the aim of expressing the nature of man. “Everything that comes from Nature will be true; there will be nothing false except what I have involuntarily put in of my own.”⁴

This is not an account of how men should be, but an explanation into what men are once the corrupting influence of society has been stripped away. Rousseau is providing a genealogical account of Natural man who upon forming simple cooperative association develops *amour-propre* and begins his descent, eventually degrading into a corrupted Civil man. He writes, “The times of which I am going to speak are very far off: how you have changed from what you were! It is, so to speak, the life of your species that I am going to describe to you according to the qualities you received, which your education and habits have been able to corrupt but have not been able to destroy.”⁵ Rousseau appears to take the position that the human species is on a continual regression from nature to destruction. Reflection will provide discontent with the present and “foretell even greater discontents for your unhappy Posterity”.⁶ As if this were not damning enough Rousseau adds that there is no going back and correcting the mistakes of the past. There is only the knowledge of the wrong been done, and “this sentiment must be the Eulogy of your first ancestors, the criticism of your contemporaries, and the dread of those who will have the unhappiness to live after you.”⁷

¹ (SD, p.19)

² (SD, p.19)

³ (SD, p.19)

⁴ (SD, p.19)

⁵ (SD, p.19 - 20)

⁶ (SD, p.20)

⁷ (SD, p. 20)

But once stripped away of this coercion what is left? For Rousseau, man is neither the aggressor motivated by fear and vainglory described by Hobbes, nor is he the rational guided creature of Locke's state of nature. According to Rousseau, in the state of nature man is neither good nor evil for he does not possess the capacity to act contrary to nature. Savage man “had neither vices nor virtues”.¹ He has “neither foresight nor curiosity”.² Further to this, Natural man is not bound by law or obligation, he does not suffer these impediments to his freedom for they exist only in more complex society. Natural man is also stupid and does not have the knowledge or learning to develop the virtues necessary for productive cooperation. “To will and not will, to desire and fear, will be the first and almost the only operations of his soul until new circumstances cause new developments in it.”³ It is the ability to feel that Rousseau ascribes to man in his most natural condition and it is through our passions that “reason is perfected”⁴ because we come to know only through our desire for pleasure. “It is impossible to conceive why one who had neither desires nor fears would go to the trouble of reasoning.”⁵ However, these desires are limited, they “do not exceed his Physical needs, the only goods he knows in the Universe are nourishment, a female, and repose; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger.”⁶ Man, in his most natural condition, differs from beast only to a small degree. There is only man's free agency and his faculty of self-perfection that distinguishes him from beast.

There are two sentiments that Rousseau ascribes to man prior to cooperative society, *amour de soi* and *pitié*.⁷ *Amour de soi* occurs in man first, it is his love of self, it is his desire for self-preservation. It is that power that leads him to satisfy the desire to satiate his hunger and slake his thirst. *Amour*

¹ (SD, p.34)

² (SD, p.28)

³ (SD, p.27)

⁴ (SD, p.27)

⁵ (SD, p.27)

⁶ (SD, p.34)

⁷ I shall, contrary to convention, not translate the French *pitié* into the English 'pity'. This is because I believe that the word is used by Rousseau to mean something more similar to the English 'empathy'. Further to this, the French word *pitié* does not carry the negative connotations of 'pity' that it seems to possess in the English language.

de soi is absolute and refers only to oneself. *Pitié* occurs later. Of *pitié* Rousseau writes: this principle, “which - having been given to man in order to soften, under certain circumstances, the ferocity of his *amour-propre* or the desire for self-preservation before the birth of this love - tempers the ardour he has for his own well-being by an innate repugnance to see his fellow suffer.”¹ This sentiment is natural to man and is also evident in some beasts. In moderating the actions of man that would otherwise solely be directed by their desire for self-preservation - *amour de soi - pitié* “contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species.”² According to Rousseau, “from this quality alone flow all the social virtues.”³ Natural man is guided by this sentiment without reflection, it is a natural and powerful feeling to avoid seeing the suffering of others, “in the state of Nature, it takes the places of Laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice.”⁴

The freedom that Natural man enjoys in the state of nature is natural freedom. It is a negative freedom and it “has no limit but the physical power of the individual concerned”.⁵ David James defines natural freedom as “a form of freedom that consists in encountering no obstacles when it comes to acting on the basis of one's desires except the limits of one's own physical and mental powers.”⁶

Although natural freedom is, to some extent, desirable its presupposition serves only to highlight the corrupted and denatured creatures that we have become. It is gone. We cannot turn back the clock and correct the mistakes that we have made, we can only move forwards. But what then is to be done, how do we regain freedom? There are two stories that Rousseau tells. One in *Emile* and one in *Social Contract*. I shall look at each in turn before asking how, if at all, these two stories are connected.

¹ (SD, p.36)

² (SD, p.37)

³ (SD, p.37)

⁴ (SD, p.37)

⁵ (SC, p.65)

⁶ (DJ, p.22)

Rousseau believes that in the state of nature a person is, in one very important sense, free – they are free to do as they please. However, at some point the obstacles to preservation within the state of nature lead people to embrace some kind of collective strength because otherwise they risk becoming too vulnerable to survive. This formation of collective strength is the formation of society by social contract and the theory behind it is developed in the book of the same name.

Rousseau's aim in the *Social Contract* is to establish a “legitimate and sure rule of administration”¹ that can be developed for people in their corrupted form. The concern is that this will undermine the individual's freedom and strength. The account of freedom that Rousseau gives in the *Social Contract* is difficult to tease out. It is formulated in providing a response to, what Rousseau presents as the primary question of the text – to discover a structure of cooperative society where the members obey only themselves, as they did in the state of nature, and “remain as free as before.”² According to Rousseau the answer to this problem, intriguingly for an attempt to maintain maximum freedom for the individual, is in the alienation of the individual to society.

In giving oneself over to society, and sacrificing the natural rights that one has in the state of nature, one guarantees a condition of equality within that society because everyone that joins the social pact makes the same sacrifice. Rousseau claims that the individual does not lose out through the alienation of their natural rights because they gain as much as they lose. The individual gains the rights, or at least their share of the rights, alienated by the other individuals who also joined the social contract. The terms of this social contract, according to Rousseau, can be expressed in the following way, “each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”³ A person is now, while a member of the social

¹ (SC, p.49)

² (SC, p.60)

³ (SC, p.61)

pact, both citizen and subject: a citizen when participating in the sovereign body of which one is a part and a subject when subject to the rules of that sovereign body.

Sovereignty, or the sovereign body, is what is created by the collection of individuals that comprise society. Sovereignty is “nothing but the exercise of the general will... [and] nothing but a collective being.”¹ This general will is an expression of the common interest, as opposed to the particular interest of an individual. The common interest is the sole thing that should govern society because it is the “point on which all interests agree”.² In other words, the only interests that are shared by all individuals are those interests that are common amongst all the members of society, and these are the interests that unite them.

Further to this, sovereignty is absolute in the power that it wields over the subjects of society. Rousseau writes, “the social pact gives the body politic absolute power over all of its members, and it is this same power which directed by the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of sovereignty.”³ This is because the people who join the social pact, in doing so, alienate all of their natural rights, which are considered beneficial to the community; but it is the Sovereign, not the person, who is the judge of what is important to the community. The individual retains only that which is of no use to the society and their share of power as a citizen. However, in the role of subject they are wholly under the dominion of sovereignty. So what exactly is the general will, and how is it realised without isolating those whose private interests run contrary to the general will?

The general will is distinct from all instances of particular will, even though they might sometimes agree, this agreement is fleeting and accidental. No particular will is continually or particularly represented by the general will. The general will is also distinct from the will of all because it regards only common interest. The will of all regards only private interests and is the sum

¹ (SC, p.69)

² (SC, p.69)

³ (SC, p.74)

of all the particular wills. The distinction between the general will and the will of all seems to be, solely, the absence or presence of private interest. Rousseau writes that if one takes away all of the “pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, what is left as the sum of the differences is the general will.”¹

Unlike an individual's deliberations, according to Rousseau, “the general will is always upright and always tends to the public utility”.² I believe that this means that the general will cannot err but that, even though each citizen attempts to engage in the general will, sometimes the individuals can err. This explains how majority verdicts can apply to the whole of society without imposing upon the freedom of its members. The people can never be corrupted but they can be led to be mistaken and it is only when the people are mistaken that the people appear bad. Furthermore, I understand Rousseau to be saying that when the people are mistaken they no longer express the general will and therefore cease to be the sovereign because the sovereign is nothing but the expression of the general will. As such, the general will can be imposed upon people when they express interests contrary to the general will without imposing upon their freedom because they were simply mistaken, and if they had reflected correctly they would have been in agreement with the general will. Therefore, there is no imposition only a recalibration of interests.

What Rousseau designs here is a model of society that prohibits any member from being under the arbitrary dominion of any other member, therefore retaining the freedom they had in the state of nature. The thought being that if each citizen is a part of the governing power, then each citizen is under the dominion of oneself as sovereign, and therefore one is not subject to dominion. By sacrificing one's natural freedom to the sovereign one risks being subject to its arbitrary will, but by the mechanisms of society defining each individual as the sovereign this risk is avoided. This is a form of republican

¹ (SC. p.73) This formulation of Rousseau's needs strengthening. I believe that for the general will to be productive it must be more than what is left after all private interests have been removed from the will of all. There must be some force gained, something above and beyond the will of all that accounts for the interests of all as a society. However, this worry does not impact on the social problem that is the subject of my thesis and as such I shall leave this comment as an aside.

² (SC. p.72)

freedom because it involves “independence of the arbitrary will of other human beings”¹ but according to James this represents only a part of genuine human freedom. In the move from the state of nature to cooperative society James identifies three different types of freedom in Rousseau's political philosophy. There is democratic freedom which “consists in the collective power of the members of a political community to determine the laws to which they are all subject.”² There is civil freedom which “consists in protection against arbitrary, unjust interference on the part of others”,³ and there is moral freedom. This final freedom James identifies as a form of positive freedom which consists in the restraint of one's appetites and actions “in accordance with universally valid rules that prescribe their duties to them, thus enabling them to consult their reason before following their inclinations.”⁴ This amounts to “self-mastery”⁵ by the individual. James claims that genuine freedom for Rousseau comes about once each of these freedoms has generated in man.

Rousseau, in the *Social Contract*, is arguing in favour of a freedom from arbitrary dominion and the opportunity to develop the self in a society governed by good social and political institutions. The value of republican freedom is greater than the value of the natural freedom of the state of nature, and combined with the positive freedom that results in self-mastery is greater still. Therefore the loss of the freedom to do as one pleases is more than compensated for by the freedom from dominion that Rousseau claims to have provided in the *Social Contract*.

An alternative interpretation of freedom in Rousseau's political philosophy is offered by N. J. H. Dent who gives an account of how one can be forced to be free in the republic without having one's freedom imposed upon. Dent also gives an explanation of what types of freedom are at play in both Natural man and Savage man. Dent distinguishes between three “effective

¹ (DJ, p.21)

² (DJ, p.21)

³ (DJ, p.21)

⁴ (DJ, p.22)

⁵ (DJ, p.22)

notions of freedom”¹ in Rousseau's political philosophy; circumstantial freedom, discretionary freedom, and principled freedom. Circumstantial freedom is the freedom (or lack thereof) from the pressures of one's environment and access to the means for desired action. This maps onto James' conception of the natural freedom of man in its earliest form.

Discretionary freedom is made up of two parts. The first, “comprises the power to regulate the dictation of present impulse or desire, in view of some believed future good or harm which present action on desire would affect.”² The second is an expression of an agent's supposed right to act in accordance with those desires without imposition. Dent writes, “the individual who enjoys maximal discretionary freedom decides all matters according to his own lights (on his own preferred basis), following his own modes of appraisal, reaching his own decision upon which he acts unchecked and unquestioned.”³ Principled freedom is the freedom of the citizen and an extension of discretionary freedom but it is not possible to retain maximal discretionary freedom in civic association because one cannot be a citizen if one is only answerable to oneself.

Dent diffuses the tension between the subject and the citizen, and shows how they remain as free as they were in the state of nature. Man's entry into civil association is motivated, in part at least, by the desire to increase circumstantial freedom by aiming to improve one's “material situation”.⁴ Circumstantial freedom is simply access to the tools and means to exercise one's desire. In making this move from the state of nature one sacrifices a degree of discretionary freedom, but this is not done in accordance with an “enlightened will”.⁵ Rather the move is motivated by the individual's “actual will”.⁶ A person who is governed by their actual will is one who “forms the idea of his own best interest (according to *his own* notions and estimates of what this might consist in), and seeks to regulate and direct his conduct to the

¹ (ND, p.195)

² (ND, p.195)

³ (ND, pp.195-6)

⁴ (ND, p.196)

⁵ (ND, p.197)

⁶ (ND, p.197)

achievement of this.”¹ Discretionary freedom when applied to actual will, which is representative of license and not freedom at all, fails to act freely in a meaningful way. In contrast with a person's actual will, which is derived from their “envisaged good”,² is a person's enlightened will which is derived from their “proper good”.³ Discretionary freedom when applied to an enlightened will is a good for the individual and if achieved an example of principled freedom.

The idea is that if an agent's desires are directed by inflamed *amour-propre* then maximal discretionary freedom would not be beneficial to the agent because they would neither be acting in their own best interests, nor in the best interests of anybody else. By contrast, in an agent who does not suffer from inflamed *amour-propre*, since their “desires and beliefs are 'natural' and true”,⁴ discretionary freedom would be a great good. However, discretionary freedom “allied to our enlightened will”⁵ becomes principled freedom. This transition is simple and follows from the recognition that our desire for honour and respect for ourselves “requires us to afford to others honour and respect” in turn. We therefore, do not seek maximal discretionary freedom but trade it off in order to secure a greater and more valuable freedom in association. Dent writes, “Principled' freedom is the unfettered scope to utilize one's power of choice and action to the pursuit of objectives, courses of conduct, that have the endorsement of right reason, as that is judged not just by oneself alone but by whatever person or agency is the custodial interpreter and arbitrator of what the requirements of 'right reason' actually amount to.”⁶

Whether we take the explication of James or Dent it is clear that both what a citizen is and the freedom that governs them are deeply ingrained in the state of which they are a part. The freedom of the citizen is defined and constructed by the state. It seems strange, then, that at the same time as the

¹ (ND, p.197)

² (ND, p.198)

³ (ND, p.198)

⁴ (ND, p.198)

⁵ (ND, p.198)

⁶ (ND, pp.198-9)

Social Contract was published Rousseau also published a second book that attempts to show the path to freedom external to the state. This is the story of *Emile* and here Rousseau develops not the citizen but the free individual. In fact, the citizen is a subject of criticism in *Emile* and not something to be aspired to at all.

The freedom developed in *Emile* is not just distinct from the freedom developed in the *Social Contract*. There is also an important distinction to be made here between the freedom postulated by Rousseau in the *Second Discourse* and the freedom developed in his work of pedagogy *Emile*. The first thing Rousseau writes at the beginning of *Emile* is “Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.”¹ The focus of *Emile* is on the creation of a free man within the domain of this corruption whereas the *Second Discourse* does not have to contend with the coercive power of society because it is a postulation of man prior to its advent. Therefore, although both the *Second Discourse* and *Emile* address freedom of the self, if we are to take seriously Rousseau's claim that society is necessarily corrupting – which it is clear that we should – we must ask what form of freedom does *Emile* undertake to develop and how is it distinct from the natural freedom of Savage man and what form of the self does Rousseau develop to possess this freedom?

The opening pages of *Emile* describe the limitations and failures of man in the present state of affairs. According to Rousseau, man forces and coerces everything around him to bend it to his will, “he disfigures everything”² but, to not do so “would go even worse”.³ One left to himself in the midst of society from birth “would be the most disfigured of all.”⁴ We must protect our children from these negative influences through education. “We are born weak, we need strength; we are born totally unprovided, we need aid; we are born stupid, we need judgement. Everything we do not have at birth and which we need when

¹ (E, p.37)

² (E, p.37)

³ (E, p.37)

⁴ (E, p.37)

we are grown is given us by education.”¹ The story of the education in *Emile* is set out to provide us with the answer of how to achieve this strength.

Rousseau identifies three origins of education – men, things, and nature. Education by nature refers to our “internal development of our faculties”,² education by men is that which we are taught by men, and education by things is our learning through our own experiences with the objects around us. Only one of these should determine our education and that is nature because we have no control over that which comes from nature. Therefore we must direct education by men and things to be in accordance with education by nature. “He alone in whom they all coincide at the same points and tend to the same ends reaches his goal and lives consistently. He alone is well raised.”³ What Rousseau means by nature is not habit but our “original dispositions”⁴ before the redirection of our senses by the corruption we suffer. Nature is that which exists before we are “Constrained by our habits”⁵ and “corrupted by our opinions”.⁶ It is that which he tries to identify in the *Second Discourse*. So when Rousseau says that we should be educated by nature, and that the education by things and men should be consistent with nature, he is saying that our education should reflect the development of Natural man.

These three “masters”⁷ conflict with one another only as a result of man's misguided ideas of education. “When, instead of raising man for himself, one wants to raise him for others”,⁸ one makes harmony within the self and harmony in society impossible. The freedom that results from the education described in *Emile* is not civil freedom. “Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man and a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time.”⁹ This apparent conflict between a free

¹ (E, p.38)

² (E, p.38)

³ (E, p.38)

⁴ (E, p.38)

⁵ (E, p.39)

⁶ (E, p.39)

⁷ (E, p.38)

⁸ (E, p.39)

⁹ (E, p.39)

man and a free citizen, and the priority of one over the other, is the circle I wish to square in Rousseau's political philosophy. It is in this passage that the conflict is most apparent because, whereas the project of the *Social Contract* appears to be the creation of the free citizen, Rousseau goes on to say in *Emile* that “Civil man is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body.”¹ And again a little further on in the text, “Civil man is born, lives, and dies in slavery. At his birth he is sewed in swaddling clothes; at his death he is nailed in a coffin. So long as he keeps his human shape, he is enchained by his institutions.”² As such, it is important to look at what Rousseau believes is the consequence of the process outlined in *Emile*. What is a free man?

Rousseau offers a virtue account of freedom – arguably in line with what we would call a positive account of freedom. The virtues that he identifies are that *Emile* must be a good judge of character, strong, hardy, humble, and appreciate the value of knowledge, and authority of one's masters. These virtues are learnt through negative education. The idea behind negative education is that a child is allowed to develop at their own pace and through their own experiences. They learn by engaging with what they themselves find interesting. This technique is still commonly used, to a greater or lesser extent, with infants today and is often referred to as learning through play.

However, there is a deeply paradoxical element of *Emile* in that the child is subject to the most extensive coercion and control at the hands of the tutor. This is in order to guarantee that *Emile* has the right kind of experiences, at the right time, and with the right consequences. It is only important to Rousseau that the child does not perceive the coercion and that the coercion is of the right type. This strong paternalism is concerning, insidious and unhelpfully dismissed by Rousseau himself, who asserts that when *Emile* becomes a free man and discovers the truth about his childhood he will thank the tutor, there will be no issue of broken trust. For now we shall leave these concerns aside.³

¹ (E, p.39-40)

² (E, p.42-3)

³ I shall return to the subject of the insidiousness of Rousseau's teaching methods in section four.

Emile is developed as a free individual but it is unclear in which way he is free. He is free from the corrupting influences of society but is subject to the arbitrary will of his tutor. He does not seem to happily fit into any one of the conceptions of freedom that James and Dent have identified within Rousseau's political philosophy, because he is neither a member of society nor a member of the state of nature. Emile exists in a space that is external to all those forces. One way of interpreting the freedom that Emile participates in is as a caricature of positive freedom - the kind that Isaiah Berlin warned us against.¹ Through the negative education that he receives, Emile develops into a man that is able to assume the roles and responsibilities of husband, father, and citizen and withstand the corrupting influences of society. He is able to achieve this because of the virtues inculcated in him by his tutor Jean-Jacques. However, as mentioned above the freedom is undermined by the dominion exercised by his tutor in achieving these results.

If these three books are to present a unified theory as Rousseau himself claims they do, how are they to achieve that in the face of such seemingly divergent themes, theories of freedom, and concepts of the person? In the following three sections I shall present three different interpretations of Rousseau that tackle this very question with different levels of success. In the first, Charvet concludes that Rousseau is inconsistent and incoherent. In the second Shklar claims that Rousseau is inconsistent but intentionally so, and in the third Neuhausner presents an interpretation of Rousseau with a fully positive conclusion. Not only are his books consistent with one another but they present a compatible and coherent whole that presents a conception of a new type of person - the man-citizen.

¹ *Four Essays on Liberty*, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Isaiah Berlin (Oxford, 1958)

Section Two - Dissolution

In the following three sections I shall present three opposing interpretations of Rousseau's political thought. What unites these theories is that each recognises a problem that is originally set out in the *Second Discourse* and answered in Rousseau's subsequent works *Emile* and *Social Contract*.¹ This problem, which I have drawn out from the literature in the previous section, is that an unjustifiable inequality results necessarily from the society of Social man. Social man has been corrupted by this society and is as a result unfree. Rousseau aims to identify Natural man, that person that remains once all societal influence has been stripped away, in order to provide a platform for a new man, one that does not succumb to the failures of Social man. The three interpretations under discussion provide an interesting spectrum of thought which serves to highlight the difficulty in interpreting Rousseau's political work and the richness and depth it offers. According to the first interpretation, this leads to the conclusion that Rousseau's project is incoherent. John Charvet argues that the Natural man described in the *Second Discourse* is itself an incoherent ideal and, further to this, that Rousseau's concept of Natural man is necessarily inconsistent with his conception of a citizen. The attempted resolution offered in *Emile*, where the creation of the man-citizen is described, is consequently unsuccessful, and Rousseau's project dissolves.

By way of contrast with this view, in section three, I shall present Judith Shklar's interpretation of the tension between the concepts of man and citizen. Shklar agrees with Charvet that there is no reconciliation between man and citizen to be had, but argues, contrary to Charvet, that this is intentional. Drawing on three important aspects of Rousseau's political theory, namely his links with utopian thought, the influence of François Fénelon upon his philosophy, and a focus on the opening passages of *Emile*, Shklar is able to present a defence of this claim and find meaning in the incompatibility of man and citizen.

¹ I, like Charvet and Neuhausser, refer exclusively to the three texts mentioned in interpreting this project. Whereas Shklar casts her net wider but still draws heavily on these three texts.

The third interpretation that I discuss is that of Frederick Neuhouser who provides a more positive interpretation of Rousseau's political project. By placing the interpretative emphasis on *amour-propre*, Neuhouser argues that Rousseau uses a “two-pronged approach”¹ to overcome the inflamed *amour-propre* of Social man. I shall look at each of these interpretations in turn. In the final section I shall develop my own view - a reconstruction of Rousseau's project of reconciling man and citizen designed to overcome his unsavoury attitude toward women, and maximise the possibility of the realisation of man-citizens.

The first and most unflattering account of Rousseau's position within this triptych of interpretations is that of John Charvet. After establishing the existence of a tension between Natural man and Civil man in the *Second Discourse*, Charvet argues that Rousseau fails to present a coherent theory of the man-citizen at all.² Charvet writes, “*Discourse on the Origins of Inequality...* contains an account of how the social conditions of men's existence create for them a fundamental problem as to their individual identities.”³ Charvet believes that, in both *Emile* and *Social Contract*, Rousseau seeks to resolve this tension. In *Emile* he takes an educational and moral perspective; in *Social Contract* the perspective of political relations. However, according to Charvet, Rousseau fails to provide a resolution in either of these works. His project dissolves because it demands that man be both denatured and founded on nature, and this cannot be done.

Charvet's discussion starts from what he describes as the assumption that has stood at the foundation of Rousseau's philosophy since the moment of illumination that led to the fevered account of corruption in the *First Discourse*:⁴ the assumption that man is by nature good, and only becomes otherwise when individuals are corrupted by society. Rousseau attempts to illuminate this process in the *Second Discourse*, by drawing out a conception of Natural man. By removing all that is imposed on us by society he is

¹ (FN, p.157)

² (JC, p.3)

³ (JC, p.1)

⁴ CWR, vol. 2

theoretically able to identify what is left and to portray man in his natural condition.

Natural goodness is therefore displayed after the influences of society and other people have been removed. As Charvet puts it, “[Natural man] possesses neither imagination nor language, and having no understanding of past and future, lives only in the present.”¹ Further to this, in the savage condition it is only Natural man's perfectibility and faculty of free will that make him distinguishable from a beast. “His behaviour in the present is governed by those two principles, *amour de soi* and pity, which themselves are impulses of the soul derived directly from nature, and not dependent on the existence of reason.”² These two principles, the sentiments of *amour de soi* and *pitié*, are all that is natural to man in his original state. There is no *amour-propre* in the state of nature because *amour-propre* is a relational concept, a self-love that comes about only when cooperative society has developed and the interactions between men become regular and fixed.

Contrasted with this conception of Natural man is Civil man. Charvet draws attention to a passage of *Emile*:

“Civil man is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by his relation to the whole, which is the social body. Good social institutions are those which best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and to transport the *I* into the communal unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole.”³

Citizen's must lose their individuality in order to become members of the state, sacrificing their private identity for a public one. For the citizen, “his primary identity is a general identity”.⁴ In fact, the “citizen's self-identification

¹ (JC, p.9)

² (JC, p.9)

³ (E, pp.39-40)

⁴ (JC, p,40)

excludes his having an identity which distinguishes him from all other men,”¹ or even, any other man. This concept of a person contrasts with the one found in the *Second Discourse*, where all individuals develop a public identity, while retaining their private identity, and with it the corrupting *amour-propre* that characterises Social man.

The move from Natural man to Social man occurs when people start to live in small communities. On the one hand this constitutes a golden age for man. What Rousseau calls the, “golden mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of *amour-propre*... the happiest and most durable epoch”.² On the other hand it ushers in corruption and servitude. In such an environment men develop a public identity, which Charvet describes as, “the identity created for them by public opinion to which they attach value.”³ No longer is man able to live entirely for himself. In seeing and spending time with others man compares himself to them, and his conception of his own worth begins to be shaped by his perception of how he stands in that relation. Instead of only feeling *amour de soi*, the love of the self as the first in one's own eyes he now also feels *amour-propre*, the love of the self compared to others. Moreover, it is in this transition that vice arises, because the individual desires to be first in the eyes of others as well as in his own eyes and becomes subject to envy, contempt, and pride. Charvet writes, “The arrival of vice on the scene as well can only be because the nature of man's self-love has been transformed from *amour de soi* into *amour-propre*.”⁴

However, as Rousseau points out, *amour-propre* can only arise in certain social conditions which characterise the 'golden age', namely the division of labour, exchange of products, economic specialisation, and private property. Of these, private property is the most significant, because it creates a gap between richer and poorer individuals and family groups, which in turn fosters *amour-propre*. As Charvet concludes, “property and economic inequality merely provide the fertile soil for *amour-propre*, hitherto restricted in its growth by the

¹ (JC, p.40)

² (SD, p.48)

³ (JC, p.21)

⁴ (JC, p.21)

egalitarian circumstances of primitive Social man's existence, to spring into vigorous life.”¹ The Social man described here is the corrupt man of contemporary society. He is neither the man of nature who lives entirely for himself, nor he is the denatured citizen who lives entirely for other people. Moreover, whereas both the citizen and Natural man have the potential to live a life of value and thus resolve the problem of human corruption, Social man does not. Charvet believes that the solution provided by Natural man, and the solution provided by Civil man, are to be found in *Emile* and the *Social Contract* respectively and each comes about through a form of education, domestic or public.

Both Natural man and Civil man exemplify valuable ways of life because, in living entirely for themselves, as in the former, or entirely for other people, as in the latter, they “achieve a significant unity in their lives, and so become something”² By contrast, Social man is merely a “self-contradictory nullity”.³ To illustrate this Charvet claims, of the three different types of man that Rousseau posits, while Social man represents what we are, Natural and Civil man represent ways that we have led, or could lead, valuable lives.

However, according to Charvet, neither Natural man nor Civil man provides a viable solution to the troubles of Social man, because they are incompatible with one another. Moreover, so Charvet argues, the very concept of Natural man that Rousseau develops is inconsistent with itself. Taking the latter point first, Charvet points out that according to Rousseau, Natural man is distinct from non-human animals in two ways; he is perfectible and has free will. Rousseau understands the faculty of perfectibility to be, in Charvet's words, “a capacity in men to develop themselves, both individually and as a species, so that they change through time with the aid of changing circumstances in a way in which animals do not.”⁴ Charvet does not challenge this because he believes it to be a stronger distinction than that of free will. According to Rousseau, Natural man is able to act contrary to nature through

¹ (JC, p.26)

² (JC, p.38)

³ (JC, p.38)

⁴ (JC, p.8)

his own determination. “This free agency manifests itself in men's capacity to will or choose independently of his natural impulses.”¹

Charvet does not think that this conception of free will is easily reconcilable with Rousseau's conception of Natural man because Rousseau states that Natural man has all that is necessary in nature for him to live comfortably and happily. This implies that there are in humans two distinct forms of desire; desires deriving from our natural impulses - *amour de soi* and *pitié* - and those that derive from reason and are a consequence of our free agency. Natural man appears only to be governed by the former. The problem with this view, according to Charvet, is that, “free will would appear as an interruption of and potential interference with these natural impulses. For free will as described by Rousseau involves the capacity to distinguish oneself from nature, and determine oneself to follow or not to follow nature's impulses.”² As such, it seems that either Natural man has everything he needs to lead a valuable life or he has free will. If the former, as Rousseau seems to hold, Natural man is not distinct from non-human animals; if the latter, he is not distinct from Social man. As such, Charvet concludes that the existence of free will bleeds the concepts of Natural man and Social man together.

Another problem for Rousseau's account of Natural man concerns the distinction between *amour-propre* and *amour de soi*. Charvet is suspicious of this distinction and argues that Rousseau does not provide sufficiently distinct definitions to keep them apart. “For if Natural man is capable of observing and judging himself, there seems to be no reason why he should not be in a position to compare himself with other men in respect of their physical capacities in the pursuit of existence”,³ and this will presumably result in *amour-propre*. If Charvet is right in this respect, there seems little to distinguish *amour de soi* from *amour-propre* and Natural and Social man cannot be distinguished by the quality of their desires.

¹ (JC, p.8)

² (JC, pp.9-10)

³ (JC, p.16)

The fine line between reflective and unreflective sentiments is again at play in Rousseau's conception of *pitié*, and here Charvet detects another problem. *Pitié*, he writes, “carries us without reflexion to the help of those we see suffer and that this involves putting ourselves in the place of the sufferer and identifying ourselves with him.”¹ *Pitié* is the basis for social virtues; but how can one understand *pitié* in this way without also understanding that it demands we identify with others as people like ourselves? Charvet writes, “All these characteristics... make pity into an unnatural sentiment, that is a sentiment which Natural man could not be said to experience [because it]... requires the ability to go out of oneself in one's feeling for the other, to live outside oneself in the other, whereas Natural man is characterised as living wholly within himself, as exemplified in a consciousness which includes no others in it.”²

By drawing attention to the tensions within it, Charvet concludes that Rousseau has not presented a coherent portrait of Natural man. In addition to this Rousseau is vulnerable to a second line of criticism, according to Charvet. Even if a satisfactory account of Natural man could be found, it cannot be made consistent with Civil man, in which case the man-citizen delineated in *Emile* is a fantasy. Charvet develops this strand of opposition to Rousseau through an analysis of the aims of the *Second Discourse* and an analysis of the ways in which *Emile* and the *Social Contract* are employed to solve the problems it poses. Charvet writes, “The problem with [the radical opposition between nature and society] is how, if we can neither return to nature in its original form, nor be content with our present corrupt social existence, we can reform Social man in such a way as to bring about a reconciliation between nature and society.”³

Rousseau frames his enquiry in the *Second Discourse* as one of discovering the origins of inequality. However, Charvet rightly notes that the scope of the text is much broader than this implies. As Charvet explains, “The

¹ (JC, p.18)

² (JC, pp.18-19)

³ (JC, p.36)

question about inequality provides an entry into a wider enquiry, for [Rousseau] takes the presence of inequality, of the moral and political variety, to be intimately connected with the existence of corruption, so that an understanding of the rise of the one will provide an understanding of the rise of the other.”¹ In man's natural condition there was perfect political equality. Inequality is, for Rousseau at least, a product of society.

Charvet treads a familiar path in viewing *Emile* and the *Social Contract* as solutions to the problems identified in the *Second Discourse* and sets out the structure of his argument accordingly. He argues both that the Natural man developed and defended by Rousseau in *Emile* and the Civil man defended and developed in *Social Contract* are incompatible with one another, and that neither is sufficient to overcome the problems from the *Second Discourse*. Man cannot be both denatured and founded on nature, which is what an egalitarian society requires.

In Charvet's view *Emile* and *Social Contract* attempt to resolve the problem posed in the *Second Discourse* on two levels. In *Emile* the solution takes “the form of a moral education for the new man”²; in the *Social Contract* it takes on “the political principles that should govern the new society.”³ Rousseau's aim is to “conceive of a form of social life which avoids the self-contradictoriness of the corrupt bourgeois form by showing how the life of man according to nature and the life of the citizen can be reconciled.”⁴

In order to show that Rousseau's project fails, Charvet has to work hard to draw out the concept of Natural man as the polar opposite of Civil man. By doing so, he cuts off any possibility of a successful resolution between the two. He describes the solution provided by the *Social Contract* as, “the solution against nature”.⁵ Whereas it is nature that Rousseau depends upon to succeed in developing the free individual in *Emile*. Rousseau cannot remove the contradictions between man and citizen, as he states is one of his aims within

¹ (JC, p.5)

² (JC, p.36)

³ (JC, p.36)

⁴ (JC, p.39)

⁵ (JC, p.39)

Emile because man is the product of nature and Civil man is necessarily denatured.

It is Charvet's contention that Rousseau has failed to resolve the social problem expressed in terms of the type of person that inhabits the world - Natural man or Civil man - and Rousseau has failed to provide a reconciliation of nature and society. Charvet writes, "The absurdity and incoherence of Rousseau's theory lies precisely in the elaboration of a social ideal founded on a rejection of the right of individuals to live and value each other in their particularity."¹ Since, valuing individuals as individuals through the sentiment of *pitié* "is the source and content of the mutual affection"² which brings people together into cooperative society, for Rousseau to argue that it is a corrupting force, "is absurd"³ and as such it cannot survive as the social principle.

Charvet's interpretation of Rousseau is open to two main criticisms. First, in failing to allow that there is a distinction between the Natural man of the *Second Discourse* and the Natural man of *Emile* he is guilty of misrepresenting Natural man. His mistaken interpretation of these categories allows him to posit an unduly wide gulf between Natural and Civil man and then claim that Rousseau is unable to cross it. To challenge Charvet's interpretation we need to read Rousseau not as defining two fixed types, Natural man and Civil man, but as offering a genealogical development of the latter. Rousseau makes this clear in writing, "the times of which I am going to speak are very far off: how you have changed from what you were! It is, so to speak, the life of your species that I am going to describe to you according to the qualities you received, which your education and habits have been able to corrupt but have not been able to destroy."⁴

The first clarification that I shall offer on Rousseau's behalf is in response to Charvet's accusation that if Natural man possesses free will then Natural man cannot be directed entirely by his natural sentiments, *amour de soi* and *pitié*. The reason that Charvet asserts this is because free agency is a power

¹ (JC, p.146)

² (JC, p.146)

³ (JC, p.146)

⁴ (SD, pp.19-20)

that allows Natural man to act contrary to nature. On this view, Natural man becomes incoherent because free will and nature are two distinct forces that pull man in different directions. However, even if we accept Charvet's interpretation of Natural man there are two possible responses Rousseau can make. First, we may say that Natural man has free will but it is dormant in the state of nature. Until he develops *amour-propre* Natural man lacks the tools necessary to exercise free will because before the development of *amour-propre*, Natural man's actions are dictated by nature.

Secondly, there is a stronger response deriving from an argument that Rousseau makes in *Emile*. As mentioned in section one, Rousseau argues that there are three forms of education - nature, things, and men. It is only when the three act in concert that one "lives consistently"¹ and is "well-raised".² If Natural man already has all of the tools needed to live happily and consistently this is because there is no corrupting influence guiding him away from the education by nature. Under these circumstances free will simply coincides with the dictates of nature. Not until the age of reason and *amour-propre*, does man need to employ his free will to avoid being led astray.

Charvet's second argument for the inconsistency of Rousseau's conception of Natural man concerns the distinction between natural sentiments. Rousseau is guilty of a slippage in his definitions of *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*, and his treatment of *pitié* underscores this confusion. *Pitié* develops in man prior to *amour-propre* but after *amour de soi*. Charvet argues that *pitié* is necessarily comparative because "for to identify oneself with the suffering other, would seem to require the recognition of the other as like oneself."³ Furthermore, in *Emile* Rousseau describes *pitié* as a relative sentiment, "involving the comparison of oneself with others".⁴ *Pitié*, therefore, represents the hinge between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* because how can Natural man be capable of *pitié*, an intrinsically relational sentiment, but not of comparative self-love? The sentiments appear to bleed into one another and as

¹ (E, p.38)

² (E, p.38)

³ (JC, p.18)

⁴ (JC, p.18)

a result Natural man must be capable of experiencing relational sentiments including *amour-propre* and is therefore not directed entirely by nature.

My response to Charvet on this matter depends upon a particular interpretation of the distinction between the natural sentiments. Charvet understands *amour-propre* as a transformation from *amour de soi* and not the birth of a new distinct passion. For Charvet, upon the development of early cooperative society man's self-love begins to be redirected. No longer is man's self-love to be defined by how he thinks of himself, from the birth of society it is defined through comparison to other people. This is arguably a mistake, Neuhouser, who I shall discuss in more detail in section four, argues for a sharp distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* and defines *amour-propre* in a way that seems to overcome the concerns that Charvet expresses above. According to Neuhouser, "The three conditions that... any instance of self-love must meet in order to be considered a form of *amour-propre*....are: 1) that the good it seeks be *esteem*....; 2) that the esteem or worth it desires be *defined comparatively*....; and 3) that its goal be esteem or worth *in the eyes (judgement) of other subjects*."¹ These three conditions must be taken together because *amour de soi* can fulfil the first criterion.

Rousseau argues in the *Second Discourse* that *pitié* is not a relational sentiment and that it is instead a natural compulsion to avoid seeing suffering. However, even if *pitié* turns out to be relational in the way that Charvet describes it does not follow that Rousseau failed to define three distinct sentiments and that Natural man becomes susceptible to *amour-propre*. All three of Neuhouser's conditions must be fulfilled for the self-love to be *amour-propre* therefore one can concede that *pitié* is in part relational and maintain a distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. It is true that there is an overlap between the three concepts of *amour de soi*, *pitié*, and *amour-propre*. However, it does not follow that there is an overlap between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. As such, Charvet's distinction to show an incoherence in Natural man fails.

¹ (FN, p.13)

Charvet's concern with the consistency of Rousseau's conception of Natural man is subordinate to his larger concern that, even if this conception was consistent, it could not be made consistent with Rousseau's conception of Civil man and thus that a devastating tension would continue to affect Rousseau's argument. Charvet's analysis of man and citizen is designed to preclude any reconciliation; but his mistake lies in reading Rousseau as regarding Civil man and Natural man as fixed concepts. On Charvet's reading, a citizen is defined by certain definite traits at all times, and this applies to Natural man as well. For example, Charvet primarily describes Civil man in the terms set out at the beginning of *Emile*, as the individual who must sacrifice his private identity for a public one. However, the Civil man of the *Social Contract* clearly does have both a private and a public identity, the former dictated by themselves in their family and the latter by the general will. So, Charvet's conclusion is highly contentious in relation to the text.

Additionally Charvet describes Natural man as possessing “neither imagination nor language”¹ and yet this is the same beast who enters into cooperative society. It cannot be the case that a man without language or imagination could conceive of the need for and purpose of cooperative society. Therefore, Charvet's interpretation fails to do justice to the texts.

In my view a more productive reading of Rousseau allows for two different forms of Civil man. The ancient citizen and the contemporary. This is in line with Neuhouser's recent interpretation of Rousseau. For example the ancient citizen who is criticised as denatured in Book I of *Emile*, and the modern citizen who is the subject of the *Social Contract* and Book V of *Emile*. The ancient citizen is what Rousseau describes at the beginning of *Emile*. He is nothing but his role for the state. The ancient citizen is a bearer “of the general will at the expense of their individual sovereignty”.² They identify their meaning completely with their polity and consider their private interests none. This is in contrast to what Neuhouser calls the modern citizen. He writes, “Modern citizens, on the other hand, are to differ from their ancient

¹ (JC, p.9)

² (FN, p.22)

counterparts in that they conceive of and value themselves as individuals and, most important, submit to the general will only on the basis of their own rational insight into the goodness of the laws that obligate them.”¹

Moreover, one can find a distinction between Natural man and Savage man. The man of the state of nature progresses by stages into Social man. In Charvet's interpretation there is one type of each. The Natural man posited in the state of nature is the same man until the advent of *amour-propre* at the beginning of cooperative society when he becomes corrupted Social man. This is not the whole story. Rousseau appeals to the state of nature as a hypothetical tool, in order to show how man would be without societal influence. The story told in the state of nature “must not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings”.² From this starting point, he builds a history of man that provides an explanation of his degeneration. There is no need to take it that man in the initial stages of this process possesses all and only the traits of the man who enters cooperative society. Man in his original condition exists without language or reason. “His imagination portrays nothings to him; his heart asks nothing of him”.³ Whereas the Natural man who first forms cooperative society has progressed from this point. He is further along in the genealogical story. This Natural man has developed *pitié* to accompany his *amour de soi* and is in a position to begin developing *amour-propre*.

This development of Natural man is mirrored in the education of *Emile*. Charvet is guilty of an important oversight in failing to see this. He writes, “I shall, however, pass over what Rousseau has to say about infancy, for it has little bearing on the main part of the argument.”⁴ Charvet takes this position because in his view, “Rousseau describes the infant as having no sentiment or idea, or even a consciousness of his own existence, and it is only with the latter that the life of the individual properly begins.”⁵ But this being without

¹ (FN, p.22)

² (SD, p.19)

³ (SD, p.28)

⁴ (JC, p.41)

⁵ (JC, p.41)

sentiments of itself is equivalent to the Savage man that Rousseau hypothesises in the *Second Discourse*. The stage of infancy in *Emile* is mirrored by the stupid brute of the state of nature. The education of infancy is of the utmost importance and lays the foundation for all that comes after. It is the same for the savage as it is the babe.

Charvet also passes by the next stage of pedagogical development without seeing the parallel between the two stories told. He recognises that Rousseau, “identifies a radical break in the child's development with the onset of adolescence at the age of fifteen.”¹ The specificity of the age need not concern us but the change in educational tactics should. Rousseau takes great pains to ensure that *pitié* is inculcated in *Emile* before the passions take hold. This is arguably because Rousseau wishes *Emile*'s education to reflect the development of Natural man. The parallel event can be seen to occur in Natural man in the Golden Age of rudimentary cooperative union. The stories told are entirely developmental. However, Charvet fails to recognise the psychological mirror that Rousseau holds up. *Amour de soi* and *pitié* are natural sentiments. *Amour de soi* is unreflective and is the earliest natural sentiment to occur in man. *Pitié* is born later in the development of man, and later still is the development of *amour-propre*.

Amour-propre occurs in early cooperative society when we learn to compare the value of ourselves through others, and in the psychological development of man at the onset of the passions and reason. If we understand Natural man in this way we can see that there is no fixed and constant conception of Natural man. It is not so easy to say, as Charvet does, that Natural man lives entirely for himself. This is only true of Savage man in the earliest stages of human development.

Setting up the concepts of Natural man and Civil man against each other in such a way allows for no possibility of reconciliation. I believe a more accurate and philosophically fruitful interpretation of Rousseau is to think of Civil man and Natural man as projects that take place over time. So despite being abstract they are not fixed in definition but progress into a consistent

¹ (JC, p.45)

model of both through a larger pedagogical project. I shall return to this idea in the final section when I develop my own view in more detail. Furthermore, this response to Charvet feeds back in to my response to his charge of inconsistency regarding Natural man. This accusation can only be made if Natural man is indeed a fixed construct. By describing Natural man as a multi-layered being that changes over time all of the force is taken out of Charvet's argument.

Ultimately, Charvet identifies an important tension in Rousseau's political work and although I believe that he is mistaken in claiming that Civil and Natural man are incompatible polar opposites, I have not shown the opposite to be true. However, there is a further complaint to which Charvet's interpretation of Rousseau is open, one that Judith Shklar explores. It may be the case that Rousseau did not intend to provide a positive resolution at all. The concepts of Natural and Civil man may be incompatible with each other after all, not because of a failure on Rousseau's part, but because he intended it to be the case.

Section Three - Negative Resolution

In the introduction I gave a brief account of Judith Shklar's interpretation of a perceived conflict within Rousseau's political philosophy. Here I shall present Shklar's interpretation in more detail so that we can appreciate the full force of her position. According to Shklar, Rousseau offers two utopias: Sparta, the utopia of man if he chooses to sacrifice his particular interests in favour of the security of the public interest; and the Golden Age, a utopia of self-expression and freedom from the coercions of the state. Shklar argues that these two utopias are incompatible with one another and also, that they were intended to be so. The task that Shklar sets herself is much more complicated than the one I pursue here because she considers a much wider collection of Rousseau's works. She reconstructs the path of the individual in Sparta not solely from the *Social Contract* but additionally from Rousseau's letters,¹ the *Discourse of Political Economy*,² as well as from the second half of *Corsica*,³ and much of *Poland*.⁴ Similarly, Shklar does not limit herself, as I do, to considering *Emile* in her development of the idea of Rousseau's Golden Age. Again, she draws on Rousseau's works *Emile et Sophie*⁵ and *la Nouvelle Héloïse*,⁶ as well as on Rousseau's autobiographical work, *Reveries*.⁷ However, what I lose in depth I hope to gain in a closer understanding of the *Social Contract* and *Emile* as distinct yet complementary texts.

Shklar has an acute understanding of Rousseau political philosophy, and incorporates into her interpretation historical and biographical considerations that help her to develop a holistic account. Rousseau, she argues, was a naysayer, a social critic who identified “the emotional diseases of modern

¹ CWR, vol. 10

² CWR, vol. 3

³ CWR, vol. 11

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ CWR, vol. 13

⁶ CWR, vol. 6

⁷ CWR, vol. 8

civilisation.”¹ He achieved this by using, “radical new ideas and the tradition of utopianism”² as vehicles for condemning society.

Shklar believes that the aim of utopists such as More, Hobbes, and Pufendorf was to “picture the awful distance between the possible and probable by showing in great detail how men *could* live, even though they *always* refuse to do so.”³ They were not aiming to establish the perfect society but rather to draw attention to the unnecessary social misery to which we subject ourselves and show that the fault of this suffering lies solely with men. Utopian theory served to bring moral judgement upon society and generate “moral recognition in the reader.”⁴ It is to this tradition that Rousseau belongs. However, Rousseau appears to offer two distinct utopian visions rather than one, Sparta and the Golden Age.

In Shklar's view Rousseau developed these two distinct and contradictory utopias to show modern man the choice that he must make, but inevitably fails to make, between becoming a citizen and becoming a man. These are two ways of overcoming the destructive nature of *amour-propre*. Either we choose the self-repression of Sparta, where individual desires and interests are sacrificed to the interests of society, thereby retarding the development of *amour-propre*; or we choose the self-expression of the Golden Age, where we gain the freedom to pursue our private interests and express our minds freely, but are reduced to spending our lives isolated and stupid, free only within the small family unit or paternal supremacy. It is because man will not choose between these two utopias that neither can come to be.

Shklar describes both utopias as preventative. The Spartan city interrupts the progress of inequality “at the founding of civil society when [growing] inequality might be averted by law, if a semi-divine law-giver should appear.”⁵ Similarly, the Golden Age arrests the growth of inequality before it becomes too pronounced. Both options, “forestall, they halt the normal course

¹ (JS, p.1)

² (JS, p.1)

³ (JS, p.2)

⁴ (JS, p.2)

⁵ (JS, p.11)

of history. Sooner or later change overwhelms both.”¹ These utopias therefore offer no solution, only judgement. According to Shklar, there is no solution offered by Rousseau. Utopia is merely “a protest against history and a challenge to its madness”² but does not deflect the necessity of our self-condemnation to “unremitting human suffering.”³

This pessimism highlights an important distinction between Rousseau and other utopian writers, such as More and Plato. According to the utopist, Shklar argues, perfection has not been achieved, but that does not mean that it is unreal. For Plato and More, utopia can be found in the “rational cosmos”.⁴ Shklar continues, “Man as a rational being is more than the sum of his reactions. Thus, both human nature and society must first be recognised as conceptual realities, which set goals, no less than they describe the patterns of which both are merely reflections.”⁵ Without the ability to understand what the best model of man and society is, these goals and patterns would be “unintelligible”.⁶ However, Rousseau does not share this positive outlook. For him man is condemned to corruption and degeneration. The role of the utopian model is therefore simply to create awareness of this state of affairs. As Shklar puts it, “His sense of disaster was correspondingly total.”⁷

Shklar supports this reading in two ways. She first explores the influence of François Fénelon upon Rousseau. Secondly, she draws attention to the opening passages of *Emile*, where Rousseau appears to tell the reader that man must choose between being educated as a man or educated as a citizen. I shall look at each of these strategies in turn.

Shklar suggests that there is “nothing astonishing”⁸ in Rousseau proposing two models of utopia rather than one and there is no need to struggle to reconcile them. Plato and Seneca both offered two models “an age

¹ (JS, p.11)

² (JS, p.12)

³ (JS, p.12)

⁴ (JS, p.9)

⁵ (JS, p.9)

⁶ (JS, p.9)

⁷ (JS, p.9)

⁸ (JS, p.3)

of innocence and an age of conscious virtue”.¹ Moreover, Fénelon's *Télémaque* presents two equally valid, though different model utopias. Rousseau was well acquainted with Fénelon. In fact, the *Télémaque* is the sole book that Emile is given on reaching adulthood by his tutor Jean-Jacques. It is clear that Rousseau held it to be an important work, and Shklar suggests the he followed Fénelon's lead.

Fénelon was interested in the quietist notion of the disinterested love of God and identifies five levels of deophilia each one distinct. They range from purely servile love; where one loves God only for the goods that are dependent upon his existence, through to the pure love by the saints. In his view most Christians were motivated by a base love of God - a hope of salvation - whereas the ancients had a pure love of the *polis*, and they loved it disinterestedly. “For Fénelon the Christians have the right object (God) but the wrong motive (self-love); the ancients had the lower if estimable object (the city) but a worthy motive (disinterested affection).”² Rousseau shared the Spartan ideal of a disinterested love of the state, this is arguably the product of the application of the general will in the republic. Furthermore, love - specifically the corrupting force of self-love - is clearly a theme in many of Rousseau's works. It is self-love in the form of *amour-propre* that leads to man degenerating into Social man, and it is self-love in the form of *amour de soi* that motivates Natural man to satisfy his immediate desires for hunger, sleep, and sex.

Another aspect of Fénelon's *Télémaque* that we can see directly in Rousseau's own work is the use of pedagogy and omniscient teacher. The *Télémaque* “is the story of the moral and political education of a young man by a knowledgeable and virtuous tutor.”³ However, *Télémaque* was written for a prince and is a story of how to become a King. *Télémaque* is the son of Ulysees. Moreover, Mentor, *Télémaque*'s tutor, is the God of wisdom. The true hero of the *Télémaque* is Mentor despite the fact that it is *Télémaque* who is to become King and succeed his father. Without the work of Mentor *Télémaque* could

¹ (JS, p.4)

² (CCR, p.87)

³ (CCR, p.82)

easily have become another Idomeneus. *Emile* by contrast is the story of an everyman (meeting certain conditions spelled out in Book I), being educated by a figment, a supposition, the consequence of the very process that has yet to begin. However, there is a clear corollary between the roles that Mentor and Jean-Jacques, Emile's tutor, play in their respective stories. Jean-Jacques is a “marvel”¹ that we must suppose to exist in order to get the project moving. As such, Jean-Jacques, as tutor is a supposition in the same manner as the God of wisdom because both are required to fulfil a set of criteria that no man could fulfil. It is clear that Fénelon had an important and direct influence on Rousseau's philosophy.

Shklar defends her view by emphasising Rousseau's claim that one must choose between being educated as a man or as a citizen. According to Shklar this means Rousseau believes that we must choose between two available paths of education; public education, which leads to the creation of the citizen; and domestic education, which leads to the formation of the free man. These two paths are represented by Rousseau's two models of utopia; Sparta provides the vision of the state of affairs if public education and citizenry are chosen; and the Golden Age is the utopia of men, free from the coercion and corruption of modern society.

This choice occurs in the opening passages of *Emile* in which Rousseau also offers a damning analysis of the corruption of man by man in society – “everything degenerates in the hands of man... he disfigures everything; he loves deformity, monsters.”² Social institutions stifle man's nature, “and put nothing in its place”.³ This corruption occurs from birth and the hypothetical condition before corruption takes over is what Rousseau calls nature. It is in relation to this that Rousseau asks us to choose our path. We must be educated either to combat these corrupted social institutions and create Sparta, or we must struggle against our corruption and try to create the Golden Age. This former option is the route of the citizen.

¹ (E, p.50)

² (E, p.39)

³ (E, p.39)

Shklar argues that each of Rousseau's works belongs to one or the other of these visions. The *Social Contract* and *Discourse on Political Economy* are the primary exemplars of Rousseau's Spartan utopia. It is a place of militarism and nationalism. The military is to be used for defence only, and the strength of the army comes from the strength of the republic. An army of citizens will defend the republic much better than any hired sword because, citizens value the republic more than they value themselves as an individual and will gladly sacrifice their life for it. A strong identification with the republic is essential for Rousseau to achieve the psychological attitude necessary for the individual to transcend their private interests and access and act upon the general will. Shklar describes citizenship as, “a matter of *self-repression*”.¹ However, the aim of the *Social Contract* was for the man of the state of nature to enter civil society and remain as free as before. This is achieved, but it is a different kind of freedom as a result.

The citizen is free, according to Shklar, in the sense that, “not only is he secure from the hostility of his fellow citizens, he is not subject to *external* coercive pressures, because by the time he reaches maturity his education has made him completely self-disciplined.”² This freedom that Shklar identifies is Civil freedom. It is the freedom that comes with the protection of good institutions from external threats but it is not moral freedom because adherence to the dictates of society is motivated by duty. Therefore, despite the citizen being self-repressed, within this society of the citizen the moral conscience is never completely absent. These civic limitations are binding but the individual remains free to some extent. “What he utterly lacks is any opportunity for self-expression.”³ But this is compensated for by the gain of security and justness within society.

Within Sparta “political participation is a potent form of civil education.”⁴ It is in participating in political life that man is educated. However, this way of life leaves no place for “private interests, hopes, and

¹ (JS, p.16)

² (JS, p.16)

³ (JS, p.17)

⁴ (JS, p.18)

opinions”¹ in public life. The Spartan city is built on the “destruction of the family and of all its emotional and social gratifications.”² In doing so the civil ethos achieves the elimination of inequality by re-directing *amour-propre* so that the people of the republic do not fall into the mutually destructive relationship of master-slave, oppressor-oppressed, rich-poor, strong-weak. Shklar writes, “[Rousseau] wanted to eliminate those opinions which bind the strong in their pride and the weak in their aspirations together into a single relationship of mutual destruction.”³

Sparta in turn imposes burdens upon its citizens and society. The citizen is an unnatural man. The process of maintaining him “in a psychological state in which 'he was neither Caius nor Lucius, he was a Roman' is a perpetual affront to his nature and one that cannot be relaxed.”⁴ It is this perpetual effort that determines the need to build a national identity and a strong military. By creating an enemy 'other' one can attach a threat to a real thing and one can detach the individual from their private desires with greater ease. The citizen is forever drawn closer to the republic as his saviour and protector without which he would surely succumb to the perceived threat of the outsider.

The other utopia that Rousseau develops, the Golden Age, “is in every respect the very opposite of the ancient city”⁵ of Sparta and is best represented in *Emile*, *Emile et Sophie*, *la Nouvelle Héloïse*, and *Lettre de M. d'Alembert*. It consists in the removal of man from society and the corrupting influences that pervade it. If one is to become a man, this removal is a necessity. Only within this world is the natural goodness of man, through the freedom from interference, permitted to flourish. Guided only by a tutor, themselves free from the corruption of society, an inhabitant of this simple and isolated world becomes a free man.

¹ (JS, p.18)

² (JS, p.21)

³ (JS, p.19)

⁴ (JS, p.20)

⁵ (JS, p.21)

Shklar describes the Golden Age as, “the paradigm of the utopia of innocence, [which] springs from one source only, unspoiled family love.”¹ The purpose of the family is the education of its children, which is as important for the parents to give, as it is for the children to receive. Shklar writes, “A man is complete only when he is ready to become a father.”² The “real joys of the Golden Age”³ lie in the pure freedom of self-expression without fear of judgement or repercussion. According to Rousseau, then, these values can only be achieved within the family unit. However, this way of life is just as unattainable as the utopia of civil society, as the measures taken in *Emile* make clear. “The model of simplicity is no more available to actual men than the civic one. Both should be contemplated and sought, but neither can be attained.”⁴

In Sparta *amour-propre* is redirected in civic life. In the Golden Age within the very limited world of each household *amour-propre* is not a threat. “Only within the family is perfect uncompetitive affection possible. Here alone self-love and love for others are one. Only here are goodness and happiness inseparable, as *égalité d’âme*, instead of inner tension, is the common state of man.”⁵ This bliss is vulnerable and begins to come away beyond the immediate family. Even among the family and its staff the conflict and discomforts of inflamed *amour-propre* begin to be felt.

The problems of the Golden Age are greater than its isolationism. The man of the Golden Age is stupid and language is his primary intellectual achievement. Furthermore, such a utopia does not allow for social mobility. According to Rousseau, change, or progress, was undesirable, not only because change within a utopia must be change for the worse, but also because change

¹ (JS, p.21)

² (JS, p.24)

³ (JS, p.24)

⁴ (JS, p.23)

⁵ (JS, p.23)

itself “meant uncertainty”¹ and was “psychologically debilitating”.² As such, Rousseau thought of all change as a source of suffering.

According to Shklar, Rousseau recognises that, for these reasons, the Golden Age will not last, and she emphasises that even the rural bliss that Rousseau describes in *Emile* ends in failure. The marriage of Emile and Sophie falls apart in Paris, just as Julie “recognises as she dies that her perfect family life had not made her happy, since she could not bear to renounce Saint-Preux's love. Torn between sexual inclination and moral duty she can find happiness in neither.”³ Shklar expertly shows how the Golden Age and Sparta necessarily lead to failure, corruption, and the destruction of man.

Further to the necessary failure of both projects, Shklar has shown that the free individual of the Golden Age and the citizen of Sparta are incompatible. Not simply because they necessarily oppose one another in a way similar to Charvet's Natural man and Civil man, but also because they exist at the end of two distinct ways of life that never cross. According to Shklar, in order to live a consistent life one must choose between the life of the citizen and the life of the free individual but man cannot achieve this and necessarily vacillates between the two, leading himself deeper into the corruption that is Social man.

There are three reasons that I reject Shklar's interpretation of the text. The first is the weight that she places on the role that Fénelon plays in Rousseau's political project. The second concerns the chronology of the Golden Age, and thirdly, I shall challenge Shklar's interpretation of the opening passages of *Emile*.

My first concern with Shklar's account is with respect to the weight that she puts on the relationship between Rousseau and Fénelon. In the *Télémaque* Fénelon develops “two equally valid, though different utopias”.⁴ These two different utopias, although distinct, suggest no contradiction. Fénelon describes *Bétique*, the utopia of rural simplicity, and *Salante*, “a model of

¹ (JS, p.29)

² (JS, p.29)

³ (JS, pp.22-3)

⁴ (JS, p.4)

organised civic virtue”¹ and these two utopias are reflected in Rousseau's Golden Age and Sparta respectively. The claim that Shklar makes in Rousseau is that the Golden Age and Sparta are distinct utopias and although they are incompatible with one another they do not contradict each other because they were never intended to be compatible.

Shklar believes that Rousseau and Fénelon each developed their two utopias for the same reason, to highlight the social corruption of their contemporary societies by showing how life could have been. Fénelon was moved by the decadence of Versailles and his view that “most modern Christians love God from a base and 'interested' motive (hope for personal salvation)”.² Much like Rousseau was moved by his distaste for Parisian intellectualism and his view that “the more new knowledge we accumulate, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of acquiring the most important knowledge of all”.³ It is true that there is a certain overlap between the two. The Golden Age and the quiet village, most thoroughly developed in *Emile*, through its rural simplicity serves to highlight the vices and corruption of man in contemporary society in much the same way as *Bétique*. Similarly, the Spartan city of the Social Contract shares much with *Salante*, providing, as it does, a definition of the model citizen and the city of which they are a part.⁴

The links between Fénelon and Rousseau are clear. They are both influenced and inspired by Greek and Roman antiquity, and they both place a large emphasis on the subordination of self-love for the greater good. However, despite their similarities it is not clear that the degree of influence that Fénelon had on Rousseau is great enough for Shklar's purposes. Firstly, the *Télémaque* was a 'mirror of princes', a book that offers advice to a ruler, and not, as Shklar argues Rousseau's work is, a utopian text. Although, a similar function is served: namely, “to judge the actual by confronting it with the perfect”,⁵ it is an important difference between the two. Another important

¹ (JS, p.5)

² (CCR, p.87)

³ (SD, p.12)

⁴ (JS, p.5)

⁵ (JS, p.4)

distancing between Rousseau and Fénelon is something that Patrick Riley identified,¹ namely their disagreement over the scope of moral consideration.

Riley argues that Fénelon was most present in Rousseau's *First Discourse* and that if Rousseau had never come to write the *Social Contract* or the *Second Discourse* then he would only have been remembered as a Fénelonian scholar and little else. However, Rousseau's thought developed beyond his influence by Fénelon and this is clearest in Rousseau's movement away from the Christian universal morality in favour of the *volonté générale*.

Fénelon subscribed to the notion of the Christian universal morality “held together by universal charity and 'disinterested' love.”² Whereas, Rousseau came to reject this position in favour of the *volonté générale*, which is particular to each republic. The clearest rejection of universal morality is in *Letters Written from the Mountain*³ in which Rousseau states his preference for a general will that is specific to a particular set of persons, even if that means “abandoning Christianity as a universal religion”.⁴ It is the importance of patriotism in establishing the necessary attitude shift amongst the members of society from their particular interests to the interests of the citizenry that led Rousseau to write, “Christianity ... inspires humanity rather than patriotism, and tends rather to the forming of men than of citizens.”⁵ Riley concludes that this means that, “for Rousseau, no *morale universelle* – whether given by Christ or Reason – can help in the transformation of natural men into denatured citizens. The *générale* must be (somewhat) *particulière*.”⁶

However, this is a position that cemented within Rousseau's thought over the course of his writings, the strongest expression of it being in his later works. Earlier, in his political philosophy, Rousseau appears to vacillate between the notion of the Fénelonian “Christian *republica*”⁷ and the

¹ CCR

² (CCR, p.89)

³ CWR, vol.9

⁴ (CCR, p.90)

⁵ (LM, pp.34-7)

⁶ (CCR, p.91)

⁷ (CCR, p.91)

importance of the general will as embodying a strong sense of patriotism. As such, it is unclear how much influence Fénelon had on Rousseau, although it is clear that Rousseau's thought extends beyond what he was taught by the *Télémaque*. Despite the fact that Rousseau takes a lot from Fénelon, this is not enough on its own to motivate Shklar's utopian interpretation.

The second concern that I have with Shklar's interpretation focusses on her conceptions of Sparta and the Golden Age. My concern takes two forms, one to do with the theoretical separation of the two utopias, the other with Shklar's conception of the Golden Age. The two utopias Shklar develops come from a variety of sources and through them she builds two clearly opposing worlds. However, in order to achieve this result I believe that Shklar has compromised elsewhere. At times in Shklar's analysis of Rousseau it feels that she is cherry picking concepts from Rousseau's body of work and assigning them to the most relevant utopia. By this means she strengthens her specific utopia but weakens her interpretation of Rousseau's political project. There is, it seems, a blurred line between those works that are representative of Sparta and those that are representative of the Golden Age. In overlooking it, Shklar makes Rousseau's project confused.

This is most clear in her treatment of *Corsica* where she writes, "the first part of the Corsican project holds up rural Switzerland as the model to be imitated"¹ and as such falls into the Golden Age utopia. However, in the second part Rousseau abandons this village model and returns "to Sparta for a model."² This suggests that the dichotomy between the two ways of life was not designed to be kept distinct. In fact, it seems to suggest the opposite, that these two models of existence were designed to come together as they do in Book V of *Emile*, when the book's namesake enters civil society as both a free man and a citizen.

The second strand of this objection focusses directly on Shklar's conception of the Golden Age. Like Charvet, Shklar fails to recognise the distinction between the Natural man of the state of nature and the free

¹ (JS, p.27)

² (JS, p.28)

individual who is taught by nature in *Emile*. The Natural man of pre-civilisation is stupid, whereas, the free individual of *Emile* possesses a positive freedom, a freedom of self-governance. One example of Shklar's conflation of these two states of man is in her description of the intelligence of the men of the Golden Age. According to Shklar they are "ignorant boors"¹ with language as their primary intellectual achievement. This is not compatible with the man that *Emile* is, or is set to become. Furthermore, it is only true of Natural man at a very specific stage in his development, after he has discovered language and formed cooperative society, but before the disruption of that society through *amour-propre*. I disagree with Shklar's analysis of the Golden Age. It is easier to arrive at a consistent understanding of the Golden Age either by looking exclusively at *Emile*, as Neuhouser and Charvet do, or by ignoring *Emile* entirely and focusing on the Golden Age described in the *Second Discourse* and reproduced in *la Nouvelle Héloïse*. What fundamentally distinguishes these texts is that they deal with different stages of the genealogy of man.

Emile must be removed from society because man has become corrupted by that society and in the process denatured. It could be said that *Emile* shows the futility of any attempt to forestall the destruction of man by showing to what extreme lengths one must go to avoid its consequences: the total alienation of the individual, prior to birth, from society. Natural man occurs much earlier in the genealogy. The time that Rousseau refers to as the "golden mean"² is shortly after the formation of rudimentary cooperative society before the inflammation of *amour-propre* has progressed too far and before inequality has become too wide. *La Nouvelle Héloïse* takes place later in the genealogical story than *Emile* and is again distinct from the Golden Age of Natural man. It focusses on an insular family unit, a microcosm of the state and a delicate balance of power between Julie and her father. In incorporating such a wide literature into her analysis of Rousseau Shklar has weakened her position because each instance of the Golden Age that she identifies is different and cannot easily be brought together.

¹ (JS, p.23)

² (SD, p.48)

The last concern that I have with Shklar's interpretation is the most challenging to her theory. It is a concern, shared by Neuhouser, that Shklar has overlooked the meaning of the opening paragraphs of *Emile*. Shklar takes a hard line in asserting that Rousseau tells us that we must choose between being educated as a man or as a citizen. We cannot be both man and citizen therefore we must be either man or citizen. However, Shklar's assertion fails to take into account that Rousseau's command states that we must choose because we cannot be educated to be both "at the same time".¹ Shklar is further undermined by Book V of *Emile* which takes as its subject the education of Emile as a husband and citizen. So, it seems that Shklar may have overlooked an important aspect of Rousseau's political project.

I would like to add one further concern, which may have implications for Neuhouser as well as Shklar, regarding these opening paragraphs. The context in which Rousseau is speaking is the education of man from infancy. Either choice, to become a man or a citizen, is an imposition. The choice is made on our behalf. We must choose whether to *make* a man or a citizen, not whether to *become* a man or a citizen. This is contrary to the language that Shklar employs in her description of Sparta and the Golden Age and understandably so. Shklar writes, "what is strikingly novel is [Rousseau's] insistence that one must choose between the two models, between man and the citizen."² Shortly after this, and more conclusively, Shklar continues to present this as a choice for a person to make, "he cannot have both, but he must try one or the other if he is to escape from his present disorientation and inner disorder."³ This is a misrepresentation of Rousseau by Shklar. The story of the *Social Contract* is of Natural man choosing to enter cooperative society, while the story of the *Second Discourse* is of Natural man deteriorating into Social man and corrupt society - presumably because they failed to make the necessary choice. This is not reflected in *Emile*. In *Emile* the choice is made on behalf of man by the tutor, Jean-Jacques.

¹ (E, p.39)

² (JS, p.5)

³ (JS, p.5)

As we have seen, Shklar believes that although the two paths of man and citizen Rousseau develops are inconsistent with one another they are intentionally so, thereby committing herself, on this point at least, to the position that Rousseau's political thought is a coherent project. The last interpretation I consider, to which I now turn, represents a more positive reading of Rousseau. Through placing the cultivation of *amour-propre* at the centre of his interpretation Neuhouser believes that he can show an escape exists for Social man, and this escape is the possibility of attaining the status of man-citizen. Therefore, Rousseau's political thought is interpreted by Neuhouser as being not merely coherent but a positive thesis where the paths of man and citizen are compatible also.

Section Four - Positive Resolution

Frederick Neuhouser perceives the same conflict as Shklar and Charvet before him. Rousseau provides two accounts of how to overcome the suffering of the Social man of the *Second Discourse* that are seemingly in conflict with one another. However, Neuhouser believes, contrary to Charvet and Shklar, that the account of the free individual in *Emile* and the account of the free citizen in *Social Contract* are compatible. Rousseau is not asking us to choose between one or the other but presents a dual project where the two distinct systems work in concert to produce the 'man-citizen'. I shall present the argument that Neuhouser develops in support of the claim that Rousseau's political thought comprises a complementary whole, and then explain the grounds on which he disagrees with Shklar.

In his interpretation Neuhouser focusses on the role of *amour-propre* within Rousseau's political thought, and places significant weight on *amour-propre* in Rousseau's philosophy. "More than any other aspect of his thought," Neuhouser writes, "the theory of *amour-propre* is the foundation on which [Rousseau's] social, political, and moral philosophy rests."¹ It is consequently important to get an idea of what *amour-propre* is. *Amour-propre* is a complex concept that has been interpreted in numerous ways. The term is mostly now left untranslated. However, it has previously been translated into English as 'pride'² and as 'vanity'³ and it continues to have negative connotations. As Neuhouser writes, "the prevailing view among readers of Rousseau continues to be that *amour-propre* is a wholly negative phenomenon, always and only a source of havoc in human society."⁴ Neuhouser resists this interpretation and insists that *amour-propre* is neutral. It is neither intrinsically a force for good, nor is it intrinsically a force for evil, and is both the source of evil in man and also the source of redemption. It is, "a form of self-love that drives human

¹ (FN, p.1)

² *A Discourse of Inequality*, ed. Maurice Cranston (New York: Penuin, 1984)

³ *On the Social Contract*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978)

⁴ (FN, p.15)

individuals to seek the esteem, approval, admiration, or love – in short, the *recognition* – of their fellow beings.”¹

Contrary to Charvet, Neuhouser views *amour-propre* as a form of self-love that is distinct from *amour de soi*, and is not a corruption, or misdirection of the latter. Rousseau describes *amour-propre* as a relational form of self-love that is not present in the man of the state of nature because it is a product of association, whereas *amour de soi* is present in Natural man and at an earlier stage of development. Charvet does not believe that this distinction can hold firm and claims that the two forms of self-love dissolve into each other; but this does not need to be the case. *Amour-propre* is relative in two ways. “The good that *amour-propre* seeks is relative”² and “since the good it seeks is recognition *from others*, its satisfaction requires – indeed consists in – the opinions of one's fellow beings.”³ Therefore, it is “inherently social in character”⁴ and in that respect relative. This certainly is distinct from *amour de soi*. Even if *amour de soi* fails to be entirely free from relations in Natural man, because there will be some sporadic interactions with other people, and because prior to the development of *amour-propre* one will develop *pitié* which is intrinsically relational, it does not itself become relational. *Amour de soi* is absolute and unaffected by how we feel toward other people, whereas one's *amour-propre* is defined by our relationships with them.

Neuhouser's claim that *amour-propre* is a neutral feature of our psychology is strengthened by reading *amour-propre* as, not merely the negative form of self-love, but as distinct from *amour de soi*. He supports this claim further with reference to Rousseau's own description of *amour-propre*. In *Emile* Rousseau calls *amour-propre*, “a useful but dangerous instrument... [that] rarely does good without evil.”⁵ However, the power of *amour-propre* doing good is not altogether ruled out. Although *amour-propre* is, “the principle

¹ (FN, p.1)

² (FN, p.32)

³ (FN, p.33)

⁴ (FN, p.33)

⁵ (E, pp.244-5)

source of the many evils that plague human beings”¹ it does not necessarily lead us to those evils. In fact, according to Neuhouser, “it is possible for *amour-propre* to assume good forms that not only enrich and elevate human existence but also have the capacity to remedy the very ills the inflamed desire for recognition produces.”²

It is with this formulation of *amour-propre* in mind that Neuhouser aims to show that *Emile* and the *Social Contract* constitute a “two-pronged approach”³ to the resolution of the problems set out in the *Second Discourse*. Neuhouser describes the corruption of man as described by Rousseau as “the cumulative and unforeseen result of an extended series of free choices (conjoined with contingent natural occurrences) that... do not involve the conscious willing of evil.”⁴ No blame is laid upon God or man. *Emile* and the *Social Contract* provide a positive resolution to this problem that is entirely within the grasp of man and is only achievable by man. “By offering a naturalistic explanation of fallenness that invokes neither a sinful will nor an innate disposition to evil, Rousseau allows for at least the possibility of a this-worldly remedy for human corruption, one that avoids positing a supernatural power (God's grace) or an other-worldly venue (the life beyond) in order to envisage evil's defeat.”⁵ However, the key to this solution lies in *amour-propre*, and it is only by grasping the centrality of this notion within Rousseau's political corpus that one can appreciate that all the other problems identified in the *Second Discourse*, even private property, are parasitic on *amour-propre*.

Despite Neuhouser's different emphasis, and the fact that his range of reference is narrower than that of Shklar, their interpretations have much in common. For both, it is within the *Second Discourse* that Rousseau raises the problems that he sets out to resolve in the *Social Contract* and *Emile*. Furthermore, Neuhouser and Shklar agree that man is theoretically able to overcome this evil because he is already in possession of the tools necessary to

¹ (FN, p.15)

² (FN, p.15)

³ (FN, p.157)

⁴ (FN, pp.4-5)

⁵ (FN, p.5)

achieve “full self-consciousness”¹ and “harmony among humans”.² The difference between them lies in the fact that Neuhouser, unlike Shklar, allows for the hope that man will overcome social corruption and become the man-citizen that Rousseau describes.

Neuhouser does not paint a very positive picture of Rousseau. “For Rousseau, fallenness may well be all that humans will in fact ever know; there may, indeed, be no actual return out of the conditions depicted at the end of the *Second Discourse*, which is to say: no actual escape from our present circumstances.”³ However, rather than embracing Shklar's fatalist conclusion he sees a greater positive function in Rousseau's writings and identifies two positive aspects of his position. Firstly, Rousseau's political work aims to do more than draw attention to man's responsibility for his suffering or merely reveal a solution that he lacks the strength to take. By showing men how they are responsible for their own corruption and misery, Rousseau gives man the awareness and therefore the opportunity to attempt to avoid the consequences of that corruption. Man can change the world to minimise the negative effects of *amour-propre*.

The second positive aspect of Rousseau's destructive account of man is that even the thin possibility of redemption that Rousseau allows gives man license to believe in the possibility of bringing about that redemption and seeking it. It is enough to motivate man to seek change and 'stop the rot', as it were. It “encourages [men] both to cultivate a hope for humanity's future and to translate that hope into concrete action.”⁴ Therefore, there is the possibility of man becoming more than the denatured and corrupted species that it currently is, which, for Neuhouser, is equivalent to saying that there is a possibility that *amour-propre* can be cultivated and properly directed. Moreover, Rousseau offers this solution in the dual teachings of the *Social Contract* and *Emile*.

¹ (FN, p.3)

² (FN, p.3)

³ (FN, p.4)

⁴ (FN, p.8)

The *Social Contract* provides an account of how properly directed *amour-propre* can be cultivated within social and political institutions. By contrast, *Emile* provides an account of how the same goal is achieved by the development of the individual character through domestic education. “The social and political world, together with the characters of those who inhabit it, must be configured if the dangers posed by *amour-propre* are to be avoided or minimised.”¹ Neither, a society's structure and foundations, nor the proper rearing of children into adulthood, is enough on their own to “forestall the dangers of *amour-propre*.”² *Emile* and the *Social Contract* deal with separate issues. *Emile* deals with 'first education' and is outside the scope of social and political theory, because its goal is the creation of a man, and a man is created independently of social and political theory. In contrast to domestic education, public education - aimed at the creation of citizens - clearly belongs to social and political theory because the state necessarily dictates it.

Even though *amour-propre* is not explicitly discussed in the *Social Contract*, the book can be read, according to Neuhouser, “as furnishing essential elements of the comprehensive response to the problematic consequences of *amour-propre* that Rousseau's thought as a whole aims to offer.”³ Neuhouser supports this position by identifying certain consequences of societal cooperation and linking them to the inflammation of *amour-propre*. What goes hand-in-hand with the development of society is, “increased productivity, the division of labour, private property, and the flourishing of individual differences”.⁴ These changes follow from the advent of metallurgy and agriculture leading to inequalities in wealth and power which become entrenched and deepen over time. “For the Poet it is gold and silver, but for the Philosopher it is iron and wheat which have Civilised men and ruined the human race.”⁵ This spread of inequality - that Rousseau spells out in the *Second Discourse* - is the problem that he addresses in the *Social Contract*. The

¹ (FN, p.155)

² (FN, p.158)

³ (FN, p.9)

⁴ (FN, p.162)

⁵ (SD, p.49)

widening inequality is fuelled by and itself fuels the inflammation of *amour-propre*.

Neuhouser identifies two other background conditions that result in a failure to halt this destructive cycle of inequality and inflamed *amour-propre* feeding each other until man destroys himself; “the absence of other, less destructive ways of acquiring a socially recognised standing and ignorance of the nature and conditions of human well-being.”¹ It is clear that the *Social Contract* aims to rectify the first background condition by providing an equal and just structure to society, and *Emile* aims to rectify the second background condition by teaching us “in the first place”² to be a man. Therefore, the *Social Contract* and *Emile* provide the toolkit necessary to overcome inflamed *amour-propre* and halt the spread of inequality in society.

Rousseau's response to these socio-political problems is to promote institutional reforms that counteract the inflammation of *amour-propre*, by demanding equality in participation and in status. He thereby, promotes “institutions that make stable and benign forms of social recognition available to all.”³ One example that Neuhouser gives of Rousseau's approach to the problem of inequality is class, and another is inequality in wealth. The former represents an inequality that Rousseau believes should be eliminated entirely, whereas the latter must merely be tempered.

Inequality in class is best represented by the division in society of those that own the materials of production, and those that do not. This is an institutionalised disparity in social power between members of society and therefore leads to “a species of dependence that is both inimical to freedom and avoidable”.⁴ This dependence however should not be eliminated because it is not in being economically dependent on the other members of society that the problem rests, it is in the inequality and therefore the solution is the equalisation of economic dependence.

¹ (FN, p.162)

² (E, p.42)

³ (FN, p.162)

⁴ (FN, p.163)

Class inequality is relevant beyond its economic considerations. A person's position in society affects their esteem and influence. This relates to the opportunities and advantages that one has as a result of their class. Institutions that promote these advantages are unjust because the only justifiable inequality for Rousseau is our natural inequality. "The first principle, then, that Rousseau's social philosophy adopts from his analysis of *amour-propre* is that good institutions must be structured such that the main opportunities they offer for achieving social standing do not depend on their systematic subjugation of others".¹ Therefore, class inequality should be eliminated entirely.

The second example of inequality that Rousseau responds to is inequality in wealth. Inequality in wealth is tolerable within certain parameters. Rousseau's claim is that the two extremes in wealth should be brought "as close together as possible".² Inequality in wealth cannot be eliminated entirely because a certain degree of inequality would arise even with the most fair and honest institutions, as a result of luck, determination, and innate talent.

Rousseau's vagueness in classifying what degree of inequality is excessive permits state-specific methods of redistribution and control, thereby allowing for the correction of the socially pernicious inequalities that civilisation engenders. As he writes, "these general objectives of all institutions must be modified in each country to meet local conditions and suit the character of the people concerned."³ Restrictions, like high taxation on luxury and control on inheritance, seek not just to control how things are in the actions of people but also in the mind. Rousseau believes that "in a society that made minimising the gap between the rich and poor a first priority.... individuals would be less likely to... confuse the value of things with the value of persons, and that would represent a significant victory in the struggle against not just extravagant behaviour but inflamed *amour-propre* itself."⁴

¹ (FN, p.164)

² (SC, fn. p.96)

³ (SC, p.97)

⁴ (FN, p.166)

However, Rousseau is not providing merely a negative thesis on controlling *amour-propre*. One of the reasons that conditions in society often favour the inflammation of *amour-propre* is because there are not enough “non-destructive opportunities for acquiring a recognised standing”.¹ This understanding of Rousseau's project in establishing just social and political institutions in the *Social Contract* provides him with a constructive programme for the cultivation of *amour-propre*.

Neuhouser attributes three types of recognition in a republic to assisting with the cultivation of *amour-propre*. Firstly, equality of citizens as subjects; second, equality as a member of the sovereign; and lastly, equality as a bearer of rights, or as a 'person'. The *Social Contract* can therefore be seen to play a central role in the limiting of *amour-propre* when one appreciates that, in a proper republic, one is afforded equal legal respect and full membership of the sovereign power. “This part of Rousseau's solution makes the political community itself a major source of the recognition individuals seek as a consequence of *amour-propre*.”²

The third species of recognition provided by the republic is the right to live as you wish and to exercise your freedom in whichever way you choose provided, that it does not interfere with the general will. The scope of the general will extends only as far as that which concerns the well-being of the sovereign body and as such there is a significant part of one's life that is left for the individual to pursue their own version of the good life. Neuhouser writes, “in a republic, laws also recognise citizens as free agents (or persons), and the importance of their individual agency is expressed in a system of established rights”.³ Through these rights one's freedom is protected by assuring, through legislation, the determination of one's life “in matters where the general will is silent.”⁴ This recognition offered by the state results in moral freedom because it is the recognition that the individual, to some extent, is the author of their

¹ (FN, p.166)

² (FN, p.167)

³ (FN, p.168)

⁴ (FN, p.168)

own life. This freedom alone “makes man the master of himself.”¹ There is an overlap here with the aims of *Emile* which raises man to be able to make these choices in the face of the corrupting influences of society.

This overlap becomes more pronounced when one considers the latter part of *Emile*, which engages with the becoming of a man as a citizen and a husband. This can also be used to offer insight into Rousseau's use of social and political remedies to inflamed *amour-propre*. Sexual love plays an important part in the transition from being merely a man to being also a citizen and a husband. Rousseau believes that sexual love is a universal human need because it “addresses the individual's need to be esteemed by another for her very particular qualities... Beyond simply functioning as a source of esteem in general, though, sexual love responds to the specific desire to occupy 'the first position' in the eyes of others.”² This is a “deep and persistent yearning”³ amongst all humans according to Rousseau, cemented through marriage, which strengthens the bond between two people in a way that can help redirect *amour-propre* into a healthy and mutual sexual love and away from the destructive desire to be simply the first in the eyes of everyone. “Marriage, in other words, transforms each spouse's being 'first for another' into a being 'first for another for everyone', and because of this it counts as part of Rousseau's socio-political response to the dangers of *amour-propre*.”⁴

However, the control offered by social and political remedies will not be enough to prevent *amour-propre* from becoming inflamed. What is also needed is the second part of Rousseau's project, that of domestic education. The principle aim of *Emile* is to investigate how the right kind of domestic education could limit the damage caused by *amour-propre* in impressionable youth. To understand the principles that govern *Emile*'s education one must understand the distinction between educating men and educating citizens. Neuhouser states that it is important for us pay adequate attention to the final three words of Rousseau's oft quoted demand that we must choose between the

¹ (SC, p.65)

² (FN, p.170)

³ (FN, p.170)

⁴ (FN, p.171)

two, “at the same time.”¹ One can read this statement as precluding the teaching of a man to be both a free individual and a citizen. It may be that the necessity in reacting either to nature or social institutions dictates that one must choose to educate man to be one or the other because nature and society pull man in different directions. Although Rousseau does not explicitly deny that one can be taught to be a man and then a citizen it could simply be ruled out in virtue of the fact that the teaching must occur in the formative years. However it is Neuhouser's opinion that Rousseau only denies the simultaneous education of man and citizen. In fact, Neuhouser draws attention to Book V of *Emile* which deals directly with Emile's education as a citizen and this occurs after Emile's education as a man.

Neuhouser believes, contrary to Shklar, that Rousseau intended *Emile* to be educated in two stages; firstly as a man, in the form of domestic education; and then in Book V, as a citizen and a husband. Emile is thereby made a man-citizen and not merely a man instead of a citizen. Neuhouser defends this position on four grounds. First, Rousseau writes that we cannot teach both man and citizen “at the same time”.² Secondly, Book V of *Emile* teaches Emile to be a citizen and a husband. Thirdly, Rousseau's stated goal is to remove the contradictions between public and domestic education, and lastly, Neuhouser believes any alternative to be inconsistent. If an individual were educated solely to be a man they would be overcome by *amour-propre*.

Neuhouser supports this reading of *Emile* through a clear analysis of the three distinct phases of education that it contains. There is the education of the pre-adolescent, the education of the adolescent, and the education of the citizen and husband. The first stage of Emile's education is a description and justification of negative education. This creates the foundations for the following phases by allowing a child to develop according to their nature. The coercive force of other people and society is removed so that “in isolation from others, Emile learns to affirm himself in his newfound strengths and abilities

¹ (E, p.39)

² (E, p.39)

without needing the approval of others”.¹ As a result, Emile develops self-esteem and a capacity for critical reflection on himself without reference to the standards of other people. However, the most important and complicated part of Rousseau's pedagogical programme is the second stage of education because the blossoming of *amour-propre* in a young person coincides with, or results in, an age of comparison (our recognition of the self of others).

Before the development of one's *amour-propre* however, and reflecting the development of man in the state of nature, the first relative sentiment must be born, that of *pitié*. Rousseau writes, “to become sensitive and pitying, the child must know that there are beings like him who suffer what he has suffered, who feel the pains he has felt, and that there are others whom he ought to conceive of as able to feel them too.”² It is through his suffering and ability to feel the suffering of others through *pitié* that *Emile* is taught the understanding of his rank amongst others. This relational attitude by definition places people on a scale, and a person's place on this scale is their rank. The proper understanding of one's rank, according to Rousseau, is one of equality. Emile gains this insight before the birth of his passions or *amour-propre*. However, Rousseau's method for cultivating a properly directed *amour-propre* is insidious and more than merely morally suspect.

Rousseau stresses the importance of cultivating the proper attitude in Emile in order to “excite in him goodness, humanity, commiseration, beneficence, and all the attractive and sweet passions naturally pleasing to men.”³ The failure to do this will result instead in “the birth of envy, covetousness, hate, and all the repulsive and cruel passions which make sensibility, so to speak, not only nothing but negative and torment the man who experiences them.”⁴ In *Emile* the age of passion, which coincides with the age at which *amour-propre* rears its head, is intentionally delayed for as long as possible, so that his tutor can properly direct his *pitié*. Rousseau's idea of *pitié* is very similar to our idea of empathy. To experience *pitié* is to “put [oneself] in

¹ (FN, p.173)

² (E, p.222)

³ (E, p.223)

⁴ (E, p.223)

the place of the sufferer”.¹ The method by which Rousseau arouses *pitié* in Emile is through a coercive programme designed to acquaint Emile with the suffering of others, even before the development of his own *amour-propre*. Emile is to understand that people feel their suffering, no matter who they are, and that they feel it as acutely as Emile does his own. Only once Emile's *pitié* has been developed is it time for the problem of *amour-propre* to be tackled.

Upon the awakening of *amour-propre* Emile is also brought to witness social inequality. Appreciating the accidental nature of most inequalities in wealth and power “is crucial to the proper formation of *amour-propre*”² and to discovering one's rank amongst men. Furthermore, it is important for Emile to understand that even those who possess a fortunate amount of wealth or power are not, as a result, protected from life's sufferings. In fact, these things “seldom bring genuine satisfaction.”³ The risk is that, if one believes that individuals are worthy of their position and their advantages one may conclude that those that do not possess these advantages, and are therefore assumed to be unhappy and unesteemed, also deserve their lot and are thus deserving of their misery.

Again, the pedagogical method that Rousseau employs to avoid the overestimation of self that is the result of unchecked *amour-propre*, appears to condone questionable practices on the part of the tutor. There is one instance where a proud Emile brings embarrassment and shame to a travelling magician. In response, Jean-Jacques and the magician trick Emile into playing the fool. Rousseau states that to avoid the overestimation of self, the story of the magician must be repeated “in a thousand ways.”⁴ The pedagogical recommendations that Rousseau makes to ensure that an adolescent does not succumb to inflamed *amour-propre* are unclear and the examples given, like that of the magician, are contentious. Neuhouser does not seek to justify these questionable practices, but believes that despite them some systematicity can be gleaned from Rousseau's project for the cultivation of *amour-propre*. As

¹ (E, p.222)

² (FN, p.178)

³ (FN, p.178)

⁴ (E, p.245)

such, Neuhouser identifies this project as a remedial one which provides a number of responses to five ways in which *amour-propre* can become inflamed.

The first category of inflamed *amour-propre* relates to the ferocity and power “with which *amour-propre* can seize individuals”.¹ Rousseau's remedy is to prolong the dormancy of *amour-propre* through domestic education (giving *pitié* the chance to become established first) and to use social and political institutions to provide more civilly productive methods of attaining recognition. The second category is *amour-propre*'s tendency to seek superiority. This is combatted first in infancy through the inculcation of empathy, and not indulging a child's whims. Further to this, one must promote equality in domestic education by training *pitié* so that Emile feels the pains of others as if they were his own. In addition one must devise political institutions that will “reinforce these psychological measures by ensuring the moral equality of citizens and by outlawing, or severely restricting, the most destructive forms of artificial inequality.”²

The third category of ways that one's *amour-propre* may become inflamed is through “threats to freedom, integrity and unalienated selfhood”.³ Rousseau's response to this manifestation of *amour-propre* is to allow the individual self-esteem in his domestic education, and use the equal moral respect provided by political institutions to counter threats to one's self-worth that will occur at the hands of particular individuals. The fourth category is when the possessor of *amour-propre* “cares so much about how others think of her that she takes appearing to be excellent to be just as desirable as actually being so.”⁴ The response to this threat of inflamed *amour-propre* is to remove children from the “evaluative gaze of others”⁵ for as long as possible, and encourage them to judge themselves by objective standards. The last category of inflamed *amour-propre* is “when a person has an exaggerated sense of the

¹ (FN, p.180)

² (FN, p.181)

³ (FN, p.182)

⁴ (FN, p.91)

⁵ (FN, p.182)

value of his own qualities and achievements”¹ and demands recognition that reflects his own fevered ego. Rousseau advises that to avoid bruised and inflated egos one must shape a child to have a reasonable conception of the self and his place within the full spectrum of society.

If Neuhouser is correct in his analysis of Rousseau the project he engaged in over the course of the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract*, and *Emile* was the development of a positive and unified argument designed to culminate in the creation of the 'man-citizen' through the cultivation of his *amour-propre*. Achieving this result may be unlikely, but it exists as a possibility, and it is because it is possibility that man strives for perfectibility. In contrast to this Charvet argued that the concepts of Natural man and Citizen were incompatible and that Rousseau's project was incoherent, and Shklar, while agreeing that the paths of man and citizen were incompatible, argued that this was Rousseau's intention in order to show the inevitability of man's destruction at his own hands.

Of these three interpretations Neuhouser's is the strongest. It is the most honest to the text and presents Rousseau's political project with a stronger purpose. However, it is not without contention. There are two particular difficulties that Neuhouser himself identifies that I would like to focus on in the remainder of this section and the beginning of the next. The first is Neuhouser's decision to interpret *amour-propre* as a distinct sentiment to *amour de soi*. The second, is his decision to pass over Rousseau's misogyny. I shall defend Neuhouser's interpretation with respect to the first but not the second. Instead I shall build on Neuhouser's interpretation of Rousseau through a modification of focus, away from *amour-propre* and toward the concept of *paideia*, and a critical reconstruction that can correct for Rousseau's misogyny. This will form the basis of the final section.

Neuhouser recognises that several aspects of his interpretation are contentious. “The most fundamental”² is that he, “more than most

¹ (FN, p.91)

² (FN, p.13)

commentators,”¹ insists upon a “sharp distinction between the two passions”² *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. As discussed in section two, Neuhouser articulates this distinction “by specifying three necessary features of *amour-propre*.”³ However, as Neuhouser himself notes, the belief that *amour de soi* and *amour-propre* are distinct seems to be contradicted by Rousseau in *Emile* where he writes of passions, “the only one born with man and which never leaves him so long as he lives is self-love - a primitive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other, and of which all others are in a sense only modifications.”⁴ Neuhouser chooses to “face up the fact”⁵ that one cannot be entirely consistent in interpreting Rousseau because of his tendency to use the same words for different meanings and concludes that sometimes, when analysing Rousseau, one must “make distinctions he himself does not make”.⁶

However, in choosing to be dismissive of Rousseau's description of *amour de soi* in *Emile* Neuhouser opens himself up to an overlapping objection, made by Christopher Brooke, in his recent book *Philosophic Pride*. Neuhouser interprets the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract*, and *Emile* as a unified argument whereas Brooke concludes that Rousseau's thought progresses over time. While it may be true that, in the *Second Discourse*, there are three distinct passions, by the time Rousseau came to write *Emile* there remained only one - *amour de soi-même*. Brooke argues that, “in the *Second Discourse*, there had been 'two principles' 'anterior to reason', which Rousseau placed at the foundation of his account of human nature. In *Emile*, there is now just one.”⁷ According to Brooke there are two kinds of modifications to *amour de soi-même*. Those that are developed naturally, and those due to external coercions, or “alien causes”.⁸ Brooke identifies the alien causes with *amour-propre* and as a result identifies *amour-propre* as a modification of *amour de soi-même*.

¹ (FN, p.13)

² (FN, p.13)

³ (FN, p.13)

⁴ (E, pp.212-3)

⁵ (FN, p.14)

⁶ (FN, p.14)

⁷ (CB, p.192)

⁸ (E, p.213)

In Brooke's interpretation of *Emile* it is not only *amour-propre* that proves to be a modification of *amour de soi-même*; it is also *pitié*. The emergence of *pitié* in *Emile* occurs when one comes to identify with the suffering of fellow humans. Rousseau writes, "If our common needs unite us by interest, our common miseries unite us by affection."¹ This identification occurs with the one's imagination. "When the first development of his sense lights the fire of imagination, he begins to feel himself in his fellows, to be moved by their complaints and to suffer from their pains."² It is through imagination that *pitié* is able to be expressed and "puts us in the place of the miserable man".³ However, this does not seem to explain how *pitié* is a modification of *amour de soi-même* but only that it occurs later in the genealogical story that Rousseau tells. The mistake that Brooke makes is to assume that the progression of the development of the natural sentiments means that each is derived from the preceding sentiment. *Amour de soi-même* was the first sentiment and is present in man at birth, because *pitié* and *amour-propre* follow from it in time, they are modifications of it.

Although Rousseau's thought may have progressed between the writings of *Second Discourse* and *Emile*, and although Rousseau's description of *pitié* may have changed to include the element of imagination rather than "an innate repugnance to see his fellow suffer",⁴ the books should still be considered as a part of the same political project. This is clear in the importance that Rousseau places on ensuring that these sentiments occur in *Emile* in the right order and at the right time, because the right order and time reflect precisely the emergence of the sentiments in the hearts of Natural man.

The second contention of Neuhouser's interpretation of Rousseau that I discuss is a much greater concern and one that I believe Neuhouser cannot overcome. It is not an interpretative contention but a quarrel with his reconstruction of Rousseau's thought. Neuhouser chooses to bracket off any questions that may arise from Rousseau's misogyny and works on the

¹ (E, p.221)

² (E, p.222)

³ (E, p.221)

⁴ (SD, p.36)

assumption that the “salvageable philosophical core”¹ that he identifies is not undermined by Rousseau's treatment of women.

¹ (FN, p.25)

Section Five - Critical Reconstruction

The most prominent concern with Neuhouser's interpretation of Rousseau's political project is with respect to the connotations of his "bracketing"¹ of Rousseau's explicit misogyny. I shall explore these connotations with reference to Rebecca Kukla's analysis of Rousseau's views on the necessity for intimate companionship.

In light of this I shall propose a solution for Neuhouser that strengthens his interpretation of Rousseau and strengthens Rousseau's political project. I do this by changing the focus of the analysis away from *amour-propre* and toward education. I recommend this for two reasons: firstly because it overcomes the conflict between Rousseau's unsavoury attitude toward non-citizens (primarily women) and his theory of equality and freedom; and secondly because, by interpreting Rousseau's project in this way, we can see that Rousseau himself provides us with the tools for success. This reconstruction can be seen as minimising any move away from Rousseau's own arguments.

Neuhouser ignores the malignant misogyny in Rousseau's political thought while acknowledging that this is a risky practice. "The most serious [philosophical] question about gender that my bracketing of the issue leaves unaddressed"², writes Neuhouser, "is whether what I treat as the salvageable philosophical core of Rousseau's thought in fact depends for its coherence or plausibility on the thesis of sexual difference."³ Rousseau himself clearly supports such a thesis. What I hope to show is that Rousseau's position can be reconciled with a more egalitarian approach to sexual difference, but only if the cultivation of *amour-propre* is seen as a consequence of Rousseau's educational theory. I show this with reference to Neuhouser's account of the role that marriage plays in avoiding the dangers of *amour-propre*.

Neuhouser recognises that the role of marriage as Rousseau sees it, is

¹ (FN, p.25)

² (FN, p.25)

³ (FN, p.25)

both to help cultivate productive forms of *amour-propre* and ward off its more inflammatory forms. This issue is discussed in Book V of *Emile*, where having been formed as a man Emile is now continuing his education. At this stage he enters both the state and “a lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual union based on his exclusive, passionate love for a particular woman, Sophie.”¹ The role of marriage, as we briefly saw in the previous section, is to give public confirmation to the “private attestation to a person's worth”.² Sexual love is an “urgent and universal human need”³ and responds to an individual's need for esteem from others. My sexual love for another satisfies their desire to be first in the eyes of another, and vice versa. Sexual love can therefore be a useful tool in avoiding the dangers of *amour-propre*, because it offers a potentially powerful and effective method of directing man's need for esteem from others. The desire to be first in the eyes of others is transformed by love into a specific desire to be first in the eyes of one particular person. The role of marriage then is to institutionalise romantic love. In doing so “it supplies external incentives for keeping the bond between lovers intact and for maintaining its exclusivity”.⁴ Moreover, the institution of marriage “secures society's recognition of each spouse's supreme and exclusive standing for one other person.”⁵ As such, marriage, more than merely recognising the subjective love of each spouse, gives it “a kind of objective status”⁶ in society's recognition of that exclusive love.

The institution of marriage is an interesting example of the control of *amour-propre*, because it follows on from sexual love and provides both an institutional response to the dangers of *amour-propre* and an interactional response to it. All social and political institutions should be modelled in such a way as to “help reduce *amour-propre*'s 'feverish' quality by providing their

¹ (FN, p.170)

² (FN, p.171)

³ (FN, p.170)

⁴ (FN, p.171)

⁵ (FN, p.171)

⁶ (FN, p.171)

members with diverse opportunities for finding recognition.”¹ This can be done in the five ways that Neuhouser identifies, which were set out at the end of the previous section.

The problem that Neuhouser finds himself in is that the way in which the institution of marriage contributes to the controlling of *amour-propre* is dependent on Rousseau's understanding of sexual difference. It is clear that Rousseau envisages different social roles for women from men. Women's nature is supposedly distinct and made more so by the education that they are given. A woman's education is designed to complement the education of a man, so that she is able to provide effectively for him once they start courting. There is however no place for women in politics or political life as only men can be citizens. Furthermore, the role of women in the nuclear family is designed to complement the role of the patriarchal head. This divide is further cemented by coupling and marriage. Therefore, it is by excluding women from political life and by making women subordinate in the household that marriage plays a part in sustaining inequality between the sexes.

However, Neuhouser need not accept Rousseau's ideas on sexual difference and instead insist that the form of coupling that successfully averts the dangers of *amour-propre* is one of equality. Rebecca Kukla,² argues that the solutions Neuhouser considers are solutions to a social problem that results from man's nature, or what she identifies as the masculine principle. It is because man has a certain nature that *amour-propre* poses a problem. By contrast, the nature of woman does not result in inflamed *amour-propre* in the same way. Rousseau is therefore answering what he perceives as a distinctly male problem.

The task Rousseau faces is to explain how two people - man and woman - who have very different natures can come together without conflict or corruption. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that these significant differences are supposedly natural in origin. In analysing Rousseau's conception of the nature of man and woman, and the roles that they play in

¹ (FN, p.181)

² RK

both the state and the home, Kukla concludes that Rousseau's conception of the problem of social association - the problem of joining forces with others and yet retaining the freedom possessed within the state of nature - "ought to have led Rousseau to recast the terms of the problem of *civic* association, and to have seen this problem as inextricably bound up with the face of patriarchy."¹ This observation leads Kukla to make the further claim that Rousseau's assumptions about the nature of the citizen follow directly from "his failure to problematise the patriarchal family."² If this is true then Neuhouser's decision to pass over the gender problem in Rousseau's political philosophy is a mistake because the public identity of the citizen will, in part at least, be defined by the private identity of man and both will be dependent upon the identity of a subjugated and distinct being - woman.

Kukla identifies three different models of gender relations to be found in Rousseau's work; feminine domination, masculine domination, and conjugal affection. If there has to be a dominant person in a relationship for *amour-propre* to be effectively controlled then Neuhouser's decision to pass over the subject of Rousseau's misogyny will prove mistaken. It is only if conjugal affection is successful that Neuhouser's argument can survive the complaint of maintaining Rousseau's misogyny. These three forms of coupling are explained with reference to the natural differences that occur between man and woman.

In Kukla's view, the natural differences between man and woman can be traced back to two impulses that make us seek the companionship of others; *aimez-moi* and *aidez-moi*: 'love me' and 'help me'. Kukla argues that these impulses develop as a result of our perfectibility which demands that "we fulfil our potential".³ As with that other natural sentiment, *amour-propre*, they are only awakened with the emergence of cooperative society. Kukla writes, "the need for love and the need for help are both equally 'natural', though both require specific social circumstances to emerge."⁴ In a mirroring of the formation of society, where men realise in time that they are stronger together,

¹ (RK, p.348)

² (RK, p.349)

³ (RK, p.352)

⁴ (RK, p.352)

in the private domain, “men and women eventually discover that they are better off working together than alone”.¹ The work is divided along gender lines and in time men and women develop into different social beings. The self-conception of the woman develops from the impulse *aidez-moi* and into the economy of care, whereas, the self-conception of the man becomes attached to the economy of object exchange which develops from the impulse *aimez-moi*. These two economies affect how a person interacts with the world and how they think.

From these economies Kukla is able to identify what she calls the feminine and masculine principles. Kukla describes the principle “to involve one's self with other's, to develop caring bonds which makes one's interests intimately connected to the interests of these others, so that those others cease to be alien”² as the feminine principle. While, the masculine principle is the project of eliminating dependence on others through the accumulation of wealth, thereby gaining a power that quashes any restriction on freedom that they may suffer through the expression of another's distinct will.

How the masculine and feminine power differ is clear. The masculine form of control is one of domination over and subjugation of the other. In contrast to this feminine power is exerted through directing the wills of those that have come to love her. Kukla writes, “Man controls by appropriating other subjects and reducing them to objects who can be exploited as direct extensions of his will. Woman controls by loving and earning love, so that others act in her interest. She leaves the will of others unappropriated, and influences these wills as distinct from her own.”³ Kukla poetically draws the distinction between the roles of man and woman, framing her interpretation around the roles of Julie and her father in *la Nouvelle Héloïse*. Both characters have control over the people around them, but this power is achieved through distinct means. “Julie governs those around her, influencing the wills of others while those remain other.”⁴ Man has no interest in governance because to

¹ (RK, p.352)

² (RK, p.352)

³ (RK, p.353)

⁴ (RK, p.353)

govern is to allow there to be others. Man seeks to destroy the other. Julie's father, "*commands* and others obey. Those he has mastered are not, relative to him, autonomous wills at all."¹

The economy of object exchange and the economy of care effect man and woman not merely in their interactions with the social world. According to Rousseau they effect their styles of thought in general. "Women are supposed to be more suited to analysing the particular and the concrete, while men are more adept at manipulating abstract principles."² Woman does not observe or understand the world in an impartial or removed manner. Woman confronts the world by "concretely involving themselves with it."³ Men conversely, cannot interact with the world in such a way. Men interact and understand the world only indirectly, "categorising it, so that he can subsume a situation under general rules."⁴ Woman practices the principles discovered and disseminated by man. Discovering abstract principles is too complicated for them.

After showing the sharp separation between the nature and self-conception of man and woman Kukla asks "how is it possible for such different beings to combine their forces and become mutually dependent without restricting each other's freedom?"⁵ Man and woman appear to be incompatible. "A man, with his atomic self-conception, cannot take a woman as non-alien unless she ceases to be distinct from his will."⁶ This is because a man commands, he does not govern, he seeks to destroy the will of another and not control it. In doing so the woman loses her identity because it exists in her relationships with other people but if her will is subsumed by the will of man then there is no possibility of forming relationships. "On the other hand, a man will be non-alien to a woman if they become involved in each other's interests, but this involves a reduction in power and freedom on the man's terms, since

¹ (RK, p.353)

² (RK, p.354)

³ (RK, p.354)

⁴ (RK, p.354)

⁵ (RK, p.355)

⁶ (RK, p.355)

she will still be alien to *him*.”¹

There are two options that Kukla identifies where both partners of a relationship can remain as free as they were prior to the relationship. “Either one partner's nature must be reconstructed so as to correspond with the other's, or both must be remade so as to form one new harmonious unit, with which both come to identify.”² This results in three forms of gender relation; feminine domination, masculine domination, and conjugal affection. The first two are examples of one partner submitting to the dominance of the other, and conjugal affection is that form of equality and balance.

The first form of coupling that Kukla identifies is that of feminine domination. This results from romantic love which is the pure love between man and woman. Pure love is expressed for an other by involving oneself in their interests and will while still recognising them as other. “Neither can be objectified or appropriated by the other.”³ However, this is a feminine kind of love and contrary to the nature that Rousseau ascribes to man. Therefore, a relationship that is one of romantic love is dominated by the female partner. While the woman dominates, a man who desires to remain in the relationship and remain free must sacrifice his original nature and “regain his freedom by making his will and interests match hers”.⁴ It is only through this adoption of the woman's interests and will that the man is able to avoid alien demands being made of him. In other words, in order to remain free and act in accordance with his desires the man must assume the desires of the woman he loves - “he begins to live *through* her.”⁵

Despite this undermining of the self, the man still retains a deeply masculine nature. This is exemplified in the clearest example of feminine domination in Rousseau's writing, that of the relationship between Julie and St.

¹ (RK, p.355)

² (RK, p.356)

³ (RK, p.358)

⁴ (RK, p.358)

⁵ (RK, p.359)

St. Preux.¹ Kukla writes, “[St. Preux] derives the entire content of his self-conception from her and her alone”.² He has merely attached his self-conception vicariously to Julie. The reason that this relationship fails is because the dominant woman defeats the purpose of being dominant in practicing her dominance. “The woman wants to love and be loved by *another*,”³ writes Kukla, “and this was essential to the completion of her own identity. In her power she has succeeded so completely in involving herself with another that she has erased his otherness, and she now loves only herself.”⁴ This does not fulfil her needs. A woman needs a partner who is distinct from her because a woman loves through her relationships and cannot do this if the man assumes her identity. “Thus extreme feminine power, in its complete ability to obtain what it desires, destroys and disfigures this object in the process of obtaining it, leaving those very desires unsatisfied.”⁵

A second form of coupling, and another form of submission, is masculine domination. Interestingly, Kukla struggles to find many examples of pure masculine domination in Rousseau's writings. This is because Rousseau believes that woman's power of manipulation is so strong that even in situations where she appears to be under the total domination of man it is she who has directed the man's will to act. Disturbingly, Kukla writes, “In *Emile*, [Rousseau] asserts that women's control is so perfect that rape and sexual exploitation are impossible, because any sexual act can only result from the woman intentionally letting down her resistance.”⁶ The closest example of masculine domination is Rousseau's own domination of his wife Thérèse. Kukla writes, “Thérèse is so totally subsumed by Rousseau that she has completely ceased to exist for him; he takes her to be a useful object in his

¹ This example is from *la Nouvelle Héloïse* which is the strongest fictional representation of feminine domination. Rousseau's own relationship with Mme. de Warens, which Kukla believes Julie and St. Preux is modelled on, is another clear example of feminine domination.

² (RK, p.360)

³ (RK, p.364)

⁴ (RK, p.364)

⁵ (RK, p.365)

⁶ (RK, p.366)

natural environment.”¹ This is evident in Rousseau's *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*² where Rousseau describes himself as living in solitude despite the fact that Thérèse is present throughout.

This master and slave dynamic cannot fulfil either partner. The happiness of the slave is self-deception because the love is not being returned to her, “and hence she is not complete.”³ Equally, the relationship is not ultimately going to fulfil the needs of the man because it is not possible for a woman to become an object for him. It is only possible for her to allow herself to be taken as an object. If this is true then, to some extent, until a woman has been wholly objectified, she chooses of her own free will to follow the commands of the man. Once this domination is complete however, the woman is wholly an object and she becomes a burden rather than a useful tool. Kukla writes, “If she were to truly to lose her autonomy and become a pure object, the man could only direct her by force.”⁴ At this point, her purpose as an object is negated because she becomes an effortful burden. The benefits that a man derives from a subjugated woman comes from her acting in accordance with his wishes of her own volition. “The man ends up in the paradoxical situation of needing both to objectify the woman, and to keep her as another, distinct subject, for he is dependent on her to do things she can only do by virtue of her status as a person.”⁵ If a man does fully objectify a woman then the care and companionship that he would receive from her is absent because, in lacking personhood, the woman is unable to provide it for him.

The final form of coupling consists in conjugal affection, a form of union that involves no domination of one over the other. In order for this to occur the partners must incorporate two distinct wills and sets of interests harmoniously into the relationship. However, the unification, if guided by the masculine principle, is one of identity, and if guided by the feminine principle is one of relation. Therefore the whole - to which a man and woman conform in

¹ (RK, p.367)

² CWR, vol. 8

³ (RK, p.368)

⁴ (RK, p.368)

⁵ (RK, pp.368-9)

a relationship of conjugal affection - must be constructed. Kukla writes, “it cannot be constructed simply by combining their interests, since there is no *a priori* way of creating a whole which expresses its constituent parts”.¹ Therefore, the nature of the partners must be altered so that they do not express the masculine or feminine principles in a formulation where they are incompatible.

This is achieved along similar lines to the way in which the citizen sacrifices himself to the state and the general will. Each partner must form a “different part of a whole being, from which they each derive their sense of identity.”² In the process each partner becomes “a partial person”³ whose interests are no longer individual but attached to the greater entity of which they are a part. Kukla identifies the act and institution of marriage as the paradigmatic example of an attempt to unify in this manner. She writes, “once married, both are transformed into parts of a single being, yet both contribute to that being by doing what they do best.”⁴ What they do best, of course, is dictated by their nature. By working independently but toward a common goal - the well-being of the whole - their actions harmonise as “each partner has control within her or his proper domain”.⁵

This is the form of coupling that best supports Neuhaus's interpretation if he is to avoid my concern that it incorporates patriarchy and the subjugation of women within it. However, conjugal affection is not an ideal solution to the threat of domination and subjugation, for two reasons. Firstly, for the harmonious relationship to operate, each partner must fully identify with the whole, and must work in concert with the interests of that whole. It is not simply that if one member of the whole acts contrary to its interests it “ceases to form a unified single being”,⁶ but that even if an individual's wishes or desires are contrary to the bounds of their role “they immediately lose their

¹ (RK, p.370)

² (RK, p.370)

³ (RK, p.370)

⁴ (RK, p.371)

⁵ (RK, p.372)

⁶ (RK, p.372)

freedom, and become constrained by the now-alien whole to which they belong.”¹ Moreover, in addition to following one's prescribed role through action one, “must be made, without feeling coerced, to want to act this way.”² It is here that the insidiousness of Rousseau's political theory again becomes apparent. It is reflected with respect to the control that Jean-Jacques holds over Emile.

The second concern with conjugal affection is that even if this harmony could be created it would not last. As Kukla points out, it is such a delicate balance of roles and responsibilities that maintaining that harmony would prove impossible. It “is such a delicate affair that the lives of those involved must be preserved in a *static* arrangement.”³ This objection relates to Shklar's reading in Rousseau's political philosophy. Shklar portrays Rousseau as having a deep suspicion of change, because it necessarily brings corruption, whether corruption of society or of the family unit. Rousseau presents a utopia, like that of the Claren's household in *la Nouvelle Héloïse*, to show how we could overcome the need to change and threat of corruption. According to Shklar and Kukla, we do not have that strength to choose such a life. As a consequence, we are condemned to become Social man. Utopia will always remain outside of our grasp. So, reconciling man and woman is either difficult or impossible. As we saw in section four, Neuhouser offers a way to avoid this pessimistic conclusion.

If we follow Neuhouser's more positive analysis of Rousseau's political theory, we can conclude that it is not impossible, but merely unlikely, that we shall manage to transcend the corruption within the family. Although the examples of failed relationships littered throughout Rousseau's writings suggest that this is very unlikely indeed, it seems that success cannot be completely ruled out. What is more troublesome for Neuhouser is the question of what form these relationships should take because each depends heavily on Rousseau's conception of the natures of man and woman. Either Neuhouser

¹ (RK, p.372)

² (RK, p.372)

³ (RK, p.374)

transports inequality into his theory through the domination or subjugation of people in their exclusive and monogamous relationships, or he accepts the insidious and static form of coupling that is conjugal affection.

Kukla's suggestion is that man and woman could learn to overcome their respective natures and “*bisexualise*”¹ themselves. If Kukla is correct and we can alter our nature to bisexualise ourselves then a different solution to the social problem can be considered, where each person must learn to both give esteem and take esteem. This suggested solution still recognises the importance that Neuhausser has shown *amour-propre* must play in the story but overcomes the problem of its being tied into Rousseau's misogyny. I believe that this suggestion can be developed by emphasising the role of education in Rousseau's project.

In order for this suggestion to work two things will need to be shown: first that Rousseau fully recognises his position as a member of the group Social man; and second that the theory of education that he presents is one of *paideia* - a continual learning over the course of one's life. This enables him to lay the philosophical foundations for a reflexive methodology, where each individual is learning and teaching throughout the course of their life and the fruits of that learning are passed on to the next generation to continue the project and bring closer a free and uncoerced way of life. This learning takes place both within the socio-political institutions that we create, and in the domestic setting that exists outside of the state.

My first point is that Rousseau is aware that he is fallible, and is developing, to some extent, genealogical fictions. This is evident in the *Second Discourse* when he attacks Hobbes and Locke for transposing onto the state of nature conceptions of man that are a product of civil society. Rousseau writes, “[in] speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression, desires, and pride [they] have carried over to the state of Nature ideas they had acquired in society: they spoke about Savage man and they described Civil man.”² But Rousseau himself

¹ (RK, p.376)

² (SD, p.19)

is not above this criticism. His task, as he sets it up, is to “form conjectures”¹ to show “what the human Race might have become if it had remained abandoned to itself.”² He then attempts to access this hypothetical position and recount the history of man with the aim of expressing the nature of man. Crucially Rousseau writes, “Everything that comes from Nature will be true; there will be nothing false except what I have involuntarily put in of my own.”³ In writing this Rousseau admits more than the fact that he is dealing in conjectures. He also admits that he is, in all likelihood, wrong. This claim is further supported when Rousseau writes in the *Second Discourse*,

“I began some lines of reasoning, I ventured some conjectures, less in the hope of resolving the question than with the intention of clarifying it and reducing it to its genuine state. Others will easily be able to go farther on the same road, though it will not be easy for anyone to reach the end of it; for it is no light undertaking to separate what is original from what is artificial in the present Nature of man, and to know correctly a state which no longer exists, which perhaps never existed, which probably will never exist, and about which it is nevertheless necessary to have precise Notions in order to judge our present state correctly.”⁴

Rousseau is not the final word on the nature of man, and he knows it. This leads into my second claim, that Rousseau develops a theory of *paideia*. Only through continual learning can one overcome corruption because the theme of genealogical fiction is reproduced in *Emile* but rather than hypothesising that which led to our corruption, Rousseau must hypothesise that which may lead to regeneration.

In Book I of *Emile*, Rousseau sets the criteria for a good governor. Emile's education must be provided by someone and so the criteria for who is the best person to do this must be established, as far as this is possible. I isolate four

¹ (SD, p.19)

² (SD, p.19)

³ (SD, p.19)

⁴ (SD, p.13)

qualities that Rousseau clearly demands of a good governor. The first condition of a good governor is that he must not be a man for sale. A teacher must be one's father. In answering the question, 'Who shall raise my child?', Rousseau responds, "I already told you: you, yourself."¹ He continues, "to make a man one must be either a father or more than a man oneself."² The second condition is that the governor himself must be well raised. Rousseau writes that, "it would be necessary that a governor had been raised for his pupil",³ but more than that all the persons to be involved in the life of the pupil must have "received the impression that they ought to communicate to him."⁴ Rousseau postulates this quality because he sees that man transposes his failures through his actions and teachings onto the people around him. The role of the governor is so intimate with their charge that these failures must be significantly magnified. Rousseau recognises that this poses an obvious regress problem for his account. "It would be necessary to go from education to education back to I know not where."⁵ This simple fact itself could spell the end for Rousseau's theory of education.

If these obstacles were not enough Rousseau demands that a good governor is young. "I would want him to be a child himself if it were possible".⁶ In order to be a proper companion and confidant to Emile the ages of pupil and governor need be as similar as they can be. Then, the fourth criteria, in addition to youth the governor must have "the age, health, kinds of knowledge, and all the talent suitable for working at [Emile's] education, for conducting him from the moment of his birth up to the one when, become a grown man, he will no longer have need of any guide other than himself."⁷

With these constraints and demands the task of the governor is too great even for Rousseau himself. He instead assumes what he refers to as an easier

¹ (E, p.49)

² (E, pp.49-50)

³ (E, p.50)

⁴ (E, p.50)

⁵ (E, p.50)

⁶ (E, p.51)

⁷ (E, p.50)

task, “I shall put my hand not to the work but to the pen; and instead of doing what is necessary I shall endeavour to say it.”¹ As such, Rousseau must hypothesise that this “marvel”² is found and continue to move forward with the hope that “in considering what he ought to do that we shall see what he ought to be.”³

It is important to recognise that this problem is repeated in the *Social Contract*. Rousseau, in describing the lawgiver, writes, “Gods would be needed to give men laws.”⁴ This creates the same problem that Rousseau experiences with Jean-Jacques, “we find in the work of the lawgiver two things which look contradictory - a task which is beyond human powers and a non-existent authority for its execution.”⁵

It is undeniable that neither the lawgiver, nor the governor that Rousseau describes is to be found amongst human beings. This is a comparable feature of Rousseau and Fénelon, for it is the in *Télémaque* where the guide, Mentor, is revealed as the God Minerva, and as Riley observed, the true hero of the story. Riley writes, “The proof comes at the very end of Telemachus: Mentor undergoes a metamorphosis and is revealed as Minerva (goddess of wisdom), and the book ends abruptly before Telemachus is shown being reunited with Ulysses. The hero has already been resolved into pure Wisdom: The nominal hero barely reaches Ithaca.”⁶ If this governor could be found then the very problem that *Emile* serves to solve is diverted because it becomes important to ask how it was solved in the creation of this creature without the process of domestic education.

Domestic education is designed for a child to be educated by nature. Nature, however, does not need to be interpreted here as having normative power or moral weight. Nature simply provides a starting point that allows us to see more clearly that which we have got wrong. By misrepresenting nature

¹ (E, p.50)

² (E, p.50)

³ (E, p.50)

⁴ (SC, p.84)

⁵ (SC, p.86)

⁶ (CCR, p.84)

we transport the problems of Social man into nature and corrupt that starting point thereby corrupting all that follows from it. I want to say that Rousseau is committed to a generational project where parent teaches child as best as they are able, and the power of the educational theory that Rousseau develops exists in its recognition of this limitation. There may have been no person available to Rousseau to act as governor, and there may be no person that fulfils the criteria now, but if the project is followed then there is a chance that there will one day be. It becomes a genealogical solution to a problem that Rousseau elucidated through a genealogical model.

There is one further point that I shall make to support my thesis. I believe that I have shown how Rousseau's misogyny is difficult to untangle from his theory of freedom and equality but that one way this may be achieved is through interpreting his thesis as one that must occur over an extended period of time, and throughout the duration of one's life. What I call Rousseau's theory of *paideia*. However, Rousseau is also guilty of promoting significant coercion and insidious teaching techniques in *Emile*. In section four I mentioned this in reference to the story of the magician. Neuhausser, argued that despite these questionable practices a certain systematicity could be gleaned from Rousseau's theory in order to avoid the dangers of *amour-propre*. I believe that Rousseau's insidious teaching habits are as damning for Neuhausser as is his decision to avoid engaging with the problem of misogyny. By reconstructing Rousseau's thesis around the theory of *paideia* rather than avoiding the dangers of *amour-propre*, one need not ignore this uncomfortable manipulation on the part of Jean-Jacques. Instead, we can agree with the systematicity that Neuhausser identifies in the practices recommended by Rousseau but disagree with the practices themselves.

Conclusion

In this thesis I have shown that there is a tension in Rousseau's political theory between the stories of freedom told in *Emile* and the *Social Contract*, and in the type of man that achieves it. This is a problem for Rousseau scholars because both *Emile* and the *Social Contract* appear to be answers to the same problem outlined in the *Second Discourse*, the problem of the degeneration of man into the corrupt and denatured Social man. I have examined three interpretations of Rousseau that have sought to resolve or explain this problem. After analysing these interpretations I have offered a novel interpretation of my own.

In the first section I analysed the three texts in question - The *Second Discourse*, *Emile*, and the *Social Contract* - and explored the freedom and the type of man that they describe. From this I identified the natural freedom of Natural man, the unfreedom of Social man, the civil freedom of Civil man, and the free individual - *Emile*. These freedoms and forms of man prove difficult to keep distinct and difficult to bring together. In the following three sections I provided three different interpretations of how this could be done. These interpretations aimed to show how Rousseau intended the solutions to the problem of Social man - provided in the *Social Contract* and *Emile* - to be read, and how far Rousseau successfully reconciles them.

The interpretation that I broadly support is that of Frederick Neuhouser. He argues that the *Social Contract* and *Emile* are parts of one response to the problem posed by Social man. They form a two-pronged approach where the former develops good socio-political institutions and the latter the development of man through domestic education. Together they are able, theoretically at least, to avoid the dangers of *amour-propre* and save man from his descent into corruption. By interpreting Rousseau in this way Neuhouser places *amour-propre* at the centre of Rousseau's political theory.

I show that Neuhouser's theory fails to escape the clutches of Rousseau's misogyny. I avoid the consequences of Rousseau's misogyny by shifting the focus away from *amour-propre* and instead placing education as a life-long

pursuit at the centre of Rousseau's political project. I do this for two reasons, firstly because of the stated aim of providing an interpretation of Rousseau and reconstruction of his ideas that do not succumb to the subjugation of non-citizens, in particular the subjugation of women. The second reason is because Rousseau provides the tools for this reconstruction himself. So despite the fact that it is necessary to reconstruct Rousseau's political philosophy in order to get the most out of it, one is able to achieve this within the domain of his own work.

I have argued that one must read Rousseau as providing a genealogical account of how man became corrupted over time resulting in the unfree and denatured Social man, and that *Emile* and the *Social Contract* provide a dual-layered response that is aimed at offering an escape from this destructive path that leads, necessarily, to the annihilation of man by his own hands. The upshot of my interpretation is that, much like the nature of man, the method must flux and change as we learn. There is no one way to achieve the aim of man-citizen. There is a guide but the guide is an imperfect man, there can be no lawgiver, there can be no Jean-Jacques. There is only the faulty Social man, but with each attempt and each generation we can change our nature and draw closer to the man-citizen.

With this analysis I believe that the political philosophy of Rousseau can be used as a platform for a new methodological approach to political philosophy. Within this thesis I make the claim, based upon my critical reconstruction, that the continual education of persons should be understood to rest at the centre of Rousseau's political philosophy. By placing a fallible but educable person at the foundation of a political methodology one is able to begin to build an organic, pragmatic philosophy. It is in this direction that I hope my research shall take me. Through this approach I hope to develop a method that will help to bridge the gap between practical thought and the development of critical thought. I believe that, because of his interest in both the citizen and in educating a person to be free, Rousseau offers the perfect starting place to achieve this aim and to develop the techniques and practices necessary to provide the best parameters for the formation of person-citizens.

As a result, this thesis shall link in with my other academic goal, which is to advance the teaching of philosophy as a taught subject in schools and colleges at all levels of education. My research politicises the philosophy of education because I am influenced by theory contained largely within the field of political philosophy, and that has inspired my philosophy of education. It is my desire to bring philosophy as a subject to more people, especially amongst under-represented groups. It is for this reason that I believe my research, beyond its academic qualities, will have practical applications that pertain to educational policy and political practice.

By following this process I offer an analysis that drags Rousseau into the twenty-first century by showing that the most unpalatable convictions that he upholds can be sacrificed without compromising his larger political project and in doing so provide a theoretical and practical foundation for the teaching of person-citizens that are equipped to cope with the necessary coercions of cooperative society.

Bibliography

- Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', (Oxford, 1969)
- Christopher Brooke, *Philosophic Pride* (Princeton, 2012)
- John Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau* (Cambridge, 1974)
- N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological Social and Political Theory*, (Blackwell, 1988)
- N. J. H. Dent and T. O'Hagan, 'Rousseau on Amour-Propre', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, Vol. 72 (1998) 57-73+5
- François Fénelon, *Telemachus* (Cambridge, 1994)
- Charles L. Griswold, 'Liberty and Compulsory Civil Religion in Rousseau's *Social Contract*', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2015) 271-300
- David James, 'Rousseau on Dependence and the Formation of Political Society', *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2011) 343-366
- David James, *Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence, and Necessity* (Cambridge, 2013)
- Rebecca Kukla, 'The Coupling of Human Souls: Rousseau and the Problem of Gender Relations', Lynda Lange (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Penn State, 2002) 346-382
- Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love* (Oxford, 2008)
- Patrick Riley, 'Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns', Patrick Riley (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge, 2001) 78-93
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile* (Penguin, 1979)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Penguin, 1968)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions* (Oxford, 2008)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 2*, 'Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (First Discourse) and Polemics, ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 3*, 'Discourse of the Origins of Inequality (Second Discourse) Polemics, and Political

- Economy', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 6*, 'Julie or the New Heloise', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 8*, 'Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Botanical Writings, and Letter to Franquieres,' ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 9*, 'Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written From the Mountain, and related writings', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 10*, 'Letter to D'Alembert and Writings for the Theatre', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 11*, 'Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Collected Writings of Rousseau Volume 13*, 'Emile or On Education (Includes Emile and Sophie; Or the Solitaries', ed. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (University Press of New England, 1992)
- Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory* (Cambridge, 1969)
- Robert Wokler, *Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford, 2001)
- Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (Cambridge, 1995)