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# How do stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration?

Mark Panton

This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Birkbeck, University of London

Summer 2017

## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that this thesis entitled “*How do Stakeholders Influence Stadium-led Regeneration?*” represents the results of my own work except where specified in the thesis.

Mark Panton

## Abstract

The use of sports stadiums in regeneration is a recent phenomenon in the UK, with the breadth of literature in this field relatively limited. However, it is an area of growing interest with numerous other sports stadium regeneration projects being proposed. So far there has been very little focus on understanding the stakeholders' perspective surrounding stadium-led regeneration. The work of Mitchell, *et al.*, (1997) on the salience of legitimacy, power and urgency provided a starting point in seeking to answer the research question: how do stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration?

In this study empirical research involving a wide range of interviews and participant observations with stakeholders were carried out in East Manchester and Tottenham, where stadium-led regeneration projects were at similar early stages of development. Secondary documentation was used to triangulate the findings and CAQDAS software utilised to assist with the analysis of the large amount of rich data that was obtained. Substantial parts of the data fell outside of the earlier typology, which indicated it was too parsimonious to adequately explain the complex array of contexts, triggers, strategies and influences that took place during stadium-led regeneration. This led to the development of a more complete framework that was necessary to understand the process and to answer the research question. The stakeholder influence framework, based on twelve concepts that are analysed in detail, provides an original contribution to knowledge in this field. One of the most significant concepts identified as part of the context was that a perceived lack of power, legitimacy and urgency can become an

important trigger for the involvement of stakeholders in trying to influence developments.

Limitations over generalisability from the two research sites are discussed, together with opportunities for further research linked to the developed framework.

## **Acknowledgements**

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Finally, I would like to thank my partner Amanda Lillywhite and daughter Zara Panton for their constant support throughout the last five years. Amanda has also worn out numerous red pens whilst reading draft chapters and offered advice and guidance during this process. This thesis is dedicated to Amanda and Zara.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Why this research?

In 1995, after a competitive bidding process, Manchester was awarded the 2002 Commonwealth Games. In 2003, the stadium that was built to host many of the Commonwealth Games events was handed over to Manchester City Football club on a two hundred year lease, under a deal negotiated and signed with the local council in 1999 (Brown *et al.*, 2004). As a supporter of Manchester City Football Club, I followed these events and they prompted my interest in the increasing use of sports stadiums as catalysts for regeneration<sup>1</sup> of urban areas. My immediate assumption was that using a sports stadium and a football club as part of a plan to regenerate a derelict local area was an entirely positive move. However, as I began to investigate the issues as part of some early research in 2010 into sports-event-led regeneration, a more complicated picture began to emerge, which has led to this research.

It became apparent from some initial reading that not all of the local community in East Manchester were content with the stadium and the associated developments in the area. As an example, the council justified the closure of a local swimming pool in Gorton partly on the basis of building an Olympic-sized aquatic centre for the Commonwealth Games. However, the people of Gorton did not see this as an appropriate local replacement, given the limited public access, increased cost of use

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<sup>1</sup> The term regeneration is used in this paper to mean the transformation of a place – residential, commercial or open space – that has displayed the symptoms of physical, social and/or economic decline, (Evans, 2005: 967).

and further distance to travel. Further, the Sports Minister, Richard Caborn (Brown *et al.*, 2004) and the journalist David Conn criticised the overall lack of community benefit and value for the public investment into elements of the regeneration of East Manchester, (Independent, 7.12.00).

Together with other negative wider effects on the local community (such as nuisance, congestion, pollution and lack of jobs for local people) identified by academics such as Adam Brown *et al.*, (2004), this provided further evidence that not everybody in the area was happy with the “stadium-led regeneration” approach. Reading these accounts, and others, led to an awareness that some individuals and groups felt unable to engage, let alone participate in the regeneration of the area; certainly not to the same extent as other larger groups of stakeholders such as the football club and the local council. At the start of my research, in 2011, Manchester City Football Club, having moved into the stadium eight years previously, were about to embark on a further significant development on an area of land immediately across the road from their stadium. The proposals involved a large training complex, the *Etihad Campus*, with a number of facilities open to the community; a walkway connecting the Campus with the main stadium; a sport-science unit; and a new sixth-form college.

During the same period, Tottenham Hotspur Football Club had set out and was negotiating its own plans to build a new stadium within what became known as the Northumberland Development Project (NDP). This project involved associated developments that proposed a public square, new retail facilities, new homes on the site of the existing football ground, establishment of a university technical college and

an increased role for the Tottenham Hotspur Foundation – a charity connected to the football club, (THFC website: new stadium plans). As part of the NDP, Haringey Council also proposed to build a walkway to connect the new stadium with a re-developed train station on the other side of the High Road. The new stadium for the football club was driven by a growing waiting list for season tickets and commercial pressures to increase income to compete with their rivals both on and off the football pitch.

The NDP was part of wider regeneration going on in Tottenham that followed on from prolonged rioting that occurred in the area in the summer of 2011. The riots involved numerous arrests, injuries to police, looting, and considerable damage to retail and commercial premises in Tottenham High Road and surrounding areas, (Guardian, 07.08.14: Tottenham riots). In September 2011, Haringey Council granted planning permission to the football club for most of their proposed developments within the NDP, including the new stadium. However, this was just the start of a tortuous process for the football club and the local community.

The proposed developments in Tottenham offered an immediately interesting comparison site to East Manchester with many similarities in its urban setting, but also evolving issues of concern about stadium-led regeneration amongst the local community. Further, there was the changed institutional context since the original stadium-led regeneration started in East Manchester, brought about by the election of the 2010 Coalition government that led to rapid, significant alterations to planning

policy (McAllister *et al.*, 2013) and an austerity budget (e.g. Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Pugalis and Liddle, 2013).

## **1.2 Stadium-led regeneration**

*“Stadium-led regeneration has emerged as a model of development to support both the expansion of football stadia and the regeneration of brownfield sites”,*  
(The Regeneration Game, 2015).

Following the early theoretical work of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997), sport-related research has been carried out into stakeholder salience in the context of sports franchise relocations in the USA (e.g. Friedman and Mason, 2004). However, there has been very little research on stadium-led regeneration developments in England and on how different stakeholders are able to engage or participate in such projects. This is despite the fact that sports stadiums are increasingly being used as vehicles for regeneration projects with the London Olympic Stadium being the most obvious example. Currently there are a number of ambitious further stadium-led regeneration plans now under construction (e.g. involving Brentford FC, West Ham United FC) or in the planning stages (e.g. AFC Wimbledon, Queens Park Rangers FC and at a non-league level, Forest Green Rovers FC). This has led to closer scrutiny of these developments in order to understand their wider impacts, the views of local communities, the financing and other related issues by organisations such as the Greater London Authority (e.g. The Regeneration Game, 2015).

The most basic argument put forward by advocates of stadium-led regeneration is that any public costs involved will be exceeded by their economic benefits. That is, stadiums and sports provide real economic benefits for the local economy and this financial success can then further enhance a city's reputation (Baade and Dye, 1990). Following increased unemployment due to de-industrialisation, this proposition was adopted in the 1980s and 1990s by a series of American cities, with early examples in Cleveland, Denver, Indianapolis and Phoenix. The trend has emerged as a model for some regeneration projects in the United Kingdom in the last fifteen years. The building of new stadiums turned into a boom during the 1990s in the USA with many major sports teams demanding and getting new stadiums in order either to remain in or move to a city, with consequential costs for the local public finances.

*"I had a little trouble with it ... It seemed a little silly to be spending \$253 million [to build a new sports stadium] at a time when we couldn't even pay our own bills for jails, hospitals and things like that,"* (Phoenix Supervisor Tom Rawles, Home Box Office, 1998, quoted by Collins, 2008: 1186).

In the USA and Canada, from 1990 to 2010, 104 new sports facilities were built for Major League Baseball, National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League and Major Soccer League teams, (Coates and Humphreys, 2011: 65). This has led to a wide literature and debate in the USA around the issues related to stadium-led regeneration. In order to justify the huge public subsidies for the building of these stadiums, 'boosters' have frequently produced figures related to

the amount of jobs and economic benefits that would be created for the area around new developments. For example:

*“Minnesota Wins!, a pro-stadium group funded by the Twins, Vikings, and local corporations, estimated that a new baseball-only stadium costing \$310 million would generate an additional \$35.9 million in economic activity and the equivalent of 168 new full-time jobs”, (deMause N. and Cagan J., 2008: 36).*

In response to the above claim, University of Chicago economist Allen Sanderson stated:

*“ if the money were dropped out of a helicopter over the Twin Cities, you would probably create eight to ten times as many jobs”, (deMause and Cagan J., 2008: 36).*

Later advocates for new sports facilities in Detroit, San Diego and Seattle adopted a slightly different approach that did not concentrate on straightforward economic benefits (Chapin, 2004) with “*psychic income*” offered as a further reason for the belief that sports stadiums can be the catalyst for urban regeneration:

*“Building offices, factories or distribution outlets create economic development, but they do not have sports’ capacity for creating personal joy and community pride and solidarity. Psychic income may be the major*

*justification for public sector subsidisation of private sports teams and events*”, (Compton in Gratton and Henry, 2001: 31).

Other positive arguments centred on the idea that stadium-led regeneration would provide “*a catalyst for the physical redevelopment of portions of the city’s core,*” rather than a purely economic investment (Chapin, 2004: 194). This approach relies in part on the anchor theory, of which there will be further discussion. It can be argued that through new stadium developments, areas such as East Manchester and Tottenham are seeking a competitive advantage through their anchor tenant football clubs from which to develop a cluster of related industries and services. However, evidence to support this notion that sport, or more specifically football stadiums, can become catalysts for regeneration goals, as “anchors” for other types of supported development, is at best highly variable. Some writers have suggested the situation in the USA is a good deal worse:

*“There are only two things you do not want on a valuable piece of real estate. One is a cemetery, and the other is a football stadium”*, (University of Chicago sports economist Allen Sanderson, in deMause and Cagan, 2008: 272).

In reality, municipal governments have been censured for deploying stadium financing in an unlawful and undemocratic manner, by ostracizing the community from taking part in the decision-making process, (Lee, 2002). For example, prior to construction of Vancouver’s BC Place Stadium, a number of public meetings were

held, however the problem with these meetings was that they were primarily information sessions for the public and prevented the community from gaining a vote in the process, (Lee, 2002). Clearly there is a need for the inclusion of stakeholders, broadly construed, throughout the process of any stadium-led regeneration. The work of Friedman and Mason (2004) on franchise relocation may provide a partial answer:

*“In creating stakeholder maps surrounding a specific policy issue, stakeholder theory may also aid policy makers in identifying and addressing marginalised groups and the inequities created and reinforced by the ongoing actions of definitive stakeholders”, (Friedman and Mason, 2004: 251).*

In the UK there has been a slow but rapidly growing emergence of the use of sport in general to address regeneration objectives, largely stemming from the belief of government and other sporting organisations that it can confer a wide range of economic and social benefits. Also that it can contribute positively to the revitalization of declining urban areas (BURA, 2003). In the UK, football clubs, and more specifically their grounds, are increasingly becoming the focus for wider urban regeneration projects. These projects raise many similarly significant issues to those that have been faced in the USA and also sometimes complex questions that are unique to particular sites. This has led to increasing attention paid to the needs of the local community and other stakeholders affected by stadium-led regeneration projects (e.g. The Regeneration Game, 2015).

Issues of governance have been pointed out by Jones (2002) in relation to the Millennium Stadium development, which may apply more generally to other schemes. These included the lack of evidence that local structures serving democracy and accountability were adequate to ensure that all viewpoints regarding the development were heard equally. It has been argued that an effective stakeholder management strategy in the context of a stadium development should include involvement in decision-making by community, resident, supporter, and business representatives; developments designed to meet the needs of local communities; regular information sharing about the stadium development; and independent monitoring of community involvement in the development, (Brown *et al.*, 2004). Manchester City FC seemed to be aware of some of the integration issues when the football club originally moved into their new stadium in 2003:

*“If we ignore our local community, we ignore it potentially at our peril, and they’ll treat us badly if we treat them badly. And I think we’ve got to be seen to be, you know purely from a selfish point of view to stop those things happening we’ve got to do something”*, (interview with MCFC official, quoted in Brown *et al.*, 2004: 28).

The quote demonstrates the importance of involving diverse groups of stakeholders in regeneration schemes; not just in consultation exercises, but genuine participation from the earliest planning stages of regeneration strategies through to on-going developments. Common criticisms of urban regeneration, of whatever type, reflect a failure to consult and to allow participation by local communities and stakeholders.

This can result in feelings that decisions are a *fait accompli*, with the local community only being consulted as a “rubber-stamp” in the process. This can lead to an inability to integrate developments and ultimately to alienation. Such problems can be affected, for better or worse, by planning regimes in place at the time. These are some of the issues that are raised at the two research sites in East Manchester and Tottenham.

One of the many interesting issues arising from a comparative analysis of stadium-led developments is that the public sector appears as a significant actor, in one form or another, whatever the surrounding political and ideological environment, (Thornley, 2002: 817). This is also true when considered temporally. In all cases public sector organisations have an important role to play, granting planning permission, and investing in transport, social infrastructure or public realm improvements around a stadium (*The Regeneration Game*, 2015). This wider public involvement means that stakeholder theory provides a highly relevant concept for investigating the influences that shape stadium-led regeneration.

*“Local authorities, stakeholders and local residents and businesses – deserve to know how a new or expanded stadium is going to affect the area. We need to know what football clubs contribute to wider regeneration, including the extent to which their section 106 agreements are fulfilled”, (The Regeneration Game, 2015).*

It has been claimed that sporting infrastructure has tremendous potential to create economic and social change (Davies, 2011), but there is a need for further research on the impacts of sports stadiums, (Davies, 2006). This research will argue there is also

a need for greater involvement of communities and stakeholders at all levels throughout the development process if stadiums are to be used successfully in urban regeneration schemes.

*“If place-making is to happen, lessons from East Manchester, Wembley and The Emirates make it clear that new stadia must not occupy large land areas – attracting growing match day crowds and swelling shareholder profits – at the expense of the communities that host them ... effective early involvement and consultation is necessary to broker stronger relations between clubs and communities”, (The Regeneration Game, 2015).*

The claims set out above, and others that have been put forward for using sports stadiums in urban regeneration initiatives, will be critically analysed. Research from the USA, where sports stadiums have been used in attempts to regenerate urban areas for many years, will be assessed in more detail later in this study. The more limited and largely qualitative literature from the UK will also be considered in this thesis. Through evidence from the literature, the stakeholder context and its theoretical relevance will also be made clear. Firstly, some background to the two research sites.

### **1.3 Background to the research sites: Institutional and planning contexts**

It is important to understand shifts in the wider institutional context, particularly in the area of planning over the period of the developments. Many of the planning changes and consequential impacts on regeneration developments can be traced back to the election of the Conservative government in 1979. Indeed it is argued that with the election of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010,

policies from the previous Conservative era made a come-back, (Dillon and Fanning, 2015).

The election of a Conservative government in 1979, driven by a neo-liberal agenda, led to major reforms to the post-war consensus. At its root was a reorientation of the state “*to support rather than supplant the market*” (Thornley, 1991: 208). A series of measures, starting with the 1980 Local Government (Planning and Land) Act, removed key powers from local government and transferred these to central government or its agents. The purpose was to ensure that decision making took place in a decentralized marketplace, with a consequent downgrading of democracy and public involvement, (Prior, 2005: 475). For Thornley (1991), the modification to the purpose of planning amounted to giving the developer greater freedom, (1991: 143) and a significant shift in power and control towards central government and market forces, (1991: 145). This sets the scene not only for later developments in 2010, but the shift away from the top-down approach and towards a much greater involvement of local communities of the Labour government elected in 1997.

In 1997 after eighteen years of Conservative Party rule, the government of Tony Blair promised a new philosophy and new approach under the banner of New Labour. Rydin and Thornley (2002: 2) consider that the election of New Labour in 1997 heralded a “*political paradigm shift*”, reflected in a new agenda of institutional change, social inclusion and participation, sustainability and urban regeneration. In two important aspects New Labour can be contrasted sharply with Thatcherism. While Mrs Thatcher took a conflictual approach, Mr Blair placed consensus and

conciliation at the top of his agenda. The second contrast with Thatcherism was the emphasis given to local democracy and decentralisation, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 3).

The priorities changed with local democracy, community, transparency, sustainability and co-ordinated or joined-up thinking moved to the top of the agenda (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 2). Stakeholder engagement was a major part of the agenda and defined as a learning process: “*learning about the views and skills of local communities, listening to the needs of local people and finding ways of jointly meeting those needs*”, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 159). In 2001, a consultation paper *Planning: Delivering Fundamental Change* (DTLR, 2001) proposed sweeping changes to the planning system. Statements of Community Involvement would require effective involvement in development control as well as development planning, (Prior, 2005: 476). Over the following years these themes became embodied in legislation and as a result the context for planning and regeneration also changed. Many of the new priorities, such as community empowerment, involved a reappraisal of the purpose and procedure of planning, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 2).

Under new legislation, local people and other interested bodies would have the opportunity to express their views on planning proposals before they were finalised. The aim was to encourage local people to participate actively in the preparation of plans from the earliest stages so that they could be fully involved in decisions about the pattern of development in their area, (Planning Policy Guidance Note 1999, 12,

para 2.10: Development Plans, DETR, London; quoted in Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 161).

The most important policy development with a spatial focus was the *New Deal for Communities*. The initiative, announced in September 1998, encouraged a more holistic approach to problem solving, a mixed market in the delivery of services and the involvement at all stages of the widest constituency of local interests, including the business community, local community organisations and residents themselves, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 205).

Colenutt *et al.*, (2015: 1) suggest that during the 2000s there was a period of restraint due to popular and government concern for sustainable development which gave environmental and social issues more prominence in planning decisions. However, this shift in emphasis went into reverse after the recession and changes in government policy since 2010, which gave pre-eminence to economic factors over all others. Arguably there was a move back towards a decentralised marketplace with the downgrading of democracy and community involvement. Indeed, it could be argued that the impacts of that earlier programme identified by Thornley in 1991 as “*widening inequalities and a neglect of needs not expressed in the market-place*”, (1991: 220), were now being repeated in more recent regeneration developments, (e.g. Watt, 2013; Minton, 2012). It is in this institutional context that the two sites need to be viewed.

### **1.3.1 East Manchester: Manchester City FC Etihad Campus development**

East Manchester encompasses some of the earliest industrial clusters from the late eighteenth century in Manchester; the place described as the '*shock city*' of the industrial revolution, (Briggs, 1963: 56). The area continued to develop in the nineteenth century as a district for traditional manufacturing industries – coal, textiles, chemicals, steel and engineering. The city of Manchester was at its height between 1890 and 1915. The opening of the Manchester Ship canal in 1894 made Manchester a major inland port. The city was at the hub of a complex canal network and growing rail system. Since then Manchester has suffered huge job losses and a fundamental shift in types of employment – especially during the second half of the twentieth century. Between 1971 and 1997 employment fell in Manchester by 26%, from 344,739 to 254,550 jobs, (Mace, Hall, and Gallent, 2007: 55), with considerable impacts on the area of East Manchester.

In the second half of the twentieth century much of East Manchester's economic base, including what was once the largest deep mine in Britain, and the employment that accompanied it, was decimated by successive economic recessions and intensive competition from global markets, (New East Manchester Strategic Regeneration Framework, 2008-2018: 5). The most recent regeneration schemes followed a period in which Manchester City Council moved from actively opposing central government in the early 1980s, to embracing its competitive ethos later in the decade. The 1987 General Election, won by the Conservative Party, seemed to have been the catalyst for the then Leader of the City Council, Graham Stringer and his Deputy Chief Executive, Howard Bernstein, to develop a process of short lines of decision-making involving a

small group of key individuals. The change in strategy led to a more top-down policy with little genuine wider involvement of the community or any other stakeholders; decentralising of power and enfranchising the most disadvantaged was barely mentioned, (Robson, in Peck and Ward, 2002). However, it did lead to the winning of substantial government discretionary funding and the delivery of large-scale developments in Manchester, (Robson, in Peck and Ward, 2002). The strategy continued when Richard Lease became the council Leader and Howard Bernstein became Chief Executive in 1996. All three men are passionate football supporters, which may partly explain the central role of sport in the city's regeneration plans.

East Manchester benefitted from one of the early NDC projects that was started in 1999. The Labour government of the time had made it clear they did not want NDC governance dominated and run by local councils. Significant efforts were made to ensure that as many people as possible, rather than a small clique, had the opportunity to be involved, which later included training and development programmes, (Grey, 2010). There were also successive Community Plans negotiated for the area from 1999 to 2017. The local community arguably benefitted from the changed approach by central government that was more inclusive and required greater participation of local communities. At the time of the announcement of the NDC programme, Manchester City Council made a successful bid to hold the 2002 Commonwealth Games. The motivation for the city's 2002 Commonwealth Games bid and staging of the event was that it should act as a further catalyst, alongside the other initiatives, for the regeneration of East Manchester, one of the poorest areas of the most multiply deprived wards in the whole of the UK, (Evans, 2007: 204). In the end, a total of

£170m of capital investment in facilities was made on the City of Manchester Stadium and Sportcity complex, which now includes the Aquatics Centre, Manchester Velodrome, together with athletics and squash centres, (Brown *et al.*, 2004: 12).

Manchester City FC moved into the refurbished City of Manchester Stadium in 2003. The process of stadium development put the football club at the centre of plans to regenerate the area, with the club given new obligations as a result: something which was unique at the time in the UK, (Brown *et al.*, 2004). Subsequent significant further inward investment, estimated at £90 million, stemmed the economic and population decline in the area through job creation, construction of new homes and improved public services, (New East Manchester Strategic Regeneration Framework, 2008-2018: 9). As part of the on-going investment in the area, in March 2010 Manchester City FC signed an agreement with Manchester City Council (MCC) and the development organisation New East Manchester Ltd (NEM Ltd), to create a transformational plan for the still largely derelict area in and around the now re-named *Etihad Stadium*, covering 79.5 acres. Following a planning application and consultation process, outline planning permission was granted in December 2011 for the *Etihad Campus* and associated development that was designed to include, *inter-alia*, a new sixth form college, sports science institute and training centre, (Manchester City Football Academy, Economic and Regeneration Assessment, September 2011: 2).

Although the planning application for the *Etihad Campus* was made during the period of the 2010 Coalition government, the changes to economic and planning policy set

out above were not felt as profoundly in relation to the development in East Manchester. Much of the wider regeneration of the area had been carried out at the time of the building of the stadium (opened in 2002) and thereafter during the period of a Labour government. Forums for engagement and participation that were put in place as a result of the NDC programme had become established. They involved multiple stakeholder groups in East Manchester and were embedded at the time of the *Etihad Campus* development. Deas and Doyle (2013) identified positive gains in social capital that developed in areas where there has been major area-based regeneration in Manchester – as was the case over a long period of time with the NDC (1999) and subsequent programmes in East Manchester.

Further, the owners of Manchester City FC had their own significant financial resources so did not have the difficulties in financing the *Etihad Campus*. As has been detailed, the owners of Tottenham Hotspur FC faced a funding gap in financing their stadium development, which led to negotiations with the local council to boost the development value and reduce community funding obligations, (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7 February 2012).

The *Etihad Campus* opened in the autumn of 2014; the sixth form academy opened in September 2015 and the Manchester Institute for Health is due to open later in 2016. It can be seen from the above, and from details set out elsewhere in this research, that the area around the *Etihad Campus*, has been subject to a series of regeneration initiatives over the last twenty years. These have all involved consultations with local stakeholders to a lesser or greater extent depending on the development and its

impact. The *Etihad Campus* development appears to have broad, if not unanimous, local support. Some members of the local community have expressed concern about the speed and level of development in the area together with its associated traffic, noise and pollution levels. Concerns have even been expressed by residents that the football club will expand further to the extent of requiring some to leave their homes (personal interviews with the author). Concerns have also been expressed over the way public funds have been spent in the area, (Conn, 2012).

In answer to this, representatives of the football club (personal interviews with the author) have stated there are no plans to obtain compulsory purchase orders over residential homes. Further, that the football club has always exceeded any requirements from the local council concerning contributions to infrastructure costs linked to proposed developments and therefore been able to come to agreements over section 106 commitments. Planning obligations under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) are a mechanism which makes a development proposal acceptable in planning terms. They are focused on mitigation of the impact of development and are often referred to as “developer contributions”. Common uses of planning obligations are to secure affordable housing, and to secure financial contributions to provide transport infrastructure. Local authorities are required to ensure that the combined total impact of such requests does not threaten the viability of development sites, (Planning Practice Guidance, 26.03.15). Section 106 agreements played an important role at both of the research sites.

Efforts were undoubtedly made by Manchester City FC to try to reach out to communicate effectively with the local community and a range of other stakeholders. This occurred, for example, through monthly meetings with local residents groups and

local businesses (on alternate months) at the football club. Similar meetings were held with the club's supporters.

Initial plans put forward by Tottenham Hotspur in 2010 to build a new stadium in the London Borough of Haringey provided an immediately interesting contemporaneous comparison site to East Manchester for this research. Although the geography of the two research sites has some differences, the community engagement may provide some explanation as to why the *Etihad Campus* development has not been subject to the planning delays, or activism, related to the development at the second research site. However, the institutional context outlined earlier also played a significant role in East Manchester and in Tottenham as will be seen below.

### **1.3.2 London borough of Haringey: Tottenham Hotspur FC new football stadium**

Tottenham Hotspur FC moved to their current ground in 1899. The area of Tottenham benefitted from the building of many modern houses and factories during the 1920s. However, the factories became a bombing target in World War II, and many homes were also destroyed with only some of these premises replaced after the war, (Ham & High, 13.12.12). A number of large housing estates were later built during the 1960s and 1970s at Broadwater Farm and Northumberland Park, but the design of these estates created unforeseen social problems. Such problems were exacerbated in the 1970s when the industrial base both nationally and locally began to decline. The football club's new stadium will be built next to their existing ground

just off Tottenham High Road and this neighbourhood shares a number of similarities with the area surrounding Manchester City's ground. Haringey is one of the most deprived authorities in the country, ranking 13 out of 326 English authorities. Indices on deprivation show that areas around the ground in Northumberland Park and Tottenham Hale are among the 2-3% most deprived nationally, (Haringey Index of Multiple Deprivation, 2010).

In the summer of 2011, prolonged rioting started in Tottenham and spread throughout England. The causes of those riots have been much debated, but they led directly to extra funding being made available from the Mayor of London and central government to this part of Haringey. The report, *It Took Another Riot* (2012), specifically referred to successive governments having focussed on certain deprived areas such as East Manchester, to the detriment of Tottenham.

*“This oversight has been exacerbated by Tottenham's being a depressed area in a rich city, and governments of all parties have assumed its issues would be tackled locally as a side effect of the growth agenda”, (It Took Another Riot, 2012: 27)*

This in turn led to a number of regeneration infrastructure projects involving housing, transport and the built environment, being proposed. The local council used the figures on deprivation, and more particularly the riots, to leverage increased funding and to argue the need for major regeneration projects in the area, (*It Took Another Riot*, 2012). The football club's stadium development project also included a new college, retail space and a residential development on the site of the old ground. In the surrounding area Haringey Council want to build new housing, community

facilities and most controversially a ‘walkway’ from White Hart Lane Station to the new stadium that would require the demolition of existing social housing and retail businesses.

Haringey Council’s Planning Committee approved the heads of terms of a section 106 agreement with the football club on 30 September 2010. These included a series of section 106 community infrastructure commitments amounting to £16,436,000 that set aside sums for: highways, transport and parking improvements; education; heritage and community projects. They additionally required that fifty per cent of the proposed two hundred housing units to be built on the site of the existing stadium were to be classified as affordable housing and priced accordingly. The football club were unhappy with the extent of their section 106 obligations and provided detailed financial information to the local council to the effect that the planning permission as granted was not financially viable. The football club also put in a bid to move to the Olympic Stadium in Stratford in 2011; outside the borough of Haringey and approximately 5 miles from the existing stadium. The bid was unsuccessful (long-time favourites West Ham United were eventually named preferred bidders in December 2012), but clearly put additional pressure on the local council.

Haringey Council commissioned a report from accountants Grant Thornton to assess the financial information provided by the football club. This report set out significant financial risks to the delivery of the new stadium project and suggested that, *inter-alia*, the cost of the development had to be reduced, the realisable value of the development increased, and investor confidence boosted, (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 07.02.12).

The full report from Grant Thornton has never been made public by Haringey Council, on the basis of commercial confidentiality.

Further, a report by the Mayor of London's Office, *It Took Another Riot* (2012) "... *bet that a programme of property-led regeneration would turn the [Tottenham] area around*", (Dillon and Fanning, 2015: 196). The Mayor of London announced on 16 January 2012 a £41,345.000 funding and investment package for Tottenham. As set out in the Haringey Report for Cabinet (07.02.012: 143), the package consisted of the following projects and funding sources:

**Table 1.1 Funding and investment package for Tottenham.**

Project	GLA funding (incl. capital / revenue	Council match funding	Other match funding
1. North Tottenham / Northumberland Park	£18m	£9m	0
2. Growth on the High Road	£2.5m	£200k	£145k from English Heritage, Diocese of London and Design for London
3. Opportunity Investment Fund	£3m	£1m	0
4. Employment and Skills	£1.5m	£1.5m	£1.5m (from private sector)
5. 639 High Road	£3m	0	0
Total	£28m	£11.7m	£1.645m

Linked to this new funding package, on 13 February 2012 the Planning Committee of Haringey Council agreed significant changes to reduce the cost and increase the realisable value of the stadium development. This largely involved reducing the football club's s106 funding obligations from £16,477,000 to £477,000 and allowing an increase in the number of flats to be built on the existing ground to 285 (from 200),

all of which would be sold on the open market, i.e. there would be no affordable housing. This latter action was stated to be “...consistent with council planning policy that a greater tenure mix be promoted in the east of the borough where there is a marked concentration of social housing”, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12: 17) and “still consistent with the Council’s planning policy which seeks 50% affordable housing subject to viability”, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12: 18).

The council accepted that “the new Stadium development faces a funding gap that has been exacerbated by the current challenging conditions in the financial and property markets”, (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 07.02.12: 145) and that it was seen as a catalyst for attracting new investment into the area:

*“There is a determination to bring forward the stadium development in order to capture the catalyst that the investment could provide. The stadium will bring investment, additional spending power, new jobs and homes. It is seen as central to the ambition to provide a new leisure-led destination in North Tottenham that could then attract further private sector investment. It provides the opportunity for the borough, with the support of local people, to bring about lasting change in the area”, (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 07.02.12: 149).*

The Reports Pack (Haringey, 13.02.12) made clear that the decision was also made against the back-drop of the changed institutional planning context provided by the Coalition government in which the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities’ *Statement on Growth*’ in March 2011 called for local authorities to review existing s106

agreements on schemes that were unviable. The Draft National Planning Policy Framework (July 2011) provided further support by encouraging local planning authorities to avoid non-essential conditions or obligations that would undermine the viability of development proposals, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, 13. 02.12, Reports Pack: 15).

The revised planning permission did retain a number of legal obligations on the football club. These included for the club to provide 10 non-football (non-construction) apprenticeships each year for the next 6 years, 50 apprenticeships in construction for Tottenham area residents and various traffic measures to be undertaken on match-days, (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 7.02.12). Also of interest were the obligations on local agencies to secure the re-naming of a section of White Hart Lane and of White Hart Lane Station to names to be agreed with the football club.

The plans approved for the new stadium development provoked considerable disquiet amongst some sections of the local community due to a number of concerns about both the process and the results of consultations. The perception amongst some local people was that the council was only interested in keeping the football club happy. They also believed, perhaps correctly given the institutional context outlined above, that large landowners generally had greater influence at the local council than other stakeholders such as local residents and the owners of smaller businesses were excluded from participation in the regeneration plans (personal interviews with the author).

Work has now started on the new Spurs stadium development, following a delay related to a compulsory purchase order over the existing Archway Sheet Metal Works Ltd on the site of the proposed new stadium. The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government approved a compulsory purchase order for the land in July 2014. This decision was appealed under the judicial review process by the owners of the business, the Josif family, but was eventually decided in favour of Haringey Council and the football club by a decision of the High Court on 20 February 2015. Whilst this legal action was taking place the football club made further significant changes to the design for the new stadium that necessitated a new planning application that was finally approved by Haringey Council on 16 December 2015. Outline planning approval was also granted for an increased 585 properties to be built on the site of the existing ground, all of which would be for sale at a commercial rate. Further consultations are still being carried out by Haringey Council and other agencies in relation to some of the developments, such as the 'walkway', that are associated with the stadium development. These are being accompanied by increasing efforts by the local community to generate their own plans for the area around the existing stadium and further protests about council decisions.

It should be noted that during the development process there has been a degree of hostility towards the demands of the local community by some of the football club's supporters, many of whom do not live in the local area. However, following an article in the Haringey Independent (15.09.14) by a member of the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust (THST), Martin Cloake, in which he urged the local people, businesses and Spurs supporters to stick together, a meeting was held between THST

and local community groups to find common cause on 12 November 2014. Common concerns from that meeting included: overwhelming support for an improved stadium, but opposition to inappropriate wider development; an unacceptable walkway; a demand for genuine consultation and engagement with the football club and the local council; associated concerns over secrecy and a lack of transparency; and lack of community benefit from the wider regeneration. This demonstrates the networking that can occur between different groups of stakeholders and the potential for influence over stadium-led developments by the combining of resources.

Although the planning application for the *Etihad Campus* was made in 2011 and Manchester City Council faced a similar institutional back-drop to that of the London Borough of Haringey, there were differences in the local context that meant the policies of austerity were not felt as profoundly in relation to the stadium-led regeneration in East Manchester. Much of the wider regeneration of the area had been carried out at the time of the building of the stadium (opened in 2002) and thereafter under a Labour government that was largely supportive of community involvement. This meant that strong community structures became embedded in the area. The owners of Manchester City FC also did not have the difficulties in financing the *Etihad Campus* faced by the owners of Tottenham Hotspur FC – they had significantly more financial resources, meaning there were no issues over s106 community contributions.

At both sites there seemed to be an assumption from the football clubs, local council and developers that a top-down plan for stadium-led regeneration involving a Premier

League football club would provide a positive catalyst for the local area, and that all stakeholders would welcome the idea (e.g. The 2012/13 – 2016/17 Eastlands Community Plan; Daily Express, 19 March 2013: *Tottenham are a beacon for the Future*). However, there is, at the very least, a demonstrable need to engage with the many diverse groups of stakeholders involved in these projects that can represent alternative views. As will be seen, failure to engage or allow participation may be the worst option.

#### **1.4 Research question**

The research question is: *How do Stakeholders Influence Stadium-led Regeneration?*

The thesis seeks to answer the question through a theoretical and practical analysis that focusses on two case study sites; understanding the context for stakeholder involvement together with the strategies used to gain the means of influence with focal organisations. In doing so, it develops a detailed narrative from the two research sites and aims to set out a number of key conclusions that can be drawn from the research.

#### **1.5 Wider objectives of the research**

In the UK, it was not until the mid-to late-1990s, in major cities such as Birmingham, Glasgow and Sheffield, that the use of sport for regeneration purposes gained some popular support, (Davies, 2006). As it is a recent phenomenon, the breadth of literature is limited. However, it is an area of growing interest with numerous sports stadium regeneration projects, many involving football clubs, having been completed

(e.g. Huddersfield Town FC, Manchester City FC, Arsenal FC); in progress (e.g. Brentford Town FC, West Ham United FC) and proposed (e.g. Bristol City FC, Forest Green Rovers FC, Queens Park Rangers FC, Tottenham FC). There are undoubted opportunities to learn from existing regeneration projects in different areas to understand how stakeholders influence these developments and to use the knowledge in the growing list of future projects. The potential to learn from other contexts (and cities) always needs to be kept open, (Robinson, 2006: 168).

This research aims to understand the issues around stadium-led regeneration using theory developed from a stakeholder perspective and uses Freeman's broad definition of stakeholders as: "... *any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives*", (1984: 46). The emphasis on managing stakeholders within the existing literature makes the approach one-directional in nature, with relationships viewed from a business perspective.

Accounts of how stakeholders influence organisations to enable them to achieve their interests, possibly at the expense of others, have largely been missing from the theory.

The focus of this research is an in-depth understanding of the process of stadium-led urban regeneration from the perspective of a wide range of stakeholders involved.

The rich language, context, and subjective views of multiple stakeholders were primarily accessed through interviews and participant observation at the two sites.

Research involving stakeholder theory, and more specifically stakeholder salience, in a comparative case study, offers a way of understanding some of the many different perspectives and complex processes involved in stadium-led regeneration projects.

The work of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) on the salience of stakeholders provided a useful starting point that also allowed further scope to build on the theory. The authors proposed a model that both defined stakeholders and assessed their importance through identifying the presence of the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. In this research these attributes were considered in an inductive way in order to remain open to other ways of understanding the perspectives of different stakeholders that provided the primary sources of data. Thus, the research considered whether attributes other than those previously identified may be salient together with issues that included the context for involvement of stakeholders in the process and their strategies to gain influence. The research also took up the challenge of Friedman and Miles (2009) to understand stakeholder mobilisation and its influence on the development process from the stakeholders' perspective. By providing thick description, informed by existing theoretical constructs, the research can also produce insights into how stakeholders involved in major regeneration projects interact with the focal organisations in these complex developments.

Stakeholder theory is highly relevant for this analysis, given that one of its fundamental arguments is that organisations should be managed in the interest of all constituents, not only in the interest of shareholders (Laplume *et al.*, 2008). The two stadiums that are the focus for this comparative case study are run by privately owned football clubs with a limited group of shareholders. This is the ownership model for most English football clubs. Despite this, it has been argued that the stakeholder concept has greater relevance for football clubs than for more conventional business, because of the particular features of certain football club stakeholders, specifically

their demands for accountability, (Morrow, 2003: 43). Football clubs regularly claim to be central to their local communities in a variety of contexts<sup>2</sup> and could therefore be expected to engage seriously with their various stakeholders in such developments. The intended contribution to knowledge of this work is the gap in research that deals comprehensively with the perspectives of managers and stakeholders in a case study to answer how they influence stadium-led regeneration proposals. It is also intended that by providing thick description, informed by existing theoretical constructs, the research can produce an interesting narrative that incorporates insights from a diverse body of stakeholders. It will assess the relevance of existing theory and the thick description should also enable readers to better assess how well the findings may fit other settings, (Balogun and Johnson 2004: 546).

The case study is a research strategy that focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings. Although most of the primary evidence comes from interviews and participant observation, multiple sources of evidence have been used. The case study is therefore well suited to investigate the phenomenon of how stakeholders engage or participate in stadium-led regeneration projects since it involves numerous individuals, groups and organisations together with a large number of secondary documents. Myers (2009: 237) states that one of the main advantages of case study research is what he calls its “*face validity*”; meaning that a well-written case study, based on empirical research in an organisation, represents a real story to which most researchers can relate, especially in the case of well-known organisations.

The involvement of Manchester City and Tottenham Hotspur presented unique

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<sup>2</sup> The Football Association website contains 2730 (as at 29.03.16) references to community and the Premier League recently published its Creating Chances report (2014) that headlines £45m spent in the community.

opportunities to research the concepts of stakeholder theory in the context of sports organisations involved in the on-going stadium-led regeneration of urban areas in major cities.

## **1.6 Structure of the thesis**

Following this introduction, in chapter 2 the stakeholder perspective sets out the key debates on stakeholder theory: together with its application to urban regeneration. Chapter 3 analyses in more detail the history of stadium-led regeneration. These chapters set out the central themes and some of the specific questions for the research study. Chapter 4, the methodology, provides a detailed discussion of the research design, and the processes of data collection, analysis and presentation, including issues of ethics, reliability and validity. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results and analysis of the research at the two sites, including the specific themes that have emerged. Chapter 5 introduces the results and sets out the framework that has been developed together with the context and triggers for stakeholder involvement; chapter 6 with the strategies of stakeholder influence; and chapter 7 with the means of influence of stakeholders. Chapter 8 discusses the findings in the context of previous research together with assessment of the impacts and limitations of stakeholder actions. Chapter 9 sets out a series of key conclusions that can be drawn from the research; possible limitations; and potential opportunities for further research.

## Chapter 2: The stakeholder perspective

### 2.1 Introduction

One of the fundamental tenets of stakeholder theory is that organisations should be managed in the interest of all constituents, not only in the interest of shareholders, (Laplume *et al.*, 2008). Common criticisms of urban regeneration reflect a failure to consult by the organisations involved, and then, importantly, allow participation by local communities, (Henderson *et al.*, 2007). Stakeholder theory is therefore highly relevant for this analysis, given that sports clubs, and more specifically professional football clubs, regularly claim to be central to their local communities in a variety of contexts<sup>3</sup> and could therefore be expected to at least engage with their various stakeholders when they are involved in stadium-led regeneration. Amongst the various calls for further research on stakeholder theory, Parent and Deephouse (2007) set out their belief that the theory of stakeholder salience can be advanced in many intriguing ways.

### 2.2 Stakeholder theory

Stakeholder theory, as set out by R. Edward Freeman (1984), represents an alternative to the views of Adam Smith, Milton Friedman and others that businesses are only responsible to stockholders and that any doctrine based around social responsibility is “*fundamentally subversive*”, (Friedman, 1970: 5).

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<sup>3</sup> The Football Association website contains 2730 (as at 29.03.16) references to community and the Premier League recently published its Creating Chances report that headlines £45m spent in the community.

*“There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud”, (Friedman, 1970: 5)*

The view that business owners, in the pursuit of profit, will ultimately produce the greatest social good persists in various forms to this day, even though a wider role for business has been put forward. Recent support for Friedman’s view that the sole responsibility of business is to increase profits, comes from one of the critics of stakeholder theory, Jensen (2002: 242), who suggested that stakeholder theory was an affront to 200 years of economic theory and research. Further, that it would result in playing into the hands of special interests who wish to use the resources of firms for their own ends. Writers such as Argenti (1997) and Sternberg (1997) have continued to question its conceptual foundations. They maintain that its pluralist assumptions create an unsustainable level of confusion concerning the purpose of the company. Argenti (1997: 445) argued that a firm would be crippled if it was forced to be accountable to many different stakeholders. He stated that, far from being a new concept, the stakeholder theory is an idea whose time has long passed, with profoundly damaging and unethical consequences; “... *the ‘inclusive company’, is an oxymoron*”.

Freeman *et al.*, (2001: 171) summarised some critics of stakeholder theory as seeing it as:

*“... a radical and quasi-socialistic theory that explicitly undermines the status of shareholders by providing value to non-shareholders that should rightfully go to them.”*

However, stakeholder theory has also been criticised as being too vague; a “*slippery creature*” and “*used by different people to mean widely different things which happen to suit their arguments*”, (Weyer, 1996: 35). Arguments for the theory have been said to suffer from an over-reliance upon theoretical generalizations and a high degree of emotion, (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). Jensen (2002), acknowledged an emotional element as an appealing factor in stakeholder theory that taps into the commitment of most individuals to the family and tribe.

Despite these strong and varied arguments advanced against some of the central tenets of stakeholder theory, many writers have also contributed to the advance of ideas associated with the concept since Freeman’s 1984 work. In that work, Freeman (1984) gave an account of the historical roots of the stakeholder approach that gave credit to Stanford Research Institute for its definition of stakeholders in 1963. Preston (1990), considered the origins of the stakeholder approach, if not the actual use of the term, as having occurred some 30 years earlier when the General Electric Company identified four major stakeholder groups: shareholders, employees, customers and the general public. While Schilling (2000) argued that stakeholder’s origins could be traced further back to the work of Mary Parker Follett (1918).

Proponents of stakeholder theory have argued strongly against criticisms that it impedes entrepreneurial risk and complicates corporate governance. Etzioni (1998) argued that the right to participate in the governance of a corporation should be shared by all stakeholder groups rather than only by shareholders and the concept of fairness should apply to all stakeholders and not merely shareholders. The notion of the corporation as a community is emphasised; that is all those groups who make up the community of the firm, invest in it and deserve consideration in decision making as well as the right to participate in corporate governance. Freeman *et al.*, (2010) sought to demonstrate that business is about how customers, suppliers, financiers, communities and managers all interact to create value. For the authors, the goal of creating value for stakeholders is very pro-shareholder. The idea of stakeholder theory being concerned with creating greater value for all, should appeal to even those shareholders who are more concerned with creating individual wealth. The argument is that by including a wider base of stakeholders, individual organisations and therefore shareholders will prosper to a greater extent. A business case for taking a broad, inclusive approach towards stakeholders was also made by Wheeler and Shillanpaa (1998), who argued that economic globalisation and mass communication will make stakeholder inclusion an increasingly essential element of corporate strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century:

*“Companies which ignore the need to actively balance stakeholder interests will be out-performed with increasing ease by stakeholder-inclusive companies”*, (Wheeler and Shillanpaa, 1998: 209)

This analysis of stakeholder theory linked to business performance was supported in research carried out by Post *et al.*, (2002), who studied the impact of stakeholder management practices over a five-year research project in three different, large businesses – Cummins Engine Company, Motorola and the Shell Group. They found that changing work practices, increased forms of alliances, and emerging new public policy issues all caused firms to realise that their success increasingly depended on relationships rather than the accumulation of conventional assets. During their research, the authors developed a view of the firm that stressed the role of stakeholder relationships in the creation of organisational wealth:

*“The long-term survival and success of a firm is determined by its ability to establish and maintain relationships with its entire network of stakeholders”*,  
(Post *et al.*, 2002:7).

It is of course a fundamental idea of stakeholder-based arguments that organisations should be managed in the interest of all their constituents, not only in the interest of shareholders; decision makers owe duties to a host of stakeholders that include local communities, employees, suppliers, creditors, and others, (Minow, 1991). These ideas build on the work of Carroll (1979, 1991) and may be one of the main reasons for the increasing popularity of the stakeholder concept, particularly after the 2008 financial crash:

*“As developed societies around the world have become increasingly sensitive to issues such as corporate wrongdoing, environmentalism and sustainability,*

*and the treatment of workers, the stakeholder perspective has gained popularity”, (Freeman et al., 2010: 113).*

Thus, stakeholder theory can bring particular focus to outside bodies such as community activists, advocacy groups, religious organisations, and other non-governmental organisations, (Eesley and Lennox, 2006). Such stakeholders are often referred to as secondary (e.g. Clarkson, 1995) since, in general, they do not have a formal contractual bond with the firm (as in the case with employees and customers) or direct legal authority over the firm (as in the case with government regulators). While firms are not contractually obligated to these secondary stakeholders, anecdotal evidence suggests that these groups can bring pressures to bear to induce firms to respond to stakeholder requests. This leads to one of the central debates in stakeholder theory of who or what is a stakeholder? This issue will now be considered, followed by other key issues that arise from the literature review that relate to the research question. These include stakeholder salience; the stakeholder’s perspective; and the application of stakeholder theory to urban regeneration and, more specifically, stadium-led regeneration developments.

### **2.3 Who or what is a stakeholder?**

*“... any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”, (Freeman, 1984: 46).*

Critics of stakeholder theory deny the relevance of stakeholders outside of shareholders (Friedman, 1962) or adopt a very narrow view of possible stakeholders,

(Argenti, 1997). Theorists adopting a narrow definition of stakeholders tend to emphasise any claim's legitimacy based on legal or moral rights via contract or exchange. In general, this involves attempts to define groups in terms of their direct relevance to an organisation's core economic interests, (Bowie, 1988; Clarkson, 1995; Hill and Jones, 1992). For example, Ambler and Wilson (1995), in support of Argenti (1993), took a restrictive view of stakeholders by defining them as participants to denote active involvement, rights and obligations. With only participants being free to determine what constitutes success and how it should be measured.

Stakeholder theory, as developed by Freeman (1984), takes the broader view and argues for genuine change in organisations, which are seen as social institutions, with responsibilities beyond their fiduciary duties to shareholders, directors and employees. In moving towards a definition, Clarkson (1995: 106) viewed stakeholders as:

*“... persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present or future. Such claimed rights or interests are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual or collective.”*

Clarkson (1995) went on to divide stakeholders into primary and secondary groups. Primary stakeholder groups are those whose continued support the corporation needs to survive. If any primary stakeholder group, such as customers or suppliers, becomes dissatisfied and withdraws from the corporate system, in whole or in part, the corporation will be seriously damaged or unable to continue as a going concern. A prime example of this direct influence of stakeholders is demonstrated in the case of

the UK jewellery store Ratner. Shareholders and customers of the retail outlet completely lost confidence in its products after its chief executive Gerald Ratner stated in April 1991 that the products in his shops were “*total crap*”. This comment in one speech led directly to wiping £500 million from the share value of the company and very nearly led to the firm’s collapse, (Daily Telegraph, 22.12.07). This occurred through the actions of a range of stakeholders in withdrawing their support for the organisation and demonstrates the power of stakeholders, including the media.

Secondary stakeholder groups are defined as those who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation, but they are not engaged in transactions with the organisation or essential for its survival, (Clarkson, 1995: 107). The media and a wide range of special interest groups are considered as secondary stakeholders under this definition. An organisation is not so dependent for its survival on secondary stakeholder groups, although they can cause significant damage to a corporation, examples being the press or a terrorist group. In a recent illustration of this phenomenon, in October 2014 Lego announced that it would not renew its marketing contract with Shell, valued at £68m, after coming under sustained pressure from Greenpeace to end a partnership that dates to the 1960s. The environmental campaign group protested about Shell’s plans to drill in the Arctic and targeted Lego with a YouTube video that attracted nearly 6m views for its depiction of a pristine Arctic, built from 120kg of Lego, being covered in black oil, (Guardian, 9.10.14).

Post *et al.*, (2002) used case studies of three large companies to demonstrate the importance of taking care of the needs of a broad group of stakeholders as a

prerequisite for both business survival and success. The authors pointed out the major impact of what they called “*non-business stakeholders*” had on Shell when the company tried to dispose of the Brent Spar oil storage unit by sinking it in the North Sea. Challenged by a variety of environmental activists led by Greenpeace, the company eventually agreed to decommission the Brent Spar on-shore. This clearly demonstrates that organisations need to be aware of the impacts of their actions not just on primary stakeholders, however defined, but on much wider groups of stakeholders. The authors concluded by listing four favourable impacts of the stakeholder management policies implemented by the firms, (Post *et al.*, 2002: 24). These were: *survival* during turbulent economic periods; *avoided costs* through a continued “*license to operate*” that may be threatened if key stakeholders become alienated; *continued acceptance and use*; and *expanded recognition and adoption* of stakeholder-oriented policies by other companies and by the consulting community:

*“Within the firm’s stakeholder network, all relationships matter, although all are not of equal relevance or priority for every specific situation or issue”,*  
(Post *et al.*, 2002: 25).

Broader definitions of the theory emphasise the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm’s behaviour whether or not they are perceived to have legitimate claims. This view of stakeholders is rooted in the reality, as evidenced by the examples above, that companies can be vitally affected by, or can vitally affect, almost anyone. At perhaps the broadest, but in many ways its most interesting reach, Starik defines a stakeholder as:

*“Any naturally occurring entity that affects or is affected by organisational performance”*, (Starik, 1994: 92).

This definition includes living entities such as animals and plants, but it also includes non-living environmental forms such as rocks and water, as well as systems of such entities including the solar system and cosmos. Even more imaginatively Starik proposes other non-living entities that can be considered as stakeholders, such as people who have died and those not yet born. This is based on future generations being brought into discussions of environmental impacts. For some, Starik’s contribution lies in his argument that non-human entities, particularly the natural environment, merit stakeholder status due to the extent of environmental deterioration of the planet caused by humans, (Friedman and Miles: 2009: 45).

Some may see this as an extreme view with little practical application in the real world. However, Mason and Slack (1996) utilised this version of stakeholder theory to explain how sports franchise relocations in the USA result in long term harm to the leagues and their franchises. Based on Starik’s view that the stakeholder concept has socio-emotional (spiritual) and ethical foundations, the authors argued that it is easy to see that the inhabitants of communities that either seek to hold onto or obtain a professional sports franchise, because of their socio-emotional ties to a team, are also significant stakeholders in this industry. There is anecdotal support for the impact of franchise movement on local people from Crompton (2004: 46), who discussed the experience of an urban economist at a radio talk-show:

*“The caller wanted him to discuss the decline of St Louis that took place after the Cardinals left for Arizona. The economist had analysed the St Louis economy and found it had not suffered, indeed it had improved, after the Cardinals left, but the caller had the distinct impression that the city was in decline”.*

Thus leagues should not operate simply to increase their own utility. They must be operated with the interests of all stakeholders in mind, with the host community being top priority. The authors accepted that in the short-term it was unlikely owners of sports franchises would exchange ethical conduct for immediate financial gain, but if they could see the long-term benefits it could eventually be viewed as a sensible business strategy, (Mason and Slack, 1996). The authors found that stakeholder theory provided a different way of looking at sporting relationships, with the recognition that wider stakeholder interests must become an essential element of the business strategies of sporting organisations.

This research on stadium-led regeneration reflects this wider view by using Freeman’s (1984: 46) broad definition of whom or what may be a stakeholder:

*“... any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”.*

It is used as a starting point as it has the benefit of allowing analysis of a wide range of relevant stakeholders, potential or actual. Whether stakeholders are viewed broadly

or narrowly, it is still then necessary to identify them in some form in order to allow managers to engage effectively and systematically with those who affect or are affected. It is also important from the perspective of stakeholders that want to influence organisations. In this research the theory includes stakeholders as individuals and as groups, so it can include residents, business owners, supporters, community groups, local councils, and football clubs amongst others. Focal organisations, who can be seen as decision-makers in this research, are also stakeholders with their own attributes. In general, to paraphrase Freeman (1984), the research involves “*all those who are affected by or can affect the stadium-led regeneration projects*”. Given the broad definition, it is important to consider the stakeholders that really matter.

#### **2.4 Stakeholder salience: power, legitimacy and urgency.**

*“Based on our study, we believe there are many intriguing ways to advance the theory of stakeholder identification and salience”*, (Parent and Deephouse, 2007: 19).

The most common way of classifying stakeholders is to consider groups of people with a distinguishable relationship with corporations, (Friedman and Miles, 2009). Freeman (1984) presented what has now become the traditional view of the organisation-stakeholder relationship, in which the corporation occupies a central position and has direct connections to all stakeholders. Coalitions of stakeholders and intermediaries acting on behalf of stakeholders are ignored in this hub-and-spokes representation, though Freeman assessed these aspects at a later stage of his model.

Researchers such as Rowley and Moldoveanu, (2003) have studied networks of stakeholders and concluded there is a need for them to be mapped in order to understand the depth of their connections. Friedman and Mason (2004) demonstrated the usefulness of stakeholder mapping in the sporting context in researching franchise relocation issues.

In trying to discover who or what really counts, Mitchell, *et al.* (1997) used Freeman's (1984) broad definition of stakeholders and developed their theory of stakeholder identification through an examination of the theoretical literature. Saliency was defined by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997: 854) as "*the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholders' claims,*" meaning that the accuracy of managers' assessments of the attributes and total saliency is therefore likely to be a significant contributor to the success of both stakeholder management and impact (Neville *et al.*, 2011). The authors proposed a model that both defined stakeholders and assessed their importance through identifying the presence of the attributes of *power*, *legitimacy* and *urgency*. Mitchell *et al.*, (1997: 881) recognised that their typology considered that each attribute was either present or absent, "*...when it is clear that each operates on a continuum or series of continua.*" There has been further, more recent discussion of saliency as dichotomous attributes (e.g. Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Neville *et al.*, 2011) and this research follows the position of Neville *et al.* (2011: 369) that power, legitimacy and urgency "*are evaluated by managers on a continuum of degrees and not as dichotomous variables*".

*Power* focuses upon the power-dependence relationship between the organisation and the stakeholder. The view that power may be considered as the capacity of an

individual or an institution to realise their will or secure certain outcomes is a feature of a great many accounts of power, including that of Max Weber. Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) accepted that power might be difficult to define, but is easily recognised as “*the ability to bring about the outcomes desired by those who possess it*”, (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974 quoted by Mitchell *et al.*, 1997: 865). The authors considered that power could gain authority through legitimacy and exercise through urgency, but is transitory: it could be acquired as well as lost. Lukes (1974) set out how a Weberian definition of power was too generic and attempted to provide a more comprehensive version by constructing a three-dimensional account of power. The simple version of power set out above was a one dimensional view with the person in power able to prevail in a decision-making process, whereas power is multi-dimensional. The second dimension involves the possibility of influencing decisions by shaping the agenda, not merely discussing existing views. The third dimension includes ways in which the powerful can transform the powerless, without coercion, to behave in the way the powerful want them to. It tries to explain the fact that people can sometimes willingly behave in ways that appear to be against their basic interests. This can be achieved through an ideological system or one of false consciousness (Little, 2010).

*“What one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude”*, (Lukes, 1974: 28).

For Lukes (1974: 27), there are very important non-coercive sources of power in modern society. The crucial point is that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent any conflict or even discussion arising in the first place.

However, concerns have been raised that, outside of the Marxist position that power derives from class, the arguments advanced by Lukes do not shed light on the social mechanisms of power; the social resources that enable groups to wield influence in this way, (Little, 2010). It is accepted this is a partial summary of Lukes's detailed arguments and the many discussions that have followed, but space does not permit a fuller exposition. Some examples of the other dimensions of power will be discussed in relation to the two research sites and put in the context of the wider triggers, strategies and means of influence that form a central part of this thesis.

One further conception of power that may be relevant in understanding influence on stadium-led regeneration is as a medium for securing certain ends, (Allen, 1997). On this view, power is more about being a resource for achieving diverse ends. Power is thus not something which exists in certain social relationships, but can be produced by a process of mobilisation whereby organisations reflect upon their own resources to achieve certain goals and, realising their limitations, attempt to pool their resources with like-minded organisations as a means of securing what is now a common goal. Allen's view is that in this process "*a new collective power base is realised that amounts to an increase of power to those in alliances*", (Allen, 1997: 62). As Lukes (1974: 61) acknowledged:

*"There are endless debates about such questions [about power], which show no sign of imminent resolution, and there is not even agreement about whether all this disagreement matters".*

These alternative views of power are relevant to later discussions, but a complete classification of the many different forms, conditions and contents of power is not possible in this thesis.

Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) accepted that an emphasis on the *legitimacy* of a claim on a firm based on a legal right or moral right, for example, is required to narrow the definition of a stakeholder. The authors also argued that power to influence the firm's behaviour, whether or not it has a legitimate claim, must also be taken into account to ensure the definition remains broad. Power and legitimacy are thus defined as core attributes that are expected to affect stakeholder salience. In this original definition, legitimacy is a characteristic of the stakeholder, but in this research is widened to include focal organisations. Suchman (1995) adopted an inclusive, broad-based definition of legitimacy that explicitly acknowledged the role of the social audience in legitimisation dynamics and Mitchell *et al.*, (1997), in suggesting that legitimacy may be explained through population ecology and institutional theory, utilised this definition of legitimacy as "*a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions*".

Neville *et al.* (2011) identified two problems with the use of this definition. That it provided a composite definition linking legitimacy with pragmatic and cognitive conceptions, but should only be viewed morally in order to provide clarity, although later research continued to use Suchman's (1995) wider definition (e.g. Parent and Deephouse, 2007). Secondly, building on the work of Eesley and Lennox (2006), that a lack of distinction between the legitimacy of the stakeholder and that of the claim is

problematic. Eesley and Lennox (2006) proposed that in addition to the legitimacy of the stakeholder, the legitimacy of the request is important. It has been argued that if the claim is legitimate, but the stakeholder is deemed not to be (perhaps due to violent or confrontational behaviour), then the claim should still be attended to by managers, (Neville, 2011). This idea will be taken up when discussing practical examples within the results and discussion sections of the thesis.

Research into industrial responses to green pressures by Fineman and Clarke (1996), found that legitimacy for stakeholder groups comprised four elements – the language the stakeholder used (the more like the industry's the more it is accepted); its image (not too radical preferred); its style of interaction (not too confrontational) and the perceived competence of the stakeholder's officers. To some extent this research is supportive of Suchman's (1995: 574) theoretical position that legitimacy is socially constructed in that it reflects a link between the behaviours of the legitimised entity and the shared beliefs of some social group, making legitimacy dependent on a collective audience, yet independent of particular observers. Fineman and Clarke's (1996) study was supported by later work by Harvey and Schaefer (2001) who found that the more mainstream and broad-based a pressure group was perceived to be by managers the more legitimacy it was considered to have. Rowley (1997) argued that greater legitimacy allowed the stakeholder a more credible threat to influence the firm's access to primary stakeholders such as customers.

Freeman (1984) defined a second managerial element to the concept of legitimacy, whereby it is legitimate to spend time and resources on stakeholders regardless of the appropriateness of their demands, due to their ability to affect an organisation.

Phillips (2003: 25) supported this dual approach to legitimacy whereby “... *stakeholders who retain the ability to affect the organisation are legitimate (derivatively), but this legitimacy is derived from the moral obligation owed other (normative) stakeholders*”. On this basis, groups such as terrorists, the media, or activists merit at least managerial consideration. Phillips points out that one implication of this conception of legitimacy is that the term “*illegitimate stakeholder*” may be a contradiction in terms, but it does at least have the benefit of taking into account stakeholders who might have a significant effect on the organisation. He went on to argue that derivative stakeholders can be likened to those identified by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) as dangerous or dormant stakeholders – see Figure 2.2.

Donaldson and Preston (1995) provide the example of the news media as a group that can help or hinder an organisation. Managerial attention to such groups is legitimate due to their ability to affect the organisation and its normative stakeholders.

The third salience attribute of *urgency* was defined as “*the degree to which a stakeholder’s claim calls for immediate attention*”, (Mitchell *et al.*, 1997: 867).


Although time sensitivity is necessary, it is not enough to identify a stakeholder’s claim as urgent. In addition, the stakeholder must view its claim on the firm or its relationship with the firm as critical or highly important. Examples of why a stakeholder would view its relationship as critical included ownership, sentiment, expectation and exposure. So, urgency includes both time sensitivity and the criticality of the claim to stakeholders, although Eesley and Lennox (2006) proposed that the urgency of the request was more vital than the urgency of the stakeholder group. Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) provide the example of the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska where stakeholders such as local residents, marine mammals, birds and the

natural environment (using Starik's, 1994, conception of stakeholders) initially possessed urgency, but without criticality or power. The criticality and power was provided when the court system and the Alaska state government took up the case of the dependent stakeholders. Supporting this example, Driscoll and Starik (2004) later suggested that the urgency will be partly driven by the probability that the content of the claim will occur. Therefore when a claim is time sensitive, critical, and has a high probability of occurring, managers will perceive the claim with greater salience, (Neville *et al.*, 2011). Weitzer and Harvey (2015) in their recent work on stakeholder prioritization argue that urgency can be influential because of the desire of decision makers to establish or maintain a satisfying relationship with stakeholders based on reliable enthusiasm. Basing their theoretical approach on Kelman's body of work on social influence, the authors argue that for such an enthusiastic decision maker, a stakeholder's perception that an issue is critical can increase the prioritisation of that issue.

The psychology literature provides some evidence that the urgency of a request will influence the likelihood of response. In particular, time pressure has been shown to make decision-makers more prone to take action, (Dror, Busemeyer, and Basola, 1999, quoted in Eesley and Lennox, 2006). Agle *et al.*, (1999) found from their research into 80 large publicly owned firms that urgency was the best predictor of shareholder salience. The concept of urgency therefore allows the capture of some of the dynamics of stakeholder relationships. Indeed, Mitchell *et al.*, (1997: 867) stressed that:

“... stakeholder attributes are variable, not steady state; they are socially constructed, not objective reality; and consciousness and wilful exercise may or may not be present”.

Figure 2.1: Qualitative classes of stakeholders




From: Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997).

Stakeholder types were categorised. *Definitive* stakeholders have all three attributes. Ultimately it is the cumulative number of the three attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency that contribute to a stakeholder group’s claim being salient from the perception of management. *Expectant* stakeholders have two attributes and include

dominant, dependent and dangerous stakeholders. *Latent* stakeholders have only one of the defined attributes, and include dormant, discretionary and demanding stakeholders. Non-stakeholders or potential stakeholders possess none of the attributes. The authors predicted that the salience of a particular stakeholder to the firm's management is low if only one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present and high if all three attributes are present.

Figure 2.2: Stakeholder Typology: Attributes Present



From: Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997).

According to this model, entities with no power, legitimacy, or urgency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders and will be perceived as having no salience by the firm's managers. This has major implications for such stakeholders that seek to influence an

organisation, although it is a subjective evaluation by managers of these qualities and is therefore open to change over time. Stakeholders that are not perceived to possess any of the three attributes can rapidly become influential and this has been recognised by other researchers, (e.g. Friedman and Mason, 2004). It means that although managers may pay most attention to definitive stakeholders, they cannot ignore other groups without risking future difficulties, (Senaux, 2008). Mitchell *et al.*, (1997: 868) also pointed out additional implications of power, legitimacy and urgency. First, each attribute is variable and not a steady state, and can change for any particular entity or stakeholder-manager relationship. Second, the existence (or degree present) of each attribute is a matter of numerous perceptions and is a constructed reality rather than an objective one. Third, an individual or entity may not be conscious of possessing the attribute or, if conscious of possession, may not choose to enact any implied behaviours. Weitzner and Deutsch (2015) argue that stakeholders must be viewed not only as claimants and influencers but also decision makers. Further, that stakeholders not only have attributes that are relevant to the motivations of other decision makers but also themselves have motivations to accept, seek, or reject influence. All of these issues demonstrate the potential dynamism of the theory. Weitzer and Harvey (2015: 1346) go on to argue that:

*“A morally motivated decision maker considers the powerlessness of a stakeholder to be a compelling reason for prioritising a claim because most normative moral systems emphasis the obligation to assist the vulnerable and helpless”.*

This issue of powerlessness will be further discussed later in the thesis in relation to the results from this research. Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) have argued that their model enables a more systematic sorting by managers of stakeholder-manager relationships as these relationships attain and relinquish salience in the dynamics of ongoing business. From a stakeholder's perspective it might also provide a theoretical pathway on how to gain influence with an organisation. There is no doubt that the work has proved to be both extremely popular and widely cited; 8124 citations according to Google Scholar as at 01.03.16. It has also proved to be highly influential, referred to by Neville *et al.* (2011: 357) as:

*“... one of the most substantial contributions in the development of stakeholder research...”*

When analysed, the typology reveals some potentially complex real-life issues. It is entirely possible that legitimate stakeholders may not have their claims addressed by an organisation if, at a certain point in time, they lack power and/or urgency, (Friedman and Miles, 2005: 95). Alternatively, a stakeholder may not have a legitimate claim but may be able to affect the organisation. This demonstrates managers have an interest in dealing with the claims of powerful, yet non-legitimate, stakeholders. It also gives an indication how secondary stakeholders may be able to influence managers.

The three variables that Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) put forward have been criticised for not being comprehensive enough. For example, Driscoll and Starik (2004) argued for the

dimension of ‘proximity’ to be incorporated in the context of eco-sustainability. The proximate stakeholders – near, short-term and actual – will be more salient to managers. This has been supported by Butterfield *et al.*, (2004) who considered that future research should include an expanded perspective on motivating factors, something that is evidenced in the framework developed in this research. The original authors were clearly aware of potential questions related to the three attributes as they called for further research to establish whether their descriptions were adequate. Recent work by Weitzner and Deutsch (2015) has suggested that powerlessness and illegitimacy may be part of a more extensive set of stakeholder attributes that can play a part in the prioritisation of decisions made by focal organisations.

Amongst other key questions, this research has accepted the challenge to understand how relevant the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency are to stakeholders involved in stadium-led regeneration and whether evidence for other characteristics can be discerned. Although widely cited, there has been limited research using the Mitchell *et al.*, framework (Parent and Deephouse, 2007) and there are still a number of gaps in the research, which will be detailed.

Agle, Mitchell and Sommerfield (1999), carried out empirical research using data provided by the CEOs of 80 large U.S. firms. They found strong support for the attribute-salience relationship. The authors accepted Mitchell and colleagues’ (1997: 854) definition of stakeholder salience as “*the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholders’ claims*”. Thus, as the stakeholder attributes of power legitimacy and urgency cumulate in the mind of a manager, selectivity is enhanced,

intensity is increased, and higher salience of the stakeholder group is the likely result. Therefore the stakeholders that receive priority from management will be those whom managers – especially CEOs – perceive as highly salient. The authors found that although groups can be identified reliably as stakeholders based on their possession of power, legitimacy and urgency in relationship to the firm, it is the firm's management (especially the CEO) which determines which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management attention, but managers may or may not perceive the stakeholder field correctly. The research suggests that these identified stakeholder attributes do affect the degree to which top managers give priority to competing stakeholders. However, the authors qualified their conclusion by recognising the strong possibility that there are other variables – that new theory must identify and relate – that operate in the values-salience setting. Also missing from the methodology employed in this research was any form of triangulation from other sources; checks in the form of information from different hierarchical levels of the organisations; or views from affected or affecting stakeholders. Parent and Deephouse (2007) found the management level and role had a direct effect on stakeholder identification and perceived salience.

Mitchell *et al.*'s (1997) framework was used by Harvey and Schaefer (2001) to examine the perceived importance of various potential green stakeholder groups and the ways in which water and electricity companies interacted with them. They found that none of the six companies they investigated had a systematic stakeholder approach that extended to all potential stakeholders.

*“Rather, the importance of specific stakeholder groups seemed to be determined by managers’ intuition, which supports the research carried out by Agle et al. (1999) and by the stance that the stakeholders themselves displayed towards the company”, (Harvey and Schafer, 2001: 243).*

The authors found that managers considered stakeholders with an institutional power base, such as government through legislation, and both environmental and economic regulators, by far the most immediately influential green stakeholders of the companies studied. Stakeholders with institutionalised or economic power were generally also considered to be legitimate. Generally, the more mainstream and broad-based an environmental pressure group was perceived to be by managers the more legitimacy it was considered to have. Unsurprisingly, companies preferred to deal with stakeholders who they perceived to be co-operative and non-threatening. In their recent work on understanding motivation in stakeholder prioritisation, Weitzner and Deutsch (2015), argued that the knowledge stakeholders engage in actions that explicitly reject the decision-maker’s system of values would negatively influence prioritisation of any claim.

The study by Harvey and Schaefer (2001) is interesting for being one of the limited pieces of empirical research that considers, implicitly, how stakeholders influence organisations through the perception of power, legitimacy and urgency. Overall the research supports the view of corporations attending most immediately to those stakeholders with institutionalised power, although public opinion seemed to be as powerful a motivator as legislation to many managers. It demonstrated the difficulties

that secondary stakeholder groups can have in influencing focal organisations, but also pointed out necessary attributes needed to attract attention. These attributes were examined by Eesley and Lennox (2006), who built a dataset of over 600 secondary stakeholder actions within the USA, all concerning environmental issues in the period between 1971 and 2003. They found strong, consistent support for their hypotheses that a stakeholder with greater power relative to the target firm in terms of resources, and whose request is more legitimate in the eyes of the general public, is more likely to elicit a positive response from a firm. However, they found conflicting evidence with regard to the legitimacy of the stakeholder group and they did not find compelling evidence that more urgent requests are more likely to elicit responses. The authors also found that a significant issue in assessing the legitimacy of the stakeholder were the tactics used (e.g. litigation, boycotts, and letter writing). Neville *et al.* (2011) have argued that even if the stakeholder is not considered morally legitimate (due to violent or confrontational tactics), if the claim itself is morally legitimate, it should endure and be attended to by managers.

In the context of sport management, Friedman and Mason (2004) used the typology developed by Mitchell *et al.* (1997) to research economic development decision-making in public subsidies for sports facilities to more than 50 USA major league teams over a decade. The authors developed a stakeholder map through the identification of specific groups and their objectives in order to better understand how different objectives produced varying responses. This involved identifying the different groups and individuals involved in, and affected by, economic development decision making. Each stakeholder was then classified through a process of

triangulation and coding. The stakeholder map they developed, identified local elites as among the definitive stakeholders, each of whom had historically been a strong proponent of facility subsidies. This provided a strong explanation for why sports facilities continue to be subsidised despite a lack of evidence of economic benefits and, at times, strong opposition from other (non-definitive or latent) stakeholder groups. The authors stated their belief that using stakeholder theory together with stakeholder mapping, could assist policy makers to identify marginalised groups and the adverse consequences created by definitive stakeholders. The authors accepted that situational factors strongly affect decisions and must be considered. So, individual cases need to be carefully mapped through detailed research in order to understand their unique circumstances. However, their overall findings suggested that decision makers should focus their resources on stakeholders possessing all three attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, whilst continuing to monitor the environment carefully to identify potential threats and opportunities.

Friedman and Mason (2005) also used stakeholder theory in a case study of the franchise move of the Houston Oilers to Nashville in order to understand the issues in greater detail. This involved the efforts of the Nashville Mayor, Phillip Bredesen, as a focal stakeholder, to manage the different stakeholders involved in the city's endeavours to build a stadium to attract the National Football League's Oilers. The authors found the case demonstrated the importance of having a strong voice among the definitive stakeholders. Frequently opponents of new stadiums have a lack of organisation and resources while proponents of new stadiums are usually well-funded and professionally managed. The research highlights the type of strategies that may

be successful in influencing focal organisations by trying to gain greater salience through networking and obtaining greater resources. It also provides warnings of potential weaknesses that can lead to loss of legitimacy through poor leadership and weak organisational skills. The results suggest that using the stakeholder mapping method employed in the analysis can help public officials identify a more manageable number of stakeholders.

*“By determining which differences are critical in affecting policy outcomes, and identifying the stakeholders whose management is necessary, policy managers can develop more effective strategies. Policy managers need to go beyond readily identifiable general categories and develop stakeholder maps grounded in attributes relevant to their unique circumstances”, (Friedman and Mason, 2005: 113).*

The stakeholder model can provide a way to understand the policy environment, but rather than being static, the stakeholder map requires decision makers to engage in regular monitoring and re-evaluating to identify stakeholders whose attributes have changed. Shifts in stakeholder maps can dramatically alter the policy landscape as different groups and evolving circumstances change the salience of power, legitimacy and urgency (Friedman and Mason, 2005). Clearly researchers also need to be aware of this issue and, where possible, to conduct a range of interviews and triangulate data as the research progresses in order to develop a deeper, organic understanding.

Friedman and Mason (2004) concluded that stakeholder analysis forces policy managers to recognise the potential negative impacts of dangerous (non-legitimate) stakeholders, whose combination of power and urgency can adversely affect facility negotiations and influence decision-making processes. This practical research evidence supports the theoretical framework of Clarkson (1995) in recognising the potential significance of what have been termed illegitimate stakeholders. Bryson *et al.*, (2002) have argued for a wide approach to stakeholder theory that should not focus only on those with power or easily identified stakeholders. Friedman and Mason's (2004, 2005) research is important for being broad enough to incorporate a wide range of stakeholders, but focussed enough to provide genuine understanding of real-life events.

Further research in the sports management area was carried out by Parent and Deephouse (2007) in order to both test the fundamental proposition of Mitchell *et al.* (1997) and build theory from their case study. Their research involved a comparative case study of stakeholder identification and prioritization by managers that concerned two large-scale sporting event committees. It had a particular focus on interviews with managers at three hierarchical levels. As part of the methodology, the managers themselves were asked to identify their stakeholders, to ensure that all stakeholders were identified. The authors found support for the positive relationship between number of attributes and salience. However, their findings indicated that Mitchell *et al.*'s (1997) stakeholder types may be more limited in practice than in theory. Their analysis suggested that power had the most effect on salience, followed by urgency and legitimacy, (2007). The concept of institutional power having the strongest salience is supported by further research in the sports area by Walters (2011) who

investigated the implementation of a stakeholder management strategy by Arsenal Football Club during the development of their new stadium:

*“It can be argued that in the case of the Emirates Stadium development, there was...little opportunity for stakeholder participation and involvement in decision-making processes for the majority of stakeholders. The only stakeholder group that the football club took a participatory approach towards was Islington Council”, (Walters, 2011: 61).*

However, it was acknowledged by the author that a limitation with the methodology used in the above case study was the under-representation of the views of a much wider range of stakeholder groups, such as community representatives and local businesses, (Walters, 2011:56).

It can be seen that the majority of empirical research is broadly supportive of the typology developed by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997). However, there are also strong indications that the issues are more complex when researched in real-life situations. Management determine salience, which may lead to incorrect perceptions of the stakeholder field, (Agle, Mitchell and Sommerfield, 1999) and other, wider stakeholder attributes may be salient, (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004; Driscoll and Starik, 2004); while the stakeholder types may be more limited in practice than in theory, (Parent and Deephouse, 2007). In any event, delineation of stakeholders requires individual case assessment, (Harvey and Schaefer, 2001, Friedman and Mason, 2004), whilst, due to changes over time, regular re-evaluation of stakeholders is necessary

and managers should be careful not to ignore marginalised stakeholders, (Bryson, 2004; Friedman and Mason, 2004). A more comprehensive framework may be useful in understanding the processes of stakeholder influence. In their review of stakeholder salience, Neville *et al.*, (2011) suggested future research should focus on the antecedents, interactions, managerial perceptions and organisational responses to salience attributes. Clearly there are significant issues related to stakeholder salience that call for further research, even prior to considering the stakeholders' perspective.

*“Despite scholarly calls for research that takes the stakeholder’s perspective, few stakeholder-oriented studies have been conducted,”* (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004: 163).

It should not be a surprise that much of the published research on stakeholder theory is from the management perspective. Large numbers of well-respected academic business and management journals are published and they largely seek to understand the world from that point of view. The result is that there has been comparatively little research carried out from the perspective of stakeholders.

## **2.5 The stakeholder’s perspective**

*“The approach of examining stakeholder relations from the viewpoint of stakeholders themselves is more recent and is still very much in the minority”*, (Friedman and Miles, 2009: 147).

The emphasis on managing the stakeholder, with relationships viewed from the firm's perspective is one-dimensional. Missing from the theory is an account of how stakeholders influence a firm to enable them to achieve their interests, possibly at the expense of the firm. Questions related to stakeholder definition and salience become further complicated when viewed from this perspective since it becomes necessary to consider further issues related to influencing strategies used by stakeholders; stakeholder networks; intermediaries; and the likelihood of stakeholder mobilisation.

Frooman (1999) is one of a limited number of researchers who have studied the stakeholder's perspective, albeit to allow managers to better understand and manage the behaviour of those stakeholders. He pointed out that only piecemeal attention had been paid to stakeholder means of influence and that nowhere in the literature had scholars made any systematic attempt to categorise stakeholder influence strategies and build them into a descriptive model. Frooman investigated the types of strategies that were available to influence firm decision-making from a resource dependency perspective and determined the factors as to which types were used by stakeholders involved in a real-life conflict. The basis for the research was a dispute that took place between StarKist (a tuna canning company), its consumers, and the Earth Island Institute (EII), an environmental organisation. He identified four influencing strategies used by stakeholders: *direct withholding*, for example, by consumers choosing to boycott the product; *direct usage*, for example by enforcing conditions on the company for continued purchase of the product; *indirect withholding*, for example, by using an ally such as the media to promote a boycott of the product; or *indirect usage*, for example by using other agents to bring pressure on suppliers to the

company. The results indicated that stakeholders use direct strategies when the firm depends on them for resources, and indirect strategies that included working through an ally such as the media, when it does not. Moreover, stakeholders withhold resources when they are not dependent on the firm and make use of firm resources conditional when they are. Sharma and Henriques (2005) found that stakeholders used both withholding and direct usage strategies to influence the environmental practices of Canadian forestry companies.

In further later research, Hendry (2005: 79) sought greater understanding of stakeholder influencing strategies by interviewing representatives from four environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGO). He found that Frooman's model was "*too parsimonious to adequately describe stakeholder influence strategies*" and proposed a more complex model grounded in his data that included a greater range of alliances that were formed by the ENGOs and set out the reasons behind those links.

Frooman (1999) argued that Mitchell *et al.* (1997) failed to distinguish the relative importance of power, legitimacy and urgency in their model of stakeholder salience, although he accepted it was not a straightforward attribute to assess. For Frooman, power was the dominant attribute. It is most likely to decide the outcome of organisation-stakeholder conflict particularly in cases where the organisation is unwilling to compromise, (Friedman and Miles, 2009: 132). Frooman (1999) introduced the idea that stakeholders may influence focal organisations indirectly, through intermediaries such as the media, in the organisation-stakeholder relationship.

In what have been labelled modified vendettas (Shipp, 1987); demonstrations, petitions, research and letter-writing campaigns are actions frequently adopted by agents, such as NGOs or activists, who do not have a resource relationship with the organisation to use as leverage, (Friedman and Miles, 2009: 191). Social media has arguably increased the extent and usefulness of using intermediaries to influence a focal organisation. These tools might all be considered part of a wider mobilisation of efforts.

## **2.6 Mobilisation and networks**

*“The issue of stakeholder mobilisation is an underdeveloped area in the literature”*, (Friedman and Miles, 2009: 190).

Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 204) argued that an examination of the “*scant*” literature on stakeholder mobilisation revealed a stakeholder group’s degree of discontent or feeling of urgency (interest intensity) was the primary condition in driving action to influence a focal firm. So, when an organisation does not act as anticipated or against the interests of a stakeholder group, it will be more likely to take action. To some extent this idea is supported by the work of Hosmer and Kiewitz (2005) who suggest that stakeholder support for organisations is most likely when stakeholders believe they have been fairly considered, fairly treated, and fairly rewarded. As a corollary, it can be argued that stakeholder mobilisation will be more likely where stakeholders believe they have not been fairly treated, considered or rewarded. Clearly stakeholders can act individually, but they usually lack the ability (power) to change corporate behaviour. From the relatively small amount of research

carried out into networks it is suggested that stakeholder coalitions and use of intermediaries can potentially be more effective – certainly from the stakeholder’s perspective.

*“Stakeholder influence is determined by the power and legitimacy of the stakeholder (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Welcomer, 2002). Therefore, indirect strategies, such as coalitions formed between stakeholder groups (Neville and Mengue, 2006; S. G. Scott and Lane, 2000), may allow stakeholders to combine their power and legitimacy in a way that enhances their bargaining positions vis-à-vis firms”, (Laplume, Sonpar and Litz, 2008: 1163).*

Evidence therefore suggests that whatever attributes they might possess, stakeholders need to network and mobilise in order to gain greater influence. This may be particularly important for smaller groups of stakeholders trying to influence larger organisations. In advancing a network theory of stakeholder influences, Rowley (1997), argued that organisations do not respond to each and every stakeholder individually, but to the interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder network. He argued that a firm is more able to resist stakeholder pressures when it is a central player in its stakeholder networks and when its stakeholder networks are less densely interconnected. Conversely, densely tied stakeholder networks can constrain firms and create the capacity to monitor organisations more efficiently through their ability to effectively communicate information. The existence of a dense stakeholder network can facilitate the formation of coalitions. Again, this research also indicates methods in which stakeholder groups can best influence focal organisations.

Butterfield *et al.*, (2004: 189) felt that future research on stakeholder alliances should probe more deeply into why alliance members come together. Evidence from the USA specifically related to opponents of new sports stadiums shows that small groups in different cities can become linked through email and websites. This enables them to constantly exchange information on the latest studies and how they can best frame and disseminate them, (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003). This allows academic research about stadium regeneration projects to become part of the wider mainstream discussions in the USA at least.

Neville and Mengue (2006) used the typology of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) to develop a framework for understanding and measuring the effects upon organisations of competing, complementary and co-operative stakeholder interactions, which they referred to as stakeholder multiplicity. The authors found that complex interactions between stakeholders (stakeholder multiplicity), could lead to influential alliances being formed and that managers needed to be aware of such possibilities.

*“Stakeholder theory can provide a useful tool to better understand the influence of key stakeholders on a firm’s activities. Managers should not consider stakeholders’ salience simply in terms of independent, dyadic relationships, but with potential interactions with other stakeholders in mind”,*  
(Neville and Mengue, 2006: 387).

However, there is evidence that multiplicity can also hinder stakeholder’s ability to mobilise for collective action due to their heterogeneous interests, (Wolfe and Putler, 2002). Considerable variability has been found in individual attitudes between and

within stakeholder groups, (Cordano, Frieze, and Ellis, 2004). Friedman and Mason's (2004) research found that the interests of various categories of members (owners, employees, suppliers, customers, the financial community, activist groups and the government) identified by Freeman (1984) cannot be assumed to be homogenous as, on any particular issue, there may be differences based upon objectives, circumstances, and group-specific attributes. It is clear from the research that specific knowledge of the wider context as well as individual circumstances is necessary to understand when particular social groups or communities might mobilise to take action.

Rowley and Berman (2000) examined the stakeholder side of the relationship to find that stakeholders must be aware, willing, and capable to effectively mobilize against firms. In later research, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) argued that a particular stakeholder group is more likely to mobilise or act as part of a collective if it has, (a) acted collectively in the past; (b) possessed internal network density (i.e. group members communicate effectively); (c) members who value the common identity through their association with the group; and (d) few members who belong to overlapping groups with conflicting interests. The work of Butterfield *et al.*, (2004) provides some supportive overlapping ideas where they found that stakeholders must perceive the target organisation will be responsive to pressure in order to mobilise. They also found that goal commonality, shared economic interests, a common threat or enemy, a shared vision, and common legal concerns all motivated stakeholder groups to come together and collaborate; issues that are taken up in results and discussion chapters. Having set out some of the key issues in stakeholder theory, the

review now focuses on the complex issues around stakeholder involvement in urban regeneration projects.

## **2.7 Stakeholder involvement in urban regeneration**

*“Major culture-led regeneration schemes are not wholly grounded or rational-decision-based. They rely more on blind faith, pork-barrel politics (Sudjic, 1993: 31) and constructed visions which appear not to look beyond the short-term physical impacts and landscapes they create”, (Evans, 2005: 960).*

It is important to define what is meant by the term regeneration. Many definitions exist, but perhaps the most useful in the context of stadium-led regeneration, relates it to the transformation of a place that has displayed the symptoms of physical, social and/or economic decline, Roberts, (2000: 17, quoted in Davies, 2010: 1439) defines urban regeneration as:

*“Comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change.”*

Many commentators argue that the relative success of Urban Development Corporations in the United Kingdom, which focussed solely on property and physical development as the engine for re-growth, (e.g. Deakin and Edwards, 1993) in

achieving the physical transformation of derelict areas, must be balanced against their failure, at least initially, to engage adequately with community groups and a belief that positive effects will “trickle down” (Bianchini *et al.*, 1990; Henderson *et al.*, 2007). Numerous studies have shown that the benefits of different forms of urban regeneration often fail to trickle down to local people who lack the skills and capital to benefit from emerging employment or business opportunities, (e.g. Henderson *et al.*, 2007). Further, the existing literature on community involvement in regeneration suggests it is not easy to balance wider community or stakeholder participation with successful developments. Regeneration agencies often limit participation to groups seen as legitimate, or most in tune with its objectives (an idea supported by the stakeholder research, e.g. Harvey and Schaefer, 2001); it is difficult to find representative community leaders; and participation is often constrained by the belief of local people that they will not be listened to, (Imrie and Raco, 2003; Jones, 2003, quoted in Henderson *et al.*, 2007: 1446).

*“Often the process of empowerment can be stimulated by the community itself, for example, when the community is under threat from a major development proposal”, (Colenutt and Cutten, 1994: 246).*

The work of Colenutt and Cutten (1994) gives an indication of the potential relevance of ignoring the local context in which some stakeholders that may be perceived to lack any salience, which can provide the trigger for them to take action. Common criticisms of urban regeneration, of whatever type, reflect a failure to consult, and then, importantly, to allow participation by local communities and stakeholders. This

can result in feelings that decisions are a fait accompli, with the local community only being consulted as a rubber-stamp in the process. This can lead to an inability to integrate developments and ultimately to alienation.

For example, Michael Porter (1995) expressed his view that it is a common mistake made with inner-city regeneration to fail to build relationships within the community and to hire locally. Hiring local residents builds loyalty from neighbourhood customers. Evidence suggests that companies that were perceived to be in touch with the community had far fewer security problems, whether or not the owners lived in the community. Porter (1995) has argued that a sustainable economic base can be created in inner cities based on their identified and exploitable competitive advantages. These include strategic location; local market demand; integration with regional clusters; and human resources. Equally Porter has identified issues such as security, lack of infrastructure and management skills as potential disadvantages.

Porter's view is that sustainable inner-city development can only be created through private investment and decries the use of "*artificial inducements, charity, or government mandates*", (1995: 56). It might be suggested that such a view overlooks the need to start the process and that private investment is unlikely to be made until a certain level of infrastructure has been provided. The potential liability inherent in brown-field sites and the large cleanup costs undoubtedly hinders the redevelopment of abandoned sites, especially in areas of previous heavy industry, (Poindexter, 1996). This is confirmed by a study of land recycling in Manchester (Adams, 1990, quoted in Healey, 1991), which suggested that in the 1980s the public sector spent large sums in

purchasing derelict sites from private companies and then passing them back at reduced prices even after considerable reclamation and infrastructure work had been completed. This is supported by Thornley's (1991: 208) view that following the election of the Conservative government in 1979 there was a reorientation of the state "*to support rather than supplant the market*", driven by a neo-liberal agenda, to give developers greater freedom. Adams (1990, quoted in Healey 1991) makes the further point that developers then profited once the basic infrastructure work had been completed, frequently through the sourcing of an "*anchor firm*".

The theory of the Anchor Firm is borrowed from commercial property economics literature, and the development of shopping malls. At least one large recognised department store is attracted as the anchor tenant and then a diversified set of smaller, lesser known and specialised stores follow. The Anchor Theory has only been researched in relation to a small number of sectors that includes shopping malls (Konishi and Sandfort, 2003), R&D intensive firms (Agrawal & Cockburn, 2003), the aircraft industry (Niosi and Zhegu, 2010) and the biotech industry (Feldman, 2003; Lawton Smith, 2012). Existing firms can serve as anchors that attract skilled labour pools, specialised intermediate industries and provide knowledge spill-overs that benefit new technology intensive firms in the region. This can positively affect firm survival and growth and subsequently the viability of the regional clusters, (Feldman, 2003: 312).

*“Anchor tenants produce positive agglomeration effects on a region by spinning off new local innovative firms and by attracting other innovative firms to the region”, (Niosi and Zhegu, 2010: 282).*

An anchor, in the form of a large, established firm may create externalities that benefit agglomerations. These can create local advantages that may benefit smaller start-up firms, (Feldman, 2003; Lawton Smith, 2012). Feldman (2003) considered the locational dynamics of the US biotech industry in relation to the Anchor Hypothesis. For the US biotech industry, the geographic location of the industry appears to be anchored by some large institutions, related firms and successful early entrants to the industry. More generally, regional anchors may encompass other institutions such as universities, government labs, research institutes and other entities, (Feldman, 2003: 320). Organisations, such as football clubs may provide expertise and knowledge about specific applications and product markets, which over time may distinguish the specialisation of an industrial cluster. Critics might point out that the theory relies heavily on a trickle-down effect, from which few local stakeholders may benefit, due to lack of skills, etc., (Bianchini *et al.*, 1990).

Further criticism of regeneration has been levelled at the gentrification effects with which it is associated, (e.g. Bianchini, 1991; Henderson *et al.*, 2007). In the UK, this may in large part be due to the pervasive assumption that urban regeneration can be achieved through private sector property development, (Healey, 1991). Although Healey’s article was written some time ago, it is still highly relevant as recent examples in the London boroughs of Kensington, Haringey and Southwark

demonstrate, (Guardian, 17/09/14). This strategy is speculative, in the sense that it encourages property development by the private sector in the expectation that demand will come forward. Very often, this is at the expense of public-sector building programmes, on the basis of producing a more “*balanced community*”. This process has also been referred to as ‘social engineering’, or “*social cleansing*” by community groups. The objective of the strategy is to achieve local economic growth by providing the physical structures appropriate for new kinds of economic activity which, in some instances, are expected to replace old manufacturing industries, (Healey, 1990). Again, the argument is that benefits will trickle down to local communities and therefore avoid problems of alienation.

It has been argued that gentrification problems can be avoided with partnerships between the development and key stakeholders such as local government and community groups, (Brown, 2008). Henderson *et al.*, (2007), explored the role of local government in urban regeneration in England and specifically the part played in developments in Manchester’s near-neighbour, Salford. In the 1980s, Salford City Council established a reputation for delivering regeneration schemes. This ability to deliver, it was argued, stemmed from:

“... *the tight political control exerted by a small group of officers and councillors known as the ‘magic circle’*”, (Henderson *et al.*, 2007: 1450).

With the development of Salford Quays, the magic circle involved the main players from the local authority and central and regional government. As it suggests, this was

an extremely top-down process with no accounts of widespread community consultation. Local people were not expected to play any part in developing the aims of the plan except through the (fairly limited) input of local councillors, (Henderson *et al.*, 2007). A significant element in the local place loyalties that were part of the inspiration for the Quays was the longstanding rivalry between Salford and its neighbour, Manchester. It seems that in this regional competition for national development funding, the two cities eventually evolved a similarly “*successful*” operating system that excluded many stakeholders for reasons of expediency. The top-down decision-making model may have been effective in securing discretionary funding, but it certainly didn’t involve the participation of all stakeholders and failed to satisfy local expectations in Salford. This resulted in local apathy towards large regeneration projects and again evidenced the need for long-term involvement of all stakeholders.

As an example, interviews carried out by Henderson and colleagues (2007) with community representatives in Ordsall throws light on a lack of community involvement in the newly developed Salford Quays. There appeared to be little social or economic integration between the residents of Ordsall and Salford Quays. Also, there had been little integration through employment. The move of the BBC into a new Salford Quays centre provided anecdotal evidence that a “*them*” and “*us*” culture was present in the area, with staff being offered security escorts out of the area, (Daily Telegraph, 11 April 2012). Salford Council later brought in a Public Space Protection Order in a bid to curb anti-social behaviour that included a ban on swearing (Manchester Evening News, 02.03.16). This demonstrates the need to

involve local stakeholders at an early stage or problems can prevail with the local community, something that has long been recognised:

*“Local regeneration committees must be set up before any plans have been devised and on which representatives (by which we mean elected representatives) from the community sit as equal partners”*, (Colenutt and Cutten, 1994: 247).

The issue of broad-based regeneration was investigated by McCarthy (2002). He analysed the case of Detroit’s entertainment-led regeneration efforts and found that issues of governance helped to explain the development of a pro-growth, entertainment-led agenda for regeneration in Detroit. The role of local politicians and local governing regimes is often critical to this process, and, particularly where policy can be pushed forward and implemented by a single figure with sufficient power, the potential exists for policy to serve personal ends, (Jones, 2001). With the election of a new Mayor of Detroit in 1994, a pro-growth agenda was adopted, which involved regeneration of the Foxtown area as an entertainment district. It included the refurbishment of an old theatre and developing a number of other theatres and restaurants in the area, (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999, quoted in McCarthy, 2002: 108). The Mayor then reached an agreement with the Detroit Lions football team and the Detroit Tigers baseball team to build two new sports stadiums in the downtown area. These stadiums were built in the Foxtown area with the assistance of public funding of around 48% of the \$505 million cost of the projects, (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999, quoted in McCarthy, 2002: 108). Proposals for the development of

three gambling casinos followed. The city of Detroit began to experience economic recovery around 1997 and investment in Foxtown created optimism about the area. However, it seems the improved financial conditions derived largely from wider economic factors, including the improved national economy, (McCarthy, 2002). The author found that the approach was fundamentally flawed as a mechanism of bringing about broadly-based regeneration, as indicated by the resulting uneven spread of benefits in terms of the wider city. In spite of the economic revitalisation, average earnings in the city remained well below what they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Additionally, persistent problems such as racial segregation, linked to labour and housing, remained. The 2000 census showed that Detroit had the highest level of racial segregation in the USA, (McCarthy, 2002).

The approach of top-down development can be criticised for failing to give due emphasis to interests without a direct stake in property ownership. It could therefore be concluded that the use of entertainment and sports-based schemes may even increase problems of social injustice and exclusion. Consequently, the justification of public subsidy of such schemes may be called into question.

*“Public needs get defined through political arrangements of urban elites who have similar interests and concerns. People whose needs differ from those within these elite coalitions are often excluded from the planning process. We should be cognisant of the fact that such a powerful symbol of common interest may also obscure other less dramatic concerns such as improving city*

*housing, or health care, or schools, or job training*”, (Schimmel in Gratton and Henry, 2001: 275).

This suggests the need for a more critical approach to the assumptions underpinning the enthusiastically promoted, or “*boosterish*”, regeneration strategies that rely on cultural and sports-led projects.

## **2.8 Summary**

In summary, stakeholder theory provides a powerful research tool to investigate the influence of communities, as part of a group of stakeholders, on the on-going regeneration of East Manchester and Tottenham. There is an emerging consensus on the need to be cognisant of stakeholders, for both strategic and moral reasons, (Laplume *et al.*, 2008). Certainly there have been many calls for further research across the field of stakeholder theory: including those that generate a diverse array of fine-grained, narrative accounts, (Laplume *et al.*, 2008; Freeman *et al.*, 2010); those that consider stakeholders’ perceptions, motivating factors and alliances (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004; Choi and Shepherd, 2005); those that view stakeholders in contexts related to economic development decision making, (Friedman and Mason, 2004); those that determine stakeholder salience attributes, (Agle, Mitchell and Sommerfield, 1999; Driscoll and Starik, 2004, Parent and Deephouse, 2007); and those that research stakeholders in more than just the large, publicly held corporations, (Phillips, 2003. Laplume *et al.*, 2008).

In the USA, researchers such as Mason and Slack (1996-97) and Friedman and Mason (2004 and 2005) have used stakeholder theory as a powerful device to scrutinise corporate behaviour. They have used the theory to argue for legal reform to rein in corporate behaviour and more directly benefit non-shareholder stakeholders. The latter authors also acknowledged that situational factors can strongly affect decisions and should be considered.

A trend has also emerged in stakeholder research towards looking at the antecedents and greater complexities involved in stakeholder relationships building on earlier theoretical work. This includes the work of Hendry (2005), providing a more complex model of stakeholder influencing strategies than the earlier work of Frooman (1999) and Weitzner and Deutsch (2015) on understanding motivation for prioritisation by focal organisations that identifies powerlessness and illegitimacy as additional stakeholder attributes. Recent investigations in the UK, such as the London Assembly report, *The Regeneration Game* (2015), demonstrate growing concerns about the effects of stadium-led regeneration on a wider range of stakeholders than just on focal organisations, supporting the theory's relevance to this research.

Overall, the literature indicates the need for any cultural or sport-based regeneration strategies to involve all stakeholders at the earliest opportunities to integrate the development together with sharing in any benefits – rather than making partial decisions over the spending of public funds. In the next chapter, sports-led projects in the form of stadium-led regeneration projects will be examined in more detail.

## Chapter 3: Stadium-led regeneration

*“Even as corporate welfare goes, sports stadiums are a questionable investment for cities, (Cagan and deMause, 1996: 14).*

### 3.1 Introduction

In the USA, researchers such as Mason and Slack (1996) and Friedman and Mason (2004 and 2005) have used stakeholder theory, including that of Mitchell *et al.* (1997), on stakeholder salience as a powerful device to scrutinise the corporate behaviour of sports organisations in the context of franchise relocations. Mason and Slack (1996) have used the theory to argue for reform to rein in corporate behaviour and more directly benefit non-shareholder stakeholders. Stakeholder theory has particular relevance for a multiple case study that involves public investment connected to stadium-led regeneration and private football clubs that stress their community involvement. Professional football clubs have a significant social role that goes beyond issues of performance, profitability and efficiency, (Jackson and Maltby, 2004). Many supporters have a deep emotional attachment to their football clubs that is much stronger than ordinary commercial loyalty. After all, customers of supermarkets or banks are unlikely to have their ashes scattered on the premises or brands tattooed on their arms. It has therefore been argued that the stakeholder concept has greater relevance for football clubs than for more conventional businesses because of the particular features of certain football club stakeholders, including their loyalty and demands for accountability, (Morrow, 2003).

Football clubs also stress their social benefits to their local communities and this concept has emerged as a key reason for granting planning permission for new football stadiums as part of wider regeneration schemes. Recently, Brentford FC used the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 to assist in obtaining planning permission from Hounslow Council for a new stadium, where local groups had raised a number of objections, (Property Week, 22.08.14). The football club successfully argued that its community activities would not only be protected, but enhanced by a new stadium. However, particularly when public money is being invested, it is important to understand the extent to which all stakeholders, not just football clubs, participate in the stadium-led regeneration process. It is also relevant to appreciate the extent to which power, legitimacy and urgency, or other attributes of salience, are significant in that participation.

Davies (2011) found that sporting infrastructure has tremendous potential to create economic and social change, but there is also a need for further research on the impacts of sports stadiums, (Davies, 2006). Authors from different perspectives and in relation to numerous sites have recognised the need to integrate regenerative economic, architectural, cultural and sporting developments, (e.g. Brown, 2004; McCarthy, 2002; Porter, 1995). This evidences the need for research into the complex real-life issue of how stakeholders at all levels influence stadium-led regeneration. Stakeholder theory provides a powerful research tool to investigate the influence of diverse groups of stakeholders on the on-going developments in East Manchester and Tottenham.

Considerable previous research has been carried out in the USA into the use of sports stadiums as significant elements of urban regeneration redevelopments and these will now be considered.

### **3.2 Developments in the USA: economic arguments**

A number of American cities embarked on programmes of stadium-led regeneration during the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Phoenix and Cleveland). These cities engaged in what has become known as place-making, which involves trying to sell the image of a place so as to make it more attractive to businesses, tourists and residents, (Kotler, Haidler and Rein, 1993, quoted in Crompton, 2004). The popularity of sport in the media persuaded many American cities that sport could be the basis from which to improve their image (Crompton, 2004). This has led to a wide literature and evidence base concerning stadiums and economic development founded on this experience. Sports writers, news reporters, politicians, businesses, pressure groups, academics and economists have taken part in detailed debates around corporate welfare. In this context, corporate welfare involves regional subsidies to sports franchises to move between cities and frequently the building of new stadiums, at often considerable public expense. Economist Mark S Rosentraub has referred to the welfare system that exists in the USA to transfer “*hundreds of millions of dollars from taxpayers to wealthy investors and their extraordinarily well-paid employees*” – even though sports have a miniscule impact on a city’s economy, (Bennett, 2012:.162)

*“Examining the 99 major league sports facilities in use over the course of 2001, Long pegged the unreported public subsidy at \$5 billion, or an average of \$50 million per facility”, (Bennett, 2012: 167).*

Numerous researchers have examined the relationship between new facilities and economic growth in metropolitan areas in the USA, (Baade and Dye, 1990; Rosentraub, and Swindell, 1993; Spiers, 1996, Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). In each case, independent analysis of economic impacts made by newly built stadiums and arenas has uniformly found no statistically significant positive correlation between sport facility construction and economic development (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). In the USA this stands in stark contrast to the claims of teams and leagues, who emphasise that, the large economic benefits of professional franchises merit significant public expenditures on stadiums and arenas, (Matheson, 2002).

Baade and Dye (1990) used regression analysis to research what economic impact the construction of a new stadium, or move of a new sports franchise had, in nine metropolitan areas in the USA. The evidence was that the presence of a new or renovated stadium had an uncertain and possibly a negative impact on local development relative to the region. The result was consistent with the idea that stadium subsidies might bias local development towards low-wage jobs. After controlling for the effect of population and time trend, the presence of a new or renovated stadium had an insignificant impact on area income for all but one of the metropolitan areas, (which involved a new NFL franchise moving to the locality as well as a new stadium). The authors did not deny the possibility of intangibles or

external benefits from civic pride or psychological identification with major sports, but stadium construction was frequently justified to the public taxpayer on tangible economic grounds. A later review by Noll and Zimbalist (1997: 35) and 15 other collaborators found similar results:

*“A new sports facility has an extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overall economic activity and enjoyment. Regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a local neighbourhood, a city, or an entire metropolitan area, the economic benefits of sports facilities are de minimus.”*

In 2004, an open letter to Mayor Anthony Williams and the Washington DC City Council was signed by 90 economists that stated, amongst other points:

*“A vast body of economic research on the impact of baseball stadiums suggests that the proposed \$440 million baseball stadium in the District of Columbia will not generate notable economic or fiscal benefits for the city. In short, it is dubious to justify the use of public funds to subsidise the construction of a DC baseball stadium on economic development grounds”,*  
(Aaron *et al.*, 2004)

Overall, evidence from researchers in the USA suggests that new stadiums have an uncertain impact on the levels of economic activity and possibly a negative impact on development relative to the region. The result is consistent with the possibility that such regeneration schemes might bias local development towards low-wage jobs and

not become catalysts for regeneration. It might be suggested that the glamour connected with sport and highly visible stadiums makes them easier to support as catalysts for regeneration than some alternatives. However, a facility cannot be a catalyst for development if it is an island built in the middle of a sea of surrounding concrete car parks (Baade and Dye, 1990). In the USA, community groups in many cities have challenged state spending policies amounting to corporate welfare, which prioritise funding for sports franchises and stadiums over social spending.

A poll by the *Minneapolis Star Tribune* in January 1997 found that if given a choice of how to divide their tax money, people would spend it quite differently than would supporters of new stadiums: 44 per cent for education; 29 per cent for crime prevention; 13 per cent for transportation; and 8 per cent for the arts; a stadium was last, at 6 per cent, (deMause and Cagan, 2008). The system of subsidies that has emerged has created what Baade calls the “*reverse Robin Hood effect*” – taking from the poor, the working class, and middle class, and giving to the rich, (Eitzen, 2000). It was even suggested a few years ago, by a Minnesota legislator that instead of spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a new stadium so the Twins baseball team could re-sign one of their players, it would be cheaper for taxpayers just to pay for his contract, (deMause and Cagan, 2008: 233). Cagan and deMause (1996) suggested that if you can’t be a defence contractor, the best way to get public funds for private gain seems to be to own a professional sports team:

*“Even as corporate welfare goes, sports stadiums are a questionable investment for cities. Tax breaks to, say, keep a factory in town might at least*

*guarantee a few thousand jobs. But sports subsidies, despite local politicians' claims to the contrary, just wind up in the pockets of team owners and a few players. The jobs created are "mostly low-paying, even below minimum wage..." says John Ryan, head of Communication Workers of America Local 4309 in Cleveland", (Cagan and deMause, 1996: 14).*

One of the most extreme examples of corporate welfare provided by deMause and Cagan (2008: 160) relates to Seattle's baseball and football teams, the Mariners and the Seahawks. This eventually left the local taxpayers with "*one of the most enormous sports debts in recent history*"; a bill of nearly \$1 billion due to their requirements for new stadiums. This is despite the fact that the Seahawks were owned by Microsoft billionaire Paul Allen. Allen had bought the Seahawks in 1996, but the price for remaining in Seattle and not moving the franchise, was a state-of-the-art stadium. Allen did pledge at least \$100 million towards stadium construction, but he also took the unheard of step of personally financing the state-wide referendum on financing for the stadium, which cost him \$4.2 million. North Carolina political science professor Thad Beyle said:

*"I just don't recall ever seeing someone pick up a total tab for an election, it bumps up against questions about just how far you can let democracy go", (deMause and Cagan, 2008: 163).*

In June 1997, voters narrowly approved the new stadium for the Seattle Seahawks,

*“It was as though the citizens of the state had decided to spend the next 20 years with signs on their back reading ‘Kick Me’”*, (Quirk and Fort, 1999:141). The example is supportive of arguments concerning the importance of a strong voice within definitive stakeholders and a demonstration of the salience of power, (Friedman and Mason, 2005).

As community resistance has grown to direct outlays from public funds in the USA, Tax Increment Financing Schemes (TIFS) have become an extreme example of the types of hidden subsidies that have become more popular as an indirect way of financing new stadiums. The argument advanced is that building a new stadium will regenerate the area through improved infrastructure, attract further development, leading to increased property prices and local taxes. TIFS are a mechanism which allows the cost of building infrastructure to be paid for through the anticipated future extra taxes generated by the property development. TIFS quickly caught on in sport with schemes proposed by the Phoenix Coyotes, Dallas Cowboys, Minnesota Twins and New Jersey Nets, (Cagan and deMause, 2008). TIFS have provoked interest on this side of the Atlantic. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, stated that the Government would look at introducing TIF powers for local authorities in this country, (Hayman, 20/09/10), although they have not caught on to the same extent.

While TIF subsidies are provided under the assumption that no new development would happen “but for” the TIF schemes, developers often strain the limits of that concept. In Minnesota, subsidy expert Greg LeRoy stated, “... *city officials were*

*found to be handing out TIF money for projects that otherwise would still occur, just on a different block”, (deMause and Cagan, 2008: 245).*

Bennett (2012) points out that the economic impact studies that are habitually relied on to justify new stadiums are generally produced by accounting firms rather than professors of economics and commissioned by those who are in favour of the developments:

*“... in their reliance on questionnaires and surveys and speculation and ‘sloppy methodology,’ they are fantasy documents which promise the moon and the stars and an El-Dorado-style prosperity if only the city council or county legislature or voters will approve the requested subsidy, (Bennett, 2012: 190).*

### **3.3 Developments in the USA: “*psychic income*”**

An increasingly popular strategy to overcome the mounting academic evidence against the economic arguments that have been put forward are those relating to “*psychic income*” – that is the emotional and psychological benefits residents perceive they receive, even though they do not physically attend sports events and are not involved in organising them, (Crompton, 2004: 49). Delaney and Eckstein (2003: 207) predict that instead of fighting an increasingly difficult battle about local economic windfalls, the “*strategic shift to emphasising non-economic issues like community self-esteem and community collective conscience*” will only increase. Advocates of public subsidies argue that the value of a team or new stadium cannot

simply be measured in monetary terms. Redefining the benefits of publicly financed parks and arenas as psychic rather than economic is the “*new frontier in subsidy apologias*”, (Crompton, 2004: 48). Elected officials recognise the legitimacy and importance of psychic income, but have no scientific basis or framework to use to determine the magnitude of subsidy which would appropriately reflect it. However:

*“If a new psychic income paradigm for justification and scientific measurement is used to appraise the value of the psychic income and, hence, the subsidy invested, then these proponents could reposition themselves as responsible keepers of the public trust”*, (Crompton, 2004: 55).

Although the academic economic evidence seems to stack up against using sports events and stadiums in general for urban regeneration, there is some support for their development on brown-field or urban sites even in the USA. Quirke and Forte (1999) acknowledge one or two success stories related to the positive impact of a new stadium on a depressed part of a city, for example, Coors Field in Denver that opened in 1995. However:

*“The problem with depressed downtown areas is that nobody with any money goes there for a variety of perfectly good reasons, including location, security and the absence of amenities. Even on game days, the crowds are gone within an hour or two after the game finishes and there is nothing to attract them back except another game”*, (Quick and Fort, 1999: 156).

DeMause and Cagan (2008) also cited Coors Field as an example of the positive impact of a new stadium on a depressed part of a city. Although they also suggest that most success stories are of stadiums being located in areas that were already experiencing economic growth and revival before the stadium appeared, citing Camden yards in Baltimore and the America West Arena in Phoenix, 1992, as examples. When researching the use of sports facilities as urban redevelopment catalysts, Chapin (2004: 201), concluded that Camden Yards:

*“... cannot be considered a successful urban redevelopment catalyst”. [But that], “... from a purely physical redevelopment perspective, Cleveland’s Gateway complex can be termed a successful development catalyst”.*

In relation to a proposed move of the New York Yankees from the Bronx to Manhattan, Chenavil (2002) accepted that the presence of a stadium can perhaps redistribute economic activity within the city. He argued that a small economic improvement would have an immediately noticeable effect in the poorer neighbourhood of south Bronx, which would not be the case in Manhattan.

Ultimately, this was a rare case of a major municipal figure, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, not getting a new stadium built in the face of local opposition. The idea that elites can get their own way and that some stakeholders get excluded from the governance process is supported by research related to stadium building by Friedman and Mason (2005) in the stadium redevelopment in Phoenix, Arizona. Collins (2008) found that the ability to exclude competing groups by private interests was essential to obtaining

their object of stadium building with public funds. This is not an effective stakeholder management strategy, which Low and Cowton (2004) contend consists of both stakeholder engagement and participation.

Ultimately, community resentment can be an enduring feature, as a result of reduced social housing and dislocation, (Rutheiser, 1996, quoted in Matheson, 2010: 12).

Research in the USA indicates that sports franchises see regeneration as an issue for local authorities and at best a potential spin-off effect from their own success at filling stadiums and car parks, even where significant sums of public money are involved, (e.g. Bennett, 2012). Mason and Slack (1996), who examined franchise relocations from a stakeholder perspective, accepted that expecting owners to forego immediate financial gain in favour of practising ethical conduct was unlikely:

*“If the construction of new stadiums and arenas were privately financed it seems unlikely that the issue of urban revitalisation would be of compelling interest”, (Coates and Humphreys, 2011).*

Whilst it seems to be accepted that new sports stadiums do not spawn large numbers of jobs, some recent US studies suggest that new stadium development can contribute to the transformation of the image of downtown locations and encourage growth in service sector jobs, (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2002). Some of the most recent evidence in support of building on brown-field sites comes from developments on this side of the Atlantic, in France and the UK. The use of sports stadiums for the purpose of

regeneration is a more recent phenomenon in the UK, leading to the scope and breadth of the literature being more limited and largely qualitative.

### **3.4 Developments in the United Kingdom and France**

It was not until the mid to late 1990s, in major cities such as Birmingham, Glasgow and Sheffield, that the use of sport for regeneration purposes gained some popular support, (Davies, 2006). In the British context, most of the cities following this strategy of economic regeneration through sport were industrial cities, not normally known as major tourist destinations. The drivers of such policies were similar to those advanced in the USA, being the need for a new image and new employment opportunities caused by the loss of their conventional industrial base. Another similarity may also be developing. Although the competitive structure of sports leagues in the UK makes it more difficult for sports organisations to hold communities to ransom than has been the case in the USA, arguably Tottenham Hotspur FC, in bidding to move to the London Olympic stadium, used a similar tactic to extract £27 million in funding towards their new stadium development from the Mayor of London and Haringey Borough Council, (Daily Mail, 31.01.12). The phenomenon is neatly summarised by Charles Euchner, with the example from Haringey set out below:

*“In a confrontation between a firm and a city, the city is like a boxer with his shoes nailed to the ground”*, (Euchner, 1993: 167, quoted by Schimmel in Gratton and Henry, 2001: 262).

In two reports, the Haringey Report for Cabinet, 07.02.12 and the Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, Reports Pack, 13.02.12, the council set out the changed circumstances since the original determination by the Planning Committee in 2010, which led it to agree significant changes to reduce the cost and increase the realisable value of the stadium development for the football club. The council saw the stadium development as a catalyst for attracting new investment into the area, but accepted the commercially confidential financial information provided to them by the football club that the development faced a funding gap that was exacerbated by challenging conditions in the financial and property markets. In addition, there was a changed institutional planning back-drop provided by the Coalition government in which the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities' *Statement on Growth* in March 2011 called for local authorities to review existing s106 agreements on schemes that were unviable. And in which the *Draft National Planning Policy Framework* (July 2011) encouraged local planning authorities to avoid non-essential conditions or obligations when they would undermine the viability of development proposals:

*“Where necessary and possible, obligations should be modified to allow development to proceed provided this continues to ensure that the development remains acceptable in planning terms”,* (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12: 15).

On the back of an overall £41,345,000 funding and investment package (see table on page 33 for full details) announced by the Mayor of London on 16.01.12, Haringey's Planning Committee agreed on 13.02.12 to reduce the football club's s106 funding

obligations from £16,477,000 to £477,000. The Committee also agreed to allow an increase in the number of flats to be built on the existing ground to 285 (from 200), all of which would be sold on the open market, specifically to boost developmental value.

Nonetheless, cities are still keen to work with sports organisations as key players in regeneration projects, since they are still seen, as in Tottenham, as being able to provide a potential catalyst for future development. The role of Manchester City Football Club, as occupants of a publicly funded stadium, has frequently been cited in official discourses as being central to community regeneration in East Manchester, (e.g. NEM strategic regeneration framework 2008-2018). As such, for the first time, the roles and responsibilities with regard to the ongoing social and economic regeneration of an English inner city were placed on a professional football club, through the Lottery Agreement between Sport England and Manchester City Council and the subsequent *Community Use Plan* between the local council and the football club, (Brown *et al.*, 2004). However, it should be noted that some specific obligations were later renegotiated by the football club, (*The Regeneration Game*, 2015).

East Manchester's New Deal for Communities Coordinator, Sean McGonigle, argued that the inclusion of local people in the decision-making process throughout the lead-up to the 2002 Commonwealth Games (for which the stadium was originally built) was a distinctive way of ensuring local community involvement, (Misener and Mason, 2009). The authors describe how urban regime members believed strongly in attempting to ensure that local residents had input into the activities and developments

in their area. One example related to local community groups and residents who would be directly affected by the new stadium being involved in the designing of the car park and parking area. They perceived such activities as being key links to capacity building, development of social capital, and community relations. Some secondary regime members – such as neighbourhood coalition members, and community development officers – expressed views that there were ongoing concerns from the local community about disruptions in the neighbourhood, the outsourcing of jobs and industry, and inequitable development activities surrounding events in the city. However, they generally believed that these problems were superficial and the regime was working toward a better model of community development and consultation (Misener and Mason, 2009).

This process of stadium-led regeneration, involving a privately owned football club that benefitted from public expenditure, as in examples from the USA, has not been without its critics. In August 2001, then Sports Minister Richard Cabourn heavily criticised the stadium deal, arguing that it ‘*was not the best use of money for sport*’ and that the government had been “*short changed*” over the Commonwealth Games’, (Brown *et al.*, 2004: 19).

*“...serious questions remain, about how far sporting infrastructure can help areas out of decline, and about the specific deals the council is striking...there appears to be little rigorous scrutiny of how the benefits balance, and the value the public is getting for its money,” (D. Conn, 7/12/2000, Independent: ‘Sharks feed from City’s new stadium’).*

It was also alleged that investment by the local authority in the new facilities was resulting in other local and grassroots sports facilities being closed. This included the ‘Gorton Tub’ swimming pool in East Manchester, (Brown *et al.*, 2004: 20). A point highlighted by a number of authors in relation to the City of Manchester Stadium development, is that there was little public or political debate, despite considerable ‘consultation’ exercises and information dissemination in East Manchester itself, (Conn, 2000; Quilley, 2000; Robson, 2002). A number of journalists complained that the council were obstructive and reticent in providing information; and some academics had been attacked in the press for merely posing questions about the stadium deal (Brown *et al.*, 2004: 21).

Carlsen and Taylor, (2003) investigated the link between long-term urban renewal and Manchester’s 2002 Commonwealth Games, including the new stadium. They argued that economic, social, and cultural benefits from mega-events and new infrastructure can only be realized through an integrated approach with long-term urban renewal policy and planning. In the case of Manchester, the city put relatively little direct money into the development of capital projects, and funding came from the UK government and private sponsorship. It is due to this factor alone that the city can produce substantial benefits from the event while minimizing exposure to risk.

Gratton *et al.*, (2000) also concluded that since much of the funding for the new investment for the facilities came from the National Lottery or central government, this provided a clear economic boost for the area and enough evidence to indicate that East Manchester benefited considerably. When the money for sporting infrastructure investment is provided by local taxpayers, as it was for the World Student Games in

Sheffield in 1991, the question arises of whether other projects might have provided better returns to the local community. When the money for investment comes primarily from outside the local community, as it did for the Commonwealth Games in Manchester, then it is an unequivocal benefit to the local community in economic terms, but may not be the best use of the funds from a national perspective, (Gratton *et al.*, 2005: 998).

Jones (2001, 2002) reviewed the impact of the Millennium Stadium, built on a brown-field site, in inner-city Cardiff. Three broad themes of potential impact could be discerned; the expenditure impacts of visitation; the contribution to urban renewal made by physical development; and the effects on investment and visitation of regular media exposure in the sports pages and on television, not all of which were positive for the local community, (Jones, 2002: 827). Davies (2008: 34) found evidence to suggest that the City of Manchester Stadium (COM) and the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff, both built on brown-field sites, generated “*tangible and intangible impacts on the commercial property market, but they vary between different sectors*”. Further, that stadiums can enhance the commercial development potential of the surrounding area:

*“In addition to the tangible impacts on commercial property values, the stadia have also generated positive impacts on imaging and confidence in the surrounding area,”* (Davies, 2008: 41).

A number of individuals interviewed for her research commented that the COM Stadium had given retailers the confidence to invest in East Manchester, e.g. Asda/Walmart. While the impacts on the retail sector are seemingly positive, caution was urged not to overstate the results, (Davies, 2008). From information gathered in interviews in East Manchester, it seems that residents' representatives in particular – those most involved in the organisations and processes of regeneration – were generally positive about the move of the football club to the area. This related to the overall benefits they saw as coming to the area and the centrality of the stadium development as the most visible sign of the area's physical regeneration, rather than specific economic benefits, (Brown *et al.*, 2004).

It should be noted that both Manchester City FC and Tottenham Hotspur had already bought-up land and premises surrounding their own stadiums, indicating the football clubs were aware of the future development potential and increase in land values such sites offered (e.g. Daily Telegraph, 10.08.13). This factor may also have been of assistance in raising finance for stadium developments.

A further example of stadium-led regeneration on a brown-field site, that largely involves central government funding, comes from just across the English Channel. The Stade de France (SdF) was built in the Saint Denis area of Paris and was effectively cost-free for local tax-payers. Saint Denis, in common with other northern and eastern suburbs of Paris, lost its industrial base in the 1970s and 1980s. Through negotiations with the state during the planning of the SdF, the area of Saint Denis secured substantial infrastructure improvements that could enhance it as a location for

new business, (Newman and Tual, 2002). The impacts arose from the greatly improved transport infrastructure that came with the stadium and most importantly from the transformation of the image of Saint-Denis; from that of a derelict area to one that appeared on the routes of tour companies. The SdF changed the attitudes of potential investors and of government. However, as with other sport and entertainment-led regeneration schemes, (e.g. see McCarthy on Detroit, 2002), a wider economic and social integration has been more elusive with pockets of severe deprivation still remaining, (Newman and Tual, 2002). This research suggests support for the idea of indirect economic benefits of stadium-led regeneration through improved infrastructure and psychic income, (Compton 2004) rather than through any direct cost-benefit analysis. The lack of broader economic and social integration arguably provides evidence of a deficiency in wider stakeholder involvement, especially at the planning stage:

*“Although the stakeholder framework can be useful as a post hoc analysis tool, its strongest application for economic decision makers is as a strategic management tool for identifying and analysing constituent environments”*,  
(Friedman and Mason, 2004: 250).

With such approaches to stadium-led regeneration, costs can be social as well as economic, and adequate account must be taken of the need to provide opportunity and facilities for all sections of the community. For example, the neighbouring community to the Millennium Stadium bears the cost of increased litter, congestion and parking, as well as a serious decline in trade on event days, (Jones, 2001).

Similarly, Brown *et al.*, (2006: 39) also noted that the staging of football matches can cause significant disruption and nuisance to local residents. The extent to which stadium owners actively respond to and lessen this disruption, as well as overcome it through more imaginative engagements with residential communities, becomes central to whether stadiums can become a genuine community resource. The engagement and participation of diverse groups of stakeholders will clearly assist in this process. The issue of integration through community involvement has been recognised almost everywhere new sports stadiums have been built as part of a regeneration process, (e.g. Brown *et al.*, 2004; deMause and Cagan, 2008). Exclusion of the local population from the planning process (ELRI, 2007), together with fear of increasing property prices and gentrification can create negative legacies for regeneration and thus need to be carefully managed and considered, (Davies, 2011). Thornley (2002: 818) makes the point explicitly:

*“Stadia developments should not be regarded as isolated projects but integrated into broader visions of local regeneration and strategic city policy, over issues such as social inclusion, sustainability and public transport”*,  
(Thornley, 2002: 818).

Jones (2002) found evidence in relation to governance issues that included local politicians that can get seduced by regeneration projects that offer exposure for the city on the global stage and present glamour not associated with the more mundane task of serving the local populace. The evidence supports Hall and Hubbard’s (1998: 8) memorable description of cities bidding for the Olympic Games as a *“major marshalling point for urban boosterism and civic peacocking”*. Delaney and Eckstein

(2003) point out that politicians like to highlight large, noteworthy projects that occur while they are in office. This can mean that highly visible projects, such as new sports stadiums, get favoured over less visible projects and long-term investment in human resources (i.e. job training and education).

More recently, the London Olympic Stadium was built on a vast brown-field site that required extensive reclamation before any form of regeneration could start. However, many of the criticisms of stadium-led regeneration that are detailed above have recently been focussed on this development, especially those related to public finance for private gain, or corporate welfare. The Olympic Stadium, which originally cost over £430 million to build, will be handed over to West Ham United for the start of the 2016-17 football season after under-going a £272 million re-fit, most of which was publicly funded. The football club struck a deal with the London Legacy Development Corporation to pay £15 million towards the re-fit and £2.5 Million in annual rent during the 99-year lease. All maintenance and security costs, including policing, stewarding, pitch maintenance, including goal posts and corner flags, will be funded by the taxpayer, (*Daily Telegraph*, 14.04.16). This information only became available after a relentless campaign by the *Olympic Stadium Coalition*, largely formed of a group of football club supporters' trusts. The deal has been criticised as a poor bargain for taxpayer and “*effectively means the east London club will occupy the Olympic Stadium virtually rent free*”, (*Guardian*, 06.08.15). This is not a view shared by the focal organisations involved, West Ham United FC and the LLDC, who have insisted that the 99 year lease, which allows for other occasional sporting and entertainment events, with a share of profits being paid into the public purse,

represents very good value for the taxpayer (Daily Mail, 15.08.15). It has been suggested that if the Olympic Stadium had got an end-user for the stadium set up in advance, local government could have reaped benefits like Manchester City Council has from the Commonwealth Games, (Guardian, 24.07.12), i.e. from the agreement with Manchester City FC.

Much other detailed specific research that ranges from the architecture (Sharr, 2013) to sociological issues (Hayes and Horne, 2011) has already been carried out around the London Olympic Stadium. It is not possible to review all of this literature, but some of the results of early studies support criticisms of gentrification through displacement of existing communities (Porter, 2009; Cheyne, 2009) and rising house costs within the host borough councils (Watt, 2013). With regeneration planning “... *best understood as government intervention that de-risked East London for private-sector investors*”, (Smith, 2014). Although investment in the building of sports venues helped support the construction industry through the recession (Denman, 2012), other evidence suggests that the 2012 Games legacy is questionable in terms of greater employment, training and housing opportunities for existing East London residents, (Watt, 2013).

### **3.5 The need for a more integrative approach**

It has been acknowledged that in the USA many new stadiums do not foster surrounding development because they are not physically interwoven with other elements of the local area. Rather, they are designed for quick entry and exit of suburban fans, (Crompton, 2004). Or, as Johnson (1991: 319, quoted in Crompton,

2004: 47) put it, “*team owners are not in the urban redevelopment business*”. It is clear that the owners of new stadiums, which are the focus of urban regeneration schemes, can do a lot more to successfully integrate these developments. An integrative approach could avoid repetition of problems of detachment from the surrounding community that have been exhibited by many North America stadiums, (Chenayil, 2002: 892). The design should build upon and assimilate the character of surrounding structures; otherwise the facility can become “*an ugly intrusion on the urban fabric instead of an indigenous component of it*”, (Crompton, 2004: 47).

Brown *et al.*, (2010) discussed the social and community value of football in their report. They made a number of recommendations that could equally be applied more widely to architectural, cultural and sports stadium regeneration schemes (2010: 45). Adoption of local employment practices, local purchasing policies, better and more inclusive governance, environmental standards and waste disposal recording have become commonplace in many businesses and there is little reason why this should not be the case with regeneration schemes. Embedding these within Company Objectives under an obligation to benefit local communities and act in a socially responsible way, can only assist integration. Tallon, (2010) believed that some lessons may have been learned with an increasingly important component of recent urban regeneration being the involvement of communities in driving forward the regeneration of their area.

In fact social benefit has emerged as a further reason to support the building of new stadiums as part of regeneration schemes. English football clubs have started to use

the activities of their largely separate community sport trusts (CST) in planning applications in order to offset some of the negotiable section 106 infrastructure obligations and to assist to obtain planning permission. Planning obligations under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 are agreements between developers and local planning authorities that are negotiated as part of a condition of planning consent. They are focused on the mitigation of the impact of a development and can include developer contributions towards direct impacts of the project and affordable housing. The Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), which may also be payable by a developer is an additional set of standard charges from which the local authority can pool resources to improve general infrastructure to include education, open spaces, sport facilities, transport, etc., (Falco, 2015). The CIL was introduced by the Planning Act 2008 and brought into force in 2010.

In a personal interview with the author in 2011, the director of one such CST, whose parent football club was having trouble securing planning permission confirmed:

*“Well, most would say that one of the major reasons why they got planning permission was the community work that the club do. I don’t think that anyone would doubt that. It’s agreed really. Yes, there’s no one who would argue with you on that. The major reason we got planning permission was the community work”, (CST Director, 2011, interview with author).*

More recently, Brentford FC used the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 to assist in getting planning permission for a new stadium. The football club argued that its community activities would not only be protected, but enhanced by a new stadium. Research was commissioned to put an objective social value on the club's outreach work, which was accepted by all of the relevant authorities. A commitment to community activities played a critical role in section 106 planning gain negotiations on the project, with the club committing to run activities for the lifetime of the new stadium, (Property Week, 22.08.14).

However, it is noticeable that many authors who have written on the subject of regeneration of urban areas, especially involving both culture and sport, have considered the lack of involvement of local communities and other stakeholders in these developments as problematic. Frequently the developments have been top-down processes where there has been a failure to include all or most stakeholders, which can soon lead to alienation and problems with the regeneration goals. In relation to stadium-led regeneration:

*“It should not be a surprise that the community goals of local officials, often do not match the location criteria and business interests of team owners.*

(Johnson, 1991:319, quoted by Compton in Gratton and Henry, 2001: 30).

Authors from different perspectives and in relation to numerous sites have recognised the need to integrate regenerative architectural, cultural or sporting developments, (e.g. Porter, 1995; McCarthy, 2002; Brown, 2004). The issue of integration through

community involvement has been recognised almost everywhere new sports stadiums have been built as part of a regeneration process, (Chenayil, 2002: 892). Exclusion of the local population from the planning process (ELRI, 2007), together with fear of increasing property prices and gentrification can create negative legacies for regeneration. The need for strategic planning and careful management has been recognised, (Davies, 2011: 229). Research in relation to the 2012 Olympic Games, supports this view:

*“For a sustainable legacy, all the objectives of the various stakeholders need to be addressed and a holistic approach taken to the developments and management of the Olympic facilities,”* (Sadd, 2010: 266).

However, as has been mentioned in relation to the background to the two case study sites, the institutional context can be significant in supporting or limiting wider stakeholder participation. At the time of the development of the COM stadium, a Labour government was supportive of an urban regeneration policy involving social inclusion, stakeholder engagement and community participation, (Rydin & Thornley, 2002).

With the election of the Coalition government in 2010, the institutional context faced by the more recent stadium-led regeneration projects in East Manchester and Tottenham changed. Central government funding cuts to regeneration schemes, the replacement of Regional Development Agencies with Local Enterprise Partnerships that came out of the Localism Act in 2011 (Pugalis and McGuinness, 2013), and the

inability of local government to borrow the required financial resources meant there was increased space for private sector involvement in regeneration. Changes in government policy since 2010 have given pre-eminence to economic factors over all others (Colenutt *et al.*, 2015: 1). Arguably there has been a move back towards the approach of a decentralised marketplace with the downgrading of democracy and public involvement, (Prior, 2005: 475) and a significant shift in power and control towards central government and market forces, (Thornley 1991).

Weiner (2000) supports the idea of leveraging the public element in any public-private partnership. He provides a cogent argument in proposing that if stadiums are subsidised using public expenditure then the facility can justify the investment by being used for the community's benefit "*as a community center, a local institution, not a monument to rich-guy sport,*" (2000: 461). Weiner strongly argues that communities that contribute their investment for the facility should share in ownership. The research organisation Substance, suggests that any stadium development should include:

*"An active and meaningful involvement in decision making by local community representatives, residents, businesses and supporter communities; developments designed with local communities to meet their needs; and independent monitoring of community involvement in the development"*, (Brown *et al.*, 2006: 41).

### **3.6 Summary**

Therefore, stakeholder theory has particular relevance for a multiple case study that considers context and involves public investment connected to stadium-led regeneration and private football clubs, which stress their community involvement. Additionally, football clubs have a highly significant social role that goes beyond issues of performance, profitability and efficiency (Jackson and Maltby, 2004) and it has been argued that the stakeholder concept has greater relevance for football clubs than for more conventional business, because of the particular features of certain football club stakeholders, specifically their demands for accountability, (Morrow, 2003). In circumstances where public money is being invested, whether directly funding stadiums or into local infrastructure, from which stadiums and private owners benefit, it is of particular importance to understand how and to what extent stakeholders, broadly defined, participate in the stadium-led regeneration process within the context of the institutional framework. It is also relevant to appreciate the extent to which power, legitimacy and urgency, or other attributes of salience, are relevant to that participation.

The next chapter on the methodology of the research will set out how the various stakeholder concepts that have been discussed fit into the research design and how they were operationalised in order to study how stakeholders have tried to influence stadium-led regeneration at the two sites in East Manchester and Tottenham.

## Chapter 4: Methodology

### 4.1 Philosophical approach and research design

The methodology is designed to answer the central research question of *How do Stakeholders Influence Stadium-led Regeneration?* As set out in the previous chapters, there have been many calls for further research on stakeholder theory, and more specifically on stakeholder salience:

*“We believe that qualitative studies, such as those of Winn (2001), Parent and Deephouse (2007), and Kochan and Rubenstein (2000), which utilize interviews, direct observation of stakeholder gatherings, and secondary sources, offer organising templates for further qualitative inquiry” (Laplume et al., 2008:1174).*

These diverse calls for further research, together with the existing body of evidence from numerous authors, demonstrates the requirement for practical qualitative research and the potential use for stakeholder theory in providing an understanding of the complex real-life issues involved in stadium-led regeneration projects. Further, a qualitative approach is considered appropriate when empirical research in an area is at an early stage and when the phenomenon in question is perceptual and complex in nature, (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Of course the merits of qualitative and case study research have been debated by many writers.

The research question focuses on understanding how individuals and groups were able to participate and influence the complex process of stadium-led regeneration in East Manchester and Tottenham. This might be possible with a quantitative approach, by, for example, using a survey strategy. However, survey strategy is usually associated with a deductive research approach and is most frequently used to answer 'what', 'who', 'where', 'how much' and 'how many' questions. It generally allows for the collection of standardised data from a large population in an economical way and can be used to suggest possible reasons for relationships between variables, (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). Generally, quantitative research is best if the purpose of the research is to have a big sample size and you want to generalise to a larger population. This type of methodology often uses probability sampling techniques to ensure generalisability with a sample being chosen by a researcher that is taken as representative of the population. Most methods utilised to achieve representative samples depend in some way on the process of random assignment and the chances of a sample being representative are higher through random selection than if the sample is purposive; that is, specifically selected by the researcher, (Gray, 2014).

Further, in quantitative research, the researcher is frequently seen as independent from those being researched. Thus the researcher is disengaged from the people and the field they are researching, (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). While quantitative researchers would regard this positively, as a means of generating objectivity and detachment, qualitative researchers would see it as failing to gain access to people's social and cultural constructions of their reality, (Silverman, 2010). Positivism adopts many of the quantitative approaches to methods of collecting and analysing data that can be

used to evaluate or falsify hypotheses. Positivist researchers generally assume that reality is objectively given and can be described by measurable properties, which are independent of the observer.

Through using these methods positivist researchers claim objectivity, but critics argue the variables in such research can be arbitrarily defined and end up trying to explain away correlations using common-sense reasoning, (Gray, 2014). One significant disadvantage of positivist research is that, as a general rule, many of the social and cultural aspects of organisations are lost or treated in a superficial manner. The context is usually treated as something that gets in the way. The techniques used in quantitative research usually mean that complex verbal ideas and phenomena come to be represented by numbers. Certainly the quantitative researcher trades context for the ability to generalize across a population and the same problem can be identified more widely in a positivist approach to research. As will be seen, context is important for this research.

For Myers (2013), one of the key benefits of qualitative research is that it allows a researcher to see and understand the context within which decisions and actions take place. For it is frequently the case that human decisions and actions can only be understood in context. Johns (2001) also stresses that it is context that provides the capacity to explain organisational phenomena and thus provides compelling reasons for researchers to pay attention to it. Johns' (2006) argument is that unless we understand all the important multi-faceted aspects of a situation we will not be able to understand person-situation interactions, which would include those involving

stakeholders' influences in complex processes. It is the context that helps to explain, or understand, why someone acted as they did and it often has the potential to shape the meaning underlying organisational behaviour and attitudes, (Johns, 2006).

Qualitative researchers contend that it is virtually impossible to understand why someone did something or why something happened in an organisation without talking to people about it:

*“Qualitative researchers argue that if you want to understand people’s motivations, their reasons, their actions, and the context for their beliefs and actions in an in-depth way, qualitative research is best”*, (Myers, 2013: 5).

Using only quantitative data to understand complex real-life situations would be like trying to divide a number by zero – a process by which you cannot find an answer.

The advantages of qualitative research include the ability to offer a richer understanding of cognition and discourse by analyses of text and respondent viewpoints, aspects generally less accessible through quantitative methodologies (Laplume *et al.*, 2008). It also allows for the use of multiple types of secondary data such as annual reports, planning documents and webcasts of meetings. Overall, the objective of qualitative research is to develop an in-depth contextual understanding of the phenomena that is being studied and to interpret meaning from social situations.

A disadvantage of qualitative research, and a criticism that is also levelled at case studies, is that it is often said to be difficult to generalise to a larger population.

However, the purpose and methods of many types of qualitative research may not be

aimed at achieving generalisations and qualitative researchers often differ in the kinds of claims they make for their research. They may seek to conduct a study which is authentic and can provide results that are dependable and trustworthy within a specific context – for example within individual businesses, organisations or communities (e.g. ethnography). Although it is always potentially problematic to argue for extensions from case studies, some sites may have features or processes that will share commonalities with other domains and the experiences of informants may also be similar, allowing the concepts to be transferable, (Corley and Gioia 2004). The thick description that should be possible with qualitative research should also enable readers to better assess how well the findings may fit other settings, (Balogun and Johnson, 2004: 546). It is also possible to generalise from qualitative research to theory and from just one case study to theory.

Although the choice of a specific qualitative research method (such as a case study) is independent of the underlying philosophical position adopted, in reality it is strongly associated with an interpretive philosophy. The interpretive approach differs from a focus on variables and hypothesis falsification used in positivism. It is interpretive because researchers need to make sense of the subjective and socially constructed meanings expressed about the phenomenon being studied. Such research is sometimes referred to as naturalistic, because researchers need to operate within a natural setting, or research context, in order to establish trust, participation, access to meanings and in-depth understanding. In practice, much qualitative research uses an abductive approach, where inductive inferences are developed and deductive ones are tested iteratively throughout the research, (Saunders *et al.*, 2012).

The goal of interpretive research is to understand the actual production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings. The metaphor of the theatre suggests that as humans we play a part on the stage of human life. We interpret our everyday social roles in accordance with the meaning we give to these roles. In addition, we interpret the social roles of others in accordance with our own set of meanings, (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). Diverse meanings are assumed to exist and to influence how people understand and respond to the objective world. Rather than producing qualitative facts to evaluate hypotheses, interpretive researchers seek to describe and understand members' meanings and the implications that divergent meanings hold for social interaction, (Gephart, 2004: 457).

For Myers (2013: 39), interpretive researchers assume that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings and instruments; all in context. Interpretive researchers aim to understand the context of a phenomenon, since the context is what defines the situation and makes it what it is. Crucial to this approach and the interpretive philosophy more generally is that the researcher has to adopt an empathetic stance. The challenge is to enter the social world of the research subjects and understand their world from their point of view.

*“The success of the researcher’s role is dependent not only on gaining physical access to participants but also building rapport and demonstrating sensitivity to gain cognitive access to their data”, (Saunders et al., 2012: 163).*

Interpretive research uncovers, describes, and theoretically interprets actual meanings that people use in real settings. It examines how particular meanings become shared, dominant, and/or contested in situations in which alternative meanings and understandings are present, (Gephart, 2004: 457). The approach is particularly appropriate to research into the perspectives of multiple individuals and groups involved in complex real-life situations as this study does. This research is about understanding in-depth the perspective of the stakeholders involved and how they make sense of their own involvement in the process through a series of interviews and participant observations with the different individuals and groups. From this perspective each individual will have a valid viewpoint on the developments, demonstrating that social reality is complex and dependent on subjective interpretations. This fits with a view that knowledge is largely socially constructed and that it is not objective or value free. Interviewing individuals, attending meetings as a participant observer and analysing the data produced, with the addition of secondary material was also, importantly, the most interesting way to carry out the research for the author.

In order to investigate these issues, the work of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) on the salience of stakeholders provided a useful starting point that also allowed further scope to build on the theory. Siggelkow (2007) points out the usefulness of having observations being guided by a frame of reference:

*“A benefit of using previous theory is the ability to “see” the data, albeit only parts of the phenomena are illuminated”*, (Smith, 2002: 402).

The salience attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency were considered in an inductive way in order to remain open to other ways of understanding the perspectives of different stakeholders that provided the primary sources of data. The basic unit of analysis is the stakeholder relationship to the stadium-led regeneration, from the perspective of the individual respondent. All of the above led inexorably towards a qualitative and more specifically an interpretive, approach to the research. For researchers interested in change:

*“...the task is to identify the variety and mixture of causes of change and to explore through time some of the conditions and contexts under which these mixtures occur”, (Pettigrew, 1990: 269)*

The involvement of two Premier League football clubs in these developments provided an opportunity for a comparative case study on the involvement of stakeholders at the two sites.

## **4.2 Case studies**

*“We need more theory building to create rich and rigorous cases that could lead us to see the overall stakeholder relationship as a multifaceted, multi-objective, complex phenomenon,” (Harrison and Freeman, 1999: 484).*

The case study is a research strategy that focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings. Case studies can involve either single or multiple cases, and numerous levels of analysis; they are rich, empirical descriptions of

particular instances of a phenomenon that are typically based on a variety of data sources, (Yin, 1994). Case studies typically allow the analysis of combined data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations. They can also be used to provide description and to generate, test, or build theory, (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Yin (2003) defines a case study as one that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result it relies on multiple sources of evidence, with the data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. The case study is therefore well suited to investigate the phenomenon of how stakeholders engage or participate in stadium-led regeneration projects since it involves numerous individuals, groups and organisations together with a potentially large number of secondary documents.

While laboratory experiments isolate the phenomena from their context, case studies emphasise the rich, real-world context in which the phenomena occur, (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). They are especially valuable as they provide the opportunity to describe the events surrounding a specific case over a period of time in an in-depth manner. They are appropriate when “*how*” and “*why*” questions are asked about

events over which the researcher has little or no control (Yin, 2003), such as *“how did you influence the process?”* or *“why was that stakeholder so important?”*

As Myers (2013) points out, in case study research it is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate the phenomenon of interest from the context because the context itself is part and parcel of the story. Also, in a case study the researcher has no control over the situation. This is clearly the case at the two research sites that are the focus of this study, in which there were constant changes to the context. For example, during the period of this research, discussions took place at both sites over new or amended planning applications with knock-on effects for all the different stakeholders. This contrasts with the use of some other research methods, such as a laboratory experiment, where the whole idea is for the researcher to maintain control of certain specified variables and to clearly separate the context from the phenomenon being studied.

Case study research can take positivist or interpretive approaches. It is acknowledged they can also take other forms (e.g. critical). Positivist case study research attempts to meet the requirements of positivist social science and is often justified as a method of testing hypotheses or propositions in the real world. However, for Stake (1995: 8), the real business of case study is particularisation, not generalisation:

*“We take a particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as to how it is different from others, but what it is, what it does. There is emphasis on uniqueness, and that implies knowledge of others that the case is different*

*from, but the first emphasis is on understanding the case itself”*, (Stake, 1995: 8).

Interpretive case studies generally attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them, relying on a constructivist epistemology, i.e. reality is socially constructed. Unlike positivist case studies, which define quality in terms of reliability and validity, interpretive case studies define quality in terms of the plausibility of the story and the overall argument. The work of Barker (1993) on concertive control in self-managing teams is a good example of this type of case study. Case study research in business uses empirical evidence from one or more organisations where an attempt is made to study the subject matter in context. Multiple sources of evidence are used although most of the evidence comes from interviews and documents, (Myers, 2013). In this research, participant observation is also used as a primary data collection method. Myers (2013: 80) suggests that one of the most important things in doing case study research is finding an “*interesting*” case in the first place. That is, one that tells researchers in a particular field something they did not know before. One of the main advantages of case study research is that it allows researchers to explore or test theories within the context of messy real-life situations. The complexities that can exist through multiple perspectives of the same situation can only be brought out in a research method that allows a researcher to get close to, or involved in the action, as the case study method does.

A potential major disadvantage of doing case study research is that it can be difficult to gain access. In this research, access was relatively easily negotiated with

individuals and community groups in East Manchester together with individuals from Manchester City FC. Interviews were carried out with a number of representatives of the football club and a considerable number of unobtrusive documents were made available by the organisation about the *Etihad Campus* development. The football club also enabled participant observation at meetings involving local residents and local businesses that occur alternately on a bi-monthly basis. In Tottenham, individuals, including local councillors, and community groups were generous with their time and access was relatively easily negotiated. Tottenham Hotspur Football Club was more guarded over access. The club provided limited and sometimes confusing communications to many of the people interested in the project, including their own supporters (e.g. Haringey Independent, 15.09.14). Nevertheless, participant observation was possible at several meetings that involved representatives of the football club, together with many secondary documents related to the proposed new stadium development.

A further potential disadvantage of the case study method is that it can be difficult to focus on the most important issues, especially in a fast-changing environment. It is possible to end up with a huge amount of data, most of which turns out to be of little use in the final analysis. The more “*shapeless spaghetti*” of data on the plate, the harder it will be to move towards some kind of theoretical understanding, (Langley, 1999: 694). This research produced a large amount of data, but computer assisted data analysis software has aided the process of ordering this material. With this amount of data it was also important to keep up to date with filing, cross-referencing and tasks such as transcribing interviews on a regular basis.

For Myers (2013: 85), the plausibility of the case in interpretive research is far more important than its design. That is, fellow researchers in a particular field will need some confidence in the case, and its story should be believable. The plausibility of a case is improved by many things, such as using multiple sources of evidence, and having a clear description of what you did and how. It is therefore important to show what was done in the research process and to explain how the research methods transformed observations into results, findings and insights, (Gephart, 2004). In this research the data analysis and presentation of results are designed to be transparent in order to demonstrate a chain of evidence that shows how the research moved from raw data (e.g. recorded interviews) to the theoretical labels or constructs used to represent that data, (Pratt, 2009: 860).

Eisenhardt (1989) has pointed out that prior identification of constructs can help to shape the initial design of theory-building research. If the constructs prove important as the study progresses, then researchers have a firmer empirical grounding for the emergent theory. If these constructs emerge as related to the key questions, they can provide a strong basis on which to build the theory. The author goes on to state that theory-building research should begin as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration. However, she admits, it is impossible to achieve this clean theoretical approach. As detailed above, this case study research started by considering the potential importance of power, urgency and legitimacy in stakeholder relations. The research and analysis has also worked in an inductive way in order to be open to alternative ways of understanding the data. One of the aims of this research is to take up the challenge of investigating other possible salient variables

and to understand the wider context at the case study sites. Case studies can be used to sharpen existing theory by pointing to gaps and beginning to fill them (Siggelkow, 2007). A further aim of the research is to fill the gap in research that deals with the perspectives of multiple stakeholders involved in stadium-led regeneration.

Myers (2009: 237) states that one of the main advantages of case study research is what he calls its “*face validity*,” meaning that a well-written case study, based on empirical research into an organisation, represents a real story to which most researchers can relate, especially in the case of well-known organisations:

*“The case study is well suited for identifying black swans, because of its in-depth approach: what appears to be white often turns out on closer examination to be black, (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 224).*

### **4.3 Data collection**

*“Sampling is a major problem for any kind of research. We can’t study every case of whatever we’re interested in, nor should we want to... We need the sample to persuade people that we know something about the whole class”, (Becker, 1998: 67).*

Sampling is not a simple matter even for quantitative researchers. Traditionally, within experimental hypothesis testing, studies rely on statistical sampling, in which researchers randomly select the sample from the population, (Pettigrew, 1988). While cases may be chosen randomly, random selection is neither necessary, nor even

preferable, (Eisenhardt, 1989). Given the limited number of cases that can usually be studied, it makes sense to choose cases of demonstrable interest that are transparently observable. Stake (1995) recommended that the selection of case study sites offers the opportunity to maximise what can be learned, knowing that time is limited. Hence, cases that are selected should be easy and willing subjects. A good instrumental case does not have to defend its typicality. The involvement of Manchester City and Tottenham Hotspur in stadium-led regeneration projects presents unique opportunities to research the concepts of stakeholder theory in these complex real-life contexts. Purposive sampling allows cases to be chosen because they illustrate features and processes of interest, (Silverman, 2010). Pettigrew (1990) accepted that a mix of forethought, intention and chance opportunism can play their part in site selection, but also that access to a highly visible case and publication of significant results about an elite institution can have significant positive knock-on effects [for researchers]:

*“There is an intentional or design component in the process of choosing and gaining access to research sites, but the practicalities of the process are best characterised by the phrase ‘planned opportunism’”, (Pettigrew, 1990: 274)*

The regeneration schemes that are taking place in East Manchester and Tottenham also need to be placed in a wider context to understand how stakeholder dynamics have developed. Following the guidelines for “*purposeful sampling*” in choosing respondents, (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), a snowball technique was used, asking individuals for recommendations of others who could provide relevant information for

the study. It follows from the above that not all of the individuals or organisations that were involved in this research were identified at the start of the process. In this research, the goal was to understand each of the case sites individually and in as much depth as possible. So it made sense to take advantage of new data collection opportunities as they arose in order to improve the research, (Eisenhardt, 1989). Stakeholders, both individuals and groups, were chosen who could provide the most information about their involvement with the stadium-led regeneration at both sites. The stakeholders included employees and representatives of the football clubs, local residents, owners of local businesses, councillors, police, community groups, and football club supporters. Thus, the research includes stakeholders as groups as well as individuals. At the two research sites, the local council and the football clubs were considered focal stakeholders, involved in managing the process, but with their own goals as stakeholders.

All individuals participated in the research on the basis of anonymity, although some spoke publicly and on the record to various media formats. It can be seen that the process was iterative, involving the collection of data; analysis of the data and locating new informants or secondary data on the basis of information deemed important by previous respondents. The data was collected in four ways: by semi-structured interviews; a small number of questionnaires; participant observation; and from secondary material. Tables 4.1 to 4.3 display a detailed list of original data sources used in this thesis. A research diary and reflexive notes of the research process were made wherever possible, in order to allow some early overlap between the data collection and data analysis stages. The iterative process was assisted by

transcribing and reflecting on the interview transcripts, which also started to give an early indication of repetition of ideas and concepts, eventually reaching a point where no new themes emerged. That is, no new or relevant information was emerging in relation to the main themes of the research and the same ideas would regularly be repeated.

It needs to be made clear that prior to the start of this research, the author had not previously met any of the individuals interviewed or had a direct relationship with any of the organisations at which participant observation took place, with the exception of two Manchester City supporters known to the author. The author has been a supporter of Manchester City F.C. for over forty years and attends approximately ten games per season. Interviews were used as the main source of data on the stakeholder's perspectives on their roles in the stadium-led regeneration process, with the participant observation providing a means of gaining additional perspectives among respondents and as another level of cross-checking. Some individuals that were interviewed took part in meetings in which the researcher was a participant observer and were mentioned in secondary material. This provided a further level of understanding of the process and demonstrates the iterative nature of the research.

#### **4.3.1 Ethics**

*“The moral principles governing or influencing conduct”*, (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2011)

Applied to research, ethics can be defined as the application of moral principles “...*in planning, conducting and reporting the results of research studies. The fundamental moral standards involved focus on what is right and what is wrong*”, (McNab, 2002: 36, quoted in Myers, 2013: 49). In getting closer to a concise, working definition for this research “...*respect and protection for the people actively consenting to be studied*”, (Payne & Payne, 2004:66, quoted in Myers, 2013: 49) can best summarise the approach taken in this research.

Informed consent is one of the most important ethical principals in qualitative research. Informed consent means that potential informants should, as far as possible: “...*be enabled freely to give their informed consent to participate, and advised that they can terminate their involvement for any reason, at any time*”, (Payne & Payne, 2004: 68). To this end all respondents that were interviewed were provided with an information sheet about the research and consent form. These documents explained the nature of the research, that information provided would only be used anonymously, that confidentiality and anonymity would be protected. Electronic copies of documents were password protected and respondents have the right to withdraw from the study at any time. Contact details were provided for the author and the first supervising academic.

At the start of any form of participant observation and other forms of fieldwork (such as planning consultations), all individuals and groups were told what the author was doing, a summary of the reasons for the research and what would be done with the findings. At regular meetings of groups that the author had previously attended, the

same process was carried out as there were frequently new people attending. In these meetings it was customary for each individual to introduce themselves at the start, thus allowing explanations to be provided. To that extent, informed consent in these situations was a fluid process that required constant monitoring rather than a pre-research agreement which precluded further thought, (Gray, 2014). People were informed that the findings would be presented anonymously and no individuals would be named in order to preserve confidentiality. This constraint did not apply to secondary data that was in the public domain. The author undertook to do all the transcription. Further questions about the research were frequently asked by participants at meetings as there was a significant amount of interest in the research, but nobody objected to the author's presence or role.

Silverman (2010) points out that one aspect of ethical practice is thinking through what your research can offer participants (see below for reciprocal actions related to this research). By doing this, the researcher is more likely to obtain research access. The end result is that good ethical practice can result in better research. For example, an offer to send copies of any articles resulting from the thesis to one of the employees of Manchester City FC resulted in a further reciprocal offer of a tour around the new *Etihad Campus* training facility shortly after it had opened.

While it may be possible to agree on some general principles, in practice there can be many ethical dilemmas and one of the central challenges for qualitative researchers is the open-ended contingencies inherent in this type of study. Survey researchers have an easier job with this because the survey questions are designed in advance and

clearly demarcate the boundaries of the project. In contrast, qualitative research moves in unpredictable ways; an activist at a meeting may propose jumping over the wall of a football ground and digging up the pitch, potentially leading to the commission of a range of civil and criminal offences. Therefore, no matter how well general ethical issues are set out, there will always be individual circumstances that require good judgement from the researcher. Pettigrew (1990: 278) points out that research can be a social process not just a technical task and that it is not possible when working with people over a long period of time to play the role of the “*brusque detached scientist*”.

It is also of great assistance to be able to talk through potential ethical issues, if possible in advance, with experienced and understanding supervisors, which is illustrated with one final example. The author was invited by a community group to attend to take notes at the organisation’s meeting with Tottenham Hotspur FC at their ground, but was concerned this might in some way compromise his neutrality. On talking this through with a supervisor, it became clear that the most appropriate way to deal with the issue was just to inform those attending, at the start of the meeting, of the author’s status and to try to record what occurred neutrally. Nobody objected to the author’s presence at the meeting. Ultimately, perhaps the golden rule of ethics is to do to others as you would have them do to you.

#### **4.3.2 Original data collection and reciprocity**

A potential limitation of some data collection methods is that you can only study a small group, or one organisation at a time. Hence, the domain of analysis can be

somewhat limited and the topics narrow. However, this research involved attendance at regular meetings of diverse groups in East Manchester and Tottenham, rather than total immersion into a single small group. Further, within focal organisations and community groups many individuals held disparate and diverse views on the stadium-led regeneration proposals.

Managing the degree of involvement with the research site is a crucial issue for individuals carrying out field research (Pettigrew, 1990). This was particularly the case in Tottenham, where the author attended over thirty meetings of different community groups, not all of which are listed due to relevance. This part of the research was at least partly ethnographic, to the extent that it allowed the researcher to become immersed in the parts of the everyday life of the people being observed, (Van Maanen, 1995).

An unanticipated, but perhaps not surprising outcome of the increased ethnographic involvement was some identification with personal issues being raised by individuals from the local communities. For example, it was hard not to feel an emotional involvement when at a public meeting a mother and daughter asked a local councillor through tears why their home and business might be demolished to make way for a new stadium walkway. It was sometimes difficult to resist the temptation to get involved with some exciting ideas. At one of the first meetings at which the author attended, one of the participants suggested “*let’s go over the wall of the football club and dig up the pitch*”. This immediately seemed to the researcher to be both an exciting idea and something that would add interest to the research narrative. At the

time, it was difficult for the researcher to refrain from agreeing with this idea. This example suggests that the respondent did not feel restrained by the author's presence in the group and his presence had to a large extent been accepted.

*“Infiltration constitutes a key skill in doing fieldwork, especially if the fieldwork involves a prolonged immersion in the life of a group, community or organisation. Fieldwork is a craft requiring both tenacity of purpose and competence in a number of social skills,”* (Punch, 1986: 16).

Within stakeholder theory there is a view that stakeholder obligations are typically reciprocal in nature, (e.g. Fassin, 2012; Phillips, 2003, based on the work of Rawls, 1971). Pettigrew (1990) supports the idea that, more generally, research is a reciprocal activity and describes it as a guiding factor in his group's work. With the participant observation method, the concept of reciprocity is important, but can also be complex. Myers (2013) suggests that it is incumbent upon the researcher to provide something in return for the time and knowledge received from the people. However, as Wolcott (2005) points out, there is an art to gift giving:

*“Field work entails a subtle kind of exchange, one that often involves gifting across cultural boundaries where exchange rates may be ambiguous or one wonders what to offer in exchange for intangibles such as hospitality or a personal life history,”* (Wolcott, 2005: 106, quoted in Myers, 2013: 142).

In this research, the author provided copies of publicly available material that was relevant for some of the work of community groups in Tottenham and of which he was aware. The author also assisted in drafting a number of documents that were submitted by community groups to public bodies as a part of various consultation processes. For example, during the period of the research, the Regeneration Committee of the London Assembly carried out its own investigation in to stadium-led regeneration, which resulted in its findings being published in *The Regeneration Game* (2015). The author assisted in drafting a response that was submitted by the *Our Tottenham* network to the Regeneration Committee. The author has also undertaken to provide a copy of the thesis to an executive at Manchester City FC.

This type of reciprocity can raise further issues of not merely bias, but ‘*going native*’, in which a researcher gets so close to the subject matter under study that it becomes impossible to maintain a balanced, academic perspective. Although accepting some researcher involvement in such in-depth research, Pettigrew (1990) equally stresses the need not to get over-involved. Maintaining a balanced position is clearly important in any form of research and it is important to be aware of any bias or emotion with this type of study. In this research, two main techniques were used to prevent over-involvement. Firstly, critical self-reflection related to examples of events such as detailed above, in which previous work as a solicitor assessing evidence was of assistance. Secondly, there were regular discussions with academic staff to prevent taking a narrow viewpoint, (Schouten and McAlexander, 1995).

During observed meetings, detailed notes of events and of what was said were written at the time, whenever possible; these included reflexive notes related to views and feelings at the meetings. Self-reflexive criticality is strengthened through repetitive checks of the researcher's interpretations, (Whittemore *et al.*, 2001). It was only on rare occasions that it was not possible to make notes during meetings and when this happened notes were made immediately afterwards on the journey home by public transport. The reflexive notes were made in the same notepad and separated when typed-up. As most of these meetings took place in the evenings, these notes were generally typed-up the next day in order to preserve as much detail as possible. They were also checked, where there were any doubts, with participants that attended the meetings.

Myers states (2013: 148) that the main advantage of fieldwork is that it enables an in-depth understanding of the attitudes, beliefs, values, norms and practices of the social group or organisation being studied. It is the best way to get an understanding of social situations from the inside. Different versions of reality have to be sought and listened to, which gives the researcher the privilege and benefit of listening to all sides of the drama. With that privilege comes the scientific and ethical responsibility to present all significant views before offering the researcher's perspective, (Pettigrew, 1990).

The data obtained from this method was of great value in providing rich detail that provided an additional dimension to the understanding of stakeholder involvement in stadium-led regeneration.

### 4.3.3 Interviews

*“Qualitative interviews are like night goggles... permitting us to see that which is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is looked at but seldom seen,”* (Rubin & Rubin, 2005: vii).

The advantages of conducting semi-structured interviews are that researchers are able to gain a better understanding of context, facilitate the understanding of the motivating rationales behind behaviours and actions and give a better appreciation of the meanings that a respondent may attach to a particular issue, (Easterby-Smith *et al.*, 2008). Silverman (2010: 123) has pointed out the centrality of interviews in a great deal of social research and in mass media products, from talk show confessionals to celebrity interviews. He puts forward the idea that we live in what might be termed an “*interview society*” in which interviews seem central to making sense of our lives.

Interviews can provide depth, subtlety and personal feeling. They can be a highly efficient way to gather rich, empirical data, especially in complex real-life situations. However, interviews may also be staged occasions when feeling and evocation is high and factual detail low, (Pettigrew, 1990: 277). A key approach to mitigate the challenges of bias in interview data is by working with numerous and, wherever possible, knowledgeable informants who view the phenomena under investigation from diverse perspectives. These informants can include people from different hierarchical levels, functional areas, groups and geographies. It is unlikely that all these varied informants will engage in convergent retrospective sense-making and/or impression management, (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). From Tables 4.1 to 4.3, it

can be seen that a diverse group of individuals were interviewed using the snowball method together with a number of completed questionnaires, and a range of meetings attended as a participant observer.

As a central part of the research, 26 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with multiple stakeholders involved at various levels of the two stadium-led regeneration projects, as set out in Table 4.1. The interviews were one-to-one and each lasted between 15 – 90 minutes. A short interview guide that contained the main research questions in order to ensure that the main issues and areas of interest were covered (see Appendix 1 and 2). The interview questions related to involvement in the regeneration process, views about stadium-led regeneration, observations on other organisations or individuals involved in the process, perceptions of influence and likely outcomes. The questions were open-ended and the respondents were encouraged to talk as much as they wanted, even when this strayed away from the starting point. It was always possible to bring the respondent back to the next question on the interview guide. This approach allowed the interviewee to feel comfortable and more prepared to open up to provide greater disclosure around the issues. It also allowed the discussions to cover wide areas, but provided consistency and focus by using the same original questions. From the perspective of qualitative research, the more interesting the story, the better it is, so long as it does not become fictional, (Myers, 2013: 119).

Using purposive sampling demands critical thought about the parameters of the population under study. From the outset of the research design, it was important to be

able to work with a diverse group of stakeholders that represented different groups involved in the stadium-led regeneration at the two sites. This was necessary to obtain the rich detail and for the validity of the study. No further interviews were undertaken once it was felt that no new insights were being gained from interviews. This issue was also discussed and agreed with academic staff.

The interviews were recorded on a digital voice-recorder with the permission of the interviewees. One interviewee found the device slightly off-putting after about five minutes, so it was turned off and notes made of the interview. Transcripts of the interviews were produced by the author as soon as possible after the interviews (generally within 3 days) and sent to all of the interviewees to check the accuracy of their responses in word and in meaning. This process proved helpful for fact-checking and also to elicit further information. Although no formal coding was carried out at this stage, the process of transcribing and discussing the interviews with informants in some cases did informally start the process of data analysis. It involved a process of thinking about the interview questions, about the informant's responses and some of the themes that started to recur.

**Table 4.1 Semi-structured interviews in chronological order**

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Position and organisation</b>
A	26.09.12	Photographer and writer, Manchester
B	03.10.12	Former chairman of professional football club
C	18.10.12	Researcher, University of Manchester
D	18.10.12	Manchester City Council consultation employee
E	01.11.12	Researcher, University of Manchester
F	19.03.13	Executive, Manchester City FC
G	20.03.13	Writer and historian, Manchester
H	21.03.13	Employee, construction site at Etihad Campus, East Manchester.
I	14.05.13	Member of Parliament
J	28.05.13	Executive, Manchester City FC
K	04.07.13	Education consultant, Tottenham
L	23.07.13	Resident and business owner, Tottenham
M	27.07.13	Supporter of MCFC and former resident of Tottenham
N	13.08.13	Local councillor, London borough of Haringey
P	15.08.13	Local councillor, London borough of Haringey
Q	21.08.13	Local resident and community activist, Tottenham
R	10.09.13	Local councillor, London borough of Haringey
S	10.09.13	Local councillor, London borough of Haringey
T	12.09.13	Parliamentary assistant
U	16.09.13	Supporter of THFC and Journalist

V	08.10.13	Local business owner, Tottenham
W	08.10.13	Local business owner, Tottenham
X	18.10.13	Local resident and business owner, Tottenham
Y	07.11.13	Executive of community sport trust
Z	03.02.14	Supporter of MCFC
AA	04.02.14	Supporter of MCFC

#### **4.3.4 Self-completed questionnaires**

Due to constraints of time and availability, it was not possible to arrange to interview three participants, but who did agree to complete questionnaires. The author had various forms of communication with these three respondents, so they were aware in advance of the nature of the research. The questionnaires were sent and returned by email, which allowed further information to be provided about the research, including ethical issues. One of the considerable advantages of questionnaires is their convenience and ease of completion for those providing answers, as was the case for the three individuals who completed them for this research. The questionnaires were modified versions of the guide used for the semi-structured interviews (Appendix 1 and 2) and therefore consisted of a short series of open-ended questions. Further advantages of questionnaires include use of standardised questions, which were comparable to those discussed in face-to-face interviews. Some of the disadvantages of a survey strategy such as low response rates and over-long questionnaires were not relevant in this research. It was also possible to confirm that the questions did not

mislead the respondents by comparing their answers with those who were interviewed.

It is suggested that questionnaires may not be the best instrument to gain understanding of complex issues or social processes, (Saunders, 2012). This research is trying to understand such complexities and it is accepted that the answers provided through the questionnaires were not as long or detailed as the responses gained in face-to-face interviews. Nonetheless, perhaps due to the fact that the questions posed were open-ended, the answers from those who completed the questionnaires provided further useful insights and comments from the respondents have been used in the Results chapters. The answers were analysed in the same way as other qualitative data rather than being treated in any way differently. In all of the circumstances outlined above, it was felt that the questionnaires were a valid and reliable form to enable data to be obtained.

**Table 4.2 Self-completed questionnaires in chronological order**

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Position and organisation</b>
AQ	05.06.13	Local business owner, East Manchester
BQ	18.06.13	Police Officer, East Manchester
CQ	18.08.14	Local resident, Tottenham

#### **4.3.5 Participant observations**

*“Fieldwork is a form of enquiry in which one is immersed personally in the ongoing social activities of some individual or group for the purposes of*

*research. Fieldwork is characterised by personal involvement to achieve some level of understanding that will be shared by others,”* (Wolcott, 2005: 44, quoted in Myers, 2013: 136).

The proposition from Wolcott (2005) is that fieldworkers should participate more, and play the role of the aloof observer less. He advises against thinking of oneself as needing to wear a white lab coat and carry a clipboard to study human behaviour; rather, a fieldworker should genuinely participate and engage with people. Additional comparative material for this study was obtained from participant observations in meetings related to the two developments. Participant observation in this form can involve social interaction in the field with subjects, direct observation of relevant events, formal and informal interviewing, some counting, collection of documents and flexibility in the direction the study takes, (McCall & Simmons, 1969:1, in Gephart, 2004: 458). The researcher’s identity as a researcher and research purpose is made clear to all concerned. In this role, the researcher can both take part and observe in activities of groups. Indeed participant observation implies: *“immersion by the researcher in the research setting, with the objective of sharing in peoples’ lives while attempting to learn their symbolic worlds”*, (Delbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1994: 37, quoted in Saunders *et al.*, 2012: 342). For this research it was vital to understand the stakeholder’s worlds from their perspective in order to try to answer the key research questions concerning their involvement in the stadium-led regeneration projects.

The overall goal of this method was to gather qualitative data about the social world within community groups involved in stadium-led regeneration processes by

interacting with people and observing them in their own setting. Participant observation enabled the author to talk and interact with people in order to gain an understanding of their beliefs and activities from the inside.

As set out in Table 4.3, participant observations in this research have included meetings of Haringey council; planning consultations in Tottenham and Manchester; public meetings of community groups, conferences and demonstrations. They have also included private and quasi-private meetings between Manchester City FC and local residents; Manchester City FC and local businesses; Tottenham Hotspur FC and a range of community group meetings in Tottenham. Apart from public meetings, such as those of the local council, the participation was overt and all groups were informed of the author's background and nature of the research.

Direct observation provides access to group processes and can confront the researcher with discrepancies between what people have said in interview and casual conversations, and what they actually do. For example, within community meetings there were sometimes discrepancies between the people that stated their intention to turn up at future events such as further meetings and those that did actually attend. Such observations can also be used to uncover the patterns of interaction that create more or less shared meanings, (Bartunek and Seo, 2002).

**Table 4.3 Participant observations in chronological order**

<b>No.</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Organisation and location</b>
1	18.10.12	16.00 – 17.00	Planning consultation, East Manchester
2	09.05.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
3	14.05.13	10.30 – 11.30	Planning consultation, Tottenham
4	22.05.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
5	04.06.13	12.30 – 14.30	MCFC Business Forum, East Manchester
6	05.06.13	19.00 – 21.00	Community group, Tottenham
7	19.06.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
8	03.07.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
9	04.07.13	18.00 – 20.00	THFC / community group, Tottenham
10	06.07.13	11.00 – 12.30	Street assembly, Tottenham
11	15.07.13	18.00 – 19.00	Street rally, outside Haringey Council meeting
12	15.07.03	19.00 – 20.30	Meeting of Haringey Council full cabinet
13	18.07.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
14	31.07.13	18.00 – 20.00	Business group, Tottenham
15	08.08.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
16	28.08.13	12.00 – 13.00	THFC ‘fun day’
17	03.09.13	17.30 – 19.00	MCFC Residents Forum, East Manchester
18	08.10.13	18.00 – 21.00	Business group, Tottenham
19	21.11.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
20	10.12.13	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
21	01.02.14	10.00 – 15.00	Community conference, Tottenham

22	03.04.14	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
23	24.04.14	18.30 – 21.00	Community group, Tottenham
24	20.05.14	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
25	17.07.14	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
26	06.12.14	13.30 – 14.30	THFC v CPFC community street assembly
27	06.08.15	19.00 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
28	03.09.15	18.30 – 20.30	Community group, Tottenham
29	18.10.15	15.00 – 17.00	Community group, Tottenham
30	16.12.15	19.00 – 22.30	Haringey Council Planning sub-committee

#### 4.3.6 Secondary material and triangulation

*“The process of compiling research material based on multi-methods is useful whether there is convergence or not. Where there is convergence, confidence in the results grows considerably. Findings are no longer attributable to a method artefact. However, where divergent results emerge, alternative, and likely more complex, explanations are generated”*, (Jick, 1979).

In this research, data from interviews and participant observation was triangulated with secondary data from a number of different sources, which included planning documents, newspaper reports, webcasts of local authority meetings, company annual reports, corporate communications, community publications and material from various social media formats such as on-line forums and blogs. The secondary data sources were used to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify limitations of the primary data. They also allowed for a richer picture than could be obtained from

interviews and participant observation alone, (Myers, 2013). Although time was spent evaluating secondary sources in terms of their reliability and bias, ultimately they were analysed and coded using the same methods as for the primary data sources and as set out below. Saunders (2012) refers to the advantage that secondary data can provide through being an unobtrusive measure, because it has already been collected.

Denzin (1970: 291) defined triangulation as “*the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon*”. A triangulated methodology is used to gather different types of data which can be used as cross checks. The aim of the triangulated approach is to draw on the particular and different strengths of various data collection methods, (Pettigrew, 1990). Similarly, for Myers (2013), triangulation is the concept that you should do more than one thing in a study by combining research methods. Triangulation allows the researcher to analyse the same topic from different angles and effectively allows you to get a fuller picture.

With data triangulation, potential problems with construct validity can be addressed because the multiple sources of evidence can provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon, (Yin 2009, pp116). Generally, the use of complementary methods is considered to improve both internal reliability and external validity, (Jick, 1979). On a simple level, it also provides evidence for details that people sometimes have difficulty remembering such as dates or figures and can often reflect the culture within an organisation, (Darke *et al.*, 1998: 283).

In this study, the triangulation of interview data with secondary data sources offered a richer understanding of respondent viewpoints and is an important aspect in order to enhance the breadth and depth of the findings, (Denzin, 1970). It also allowed for a more detailed understanding of the context at both of the research sites.

#### **4.4 Data analysis and presentation**

*“... moving from shapeless spaghetti toward some kind of theoretical understanding that does not betray the richness, dynamism, and complexity of the data but that is understandable and potentially useful to others”, (Langley, 1999: 694)*

Qualitative studies have a quality of undeniability because words have a more concrete and vivid flavour that is more convincing to the reader than pages of numbers, however, qualitative analysis has been criticised for being lacking in methodological rigour, prone to researcher subjectivity and based on small cases or limited evidence, (Gray, 2014). A further issue is the extent to which data should be analysed. As Strauss and Corbin (1998) point out, some researchers believe that the data should not be analysed at all, but should merely be presented. Other researchers are more concerned with theory building, interpreting the data to build concepts and categories that can be brought together into theoretical frameworks

This research produced a large amount of data in different formats, including interview transcripts, reflexive notes from participant observations, photographs, audio files and secondary data in a variety of formats. In order to assist in the

movement from the “*shapeless spaghetti*” towards theoretical understanding, computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) was utilised. The NVivo software programme was used for this purpose, which made the process of storing, coding, retrieving and analysing the data from the various sources much quicker and simpler than working with physical documents. Throughout this process there was no intention to transform the qualitative research into an automated analysis of the text. It assisted in making sense of the “*captured complexities*” of the real world, (Pettigrew, 1990: 281).

The over-arching purposes of the data analysis were three-fold. Firstly, and most importantly, to answer the research question as to how stakeholders influenced stadium-led regeneration. Secondly, to produce a detailed “*thick*” narrative from the perspectives of the different stakeholders of their relationship to the stadium-led regeneration in their area. And, thirdly, to make the narrative trustworthy by making it clear from where, and how, the analysis has been developed. This is especially important where there is a voluminous amount of data obtained through a range of research methods. The NVivo software programme allowed for quick reference to similar concepts, enabled analysis into smaller groups of themes and collection of representative samples across the various types of data. The coding was an iterative process that started once the majority of the interviews and participant observations had been completed. The framework for stakeholder involvement emerged through the recognition of patterns of relationships among constructs within and across the two cases and their underlying logical arguments, (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

The analysis started by identifying relevant concepts in the data, using the language of the respondents, and grouping direct quotations under different categories. Van Maanen (1979) calls these first order concepts the “*facts*” of an investigation. In this research, this involved concepts linked to stakeholder’s views as expressed in interviews with the researcher and in meetings at which the researcher attended as a participant observer. ‘*Power*’, ‘*legitimacy*’ and ‘*urgency*’ provided starting points for the research from the literature and the definitions advanced by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) were initially utilised to operationalise these concepts, although more complex relationships did emerge and these are set out in the results and discussion chapters.

Numerous other concepts related to how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration began to emerge at this stage. Subsequently, the concepts most widely supported with quotations were linked together within categories in order to establish their relationships. Van Maanen (1979) refers to these secondary concepts as the “*theories*” that are used to organize and explain the “*facts*”. In this case twelve concepts became clearly linked. They represent what can be called “*interpretations of interpretations*”, (Van Maanen, 1979: 541). The twelve concepts were linked together under an umbrella of three aggregate categories that make up the emergent framework to understand the process of how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration developments. The framework that sets out the concepts is produced at Figure 5.1 in the Results and Analysis at page 158. Chapter 5, under the overarching theme of Context and Triggers for Stakeholder Involvement, includes results and analysis for the concepts of: consultation, engagement and participation; economic impacts; social impacts; governance and transparency; and lack of power, legitimacy

and urgency. Chapter 6, under the overarching theme of Strategies of Stakeholder Influence, includes results and analysis for the concepts of mobilisation; groups, alliances and networks; dissent and protest; and media. Chapter 7, under the overarching theme of Means of Stakeholder Influence, includes results and analysis for the concepts of power; legitimacy; and urgency.

As will be seen, the amount of data connected to each of the twelve concepts from interviews and participant observations provided considerable supporting material for the interpretations to be included in the results and analysis chapters as set out above. Data from these original sources allowed a detailed narrative to be produced around the emergent framework for discussion. Langley (1999: 708) points out that in theorising from process data, researchers should not be shy about mobilising both inductive (data-driven) approaches and deductive (theory-driven) approaches iteratively or simultaneously as inspiration guides us. There is room not only for building on existing constructs to develop new relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989) but for designing process research that selectively takes concepts from different theoretical traditions and adapts them to the data at hand, or takes ideas from the data and attaches them to theoretical perspectives, enriching those theories as it goes along. One of the purposes of the detailed methodology and results and analysis chapters is to provide a clear way to demonstrate a “*chain of evidence*” that shows how the research moved from raw data (e.g. interview recordings) to the theoretical labels and constructs that have been used to represent that data, (Pratt, 2009: 860).

*“It is important to show what was done in the research process and to articulate how research practices transformed observations into results, findings and insights”*, (Gephart, 2004: 458).

It is acknowledged that whatever strategy is used, there will always be an uncodifiable step that relies on the insight and imagination of the researcher, (Langley, 1999:707, acknowledging Weick, 1989). The volume and variety of support for the concepts included in the framework at Figure 5.1 in the form of quotations from interviews and participant observations helps to avoid the problem of “*exemplifying*” whereby a few examples are provided, but there is a failure to explain how they represent broader data or explain why they were chosen, (Gephardt, 2004: 460) and ensures there is as much “*showing*” as “*telling*”, (Pratt, 2009). The narrative also allows for a great amount of information to be included, which demonstrates detail and rich data, (Corley and Gioia, 2004).

#### **4.5 Validity and reliability**

The related issues of validity and reliability refer to the extent to which data collection methods measure what they were intended to, and the extent to which such techniques produce consistent findings, (Saunders *et al.*, 2012). Internal validity refers to whether there is compelling evidence that the researcher has achieved a strong link between the evidence and the theoretical ideas they develop from it, (Gray, 2014). In this research a range of checks were used in order to enhance the validity of the results. This included member checking by getting respondents to check transcripts of interviews in order for the accuracy of their responses in word and in meaning. This

process also proved helpful for fact-checking and also to elicit further information. Secondary material provided further sources for understanding the events and to verify discrepancies of both respondents and the researcher, (Corley and Gioia, 2004).

In using participant observation there are a number of threats to reliability and validity. Potential problems of observer error and observer biases were minimised through both immersion in the subject matter and informant verification. Through much reading around the subject matter and attendance at many meetings the researcher was able to build up a detailed knowledge of the developments and the people involved in order to minimise the likelihood of these problems. Due to the participation being overt, with people aware of the status of the researcher, it was also possible to check facts and interpretations with respondents. A potentially more problematic threat is that of observer effect, whereby the presence of the researcher can influence the behaviour of members of the group. In this research, the issue was mediated through a process of habituation from regular attendance at meetings as a participant observer, (Silverman, 2010). Gathering data from multiple sources can assist with triangulating the data, together with corroboration of reported findings across multiple respondents, (Gioia *et al.*, 2010). To verify the trustworthiness of the data analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), two separate methods were employed. Details of the coding and concepts were discussed with the research supervisor in order to consider alternative explanations for the emerging findings. Secondly, samples of the coding of the documents were reviewed by an outside researcher. Any discrepancies were discussed in order to reach agreement on how to code the concept.

External validity refers to the degree to which findings can be generalised to other social or organisational settings. As noted above, this can be difficult to achieve in qualitative research due to the rich details from the case studies and small samples. Lincoln and Guba (1985) distinguish between two kinds of generalization. The first is nomothetic, based upon a rationalistic, law-like stance, as in the positivist stance. The second is termed ‘naturalistic generalization’, which is a more intuitive, ideographic but none the less, an empirical approach based upon personal, direct experience. Lincoln and Guba (1985) dismiss the notion of nomothetic generalizations that are truly universal to all situations. Although it is always potentially problematic to argue for extensions from case studies, some sites may have features or processes that will share commonalities with other domains, (Corley and Gioia (2004: 205). Some specific characteristics of the two sites in this investigation might differ, but many of the features and processes of the stadium-led regeneration developments would be applicable to other locales as well. For example, the form of consultation and local community reactions in Brentford, where the local football team have recently been granted planning permission to build a new stadium, can be compared to those in Tottenham. The two sites, like others, share many similarities in their immediate environment, including local governance, sporting context and local communities. For that reason, there is confidence that the research is likely to have applicability beyond this particular study. External validity can also be strengthened by relating the findings from one or multiple cases back to the literature, showing that the results are theoretically feasible and/or are supported by similar empirical results, (Dooley, 2002); see discussion in chapter 8.

Reliability is the extent to which the findings of a study can be replicated. This is frequently a challenge in qualitative research that often deals with unique social settings or cases, (Gray, 2014). For practical reasons, strict external reliability for this study is unattainable due to the individual processes of negotiating access; meetings attended as a participant observer; and uniquely changing circumstances. However, it would be possible to replicate the basic research methods used in East Manchester and Tottenham at other sites in the future. For most qualitative approaches, reliability is improved, if not guaranteed, by triangulation; gathering information, as with this research, from multiple sources or by using multiple data gathering tools, (Gray, 2014).

In terms of the methodology, limitations of the study may stem from the subjectivity and biases of the researcher. A possible limitation with qualitative research that uses interview data is that respondent's memories could be susceptible to retrospective reconstruction. Van Maanen (1979) examined a series of ways in which a researcher could be deliberately or inadvertently misled when carrying out fieldwork. The first can occur because informants want to mislead a researcher for their own reasons and this can include by evasion. For example, in Tottenham, a series of posters using the Spurs logo (a cockerel) that strongly objected to the stadium development were put up in the area around the football ground. Members of one particular community group always denied being responsible for putting up these posters despite what appeared to be knowing looks being exchanged at a number of meetings that the author attended. At one point in the meeting the club's representatives expressed their displeasure at

what they saw as the mis-use of their intellectual property, so there may have been good reasons for any individual present to deny any links to the posters.

The second way in which this can happen is when informants are wrong or mis-informed about an issue. For example, in East Manchester, one local resident that lived on the estate opposite the football ground remained insistent that her house was in danger from further expansion by the football club, despite repeated assurances that no such plans existed. Although this scenario does provides additional data to understand how football clubs are perceived by some local stakeholders. Thirdly, informants may be completely unaware of the background that underlies many of their own activities. For example, in Tottenham, some of the football club's supporters, perhaps due to the lack of specific information communicated by the football club, were unaware of many of issues surrounding the building of the new stadium, but willing to comment on them in local media. Indeed, there were always a lot of rumours about the stadium project, which many people would repeat as being true, but most of which later proved to be unfounded. Limitations of this study and the potential for further research that includes the increasing numbers of stadium-led regeneration projects will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

## **Chapter 5: Results and analysis: context and triggers for stakeholder involvement**

### **5.1 The stakeholder influence framework**

This chapter and the following two chapters provide supporting evidence for each of the twelve concepts devolved from the data analysis and presented in the results section as part of the framework for understanding the process of how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration, as set out in Figure 5.1. The concepts are drawn together under three overarching themes of: Context and Triggers for Stakeholder Involvement; Strategies of Stakeholder Influence; and Means of Stakeholder Influence. The results, in the form of quotes from interviews and participant observations, evidence how the concepts and overarching themes evolved from the data. The concepts and overarching themes were linked to produce the emergent framework to answer the central question of the thesis as to how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration. In this research, the data provided both details to support the framework concepts and a rich source of material that provided a narrative as to how stakeholders engaged with the stadium-led regeneration at both of the sites.

The interviews and participant observations carried out for the research yielded a great deal of data related to how stakeholders try to influence stadium-led regeneration projects, but much of it could not be categorised using the Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) model. It became clear from the data analysis that while some of the data supported the model, another substantial part of the data fell outside that typology. It


was too parsimonious to adequately explain the complex array of contexts, triggers, strategies and influences that took place during the stadium-led regeneration. Much more was going on underneath the means to influence focal stakeholders and therefore a more complete model has been created that sets out the context and triggers for stakeholder involvement and strategies of stakeholder influence. Thus, the framework developed from the results and data analysis presents all of the twelve concepts most strongly linked with influence on stadium-led regeneration.

This chapter, under the overarching theme of Context and Triggers for Stakeholder Involvement, includes results and analysis for the concepts of: consultation, engagement and participation; economic impacts; social and community impacts; governance and transparency; and lack of power, legitimacy and urgency. Chapter 6, under the overarching theme of Strategies of Stakeholder Influence, includes results and analysis for the concepts of mobilisation; groups, alliances and networks; dissent and protest; and media. Chapter 7, under the overarching theme of Means of Stakeholder Influence, includes results and analysis for the concepts of power; legitimacy; and urgency.

The data analysis involved understanding a range of concepts that emerged from the original research, through the language that was used in interviews and participant observations at the two sites, together with secondary documents. NVivo software was used to assist with the analysis of the large amount of original data and secondary documents that were collected. In using the software programme, there was no intention to transform the qualitative research into an automated analysis of the text.

Figure 5.1 provides the high-level graphic representation of the concepts identified in the final stage of the data analysis and summarises the three-stage process of stakeholder influence on stadium-led regeneration that emerged from the data. Thus the process of stakeholder influence emerged through the recognition of patterns of relationships among constructs within and across the two cases, (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

**Figure 5.1 Stakeholder influence framework**



During the first stage of the analysis, quotations from interviews and participant observations were grouped into a large number of emerging concepts. There were a total of 51 individual concepts opened-up as nodes within the data analysis software. For example, concepts such as consultation and participation; economic and social impacts; dissent and protest; and lack of power, legitimacy and urgency were strongly supported at this initial stage of analysis. These concepts were also supported by secondary sources such as newspapers, websites, social media forums, etc. During the second stage of the data analysis the twelve concepts that were most widely supported and relevant to the overall research question were analysed in order to try to establish the relationships between them in order to answer how stakeholders gained salience to influence stadium-led regeneration. This stage of the analysis was closely linked to the third stage where, having established links between the twelve concepts, they were brought together under three overarching themes to produce the framework, which set out the process of influence at the stadium-led regeneration sites in East Manchester and Tottenham. All twelve concepts were found to be important at both sites, but some, such as dissent and protest, and urgency played different roles. These issues are discussed in more detail below and in the following chapters.

## **5.2 Context and triggers for stakeholder involvement**

At the outset it is important to set out the context at the two research sites, some of which emerged from the data analysis. Differences in the approaches of the various stakeholders in East Manchester and Tottenham are discernible in-part due to the history and stages at which the regeneration progressed at the two sites, but also the forums that were available to stakeholders to participate in the developments. The

geography of the two sites is also different, with much of the development in East Manchester built on remediated industrial land that included a former chemical works, while in Tottenham the new stadium and other associated projects were planned for a densely populated urban area. In East Manchester, the building of the Etihad Campus and linked developments was just the latest stage in a process begun over a decade previously with the New Deal for Communities and then the construction of the City of Manchester Stadium in 2002. There was a stated aim at the outset to try to involve the local community throughout the decision-making process, (Misener and Mason, 2009).

In Tottenham, although planning permission had originally been granted by Haringey Council in 2010, assembly of the land on which the stadium would be built was only completed in 2015, due to a number of legal complications. In February 2012, Haringey Council produced an “*area-wide regeneration master plan*” that included the demolition of property in the Tottenham High Road West area, to be replaced with new flats, houses, shops, cafes, a library and a proposed cinema. Much of High Road West is adjacent to the existing football ground. Although launched with the usual caveats concerning consultation, the new stadium and the wider development proposals soon became the focus of dissent, protest and controversy in the local community. It will be argued that the approach of the focal organisations in East Manchester and Tottenham, in the main the local councils and the football clubs, had significant impacts on the way that stakeholders became involved and tried to exert influence on the stadium-led regeneration process.

Five separate concepts were found to make up the overarching theme of Context and Triggers for Stakeholder Involvement: consultation, engagement and participation; economic impacts; social impacts; governance and transparency; and lack of power, legitimacy and urgency. It is argued throughout the analysis that the contexts of East Manchester and Tottenham are important to the results. They provided some major similarities, together with some obvious differences. For example, both of the developments included improvements to local transport services that involved the building of new or re-developed stations (tram stations in East Manchester and a train station in Tottenham) and name changes connected to the football clubs of stations and local roads. It should be made clear that much of the infra-structure improvements were not paid for by the football clubs, but through a range of public funding bodies that included the local council. There were also plans to build large ‘walkways’ at each of the sites. In East Manchester, the walkway was largely uncontroversial since it would be built over a very busy junction to link the existing stadium and the new campus. It did not involve any major demolition and was paid for and built by the football club. In Tottenham, the similarity ended with it being a walkway over a busy road. This was an example where strong views were frequently asserted about local levels of consultation, engagement and participation, as will be seen below.

### **5.3 Consultation, engagement and participation**

*“They don’t understand that consultation doesn’t mean telling people what you’ve done after you’ve decided to do it”, (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13).*

The context for the consultation, engagement and participation of the local population, and divergent approaches to these issues in East Manchester and Tottenham, began to emerge at early stages of the regeneration process at these sites. East Manchester had been involved in stadium-led regeneration since 2000, a period that coincided with the New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme for local neighbourhoods and planning for the building of the City of Manchester Stadium (as it was then known). The NDC programme was designed to involve local communities at all levels and therefore residents and community forums were set up for consultation, engagement and genuine participation. This is not to suggest that the involvement of the community was absolute, but as an example of the participation, the NDC Board had a total membership of twelve, half of whom were residents elected through the Resident's Form, while another resident, the Voluntary Sector Consortium, chaired the Board, (Community Engagement, 2008). The Resident's Forum comprised of residents' associations in the area.

*“In East Manchester the New Deal for Communities was significantly successful. In some areas it worked negatively. East Manchester seemed to get the balance right. Sean McGonigle; the choice of him was significant and he was able to motivate and inspire key neighbourhood figures”, (A, photographer and writer, Manchester, interview with author, 26.09.12).*

Examples of consultation and engagement were not difficult to find in East Manchester. Indeed there was some evidence that the sheer amount of consultations and engagement over a period of over fifteen years led to a resigned air towards

participation in them, with one interviewee referring to the people as having been “*consulted-out*”.

“*Some individuals and groups have participated to start off with, but later dropped out due to the length of time that the regeneration has been going on*”, (C, researcher, Manchester Metropolitan University, interview with author, 18/10/12).

There was some personal anecdotal evidence of the phenomenon when the author attended a consultation event for developments linked with the *Etihad Campus* project at Beswick Library in East Manchester, where there were very few people in attendance. Despite being made aware of the author’s background, the person running the consultation was keen that the author completed a questionnaire, perhaps to increase participation numbers, wherever the views came from. There was also some evidence of the cynicism that can exist towards consultation exercises at another event where it was stated: “*Well I think consultations; people are very cynical about consultations*”, (local resident, East Manchester, participant observation at meeting, 03.09.13).

There appeared to be a realisation of the on-going need to work with the community by Manchester City FC that was evidenced from previous research, (e.g. Brown *et al*, 2004: 28). This involved both engagement and participation with the *Etihad Campus* development. Examples included site visits for residents groups as the *Etihad*

*Campus* building progressed, and involvement of supporters and local schools in the design of a community wall. There were also events at the existing stadium:

*“So that we get together with people in the community to talk about what we’re doing, some of the planning opportunities, some of the developments we’re talking about, the activities we undertake, the disruption we cause. You know you can’t invite 65,000 people to a concert and not cause some disruption. We try to pick those things up”*, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).

Perhaps as a reflection of the work involving the community, there was some enthusiasm expressed in East Manchester about the relationship with stakeholders from those with both direct and indirect connections with the football club.

*“I think in general we’ve got a good relationship with the local community,*  
(J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).

*“We hold regular meetings with the local residents and businesses, the feedback is generally good, MCFC and GMP work in partnership with locals to overcome issues”* (BQ, police officer, Manchester, completed questionnaire, 18.06.13).

Cynicism that was occasionally heard in East Manchester was more prevalent from people in Tottenham that were affected by the stadium-led regeneration. The quote at

the top of this section concerning the perceived meaning of consultation provides an example of the reactions of many stakeholders to the discussions that took place in Tottenham. As an example, the walkway to the busy High Road was designed to link the proposed new stadium to a substantially new train station, with a re-modelled entrance and new shops also being part of this development. The important differences with its East Manchester counterpart that provoked controversy were that: the walkway would involve the demolition of a large number of social housing units, private homes and many small retail business units opposite the planned new stadium; it would be paid for by public funds; and many people felt there had not been a legitimate consultation over what were known as the High Road West development proposals:

*“The High Road West community was never consulted over the demolition of their local shops and businesses. The recent consultation never gave an option to retain them. Only the petition gave the community the chance to have its say”*, (X, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13).

*“They didn’t ask me what I wanted, they didn’t ask my husband and all the shopkeepers in our parade. They didn’t ask them what they wanted ...”*, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

The controversy over the development plans linked to the new stadium, on which local people felt there had been little consultation, engagement of participation, began to attract national publicity with a three page article in *The Guardian*. The article

stated that Spurs stood to profit from residential development around the High Road because of the property the football club had bought in that area in recent years. It also pointed out that:

*“A council housing tower block[s] and rows of shops with people living above are to be knocked down to create a wide walkway for Spurs fans from a relocated White Hart Lane station straight to the new 56,000-seat stadium, with its shops, bars and food outlets; the council says on non-matchdays the walkway will be a ‘mini-town centre’ public space, (The Guardian, 30.10.13).*

It was through community meetings, leaflets, word of mouth and the local media that most local people eventually became aware of the main elements of the plans that were approved for the new stadium in 2012 by Haringey Council. Many were annoyed and felt disengaged by some of the details, including the council’s decision to revise the original planning agreement to reduce Tottenham Hotspur FC’s Section 106 community infrastructure payments from over £16 million to just £477,000 and release it from a 50% affordable housing requirement for property built on the existing football ground (later, further amended). These were controversial issues from which many people in Tottenham felt excluded rather than engaged or able to participate in the stadium-led regeneration process:

*“There has been no engagement with local business about the development of this regeneration plan. We have been lied to and lied to by our own elected representatives. The key decisions for this master plan were made long before*

*the consultation.*”, (Deputation of Tottenham Traders to Haringey Council meeting of 28.11.13).

In an email copied to the author, one business owner and resident complained that:

*The people that are directly affected had no knowledge of this [the consultation on development plans] until a fortnight ago, however there is a massive percentage of people that again have no idea of these plans or the opportunity to respond, so we are taking time to find them and explain the disaster that awaits them, their business and their property if these plans go ahead,* (email from L, Tottenham, 19.05.13).

There was a view held by many stakeholders that consultations carried out by Haringey Council were unrepresentative and that Tottenham Hotspur FC had a hold over the council:

*“Tottenham are basically blackmailing the council. We, my dad S, and brothers J and R built the business up from scratch and have been here for 30 years”,* (V, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 8.10.13).

Partly in response to Haringey Council’s “Plan for Tottenham”, the *Our Tottenham* network was formed early in 2013 for local people to defend community assets and participate in the changes by putting forward their own community plans (*Our*

*Tottenham* website). It started up as a network of local community organisations and during the research process over 50 groups became affiliated. The *Our Tottenham* network summarised some of the views of the groups it represented on the stadium-led regeneration proposals:

*Say no to the threats to Tottenham High Road West homes and local shops. Tell the Council their current 'consultation' is a fraud. There should be improvements not evictions and demolitions throughout the area. The council are currently consulting over their controversial and shocking latest proposals – to demolish homes and small shops in North Tottenham, (Our Tottenham website, accessed 15.05.14)*

It should be made clear that there was a wide range of views about the stadium-led regeneration. These included people who believed that the local community had the opportunities, but had not engaged sufficiently with the process:

*“So I think they should engage, in my opinion so that they can influence the outcome. That’s the situation on that. People have to engage. And hopefully, with the consultation, they’ve woken up and we can deal with ... they can now begin to engage”, (N, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 13.08.13).*

Large numbers of supporters of the football club, many of whom did not live in the area, engaged in the debate through social media forums and newspaper online

comment sections. The majority of Spurs supporters wanted the new stadium to go ahead as soon as possible and many could not understand why local people would not want the new developments with which it was connected. In truth, many writers in the comment section from the Haringey Journal on 05.07.13 (*Campaigners demand Spurs put up £100 million for renewal of community*) were not sympathetic to the local community:

*“Who are they to demand this outrageous sum, without Spurs Tottenham would be a third world area. What do you expect from a Labour Party heartland; greed, corruption and gimme, gimme, gimme lifestyle?”*

The above was typical of views expressed beneath the article that the *Our Tottenham* campaign group had demanded that Spurs match the apparent £100 million Section 106 contribution of Arsenal when they built the *Emirates Stadium*. Although there were one or two comments that were more supportive of the local community:

*“As a Spurs fan I'd like to see Spurs pump in £100 million into its area. Time to give something back to the area from which it has taken so much, as long as the money doesn't get wasted by charity bureaucrats. Spurs belongs to Tottenham more than it does to ENIC, and I'm not speaking as a resident of Tottenham”,* (Haringey Journal, 5 July 2013).

Both Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC appeared more sanguine and positive about the planned development together with the results of consultation and engagement efforts:

*“The project has the overwhelming support of the local community, 98% of which gave the proposals its whole-hearted endorsement during last year’s consultation period”, (local councillor, Haringey, the Guardian, 30 .10.14).*

*“With our planning application, we consulted fully. We received only 23 letters that were not wholly supportive and only 3 objected. It was a very good consultation exercise. We have relocated 73 businesses and residents by agreement. We, as a club, that’s how we go about it, (executive of THFC, participant observation at meeting between THFC and Our Tottenham, 04.07.13).*

Manchester City FC and Tottenham Hotspur FC described their approach to engaging with the local community in positive terms, but there were differences in how these views were expressed and the means for facilitating that communication:

*“Well we try to respect them, basically [the local community]. So for example, we have, on a monthly basis we have a community meeting. On month one it’s business community, month two it’s residential community, then it swaps around every month”, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).*

*“[It is] Useful to hear the concerns of residents, although they may not be issues that we can influence. As a club, the way we operate is to take as much*

*of the community along as possible*”, (executive of THFC, participant observation at meeting between THFC and *Our Tottenham*, 04.07.13).

The differences in expression may reflect diverse approaches by both the football clubs and their local councils. They might be considered important in the longer term in the light of the need for integration through community involvement identified in the literature. They can also be seen as more immediately important. While in East Manchester most stakeholders seemed content with their level of involvement, many in Tottenham felt they were not sufficiently consulted and were not provided with the means to engage or participate in the developments. This was the context at the research sites and became a trigger for some stakeholders to try to obtain the means by which they could influence the developments.

#### **5.4 Economic impacts**

*“The new stadium, visitor attractions, homes and other uses proposed for the site would support a total of 2,500 jobs in the locality – a net 1,700 directly employed at the site with a further 800 supported through the supply chain and other direct spending”*, (The Hotspur, July 2015: 08).

The financial situation might not be as beneficial for sports teams in the UK as it is in the USA, but it is arguable that many of the economic benefits that accrue to local stakeholders are largely due to the input of public funds, (e.g. London Olympic Stadium and surrounding developments). In the case of East Manchester, land remediation, the building of the City of Manchester Stadium, and many of the

surrounding developments and infra-structure improvements were paid from public funds. In Tottenham, the new stadium was being privately financed, but many proposed public realm improvements and changes to be made around the vicinity of the new stadium would come from public funds. Despite the results of research into economic impacts from the USA being known, all of the focal organisations involved at the two research sites made positive statements about the potential economic benefits and amount of money spent, or to be spent in the area. The figures related to total spend on development, projected amounts related to jobs created and overall spending. Such claims, known as boosterism in the USA, were made by the respective football clubs and local councils in documents, websites and by individuals in meetings and interviews. In truth they were central to the cases made out to the local communities.

*“The remediation of the site over the past years has already created forty-nine jobs, all of which were recruited in the local community and thirty-four of which were taken up with the previously long-term unemployed”*, (executive of MCFC in City Football Academy video, 2012).

For some local residents in East Manchester there were perceived benefits connected with public realm improvements, such as tree planting, that were undertaken by the football club:

*“Prices of houses will go up even higher now”*, (resident of East Manchester, participant observation in MCFC Resident’s Forum, 03.09.13).

The comment above seemed prescient when the Manchester Evening News (MEN, 14.03.2016) published research that average house prices in the M11 3 postcode, near the Etihad Stadium, had risen 718 per cent, from £20,000 in 1995 to £165,000 in 2015.

Although given less prominence in most descriptions of what had happened over the previous fifteen years in East Manchester there was still concern about negative economic impacts:

*“There is massive unemployment. All that NEM [New East Manchester] Ltd have done is build houses, that’s all they’ve done. People want jobs, they want a life. These areas have been redeveloped but they are dislocated”,*  
(Manchester, Urban Forums, 2012).

*“The future is seen to be precarious as my informants worry that East Manchester will remain isolated and dislocated from the wealth and progress seen in other areas of the city”,* (researcher, Manchester Metropolitan University, interview with author, 18.10.12).

However, some of the comments from focal stakeholders, clearly taking a business perspective, reflected ideas from the literature concerning ‘anchor tenants’ and ripple effects positively developing more businesses locally.

*“We probably are an anchor tenant around here just because of the potential of the club to invest and make a commercial success of the club and attract visitors to this area”*, (F, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 19.03.13).

*“We have national and regional government knocking on our doors, saying when are you going to build the stadium? The stadium is a catalyst for a ripple effect”*, (executive of THFC, participant observation at meeting between THFC and *Our Tottenham*, 04.07.13).

There were examples of proposed and built economic developments that were linked to the stadium-led regeneration at both of the research sites. In East Manchester there was a planned sports technology hub that would work with a number of sports organisations based in the area, including the football club, together with local colleges and universities. In Tottenham, a new technical college had already been built on land next to the site for the proposed stadium, which was connected to the foundation of the football club and Middlesex University. Large supermarkets had also been built near to the new stadiums at each of the sites.

The quote at the top of this section demonstrates that economic benefits can depend on from where you view them. Alongside the uncertainty of future projections, many local stakeholders in Tottenham began to point out negative economic impacts that demolitions would have on their own businesses. These included effects on their

family lives such as stress and being unable to make any significant investment in their business or even homes due to the uncertainty:

*“They said that these plans would benefit the community and the community wanted enhanced facilities and la, la la. But I said we don’t and none of the shopkeepers do, because that walkway is not going to help anyone, it’s not. It’s going to get rid of four generations of a family business that’s been there for thirty years...”,* (X, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13).

The fact that the football club had been successful on viability grounds in reducing their Section 106 commitments from an original figure in excess of £16 million down to £477,000 lead some people to further question who would really benefit from any economic impacts, (Tottenham Hotspur FC’s Section 106 contribution subsequently became a reserved matter to be agreed with Haringey Council after the club was granted revised planning permission on 16. 12.15). When further sums totalling up to £41 million were made available in response to the riots in the area in 2011 this view was further re-enforced for some people:

*“And it was terrible for people, but Spurs were able to get advantage from the riot. Because of course they said we are staying and we are committed to Tottenham, all this stuff. Because, suddenly, a bit of money tap came on. The money tap, because what are we going to do with Tottenham?”* (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

The football club was keen to make it clear that it was not receiving any public funds for building the new stadium and was not involved in constructing the controversial walkway across Tottenham High Road:

*“We are not taking public money. That £41m is not coming in to the club. It’s not a walkway to the stadium, it’s not our walkway”,* (executive of THFC, participant observation at meeting, 04.07.13).

In East Manchester, the context in which many of the local community saw the economic impacts of the stadium-led regeneration included seeing the value of their property increase due to continued public realm improvements and, more generally, the area continued to recover with increased employment prospects. These impacts were largely seen as positive and therefore not a trigger to try to gain more salience with focal organisations. There did not seem to be any concern at this stage of the regeneration of the area that rising house prices could lead to higher rents and gentrification, inadvertently displacing people that might no longer be able to live in the area, (Watt, 2009).

In Tottenham, although supporters of the football team saw the potential economic benefits from a larger stadium that would flow into the local community, many local people saw the benefits as accruing mainly to the football club due to its powerful position. The context for many stakeholders was potentially ruinous economic impacts in the form of demolition of homes, retail businesses and of industrial units that was led by the council.

*“In my view, and maybe I shouldn’t say this, but I think they should be knocked down, they are an eye sore. They are crap buildings and should be hauled down”*, (P, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 15.08.13).

These negative perceptions of the economic impacts became a trigger for many local stakeholders in Tottenham to start to try to exert influence on stadium-led regeneration through a range of strategies.

### **5.5 Social impacts**

*“... You’re going to have academy players living there, first-teamers living there. I live on the same street as YaYa Toure or whatever (laughter). It’s not quite like that, but it’s a massive boost to East Manchester”*, (G, local writer and historian, Manchester, interview with author, 20.03.13).

Closely linked with economic impacts are social impacts. These can include both tangible and intangible aspects to new stadiums. There was evidence from East Manchester and Tottenham of both of these types of arguments being put forward by representatives from the football clubs. These included improvements in the educational offering at both sites and *“unparalleled change”* in East Manchester:

*“What we witnessed really in living memory this was one of the worst places on the planet to live in terms of acid rain and pollution. In 1957, this was just about the worst polluted place on the planet”* (executive of MCFC, City Football Academy video, 2012).

In East Manchester, the football club demonstrated some awareness of the fact that the employment of local labour can have straightforward economic benefits, but also more intangible social impacts:

*“... the beauty of taking people on locally is that we want to create a sort of ownership. We want them to feel that it’s something that they feel proud of. It’s local to them, it’s part of their life. They walk past this and if there’s pride and there’s ownership, then in turn there’ll be respect for that as a landscape and as part of their street scene”, (executive of MCFC, City Football Academy video, 2012).*

However, there was evidence that so much change was taking place in East Manchester that it had already made such community integration difficult. The power of the football club was perceived to be too great by some people. This was evident from Kathlene, a grandmother in her sixties, who had rented a house opposite the City of Manchester stadium since the 1980s. Her story was told in an Urban Forums event. Kathlene heard a rumour that the land where her house stood had been earmarked for development. She had been told that the owners of Manchester City Football Club wanted to purchase the land and were planning to demolish her house in order to build leisure facilities and a hotel for visitors to the stadium:

*“Kathlene was very concerned and that the stories were more than a rumour. She seemed fretful and said that she didn’t want to leave her home as she had many happy memories of her children growing up in the house and had a*

*close relationship with her neighbours. A couple of days after this conversation, I met up with a woman who works for New East Manchester at a community centre. With Kathlene's permission, I asked her about the plans for the new development. She insisted that there was no substance to the rumours and told me that the houses would not be demolished as the land was not for sale. I re-layed the information to Kathlene, but it did not dissipate her fears. Kathlene said that the rumours were widespread and she could not rest easy as the regeneration agency had lied before", (Manchester, Urban Forums, 2012).*

There were other negative social impacts for those living and working near sports stadiums. In East Manchester most of the impacts complained of were directly related to events being held at the Etihad Stadium, rather than the new development. For some residents there was a feeling that the rights of fans were placed above those who lived in the area. Some of these issues were acknowledged by the football club:

*"There's the inconvenience of the match day and the biggest inconvenience that has been endured locally was when Oasis played the stadium and there was lots of criticism from the residents about what people do in their gardens", (J, executive of MFCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).*

The extent to which stadium owners actively respond to and lessen disruption, as well as overcome it through engagements with local communities, becomes central to whether stadiums can provide positive social and community benefits. Section 106

agreements between developers and local councils and the Community Infrastructure Levy are in part designed to provide financial contributions from developers towards improving local facilities to deal with such issues and to support community developments. These can include projects that assist with community integration involving education, open spaces, sports facilities, transport, etc. In East Manchester this was not seen as a major issue by the football club:

*“... we’ve never tried to buy out of 106 agreements, we’ve always stuck to them, but usually, and when I say usually I’m talking 90-odd percent of the time we sort of over-provide, we over-perform in those areas”*, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).

However, as previously mentioned, Tottenham Hotspur FC managed to considerably reduce their original 2010 section 106 commitments to Haringey Council through a financial viability assessment. The scrapping of the affordable housing provision, public realm improvements and a play area, amongst other changes, led to resentment locally when this was realised.

*“Now all we’ve got left of what was promised as a social contribution is the square, for social events really, as far as I can see”* (participant observation at street assembly, Tottenham, 06.07.13).

Some local councillors in Haringey also expressed their concerns on the section 106 agreement:

*“I still have a niggling concern that we rolled over far too quickly on the section 106 on Spurs and notwithstanding the fact they got a good hammering yesterday by Man City, that’s an aside. I just want to make sure this borough is not the patsy for Spurs. That’s what I am concerned about, that’s what I pick-up from the area forums and such-like and it just seems like everything is Spurs, Spurs, Spurs, Spurs, Spurs at the expense of everything else.”*

(Councillor Bull, at 37.13, webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council on 25.11.13).

In Tottenham there was also a realisation of some of the negative social aspects that can come with a football stadium in an urban area, even from a supporter of the football club:

*“I think probably a lot of people that live in Haringey probably say ‘I can’t fucking wait to see the back of it’. There’s this lot, they come in, they get pissed, they get noisy and lairy and leave litter all over my streets. I can’t get in my front door. I can’t drive up the High Road. I can’t get on a bus. The trains are all crowded and occasionally there’s a row if they are playing Chelsea or West Ham or something like that and I’d rather see the back of them. And I certainly can’t afford to go and see them”. (U, THFC supporter, interview with the author, 16.09.13).*

However, many of the negative social impacts that were discussed in Tottenham related to the proposed developments adjacent to the stadium that involved demolition of social housing, small retail shops and industrial units. The terms ‘*gentrification*’

and ‘*social cleansing*’ were frequently used by members of the local community with one individual at a street assembly (participant observation on 06.07.13) describing the new stadium as a “*Trojan horse for gentrification*”.

*“The brothers, their dad built that. Two generations. That’s not regeneration, that’s social cleansing”*, (W, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 08.10.13).

Many Haringey councillors were fully aware of the views held by the people they represented and some were still expressing concern at the plans they had already passed in previous meetings:

*“But you don't have to be close to the detail of the stadium plans or the wider place-changing agenda to be alarmed by what is proposed. Simply knowing that the plan involves bulldozing through shops on the High Road, council homes on the Love Lane Estate, and demolishing a public library for a fans walkway tells you all you need to know about its social cleansing drive”*.

(Councillor Bull at 37.28, webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council on 25.11.13).

There were different perspectives, especially from the focal organisations. Haringey Council was keen to challenge the idea of replacement of the existing community, with the Council Leader Clare Kober stating during a council meeting on 25.11.13 that “... *the right of return would be on the basis of a social rent, although social rents will rise over time*”. Meanwhile, Tottenham Hotspur FC stressed its inability to

become involved in what it saw as the council's plans for the area, such as the walkway over the High Road:

*“You would put us in a difficult position if we went against the council. We haven't always agreed with the council. We have put in a lot of time and energy to be more collaborative”, (executive of THFC, participant observation in meeting between THFC and *Our Tottenham* , 04.07.13).*

There were some appeals from those focal organisations in Tottenham to the local community of the more intangible social benefits of stadium-led regeneration, such as civic pride that might accrue to the local community. The phrase *“place-making”* was used in one consultation meeting by a representative from one of the development companies; to general scepticism and some mirth in the room. Such claims were also undermined by the unsuccessful attempt of the football club's Chairman Daniel Levy to move the football club out of the area by bidding to move into the Olympic Stadium in Stratford in November 2010. Overall, the uncertainty that stadium-led regeneration proposals can cause might be considered the most enduring of the social impacts in the area, evidenced when individuals mentioned being *“scared”* and *“put on edge”* by the proposals:

*“Well this thing has caused so much stress to us and as a business and as a family and as a couple. Because like I say, you go to bed with a question mark over your head, you wake up with a question mark. You're faced with your life. They're on the block for the chop”, (L, local resident and business owner,*

Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

The context of perceived negative social and community impacts that local stakeholders in Tottenham felt, including fear and stress for their own futures, provided a strong trigger for some stakeholders to become involved in attempting to influence the stadium-led regeneration that was taking place around them. This was the case even though their own perception was that they started off with little influence with the focal organisations. In East Manchester, although stress was present amongst some local stakeholders, for many others the context involved some positive social impacts from the developments that included more employment and a general perception that the area was improving. These developments, linked to other engagement strategies, meant that social impacts provided fewer triggers towards stakeholder involvement. It also allowed the focal organisations in the area to resist stakeholder pressures through the central role they played.

## **5.6 Governance and Transparency**

*“I’ve been a Labour Party member for years, lived here for years and been a councillor for years. I’ve never seen anything so diseased and secret. It’s almost as if we are working for Spurs”*, (R, councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 10.09.13).

The linked concepts of governance and transparency affect the ways in which stakeholders can take part in the decision-making process. The governance of many regeneration projects, including those linked to sport such as the Olympic Stadium in

London, have been criticised for being opaque and lacking democratic controls, (Minton, 2012). Governance structures should be in place in order to ensure that a wide range of viewpoints regarding development were heard equally. In East Manchester, despite some individual concerns, overall there were fewer complaints about the ability of local viewpoints to be heard concerning the stadium-led regeneration from stakeholders. Governance structures had been put in place at an early stage of the regeneration process to enable engagement and participation and these proved to be effective. Further, it reflected some openness from the football club to admit that problems occurred and they could affect local stakeholders:

*“We’ve not pretended at any point that the activities we undertake don’t disturb people. They do, they’re bound to, but working with local people and local businesses we can offset that with a little bit of thought and care and attention. That’s being a good neighbour. To pretend it didn’t exist wouldn’t be good and clearly not to do the things we do, wouldn’t be good for the local economy, so it’s striking a balance”, (executive of MCFC, participant observation in MCF Residents Forum, 03.09.13).*

In Tottenham there was evidence across a range of local stakeholders to support findings of governance failings to allow wider viewpoints to be heard regarding the development. Examples of criticisms included supporters not being kept informed about “... a range of strategic and financial issues...”, together with:

*“She’s [the Mayor of Haringey] representing the main landowner, yes and only the main landowner. When the Northumberland Park Development*

*project [adjacent to the football ground] first came out, the council was helping them buy the land across the road”, (X, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13).*

The associated concept of transparency is equally important in stadium-led regeneration schemes as it can ensure that local stakeholders are able to genuinely engage and participate with consultations about proposals for developments in their area.

*“The fans and the local community should be at the centre of this discussion, but we are all too frequently told that options are simply not possible without further detail being given. This fuels a culture of suspicion”, (Haringey Independent, *Spurs stadium project – are we asking the right questions?* 15.09.14).*

The issue of transparency has been recognised in a series of legal cases related to large scale developments; specifically those involving financial viability statements (see *Viability for Dummies*, 2014, for various examples). In addition, in publishing their recent investigation into stadium-led regeneration, the London Assembly specifically stated that the public had a right to transparency over arrangements over stadiums and public funding to safeguard that public investment. Moreover, the Local Government Transparency Code 2014 requires local authorities commit to the principles of open data and transparency, (*The Regeneration Game*, 2015: 25).

There appeared to be structures in place in East Manchester to provide enough transparency of information for engagement and participation by local stakeholders.

Even if it was only an offer to visit what was then the *Etihad Campus* building site. However, there were limits to that transparency even in East Manchester:

*“Well that’s part of the main contract so I can’t go in to too many details about the original contract that’s been agreed with BAM and MCFC”,*  
(H, employee of BAM, interview with author, 21.03.13).

In Tottenham there were considerable concerns from a range of stakeholders over what was perceived to be the lack of transparency over the whole stadium-led development process. A supporter of the football club suggested that a transparent framework for change from Haringey Council was essential: *“Then there can be trust between the council and the community and people will know their views will be listened to”* (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13). One local councillor expressed views on this issue in very strong terms:

*“What really pisses me off is the secrecy. I got an offer to view a document, but on the basis of secrecy. I said what needs to happen is all of it should be in the public domain so people can see what’s going on. I was offered a meeting, but it would be private and confidential”* (R, local councillor, Haringey, participant observation in meeting, 31.07.13).

There was evidence related to a previous development at Tottenham Hotspur FC of the *Shelf* in the 1980s that transparency was an historical problem for both the football club and Haringey Council. On that occasion, in the view of one supporter, the club had tried to *“sneak through”* the demolition of the *Shelf* part of the stadium and the

council “*saw an opportunity to get something out of it themselves as well and that’s being replicated in this battle*”, (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author 16.09.13). The historical context was also apparent in concerns expressed by some local people about the ways in which the football club had for many years surreptitiously approached property owners and bought-up land on the other side of Tottenham High Road to their stadium. A good governance structure allows for transparency that enables stakeholders to hold local politicians to account and to participate in changes in their community. The reverse situation can fuel a culture of suspicion. There is evidence from this research that when the context involves a belief by stakeholders that there is a poor governance structure and a lack of transparency, it can become a trigger towards them adopting more assertive actions such as dissent and protest, as will be seen in the next chapter:

*“So we let her speak and sell this brochure, like a holiday brochure and when she stopped speaking the Turkish barber’s son said these plans are causing a lot of pain. B [husband] spoke and said ‘no, these are all underhand tactics and we have to do something’”* (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

For a number of reasons in East Manchester there was not the same level of growing opposition to the on-going stadium-led regeneration. These included the geography of the area, the history of stadium-led regenerations that spanned a longer period of time and the structures put in place for stakeholder participation. There are proportionately more quotes above from the Tottenham area where the context was

different. Local stakeholders were very concerned about the lack of transparency in the planning and consultation process around the stadium-led regeneration. Importantly, these issues of governance and transparency provided the context in which local community groups and supporters of the football team would eventually coalesce with their shared concerns. This difference in the process in Tottenham supports the idea that lack of transparency and failures in governance can become triggers for action by stakeholders. They also linked to the final concept that provided the context and triggers for stakeholder involvement.

### **5.7 Lack of power, legitimacy and urgency**

*“They can’t just take our factory and our land, which we have built over so many years’ work, to build flats to make money; surely that is theft?”* (V, local business owner, Haringey, interview with author, 08.10.13).

Support for the idea that a perceived lack of salience can become a trigger for stakeholders towards trying to influence stadium-led regeneration, came from both of the research sites. In East Manchester, there were some grumbings about the power of the football club and its strong links with Manchester City council, which granted it greater influence:

*“So despite the fact that Manchester City are only occupants of the stadium under an agreement with the council, many of my informants were anxious about their influence in the area”,* (researcher, MMU, transcript from Manchester, Urban Forums, 2012).

Overall, in East Manchester, there were fewer expressions of powerlessness, lack of legitimacy or lack of urgency. Representatives of Manchester City FC believed that in general the football club had a good relationship with the local community, which was supported by others, for example:

*“MCFC have had a big impact in the local area, they have clearly made a decision to involve the community in their plans, and this has had a positive impact”* (BQ, police officer, GMP, completed questionnaire, 18.06.13)

These views were reflected in less objections and expressions of dissent in East Manchester to the proposed *Etihad Campus* and associated developments such as the walkway that were present and underway in Tottenham. In East Manchester, there were some established routes through which local stakeholders could air their views and participate, developed in-part from the NDC partnerships during the building of the stadium at the start of the century. The context was a different one in Tottenham in which stakeholders felt that they were not being listened to by focal organisations and if the council wanted something *“they will have it and it’s set in stone”*, (Q, local resident, Tottenham, interview with author, 21.08.13):

*“Effectively, they’ve already decided they’re going to demolish part of the estate, at least. In which case it demoralises people”*, (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation at meeting, 09.05.13).

Many people felt that the football club and other organisations had far greater power than the local community, that “*we’re not making the decisions, it’s big business*”, (participant observation at Tottenham Traders Partnership meeting, 08.10.13). This was acknowledged in a Haringey Council meeting:

*“I suppose local people are feeling that the ear that it [Spurs] has in the council is going to weigh far more than local people”*, (Councillor Winskill, from webcast of Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council, 25.11.13).

*After the Riots: Taking Tottenham Forward* (2012), commissioned by Haringey Council and produced by the Tottenham Community Panel (a group of community leaders), set out recommendations that mirrored the aims of previous urban renewal schemes in Tottenham: “*regenerate Tottenham High Road, improve the image of the area, create opportunities for young people and improve the relationship between police and the community*”. In keeping with these previous regeneration approaches the Tottenham Community panel also emphasised “*community involvement and leadership*”, (2012: 5, quoted in Dillon and Fanning, 2015: 199).

In contrast to the Community Panel, the *Strategic Regeneration Framework* (Haringey Council, 2013) that fleshed out the *Plan for Tottenham* adopted a far more pro-development approach to regeneration. It envisaged the building of 10,000 new homes and the creation of 5,000 jobs by 2025. It emphasised that achieving these targets would depend on Tottenham’s ability to attract large-scale investment. In

effect, Haringey Council “...brought into gentrification policies as a means of fixing communities like Tottenham’s in the face of considerable community opposition to such goals”, (Dillon and Fanning, 2015: 202). Not surprisingly, in Tottenham there were also expressions that amounted to a lack of legitimacy for local people:

*“We are people that contribute greatly to the community, but we are being pushed out of the area we were born and raised in, Tottenham, and punished for not fitting in with the new plans”, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).*

*“The Council’s Plan for Tottenham does not generally represent what local people need or want. The creation of community plans mean the Council must change their approach”, (Our Tottenham email, 07.02.14).*

For some there was also a lack of urgency in the way in which focal organisations dealt with the demands of local stakeholders. This in turn began to generate urgency to gain influence from those stakeholders:

*“Please let others know of this situation. We the community need support, some feel their voices won’t be heard; we’ve told them to complete the feedback form though there is a shortage of brochures in the local library, a bulk of which did not have the feedback forms”, (email, from L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, 19.05.13).*

The lack of salience became a significant trigger for stakeholders to argue against the existing stadium-led regeneration plans. The context of lack of influence for stakeholders in Tottenham provoked anger towards focal organisations in the area:

*“We have been lied to and lied to by our own elected representatives. The key decisions for this master plan were made long before the consultation. Key factors were decided at the beginning of 2012. That’s when our small businesses were sacrificed in order that one very big business could become even richer”, (Our Tottenham email, 05.12.14).*

*“ ... it’s their business, their home, their building, they’ve done it up, they’ve looked after it, they’ve put the money in to it and they are really pissed off that somebody else is going to come along and knock it down”, (R, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 10.09.13).*

This became a trigger for a questioning of the whole process of stadium-led regeneration and its potential effects. It is possible to see the perceived lack of salience with the focal organisations turn into a desire to try to influence and participate in the process of stadium-led regeneration. The original lack of salience triggered movement towards trying to influence the developments:

*“But it was again, people just saw this as a fait accompli. ‘What you’re going to knock those down’? We’re not having that. And it’s almost that you cause people to dig their heels in. If you talk to people and treat them with a bit of*

*respect, maybe you can get the kind of compromise deal that you want to go through”, (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13).*

Once stakeholders in Tottenham realised their own position, they saw the need for increased pressure on focal organisations and started to develop alternative strategies to gain salience that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter:

*“They are going to keep going with their not-so-hidden agenda over businesses, shops, houses. So we are going to have more of these campaigns”*  
(Participant observation at meeting on 03.07.13).

*“So, Spurs and Haringey Council, the game is far from over. The bulldozers are not even on the pitch. The community will stop your agenda to push people and businesses out of their Tottenham home (Our Tottenham email, 05.12.14).*

The results set out not only the different contexts in which the stadium-led regeneration took place, but also evidenced those that went on to provide triggers for stakeholder involvement in East Manchester and Tottenham. They demonstrate the complex antecedents that occur before stakeholders even start to try to gain influence in the process of stadium-led regeneration. Perspectives from Tottenham demonstrate the dynamism of stakeholder theory and the central point of this concept that a lack of salience can be an important driving force for stakeholders to become involved in influencing the process of stadium-led regeneration. It is supported by the context

from East Manchester, where arguably an effective stakeholder management system was adopted by focal organisations that allowed engagement and participation (Low and Cowton, 2004), and fewer alternative strategies were adopted by stakeholder groups. This takes us on to the next stage of the stakeholder influence framework and the strategies used by stakeholders at the research sites.

## **Chapter 6 Results and analysis: strategies of stakeholder influence**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Four separate concepts from the two research sites were found to make up the aggregate dimension of strategies of stakeholder influence: mobilisation; groups, alliances and networks; dissent and protest; and media. A number of these concepts have individually been identified previously in theoretical or empirical stakeholder research, but have not been linked together in this way as part of a wider framework. These connections are acknowledged below and the links to previous literature discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. A range of the strategies detailed below were used by stakeholder groups and focal organisations to try to gain salience to influence the stadium-led regeneration at the two sites. Thus they are an intermediate stage within the framework of stakeholder influence, once stakeholders have become involved, that can be used to try to gain salience with focal organisations.

### **6.2 Mobilisation**

*“They spout rhetoric and pay lip service to local consultations in such an obvious patronising way that they have created and encouraged the formation of the Our Tottenham movement that is growing and growing”, (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation in community meeting, 18.07.13).*

The idea that when an organisation does not act as anticipated, or acts against the interests of a stakeholder group, that group will be more likely to take action, or

mobilise, (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003) finds support at both of the research sites that are the subject of this study, but for different reasons. In East Manchester, the focal organisations (Manchester City Council, New East Manchester Ltd and Manchester City FC) arguably largely acted as stakeholders expected. That is: the focal organisations involved their stakeholders, listened to their views during consultations, and acted on at least some of the issues that were raised during the various stages of the stadium-led regeneration. In East Manchester, the building of the *Etihad Campus* and associated developments was just the latest stage in a process begun over a decade previously with the New Deal for Communities and the subsequent opening of the City of Manchester Stadium in 2002. There was an aim at the outset of these developments to try to involve the local community throughout the decision-making process, as argued by East Manchester's New Deal for Communities Co-ordinator:

*“We resource them, we support them, we help them, we train them, we make sure structures are in place, with residents' groups in every single level of decision-making”* (Misener and Mason, 2009: 781).

Mobilisation of individuals and groups had largely taken place at the start of this regeneration process. Some groups such as local resident's associations were still engaged in the process, although attendance at the regular meetings held at the Etihad Stadium by the residents and local businesses was dependent on whatever developments were happening in the area, especially at the football club. This lends support to the notion that urgency is important for stakeholders:

*“We can go for several meetings when we get a dozen to twenty people turn up and it’s always the same dozen to twenty and there’s nothing wrong with that. They always contribute. But then we can have a couple of meetings, you know we’ve recently announced in the press a stadium expansion since the last meeting, so I dare say that the next community meetings will be a lot busier, because people will want to know what’s going on and what’s planned”, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with the author, 28.05.13).*

Within these meetings, stakeholders mobilised around complaints such as traffic and the amount of dust and rubbish around the development site, which could then be considered by the focal organisations, with a particular Mancunian view:

*“There have been a couple of complaints from residents about dust, but at least it does indicate we have had better weather. Problems with traffic have been resolved”, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).*

Mobilisation of stakeholders in East Manchester was largely limited to attending meetings as above or at consultations set up by the focal organisations. One such consultation concerned some of the wider public-realm linked elements of the *Etihad Campus* development and took place on 18.10.12, at the Beswick Library in East Manchester. From the author’s personal attendance at this consultation, it appeared not many stakeholders were involved. The person running the consultation agreed there had been a lot of regeneration and consultation already, and this might explain the limited number of people taking part in the event. He made the point that if

people largely agreed with the proposals then they might not bother to come along and if they didn't want what was on offer they would be more likely to come along. He acknowledged that on a previous occasion he had sat for two hours at the library and nobody had approached him or the exhibition. However, he stated there was interest in the development and there was a generally very positive community reaction. Although there is some evidence, as advanced above by another interviewee, that stakeholders had been "*consulted-out*", it can be also argued on this basis that that the expectations of such stakeholders were met by the focal organisations:

*"In my opinion most of the locals regard the arrival of MCFC as a positive thing, there are of course problems and issues, but as long as people's concerns are listened to, and their views respected, we can all usually work things out"*, (Greater Manchester Police officer, Manchester, completed questionnaire, 18.06.15).

As a corollary to the work of Hosmer and Kiewitz (2005), it can be argued that stakeholder mobilisation will be more likely where stakeholders believe they have not been fairly treated, considered or rewarded, which was the case for many individuals in Tottenham.

*"People will come along to rally – residents and businesses are not happy"*, (local resident and business owner, participant observation at community meeting, Tottenham, 03.07.13).

This is not to doubt some of the practical barriers that can prevent the mobilising of stakeholders, which were made clear in Tottenham:

*“But when you say go to the library, they can’t be bothered and the council know this”*, (L, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

In Tottenham, an example of the type of mobilisation of stakeholders that was taking place can be seen in the formation and growth of the *Our Tottenham* network. This group was founded out of a community conference on 06.04.13: *“as a network of local individuals and community groups to stand up for people in Tottenham around regeneration issues”*, (*Our Tottenham* website). Various community groups affiliated to the organisation from its inception and these grew to number over fifty during this research (as at 13.05.2015). After a council planning consultation in May 2013, more people in Tottenham, including those that were most threatened by the stadium-led regeneration plans, had started to mobilise through common concerns about the development plans and a growing realisation of their lack of power with focal organisations. This was done through a range of community groups and multiple activities, although some difficulties were acknowledged:

*“A, L, and myself are the active ones in the group and getting people with us, we’re trying to get all the rest, as many people with us, but actually getting other people to move is a slow process when they are not used to it”*, (X, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13).

Different community groups produced a range of communications, including leaflets, press releases and social media activity that emphasised their attempts at acting together to mobilise against what they saw as the various threats from the stadium-led regeneration:

*“Local residents and traders have been mobilising to resist the current wave of gentrification that is sweeping through Tottenham, driven by the stadium redevelopment plans”, (Our Tottenham leaflet, 05.12.13)*

As stakeholders began to mobilise in Tottenham there was a perception from some in the local community that focal organisations were beginning to respond to pressure, especially after the meeting that occurred between Tottenham Hotspur FC and the *Our Tottenham* group in July 2013. The effects of the mobilisation led to a growing confidence amongst local individuals and groups in organising for meetings and consultations.

*“I think the meeting has made Spurs and the council concerned. I think it’s put the wind up the council and Spurs themselves. I think they realise there’s resistance now”, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, 23.07.13).*

*“We filled out the room, because it’s a small room. They weren’t expecting us to come, so we took as many people as we could ... so there was a big cluster of us”, (local business owner, participant observation at community meeting,*

Tottenham, 08.08.13).

At the same time, some of the limitations to the mobilisation were recognised by those involved, which included the number of households in Tottenham that were not involved in the campaigns and the inability to get large numbers of people on the streets.

*“We’ve got a coalition, but it doesn’t mean we can get hundreds of people on the street. One of the problems is mobilising all of the different community groups”*, (participant observation at community meeting in Tottenham 03.07.13).

*“The only good thing to come from this consultation is that the community has become a bit closer, but we’re all still worried”*, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

In Tottenham, there were many examples of the process of mobilisation taking place and being linked with other strategies to try to gain influence in the stadium-led regeneration that was planned. Mobilisation was less obvious in East Manchester during this study, in-part due to the timing of the research and the chronology of the regeneration.

### 6.3 Groups, alliances and networks

*“We’ve started to overcome the kind of isolation and fragmentation of a whole range of different groups and campaigns that aren’t encouraged to link up and support each other and the council really doesn’t take seriously unless they can show that they’ve got backing, they’re not treated seriously or they can be ignored, you know if the council feels that they are just on their own”*

(Q, local resident and community activist, Tottenham, interview with author, 21.08.13).

Much of the mobilisation to influence stadium-led regeneration took place through groups, alliances and networks of stakeholders, many of which already existed in East Manchester and were growing in number and size in Tottenham. In East Manchester, at the start of the *Etihad Campus* development process, there were already numbers of well-defined stakeholder groups that included local resident’s associations, local businesses and supporter groups. These groups were well established and had strong existing links and forums through which communication took place with the focal organisations of Manchester City FC, Manchester City Council and New East Manchester Ltd. As an example of the establishment of these different groups of stakeholders and their perceived salience, Manchester City FC organised alternate monthly meetings, with local residents’ groups and local businesses invited to the football club to discuss issues such as the new *Etihad Campus* development and any other connected issues that might exist. It seemed that in East Manchester the means to influence the stadium-led regeneration developments had already been opened-up

to groups of stakeholders, allowing both engagement and participation (Low and Cowton, 2004).

*“What we try and do is use bona fide representatives of the community, residents associations and groups, rather than if you like a free for all”*, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).

During a meeting with local residents attended by the author at the existing football stadium, the football club and representatives of other focal organisations that attended these meetings listened to complaints about rubbish, lack of mobile phone coverage, parking and other issues. They suggested ways to overcome the problems, which could be monitored and reviewed at the next meeting. The interaction appeared aimed at solving the problems. The approach of Manchester City FC and the other focal organisations to include stakeholder groups in discussions about problems that occurred in the area allowed a forum for residents to air their views and allowed issues to be addressed at an early stage. This meant that the football club was credited with listening to and trying to sort out some of the problems. In East Manchester, it appeared that stakeholders' salience with focal organisations was relatively high due to the recent history of regeneration in the area, which meant there was an inclusive approach towards problems.

In Tottenham, a more confrontational approach by stakeholders towards focal organisations such as Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspurs FC began to evolve out of the mobilisation. This could also be seen to evolve as the groups grew in

numbers and became more confident. Although the original plan for the new football stadium had been put forward in 2010, Haringey Council subsequently planned to link this to wider regeneration of the area involving a large number of additional projects, after the serious riots that occurred in Tottenham in 2011. The need for stakeholders in Tottenham to form alliances between groups in order to influence Haringey council and put forward their own views and plans was acknowledged by many different individuals, as this example makes clear:

*“They need to really properly get organised, then hold the likes of myself and my colleagues to account. That’s what needs to happen”*, (N, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 13.08.13).

The same councillor expanded on his view that there was a lack of properly organised groups to hold the council to account:

*“So I think it is those networks probably that are missing or lacking in that part of Tottenham, because if there is proper co-ordination I am sure that the council and Spurs will take note. The councillors can’t do it for them”*, (N, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author).

From the above, it is possible to discern the acceptance of local stakeholders as legitimate participants in the debate, but also an acknowledgement that without organisation and growing links they lacked power and urgency with Haringey Council. There appeared to be some justification for what was said by the local

councillor as individuals began to show an awareness of their lack of power and the need to organise through groups, alliances and networks. Individuals that were not linked to groups were the most concerned about developments in their area, “*with little perceived ability to influence anything*”, (CQ, local resident, Tottenham, completed questionnaire, 18.08.14).

*“I think that any person that takes on big organisations needs to be in a group. It doesn’t matter how strong, smart, savvy, knowledgeable you are, you cannot do it on your own”*, (X, local resident, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13).

It was also clear that individuals found community groups helpful and supportive, which provided confidence towards challenging focal organisations. Examples were provided in interviews of individuals that felt more positive after attending meetings organised by community groups such as *Haringey Defend Council Housing* and *Our Tottenham*. At these meetings council processes and existing rights were explained and support that was available was set out. There was also a sense of a number of different causes being inter-linked, with an understanding that it was the focal organisations in Tottenham that needed to be influenced:

*“I mean Our Tottenham has been going since April [2013]; we found out about them in May through the newspaper. Yes, so I mean just going to the first Our Tottenham meeting was encouraging, supportive, because there are*

*people out there who care*”, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

*“I thought we might just have to keep it amongst the parade of shops here, but we are supporting the cause of Our Tottenham and Our Tottenham are supporting our cause because it’s all inter-linked and it’s against the council, it’s against Spurs”*, (participant observation in community meeting, Tottenham, 19.06.13).

With this growing confidence amongst community groups in Tottenham, alliances began to widen to make common cause with groups such as the Tottenham Supporters Trust over issues of shared concern. Some of the club’s supporters were able to see wider issues raised by the stadium-linked developments:

*“It’s not hard to see why the walkway is so controversial. It flies in the face of all the fine words about community benefit the club was so anxious to utter in the aftermath of the riots and symbolises the growing unease at the divide between private benefit and public good that colours much current debate”*, (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13).

A series of articles appeared in the Haringey Independent (e.g. *Spurs fans, local people and businesses must stick together for a brighter future*, 07.10.14) written by Spurs supporter Martin Cloake, which acknowledged some of the problems with the new stadium and its associated developments. He also pointed out a number of

concerns that both groups shared over the governance and transparency of the main focal organisations involved in the regeneration scheme.

*“But more Spurs fans than some may imagine, certainly if the comments under the trust’s last blog are anything to go by, are prepared to make common cause with the local community... For all the reported differences between Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur PLC over the years, it seems both organisations share a tendency to define consultation as ‘telling the punters what’s been decided’”, (Martin Cloake, Haringey Independent, 07.10.14).*

Following this article a meeting was held on 12.11.14 between *Our Tottenham*, *Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust (THST)*, *Tottenham Business Group* and *Tottenham Community Sports Centre* to discuss matters of common interest. The THST has over ten thousand members. Although their work relates mainly to impacts on Spurs supporters, the group is also committed to issues of wider community benefit and having good relations with the local community. Matters of common concern included secrecy, gentrification, infrastructure, the controversial walkway, a demand for transparency and support for Tottenham Hotspur FC. All agreed that the football club and the council had not conducted genuine consultations or taken on board the views of supporters or residents. It was also agreed there was overwhelming support for an improved stadium, but not some of the inappropriate wider redevelopment, (*Our Tottenham* website, note of meeting from 12.11.2014). Martin Cloake of THST, reporting on the meeting, stated:

*“The community groups are at pains to assure us they don’t oppose the stadium expansion – most of the people there are Spurs fans too. But there are*

*serious issues with the associated developments. Where once there was agreement and support across the board for a set of plans that seemed to deliver a better stadium that was a part of a vibrant community, now there is suspicion and fear. What a sad failure that represents”, (Our Tottenham website, note of meeting from 12.11.2014).*

The meeting and notes of agreement between the groups demonstrated the sort of ties that developed between many stakeholders in Tottenham, while the football club and the council largely stood on the outside. This example of mobilisation and networking demonstrates in a clear way how stakeholder groups can combine their numbers and different perspectives to try to gain greater power, legitimacy and urgency.

It can be seen from the above that one of the major reasons for the formation of networks and alliances between groups is that it can lead to greater salience with focal organisations for stakeholders. It can be argued that larger groups were perceived at the outset by many stakeholders (including local councillors) to possess more legitimacy and also the potential power to influence the focal organisations. The research at the two sites supports the work of network theorists that a focal organisation is more able to resist stakeholder pressures when it is involved with its stakeholder networks, as was the case in East Manchester. And that, conversely, strongly linked stakeholder networks, as in Tottenham, can put constraints on organisations and create the capacity to monitor them more efficiently through their ability to effectively communicate information, (Rowley, 1997; Rowley and

Moldoveanu, 2003). These issues, together with further examples, will be considered in more detail in Chapter 8.

#### **6.4 Dissent and protest**

In East Manchester any dissent and protest largely occurred through conventional channels in regular meetings between local stakeholders. For example, there were complaints from residents in East Manchester that were linked to events held in the main stadium, both football and concerts (but not rugby league). The problems included parking, drug-dealing, loss of mobile phone signals, unruly behaviour, noise, urinating in gardens; “*You see fans stood outside, dealing going on. It’s residents as well*”, (participant observation at MCFC Residents forum, 03.09.13). There was also some dissatisfaction at the amount of tickets that were allocated to residents for concerts that took place in the main stadium during the summer, and a request for more. Additionally, there were complaints more directly related to noise and dust from the new development, which the football club accepted, but also praise for the construction company BAM, which had undertaken a number of community projects such as putting in new changing rooms at a local swimming pool and tarmacking of areas around some residences: “*BAM should be congratulated for that....*”, (participant observation at MCFC Residents Forum, 03.09.13).

It should be noted that the above comments and anecdotal notes were made during a meeting between the football club and local residents’ representatives at the existing stadium. As one of the club’s representatives stated, the meetings could cover almost anything connected to the football club. Although meetings frequently revolved

around problems encountered by the residents, in the past they had covered everything from noise at a concert and stadium development issues, to the signing of a new player, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13). Thus there was a forum for the expression of dissent in which to raise problematic issues for local stakeholders and even occasionally to praise. It can be argued that Manchester City FC exercised more power over their stakeholders through granting stakeholders forums and access in which to engage. There was certainly a shared idea that stakeholder groups had some salience, which was important for all the groups involved.

In Tottenham, views were expressed at an early stage of the stadium-led regeneration that since focal organisations in the area were not listening to issues of importance to local stakeholders, a more confrontational approach might be necessary. One idea of protest that was mooted by a volunteer at an early meeting of the *Our Tottenham* group may well have grabbed their attention:

“*We could go over the fence of the new stadium ...*”, (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation in community meeting, 09.05.13.)

The purpose of going over the fence was to dig up the pitch in order to get Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council to take greater notice of the views of local people on the regeneration plans. The precise objective would have been difficult as work had not even started on the new stadium at this stage and in any event the outcome of such an action would have been unpredictable in terms of increased salience. Also

aimed at the football club, one group started to put up posters decrying the proposed new stadium and its associated developments using a design with a cockerel similar to Tottenham Hotspur's logo. These were posted on hoardings around the ground and the adjacent area by unidentified individuals. Although members of the *Our Tottenham* network denied being responsible for the posters (interviews and participant observation by the author) they led directly to an email invitation to this group to attend a meeting with the football club on 04.07.13. This email acknowledged the importance of *Our Tottenham* and the football club in the renewal of Tottenham and said it would welcome the opportunity to meet with the community group.

*Our Tottenham* acted quickly to report the request for the meeting from the football club in a press release. The fact that Tottenham Hotspur FC responded to the poster campaign by inviting the community group to talks demonstrated its effectiveness and had the impact of encouraging *Our Tottenham* and other stakeholders to continue their protests. However, the meeting between *Our Tottenham* and Tottenham Hotspur FC on 04.07.13 made little progress on substantive issues and is the only one that has so far taken place between the two organisations

Numerous other forms of dissent and protest took place including: demonstrating outside the council chamber; sending formal deputations to speak at council meetings; organising conferences; attending at consultations and community meetings. At most of these events, banners, leaflets and petitions were taken along to further mobilise the protests and questions were asked of those attending. As an example, at a meeting

organised by Haringey Council, *Tottenham Futures*, on 30.07.14 at Tottenham Town Hall the *Haringey Independent* reported that:

*“A crying ten-year-old asked the council why her home was being demolished at the launch of Tottenham’s regeneration plans. The trickiest [question] came from Summer Gomez-Sullivan, of White Hart Lane. Her home above the tattoo parlour run by her father, Robert Sullivan, is set to be knocked down under the council’s plans for Tottenham’s High Road West area. Councillor Alan Strickland, cabinet member for regeneration and housing, said he understood the demolition was “incredibly difficult and traumatic”, but that “residents, on the whole, supported the proposals”, (Haringey Independent, 31 July: Tottenham regeneration: a ten year old asks the tough questions).*

Other forms of dissent and protest, included standing as single issue candidates in the 2014 local elections and obtaining Legal Aid to challenge some of the consultations carried out by Haringey Council, by way of judicial review. Although not all the forms of dissent and protest met with universal praise from all of the local stakeholders:

*“It’s different though, it’s different groups. I don’t know why, I wish they weren’t so skewed in their view of it. They direct it all to Spurs, they should be directing it at the council”, (X, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author).*

Undoubtedly the *Etihad Campus* development in East Manchester was less controversial due to a number of factors such as the geography and history of the area,

but there were also forums available through which to express views and a perception amongst stakeholders that they had salience with the focal organisations involved.

These factors meant there was less protest and dissent. In Tottenham, some stakeholders were aware of their initial lack of influence with the focal organisations. Different forms of dissent and protest were strategies used to a greater extent by these stakeholder groups in Tottenham in order to gain more salience to influence focal organisations in the area.

## **6.5 Media**

There is a wide literature on what focal organisations should do to establish and maintain an effective media plan. In this research it will be seen that, for their own reasons, the main focal organisations at the two sites, the football clubs and local councils, took differing, opposite approaches towards their media and stakeholder engagement strategies in relation to the stadium developments. From the outset, in advance of any formal planning consultation, Manchester City invited local and national journalists to see plans for the new facilities that were proposed and made much of the material available on their own website. Information was also provided and consultations held for various stakeholder groups such as local businesses, local residents and supporters. There may have been some cynicism as to how much notice the club took to responses, but this approach continued during the planning and building process, to the extent that a typical reaction was:

*“I mean City is City and being a season ticket holder, you get questionnaires every 20 minutes. Do you like this, do you like that, but I’m not sure how*

*much they listen. I think that's just lip service really. I'm not a local fella, so who knows?"* (M, supporter of MCFC, interview with author, 27.07.13).

In general, the approach of Manchester City (and to a lesser extent Manchester City Council and New East Manchester Ltd) was to attempt to utilise the media to provide a positive story. The football club did this through all of its own media outlets, including a range of social media and by providing material for the regular media to use. Regular media proved to be a willing recipient and although not all stories were entirely positive, (e.g. Guardian 04.10.2011: *Manchester City's campus plans highlight the gap between rich and poor.*) it did result in a lot of favourable coverage.

From the interviews and participant observation, together with an examination of data from third parties that included press, magazines, websites, Twitter and other social media sites, there was no real evidence of stakeholders connected to the East Manchester site using the media to campaign against the *Etihad Campus* and associated developments. Although there were some negative comments expressed, a large majority of those attached to media articles and supporters' websites were in favour of the development – even from supporters of other teams, (e.g. the Guardian 04.10.2011). One comment echoed the argument against the trickle-down effect in making a point that an Aston Martin or Bentley flashing past the Campus was unlikely to change the predicament of some of the poorer members of the local community. However, in general, the comments were positive with the overall tone that people didn't understand the cynicism towards the project, which was taking place in an area that badly needed investment and jobs:

*“I’m a Manchester United fan and it is very easy for me to ignore important tribal rivalries when I think of the difference this will make to East Manchester; no sixth form colleges, as many have already noted? New developments for communal use? Lots more jobs for the area? Well, fuck it then, a massive thank you to Sheikh Mansour!”, (reader’s comment, The Guardian, 04.10.11).*

*“Only a gimcrack could find something to complain about with this. I may be a red but I am also one of those chippy Mancs that maintains our city is better than anyone else’s (even though I secretly know it isn’t) and, honestly, I haven’t got a bad word to say about this project”, (reader’s comment, The Guardian, 04.10.11).*

During the period of this research (2011-2015), Tottenham Hotspur FC took a different approach to the media that largely involved providing little information about the stadium development as it stalled and only commenting across media outlets when necessary. For example, as part of this research the football club’s website was checked in preparation for an interview with a Spurs supporter to take place on 16 September 2013; the section on the stadium development had not been updated since September 2012. The interviewee on that occasion looked for reasons to explain the football club’s approach, but whatever the explanation found it detrimental to their cause:

*“... they’re saying some of it is commercially confidential, but there are surely some ways that you can communicate. But they do seem to*

*shoot themselves in the foot quite a lot and I don't know whether its stupidity or it's just whether they don't care", (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13).*

Tottenham Hotspur FC seemed content to leave the media narrative to others. As some of the details of the council's wider regeneration scheme became clearer, including the proposed demolition of social and private housing, together with retail outlets and industrial units across the road from the football ground, it also became easier for local residents and business owners to get their voices heard in the media. The formation of the *Our Tottenham* group gave local individuals a platform from which to share knowledge and the confidence to start campaigning through the media. Local media such as the *Haringey Independent* and *Tottenham Journal* started to run items from local stakeholders related to the stadium development (e.g. *Tottenham Journal*, 05.07.13: *campaigners demand spurs puts up 100 million for renewal of Tottenham - community open meeting Saturday*). These articles in the local press started to pick-up on the growing mobilisation that was taking place in the area that included the organisation of a conference by community-minded activists (Chris Brown blog, 04.08.13: *Tottenham slow motion car crash – top down versus bottom up*); protests by the Tottenham Traders Partnership (*Haringey Independent*, 23.07.13: *This is not regeneration, this is gentrification*); and, later on, links between the local community and Spurs supporters (*Haringey Independent*, 07.10.14: *Spurs fans, local people and businesses must stick together for a brighter future*).

In Tottenham, with the stadium development stalled, the football club reluctant to provide any information, and Haringey Council struggling to deal with many issues connected to the wider regeneration and numerous other problems within the borough, local stakeholders from Tottenham, including members of the *Our Tottenham* group were increasingly being sought for their views. Aside from the above, further examples included interviews carried by local media; letters published in the *Evening Standard* (28.03.13) and the *Guardian* (11.11.2013, 18.04.2014, 17.05.2015); an interview with Dave Morris of *Our Tottenham* carried by *BBC Radio London* (24.09.13) and an item for the *BBC 1 London News* evening bulletin (05.09.2013), which contained an interview with Lia Clera Gomes a local resident and business owner, who was also a member of a number of community groups. This type of media strategy had proved successful in previous campaigns against developments linked to football clubs:

*“The groups that are well organised are most able to influence football clubs and most likely to embarrass the club if they don’t get their own way. Social media savvy, well connected”*, (Y, executive of community sport trust, Interview with author, 07.11.13).

A further example in early October 2013, involved David Conn, a reporter from the *Guardian*. Conn, accompanied by the author, interviewed a number of local people before attending a consultation meeting organised by the council for residents and business owners about regeneration projects that were proposed in the area around the stadium development. A detailed three-page article subsequently appeared in the

Guardian on 30.10.13 (*Tottenham's new stadium: how club can cash in on development plan*) in which local stakeholders were extensively quoted about their concerns for their homes and businesses. The football club and the local council were also quoted, but their views were not given the same prominence as the concerns of others about the stadium and linked developments. Further, interviews with a number of local stakeholders also appeared on a video linked to the article.

A number of individuals that were linked to the *Our Tottenham* group saw the power of media to embarrass Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC over specific issues due to the reputational damage. An understanding developed that the focal organisations cared about their media perception. As one individual stated:

*“It is through media and social media that we can keep the pressure on. They [Haringey Council] accused me of low-grade media hackery – I take that as a compliment”,* (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation in community meeting, 18.10.15)

The different approaches of *Our Tottenham* and Tottenham Hotspur FC to working with the media were made clear after the football club invited the community organisation to attend a meeting on 04.07.13. One of the first things said by a representative of Tottenham Hotspur at the start of the meeting was that they would like the meeting to be off the record as they found things worked better that way. One of the first utterances by a member of the *Our Tottenham* group as they left the stadium concerned how the meeting should be written up for a press release to go out

as soon as possible. This example also demonstrates how the media was used by the group to gain power and legitimacy. The football club had been annoyed at what they assumed to be the use of part of their logo on posters, but it had unwittingly provided *Our Tottenham* with means of influence through their invitation and the group was quick to seize the opportunity. The ability of *Our Tottenham* to interact directly with a Premier League football club, a focal organisation that remained generally very uncommunicative, demonstrated degrees of power, legitimacy and urgency possessed by the community group. The resulting publicity provided further salience for the *Our Tottenham* network and practical evidence that indirect strategies can allow stakeholders to increase their power and legitimacy in a way that enhances their bargaining positions with focal organisations, (Laplume *et al.*, 2008). It also provided an example of how both Tottenham Hotspur and Haringey Council appeared to be out-manoeuvred by stakeholders working against regeneration proposals as they mobilised, formed alliances, protested and used the media to the detriment of the position of the focal organisations. Certainly *Our Tottenham* and other stakeholder organisations such as the Tottenham Traders Partnership were organised and utilised indirect pressure through media in order to extend their influence and salience with the focal organisations. Individuals involved with these groups became aware of the power of the media to exert this type of influence as was clear in the response to a question about how Haringey Council perceived *Our Tottenham*:

*“I think they are quite threatened by Our Tottenham, because they care about their media perception. It makes them quite upset”, (participant observation at community meeting, 18.10.15).*

In both East Manchester and Tottenham media articles related to stadium-led regeneration at both sites attracted a wide range of comments online. In East Manchester, focal organisations were generally open with the media. The coverage and comments were largely benign or positive. The focal organisations in Tottenham seemed more reluctant to engage with the media, leaving the field more open for others. The stakeholder groups in Tottenham used the media as an important intermediary to create a greater awareness of issues connected to the stadium-linked regeneration. For those stakeholders, unable to use direct withholding or usage strategies, the media was an important indirect ally in exerting pressure and increasing their own salience with the focal organisations (Frooman, 1999). The next chapter will consider how use of media and the various strategies outlined above impacted on the power, legitimacy and urgency of the stakeholders in being able to influence the stadium-led regeneration in East Manchester and Tottenham.

## Chapter 7 Results and analysis: means of stakeholder influence

### 7.1 Introduction

Three concepts from the two research sites were prominent in making up the dimension of means of stakeholder influence and these were power, legitimacy and urgency. The results of this research therefore supports the earlier work of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) in finding these concepts as the most salient in gaining influence on stadium-led regeneration. Some authors have considered that other variables such as proximity (Driscoll and Starik, 2004) might be found as relevant to salience, but no other means of influencing stadium-led regeneration in either East Manchester or Tottenham were significantly supported. Although all three elements tended to work in support of each other, power was the concept that was most frequently mentioned by all stakeholders and therefore considered paramount. There were examples from the two research sites of a number of different ways in which power has been defined as were set out in the literature review. These will be considered in this chapter.

### 7.2 Power

*“I mean councils are always in awe of football clubs. Either because they support them or councillors are actual fans of that club. It’s not an equal relationship”, (Y, executive of community sport trust, interview with author, 07.11.13).*

Stakeholders involved in the stadium-led regeneration were clearly aware of where power lay and examples that supported an interpretation of power that involved an

unequal relationship were not difficult to find at both research sites. The stakeholders' conception of the importance of this type of Weberian power is revealed most strongly in their comments in relation to the capacity of the football clubs at both sites to bring about their desired outcomes and in the ability of local councils to push through their own policies.

However, power also has to be viewed within the context of the institutional framework that existed temporally at the two sites. The original stadium-led regeneration in Manchester, begun in 1999, took place under the New Labour government in which there was an emphasis given to local democracy and decentralisation, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002). Expectations of community involvement and therefore degrees of power came through policies such as the Planning Policy Guidance (1999) and the *New Deal for Communities* that encouraged the involvement, at all stages, of the widest constituency of local interests, including the business community, local community organisations and residents themselves, (Rydin and Thornley, 1991: 205).

The stadium-led development in Tottenham began in 2010, the year of the election of the Coalition Government and two years after the financial crash of 2008, leading to a different institutional context. There was far less concern for community engagement and greater prominence given to economic factors above all others, (Colenutt *et al.*, 2015).

*“The balance between economic, social and environmental factors in planning was radically changed,”* (Colenutt *et al.*, 2015: 7).

This meant an increased space for private sector involvement in regeneration and greater power for developers due to the prominence given to their financial viability concerns, (see for example, Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12). From 2012 onwards with the publication of the National Planning Policy Framework, viability assessment moved to the foreground. It reinforced the asymmetry in the relationship between the property industry, local authorities and the communities they served, (Colenutt *et al*, 2015: 1).

Flegstein (1998) earlier argued that the development of quantification reflected the relative power of stakeholders that was deeply embedded in political and economic arrangements (quoted in McCallister *et al.*, 2013: 4). Viability assessments also meant different stakeholders having differing (or no) access to the consultation process meaning the outcome was rarely, if ever, a fully inclusive consensus, (McCallister *et al.*, 2013: 27). Many stakeholders may have been unaware of the details of these institutional frameworks in which regeneration developments took place, although some community comments (interviews with author) do indicate a good understanding of the power-relationships involved.

The word power was not always used explicitly, but the meaning of the comments from stakeholders is clear. In East Manchester it was not hard to find views on the power of the football team to bring about their desired outcomes from the local council.

*“So despite the fact that Manchester City are only occupants of the stadium under an agreement with the council, many of my informants were anxious*

*about their influence in the area*”, (C, researcher, MMU, interview with author, 18.10.12).

*“As long as they [Manchester City Council] are getting more money out of it you’ll get permission”*, (local resident, East Manchester, participant observation at MCFC Resident’s Forum, 03.09.13).

To a large extent a close relationship between these two focal organisations was acknowledged by representatives of the football club. As one representative pointed out, this was not least due to the fact that Manchester City Council was the football club’s landlords. There was also a joint venture announced between the two organisations to develop land that both organisations owned around the stadium area, (F, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 19.03.13).

*“There are strong ties at a very high level. Howard Bernstein and Richard Leese who are well in with what the club are trying to do. The city council is fortunate that the club is open to being part of the community and not an island”* (A, photographer and writer, Manchester, interview with author, 26.09.12).

There was even an example of crediting responsibility to the football club for an action that may never have taken place, due to its assumed power.

*“Because there was a Wetherspoon’s that had planning permission, didn’t it? A few years ago apparently, but it just never appeared. You don’t know if City have said we don’t want that because of City Square”, (M, supporter, MCFC, interview with author, 27.07.13).*

It is easy to see the relationship in East Manchester between Manchester City FC and Manchester City Council as unequal, given the huge wealth available to the football club and considerable sums already invested in the area by its owners. Manchester City Council is not a large unitary authority (such as Bristol or Cornwall) and covers a relatively small area of the conurbation of Greater Manchester. East Manchester is still one of the poorest areas of the most multiply deprived wards in the whole of the UK, (Evans, 2007: 204). However, at the start of the regeneration process in East Manchester with the New Deal for Communities programme in 1999, processes were put in place to ensure local stakeholders were involved:

*“It was clear to me that local agencies weren’t used to working together and we understood we weren’t going to change an area without engaging all the stakeholders”, (Hilary Armstrong MP, Minister with responsibility for Local Government and Housing, 1997-2001, from Grant, 2010)*

The forums for engagement and participation that were put in place became established and involved multiple stakeholder groups in East Manchester. So, whatever the apparent disparities in power between the local council, the football club

and local stakeholders, there was an embedded process to involve the local community.

*“Believe me, we weren’t ‘yes’ people. No way. We were vocal... very vocal. If we didn’t understand anything, we’d stop them in their tracks and ask them to explain without using jargon. Don’t speak to us in initials; speak to us in plain English, we’d tell them”*, (Linda Wagner, resident, East Manchester, from Grant, 2010).

Although no specific research was carried out in East Manchester, Deas and Doyle (2013) identified positive gains in social capital that developed in areas where there has been major area-based regeneration in Manchester – as was the case with the NDC and subsequent developments in East Manchester. During the research process it was therefore possible to understand that stakeholders in East Manchester already possessed degrees of salience from this historical process. A prime example of this was the alternate monthly meetings between the football club and local residents and local businesses. It is possible to view such meetings as an example of Allen’s (1997) conception of power, an increase in which is achieved through collective alliances. Such meetings might also be understood through Lukes’s (1974) multi-dimensional view of power, within which not only is the football club able to shape the agenda, but stakeholders can develop a level of false consciousness. Perhaps some of the concerns expressed by stakeholders provided support for this conception, whereby some potentially deeper or problematic issues for the focal organisations involved were not discussed in favour of those that were deemed more interesting:

*“Can the residents have a night in the hotel before the players move in”,*  
(resident, East Manchester participant observation at MCFC Residents Forum,  
03.09.13).

*“How many tickets were allocated for the concerts ... Can we get more?”*  
(resident, East Manchester, participant observation at MCFC Residents Forum,  
03.09.13).

Under Lukes’s (1974) conception, the football club, in part by use of such meetings, could exclude the real interests of local stakeholders in East Manchester – the most effective use of power being to prevent any conflict from arising at all. There was some awareness of the issue of weaknesses within local communities that can be exploited by more powerful organisations, albeit from the perspective of somebody closely connected to a football club:

*“I suppose the powerful versus the weak, that classic friction. So if they perceive the local residents to be weak, not organised, not articulate, not well educated, not unified. Then they can dance, run rings around them”,* (Y, executive of community sport trust, interview with author, 07.11.13).

Certainly the ways in which the meetings were conducted and the outcomes for stakeholders in East Manchester demonstrated degrees of salience with the focal organisations that were not present in Tottenham. One of the similarities in Tottenham with East Manchester was the dominant position of the football club.

Tottenham Hotspur FC is the largest landowner in the area, a significant local employer and, through its separately constituted community sports trust, a significant provider of community outreach work. As a result of this position in the locality, the ability of the football club to bring about the outcomes it desired was recognised and discussed; frequently unfavourably by stakeholders. This form of Weberian power was acknowledged and many local people believed that Spurs were “*holding the council to ransom*” or that “*the council are pandering towards Spurs*”, (Q, local resident and activist, Tottenham, interview with author, 21.08.13). Even local councillors expressed concerns that “*Spurs rule. They are the ones with the ball of string*”, (S, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 10.09.13):

*“I think that perhaps what is worrying local people is that we know Tottenham Hotspur have got a track record of having the ear of the council”,* (Councillor Bull, webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council on 25.11.13).

Despite the changed planning policies and economic pressures which the council was operating under, the leader of Haringey Council, Claire Kober, found perceptions that the football club had any kind of power over the stadium-led regeneration process more difficult to understand:

*“I think the kind of characterisation that somehow the council is dancing to Spurs’ tune is something I find quite curious”,* (Clare Kober, Leader of Haringey Council from webcast of Overview and Security

Committee of Haringey Council, 25.11.2013).

Officers of Haringey Council were in fact keen to stress the council's own autonomy and to distance itself from the idea that the local football team possessed any power over it. One council officer stated that the consultation on the High Road West development had been carried out without the cooperation of Spurs and the football club had been angered by this approach. (Officer of Haringey Council from webcast of Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council, 25.11.2013). This ignored other significant factors such as changes to planning policy in 2011 that required all local authorities to review existing s106 agreements on schemes that were unviable; *"to ensure viability... and to provide competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to be deliverable"*, (National Planning Policy Framework, 2012: para 173).

The view of more than one resident was that the football club had been planning for the stadium-led regeneration for a number of years and was aware of the powerful position it and the local council were in when it came to decisions over the purchase of property around the football ground:

*"I think they [Tottenham Hotspur FC] viewed the shop as not very important and probably thought they could buy it for under market value. So my agent wrote to them and said this was ridiculous it's not even half the value. And the guy wrote back: 'it's only a minor advantage to us to get the shop early."*

*We will be able to obtain it with CPOs later anyway”*, (X, local business owner, interview with author, 18.10.13).

In truth there were many expressions of this Weberian conception of power in Tottenham whereby it was accepted by stakeholders in the area that a focal organisation such as Haringey Council had the capacity to prevail in the decision-making process, whatever the reasons behind its decision-making:

*“We will be severely affected by the regeneration. Our home and business will be demolished. We supported Tottenham staying here. When this came to light we couldn’t believe it – we are being pushed out, we will lose our home and our friends”*, (L, local resident and business owner, interview with author, 23.07.13).

In Tottenham, there was an acknowledgement that some people that had voted positively in one of the consultations about redevelopment of social housing might have done so without having been provided with all of the information on which to make their decision and against their basic interests:

*“I’d never even heard of social cleansing until the last meeting, but for me 70% who said ‘yes’, they won’t be here”*, (CQ local resident, Tottenham, questionnaire, 18.08.14).

Although some residents had agreed to go along with council development proposals, there seemed to be less acceptance of any pervasive ideology of the kind outlined by Lukes's (1974) multi-dimensional view of power:

*“The football club appears to have a very arrogant attitude to the area and the power they exert over it. There is a discrepancy between their desire to ‘work with the community’ and the actual ability of them to do so – they have not”,* (CQ, local resident, Tottenham, questionnaire, 18.08.14).

There were also examples of Allen's (1997) alternative conception of power as a resource for achieving diverse ends, which can be seen through the understanding by some stakeholders of the need to pool resources in order to exert influence to gain greater power over developments. In a moment of prescience that pre-dated the meeting between *Our Tottenham* and the *Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust* by over a year, one supporter pin-pointed the issue:

*“Power always tries to play those it seeks to control off against each other. So it's important that Spurs fans and the local business and residential communities work together to achieve the best outcome for the greatest number”,* (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13).

So there was a clear realisation by some individuals of the importance of forming alliances, as part of the way to increase power.

*“Everyone from this parade was representing the owners of the buildings. The owner went from Tennessee Chicken. The shopkeeper couldn’t go, but the owner went. M is the owner and he works the shop and took his son there; C went from next door; B and I went, so there was a big cluster of us”*, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 23.07.13).

This can be discerned in East Manchester (with residents groups for example), but there were also many examples of both stakeholders and focal organisations cooperating in order to increase their power in Tottenham. For example the Tottenham Landowners and Major Businesses Group appeared to have been set up to support many of the major land developments that were being proposed and included representatives from Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. For stakeholders, it was an on-going process to match the power of those organisations:

*“We know that the council might find it easier to push people on council property around, but they find it harder with all the freehold owners and leaseholders on non-council property”*, (X local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13).

There was also an implicit recognition that more investment could be available from the focal organisations in Tottenham if the community worked together to increase its power.

*“People have to support each other and demand the best from the considerable resources that indeed are available if there was enough pressure from the community we could access these resources”*, (Q, local resident, Tottenham, interview with author, 21.08.13).

In East Manchester, some stakeholder groups had previously been involved in forming alliances and working with focal organisations such as the football club and Manchester City Council as a result of previous regeneration projects. Despite the apparent disparities between the groups, this had resulted in some sharing of power between stakeholder groups and focal organisations. In Tottenham, this process was at an earlier stage with stakeholders forming groups and alliances in order to try to increase their own power with focal organisations. Stakeholders did this through a range of strategies, such as the use of intermediaries that included the media, and multiple forms of dissent and protest outlined in earlier chapters. As outlined above, the institutional context had changed significantly since regeneration had started in East Manchester in 1999 and this had a greater impact on the power relations between groups in Tottenham.

### **7.3 Legitimacy**

*“The sheer number of people and groups who attended [the Our Tottenham Community Conference on 01.02.14] is yet another sign that people in Tottenham are tired of the Council’s top-down approach to regeneration”*, (Our Tottenham email, 07.02.14).

In this research, legitimacy was accepted as a characteristic of the stakeholder and also of focal organisations. Legitimacy can be viewed, for example, as having a legal or moral claim on an organisation in order to exert influence. For similar reasons to those set out in relation to power, legitimacy also has to be viewed temporally within the context of the institutional framework in which these capacities were distributed.

The original stadium-led regeneration in Manchester, begun in 1999, took place under the New Labour government which Rydin & Thornley (2002: 2) consider heralded a *“political paradigm shift, reflected in a new agenda of institutional change, social inclusion and participation, sustainability and urban regeneration”*. Thus community involvement was legitimised by central government through policies such as the *New Deal for Communities*.

In 2010, when the stadium-led development in Tottenham began, the institutional context was very different. Through economic and planning policies previously outlined, the financial viability concerns of developers were given increased prominence and greater legitimacy over community involvement and local democracy:

*“When it comes to urban policy we identify a retreat from efforts to engage communities in urban renewal and an embrace of private sector-led local corporatism as the mechanism by which to foster local economic growth, mainly through property development. There is a resonance with the market-led and property-led regeneration of the Conservative government in the 1980s”*, (Dillon and Fanning, 2015: 189).

The changed institutional context may not have been immediately obvious, but in both East Manchester and Tottenham stakeholders and focal organisations demonstrated their own understanding of this element of salience in providing expressions of their legitimacy in order to be able to influence the stadium-led regeneration that was going on. For example, in Tottenham, representatives of the football club stressed its work in the community and its history: “*The Club has been in the area longer than anybody; since 1882*” (THFC executive, participant observation at meeting between THFC and *Our Tottenham*, 04.07.13). While in East Manchester, the football club stressed its willingness to listen and sometimes act:

*“We don’t always get it right, sometimes we can’t do those things for a whole range of reasons, but by and large that’s how we behave”*, (J, executive of MCFC interview with author, 28.05.13).

There was also evidence of focal organisations in both East Manchester and Tottenham being aware of a need for stakeholder representatives to demonstrate their legitimacy, through recognition by those whom they set out to represent, in order to gain access to meetings:

*“It’s by and large invitation, but we’ve had lots of meetings where somebody’s come along and they say that they represent X and as long as we can verify that, that’s fine”*, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).

*“And I think the other thing; you need to have someone to talk to. Now you*

*can't just have different individuals springing up from everywhere and saying I represent that group and I represent that group whereas it's just themselves with one or two concerns. So you have to have established groups"*, (N, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 13.08.13).

From the above, it is clear that part of the stakeholder management process for focal organisations was to work only with groups they viewed as legitimate. Neville *et al.* (2011) argued that if a claim is morally legitimate, but the stakeholder is not, then the claim should still endure and be addressed by managers. However, assessment of the legitimacy of some stakeholders may have been a way for the focal organisations to ignore groups with whom they did not want a relationship, which could change dependent on the institutional context at the time:

*"What we try and do is use bona fide representatives of the community, residents associations and groups, rather than if you like a free for all. So I have to be careful there, yes it's open door, but it isn't a free for all"*, (J, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 28.05.13).

It is clear that in this case the football club was looking to involve broad-based and mainstream groups. Given the institutional context that existed in Tottenham, where private developers were granted increased legitimacy and seen as catalytic for the area, financial viability concerns were raised by the football club together with attempts to marginalise some community groups, together with the arguments they put forward:

*“Everybody agrees improvements are needed, but the demands are not realistic. We have spent £100m buying property in Tottenham on a turnover of £130m. Nobody else is buying property in Tottenham”* (executive of THFC, participant observation at meeting, 04.07.13).

But stakeholders also questioned the legitimacy of focal organisations during the stadium-led regeneration process in Tottenham, especially in relation to consultation processes:

*“They can’t vote against the whole plan; that’s why it was intellectually dishonest, the whole bloody thing, because you weren’t allowed to say ‘nothing, refurbish the estate please”* (R, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 10.09.03).

This supports the view that the changed institutional context in Tottenham meant a lack of community input, (McAllister *et al.*, 2013: 28) and where *“the limited scope of such consultations was hardly surprising,”* (Dillon and Fanning, 2015: 202).

However, as with the earlier salience concept of power, there was evidence that both stakeholders and focal organisations in East Manchester were perceived to possess considerable legitimacy through the regeneration process that had taken place over the previous fifteen years in the area and endured through later developments:

*“Eventually with all their training and presentations we ended up knowing as much as the council did, they’d taught us that well”*, (Maggie Warburton, resident, East Manchester, from Grant, 2010).

The concept of legitimacy seemed to be one that was also passed down the supply chain in East Manchester, where it was important for contractors working on stadium-led regeneration projects for the football club to maintain their own legitimacy. This was done in part through setting Key Performance Indicators related to numbers of local residents employed and setting-up of apprenticeships. There was also reflection from East Manchester on how local stakeholders that engage and participate can not only bring legitimacy to large regeneration projects, but also be major assets in those developments.

*“Appointing local people was one of the best things they could have done. That works. Even with the best intentions, people coming in from the better parts of town do not understand what it is like to live in this area”*, (Dot Rathbone, East Manchester resident, from Grant, 2010)

*“I have a great deal of respect for the resident representatives, their impact has been fantastic over the years”*, (Hedley Carter, resident, East Manchester, from Grant, 2010).

In Tottenham, some groups had only recently formed to influence the regeneration process and others had not become involved in the associated issues until after

consultations started in 2013. This indicates that time can be an important element in gaining legitimacy. The issue was acknowledged by a local councillor who implicitly accepted that the focal organisations involved would take notice of issues raised by legitimate groups, but that point had not yet been reached:

*“So I think it is those networks probably that are missing or lacking in that part of Tottenham, because if there is proper co-ordination I am sure that the council and Spurs will take note”, (N, local councillor, Haringey, interview with author, 13.08.13).*

As part of the changing dynamics of the area, groups were still in the process of becoming known and for some groups, like *Our Tottenham*, their legitimacy was questioned, especially by supporters of the football club, where members of the *Our Tottenham* network were described as: *“... a couple of left wing union members and the local stoner demanding 100m ... not even sure why THFC give them the consideration of a meeting”, (comment to Haringey Independent, 5 July, 2013).*

*“Perhaps Our Tottenham should stop trying to speak on behalf of the "community" when they have zero mandate to do so” (comment to Haringey Independent, 5 July, 2013).*

Other people were keen to stress that the regeneration issues in Tottenham were not just marginal points picked up by one community group, with large numbers of individuals willing to sign a petition to save local homes, shops and other businesses:

*“More than 1,800 people from the N17 area alone signed our petition, and that’s equivalent to half the households in the High Road West area; or twenty times the figure used by the council as a mandate to demolish”* (Patricia Percy, member of Tottenham Business Group, in Haringey Independent, 22.01.14).

The meeting between Tottenham Hotspur FC and *Our Tottenham* in July 2013 increased the community group’s legitimacy in the area at an early stage of its organisation and supported its own claims to have a local mandate:

*“So the fact that we’ve got together as Our Tottenham and the fact that it’s in a very short space of time we’ve had a large conference ... and pledged to campaign together and to support each other is a huge step forwards for those groups, for the people of Tottenham ... We’ve got a mandate, we’ve got a superb charter”*, (Q, local resident and activist, interview with author, 21.08.13).

*Our Tottenham* used the meeting with the football club to increase the public profile of the community group and its demands through articles in the local press, which arguably further increased its legitimacy. In this example, the media was able to positively affect the legitimacy of the stakeholders, and their claims (Neville, 2011). A second conception of legitimacy is also supported by the meeting. For the football club, stakeholders that have the ability to affect the organisation can be considered legitimate (Freeman, 1984). Some of the claims put forward in the meeting by the

*Our Tottenham* group, such as payment of £100 million for community benefit may have been deemed illegitimate by the football club, especially in the institutional context of the council trying to attract private investment into the area. However, due to the ability of the group to affect the organisation, the football club found it legitimate to spend time and resources to invite *Our Tottenham* representatives for discussions.

The later meeting between *Our Tottenham* and the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust on 12 November 2014 arguably further enhanced the community group's legitimacy and increased pressure on Tottenham Hotspur FC to respond to the demands of both groups. Such a meeting demonstrated the ability of *Our Tottenham* to be able to reach out to a wide range of groups, including the football club's supporters, to discuss matters of common interest which could potentially affect the football club and the local council.

As with the concept of power, a number of stakeholder groups in East Manchester were already perceived to have legitimacy by focal organisations, whereas it was still a contested and developing issue in Tottenham. Stakeholders in East Manchester had the benefit of a process of community participation that had become institutionally embedded since the NDC programme started in 1999. In Tottenham, the changed institutional context brought about by the economic crash of 2008 and the election of a Coalition government in 2010 meant greater prominence and legitimacy granted to private property developers such as the football club who were seen as catalysts for economic regeneration. This also meant a corresponding downturn in the legitimacy

of community interests and a situation in which focal organisations needed to be more aware of the changing dynamics of salience concepts such as legitimacy to identify stakeholders whose attributes altered rather than remained static, (Friedman and Mason, 2004).

#### **7.4 Urgency**

*“There is a feeling that you’ll be next, even if you are not directly affected at the moment”*, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham).

Although this concept is the one for which there was the mildest support in the research, it was prevalent in the data as a means of influence and there were numerous examples of its relevance at the two research sites. Stakeholders, particularly in Tottenham, showed awareness of the need to stress the criticality of their own claims to focal organisations that included calls for immediate attention and that individuals *“... had to wake up and smell the coffee”*, (X, local resident and business owner, Tottenham). Such expressions of urgency should not have been surprising in Tottenham as associated developments of the stadium-led regeneration included plans to demolish residences, together with retail and industrial units adjacent to the proposed new stadium. Here, there were calls for immediate attention:

*“When, why and how will you take us off the plan? We own our property”*, (L, local resident and business owner, Tottenham).

With some justification, it was stakeholders whose homes and businesses featured on these plans that advanced urgency as a central part of their claims to influence:

*“People are very concerned, they’re frightened, they’re very scared”*, (X, local business owner, Tottenham, interview with author, 18.10.13). These stakeholders clearly saw their claim not just as urgent; the criticality of the issues was also made clear:

*“I have lived in Tottenham all my life. I have never been scared, not until I saw these plans. The uncertainty and strain it has put on our family and neighbours is awful”*, (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation in community meeting, 19.06.13).

Unsurprisingly, it is ‘urgent’ stakeholders that are more likely to take action than those not possessing this attribute and these stakeholders in Tottenham were at the vanguard of the campaign against some of the associated developments related to the stadium-led regeneration. There were also warnings to others as part of a claim of urgency:

*“We say this to Tottenham residents: Beware! We are at the forefront of this process. Your turn is coming next. Get involved now, be aware that area plans are already made, and question everything in this process”*, (Patricia Pearcy, Haringey Independent, 22.01.14).

It is also possible to see how the concept of urgency, especially where the issue is critical, is used to re-inforce calls to form alliances and to mobilise:

*“We, the local independent businesses, the residents and workers in the area need help and support immediately”* (participant observation at street assembly, Tottenham, 06.07.13).

The link between urgency and alliances and mobilisation is not one that has been made previously, but demonstrates the two-way relationship between means and strategies of stakeholder influence that is set out in the framework (Figure 5.1, page 158). Stakeholders in Tottenham clearly saw the criticality of their claims as a way in which to influence not just the relevant focal organisations but also wider groups within the community. These expressions of urgency occurred during a period in which Tottenham Hotspur FC was largely silent on their stadium development due in part to the slow process of land assembly for the stadium. This involved litigation by Haringey Council to obtain a compulsory purchase order over the business premises of Archway Metal to assemble the site for the new stadium. The litigation eventually concluded positively for the council and the football club in February 2015. At this point there was more urgency from the football club to make progress with the new stadium development, although it still took several months before the press launch in July 2015 of a revised stadium development plan. The revised development necessitated a further planning application with all its associated voluntary and statutory consultations. This involved further triggers and strategies by stakeholders

and focal organisations by which to influence the latest stadium-led regeneration plans.

*“Stadium controversy grows. Local people oppose threats of demolition of nearby homes and estates, shops and businesses, and historic buildings. The local campaign is growing, we say no”*, (Leaflet handed-out to people attending pre-application meeting at Northumberland Park School, 15.07.15).

*“At this stage and barring no major hiccups we are committed to staying on course for a 2018 opening and shall be working with Haringey Council to facilitate a timely process”*, (Daniel Levy, Chairman, THFC, The Hotspur, July 2015).

Eventually the revised planning application was approved by Haringey Council on 16 December 2015.

*“We are determined that this scheme delivers something that becomes an iconic landmark, instantly recognisable around the world and capable of acting as the catalyst needed to kick-start the regeneration of this area”*  
(Daniel Levy, Chairman, THFC, The Hotspur, July 2015).

In East Manchester the main expressions of urgency came from the football club, keen to make progress with their plans that, aside from the Etihad Campus, also involved building new, larger stands to the main stadium as this research progressed:

*“It’s an aggressive timetable, but could be modified by only doing one end at a time”*, (MCFC executive, participant observation at MCFC Business Forum,

Stakeholder groups in East Manchester did not have the same immediate concerns over the stadium-led regeneration that was taking place as stakeholders in Tottenham did and therefore it was less obvious during this research. In East Manchester there was not the time-sensitivity or criticality to claim immediate action from stakeholders to focal organisations. For those stakeholders in Tottenham whose homes and businesses were threatened with demolition, urgency was an important means to influence focal organisations and it can be heard in their comments. Although urgency as a concept was present at both research sites, it was different groups in East Manchester (a focal organisation) and Tottenham (local stakeholders) for whom it had most resonance. The concept of urgency again demonstrates the changing dynamic of stakeholder relationships and further supports the need for an active understanding of stakeholder groups advocated by Friedman and Mason (2004).

The framework for understanding how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration, including all twelve concepts, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, which also sets the study in the context of previous research to highlight supporting evidence; any contradictory indications; and developing issues.

## Chapter 8: Discussion

### 8.1 Introduction

*“...situations where the interests of a stakeholder and a firm are in conflict form the more interesting class of stakeholder firm interactions...”*, (Frooman, 1999: 197).

This chapter sets out how stakeholders have sought to influence the stadium-led regeneration projects in East Manchester and Tottenham based on the results of the research and as set out in the stakeholder influence framework. It will place the results within the context of previous related research, firstly through reflecting on the triggers, strategies and means of stakeholder involvement; then by assessing the impacts and limitations of the stakeholder's strategies and means of influence.

In this research, the typology of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) was used deductively to consider its relevance, but also inductively, with a view to being open to understand other ways in which stakeholders in two complex, urban developments might influence stadium-led regeneration. This philosophical position was supported by the volume of relevant data that was obtained. The results chapters evidence that the interviews and participant observations carried out for this research yielded considerable data related to how stakeholders try to influence stadium-led regeneration projects. However, much of it could not be categorised within the Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) typology, which was too parsimonious (Hendry, 2005: 94) to adequately explain the array of contexts, triggers, strategies and influences that were taking place; much more was going on underneath the surface in order ultimately to try to influence focal stakeholders. Thus, the framework developed from the results

includes the twelve concepts found to be most strongly linked with how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration.

There were many surface similarities between the East Manchester and Tottenham sites including their urban locations, the wider regeneration proposals linked to stadium development and the size of the two football clubs. However, the context and triggers for stakeholder involvement, together with the strategies used to gain the means of influence, were linked in different ways at each of the sites. This can be explained in part by the different geography and history at the two sites, but also, importantly, the approach of focal organisations to the consultation, engagement and participation of stakeholders. The situation in Tottenham, where there was a good deal of observable conflict between stakeholders and focal organisations did, as Frooman (1999) suggests, provide interesting and also highly relevant material for this research study. Although there was less open conflict in East Manchester, the ability to study a comparable site with a different local context provided major benefits in providing corroborative evidence to develop the framework.

The relevance of the context at both sites can be understood through the comments from stakeholders in interviews and from observations carried out at meetings in East Manchester and Tottenham. The results provide considerable support that the context effects can be both subtle and powerful. One of the most compelling illustrations of the reasons to pay attention to context resides in its capacity to explain anomalous organisational phenomena, (Johns 2006).

## **8.2 Context and triggers for stakeholder involvement**

Some of the concepts that emerged from the research not only provided context, but became significant triggers for stakeholder involvement, especially in Tottenham, where stadium-led regeneration was at an early stage at the start of this research in 2013. The anomalous phenomenon of lack of power, legitimacy and urgency became a significant trigger for the involvement of many stakeholders in Tottenham, which led to strategies to achieve these attributes. This phenomenon has not been revealed in previous stakeholder research, and is potentially relevant for planned stadium-led regeneration projects in the future, of which there are an increasing number. In East Manchester there were fewer triggers towards involvement. On this basis it is argued that where stakeholders perceive they have some power, legitimacy and urgency they may be less likely to use some of the strategies taken up by stakeholders in Tottenham.

### **8.2.1 Lack of power, legitimacy and urgency linked to the consultation process**

Recent theoretical work by Weitzer and Deutsch (2015) has argued that powerlessness and illegitimacy should be included as attributes within a revised stakeholder prioritisation framework and can play a role in decision-making of organisations. Based on the social influence work of Kelman (1958, quoted in Weitzer and Deutsch, 2015: 1337), it is argued that completely powerless stakeholders may be treated favourably by morally motivated decision-makers. In this research there was no evidence of this type of behaviour from decision-makers within the focal organisations involved. Focal organisations largely adopted an instrumental approach, which regards stakeholders as the means to accomplish strategic objectives, (Parmar

*et al.*, 2010). Nonetheless, it is interesting to see such different concepts of salience now being considered.

The model of stakeholder legitimacy devised by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) has major implications for stakeholders that seek to influence an organisation since entities with no power, legitimacy, or urgency in relation to organisations are not stakeholders at all and will be perceived as having no salience by the firm's managers. Antecedents to salience, such as context and motivating factors, were not considered by the authors. It is therefore important in this model to gain salience in order to influence focal organisations and ultimately, in this research, the stadium-led regeneration process. For many stakeholders in Tottenham, their lack of salience with focal organisations was initially highlighted by the perceived lack of genuine consultation, engagement or participation with the wider regeneration process that included the new stadium and walkway. Many local people, whose own homes and business premises were sign-posted for demolition, were shocked at the lack of influence of their views on regeneration proposals.

Perhaps people in Tottenham should not have been surprised at this situation, given the discourse, planning policy framework and austerity budget introduced by the 2010 Coalition Government, together with examples of similar outcomes of rejection of community participation in other parts of London. Since the election of the Coalition government in 2010, there had been "*a dramatic shift in the discourse around neighbourhood regeneration*", with regeneration itself apparently side-lined as a

policy tool, (Broughton et al., 2011: 82). For example, the National Planning Policy Framework (2012, paragraph 173) stated:

*“To ensure viability, the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to development, such as requirements for affordable housing, standards, infrastructure contributions or other requirements should, when taking account of the normal cost of development and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable”.*

Under this policy developers and land owners aimed to minimise the percentage of affordable units and other community obligations as far as possible. This was supported by a combination of the changed government policy and use of viability assessments. There also appeared to be an acceptance by some in Haringey that regeneration would squeeze out some of Tottenham’s most marginal residents, or at least prevent others like them from moving to the area:

*“Regeneration can be a controversial process. Every building has memories attached. New developments may not be to everyone’s taste. The benefits of physical regeneration are often questioned too – does it lift people out of poverty, or simply price them out of living in the area?” (It Took Another Riot, 2012: 104).*

In allowing an increased number of flats to be built on the site of the existing Tottenham Hotspur FC ground (eventually increased to 580, from 285) and sold on the open market one of the reasons put forward by Haringey council was that it would “...*help broaden the tenure mix in this part of Tottenham*”, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12: 15).

Elsewhere in London, the redevelopment of Woodberry Down estate in Hackney was estimated to increase the proportion of private homes from 31 per cent to 59 per cent. In Southwark council properties on the 1000-home Heygate estate were emptied of their residents to facilitate large-scale development, and over 50 percent of the new units built will be private. There were examples of similar developments in the East London boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets (Watt, 2013: 102-103). On the Carpenter estate in East London residents were very aware their part of Stratford was changing, partly as a result of the Olympics and voiced similar concerns to the people of Tottenham. “*The council want to get rid of the poor people*” (interviewee 2); “*the future is in Stratford but we’re not the type of people it seems they want in Stratford. They seem to want all the well-to-do people in from the City with the money*”, (elderly male resident, BBC News 2012), (Watt, 2013: 110).

Minton (2012) has argued that the body of law related to land assembly or compulsory purchase, which was used in Tottenham and in the above cases, has changed significantly to enable councils (and private landlords) to buy up all the land and property in a given area if they are able to prove the development will be of public benefit.

*“The big change was brought about by an act of Parliament in 2004. It altered the definition of ‘public benefit’, by placing far greater importance on the economic impact of a big new scheme, rather than taking into account the effect of the community”, (Minton, 2012: 22).*

Caruso (2001) argues the growing pressures to assemble ever larger sites are driven by economic development at the expense of eroding the public realm. Land assembly is:

*“... one of the most direct and destructive manifestations of the current economic regime on the city. The requirement to increase returns on investment year on year means that even properties need to earn more. This can only be achieved by demolishing single buildings and erecting ever larger, more efficient ones”, (Caruso, 2001: n/a).*

This legislative change, along with other changes in planning policy and rising land values has led to a loss of public space and what Harvey (2008: 39) has termed “*the right to the city*” increasingly falling into private or quasi-private ownership through an “*accumulation by dispossession visited on the least well-off*”. In the context of the USA, Harvey (2008: 38) has discussed the example of New Haven, where wealthy Yale University has redesigned much of the urban fabric to suit its own needs after the town became strapped for resources for urban investment, leading to neighbourhood resistance.

The parallels of the above with major English football clubs in stadium-led urban regeneration projects are not hard to see. Once the idea of lack of influence had taken root in Tottenham it also fed into local stakeholder's views about the economic and social impacts and lack of transparency around the regeneration process.

Consultations were carried out by Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC about their separate proposed developments. These focal organisations were clearly satisfied with the processes they undertook, but many local stakeholders felt that the consultations were a “*sham*” and this was frequently reflected in their comments. Of particular concern to many people was the High Road West consultation, which contained three options for degrees of demolition to social housing and retail businesses, none of which involved refurbishment to properties. People were shocked that they were only being consulted on how much of the estate and how many of the retail businesses would be demolished. A view grew amongst local people, especially those living and working in the areas nearest to the football stadium, that it was not a genuine consultation. Also, that there was little attempt at engagement by the football club or the council, or any encouragement to participate in the regeneration process. As a result, many individuals within this group believed that decisions on the future of their homes and businesses had already been taken, whatever the results of the consultation, and this is evident from evidence in the results chapters.

At least one Haringey councillor felt this position had been reached due to a lack of engagement and organisation on the part of the local community at the outset of the regeneration process. The perceived lack of genuine consultation, engagement and participation then became a further trigger for stakeholders in Tottenham to attempt to

gain salience through a range of strategies that included mobilisation, dissent at meetings, protests and use of the media in its many diverse forms. Differences in emphasis between stakeholders in East Manchester and Tottenham that began to emerge through the analysis of the data were clear when it came to considering this issue of lack of power, legitimacy and urgency combined with issues of consultation, engagement and participation.

These differences were framed by the temporal sequence of change, which started in East Manchester in 1999 with the New Deal for Communities programme; followed by the building of the City of Manchester Stadium for the 2002 Commonwealth Games; and completion of the *Etihad Campus* in 2014. The election of Labour in 1997 reflected a new agenda of institutional change, social inclusion and participation, sustainability and urban regeneration, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 3). At the start of the regeneration process in East Manchester, the NDC:

*“...encouraged a more holistic approach to problem solving, a ‘mixed market’ in the delivery of services and the involvement at all stages of the widest constituency of local interests, including the business community, local community organisations and residents themselves”, (Rydin and Thornley, 1991: 205).*

In East Manchester significant efforts were made to ensure that as many people as possible, rather than a small clique, had the opportunity to be involved, which later included training and development programmes, (Grey, 2010). The policy changes

implemented by the Labour government were not just related to the NDC. In 2001, a consultation paper *Planning: Delivering Fundamental Change* (DTLR, 2001) proposed sweeping changes to the planning system. Statements of Community Involvement would require effective involvement in development control as well as development planning, (Prior, 2005: 476).

Over the following years these themes became embodied in legislation and as a result the context for planning and regeneration also changed. Many of the new priorities, such as community empowerment, involved a reappraisal of the purpose and procedure of planning, (Rydin and Thornley, 2002: 2). Colenutt *et al.*, (2015: 1) have argued that during the 2000s there was a period of government concern for sustainable development which gave environmental and social issues more prominence in planning decisions, but this shift in emphasis went into reverse after the recession and changes in government policy since 2010. Subsequently pre-eminence was given to economic factors over all others with the consequential downgrading of democracy and public involvement since the Coalition government was elected in 2010.

However, due to its recent history of regeneration, there were still embedded existing routes for stakeholders to engage and participate in the on-going stadium-led regeneration of the area in East Manchester, continued by the *Etihad Campus* development. Many resident and community groups had been developed as a result of the 1999 NDC regeneration programme that encouraged the involvement of local people. There were also successive Community Plans negotiated for the area from 1999 to 2017. It can be argued that the major successive area-based interventions in

East Manchester had led to positive gains in social capital, (Deas and Doyle, 2013). Further, that New Labour's approach to governance with its emphasis upon performance, partnership and participation had become so deeply entrenched at the local level that the Coalition's reforms were inevitably interpreted and refracted through this lens, (Lowndes and Prachett, 2012: 22).

Therefore in East Manchester lack of salience played a lesser role, where stakeholders such as resident's associations and community groups already had levels of power and legitimacy from their historical involvement with the main focal organisations and the forums that had been established.

As a result of this engagement and participation, urgency was also less of an obvious issue during the period of this research, since issues could be discussed at an early stage to try to get them resolved. Stakeholders in East Manchester accepted that Manchester City FC, New East Manchester Limited (NEM Ltd) and Manchester City Council were important organisations in the area and the football club was perceived as particularly powerful. However, stakeholder groups perceived themselves to have salience with these organisations through, for example, monthly meetings with local residents groups and local businesses at the football club. Similar meetings were held with the club's supporters. NEM Ltd also had an office in Beswick, near to the *Etihad Campus* development, where people could walk-in to raise issues about the local developments that included projects related to Manchester City FC. These examples provided evidence of the potential for engagement and participation with the focal organisations in East Manchester.

Activities undertaken by these focal organisations, whether acknowledged as stakeholder management strategies or not, put organisations such as Manchester City FC at the centre of a number of networks, which gave them greater power through their involvement in a large number of stakeholder relationships (Neville and Mengue, 2006). It can be argued that the greater salience achieved by stakeholders in East Manchester with focal organisations meant there was not a lack of power, legitimacy or urgency to act as a trigger for the setting-up of new groups or adoption of alternative strategies in order to try to exert influence on the stadium-led regeneration projects. Consultations took place about developments that were linked to the stadium-led regeneration; local people took part, or didn't, as they wanted. In fact, due to the number and frequency of consultations that took place in a period that extended over a decade, it was suggested in the Results chapter that many people were “*consulted-out*”. For example, Manchester City Council accepted that a 2012 consultation linked to regeneration around the *Etihad Campus*, although overwhelmingly positive, returned a “*disappointingly low*” 92 responses (Manchester City Council, 21.11.12).

### **8.2.2 Economic and social impacts**

In East Manchester and Tottenham the issues of economic and social impacts, both positive and negative, were highly relevant to the involvement of stakeholders. With both areas suffering from multiple deprivations, local stakeholders were looking for, and wanted to try to ensure, positive impacts from the stadium-led developments in their area. Although the literature from the USA largely discounts any positive economic relationship between sport-stadium-led regeneration for local communities

(e.g. Baade and Dye, 1990; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; de Mause and Cagan, 2008), there is some support for developments on brown-field sites having some economic and social impacts, (e.g. Quirke and Forte, 1999). Representatives of Manchester City FC were obviously keen to discuss anticipated positive impacts that the *Etihad Campus* and associated developments, built on a brown-field site, could have on the local area both in interviews for this research and across wider media:

*“I think over the next few years we may well see other community and other facilities, such as commercial facilities developing in the area hopefully. I think there’s a hope, a hope from us and from the city council that this will be a bit of a catalyst to regenerate this whole area really”, (F, executive of MCFC, interview with author, 19.03.13).*

There was also academic and journalistic support for some of the claims of economic benefit of the stadium-led regeneration in East Manchester that spanned the various developments in the area of over a decade. Investigating the effects just after the football club had moved into the stadium Brown *et al.*, (2004) found that residents’ representatives that were most involved in the organisations and processes of regeneration were generally positive about the move of the football club to the area. Four years later Davies (2008: 34) found *“tangible and intangible impacts on the commercial property market”*. While in 2011, in an article by David Conn about the planned *Etihad Campus*, public comments underneath the article were largely positive and related to the regenerative effect of the development:

*“I think it would be churlish not to recognise that this investment in a very deprived area of East Manchester is a huge shot in the arm to both the local community and local business”, (reader’s comment, *The Guardian*, 04.10.11).*

During this research, some residents and owners of small to medium-sized businesses in East Manchester also commented on positive wider economic impacts in the area and this is reflected in the results chapters. Residents were happy to confirm the earlier reports that impacts included an increase in local property prices that were anticipated to continue to rise with further public realm improvements associated with the new developments. These comments seemed to be borne out when the Manchester Evening News (MEN, 14.03.2016) published research that average house prices in the M11 3 postcode, near the Etihad Stadium, had risen 718 per cent, from £20,000 in 1995 to £165,000 in 2015. There was also support from interviews for this research, evidenced in the results chapters, for the idea put forward that stadium-led regeneration can be a catalyst for further inward investment.

In East Manchester, local residents expressed concerns during consultations about the importance of securing the maximum economic and employment benefits from the Etihad Campus and linked regeneration projects (Manchester City Council, 21.11.12). It has been argued that hiring locally can build loyalty from the local neighbourhood and evidence suggests that companies perceived to be in touch with the community have far fewer security problems, (Porter, 1995). The football club and its main building contractors employed on the Etihad Campus were concerned not just to hire locally, but also to support the local supply chain through sourcing materials for the

Etihad Campus within the north-west region wherever possible. Hiring of local labour and locally sourced materials were part of the key performance indicators for construction companies involved in the Etihad Campus development and they became part of a positive context for the area. There was a general acknowledgement by stakeholders in East Manchester that some economic and social benefits had been created through the involvement of the football club and the stadium-led developments.

In Tottenham, the football club also stressed their efforts to recruit locally once the building of the stadium and associated developments got under way (The Hotspur, July 2015). For the community in Tottenham, the presence of the football club was acknowledged to bring economic benefits to some local businesses and the majority of local stakeholders did not object to the idea of building a new stadium since they could see advantages from the project, not the least of which was Tottenham Hotspur FC remaining in the area. Many small local businesses had signed a petition to keep the football club in Tottenham when the chairman had bid in 2010 to move to the Olympic Stadium in Stratford, six miles away. However, a central issue in Tottenham, which was closely linked to projected economic benefits, was the wider regeneration plans that included demolitions of many properties around the stadium area as part of the proposed regeneration. During this research much of the development in Tottenham was still at the planning stage and therefore economic benefits were largely projected for the future. Stakeholders could see how the football club would benefit from the new stadium and the proposed developments, so were unhappy with Spurs' greatly reduced section 106 contribution (from £16 million to £477,000) for

community infra-structure. The football club argued it was privately funding the new stadium that involved an investment of over £400 million into the area and decisions about wider regeneration, such as demolitions and the proposed walkway from White Hart Lane station, were made by the council. Research in the USA indicates that sports franchises see regeneration and its economic impacts as an issue for local authorities. It is at best seen as a potential spin-off effect from their own success at filling stadiums and car parks (e.g. Mason and Slack, 1996). For some local stakeholders, this seemed to be the case in Tottenham. Many local residents and owners of businesses in Tottenham failed to see how they would benefit, especially those under threat of compulsory purchase orders for their property, and it was negative economic impacts that became a trigger for stakeholders to devise strategies to gain greater influence on what was happening in Tottenham.

There is less discussion within the literature about negative economic and social impacts of stadium-led regeneration than the potential positive impacts. However, they are real for local residents and business owners and many impacts are linked to event days. Some evidence is anecdotal, such as the waitress from a restaurant nearby to Coors Field in Denver who told researchers of her hatred of match days at the stadium because it drove away her regular customers who were bigger tippers, (Delaney and Eckstein, 2003). Such anecdotal findings were supported at both of the research sites where residents and businesses experienced problems with parking, traffic, anti-social behaviour and, for some businesses, a down-turn in trade.

There is also academic research that evidences negative economic and social impacts for those living and working near stadium-led regeneration developments. Jones (2001, 2002), found three broad themes of potential impact of the Millennium Stadium: the expenditure impacts of visitation; the contribution to urban renewal made by physical development; and the effects on investment and visitation of regular media exposure in the sports pages and on television: not all of which were positive for the local community. For example, the neighbouring community to the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff bore the cost of increased litter, congestion and parking, as well as a serious decline in trade on event days with around half of Cardiff city-centre users unlikely to shop in the centre on match days because of concerns over antisocial behaviour, crowds, and transport, (Jones, 2002).

Similarly, Brown *et al.*, (2006: 39) in researching communities around football grounds, including East Manchester, noted that the staging of football matches can cause significant disruption and nuisance to local residents. During this research stakeholders in East Manchester expressed similar concerns about existing negative social impacts that also included drug dealing and loss of mobile phone signals on event days. Manchester City FC was made aware during their regular meetings with residents of these issues and employed private contractors to clear-up rubbish after events, which provided an example of the power of local stakeholders to hold focal organisations to account on such issues. Officers from Greater Manchester Police and council employees attended these meetings, so that other local organisations could react to the concerns of the local community. Stakeholders were also concerned about issues such as dust and noise from the building of the *Etihad Campus* and these were

discussed in meetings with the football club, at which site contractors were present. Concerns were also raised during consultations that the *Etihad Campus* and linked developments should be fully integrated into the community and did not seek to exclude residents from using facilities, (Manchester City Council, 21.11.12). There was a limit to the extent of community use of the main *Etihad Campus* site, but access to community facilities within the complex was made available.

In Tottenham, there were similar concerns expressed about the negative social impacts, such as traffic, inability to park, litter and antisocial behaviour, related to match days at the stadium; although these were directed largely towards Haringey Council rather than Tottenham Hotspur FC. This was perhaps because the council had forums for such complaints and may have been more responsive. Concerns were expressed to both the football club and the local council at pre-planning application meetings about how the area would cope with an increase in attendance at the new stadium from 37,000 up to 61,000.

However, most of the negative economic and social impacts discussed by stakeholders in Tottenham related to those developments that were proposed as part of the stadium-led regeneration, but had not yet started. Local residents and business owners expressed their views that as part of the wider regeneration linked to the new stadium in Tottenham, “*social engineering*”, “*social cleansing*” and “*gentrification*” were taking place around them; phrases that were frequently used by local stakeholders in community meetings. Equally, in community and council meetings, council representatives were very keen for these phrases not to become part of the

discourse linked with regeneration in Tottenham. Many local people expressed a view that they were being pushed out of the area by Haringey Council so that a new group of people could move in, which is clear from the comments in the results chapters. In the USA community resentment as a result of reduced social housing and dislocation, has been found to be an enduring feature in stadium-led regeneration projects, (Rutheiser, 1996, quoted in Matheson, 2010: 12). In Tottenham, these issues were part of the context of the regeneration and even some local councillors seemed to be having second thoughts on parts of the planning application they had already approved:

*“On the question of Northumberland Park, a question that is really starting to emerge is who is the redevelopment of Tottenham, of Tottenham Hotspur for? Is it for the people living there now or is it for a group of people that you’ve got in mind to live there? And the reason I think we ask this is that when the first planning application went in there was going to be a big chunk, planning officers were really feeling pretty good about they’d negotiated 50% social affordable housing. Next application comes in, that’s gone.”* (Councillor Winskill, webcast of the meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council on 25.11.13).

Tottenham Hotspur FC was seen by many local stakeholders as being responsible for some of these economic and social issues, especially those linked with its own plans for building four residential towers on the existing stadium site, where there would be no affordable housing. The football club was also perceived to be involved with the

proposed walkway to link the new stadium to White Hart Lane train station that would involve the destruction of social housing and the station's potential re-naming by the football club (together with a re-named southern end of White Hart Lane). There were concerns that when the new stadium was built it would be designed to capture the spending of the increased number of supporters to the detriment of local businesses. It was felt by local businesses that the proposed walkway would mean that supporters would go straight into the ground without spending money in smaller local businesses. Similar concerns have been expressed in the USA over "*fully-loaded facilities*", (Crompton, 2004: 48). One commentator, discussing a proposed new stadium in Chicago, put forward a view that many might have been seen as having relevance in Tottenham:

*"Never have city and stadium been so detached from each other. The garages will attach to the park by elevated walkways, and thus fans who arrive by car will have the privilege of never actually setting foot on the South Side of Chicago"*, (Euchner, 1993, quoted in Crompton, 2004: 47).

The local context of existing and potentially negative future economic and social impacts became important triggers in Tottenham that mobilised stakeholders to try to gain salience for their concerns with focal organisations. In East Manchester, some economic and social benefits were seen by the local community as resulting from the stadium-led regeneration of over a decade and they were therefore not significant triggers for further strategies to gain salience with focal organisations.

### 8.2.3 Governance and transparency

Governance and transparency were important concepts that were closely linked with the issues of consultation, engagement and participation. In Tottenham, “*underhand tactics*” and “*lack of transparency*” became part of the discourse in relation to these two issues. A range of research related to stadium building, from Cardiff, Wales (Jones 2002a) to Phoenix, Arizona (Collins, 2008) strongly supports the idea that some stakeholders get excluded from the governance process. Jones (2002) found evidence that local politicians can get seduced by regeneration projects that offer exposure for the city on the global stage and provide glamour not associated with the more mundane task of serving the local populace. Such concerns were replicated in Tottenham where feelings of exclusion were increased when it was confirmed that local councillors had attended the MIPIM property conference in Cannes in 2014 with property developers covering some of the costs, (Haringey Independent, 12.03.14). (Haringey Council returned to MIPIN in Cannes in 2015 and in 2016, when Tottenham Hotspur FC were one of six sponsors that paid £2,500 towards the costs of attending the event, *Haringey Regeneration, 2016*). Municipal governments have been censured for deploying stadium financing in an unlawful and undemocratic manner, by ostracising the community from taking part in the decision-making process, (Lee, 2002: 863). Whilst Collins (2008) found that the ability to exclude competing groups by private interests was essential to obtaining their object of stadium building with public funds.

The results chapters evidence the many concerns that were expressed by stakeholders in Tottenham about a wide range of governance and transparency issues related to

both the development plans and focal organisations. They included concerns over consultation exercises; the evidence base on which consultations were constructed; access to council documents; representation of local views; viability reports that were not made public; the work of groups such as the Tottenham Landowners and Major Businesses Group; and the relationship between Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. Lack of transparency and communication from Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council were part of the context that inspired the meeting on 12.11.14 between Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust and the *Our Tottenham* network; since both groups believed much more information should have been made publicly available about the developments by these focal organisations.

In East Manchester, despite some individual perceptions about the power of the football club, the overall context appeared less threatening to stakeholders. Issues around consultation, engagement and participation, together with economic and social impacts did provide triggers for stakeholders to become involved in the discussions about stadium-led regeneration, but lack of transparency and governance issues were less significant than in Tottenham. Having forums in which to discuss such issues meant they did not immediately lead to alternative strategies, such as dissent, protest or use of the media to embarrass focal organisations as was the case in Tottenham. The context in Tottenham led to a greater momentum towards mobilisation than in East Manchester as a perceived lack of power, legitimacy and urgency together with lack of governance and transparency and the threat of potential negative economic and social impacts, became important triggers for the development of alternative

strategies towards gaining influence for stakeholder groups that became involved in the stadium-led regeneration.

This evidence supports and takes further the stakeholder mapping work of Friedman and Mason (2004), who found that stakeholders that were not perceived to possess any of the three attributes of salience could rapidly become influential. This research provides a framework and detailed evidence to demonstrate how that can occur in real-life stadium-regeneration projects. In this research, it can be argued that some stakeholders, such as the *Our Tottenham* group, that were initially perceived by focal organisations to be without power, legitimacy and urgency were able to change their position to gain salience through a range of strategies.

### **8.3 Strategies of stakeholder influence**

A range of strategies were used by stakeholder groups involved in the stadium-led regeneration process to try to gain salience with focal organisations at both of the research sites. Mobilisation and the formation of groups, alliances and networks were still in progress in Tottenham during the research period, but they quickly moved on to making use of the media together with various forms of dissent and protest. In East Manchester many community groups had existed for much of the previous fifteen years due to the longer process of stadium-led regeneration in the area, but these phenomena were still relevant for their continued salience with the focal organisations.

### 8.3.1 Mobilisation

Within the framework developed from this research, an important stage in the process of stakeholder influence on stadium-led regeneration is through the mobilisation of individuals and groups. Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003: 204) argued that an examination of the “*scant*” literature on stakeholder mobilisation revealed that a stakeholder group’s degree of discontent, or feeling of urgency (“*interest intensity*”), was the primary condition in driving action to influence a focal firm. Some of the scant literature on mobilisation is provided by Hosmer and Kiewitz (2005), who suggest that support for organisations is most likely from stakeholders when they believe they have been fairly considered, fairly treated, and fairly rewarded. Stakeholder mobilisation will thus be more likely when stakeholders believe they have not been fairly treated, considered or rewarded. The empirical research from both East Manchester and Tottenham provides evidence to support and extend this previous work in the stadium-led regeneration context and sets it in the wider stakeholder influence framework.

In Tottenham, lack of salience, negative economic and social impacts, together with a perceived lack of transparency, especially related to the consultation process, generated interest intensity and were triggers towards a range of strategies to try to influence the stadium-led developments. The threat of demolition of many homes and businesses provided urgency towards mobilisation through a belief of some that they had not been fairly treated, which in-turn generated a common identity. The context was more positive in East Manchester where there was support from stakeholders for many of the economic and social impacts linked to the stadium-led regeneration, so

there was less urgency or interest intensity from stakeholder groups towards mobilisation and other possible influencing strategies.

Rowley and Moldoveanu, (2003) argued that a particular stakeholder group is more likely to mobilise or act as part of a collective if it has (a) acted collectively in the past, (b) possessed internal network density (i.e. group members communicate effectively), (c) members who value the common identity through their association with the group, and (d) few members who belong to overlapping groups with conflicting interests.

There were existing campaigning community groups in Tottenham, but many were formed, or gained new impetus, as a result of the stadium-led regeneration plans.

Communication between these groups began to improve through the *Our Tottenham* network, which made mobilisation for events such as presenting depositions to the council, drafting objections to planning proposals or street assemblies, more effective through bringing larger groups of people together.

It should not be overlooked that there can be real practical issues in getting people to respond to consultations. In Tottenham the need to walk less than 100 metres to a library was enough to put some people off a consultation that centred on demolition of local homes and businesses, as evidenced in the results chapter. Where members of stakeholder groups have heterogeneous interests, research from a number of studies (Wolfe and Putler, 2002; Cordano *et al.*, 2004)), supports the idea this can affect their abilities to mobilise and protest around some objectives. For example, in Tottenham some individuals felt there was too much concentration on the role of the football club and the council should be of greater focus in the strategies that evolved. Others felt

that community groups needed to reflect the local populous to a much greater extent, so needed to get out into the community more. In East Manchester, multiple concerns also existed, which included standard of housing, availability of jobs, the educational offering, sports facilities, etc. To some extent the issue of heterogeneous interests in East Manchester were mitigated through the *Eastlands Community Plan* that set out the issues in detail and the involvement of specific local groups in the different areas. However, there were still differences within these groups. As an example, on a prosaic level, in meetings involving Manchester City FC, some people were concerned at the disturbance caused by concerts that took place during the summer at the stadium, but other members of residents groups wanted more free tickets to the events to be made available.

Both research sites provided support for ideas advanced by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) that the formation of solidarity among group members can create a strong culture and the stronger the group's culture, the more salient the group is to its members with a consequent greater propensity to mobilise. The strongest evidence for mobilisation during the period of this research came from Tottenham, where the situation was more dynamic with many new proposals for regeneration, some of which were linked to the new stadium development. Individuals and groups looked to join together and network in order to overcome their lack of salience with the main focal organisations, Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. The research sets out how there was a growing movement towards mobilisation within the local community, which coincided with the release of a major consultation on High Road West in May 2013. During the summer of 2013 stakeholders appeared to realise the

urgency of their own situation and the need to mobilise; or in the words of one business owner, to “*wake up and smell the coffee*”. The results chapters provide evidence for the idea that stakeholders can be driven to mobilise by their local context and a number of potential triggers.

During the development process of the *Etihad Campus*, the main evidence of mobilisation of stakeholder groups was their embeddedness within the regeneration process through, for example, regular attendance at meetings organised by the focal organisations and participation in consultations at various stages. As indicated above, those existing groups had established forums in which to raise issues related to the building work for the *Etihad Campus*. In the language of the salience framework of Mitchell *et al.* (1997), legitimate stakeholders were provided with access and treated as possessing power and potential urgency; they were treated as ‘*dominant*’, if not ‘*definitive*’ stakeholders.

### **8.3.2 Groups, alliances and networks**

As with mobilisation of stakeholders, there has been relatively little research carried out into the impact of groups, alliances and networks in stakeholder theory. In advancing a network theory of stakeholder influences, Rowley (1997), argued that organisations do not respond to each and every stakeholder individually, but to the interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder network. From a management perspective, Oliver (1991) argued that if stakeholders are not strongly connected together, managers are more likely to avoid, defy or manipulate them, rather than acquiesce to their demands. Both of these views demonstrate why it was

important for stakeholder groups to collaborate. Butterfield *et al.*, (2004), while researching the collaboration of stakeholder groups at three nuclear weapons sites in the USA, found that issues such as common goals, shared economic interests, shared vision, and common legal worries all motivated stakeholder groups to collaborate.

Common contexts and triggers, such as lack of power, legitimacy and urgency led over 50 different community groups to affiliate themselves with the *Our Tottenham* network to combine their efforts to try to influence focal organisations. This network challenged existing plans put forward by Haringey Council and other organisations, such as those to demolish social housing and build a walkway to the new Spurs stadium, which is an on-going issue. A number of affiliated organisations also put forward alternative plans for community based regeneration in sites across Tottenham. These included plans related to community centres, social housing, community spaces, parks, markets and retail units. Affiliated groups worked together to develop these plans and shared information about their work with focal organisations such as the council. This was important as many individuals and groups were new to some of the processes of the local council, campaigning and protest. Hendry (2005: 94) found that allies may be sought that do not have stakeholder power of high interdependence relationships with target firms. For example, allies often provide important expertise or additional contacts. Allies' previous experience may enable them to develop more creative solutions. The importance of working at maintaining relationships and networks for community groups have been recognised, (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004). The legitimacy of a claim can also increase where co-operation between stakeholders leads to stronger arguments being presented to support a claim to influence. Even allying

with other relatively weak stakeholders can boost legitimacy, which may encourage more powerful allies to join the alliance. An alliance of relatively weak stakeholders representing multiple perspectives could also convince more powerful stakeholders, such as legislators, of the desirability of the alliance's position, (Hendry, 2005; Laplume *et al.*, 2008). Once individuals nearest the football ground in Tottenham had started to mobilise and network, there was even evidence of councillors reconsidering their own positions on the planning permission that had been granted to the football club.

A significant example of stakeholders forming alliances to enhance their salience with focal organisations from this research includes the meeting between *Our Tottenham* and the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust in November 2014. The meeting involved the discussion of serious issues that both groups believed existed with developments linked to the new stadium and common themes of lack of trust and consultation with Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council, which arguably enhanced both groups' salience with these focal organisations. From the field of collaboration research, Butterfield *et al.*, (2004) point out that a range of positive outcomes have been identified for groups that are able to work together. These include problem solving, learning from partners, distributed risks, achieving collaborative advantage, a greater level of collective understanding, generating social capital, shifts in the power of distribution, efficiency, and organisational. These concepts also link with some of the strategic management literature in which it is argued that co-operation can lead to efficiency gains through reducing duplication and making communication quicker, (Ansoff, 1965, 1988, quoted in Butterfield *et al.*,

2004). Examples of many of these phenomena such as problem solving, learning from partners, greater levels of collective understanding, and improved communications occurred at both of the research sites.

Social capital is a subject that has not been specifically analysed from the data in this research, but there were many examples of this form of economic and cultural capital in evidence at both sites. In Tottenham, although there were initial concerns expressed by some councillors that local people were not engaging with consultations and other public events concerning regeneration proposals, stakeholders seemed to become aware that although they could act individually, there was a need to work in larger groups and networks in order to influence the main focal organisations. Within the *Our Tottenham* network there were a number of individuals with a history of campaigning on a range of issues whose experience was useful to groups that were defending community interests and challenging decisions at different sites. There were individual professionals from legal and planning backgrounds that were able to provide more specific information that was shared within the network. The network also included students and researchers with a range of interests that were able to reciprocate for granting access through drafting responses to planning consultations and regional government investigations, amongst other activities.

A further practical example that supports these various ideas around groups, networks and alliances occurred when Tottenham Hotspur FC invited the *Our Tottenham* group for a discussion at the football club on 4 July 2013. By inviting the *Our Tottenham* into the stadium, the football club implicitly recognised their legitimacy, which added

to the power of the group and demonstrated a degree of urgency to their campaigning. At the meeting, *Our Tottenham* presented a series of demands, including the investment of £100 million in the community by Tottenham Hotspur Football Club, which was not accepted by the football club. In such cases, Butterfield *et al.*, (2004) have argued that stonewalling (i.e. failing to be responsive, maintaining psychological distance, etc.) may in fact be an appropriate instrumental strategy for the focal organisation. As it was, Tottenham Hotspur FC appeared less engaged with local stakeholders involved in the stadium-led regeneration plans and arguably was not a central player in all of its stakeholder networks, while community stakeholders were developing dense network connections. The benefit of being positioned at the centre of social networks is the greater power achieved simply by being involved in a greater number of relationships (Neville and Mengué, 2006). In Tottenham it was the stakeholder groups, through their various alliances and networks that were placing themselves at the centre, whereas in East Manchester focal organisations such as Manchester City FC were making efforts to talk with stakeholders and to be at the centre of their networks.

In East Manchester, Manchester City FC, by engaging with a range of community groups, whether it was part of a strategic stakeholder management programme or not, became central within their networks. Groups that were seen as legitimate worked with focal organisations such as Manchester City FC to try to make changes related to resolve problems such as rubbish and car parking on event days. These can be seen as relatively small efforts by the football club, or what Fineman and Clarke (1996: 727) called “*first order*” changes, which could be expected by stakeholders with a

high legitimacy and low threat status that were achieved without questioning the whole process. Fineman and Clarke (1996) also highlighted the fact that for some stakeholders, greater, second order changes are necessary, which involve a more confrontational approach with the aim of puncturing the equilibrium accepted by focal organisations. Such an approach was more obvious and relevant in Tottenham where dissent and protest played a more obvious role.

There was evidence (e.g., Grant, 2010) to indicate that in East Manchester, important second order changes took place during the period between 1999 – 2002 when the New Deal for Communities investment in the area started and the original City of Manchester Stadium was built. During this period, significant community involvement was encouraged by organisations such as Manchester City Council and New East Manchester Ltd, but also fought for by local community groups in order to direct regeneration away from a top-down approach (Grant, 2010). Parallels can be drawn between this earlier period in East Manchester, in which groups started up and confronted some of the focal organisations and the early stages of mobilisation of groups in Tottenham across the period of 2013 – 2015.

### **8.3.3 Dissent and protest**

The literature suggests that what have been labelled modified vendettas; demonstrations, petitions, research and letter-writing campaigns are actions frequently adopted by agents, such as NGOs or activists, who do not have a resource relationship with the organisation to use as leverage, (Friedman and Miles, 2009: 191). Shipp (1987: 603) defined modified vendettas as “*organised attempts by non-government*

*groups to influence corporations through the application of economic and non-economic sanctions*". The results chapters provide evidence of the different levels of dissent and protest that started to take place in Tottenham related to the stadium-led regeneration. They reveal that community groups were involved in actions that included: street assemblies; conferences; attendance at and responses to consultations in large numbers; organisation of petitions; deputations speaking at council meetings; contributions to regional investigations into stadium-led regeneration; social media campaigns and a range of other media activities that will be considered below. A sense of growing momentum was created:

*"We are going to have more of these campaigns"*, (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation at street assembly, 06.07.13).

One resident specifically credited the council's *"rhetoric"* about consultations with encouraging the formation of groups such as *Our Tottenham* and much of the resulting dissent and protest. This was because the council's actions did not match the words for many stakeholders. Arguably, representative stakeholder organisations have an advantage over focal organisations in that they are able to mobilise volunteers to carry out actions of protest or dissent that are likely to attract media attention (Friedman and Miles, 2009), such as *"going over the wall to dig up the pitch"* of the site of the proposed new stadium. In Tottenham, stakeholder groups and individuals also discussed standing in local council elections and legal action against the council to challenge their consultation process. Individuals can clearly act on beliefs and sentiments in ways that it is difficult to imagine corporations behaving. However,

previous research (e.g. Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Harvey and Schaefer, 2001) indicates that although publicity-seeking actions can generate media attention; it can also make it harder to be seen as a legitimate organisation. This might have been the case for the *Our Tottenham* network if they were perceived to be responsible for digging up a football pitch. It could thus have made the overall objective of influencing the stadium-led regeneration plans more difficult.

There is clearly a balance for stakeholders between gaining the attention of the media and focal organisations through actions that demonstrate power, and alienating them to the extent of losing the legitimacy to exert influence. The meeting between *Our Tottenham* and Tottenham Hotspur FC resulted largely from a poster campaign put up in the vicinity of the Spurs ground that used a similar logo to that of the football club and expressed strong dissent about their involvement in the stadium-led regeneration plans. Fineman and Clarke (1996: 721) found in their work with industry responses to green stakeholders that there was a distinction drawn between “*reasonable*” and “*unreasonable*” protest groups. Within the salience framework, some groups were deemed legitimate and others not so. There was little consistent dialogue with “*wilder*” stakeholders and there were few attempts by managers to accommodate their views ...in the words of one senior manager, “... *it leads us to a dialogue of the deaf*”.’ This description could easily have been applied to the meeting between *Our Tottenham* and Tottenham Hotspur Football Club on 4 July, 2013. The meeting provided significant benefits of salience to the community group, greatly increasing its legitimacy, but little constructive or on-going dialogue. This, and other examples of dissent and protest from Tottenham, supports earlier research that stakeholders’

effectiveness hinges upon their ability to penetrate defensive screens put up by focal organisations by inflicting financial pain (e.g. lost sales or markets, fall in share values), embarrassment (e.g. from reputational damage), or both, (Fineman and Clarke, 1996).

As opposed to individual stakeholders, corporations may be affected by the beliefs and sentiments of their top leaders, but actions based on these beliefs and sentiments will be constrained by the range of other people that must be relied upon to carry out such actions, and by the strict operating conditions required to keep corporations afloat, (Friedman and Miles, 2009). The most severe act of damage linked to the stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham occurred to a local business, Archway Metal. This company fought a long, but ultimately unsuccessful campaign against being moved from the site of the proposed new football ground that involved several years of litigation over the compensation payable to the business; the alleged wider benefits and impacts on the area; and European Union rules on state aid. A few weeks before the court decision that granted a compulsory purchase order to Haringey Council over the property in February 2015, a serious fire broke out in the premises of the business. Although there was a police investigation no arrests have ever been made in relation to the fire, so the reasons or motives for the fire remain unclear. The damage that resulted from the fire closed down Archway Metal at their site in Paxton Road, opposite Tottenham Hotspur's existing stadium and on the centre-spot of the proposed new stadium. Certainly Archway Metal was subject to "*modified vendettas*" by individuals identifying themselves as Spurs supporters over a long period of time; as a look at the twitter feed of @archwaymetal demonstrates.

It should be noted that *Our Tottenham* and other community stakeholder organisations were not in positions to mobilise some of the influencing strategies identified by Frooman (1999), such as direct withholding or direct usage through organising consumer boycotts or shareholder activism related to the football club. This was because a significant majority of Tottenham Supporters were in favour of building the new stadium, if not necessarily the associated developments, and football supporters are seen as extremely loyal to their team (e.g. Tapp, 2004). Further, although Tottenham Hotspur was one of the first football clubs to be floated on the stock-market, it now operated as a private company with 100% of the shares owned by ENIC Group (formerly English National Investment Company). It should also be pointed out that many of the local residents and business owners supported Spurs and backed the idea of a new stadium, but not associated regeneration projects such as the walkway or demolition of social housing. Many of the same people said they could not afford to attend the football matches at the existing stadium. The approach taken by *Our Tottenham* and other groups in Tottenham evidences that stakeholders use direct strategies when the firm depends on them for resources, and indirect strategies that include working through an ally such as the media, when it does not, (Frooman, 1999). Thus, *Our Tottenham* was unable to directly influence Tottenham Hotspur FC through, for example, a boycott of games. However, it was able to use the media to try to embarrass the football club and the local council by, for example, comparing the Section 106 contributions made by local rivals Arsenal to Islington Council. The *Our Tottenham* Community Conference on 01.02.14 evidenced the growth in the number of groups in the area that had subsequently become involved in community

activities around the proposed stadium-led regeneration (representatives of over fifty groups attended):

*“Our meetings and conferences have been well organised: efficient, yet not bureaucratic; democratic and accountable; inclusive and transparent”*,  
(participant observation at community meeting, 18.10.15).

Arguably there were fewer signs of dissent and protest related to the *Etihad Campus* development as a result of the longer period of stakeholder involvement and the implicit acknowledgement of their salience with the focal organisations through forums to air their dissent, or to question the developments. Many of the major changes that were being proposed in Tottenham as part of the stadium-led regeneration had already taken place in East Manchester. Lukes (1974: 27) might also point to this lack of dissent and protest in East Manchester as an example of domination through unconscious mechanisms that result in a manufactured consensus: *“The most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place”*. However, it is suggested that the focal organisations in East Manchester were able to put forward a more positive case than occurred in Tottenham. Not only was there greater engagement and participation during the stadium-led regeneration process, together with more transparency for stakeholders, but due to the chronology of the developments they were also able to see some of the social and economic benefits that were resulting from the stadium-led regeneration.

The context in Tottenham was clearly different to that in East Manchester and lack of salience for stakeholders in that part of Haringey meant that dissent and protest was a

strategy employed to a far greater level. This was supported through the use of important intermediaries such as the media.

### **8.3.4 Media**

Stakeholder groups and focal organisations at the two research sites were aware of the media and its potential uses, but approached it in differing ways. The stakeholder groups were not of a size that ran professional media departments and the strategy of a number of the focal organisations (e.g. Tottenham Hotspur FC) was at times to say as little as was absolutely necessary about the proposed developments. There was also no real evidence of stakeholders in East Manchester using the media to campaign against those developments or for particular community gains. There was evidence in East Manchester that focal organisations such as Manchester City FC and Manchester City Council were keen to use the media to publicise the benefits to the local community of the *Etihad Campus* and its associated developments.

The average property developer might not be overly concerned about their local image, but football clubs regularly claim to be central to their communities in a variety of contexts,<sup>4</sup> so would be expected to be sensitive to any reputational damage related to their engagement with their neighbours that might occur through use of the media. The local councils that were closely involved with the stadium-led regeneration at both of the sites would inevitably face local elections so would also have a stake in gaining positive media coverage and be concerned about any negative publicity.

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<sup>4</sup> The Football Association website contains 2730 (as at 29.03.16) references to community.

Gaining the media's attention was an undercurrent to many of the public and community meetings in Tottenham where stakeholders were aware of the benefit of publicity for their cause. They were also cognisant of the media's readiness to print stories that could be embarrassing or portrayed the main focal organisations in a poor light. The hugely increased use of social media in the last decade amplified the significance for both stakeholders and focal organisations:

*"It is through media and social media that we can keep the pressure on. They [Haringey Council] accused me of low-grade media hackery",* (participant observation at community meeting, 18.10.15).

Frooman (1999) identified use of the media as a part of "*indirect*" withholding, one of four influencing strategies used by stakeholders. Friedman and Miles (2009) supported the idea of the media as intermediaries and argued that mass media could play a significant and under-analysed role in organisation-stakeholder relations. Certain predictable characteristics have been found as to how the media may react to what they term crisis situations. If, for example, there are no comments from focal organisation, the media will seek explanations elsewhere or look for sensational angles, (Friedman and Miles, 2009). It can also allow negative stories to take hold. For example, Tottenham Hotspur FC's approach to questions about the stadium-led regeneration was not to discuss anything to do with the lack of progress for long periods. In Rowley's (1997) terms, the football club was not a central player in all of its stakeholder networks, while stakeholder groups were developing dense network

connections. This allowed those stakeholder groups to get their stories into the media and for rumours to spread, for example:

*“Spurs have tinned up properties around the ground. There are rumours that Directors of Spurs have their own companies and are buying up land”,* (local business owner, Tottenham, participant observation in meeting, 31.07.13).

A three-page article that ran in the *Guardian* on 30.10.13 contained a number of stories from local stakeholders in Tottenham about their views and personal experiences on the stadium-led regeneration. Within the article there were some negative stories about the football club concerned with the buying-up of properties in the area, offshore ownership structures and likely benefit from destruction of property across the road from the new ground. A link to a video entitled *“Tottenham Hotspur get new stadium, but local businesses lose out”* was also produced by the newspaper and made available to readers. It can be argued that it is useful to some stakeholders that stories of effective, efficient stakeholder management do not sell newspapers (or websites). An effect of the trend is the attention the media has given to a number of cases of poor stakeholder management, (Friedman and Miles, 2009).

Some of the individuals involved in running campaigns who were not public relations professionals expressed concerns about the way in which the media would portray their own stories. Stakeholders had an understanding of the need to work with the media, but given that it can play the role of arbiter, facilitator of communication among groups and provide counter-arguments from different opinions, (Marks and

Kalaitzandonakes, 2001); there was also some wariness on their part. This wariness was shared to a large extent by some of the focal organisations, notably Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. Martin Cloake, a Spurs supporter and journalist became so frustrated by the continued failure of the football club to discuss developments, even with their own fans, that he wrote an article in the *Haringey Independent* (18.11.2014) entitled *Everyone has an opinion, but Spurs remain quiet*. The lack of information available in the media from both the football club and the council became one of the issues that inspired the meeting in November 2014 between Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust and the *Our Tottenham* group.

However, the approach of Tottenham Hotspur FC had parallels from the research of Harvey and Schaefer (2001: 251), which involved a number of managers that worked in the energy industry. The media was often considered to be hostile and unfair to their companies and keeping a company out of the headlines was frequently mentioned as one purpose of good environmental management. Managers said they would generally try to avoid the media, unless they were approached in a way that made it impossible not to reply. The authors also found that the media was a stakeholder group whose legitimacy was questioned by these managers. Conversely, it has been argued that organisations attempt to understand stakeholder expectations and the media should not be regarded as an enemy but as a significant stakeholder that can shape the perceptions of an organisation's performance during a crisis, (Jackson and Schantz, 1993, quoted in Friedman and Miles, 2009). There was awareness within some football clubs of the potential for disruption by well organised groups and the need to understand the expectations of stakeholders in the community, which

included an acknowledgement of the importance of the media and its relevance to football clubs:

*“The media is much more important now and they can fan the flames. On a Monday morning some newspapers can have ten or twelve pages about the weekend’s football”*, (B, former Chairman of a professional football club, interview with author, 03.10.12).

Overall, it was the focal organisations in East Manchester and the stakeholder groups in Tottenham that were most keen to use the media as part of their strategies to gain support for their different aims. Media was a unique concept in the stakeholder influence framework in that it was used by different stakeholder and focal groups in different ways at each of the sites. In Tottenham, the media was used by stakeholder groups to put forward their case to a much greater extent than the focal organisations in the area during the research, while in East Manchester it was used extensively by the football club and Manchester City Council, but largely ignored by the stakeholder groups.

#### **8.4 Means of stakeholder influence**

It has been posited in some research that “*other variables*” (Agle *et al.*, 1999) and more specifically “*proximity*” (Driscoll and Starik, 2004) might be found to be relevant to salience with focal organisations. Although this research was open to considering other variables, as part of an inductive approach, other means of stakeholder influence were not found to be as strongly supported in this research as

those advanced by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997). It is therefore accepted in this framework that power, legitimacy and urgency are the most salient concepts for focal organisations and the most relevant for stakeholder groups seeking to influence them. All of these concepts were supported at the research sites, with power being the most frequently discussed phenomena and relatively most important.

#### **8.4.1 Power**

For Mitchell *et al.*, (1997: 865), power might have been difficult to define, but was easily recognised as “*the ability to bring about the outcomes desired by those who possess it*”. This was the starting point for this research, but other conceptions of power advanced by Allen (1997) and Lukes (1974) were also considered and the two research sites provided examples of their relevance to understanding the concept and answering the research question. Previous research has found that one of the original motivations for collaboration amongst groups that formed alliances and worked together at former nuclear sites in the USA, was to achieve power, (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004). In East Manchester and Tottenham, stakeholders clearly wanted to have influence on the stadium-led regeneration that was going on in their areas. The results chapters evidence the understanding within stakeholder groups of their own salience and relationships with those who they considered possessed power. Stakeholder groups were very conscious of whom or what organisations possessed power and to what extent it could be used. This is, to a large extent, the same process that managers within focal organisations go through and can be linked with the work of Harvey and Schaefer (2001). The authors found in their research that managers considered stakeholders with an institutional power base, such as government through

legislation, and both environmental and economic regulators, by far the most immediately influential stakeholders of the companies they studied. Stakeholders with institutionalised or economic power were generally also considered to be legitimate in that research.

There is support for this previous work at the two research sites involved with the two football clubs (economic) and two local councils (institutional) seen by many stakeholders as possessing the most power, if not always legitimacy. This put the lack of power of some stakeholders, sometimes combined with a lack of legitimacy and/or urgency, into sharp relief. It can be argued that it was through a realisation of this context that some stakeholders, especially in Tottenham, recognised the need to mobilise through larger groups, alliances and networks, combined with other strategies, in order to try to gain salience with the more powerful focal organisations. In the cases reviewed by Butterfield *et al.*, (2004), power was seen in terms of the ability of the community to speak with one voice to influence the Department of Environment's actions on cleanup. There is evidence that some individuals within community groups in East Manchester and Tottenham were aware of this issue:

*“Power always tries to play those it seeks to control off against each other. So it's important that Spurs fans and the local business and residential communities work together to achieve the best outcome for the greatest number”, (U, supporter of THFC, interview with author, 16.09.13).*

The first step in trying to gain influence was to form alliances between the various groups, but in doing so it was then important to be able to agree on major issues in order to increase the power of the groups involved. The realisation of the importance of forming alliances lends support to Allen's (1997) alternative conception of power as a medium or resource for securing diverse ends. Allen's (1997: 62) conception sets out how power can be produced through a process of mobilisation in which organisations, realising their limitations, pool resources to secure a common goal. Allen's view is that in this process a new collective power base can be produced that amounts to an increase of power to those in alliances, something that began to emerge in Tottenham as stakeholder groups grew in influence during the development process. *Our Tottenham*, having grown to include over 50 affiliated community groups during the period covered by this research, was a clear example of increasing collective power that enabled its members to "*lobby and meet with some of the key regeneration powers*", (participant observation at community meeting, 18.10.15). The work of network theorists (e.g. Neville and Mengue, 2006; S.G. Scott & Lane, 2000), which argues that coalitions between stakeholders allows them to combine their power also supports Allen's (1997) view. There were clear examples of this phenomenon in East Manchester and Tottenham with community groups working together.

For Lukes (1974), there are important non-coercive sources of power in modern society that can allow the powerful to make those without power behave in ways that appear to be against their basic interests. In Tottenham, some residents in social housing, across the road from the proposed new stadium, voted for the demolition of their properties in a consultation process. Many other local people found this view

difficult to understand due to the vagueness of the benefits put forward by Haringey Council to existing residents at that stage. The crucial point being that the most effective use of power is to prevent any conflict or even discussion arising in the first place. In meetings between Manchester City FC and its local stakeholders, the football club was arguably able to shape the agenda around positive corporate social responsibility work being carried out in the area by, for example, contractors involved in the building of the *Etihad Campus* and around “*first order*” changes, (Fineman and Clarke, 1996) related to issues such as litter and noise. The monthly meetings that were held at Manchester City FC were by invitation only to stakeholders that included local resident groups and community organisations. The research demonstrates the meetings were relatively open, but access was ultimately controlled by representatives of the football club. Such examples arguably support the alternative conception of power provided by Lukes (1974). Previous research has found that managers can be crucial mediators of stakeholder influence, (Fineman and Clarke, 1996, Agle *et al.*, 1999).

In East Manchester, groups had been able to effect “*first order*” changes. Aside from issues covered above, they included improved fencing and gates for the housing estate directly opposite the stadium; community facilities within the *Etihad Campus* and on-going discussions with the football club about further improvements to the area around the stadium. In Tottenham, there was a strong desire for much greater community influence on the wider regeneration scheme that was associated with the football club’s new stadium. There were many expressions from the community that the process had been dominated by property development interests, which meant a

top-down approach that did not consider community groups as legitimate partners in the regeneration process. Community groups that became involved in the process during 2013 gained a certain amount of power as the regeneration process progressed that started to allow them not merely to analyse and object to some of the developments, but also to promote their own community planning agenda to produce a Community Plan for Tottenham.

Community groups in East Manchester and Tottenham wanted enough power to allow effective involvement in the stadium-led regeneration schemes, not just to be consulted. It was through a range of strategies to try to gain the salience attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency that provided the means to do so. The stakeholder groups needed to combine these elements of salience to exert influence. And it is this second salience concept that is now considered.

#### **8.4.2 Legitimacy**

Legitimacy is solely a characteristic of the stakeholder in the definition put forward by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997). It is based on a legal or moral claim on an organisation, for example through being a supporter of a football club or living nearby to a stadium. A wider definition was used for the purposes of this research that included the legitimacy of focal organisations, which was sometimes questioned by stakeholder groups.

There was a perception from many stakeholders in Tottenham, especially those that lived or worked in the vicinity of the football ground that they were not seen as

legitimate contributors to the regeneration process to the extent that their participation was to be encouraged. For example, it was felt that Haringey council made it difficult to take part in many of the consultation exercises. This was particularly the case with the High Road West consultation that involved demolition of social housing and retail businesses opposite the football ground. One of the many issues that stakeholders had with this consultation was the failure to print or make enough of the consultation documents available in Turkish, there being a significant Turkish population in the area with their own community centre nearby to the current stadium. Local businesses also started up a petition that eventually obtained over 4,000 signatures against any demolitions, but this was not accepted as part of the consultation.

The institutional context was also important in Haringey. The council saw the stadium development as a catalyst that could attract further private sector investment, additional spending power, new jobs and homes and lasting change to the area, (Haringey Report for Cabinet, 07.02.12: 149). The increased importance of financial viability assessments was also relevant. Haringey council accepted that the 2010 consented stadium development was not financially viable and the planning committee therefore agreed to decrease the s106 financial obligations and boost the development value for the football club, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12: 18). To do otherwise could have meant a derelict site with nothing built and would go against the NPPF Framework (2011) not to undermine the viability of development proposals. This could have resulted in a costly planning appeal.

*“Policy now dictates that targets for affordable housing, community services and infrastructure payments must be set at levels that do not compromise the financial viability of proposed developments”, (McCallister et al., 2013: 3)*

Colenutt *et al.*, (2015) have described the rise of financial viability assessments as one of the most fundamental changes in the UK planning system that has reinforced the asymmetry in the relationship between the property industry, and local authorities and the communities they serve with the balance between economic, social and environmental factors in planning radically changed. McAllister *et al.*, (2013: 27) found this has meant the outcome of consultation is rarely, if ever, a fully inclusive consensus:

*This is, in part, because different stakeholders can have differing (or no) access to a consultation process; our research evidences this, showing a lack of community input to DVA”.*

It is therefore entirely possible to see how a lack of legitimacy was felt in the local community and became a trigger for involvement in trying to influence the stadium-led regeneration for many people in the area. Individuals did start to build up legitimacy with focal organisations such as Haringey Council and the regional London Assembly through networking and forming alliances with community groups, together with using other intermediaries such as the media. Building-up legitimacy was also done in-part through the growing number of individuals and groups expressing their views on proposed regeneration projects in meetings and during

protests, but also through direct detailed submissions by some of these community groups to planning consultations and investigations. This work was assisted by academics, researchers and students involved in planning issues, many of whom lived in the local area.

Harvey and Schaefer (2001) found that the more mainstream and broad-based a pressure group was perceived to be by managers the more legitimacy it was considered to have. Unsurprisingly, companies preferred to deal with stakeholders who they perceived to be co-operative and non-threatening. The authors of the study acknowledged their findings corresponded in many respects with those of Fineman and Clarke (1996), particularly in terms of managers' tendencies to ignore non-traditional and potentially hostile stakeholders. There was evidence at both research sites to support this previous work. For example, in East Manchester, a supporter of Manchester City FC that owned a number of public houses around the stadium, and had been a self-confessed football hooligan, was not invited to attend the monthly meetings held at the football club. In Tottenham, the football club only held one meeting with the *Our Tottenham* community network after a poster campaign by the group. During this meeting there was little understanding shown of either side's differing views of the regeneration developments. In Tottenham there was also an awareness that as the issues became more critical and urgent for some groups, more confrontational action might need to be taken:

*“We need to be more determined, more assertive as we gain in confidence and if necessary we need to occupy,”* (participant observation at community meeting, 06.08.15).

A significant driver of assessments of the legitimacy of stakeholders is the tactics they use, (Eesley and Lennox, 2006). However, it has also been argued that if the claim is morally legitimate, then it should be considered by managers, even if the stakeholder group is not seen as being legitimate due to a confrontational or violent approach, (Neville *et al.*, 2011). In East Manchester, a number of stakeholder groups had built up legitimacy with the football club, the development company (New East Manchester Ltd) and the local council over a number of years. This was based on discussions at regular meetings where local residents groups, local businesses and supporter groups were consulted and involved in meetings with focal organisations as a matter of course. In the terminology of Fineman and Clarke (1996), these stakeholders had high legitimacy and low threat that allowed them to argue for *“first order changes”*, such as improvements to rubbish collection, parking and policing around events held at the stadium. It was not clear what the next steps of stakeholders would be if no action was taken by Manchester City FC or Manchester City Council, but a number of the strategies used in Tottenham, such as use of local media may then have become appropriate.

Rowley (1997) argued that greater legitimacy allows the stakeholder a more credible threat to the focal organisations – arguably leading to greater engagement and possibly influence with those organisations. For Fineman and Clarke (1996), threat

concerned the stakeholder's perceived capacity to injure or embarrass; a capacity strengthened by alliances with other stakeholders and through use of media. For example, the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust (THST) had a membership of over 10,000 individuals and groups. It was perhaps this level of backing that provided both legitimacy and potential threat to the football club. THST had started to meet regularly with the football club during 2014 and 2015 to discuss issues of concern to supporters, whereas there was only ever one meeting between *Our Tottenham* and Tottenham Hotspur FC. Stakeholders with greater power relative to focal organisations in terms of resources, and whose request is more legitimate in the eyes of the general public, are more likely to elicit a positive response from an organisation, (Eesley and Lennox, 2006). This was one reason that the meeting between THST and *Our Tottenham*, in November 2014, was significant for the community group in being able to forge an alliance with the supporters group that already possessed greater degrees of power and legitimacy with the football club. THST may also have derived some increased power from the meeting, with the football club potentially concerned about a strengthened capacity to embarrass the club. At the time of writing there had not been a further meeting between THST and *Our Tottenham*.

The greater degree to which activities, such as legal actions, impose costs on focal organisations, the more likely the action is to effect change, (Eesley and Lennox, 2006: 777). Certainly groups in Tottenham started to ask deeper questions about the whole regeneration process and sought greater *second order changes*, (Fineman and Clarke, 1996). These included a number of legal challenges that at the time of the research were either underway or being considered, including freedom of information

requests and a potential judicial review of the consultation process linked to the proposed demolition of social housing and retail businesses. As the regeneration process in Tottenham gathered pace, so the activities became more urgent.

### 8.4.3 Urgency

The third salience attribute of “urgency” was defined as “*the degree to which a stakeholder’s claim calls for immediate attention,*” (Mitchell *et al.*, 1997: 867).

Urgency includes both time sensitivity and the criticality of the claim to stakeholders.

Psychology literature provides some evidence that the urgency of a request will influence the likelihood of response. Additionally there is support for the idea that time pressure can make decision-makers more prone to take action, (Dror, Busemeyer, and Basola, 1999, quoted in Eesley and Lennox, 2006). Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) argued that the concept of urgency also allowed the capture of some of the dynamics of stakeholder relationships:

*“... stakeholder attributes are variable, not steady state; they are socially constructed, not objective reality; and consciousness and wilful exercise may or may not be present,”* (Mitchell *et al.*, 1997: 867).

The concept may allow the capture of dynamics, but the above features can make urgency the most difficult of the three means of influence to pinpoint at research sites. However, it is possible to draw comparable examples from the literature and the two research sites. Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) argued that the Exxon Valdez oil-spill provided an example of how a dependent stakeholder could move into the most salient

stakeholder class by having its urgent claims adopted by dominant stakeholders; in this case the Alaska state government and the court system to provide advocacy to enforce their claims. Because power in such relationships was not reciprocal, its exercise could be governed either through the advocacy of other stakeholders, or through the guidance of internal management values, (Mitchell *et al.*, 1997). There were examples of both these types of power used by dependent stakeholders at the research sites.

In Tottenham it was the individuals who were threatened with the demolition of their homes and businesses by council planning proposals that pressed the most urgent claims on Haringey Council and, to a lesser extent, Tottenham Hotspur FC. These individual stakeholders lacked any power during the early stages of the regeneration process, but even at this stage they were able to use the media and some local councillors, in an advocacy role, to highlight their situation. As their campaign progressed these stakeholders became more organised and were able to form alliances with other stakeholder groups and networks to protest against the regeneration plans. Although they might be classified as “*dependent*” stakeholders, it was the urgency of this group’s claims that caught the attention of the media, with newspaper articles together with radio and television interviews with spokespersons. They were also able to mobilise through forming alliances with other groups in Tottenham and their advocacy campaigns included petitions, street rallies, attendance at consultations and deputations to council meetings. The urgency of this group’s campaign led to the organisation of a rally opposite White Hart Lane Stadium on 06.12.14 on the day of Tottenham Hotspur FC’s game against Crystal Palace. The rally also provided an

example of the growing power and legitimacy of the *Our Tottenham* network, under whose umbrella it was organised. This was the first time that any group had campaigned against the regeneration proposals that were linked to the new stadium on the day of a home game in Tottenham to directly appeal to Spurs supporters. During the rally speeches were made, leaflets handed-out and supporters were encouraged to sign a petition against the demolition of homes across the road from the ground. The event was widely reported locally. Paul Coleman, a blogger on London topical events captured some of the issues in his report:

*“Being a Tottenham fan doesn't mean I agree with what the club is doing. Gillespie, a former councillor himself, hopes other Spurs fans will think beyond just being a Spurs supporter. I hope Spurs fans will think about the Tottenham people who could lose their homes”,*  
(paulcolemanslondon.blogspot.co.uk/ 06.12.14).

All of these actions led to demands for further consultations and also a potential legal challenge to the planning process followed by Haringey Council. Community groups were aware of the need to maintain the urgency generated by such events:

*“We need to get as many people on the streets as possible. We need to get feet on the street in large numbers”,* (participant observation at community meeting, 06.08.15).

Such comments above provide examples of the dynamism of salience theory, in which stakeholder attributes are variable and groups are not in a steady state. By appealing

to Spurs supporters and generally trying to widen the mobilisation of stakeholders, groups were trying to increase their salience with focal organisations.

In East Manchester, the main expressions of urgency came from the football club in developing the *Etihad Campus* to an aggressive time-plan. During the period of this research there was not the time-sensitivity or criticality to claim immediate action from stakeholders to focal organisations. Community groups largely appeared to have their concerns addressed at an early stage of the process, which demonstrated degrees of participation and salience.

### **8.5 Influence on stadium-led regeneration**

In order to understand the framework in more detail, the extent to which the strategies and means led to stakeholders being able to influence stadium-led regeneration in Tottenham and East Manchester will now be considered. The views of stakeholders involved in the regeneration process at both research sites will be set out, together with an analysis of the influence that was exerted.

Only four months after the formation of the *Our Tottenham* community group in April 2013, one of its members set out the impact he thought their network had in the area:

*“I think it’s made a big difference. First of all we’ve started to overcome the kind of isolation and fragmentation of a whole range of different groups and campaigns that aren’t encouraged to link up and support each other... and the council really doesn’t take anyone seriously unless they can show that they’ve*

*got backing, they're not treated seriously"*, (Q, local resident and community activist, Tottenham, interview with author, 21.08.13).

Forming alliances with a large number and wide range of Tottenham groups was seen by many members of *Our Tottenham*, who in many instances were members of other community groups, as one of the most positive contributions of the network since its launch in April 2013. However, people also agreed that the network could improve by reaching out and interacting with many more diverse groups, together with the tens of thousands of people living or working in the area. This was the view of one member of *Our Tottenham*, reflecting over two years since the formation of the group:

*"The council thought the group [Our Tottenham ] would raise a few issues and as time goes by it would just wither away. But, it's building strength to continue to challenge the council,"* (participant observation at community meeting, 03.09.15).

A number of community groups used the legitimacy and knowledge that was gained by *Our Tottenham* to challenge focal organisations in Haringey and to put forward their own plans. These included, for example, Haringey Community Centres Network, Haringey Defend Council Housing, Broadwater Farm Residents, Friends of Lordship Recreation Ground and, most recently, Friends of Marcus Garvey Library. Many of the proposals for development, or demolition put forward by Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC, were either directly linked to, or geographically close to the new stadium development. There were many groups that were active and

loosely aligned through the *Our Tottenham* network and at a strategy meeting the group felt that one of the achievements since its formation was to have:

*“Enabled or supported efforts and campaigns to defend certain community interests, facilities and sites, and generally promoted solidarity and mutual aid amongst groups”*, (participant observation at community meeting, 18.10.15).

Individuals and groups had also started to engage with policy at an earlier stage of its formation than had been the case previously in the area. The *Our Tottenham* Planning Policy Working Group made detailed submissions concerning flaws in the consultation process for the Haringey Local Plan, including a call for the consultation to be halted and re-scheduled. A detailed response was received from Haringey Council that set out the council’s position on all the issues raised, but denied any planning obligations had been breached. Subsequently, two members of the group were invited to attend a meeting with the Head of Strategic Planning, Transport and Infrastructure at Haringey Council concerning the draft Haringey Local Plan on 08.07.15. This was particularly significant since a new Local Plan is only drafted once every ten years. As a result of that meeting a number of changes to planning consultations were made and a review of the Statement of Community Involvement carried out. *Our Tottenham* and other community groups had clearly gained some legitimacy with Haringey Council. Such examples support the idea that salience attributes are not dichotomous, but evaluated by managers within focal organisations on a continuum of degrees, (Neville *et al.*, 2011).

Two community groups in Tottenham (*Our Tottenham* and the Tottenham Business Group) also provided detailed submissions to the London Assembly Regeneration Committee investigation in to stadium-led regeneration. The subsequent report, *The Regeneration Game*, published in March 2015, included issues related to local, independent businesses, raised by the Tottenham Business Group and commented on the watering down of affordable housing targets linked to THFC's new stadium, highlighted by *Our Tottenham*. *The Regeneration Game* proposed a Charter for effective stadium-led regeneration that included a number of proposals put forward in the *Our Tottenham* submission. These included greater community and stakeholder involvement, effective use of a stadium scheme as a community asset, stadium-linked housing development to be of mixed tenure, and transparency, in line with the *Local Government Transparency Code, 2014*.

As the stadium-led regeneration progressed, Tottenham Hotspur FC held a pre-planning application meeting on 15.07.15 at a local school concerning revised designs for the new stadium and new proposals for developments on what would become their old ground. It was felt that in the past very few people would have attended such a meeting and even fewer spoken out to express their views. However, in a further example of a growing feeling of empowerment within the community, many individual residents and representatives of community groups came along and spoke at the meeting: "*We are mobilising around issues. The Spurs meeting is a very good example of this*", (participant observation at community meeting, 06.08.15). And:

*“It was great to see so many people at the meeting and to hear so many people speaking out at the meeting. Everything that is going on has bolstered people’s ability to speak out”, (participant observation at community meeting, 06.08.15).*

*Our Tottenham* submitted its views on the revised planning application that was submitted by Tottenham Hotspur on 18.09.15 for the new stadium and linked developments. The community group were able to support some of those views on recommendations from the London Assembly report, *The Regeneration Game* (2015). They formed part of the report to the Haringey Planning Committee that granted planning permission for the developments on 16.12.15, where it was acknowledged that:

*“Football clubs have a responsibility to ensure that the local community gains from a new stadium. Communities must benefit from new mixed tenure housing, and improved transport links and across the local area. Local authorities must also capitalise on opportunities to guarantee that clubs and other incoming businesses prioritise the local workforce when sourcing new employees”, (Haringey Report for Special Planning Sub-Committee, 16.12.15).*

*Our Tottenham* can be seen as an umbrella organisation that gained not just degrees of power and legitimacy, but also became a repository of key skills and understanding of strategies that could be used by community groups to engage with and challenge focal

organisations. There was an acknowledgement of the strategic position of the group, which also reflected on its growing legitimacy, from one member:

*“There’s been no effective opposition in Haringey for years, it’s always been Labour. If there is an umbrella organisation, it becomes the opposition,”*  
(participant observation at community meeting, 06.08.15).

During the period of this research, *Our Tottenham* gained increased power that enabled its members to lobby and meet with some of the key regeneration powers prior to consultations being launched, whereas this was not the case at the start of the regeneration process; for example prior to the High Road West consultation in April 2013. It was felt by members of *Our Tottenham* that there had been changes in the attitudes of elected members and staff of Haringey Council due to the oversight of community groups and who were now more careful in how they carried out their work, especially in relation to community engagement:

*“The council is aware of everything we are doing. Almost everything in the latest propaganda is in relation to issues we have raised. The network is a very significant development, we’ve never been organised like this before in Tottenham”*, (participant observation at community meeting, 03.09.15).

There was also a degree of realism as to what had been achieved by community groups. There were successes where groups had been able to exert influence on some issues. These included plans to build on Lordship Recreation Ground, which were

abandoned due to the volume of objection; a community plan to preserve the indoor market and renew Wards Corner, which had received planning permission; an on-going campaign to save Bull Lane Playing Fields; the formation of links with groups to defend social housing, listed buildings and community facilities around the football ground and started discussions with Haringey Council concerning the ten-year plan for Tottenham (Tottenham Area Action Plan).

However, it was also agreed that community groups could have been more effective and influential with Haringey Council on projects that were part of the stadium-led regeneration such as High Road West that involved proposals to demolish social housing on the Love Lane Estate, retail premises, and the entire Peacock Industrial Estate that was full of small and medium-sized enterprises. It was felt that community groups did not have enough information about potential schemes and discussions that took place between the local council and developers. Some of these discussions took place with groups such as the Tottenham Land Owners and Major Businesses Group, to which community groups had little access other than obtaining minutes of meetings via Freedom of Information requests. More power, legitimacy and urgency were needed to influence in these areas. However, community stakeholders were learning from these issues as there was recognition of the need to develop information-sharing and greater legitimacy with focal organisations. Proposals were also put forward to mobilise and prepare strong responses at an earlier stage in relation to issues such as the Draft Tottenham Area Action Plan, put out for consultation in January 2016 and possible demolition plans for other social housing in the areas around the stadium such as Northumberland Park.

It has to be acknowledged that the power of focal groups in Tottenham, such as the council and the football club was sufficient to resist major changes to the most significant of the stadium-led regeneration plans. Archway Metals had ultimately lost its court battle against a compulsory purchase order and, despite a delay of five years since the original planning permission was granted, the building of the new stadium had started in late 2015. Although most of the community were content to see a new stadium built, there were many elements of the plans that local stakeholders still felt should be changed. These included the level of the football club's section 106 community contributions and levels of social housing within the proposed developments on the site of the existing stadium. There were also significant objections to the proposed demolition of three locally listed buildings as part of the new development proposals. Groups of stakeholders such as *Our Tottenham*, Historic England and Haringey Defend Council Housing did not appear to have the power to influence the focal organisations on these issues. On 16.12.15, Haringey Council granted full planning permission for a re-designed 61,000 seat stadium and a 22-storey hotel. This planning approval permitted demolition of the three locally listed buildings and a terrace of seven houses. Campaigners continued to lobby the office of the Mayor of London, which had objected to the demolition of the locally listed buildings and could still overrule the local authority. Outline planning permission was also granted for the construction of four residential blocks providing up to 585 units, together with the building of an extreme sports building and a community health building. None of the residential units would be sold as social or affordable

housing. The section 106 commitment was part of the reserved matters that were still to be agreed between the council and the football club.

A viability report commissioned by Tottenham Hotspur FC for this latest planning application, with which Haringey Council's independent report largely agreed, stated that the stadium and linked developments would produce a return on investment of 1.2%, which would be unacceptable for most developers (Haringey Report for Council, 16.12.15). The council had already accepted in an earlier report that the land value generated from housing development, boosted by allowing all of the properties to be sold on the open market, would support the whole stadium construction, arguably a huge effective public subsidy. Maximising the value would enable the wider stadium development as a whole to be viable, (Haringey Planning Sub-Committee, reports pack, 13.02.12: 18).

It should be pointed out that, unlike the original City of Manchester Stadium (although not the *Etihad Campus*), Tottenham Hotspur's new stadium would be entirely privately financed and the investment of over £400 million into the area was welcomed by many people. Linked to the new stadium were the council's High Road West plans for a walkway to be built across Tottenham High Road, which would involve the demolition of social housing on the Love Lane estate and a significant number of retail premises. Although work had not started at the time of writing, these plans from Haringey Council were still in place and the power of local stakeholders to stop this development appeared limited, given a previously positive local consultation and the stated intentions of the local authority. However, the campaigning over this

issue is still on-going and there may be a legal challenge by local residents by way of a judicial review over the way in which the original consultation was carried out by Haringey Council.

The above examples demonstrate that through a number of triggers for involvement and range of strategies, community groups in Tottenham managed to gain some power, legitimacy and urgency with focal organisations, but there were limits to the extent of the salience and their overall impacts on the stadium-led regeneration. At a strategy conference in October 2015, groups in Tottenham acknowledged successes in supporting community interests and developing community planning. However, they also agreed they could do more to successfully challenge what they saw as attacks on their community and to develop more effective working groups to exert greater influence on the stadium-led regeneration process in the area.

In East Manchester, stakeholders were able to exert influence on the original City of Manchester Stadium, built in 2002 and reconfigured for the football club in 2003, through community groups that had been supported by the New Deal for Communities programme, which was rolled out in 1999. Some of these community groups still possessed salience and were able to exert influence over the ongoing stadium-led regeneration of the area that included the building of the *Etihad campus*. This was evidenced by the bi-monthly residents and local community groups meetings that were held at the Etihad Stadium and chaired by a representative of Manchester City FC. On alternate months, the football club also met with local businesses and other larger stakeholders such as Sport England. At those meetings, the representatives of local groups could raise any matters connected to the football club,

which meant there was a forum to raise problematic issues, but also to be briefed on any work taking place around the stadium. By being able to participate in the process, local stakeholders were also able to make requests of the football club and of their contractors. For example, the main construction company involved in the building of the Etihad Campus undertook a number of community projects such as putting in new changing rooms at a local swimming pool and tarmacking of areas around some residences. The main contractor was also expected to abide with agreements of Key Performance Indicators related to employment of local residents, setting-up of apprenticeships and maintaining a local supply chain.

It can be seen that stakeholders in East Manchester also relied on the internal management values of the focal organisations in the area, highlighted by Mitchell *et al.* (1997), more than the advocacy of other stakeholders, such as the media.

Representative of Manchester City FC, New East Manchester Ltd and Manchester City Council, spoke of their organisations as having responsibilities towards the local community. As a result of these internal management values, stakeholders in East Manchester were able to make demands on the football club and the local council that they had an expectation would be acted upon. For example, representatives from the football club discussed improvements that had been and could be made in the area, such as installing gates on local estates. This type of work was acknowledged by Manchester City Council:

*“Over the last three and a half years MCFC has undergone a remarkable transformation, both on the field and off it. During this time the club’s*

*commitment to East Manchester has become much deeper and much broader, setting an example for other Premiership Football Clubs and other professional sports bodies in the UK to become involved in transforming their communities”, (Manchester City Council Report for Resolution, 14.03.12., Eastlands Community Plan, item 5.1).*

A further example of the attitude of the management of the football club related to the section 106 agreement reached with Manchester City Council concerning the building of the *Etihad Campus*. As part of the wider regeneration of the Beswick area, Manchester City FC agreed to contribute £3 million towards the proposed Beswick Leisure Centre, £9.7 million of grant funding towards the proposed Manchester Institute of Sports Science and 5.5 acres for the building of the Connell Sixth Form College.

Lack of dissent and protest in East Manchester could also be viewed as an example of domination through unconscious mechanisms that result in a manufactured consensus. It could provide supporting evidence for the argument of Lukes (1974:27) that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. For Lukes (1974), there are important non-coercive sources of power in modern society that can allow the powerful to make those without power behave in ways that appear to be against their basic interests. However, it is suggested that focal organisations in East Manchester were also able to put forward a more positive case than occurred in Tottenham. Not only was there greater engagement and participation together with more transparency for stakeholders, but due to the chronology of the

developments they were also able to see some genuine social and economic benefits that were resulting from the stadium-led regeneration. This meant there were fewer triggers for stakeholders to use the type of strategies outlined above in order to gain the means of influence. Therefore there were fewer mobilisations, formation of new groups, alliances and networks, dissent and protest, and use of the media. Community groups used existing forums through which they could express their views.

The processes of trying to influence the stadium-led regeneration are still very much on-going in Tottenham with stakeholders acting in growing numbers through larger numbers of groups. Use of a range of strategies was aimed at increasing the impact on focal organisations, potentially leading to gaining greater power and legitimacy.

## Chapter 9: Conclusion

The main purpose of this thesis was to understand how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration through an empirical study focused on research sites in East Manchester and Tottenham. From the existing literature on stakeholder theory, the salience typology of power, legitimacy and urgency, derived by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) was used as a starting point in this research to begin to understand how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration. Within the literature there was considerable encouragement for further research of these salience attributes (e.g. Agle *et al.*, 1999; Neville *et al.*, 2011; Parmar *et al.*, 2010), together with other under-researched related ideas that include: the stakeholder's perspective (Frooman, 1999); stakeholders in contexts of economic development decision-making (Friedman and Mason, 2004); stakeholder group action (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003); and stakeholder networks (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004).

The data collected from the interviews, participant observations at many different meetings involving a wide range of stakeholders, and secondary documents relating to both sites, supported previous research with power, legitimacy and urgency as the central means of influence, (Agle *et al.*, 1999; Mitchell *et al.*, 1997). However, the depth and range of data also allowed for the development of a wider framework of stakeholder influence that involved the detailed analysis of the antecedents of stakeholder salience with focal organisations.

It became clear that the context at the research sites could provide a number of significant triggers for stakeholder involvement, leading to a range of different strategies being used to gain the means of influence. These included some issues raised in previous research as set out above, but also provided support, *inter-alia*, for the idea that a lack of power, legitimacy and urgency could play a significant role for some stakeholders in seeking to gain influence. In all, there were twelve concepts supported by the data analysis and these are set out within the stakeholder influence framework in Figure 5.1 at page 158. The twelve concepts that make up the Context and Triggers for Stakeholder Involvement (consultation, engagement and participation; economic impacts; social and community impacts; governance and transparency; and lack of power, legitimacy and urgency), the Strategies of Influence (mobilisation; groups, alliances and networks; dissent and protest; and media); and the Means of Stakeholder Influence (power; legitimacy; and urgency) were developed through this research and analysed in the results section. The impacts of the stakeholder's strategies to gain influence in East Manchester and Tottenham were assessed and the results placed in the context of previous related research in the previous discussion chapter.

The different contexts at the two research sites, together with the rich data collected during the study, also allowed for the development of a detailed narrative to understand how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration. Further, it has allowed for six additional specific conclusions to be drawn from the study that relate to the central research question. These will now be set out, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the study and opportunities for further research.

## **9.1 Context can play a significant role in generating triggers for the involvement of stakeholders**

Johns (2001, 2006) has set out the importance of context in organisational behavior and its relevance has been acknowledged by Yin (2009) and in sport management by Friedman and Mason (2004). The evidence from this research is that it played a prominent role for stakeholders in both East Manchester and Tottenham. It was found in the research that the context at both sites produced factors that could act as triggers for the involvement of stakeholders, this included the institutional context. As examples, a lack of genuine consultation, engagement and participation, arguably flowing from changes to planning and economic policy, together with a perceived lack of salience, became significant triggers for stakeholders in Tottenham to attempt to gain influence through using a range of strategies.

Although much of the literature discounts any positive economic relationship between sport-stadium-led regeneration for local communities (e.g. Baade and Dye, 1990; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; de Mause and Cagan, 2008), the context in East Manchester involved demands for positive economic and social impacts made by stakeholders that included local residents and businesses. This research found there were a range of positive comments expressed about the social and economic benefits of the stadium-led regeneration in East Manchester. The regeneration had begun in East Manchester in 1999 under New Labour, so had started in a different institutional context.

Anticipated negative economic and social impacts for many local residents and owners of businesses in Tottenham, especially those under threat of compulsory

purchase orders for their property, became a further important trigger for these stakeholders to devise strategies to gain greater influence on the stadium-led regeneration plans. Local residents and business owners in Tottenham expressed views that “*social engineering*”, “*social cleansing*” and “*gentrification*” was taking place around them as part of the wider regeneration linked to the new stadium. In Tottenham, these issues were part of the context of the regeneration and the potential for the same resentment found in previous research from North America (Matheson, 2010) over the lack of social or affordable housing still exists.

When linked with concerns over governance and transparency, this potential was compounded, especially when “*underhand tactics*” and “*lies*” become part of the discourse, as they did in relation to those issues in Tottenham. Many local people felt excluded from the planning process relating to developments that were taking place in Tottenham. The feelings of exclusion were increased when it was confirmed that local councilors had attended a property conference in Cannes in 2014 with property developers covering some of the costs, (Haringey Independent, 12.03.14). In contrast, the context was one of more adequate transparency and governance structures that allowed for greater engagement and participation in East Manchester, (Grey, 2010). Certainly there were fewer complaints about these issues and they did not become triggers for further action by stakeholders. Although some issues were raised by stakeholders about the construction of the *Etihad Campus*, there were forums in place in which to engage and participate in discussion of those issues. Indeed there was some evidence of stakeholders being “*consulted-out*” in East Manchester.

The differences in institutional context at the two sites meant that changed planning and economic policies had a greater impact on issues such as consultation in Tottenham. Strong community structures that were in place in East Manchester from earlier regeneration developments, together with different approaches to viability by the football club and Manchester City Council, led to different outcomes.

In summary, a lack of salience, consultation and transparency together with potential negative social and economic impacts acted as triggers for many stakeholders in Tottenham. In East Manchester, promised economic and social benefits were important to stakeholders. Together with degrees of salience with focal organisations, adequate consultation and transparency, they provided a context for local stakeholders in which the triggers towards further strategies of action existed, but impacted differently to those in Tottenham.

## **9.2 Lack of power, legitimacy and urgency can become an important trigger for the involvement of stakeholders in trying to gain influence.**

The anomalous, but significant phenomenon that became a trigger for the involvement of many stakeholders in Tottenham was their perceived lack of power, legitimacy and urgency at the outset of the stadium-led regeneration programme. In both East Manchester and Tottenham, the football clubs and local councils were seen by many stakeholders as being the focal organisations that possessed the most power, if not always the most legitimacy. This put the lack of power, legitimacy and urgency of some local stakeholders into sharp relief. Weitzer and Deutsch (2015) have argued that completely powerless and illegitimate stakeholders may be treated favourably by

morally motivated decision-makers. In this research there was no evidence of this type of behaviour from the focal organisations involved, who largely adopted an instrumental approach, which regarded stakeholders as the means to accomplish strategic objectives, (Parmar *et al.*, 2010).

For many of the residents and business owners that lived and worked across the road from the existing stadium in Tottenham, the realisation of their lack of salience came during the High Road West consultation in spring 2013. Many of these stakeholders then understood that within the regeneration plans set out by Haringey Council for the area there were no plans for refurbishment of buildings, with only differing levels of demolition offered as part of the consultation. It was also decided by the council that a petition containing several thousand names that was gathered together by local businesses and residents could not form part of the formal consultation process. Exclusion of competing groups linked to stadium-building has been found in previous research, (Collins, 2008; Lee, 2002). In this research, the realisation of their lack of salience became a trigger that led these stakeholders to mobilise through larger groups, alliances and networks, combined with other strategies, in order to try to gain salience with the more powerful focal organisations such as Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC.

For example, *Our Tottenham*, *Tottenham Business Group*, and *Tottenham Community Sports Centre*, community groups with far from homogeneous views (cf. Wolfe and Putler, 2002) met with the *Tottenham Hotspur Supporters Trust* on 12.11.14. Issues of mutual interest that included a lack of transparency, lack of trust and an unwillingness to listen from Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council about the new stadium, together with some of its linked developments were discussed. *Our*

*Tottenham* used local media, social media and leaflets to provide details of the meeting. The different groups represented significant numbers of local people together with Spurs supporters and demonstrated the ability of the differing groups to come together over matters of common interest, thus increasing their individual legitimacy and power with focal organisations, (Butterfield *et al.*, 2004).

The experience in East Manchester demonstrated that where stakeholders such as residents and community groups had salience with focal organisations to participate in the regeneration, they were less likely to go on to use other strategies such as protest and dissent, and use of the media, to try to gain further influence over the process. Focal organisations should therefore engage positively to allow genuine participation and be clear about economic and social impacts with stakeholders to avoid the likelihood of further actions being taken; even where it is only for their own benefit – see further below. The concept of lack of salience acting as a trigger for stakeholder involvement has not been revealed in previous stakeholder research and is potentially relevant for planned stadium-led regeneration projects, of which there are a numerous examples.

### **9.3 The stakeholder influence framework provides a more comprehensive understanding of stadium-led regeneration than the typology developed by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997).**

The original typology developed by Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) was too parsimonious (Hendry, 2005: 94) to adequately explain the complex array of contexts, triggers and strategies that can take place: much more was going on underneath the surface in

order to achieve the means to influence focal stakeholders. The context In East Manchester and Tottenham provided specific triggers for the involvement of stakeholders in trying to gain influence with focal organisations, which has not previously been investigated or understood. Although considerable research has been published on issues such as the economic impacts of new stadiums (Baade and Dye, 1990; Davies, 2011; deMause and Cagan, 2008; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997), the concept has not been considered as a trigger for involvement of stakeholders. Results from this research and from previous studies on stakeholder salience (Eesley and Lennox, 2006; Harvey and Schaefer, 2001), stakeholder mapping (Friedman and Mason, 2005), context (Johns, 2001, 2006), mobilisation (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003), and networking (Neville and Mengue, 2006) support concepts derived from the data analysis, leading to the development of the stakeholder influence framework.

Strategies of stakeholder influence such as mobilisation (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003; Hosmer and Kiewitz, 2005); groups, alliances and networks (Neville and Mengue, 2006; Butterfield *et al.*, 2004); dissent and protest (Fineman and Clarke, 1996) and media (Jackson and Schantz, 1993) have also received consideration by researchers of stakeholder theory. Frooman (1999) considered in broad terms strategies used by stakeholders to influence business organisations and later work by Hendry (2005) refined those ideas. However, the links between a range of specific strategies and their impact on the means of salience has not been considered or investigated. The wider framework developed from this research links the context and triggers together with strategies used by stakeholders to means of influence, to answer

the central research question as to how stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration.

For example, local stakeholders felt they lacked salience with Tottenham Hotspur FC and Haringey Council. Individuals decided to highlight their issues with posters that expressed strong dissent about the stadium-led regeneration plans, using a cockerel (Spurs' logo) to do so. Behind the poster strategy lay a perception that Tottenham Hotspur FC possessed too much power with Haringey Council, with the poster campaign going up in the vicinity of the football ground. As a direct result of this strategy Tottenham Hotspur FC invited the *Our Tottenham* group for a meeting at the football club on 04.07.13. The meeting did not make any real progress in terms of the demands from *Our Tottenham* or understanding of the football club's position. However, by inviting the *Our Tottenham* group into the stadium for the meeting, the football club implicitly recognised its legitimacy, which added to the power of the group and generated a degree of urgency to their campaigning.

The context and triggers were different in East Manchester, which impacted on the strategies employed. Stakeholders were able to exert influence on the building and functioning of original City of Manchester Stadium, built in 2002, through community groups that had been supported by the New Deal for Communities programme, started in 1999. Community groups, local businesses and networks of local resident's forums were able to exert influence in monthly meetings at the Etihad Stadium. Manchester City FC, by engaging with a range of community groups, whether it was part of a strategic stakeholder management programme or not, became central within their networks, (Neville and Mengue, 2006). The concepts that make up the stakeholder influence framework impacted differently in East Manchester, but

were still relevant and these have not previously been understood or set out in this form.

#### **9.4 Groups without any salience can rapidly become definitive stakeholders due to local context and use of a range of strategies of influence.**

*“It may just sound like 6 or 7 people, but it is really significant. It’s never happened before, different groups linking up to challenge the council. It’s really significant”*, (local resident, participant observation at community meeting, Tottenham, 08.08.13).

As part of the dynamism of the salience theory, Mitchell *et al.*, (1997: 879) suggested that stakeholders who possessed only one salience attribute, could quickly become definitive stakeholders if they were particularly adept at *“coalition building, political action or social construction of reality”*, while Friedman and Mason (2004) found that stakeholders that were not perceived to possess any power, legitimacy or urgency could rapidly become influential. This research extends this previous work to provide the framework and evidence to demonstrate how that can happen. For example, some community groups, such as *Our Tottenham*, that were initially perceived by focal organisations to be without any salience, were able to change their position to gain influence due to triggers within the context of the stadium-led regeneration process and their ability to mobilise, network, protest and use the media.

The research indicated there was a growing mobilisation within the local community after a consultation on the High Road West proposals put forward by Haringey Council in April 2013, due to the perceived unfairness of the proposed developments and the consultation process. Individuals nearest the football ground in Tottenham started to network and form alliances, including affiliating to the *Our Tottenham* network. As part of the growing mobilisation and range of strategies undertaken, stakeholders found multiple ways to protest including proposals to stand in local council elections and legal action against the council to challenge consultation processes.

*“We don’t have one strategy; we have a whole range of strategies: lobbying, protesting, planning, support alternative planning ideas, we’ve got a positive charter, we’re supporting groups and networks,”* (participant observation at community meeting in Tottenham, 06.08.15).

There was evidence of the benefits of these strategies with some Haringey councillors later reconsidering their own positions in 2014 on the original planning permission that had been granted to the football club in 2011, as set out in the preceding chapters. This evidence supports previous research by Hendry (2005) that an alliance of relatively weak stakeholders representing multiple perspectives could convince more powerful stakeholders, such as legislators, of the desirability of that alliance’s position. A further indication of the increased power and legitimacy achieved by *Our Tottenham* was its network of over 50 affiliated community groups during the period covered by this research. This was a clear example of increasing collective power through a process of mobilisation in which organisations, realising their limitations, pool resources to secure a common goal, (Allen, 1997). Community groups started

from a low base and acknowledged they could have been more effective, with the power of focal groups in Tottenham sufficient to resist major changes to the most significant of the stadium-led regeneration plans. Nonetheless, based on this research it is argued that focal organisations should be more aware of developing groups that might previously have been classified as non-stakeholders within the Mitchell *et al.*, (1997) typology. This should be part of an increased understanding by focal organisations of the potential triggers for community action and subsequent strategies that can be used by stakeholder groups.

### **9.5 Managers of focal organisations are crucial mediators of stakeholder influence, but stakeholders can influence their thinking.**

Previous research has found that managers can be crucial mediators of stakeholder influence (e.g. Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Agle *et al.*, 1999; Harvey and Schaefer, 2001) and both research sites support and extend these previous studies. In East Manchester, stakeholders relied on the internal management values, highlighted by Mitchell *et al.* (1997), more than the advocacy of other stakeholders in order to try to influence focal organisations. There has been little research into the issue of internal management values in relation to stakeholder theory. Internal management values at the focal organisations of Manchester City FC, New East Manchester Ltd and Manchester City Council allowed local stakeholders influence on the stadium-led regeneration process. Stakeholder groups attended regular monthly meetings with these focal organisations held at the *Etihad Stadium* and as a result, they were able to raise issues of concern to affect “*first order*” changes, (Fineman and Clarke, 1996). In

meetings between Manchester City FC and its local stakeholders, the football club may have been content to deal with these first-order changes and otherwise able to shape the agenda around positive corporate social responsibility work being carried out in the area by, for example, contractors involved in the building of the *Etihad Campus* as well as the football club's charitable foundation.

In this research there was also evidence that stakeholders that were seen by managers at focal organisations as not being legitimate were not invited to the meetings.

However, stakeholders can influence the perception of management through the range of strategies set out in the framework for this research. Managers at focal organisations will take note of stakeholders that possess power, influence and urgency (Agle *et al.*, 1999), but also prefer to deal with “reasonable” rather than “unreasonable” protest groups, (Fineman and Clarke, 1996: 721).

In Tottenham, at the start of the stadium-led regeneration process community groups lacked salience with the managers of focal organisations such as Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC. This meant that organisations such as *Our Tottenham* relied more on the advocacy of other stakeholders, such as the media and local councillors, in order to try to influence managers within these focal organisations. For example, generating negative publicity lay behind the poster campaign that led to a meeting between *Our Tottenham* and representatives of Tottenham Hotspur FC on 04.07.13. Further examples evidenced the way in which stakeholders were able to change the perception of managers. At least one councillor believed that stakeholders had not engaged with the process or got themselves organized enough to influence the council. However, during the period of this research, through the use of a range of strategies, this changed to the extent that members of community groups such as *Our*

*Tottenham* were consulted by senior Haringey council officers on the ten-year Tottenham Plan to an extent that would have seemed highly unlikely only two years previously. Similarly, the *London Assembly Regeneration Committee* report into stadium-led regeneration, *The Regeneration Game*, proposed a Charter for effective stadium-led regeneration that included a number of proposals put forward in the *Our Tottenham* submission. These proposals included: greater community and stakeholder involvement; effective use of a stadium scheme as a community asset; stadium-linked housing development to be of mixed tenure; and transparency, in line with the *Local Government Transparency Code, 2014*.

**9.6 Focal organisations should engage positively to allow genuine participation and be clear about impacts with stakeholders; even when an instrumental approach is taken to stakeholder relationships.**

*“If we ignore our local community, we ignore it potentially at our peril, and they’ll treat us badly if we treat them badly. And I think we’ve got to be seen to be, you know purely from a selfish point of view to stop those things happening we’ve got to do something”*, (interview with MCFC official, quoted in Brown *et al.*, 2004: 28).

The issue of integration through community involvement has been recognised almost everywhere new sports stadiums have been built as part of a regeneration process (e.g. Brown *et al.*, 2004; deMause and Cagan, 2008). The literature suggests that the engagement and participation of the local population is very important in order to

create positive legacies from sports-led developments, with the objectives of the various stakeholders needing to be addressed, (Sadd, 2010; Davies, 2011). Meetings involving local stakeholders and focal organisations in East Manchester provided some evidence of the integrative approach that Chenayil (2002) suggested could avoid the repetition of problems of detachment from the surrounding community with many new North American stadiums. To be successful such integration should be wide enough to include participation in the decision-making process together with economic and social integration. Evidence also suggests that community participation and engagement has positive effects on social and community well-being, (Impact of Regeneration, 2007).

In East Manchester, stakeholders were treated as possessing salience by focal organisations such as Manchester City FC, New East Manchester Ltd and Manchester City Council. Groups that were seen as legitimate worked with focal organisations such as Manchester City FC to resolve problems such anti-social behaviour on event days. By engaging with a range of community groups, whether it was part of a strategic stakeholder management programme or not, the focal organisations became central within their networks, (Neville and Mengue, 2006). This engagement gave the focal organisations more control over the regeneration process through the ability to deal with potential issues at an early stage. It also meant there were fewer triggers for greater stakeholder involvement or strategies, such as protests or use of the media, to gain greater influence.

In Tottenham it was the stakeholder groups, through their various alliances and networks that placed themselves at the centre. Fineman and Clarke (1996) highlighted the fact that for some stakeholders, greater, second order changes are necessary, which involve a more confrontational approach with the aim of puncturing the equilibrium accepted by focal organisations. Such an approach was more obvious in Tottenham where there was a more instrumental approach adopted by focal organisations. There was evidence (e.g., Grant, 2010; Misener and Mason, 2009) to indicate that in East Manchester, important second order changes took place during the period between 1999 – 2002 when the New Deal for Communities investment in the area started and the original City of Manchester Stadium was built. During this period, significant community involvement was encouraged by organisations such as Manchester City Council and New East Manchester Ltd, but also fought for by local community groups in order to direct regeneration away from a top-down approach (Grant, 2010). Parallels can be drawn between this earlier period in East Manchester, in which groups started up and challenged focal organisations, and the early stages of mobilisation of groups in Tottenham across the period of 2013 – 2015.

It should also be noted that on 16.12.15, conditions were put into the agreed planning application for the stadium in Tottenham by Haringey Council to include the establishment and maintenance by the football club of a Business and Community Liaison Construction Group during the building of the stadium and all linked developments. This did not go as far as compelling the football club or any other focal organisations to hold any regular meetings with community groups, but did require some degree of engagement through providing information in various forms to

the local residents and businesses. Such engagement had not been included in the previous planning permission granted in 2011, so was an improvement for stakeholders on the previous position, but fell short of participation offered by focal organisations in East Manchester. The planning conditions certainly did not preclude focal organisations from taking such further steps voluntarily.

## **9.7 Limitations**

It is frequently argued that it is difficult, if not impossible to generalise from a specific case study to wider populations, largely due to the small-scale numbers involved, (see Flyvberg, 2006). Corley and Gioia (2004: 205) acknowledge this issue, but have argued not for “*generalisability*” but for the “*transferability*” to other sites of the findings from their own single case studies. Differences between the two sites that were studied, such as their history, geography, chronology of the developments, approaches of focal organisations and of stakeholders, may also make it difficult to generalise.

The regeneration programme linked to building a new stadium in Tottenham was more expansive than the work undertaken in East Manchester linked to the new training complex. Individuals and community groups in Tottenham were only just becoming aware of the potential impacts of some of the stadium-led regeneration proposals, many of which were controversial locally, as this research got under way. This led to greater activity, both from focal organisations and stakeholders as they got organised, which meant there were more opportunities to gain access to community

events, meetings, and consultations than occurred in East Manchester. However, in East Manchester, Manchester City FC offered greater access than was available in Haringey from Tottenham Hotspur FC. In any event, the high-profile nature of these developments that involved significant sums of public and private money together with Premier League football clubs meant there was a considerable amount of secondary material available, whether in printed form or through social media. Ultimately, there was a huge amount of data to analyse from both East Manchester and Tottenham, much of which it has not been possible to include in the thesis.

Given all of the above and the fact that it is always potentially problematic to make claims for extensions from case studies, it is nonetheless argued there are sufficient similarities between the two case studies and the findings with features to be found at many other sport regeneration developments in the UK or elsewhere. The rich description should also enable readers to better assess how well the findings may fit other settings, (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) and the fact that data analysis began yielding fewer new insights as it progressed indicates that the framework was comprehensive. Using stakeholder theory to understand the different contexts at other regeneration sites could also provide a unifying approach.

Managing the degree of involvement with the sites is a crucial issue for individuals carrying out field research (Pettigrew, 1990) and as discussed above, there were many opportunities to gain access to community events, meetings, and consultations, both in East Manchester and Tottenham. During these meetings, a range of emotional (tearful children asking why their home would be demolished), exciting (“*going over the wall to dig up the pitch*”), incomprehensible (comments about “*metal-bashing*” in relation to local business), amusing (a councillor’s reaction to use of the term “*place-making*”)

and boring (sections of council meetings) events took place. It can be argued it is possible for such events to bias the researcher and limit the reliability of the results. Pettigrew (1990: 272) warns against getting over-involved and “*going native*”. It is the job of the researcher to maintain a balanced position and to be aware of any bias or emotion with this type of study, especially when it comes to writing-up the thesis. Critical self-reflection, together with discussing the events with others, especially academic staff, were important steps to prevent taking a narrow viewpoint, (Schouten and McAlexander, 1995).

Data collection was limited to perceptions of those involved in the stadium-led regeneration at the two sites and available secondary material, with no specific measurement of salience, which might be a consideration for future research. Some of these limitations, such as potential opportunities to consider the relevance of the stakeholder influence framework at other sites, lead directly into opportunities for further research.

## **9.8 Opportunities for further research**

There is significant interest in the involvement of major UK sports organisations in a large number of new stadium plans that are being increasingly linked to wider regeneration efforts across the country. This interest is evidenced by a number of invitations to the author from national news organisations to comment on new stadium developments at varying stages of progression. As can be seen from this research, stadium-led regeneration plans can be extremely complex in design, take many years to process and affect many different stakeholders. These stadium-led

regeneration projects may offer the opportunity to undertake further research utilising the stakeholder framework that has been set out in this thesis. As Robinson (2006: 168) has suggested:

*“...any research on cities needs to be undertaken in a spirit of attentiveness to the possibility that cities elsewhere might perhaps be different and shed stronger light on the processes being studied. The potential to learn from other contexts, other cities, would need to always be kept open and hopefully acted upon.”*

The stakeholder influence framework started from the work of Mitchell *et al.*, (1997), but its extension to look at antecedents of the salience attributes has resulted from a more inductive approach. This approach could be extended, since there may be additional concepts involved at other sites that were not picked-up or as strongly represented in the research from East Manchester and Tottenham. Thus, the context may throw up different triggers for stakeholder involvement and alternative strategies to gain influence may be used in other stadium-led regeneration projects. For example, the analysis for this research provided data that place-making and public sector involvement were mentioned as part of part of the context in East Manchester and Tottenham, but the evidence was not strong enough to include them as concepts within the stakeholder influence framework. It may also be possible to consider the extent to which a lack of salience can act as a trigger for stakeholder activity at other sites.

On a deeper level, this research has set out the antecedents to the means of salience in the stakeholder influence framework that extend back to the context and triggers for involvement of individuals in trying to gain influence. Future research could continue to investigate the complexities of this process and to develop more finely tuned concepts. For example, detailed investigation remains to be carried out into how groups form and the way in which leaders or leadership structures evolve. The experience gained through this research and the framework developed opens up the possibilities of working more directly with stakeholders in more action-research or ethnographic roles. Such research activity could involve work with focal organisations or community groups involved in wider regeneration activities that are not solely linked to sports stadiums, for example on cultural regeneration projects or cluster projects. Whilst it was important from the author's perspective for this research to develop a detailed, rich narrative from East Manchester and Tottenham, future research could use economic and non-economic measures to evaluate the impact of stakeholder influence strategies.

## **9.9 Closing**

From the results of this research, it is argued that it is vital to have in place genuine consultation processes that allow stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process with their views being used to influence stadium-led regeneration.

Community participation can bring feelings of autonomy, fulfilment and purpose together with some ownership of the developments, (Impact of Regeneration, 2007).

Further, economic and social impacts should be realistically assessed and any

negative impacts kept to a minimum, while it is important to have transparency and open governance (as also recommended in the *Local government transparency code 2014* and the London Assembly investigation, *The Regeneration Game*, 2015).

Involving stakeholders through providing them with genuine means to influence stadium-led regeneration through the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency may seem problematic to some focal organisations, but, perhaps counter-intuitively, it can lead to fewer triggers towards mobilisation and other strategies of stakeholder action. If the processes that were put in place in East Manchester were adopted in other stadium-led regeneration projects, it could lead to more control for focal organisations. It might be noted that both Manchester City FC and Tottenham Hotspur FC received original planning permission in 2011 for their training site and new stadium respectively. The *Etihad Campus* opened in December 2014, whilst revised planning permission for the stadium in Tottenham was eventually granted by Haringey Council on 16.12.15., with completion likely in 2018. Haringey Council acknowledged that:

*“Football clubs have a responsibility to ensure that the local community gains from a new stadium. Communities must benefit from new mixed tenure housing, and improved transport links and across the local area. Local authorities must also capitalise on opportunities...”*

Through a number of triggers for involvement and range of strategies, community groups in Tottenham managed to gain some power, legitimacy and urgency with focal organisations, but there were limits to the extent of the salience and their overall impacts on the stadium-led regeneration. It has to be acknowledged that the power of focal groups in Tottenham, such as the council and the football club was sufficient to resist major changes to many of the stadium-led regeneration plans. Within a democracy governed by the rule of law, possessing power, legitimacy and urgency may not be enough to win all of the arguments. In the case of Archway Metal, in Tottenham, the business arguably possessed all three of these attributes of salience. The company fought and lost a four year battle with Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC against a compulsory purchase order. However, it does demonstrate that possession of power, legitimacy and urgency may allow stakeholders to influence stadium-led regeneration, even if it is merely to slow down the process, which might itself be an important instrumental weapon.

The results of this research have important implications for stakeholder groups and focal organisations. For both groups the results provide evidence of the context and type of issues that are likely to drive people towards trying to influence regeneration projects. It also sets out the type of strategies that can be effective in gaining responses from, and salience with, focal organisations.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Questionnaire and interview guide, East Manchester

Manchester City's Etihad Campus Development and Tottenham Hotspur's Northumberland Park Development: how do stakeholders influence stadium-led regeneration?

**Questionnaire produced by Mark Panton, PhD student / researcher from Birkbeck College, University of London. Contact at [pantonmark@hotmail.com](mailto:pantonmark@hotmail.com)**

Name:

- 1) Are things better or worse in East Manchester since MCFC moved in?
- 2) What changes have you noticed? Any specific examples?
- 3) Do local residents have any concerns about the Etihad Campus Development or further development of the stadium?
- 4) Does the football club consult with local groups and take notice of what people say?
- 5) Are local people and groups able to work with the football club to sort out any problems or make positive changes? Any specific examples?
- 6) How is MCFC perceived generally in East Manchester?
- 7) In the future do you think East Manchester will change further and if so, how?
- 8) Any further comments that you might have about the involvement of MCFC in East Manchester?

**End**

## **Appendix 2 Questionnaire and interview guide, Tottenham**

Manchester City's Etihad Campus Development and Tottenham Hotspur's Northumberland Park Development: a stakeholder perspective on 'stadium-led regeneration'.

**Questionnaire produced by Mark Panton, PhD student / researcher from Birkbeck College, University of London. Contact at [pantonmark@hotmail.com](mailto:pantonmark@hotmail.com)**

Name:

- 1) What is the general attitude of Tottenham Hotspur FC (THFC) towards local people in relation to the 'stadium-led regeneration' in the area?
- 2) Are things better or worse than they used to be in the area around the THFC stadium?
- 3) What groups are perceived as most important by the football club and the local council?
- 4) How is the importance related to perceived stakeholder power, legitimacy and urgency?
- 5) How are the local council and THFC perceived by the local community in relation to the regeneration proposals for Haringey?
- 6) How do local people wield their influence on the regeneration process?
- 7) Do local people believe they have been able to exert influence?
- 8) Do different stakeholders and groups work together (form alliances)?
- 9) Are there concerns by local businesses about the commercial nature of the development?
- 10) Are there concerns about environmental problems related to the development?

11) Do people think that things will get better or worse in the area in the next few years?

**END**