The openness of self-constitution : creativity, authenticity, and autonomy

The Openness of Self-Constitution: Creativity, Authenticity, and Autonomy

Nikos Erinakis

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London, 2015.

Statement of Originality

I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis entitled “The Openness of Self-Constitution: Creativity, Authenticity, and Autonomy” is my original and authentic creation.

14.12.2015



Nikos Erinakis

The Openness of Self-Constitution: Creativity, Authenticity, and Autonomy

Abstract

Most theories either identify autonomy and authenticity or else conceive the one as a core condition of the other. This thesis concentrates towards a reconceptualization of *authenticity* aiming at a clearer distinction between it and *autonomy*. By doing so, we shall be able to make much better sense of the everyday cases in which these notions are involved. Authenticity may be irrelevant or even conflicting to autonomy and each of these concepts needs to be understood in its own terms. At the heart of this thesis lies the development of a novel conception of authenticity. In contrast to the vast majority of prominent thinkers, who base their conceptions of authenticity on rationality and reflection, I base mine on *creativity*. Creativity has been widely understood as the creation of something both original and valuable. I develop a novel conception of creativity, which is designed to help us understand authenticity. I focus on what a creative process is, and I define it in terms of a conception of novelty and of sensitivity to the intrinsic value of the creative outcome. In light of this, I formulate a necessary and sufficient historical/developmental, externalist, non-intellectualist, non-rationalist and content-neutral condition of authenticity. While almost all theories of authenticity necessarily require the existence of a true self or at least some kind of self—the existence of which has been widely questioned by empiricists, neuroscientists and post-modern thinkers—the conception that I put forward is not a self-expression view of authenticity. In addition, I conceive autonomy and authenticity as two different normative principles: Autonomy is a moral concept that regulates permissible and impermissible actions, while authenticity is an ethical concept, which describes part of the moral good. I conclude that while respecting autonomy, we should primarily aim at developing social structures that promote authenticity.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I offer my sincerest gratitude to my primary supervisor Dr. Michael Garnett—he has been a tremendous mentor for me; his advice on my research has been priceless, whilst he has always allowed me the room to work in my own way. I would also like to thank Dr. Cristian Constantinescu for his fruitful comments and encouragement, as well as Dr. Andrew Huddleston, for insightfully guiding and enriching my research. My special appreciation and gratitude goes also to Professor Anthony Price—his support has truly helped me throughout my thesis.

Furthermore, while being a recognised doctoral student at the University of Oxford for the third and last year of my thesis, my supervisors there, Dr. James Grant, Dr. Edward Harcourt and Professor Stephen Mulhall, have offered me excellent guidance, much advice and insight, and have helped me to widen my research from various perspectives throughout my work.

My sincere thanks also goes to my fellow research students at both the University of London and the University of Oxford. Their support and comments helped me substantially throughout the writing of this thesis.

Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude to the State Scholarship Foundation of Greece (I.K.Y.). The full scholarship, which I obtained as part of the European Union "Lifelong Learning Programme" (2007-2013) of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) (2007-2013) and the European Social Fund (ESF), has funded all my academic and living costs.

Last but not less important, words cannot express how grateful I am to my parents and my brother—their love and support have been essential. I would also like to deeply thank all my friends who have always supported me and incited me to strive towards my goals.

Table Of Contents

Ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν: I searched myself.

—Heraclitus

Introduction

Make it new.
—Ezra Pound

Oscar Wilde said: "'Know thyself' was written over the portal of the antique world. Over the portal of the new world, 'Be thyself' shall be written." (Wilde, 1997: 1047) In these two phrases are summarized the ancient and modern ideals of being true to one's self. At the dawn of the 20th century, the existentialists might have said: 'Make thyself'. However, on the one hand, nothing ensures us that there is, in fact, a certain robust pre-given self that we can simply discover and come to know, or that we can embrace and identify with. On the other hand, simply making yourself does not necessarily mean that you do so authentically. Mere production alone is not adequate; something more is required: *creative* production. I would thus rather say: 'Creatively constitute thyself'.

Most theories either identify autonomy and authenticity or else conceive the one as a core condition of the other. It has gradually become clear to me that some of the most crucial problems that are raised regarding the concepts of authenticity and autonomy come from the fact that we have not paid enough attention to the distinction between them and to the different moral roles that they play. It is my view that not only should autonomy not be equated with authenticity, but also that the latter should not operate as a necessary condition for the former, since in many cases they directly conflict. This thesis concentrates on a reconceptualization of *authenticity* and *autonomy* aiming at a clearer distinction between them and a reconsideration of their relation.

At the heart of this thesis lies the development of a novel conception of authenticity that is based on a combination of original elements. In contrast to the majority of prominent theorists of autonomy and authenticity, who base their conceptions of authenticity on rationality, I base mine on *creativity*, while I also explore other relevant notions, such as novelty, originality, and imagination. Furthermore, while all theories of authenticity require the existence of a true self or at least some kind of self, I put forward a conception that is not a 'self-expression' view of authenticity; that is, the theory proposed here does not require a substantial theory of the self.

Many thinkers understand authenticity in terms of the simple idea that what is authentic is whatever is one's own, with the question of what it is for something to be one's own either neglected or misconstrued as a question

about autonomy. I aim at showing that a broader understanding of authenticity is required and that autonomy and authenticity are not only not coextensive but also potentially contradicting and conflicting. What is important regarding the quest for authenticity is to determine in which ways one's creations are one's own. Hence, there are two central questions that need to be answered: *What* it means for a creation to be one's own, and *how* it comes to be one's own.

In the first chapter, I survey prominent conceptions of authenticity and autonomy, and more precisely the relation that contemporary thinkers propose between the two. I divide the dominant contemporary theories into three categories: firstly, conceptions that conceive authenticity as both necessary and sufficient for autonomy; secondly, conceptions that conceive authenticity as necessary but insufficient for autonomy; thirdly, conceptions that conceive authenticity as neither necessary nor sufficient for autonomy. I argue that Harry Frankfurt's and John Christman's accounts belong to the first category, that Gerald Dworkin's and Alfred Mele's accounts belong to the second category, and that James Stacie Taylor's account belongs to the third category. Given this, most scholars who construct autonomy conceptions seem to take for granted that authenticity is, if not autonomy itself, at least a core condition of autonomy. I claim that this is the main source of several critical misunderstandings in regard to these two notions. Furthermore, I argue that even though Frankfurt's and Dworkin's models are widely considered as nearly identical because of their shared hierarchical nature, they are importantly distinct in view of the different ways in which they relate authenticity to autonomy, and that even though Christman seems to distinguish authenticity from competence, he ultimately does not. I maintain that Frankfurt's and Christman's theories of autonomy are best understood simply as theories of autonomy and not of authenticity. Moreover, I treat the theories of Dworkin, Mele, and Taylor as theories of autonomy that misuse the nature and role of authenticity in regard to autonomy.

In the second chapter, I explore in greater depth some problems regarding the conceptions of authenticity introduced in the first. Chapter II is an attack on contemporary conceptions of authenticity, and I argue that most of their standard conditions are unconvincing. I investigate the weaknesses of both the higher-order endorsement models and the externalist historical models by maintaining that none of activity, wholeheartedness, reflection, and rationality is either necessary or sufficient for authenticity. Since manipulation in regard to higher-order desires may take place, one can meet any of these conditions while at the same time being inauthentic. Given this,

it has been argued that although these conditions are perhaps insufficient for authenticity they may still be necessary. However, I argue that they are also unnecessary. This opens the way to the idea that, when distinguishing which attitudes are authentic, we should look not only to rationality and reflection but also to feelings, emotions, intuitions and imagination—as long as they are *creative*.

In the third chapter, I propose a new account of creativity. I trace the origins of the notion, and sketch a map of its various treatments in philosophical thought. I conclude that creativity has been widely understood as the production of something that is original and valuable in some way. I present and discuss some dominant contemporary conceptions of creativity, such as those developed by Boden, Gaut, Kronfeldner and Novitz, before developing a conception of creativity designed specifically to help us to understand authenticity. I focus on what a creative process is, and understand it in terms of a psychological conception of novelty and of sensitivity in regard to the intrinsic value of the creative outcome.

In the fourth chapter, I propose and discuss a novel account of authenticity that avoids the problems explored in the previous chapters. In short, the conception I develop is historical/developmental, externalist, non-intellectualist, non-rationalist, and content-neutral. I present and discuss each one of these characteristics. I formulate necessary and sufficient conditions of authenticity based on the account of creativity developed in the previous chapter. I then concentrate on articulating in more detail what exactly is for various attitudes to be authentic, i.e. authentic desires, emotions and beliefs. I also give an account of *inauthenticity* and an account of *non-authenticity*. While most conceptions of authenticity categorize all persons and attitudes that are not authentic as being inauthentic, I argue that in reality some of them are simply non-authentic.

In the fifth chapter, I explore the relationship between authenticity and the self. I argue that many equate authenticity with an idea of self-expression, and that most theories of authenticity require or at least entail some aspect of self-expression. Following from this, one major difficulty and weakness of such views is that they seem to require the existence of some kind of 'true' self. I argue that there are two dominant conceptions of the self. According to one, which has its roots in Plato and Aristotle, the self is an unchanging and continuous agent that operates as a unifier of the external and internal stimuli we receive. This is an understanding of the self as one's relatively stable traits and dispositions. According to the other, which has been espoused by empiricists, neuroscientists and post-modern thinkers, the self is constantly

changing and incoherent and, in general, can be considered an illusion. Both are potentially problematic. In addition, while focusing on Jean-Paul Sartre and with attention to Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, I critically discuss the existentialist views of authenticity and the self by exploring their possible weaknesses.

The account proposed in this thesis presupposes *no theory of the self*, and so avoids these problems. Philosophers of authenticity and autonomy have typically based their conceptions on the existence of some kind of true self. I argue that this direction of thought leads us unavoidably to dead ends. A main strength of the theory proposed here therefore is that I put forward an account that is not based on a self-expression view of authenticity, i.e. it does not require an extensive theory of the self.

In the sixth chapter, I discuss accounts of autonomy based on the traditional idea of rational self-legislation. I argue that we need to know on the one hand what an autonomous choice is and on the other hand, what it is to respect an autonomous choice. As regards the first of these, I construe autonomy as a kind of competence and I explore the competence conditions of several prominent accounts. As regards the second, I argue that the main duty in order for persons to respect the autonomy of others is the duty of non-paternalism, and I elaborate on the way I conceive non-paternalism.

I focus on discussing various types of conflicts, i.e. conflicts between competing authentic attitudes and conflicts between authenticity and autonomy. I begin by suggesting that authenticity may be irrelevant to or even in conflict with autonomy and that each concept needs to be understood in its own terms. A core contribution of my thesis in the current debate is that I conceive autonomy and authenticity as wholly distinct moral concepts. I take autonomy to be part of the principle of the right, and authenticity to be part of the theory of the good. This distinction has not, to my knowledge, been previously recognized. Based on the principle of non-paternalism and with the help of Immanuel Kant's formula of the end in itself (FEI) and John Stuart Mill's harm principle I argue that autonomy is a moral concept, which should be used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions and ought to be respected, while, with the help of Mill's ideas in regard to individuality, I argue that authenticity is an ethical concept, which describes part of the good that ought to be promoted. I thus explore autonomy as a constraint in the pursuit of authenticity.

In addition, I explore the notion of authenticity in cases of non-autonomous persons. A central aim of my account is to prove that it is possible for a person to be autonomous while inauthentic, as well as to be

authentic while non-autonomous. Given this, another important contribution of my thesis is that it gives guidance on how to treat people who may not be competent for autonomy, but are nevertheless capable of authenticity. In terms of regulation, we should respect the autonomous desire, decision or action of a person, despite the fact that her authentic one might be different. I claim, however, that the ideal society would be one in which the autonomous attitudes are equated with the authentic attitudes of a person and thus we should aim at developing social structures that promote authenticity.

My focus lies on what authenticity is rather than within which specific social conditions it can thrive. It would be, however, a miscomprehension of my theory to construe it as individualistic and lacking social/relational elements. I am not denying the importance of social interrelations with other persons and social entities in the formulation of authentic creations. On the contrary, the account proposed here involves both social and asocial aspects. Besides, I clarify that there cannot exist ex-nihilo creations, i.e. outcomes of parthenogenesis. Whereas manipulation, oppression and coercion bypass creativity and authenticity, more voluntary forms of influence enhance them. One is endlessly creating one's inner nature, not through an inward self-directed direction, but in a constant creative feedback with one's social reality. Both individual and social life can be radically transformed through creativity, and in this sense creativity and authenticity are capable of potentially playing a crucial emancipatory role in both an individual and a collective level.

As a revolt against the oversimplification of founding authenticity solely on reflective rationality, the theory developed here attempts to grasp an image of our whole nature. In my view, creativity is a more wholly human capacity than mere rationality and in this respect is more appropriate to operate as a core condition of authenticity. I argue for a new view of authenticity and its relation to autonomy. The motivation behind the view I am considering is to pull apart authenticity from autonomy, reflective rationality and the self, which I believe seriously restrict it, and to direct it towards imaginativeness and creativity, where it may be more at home.

I claim therefore that the origin of authenticity lies neither in a concrete human essence, as traditionally argued, nor in a capacity for rational reflective or radical choice, as maintained in analytic or existentialist thought, nor solely in a collection of personal feelings and transient desires, as argued within Romanticism. The conception proposed in this thesis is significantly different from subjectivist and social-relational substantive self-expression theories, as well as existentialist theories, since it requires neither a

substantive theory of the self nor a capacity for reflective rationality and radical choice.

These claims will, I hope, be vindicated in what follows and shall restore some initial clarity and coherence to an idea that has been widely considered overly vague, unstable and suspicious. It may seem slightly paradoxical to explore and analyse a concept and human capacity that I regard as non-rational through analytic reasoning alone. I hope, nonetheless, that the positions and the arguments that accompany them will shed more light on what I consider to be the most important outcomes of imagination and, in cases, its conjunction with reason: creativity and, in extension, authenticity. Besides, to think against rationality does not mean to support the irrational, but rather to attempt a reevaluation of their nature and role. Exactly as avant-garde art does not have any general rules but each work of art is characterized by specific elements that render it unique and genuine; authentic creations, either attitudes or works, cannot be characterized by specific rules and structures, but rather by a specific capacity through which they are rendered unique and genuine.

We find ourselves ‘thrown’, as Heidegger would say, into a world and a situation not of our own making, already disposed by moods and particular commitments, with a past behind us that constrains our choices. The "ethic of authenticity", if radicalized, may provide us with more fruitful responses to the tensions of post-modern morality and enrich the answers generated by the more mainstream tradition of the "ethic of autonomy”. An authentic life is not one that can be simply discovered and then experienced; it is one that needs to be *creatively* created. In the face of a contemporary post-modern drift towards a standardized instrumental mass society, it seems to me that through creative creation the possibilities of an authentic and genuine life may be awakened.

Chapter I

[Three Views on the Relationship between Authenticity and Autonomy]

1. Introduction

Most contemporary theories of autonomy either do not distinguish between authenticity and autonomy or else consider the former to be a necessary condition of the latter. A clearer distinction between the two and a reconsideration of their relationship is required. In this chapter, I survey prominent conceptions of authenticity and autonomy and more precisely the relation that some prominent contemporary thinkers propose between the two. I mainly concentrate on higher order endorsement theories and externalist historical conceptions of autonomy.

2. A Brief History

Many philosophers have referred to the etymology of the word *autonomy* (αυτονομία) which consists of the words *auto* (αυτο) and *nomos* (νόμος) meaning self and law, rule. To begin with, even though the term autonomy was introduced by Ancient Greek thinkers to describe the right of city-states to self-legislate and govern free from the interference of foreign powers, it soon began to denote self-legislation, self-governance, self-determination, self-ownership, and personal sovereignty. However, we can reasonably claim that what ancient Greek philosophers had in mind when they referred to persons that were competent to being guided and ruled by reason was the competency for autonomy. For example, Plato, Aristotle and many of the Stoics would probably accept that a self-governing person is a person who is ruled primarily by reason. Both Plato in the *Republic* and Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1166a17-19) considered the rational part of the soul to be the most truly human. They identified humanity with the conception of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) and the ability of one to not be dependent on others.[1] Thus, the ancient Greek ideas of self-mastery and

[1] Besides, when Socrates rejects the idea that human virtue depends on a person's sex or age and he leads Meno towards the idea that virtues are common to all people, he refers to temperance (sophrosunê- exercising self-control), i.e. to a form of autonomy based on self-

self-determination operated as the foundational concept of both collective and individual autonomy.

If we search back to the origins of the word, in Thucydides the word 'autonomous' describes a person who experiences personal independence and the freedom of the person to use one's own laws. In Herodotus 'autonomous' is the one who lives under one's own rules and laws and in Sophocles is the one who experiences freedom of the will. Nevertheless, the term that I find interestingly illuminating is *autonoos* (auto+nous) which derives from the words *self* and *mind* and in my view is directly related to the notion of autonomy as we use it today. It is first met in Aeschylus, meaning the one who acts in accordance with one's own will. However, the word authenticity (αυθεντικότητα) is not met in ancient Greek texts until the Hellenistic years (sometime after the 300 BC) when it is used by the Alexandrian scholars of Archaic and Hellenistic texts in the Alexandrian library. The origin of the word comes from authentis (αυθέντης) which in Herodotus means the one who does everything with one's hands, by one's own, and more precisely in Euripides and Aeschylus refers to the one who has murdered a member of one's own family (e.g. Oedipus), since the second component of the word entea (έντεα) in the *Iliad* means 'weapons'. The interesting part is that throughout the Hellenistic times, the word *authentis* began to refer to the one who was the originator of an action, meaning the one who firstly and originally created that action. [2]

It is obvious that today we use the word in a different sense, but with a certain degree of imagination one can understand how the connection between authenticity and originality was developed. We notice that in Ancient Greece the word 'autonomous' included the notion of authenticity as we understand it today and it was almost equated with it, since a specific distinct word for it did not exist yet. Given this, a misunderstanding is revealed, proving a conflation and confusion of those two notions since their birth. In my opinion, this confusion continues today and needs to be resolved, giving authenticity the place it deserves as a distinct and in many cases irrelevant or even opposing notion to autonomy. I believe that an autonomous person is closer to or even equated with the idea of the autonoos person, whereas the authentic person has to do with a more holistic idea of one's inner nature and needs to be distinguished from the other two.

---

regulation. In addition, as Cooper (2003) maintains the thinker and orator Dio of Prusa (ca. 50–ca. 120), in his 80th Discourse, defines individual autonomy almost in the way it is conceived in contemporary philosophy.

[2] The etymologies and the sources of these words are drawn from Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, H., S., and McKenzie, R., 1996, *A Greek-English Lexicon,* Oxford: Clarendon.

Nevertheless, besides the roots of these notions in ancient times, it was Kant (1998 [1785]) who brought the concept of autonomy into philosophical focus. He formulated the notion of moral autonomy as one being in authority over one's attitudes and maintained that one should follow one's own self-imposed law and not an externally engineered law. It is crucial though that Kant in accordance with the Enlightenment idea of the universality of reason conceived inclinations, feelings, emotions and all other non-rational elements as external to the self-legislation of the will, i.e. following them renders our actions heteronomous. In addition, it was Mill (1991 [1859]) who contributed crucially to the normative significance of autonomy in his *On Liberty*. Although he did not use the term 'autonomy' in his writings, it is widely accepted that he had self-determination and self-governance in mind. Despite the differences of their conceptions, both developed accounts of autonomy that are based on rationality and self-reflection. Until our days the most prominent conceptions of autonomy and authenticity, including the ones I shall be discussing, are divided between those two approaches, the Kantian and the Millian.

In regard to authenticity, the first systematic use of it in philosophy appeared in Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1962 [1927]). It is important to note, however, that the German word used by Heidegger—translated to 'authenticity'—is *Eigentlichkeit*, which in a more faithful translation means 'ownliness', or 'that which is one's most own'. Also, even though it was Heidegger who introduced the term in existentialism, through it, besides being true to one's individually unique true self, he also referred to a person's capacity to be potentially fully human. In addition, Lionel Trilling in his *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972) maintained that the ideal of authenticity is a relatively new notion in Western thought. In his view, the emergence of authenticity as a character ideal was founded on a conception of social existence as something alien to our capacity to be true to ourselves—an idea that was also manifested in the various social contract theories that originated in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Following from this, most scholars who develop conceptions of autonomy seem to take for granted that authenticity is, if not autonomy itself, at least a core condition for autonomy, or in other words, that it is the first and basic step for autonomy to obtain. I believe that this is the source of several critical misunderstandings, beginning with the negligence of the importance of authenticity as a fundamentally separate concept. Only if authenticity is understood in its own terms can the various different dimensions of it be revealed.

Moving on to the dominant contemporary autonomy and authenticity conceptions, there are two ways in which authenticity conditions are generally introduced. The first is that we seek conditions based on which we can distinguish authentic from inauthentic features of the self. The second is that we seek conditions that present the tools based on which the agent is able to formulate and develop authentic features. While studying various scholars that refer to higher-order endorsement and historical models, we notice that Frankfurt's conception of autonomy is equated with authenticity, Dworkin's with authenticity and independence, Christman's with authenticity and competence and Mele's with self-control and authenticity. More precisely, it seems to me that the prominent theories of autonomy can be divided into two categories. In the one, autonomy is equated with authenticity, and in the other autonomy consists of authenticity plus some other element. Accounts of the former kind have been developed by Frankfurt and Christman, while accounts of the latter kind have been developed by Dworkin and Mele.

I shall discuss, firstly, the conceptions which conceive authenticity as both necessary and sufficient for autonomy, or in other words, those which equate autonomy with authenticity, i.e. Frankfurt's and Christman's accounts; secondly, those conceptions which conceive authenticity as necessary but insufficient for autonomy, i.e. Dworkin's and Mele's accounts; thirdly, the conception which conceives authenticity as neither necessary nor sufficient for autonomy, i.e. J. S. Taylor's account. As I shall argue, Frankfurt's and Dworkin's models are often considered as almost the same because of their hierarchical nature. However, in my opinion, Frankfurt's and Dworkin's conceptions of autonomy, despite their similarities, are importantly distinct, since the former can be equated with authenticity while the latter requires independence too, thus, they should not be conflated into one model. Furthermore, even though Christman seems to distinguish authenticity from competence, I shall argue that he does not and that his competency condition is absorbed into the one of authenticity, with the result that he equates autonomy with authenticity too. This categorization and argumentation regarding the discussed theories, as well as the possible relations between authenticity and autonomy, will provide me with the necessary starting points in order to develop my conceptions of authenticity and autonomy in the chapters that shall follow.

3. Authenticity as both necessary and sufficient for Autonomy

For Harry Frankfurt the "authentic self" consists of our higher-order desires (Frankfurt, 1988: 12-25). He argues that a person "has a desire of the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires 'second-order volitions' or 'volitions of the second order'. Now it is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person." (Frankfurt, 1988: 16) As O' Conor writes: "On Frankfurt's analysis, I act freely when the desire on which I act is one that I desire to be effective. This second-order desire is one with which I identify: it reflects my true self." (O' Conor, 2005: 11)

In Frankfurt's theory therefore the key to autonomy and authenticity is identification.[3] He writes: "To identify an agent's will is either to identify the desire (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he performs or to identify the desire (or desires) by which he will or would be motivated when or if he acts." (Frankfurt, 1988: 14) Identification can be equated with both autonomy and authenticity. The process of identification necessarily requires reflection and endorsement. For him, personal autonomy is to be conceived as a capacity to reflect on, and then identify with, one's first-order desires through second-order ones, which are desires to have this or that first-order desire. In other words, the agent's first-order desires reflect what one wants and one's second-order desires reflect what one wants to want. However, what is crucial is one's identification with one's higher-order desires and not how they have originated (Frankfurt, 1988: 53-54).

Frankfurt writes: "A person acts autonomously only when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will." (Frankfurt, 1999: 132) He argues that one is autonomous when one acts out of volitional necessity and he has sought to draw a distinction among motives as internal or external to the self by suggesting cases in which an agent lacks autonomy because she is actuated by motives from which she is alienated. Such cases suggest that being autonomous is a matter of being governed from within, i.e. by motives internal to the self. The idea of the essential character of one's will may be

[3] It should be noted that Frankfurt's conception is not explicitly an account of autonomy, but one of freedom of the will. Even though he speaks about authenticity and autonomy, he does not define his conception either as one of authenticity or of autonomy. Nevertheless, his account has been widely absorbed into the literature as one of autonomy.

understood as the authentic character of the will. Given that, it is reasonable to consider Frankfurt's conception of autonomy a conception of authenticity.

As I discuss in Section 4 of this chapter, J. S. Taylor, and Velleman as well, argue that being governed by such a volitional essence might amount more to authenticity than to autonomy. In Velleman's words: "Even if I believed that a person had a motivational essence of this kind, I would not infer that his being governed by this essence was what made him autonomous. Being governed by such an essence might amount to authenticity, perhaps, but not autonomy." (Velleman, 2002: 97) Given that Frankfurt himself does not make any explicit distinction between identification, activity, autonomy and authenticity, it can be suggested that for him these concepts are exactly the same or at least coextensive. For instance, he writes that: "The distinction between heteronomy and autonomy coincides. . .with the distinction between being passive and being active" (Frankfurt, 1999: 133) and as Taylor argues: "This makes it plausible to believe that, for Frankfurt, for a person to identify with her effective first-order desires is also for her to be autonomous with respect to them." (Taylor, 2009: 48) Also, as mentioned, for Frankfurt a person acts autonomously when the person's volitions originate from the person's essential character of will, a claim that suffices in order for autonomy and authenticity to be identified. In addition, in Taylor's view: "Even though Frankfurt did not explicitly mention the concept of autonomy in his early work on identification, it seems appropriate to hold that these concepts are coextensive…there is also reason to think that he intends to offer his hierarchical analysis of identification as an analysis of autonomy." (Taylor, 2009: 47)

In John Christman's theory, autonomy is understood as a combination of competency and authenticity. An agent is competent when she is able to form intentions regarding her characteristics and to critically reflect on them. These characteristics can then be considered authentic, if the agent critically reflects, without any constraints by distorting factors, on the historical process through which it came to exist, and if the agent accepts it as part of her understanding of the nature and essence of her self and not feel alienated by or from it.

Christman's model is conceived as a historical one, in the sense that the means and historical processes through which the person makes certain decisions are considered to be the core factors for determining whether those decisions are autonomous. He argues that in order to avoid conceiving of autonomy as a label for the ideal life, we should require that the autonomous individual accepts herself in the minimal sense of not being

acutely alienated from the basic elements of her motivational structure and conditions of life. For him, minimal rationality means that the agent should not experience 'manifest conflicts' in the set of desires and beliefs that she has relative to a certain desire. More precisely, he clarifies that: "a person P is minimally rational at t when P experiences no manifest conflicts of desires or beliefs which significantly effect actions by P at or subsequent to t." (Chirstman, 1993: 287) Nevertheless, what is important is the agent's stance towards diachronic aspects of autonomous agency, i.e. how such a trait is developed and expressed over time and contingent on the particulars of personal history.

When Christman outlines the conditions for autonomy, he has one condition for authenticity (which consists of three subconditions) and a separate condition for competence (which consists of two subconditions), demonstrating that he does not intend to equate autonomy with authenticity. However, the phrase "one's own" is used in relation to both autonomy and authenticity throughout the book without clarifying if "one's own" judgments, commitments, desires, beliefs, values etc. are the autonomous or the authentic ones. He writes: "The fundamental structure of normative commitments and pattern of judgment is what must be "one's own" in order for the person to be autonomous in the sense that matters here" (Christman, 2009: 136). Christman suggests that a person is autonomous regarding a desire D, if one does not, or would not, reject it after reflecting upon the process by which one came to have it. In Christman's words: "The key element of autonomy is, in my view, the agent's acceptance or rejection of the process of desire formation or the factors that give rise to that formation, rather than the agent's identification with the desire itself." (Christman, 1991: 2) He provides the following conditions for autonomy:

> Relative to some characteristic C, where C refers to basic organizing values and commitments, autonomy obtains if:
>
> (Basic Requirements – Competence):
> 1. The person is competent to effectively form intentions to act on the basis of C. That is, she enjoys the array of competences that are required for her to negotiate socially, bodily, affectively, and cognitively in ways necessary to form effective intentions on the basis of C;
> 2. The person has the general capacity to critically reflect on C and other basic motivating elements of her psychic and bodily make-up; and
>
> (Hypothetical Reflection Condition – Authenticity):
> 3. Were the person to engage in sustained critical reflection on C over a variety of

conditions in light of the historical processes (adequately described) that gave rise to C; and

4. She would not be alienated from C in the sense of feeling and judging that C cannot be sustained as part of an acceptable autobiographical narrative organized by her diachronic practical identity; and

5. The reflection being imagined is not constrained by reflection-distorting factors. (Christman, 2009: 155)

While reading Christman's conditions, however, we notice that the second condition presupposes the first and the third presupposes the second, since it does not seem possible for an agent to be able to critically reflect on C without firstly being able to form effective intentions to act on the basis of C. In other words, Christman's requirements for competency can be synopsized into one only condition regarding the capacity of the agent to critically reflect. More importantly though, we notice that the first of the authenticity conditions presupposes the capacity of the person to critically reflect; for Christman, authenticity necessarily requires critical reflection. Hence, the previous two conditions, which Christman calls competency conditions and refer to critical reflection, are incorporated into the authenticity conditions. In other words, all of Chistman's conditions of autonomy are incorporated in his authenticity conditions. Therefore, based on his understanding of authenticity and the requirements for it, autonomy is in fact equated with authenticity, as it is in Frankfurt's conception.

4. Authenticity as necessary but insufficient for Autonomy

For Gerald Dworkin (1988), autonomy is the combination of independence and authenticity. The conception of identification is similar to Frankfurt's, meaning that in order for it to take place, reflection, hierarchy and endorsement are required. In his view, the "true self" is equated with our higher-order preferences. Authenticity obtains through the identification of the person with her higher-order desires in order for the determinants of her behavior to become her own. A person can be considered autonomous if she is able to critically reflect upon her first-order desires and to change them if she decides to, with the sole condition that the critical reflection of the agent is independent and free from influences that would subvert it. In terms of what it takes for something to be one's own, he writes: "It is the attitude a person takes towards the influences motivating him which determines whether or not they are to be considered 'his.' Does he identify with them,

assimilate them to himself, view himself as the kind of person who wishes to be motivated in these particular ways?" (Dworkin, 1976: 25) On Dworkin's account, what matters is our ability to critically reflect while asking if we truly identify with such desires. Furthermore, while on Christman's account the person needs to *counterfactually* critically reflect upon her desires, decisions and values and not repudiate them, on Dworkin's account one needs to actually reflect upon those and endorse them.

However, on Dworkin's conception one can be considered authentic but not autonomous if one follows one's desire after reflecting and identifying with it, even if one has been externally manipulated in having certain higher order desires. For example, imagine a person who identifies with her first-order desire to betray the secrets of her beloved one, because she has been brainwashed into having a second-order desire that motivates her to do so. She may identify with her second-order desire for betrayal, but obviously she is not independent in having it. Thus, on Dworkin's view, since she identifies with her higher order desires, she is authentic but not independent; thus, authentic but not autonomous. As I shall argue, such an understanding of authenticity is problematic.

Turning now to Alfred Mele, in the first part of his book *Autonomous Agents* (1995) he discusses the notions of akrasia and self-control, arguing that self-control is the basis for autonomy.[4] He clarifies that self-control by itself cannot ensure autonomy, since the agent may be self-controlled, while, however, controlling herself in accordance with values and beliefs that are products of external manipulation. In the second part of his book he proposes the addition that must be made to self-control in order for autonomy to exist: authenticity. For Mele, in order for a pro-attitude to be possessed autonomously, it should be also possessed authentically.

Thus, it is clear that for Mele autonomy consists of self-control and authenticity. Even an ideally self-controlled person cannot be autonomous if the condition for authenticity is not met. For him, as with Dworkin, the capacity of one to reflect critically upon one's preferences and desires, and the ability either to identify with these or to change them in light of higher-order preferences and values, is necessary for autonomy. However, in order for autonomy to exist something more is required and this is where the historical aspect appears. Since for Mele autonomy is not simply an

[4] The condition of self-control, which has been common to thinkers of freedom and autonomy, has its origins in Descartes's model of rational control and more importantly in Locke's rebuilding and redefinition of Descartes's theory of rational control of the self. Locke develops an idea of a process of self-remaking from which it is concluded that a person instead of blindly following the *telos* of nature may formulate one's own self.

internalist matter, like it is for Frankfurt and Dworkin, the history of the individual and the formation of her characteristics play a significant role. This makes his conception an externalist one. As proven especially by his 2* condition (Mele, 1995: 171-2), he is interested in the history of the formation of each characteristic in order to distinguish whether it is a history which is authenticity-enabling or authenticity-blocking. In this sense, his conception of authenticity is clearly history-sensitive.

By devoting one section to the distinction between causation and compulsion, he elaborates further on the externalist notion of authenticity that interests him. For Mele, authenticity is "a historical property of agents required for responsibility for the possession of a pro-attitude. A necessary condition of an agent S's authentically possessing a pro-attitude P (e.g., a value or preference) that he has over an interval t is that it be false that S's having P over that interval is, as I will say, compelled* –where compulsion* is compulsion not arranged by S." (Mele, 1995: 166) Mele's historical condition for authenticity is a negative one, in the sense that in his conception the agent should not have a certain history but rather lack a certain kind of history (i.e., compulsion) in order to be autonomous regarding a pro-attitude. After discussing a number of variations of his core examples, he proposes the following conditions in regard to compulsion for his conception of autonomy:

> 1. A sufficient condition for its being false that someone who possesses a practically unsheddable pro-attitude, P, is compelled to possess P. Barring compelled "innate" pro-attitudes, an agent who is practically unable (over a span of time) to shed a pro-attitude P with which he strongly identifies for reasons whose possession is not explained by a bypassing of his capacities for control over his mental life is not compelled to possess that pro attitude.
>
> 2. A first approximation of a sufficient condition for P-compulsion*. If an agent S comes to possess a pro-attitude P in a way that bypasses S's (perhaps relatively modest) capacities for control over his mental life, and the bypassing issues in S's being practically unable to shed P, and the bypassing was not itself arranged (or performed) by S, then S is compelled* to possess P.
>
> 2*. If an agent S comes to possess a pro-attitude P in a way that bypasses S's (perhaps relatively modest) capacities for control over his mental life, and the bypassing issues in S's being practically unable to shed P, and the bypassing was not itself arranged (or performed) by S; and S neither presently possesses nor earlier possessed pro-attitudes that would support his identifying with P, with the exception of pro-attitudes that are themselves practically unsheddable products of unsolicited bypassing; then S is compelled* to possess P. (Mele, 1995: 171-2)

Mele draws the distinction between causation and compulsion in order to defend the view that autonomy is compatible with determinism. He refers to the case of Beth, a person who is brainwashed to be a psychological twin of Charles Manson. If the real Manson, in contrast to Beth, was not compelled to have such values, then only he should be considered autonomous with respect to them. In arguing that Beth is not autonomous, Mele concludes that the autonomous possession of a pro-attitude requires authenticity. That does not mean, however, that whoever is compelled to have certain values is directly rendered non-autonomous; it depends upon whether the effects of manipulation remain in force. Therefore, it is different to be compelled to acquire a value at a time and to be compelled to possess a value over a stretch of time. Mele argues that although Manson is not relevantly different to Beth internally, he differs from her with respect to autonomy. That, as Mele claims, "is a historical point" and proves the importance of taking into serious account the personal history of the individual when answering questions of authenticity and autonomy regarding one's self.

Furthermore, while concentrating on the relationship between authenticity and autonomy, Mele discusses the case of someone who voluntarily decides to be manipulated in order to promote her autonomy (e.g. she allows herself to be hypnotised in order to quit smoking). This is an interesting case which incorporates the crucial reason why the distinction between authenticity and autonomy is important. If one decided that a particular desire was inauthentic, then it would make sense to autonomously choose to reject it. But what if one's desire was *authentic* and one autonomously decided to reject it?

Based on Cal's case, an ex-smoker who is happy with his decision to quit smoking but sometimes still experiences a desire to smoke, Mele claims that even if the desires of an agent are not manifestations of her autonomy, the agent may be autonomous in continuing to have them. It would be interesting to consider Mele's argument in terms of authenticity in order to possibly stretch out a crucial difference between autonomy and authenticity. Think of a person who quit smoking last year but now desires to smoke a cigarette. Even though she has autonomously quit smoking for a year and she continues to rationally believe that she should not smoke, she may, while meeting Mele's requirements for authenticity, authentically desire to have a smoke. If she lights one up, she is authentically non-autonomous. In addition, based on Dworkin's theory, consider a person who experiences a first order

desire to quit his job in order to travel with an old bike all the way through Pan-American Highway in Latin America. He experiences, however, a second-order desire that dictates him to keep his job in order to be able to retain his costly way of living. Although, he concludes after rational reflection that he should follow his second-order desire, he does not, and he embarks for Latin America. This person also is authentically non-autonomous.

Following from the above, it seems that on all of the accounts mentioned in this chapter rational reflection is necessary for autonomy. Nevertheless, it should be clarified that Frankfurt's model does not require rationality but only reflective thinking. In other words, in all four philosophers' views, authenticity is a fundamental, necessary condition for autonomy and it requires either rational, critical or simply mere reflection.

As mentioned, for Dworkin autonomy is equated with authenticity and independence, while for Mele with self-control and authenticity. However, the historical aspect of Dworkin's account is incorporated in his idea of independence, whereas the historical aspect of Mele's account, as proved by the conditions he provides, is incorporated in his idea of authenticity. Thus, I believe that Mele's notion of authenticity is equivalent to Christman's notion of authenticity, and, as Christman's conception includes within authenticity something like Dworkin's independence condition, they both involve Dworkin's notions of authenticity and independence, i.e. Dworkin's notion of autonomy. Furthermore, we are led to the conclusion that Frankfurt conception of autonomy is more or less equivalent to what Dworkin calls 'authenticity'. In turn, Dworkin's account of autonomy is more or less equivalent to what Mele calls 'authenticity'. The following graph might be useful in clarifying these interrelations:



5. Authenticity as neither necessary nor sufficient for Autonomy

James Taylor in *Practical Autonomy and Bioethics* (2009) develops three conditions in order for a person to be autonomous, which he calls the Threshold Condition, the Degree Condition and the Tracing Condition. The Threshold condition requires that the person making the decision is not influenced by biased information provided by another person, or (if one has been influenced in such a way) that one is able to distinguish how one's decision-making process has been affected, in order to eliminate its effects (Taylor, 2009: 7). Since for Taylor the Threshold condition is only necessary and not sufficient for autonomy, he introduces the Degree Condition that operates as a crucial addition to the former. For Taylor, the degree which one is autonomous with respect to one's decisions results from the degree to which one endorses the decision-making procedure based on which one

makes the decision. The more a person endorses the decision-making procedure that she uses, the greater her degree of autonomy with respect to that decision is. The degree of autonomy therefore of one's decisions is partly determined by the degree to which they result from a decision-making procedure that one is satisfied with. Thus, Taylor here uses the idea of satisfaction in terms of one being autonomous in a degree analogous to the degree one is satisfied with one's decision-making procedure (Taylor, 2009: 8-9). Satisfaction of a person "consists solely in his being unmoved to alter it after he has become aware of how he makes his decisions." (Taylor, 2009: 9) He considers a person satisfied with a decision-making procedure if the person believes that has sufficient reason to continue using it. The Tracing Condition refers to the possibility that one may autonomously change one's decision-making procedures, i.e. one's order of priorities, as long as one is autonomous the moment one decides to change them (Taylor, 2009: 11).

For Taylor, Frankfurt's account is a metaphysical one that deals with the issues of free will and responsibility. Contrariwise, his own account is a political one that deals with the way the decisions of a person are affected by others. He argues that Frankfurt's conception of autonomy is in fact a theory of authenticity and primarily concerned with identification. Taylor's account, on the other hand, is externalist, i.e. autonomy is conceived as an externalist concept, since the autonomy of the person depends also on external factors, rather than simply on one's own beliefs and desires. Identification, however, is by definition an internalist notion, which refers to the relation between the agent's mental states. Taylor points out that one can identify with a decision that is not autonomous, if that decision does not meet his threshold condition (i.e. it is the result of manipulation by another agent). In this sense, if we accept the equation of authenticity and identification, one can be authentic while not autonomous, a possibility that stands for Dworkin's and Mele's theories too. However, the interesting part of Taylor's theory is that one can also be autonomous without being authentic. I shall explore these possibilities in the following paragraphs.

To begin with, Taylor describes the reasons why identification and autonomy are often considered coextensive. Firstly, historically, Frankfurt's and Dworkin's accounts were developed during the same period and they share strong similarities, as they both develop hierarchical conceptions of first-order and second-order desires. Frankfurt's conception concentrates on the conditions regarding free action and free will and Dworkin's conception concentrates on the conditions regarding self-rule. Secondly, in Taylor's opinion, it is natural to intuitively hold that the process of identifying with a

desire is the same with being autonomous towards that desire. Thus, he argues that the conflation between identification and autonomy makes sense, since their procedures can be intuitively misunderstood as being the same. For both Frankfurt and Dworkin, in regard to the basic questions that their theories attempt to answer, it is crucial whether one endorses and identifies with one's essential motivations. Taylor maintains that:

> The question of what conditions must be met for a person to identify with his effective first-order desires is also widely taken to be the question of what conditions must be met for him to be autonomous with respect to them. Indeed, so widespread is the view that Frankfurt and Dworkin have offered substantially similar analyses of the same concept that it is common for persons to write of the "Frankfurt–Dworkin" approach to analyzing identification, or autonomy, with the terms "autonomy" and "identification" being used interchangeably. (Taylor, 2009: 39)

However, even though Frankfurt's and Dworkin's theories share strong similarities, I consider them to be crucially distinct, since the former equates autonomy with authenticity, while the latter, besides authenticity, also requires independence for autonomy—not to mention that it is in independence that the historical dimension of his theory lies. This difference alone suffices in order for them not to be conflated into one model.

Following from this, Taylor refers to Frankfurt's conception of autonomy as one of authenticity. He writes, "The sense of autonomy as authenticity has been developed by Harry Frankfurt—and, unlike his analysis of identification, Frankfurt's account of autonomy as authenticity is undoubtedly intended to be an analysis of autonomy." (Taylor, 2009: 30) Velleman (2002) also criticizes on the same basis Frankfurt by claiming that when one is governed by one's "motivational essence", then one's desires may be called authentic, but not necessarily autonomous. He points out that being governed by such an essence might amount perhaps to authenticity, but not to autonomy.

Velleman seems to have a strong point about the relation between authenticity and autonomy. He refers to "the paradigm case of inauthenticity, the person who manifests what D. W. Winnicott called a 'False Self'…The individual who has a 'False Self' laughs at what he thinks he is supposed to find amusing, shows concern for what he thinks he is supposed to care about, and in general conforms himself to the demands and expectations of others." (Velleman, 2002: 97) However, Taylor, while defending Frankfurt, responds to the case of the "False Self" by arguing that one may be authentically inauthentic or, in other words, remain authentic in being inauthentic. He writes:

> Although this person is not acting authentically, he is not lacking in autonomy. Indeed, argues Velleman, this person's "grip on the reins of his behavior is too tight, not too loose," with his inauthenticity stemming from not too little autonomy, but too much… For this example to work against Velleman all that needs to be true is that the agent in question is authentically inauthentic; that is, he is authentically other-directed… If this person was someone who always took all of his behavioral cues from others it is not implausible to hold his actions were representative of who he really was; they represented his nature as an other-directed cipher. As such, while his laughter might not be authentic in the sense of its expressing genuine amusement, it would be authentic in the sense of being representative of this person's other-directedness. It would be authentically inauthentic. (Taylor, 2009: 31)

In Taylor's view, it is not clear that the person who manifests a "False Self" is as much a paradigm of inauthenticity as Velleman believes. Velleman's case against Frankfurt's view rests on the intuition that one who governs one's self in the way a person with a "False Self" would, acts inauthentically. However, Taylor points out that it should not be taken as a fact that this person's actions are inauthentic in the sense of not representing what she genuinely desires. He writes: "an agent might be fully authentic, in that his actions flow from his motivational essence, but still fail to be autonomous—and so autonomy and authenticity are not coextensive, as Frankfurt believes." (Taylor, 2009: 32) In other words, if the decisions and actions of an agent come from her motivational essence, she might be authentic but not necessarily autonomous; in that sense autonomy and authenticity are not coextensive. This can be considered as an attempt to distinguish authenticity from autonomy; however, I should underline that the distinction between authenticity and autonomy that I shall propose is very different from this.

In order to further clarify the above arguments for and against Frankfurt's conception of autonomy, let me synopsize the relevant positions. Velleman claims that Frankfurt's conception has certain flaws, since even if one meets its requirements, one may still be inauthentic, e.g. the case of the "False Self". Hence, authenticity is not always achieved through Frankfurtian identification. By contrast, Taylor supports Franfkurt's conception and responds to Velleman by arguing that even one who manifests the inauthentic "False Self" may still be authentic, in the sense that one may be authentically other-directed.[5]

[5] The way Frankfurt's conception of identification is being approached and treated by both Velleman and Taylor operates as additional proof that it is equated with authenticity and not autonomy, like I claimed in Section 3.

Furthermore, Taylor, while he provides his own conditions for autonomy, equates identification with authenticity, which as I shall argue in the following chapter is problematic and misleading. However, on his view a person who meets his autonomy conditions but fails to identify with her higher-order motivations might be autonomous while failing to be authentic. Therefore, for Taylor authenticity and autonomy are distinct concepts. He writes: “It is possible that a person could be autonomous with respect to an effective first-order desire even though she does not identify with it.” (Taylor, 2009: 44) In addition to that, by making a distinction between agential desires and personal desires, he maintains that not only is a person’s identification with effective first-order desires insufficient for one to be autonomous with respect to them, but it is also unnecessary. For him, identification refers only to desires, whereas autonomy refers to decisions and only derivatively to desires. In this sense, a person may not identify with an effective first-order desire but may still be autonomous with respect to it. On the other hand, based on the example of Shakespeare’s Othello and Iago, in which the former is manipulated by the latter in making a decision, Taylor claims that Othello acts freely and of his own will but with diminished autonomy. Hence, identification with one’s effective first-order desires is sufficient and necessary for authenticity but not sufficient for autonomy.

6. Conclusion

I have argued that the prominent contemporary autonomy conceptions can be divided into three categories, those which consider authenticity as i) necessary and sufficient for autonomy, ii) necessary but insufficient for autonomy, and iii) neither necessary nor sufficient for autonomy. The thinkers mentioned in this chapter consider a person autonomous if one’s way of life is expressive of her "true self", or, in other words, if she is not alienated from her existence, while they propose conditions based on different forms of sustained self-reflection. The notion of the ’’true self’’ may be basic for some theories of autonomy, but it certainly is fundamental for all theories of authenticity. Therefore, the line between where authenticity ends and autonomy begins and more importantly where the two overlap (if they actually do) is hard to be distinguished based on them.

In addition, we have seen that many thinkers take for granted that authenticity should be based on rationality and self-reflection, i.e. on the exact same elements that autonomy is based on too. Given that, as I shall argue, the occasions when authenticity comes into direct conflict with autonomy tend to be neglected and unexplored. If a more enriched and inclusive account of authenticity is proposed, not based only on the same features as autonomy, then authenticity could not simply be the basis of autonomy. Identification should not be misunderstood as either authenticity or autonomy per se. In terms of authenticity, there are cases that the person might not be able to identify with a desire of hers but still this desire to be authentic of hers. In this sense, Frankfurt's and Christman's theories of autonomy, even though they are equated with their understanding of authenticity, remain theories closer to the essence of autonomy than to authenticity. Moreover, I understand Dworkin's, Mele's and Taylor's theories as ones of autonomy that misuse the nature and role of authenticity in regard to autonomy. Based on the above, the theories to which I referred are theories of autonomy that are identified with or based on authenticity. However, as I shall argue, they remain distant to the core of authenticity, at least in the way I conceive it. The condition for authenticity that shall be developed in this thesis does not necessarily require either rationality in the sense discussed in Christman's and Mele's models or reflection in the sense discussed in Frankfurt's and Dworkin's models.

Chapter II

[What Authenticity is not]

1. Introduction

I have argued that most autonomy thinkers either identify authenticity with autonomy or else take authenticity to be a core condition of autonomy. It is my view that a redefinition of the notion of authenticity and a reconsideration of its conditions is required. To begin with, authenticity should be approached as a notion for which positive constraints should exist. It may obtain through various different processes of the person, either conscious or unconscious, as long as those are creative, and not necessarily solely through rational or reflective ones.

In this chapter, I elaborate on the weaknesses of the higher-order endorsement models and the externalist historical models of authenticity by concentrating on the reasons why I believe activity, wholeheartedness, rational and mere reflection, and both reflective and unreflective reasons are inadequate to operate as either necessary or sufficient conditions for authenticity. Since manipulation in regard to higher-order desires may take place, one can meet any of these conditions while at the same time being inauthentic with respect to an attitude. Given this, it has been argued that those conditions may not be sufficient for authenticity, but that they still are certainly necessary. In contrast to the majority of the prominent autonomy and authenticity thinkers, I argue that they are not necessary either. This should create a basis upon which I maintain that when distinguishing which creations are authentic, we should not only trust rationality and reflective thinking, but also other capacities of ours, like imagination, intuition, inclinations and drives, as long as they are creative.

In general, I distinguish between authenticity regarding attitudes and beliefs and authenticity regarding decisions and actions. A person may experience two equally authentic desires, but it is a matter of the strength of each, in regard to which of the two one will authentically choose to follow, i.e. which will constitute one's authentic decision. In this chapter I concentrate on the former, i.e. authenticity regarding attitudes, and I return to the latter in the following chapters.

2. Activity

Many theorists argue that authenticity and activity are directly connected, and more precisely that in order for a person to be authentic with respect to a certain desire one necessarily needs to be active towards it. The connection between activity and authenticity in the sense of ownership of attitudes is evident both in Harry Frankfurt (1988, 1999, 2002) and Richard Moran (2002), who claim that what is required for a desire to be authentic is that the agent be active towards it.

Frankfurt is rather clear about his view of what activity is. In order for one to be active with respect to a desire, one must identify with that desire. In other words, we are active towards all and only those passions that are genuinely internal to us, i.e. our own. For him, ownership of higher-order attitudes, identification with those attitudes and activity with respect to them all amount to the same thing. In his own words:

> Now a person is active with respect to his own desires when he identifies himself with them, and he is active with respect to what he does when what he does is the outcome of his identification of himself with the desire that moves him in doing it. Without such identification the person is a passive bystander to his desires and to what he does. (Frankfurt, 1988: 54)

Furthermore, he also writes: “The attempt to explicate being active in terms of endorsement is inevitably circular, accordingly, since asserting that a person endorses something necessarily presupposes that he is active.” (Frankfurt, 2002: 220) This suggests that we are active towards those desires that are truly our own, “which express our nature most fully and most authentically,” (Frankfurt, 2002: 224) or in other words that are in such a degree our own that “do not accommodate themselves to our thinking. Rather, our thinking accommodates itself to them.” (Frankfurt, 2002: 224) However, it also suggests that not only are identification and ownership a presupposition for activity, but that activity is also a presupposition of identification and ownership. Identifying with a desire means being active towards it and being active towards a desire is necessary and sufficient for being able to identify with it. In this sense, authenticity cannot exist without activity and vice versa. Following from this, in his theory, authenticity is equated with identification, which is equated with ownership, and identification presupposes activity, while activity presupposes identification too. Thus, Frankfurt equates authenticity with activity or at least activity can be considered a both a necessary and sufficient condition for authenticity.

In *Contours of Agency*, Frankfurt's "Reply" to Moran includes a number of interesting points. He writes: "In his [Moran's] view identifying with something like a thought or a desire consists in 'assuming some kind of active stance toward it'." (Frankfurt, 2002: 218) For Moran, Frankfurt's grouping of the internal/external and active/passive distinctions makes sense for sensations and bodily movements but not for attitudes and mental states. In order to support the distinction between attitudes and sensations in terms of a person's responsibility towards them, Moran refers to the connection of it with activity, which for him presupposes identification. He attempts the same equation between the agent's ownership of beliefs and attitudes and her activity towards them. In other words, one is active with respect to an attitude if this attitude is one's own and in this sense one has endorsed and identified with it. Hence, in Moran's view too, activity is equated with authenticity.

However, activity cannot operate as a sufficient condition for authenticity, since a person, even when she is active with respect to an attitude, could have been manipulated into being active or into wanting to be active towards it.[6] Even if the person identifies with a desire based on higher-order reflection, her second-order desires may be a product of external manipulation. Consider the case of a person who is hypnotized by agents of the secret service of a country in order to murder the prime minister and to confess afterwards that he had personal or ideological reasons to do so. This person will certainly believe that his self is both active towards his second order desires and, since he identifies with those, active towards his first order desires too. In reality though, he has been manipulated into believing this and committing a crime, which he did not authentically desire to commit in the first place. Thus, one may be active towards a desire, while inauthentic with respect to it. Moreover, this same argument may just as easily be made against all of the other internalist conditions with which I deal in this chapter, i.e. wholeheartedness, all kinds of reflection, and having any kind of subjective reasons for desiring or doing something.

I now argue that activity, besides not being a sufficient condition for authenticity, is not a necessary condition for it either. I believe that the distinction between authenticity and activity should be clear. If a person is active that does not mean in any sense that she is necessarily authentic, i.e. it is possible for a person to be authentic but passive. It is often thought that when a person experiences a strong emotion that overwhelms her, she is passive towards it, since she can do nothing to control it. Even so, she might

[6] This is discussed in depth in Mele's *Autonomous Agents* (2005) and Christman's "Autonomy and Personal History" (1991) and *The Politics of Persons* (2009).

be completely authentic with respect to it since it may arise solely from her internally generated attitudes.

Consider the following example:

> *Unfaithfulness*. A person meets someone and they both experience an extreme sexual connection between them. They authentically desire to sleep with each other. However, both of them are in strong relationships and they know that besides the sexual connection they share nothing else, while each of them has countless things in common with their current partner. Despite that, they go on and spend the night together. A common friend tells on them and they both end up divorced from their partners and unable to see each other again because of guilt or because they do not fit at all in everyday life.

The desire that these two persons experienced was so strong that they both felt passive with respect to it, and they could do nothing to control or change it. If they had been able to reflect properly (either rationally or not) on this desire they would have probably avoided having sex, and they would probably be better off afterwards. However, this does not change the fact that what both authentically desired at that moment was to sleep with each other. They may be considered passive with respect to this desire that surpasses any form of their rational resistance and gets control of them, but that does not mean that they are not also authentic with respect to it. In other words, this might have just been a strongly authentic desire that rendered them passive.

However, in many cases the question of passivity and activity might be more complex than it looks. In this sense, it would be better to speak of cases where the agent *experiences* something as active or passive and not necessarily *is* active or passive, since in reality one may be active in both cases. Attitudes, which are generally considered passive, may be actually active in cases that are direct responses of the person towards the stimuli that caused them. For instance, even inertia may be an active response in many instances. Nevertheless, when one is either active or passive, or even when one experiences an attitude as being passive towards it, while in reality one may be active, one can be authentic with respect to it.

Authenticity and activity should come apart as notions. Authenticity does not require activity in any sense. Activity is neither necessary nor sufficient for authenticity.

3. Wholeheartedness

In Frankfurt's view, identification with a desire requires a certain sort of stability or equilibrium with respect to one's attitude towards it; this is the role of wholeheartedness. For him, wholeheartedness means having a higher-order desire without reservation or other conflicting higher-order desires. Authenticity with respect to, or identification with, a desire is a matter of being reflectively satisfied with it, and this in turn is a matter of being wholehearted with respect to it. He writes: "Now I will try to develop a more fully articulated understanding of what it is to be wholehearted, by construing it as tantamount to the enjoyment of a kind of self-satisfaction." (Frankfurt, 1999: 102) and "Identification is constituted neatly by an endorsing higher-order desire with which the person is satisfied." (Frankfurt, 1999: 105) Thus, for Frankfurt wholeheartedness is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for self-ownership of the attitudes, i.e. for authenticity. However, I shall argue that it is neither sufficient nor necessary.

Frankfurt conceives ambivalence as a volitional division in the self that keeps an agent from settling upon or from tolerating any coherent affective or motivational identity. A person is ambivalent when she is moved by preferences regarding her desires that are incompatible. For Frankfurt, ambivalence is constituted by conflicting volitional movements which meet two conditions: Firstly, they are by their nature opposed and secondly, they are both wholly internal to a person's will rather than alien to him, i.e. she is not passive with respect to them. Conflicts involving first-order psychic elements alone do not pertain to the will; conflicts that pertain to the will arise out of a person's higher-order reflective attitudes. But even conflicts that do implicate a person's will are nonetheless distinct from ambivalence if some of the psychic forces they involve are exogenous—that is, if the person is not identified with them and they are, in that sense, external to her will. This leads Frankfurt to claim that if ambivalence is to be understood as an illness of the will, then for the will to be healthy it should be unified and wholehearted (Frankfurt, 1999: 100-1, 106-7).

In my view, wholeheartedness seems like an ideal that can be reached only in specific and rare cases. I can imagine how I could wholeheartedly decide with whom I generally want to spend the following years of my life, but in issues met in everyday life the state of wholeheartedness is not so clear. Most decisions we make are outcomes of conflict, but we rarely come out of this conflict with the feeling of wholeheartedness that Frankfurt describes. More than often we make a

decision with some doubts or ambivalent thoughts about it. A part of ours might still want to decide to follow the other option. That is not to say, of course, that authentic decisions and actions cannot exist, but rather that wholeheartedness need not be a necessary condition for considering them such. I may authentically desire to cheat on my partner but that does not mean that I do it wholeheartedly, or I may have an authentic desire for self-harm but that does not mean that I harm myself wholeheartedly. A part of me might still want to do otherwise, even though doing otherwise might not be authentic. In this sense, wholeheartedness cannot operate as a sufficient condition for authenticity. Besides, the example of manipulation, mentioned in the previous section, stands here too. One may be manipulated in desiring wholeheartedly to act in a certain way. What remains, therefore, is to prove that it cannot operate as a necessary condition either.

Frankfurt explores the question of whether it is possible for a person to be satisfied with ambivalence. He takes for granted that we necessarily desire in a wholehearted way to be wholehearted: “But no one can desire to be ambivalent for its own sake. It is a necessary truth about us, that we wholeheartedly desire to be wholehearted.” (Frankfurt, 1999: 106) However, I cannot see how this can be taken to be an axiom. There are people who prefer to be in a state of ambivalence, people who experience panic when they are with both legs on the one side of things. They may feel that by identifying themselves with only one desire out of two they become one-sided and they lose the complexity of their multisided nature. They may feel trapped by wholeheartedness, whereas their authentic state may be ambivalence and levitation between two or more equally authentic desires.

One may remain completely indecisive between two partners that one may have at a certain period of time. One may feel that choosing to be with only one of them would be inauthentic, since suppressing one’s desire for the other partner would render one inauthentic with respect to this decision. In this extreme case one may prefer the ambivalent state of being between both partners and not with each one exclusively. Thus, there may exist cases in which one may be authentic only when one levitates constantly between two different desires, whether these are irrelevant and unrelated to each other or they are conflicting.

At another point Frankfurt claims that the ambivalence of a person obstructs the way of a possible existence of a certain truth about this person; there exists neither truth nor lie about this person: “This is why ambivalence, like self-deception, is an enemy of truth…[H]is ambivalence stands in the way of there being a certain truth about him at all. He is inclined in one

direction, and he is inclined in a contrary direction as well; and his attitude toward these inclinations is unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of his alternatives, nor that he prefers the other, nor that he likes them equally." (Frankfurt, 1999: 100) Could we accept such an argument in this case? In my opinion, we cannot. The state of ambivalence may be part of the agent's authentic nature. Referring back to the discussion of the previous section, even if activity is lost because of the state of ambivalence, we may say that the agent is authentically passive, as long as the agent's authenticity is manifested more truly in a state of ambiguity.

Consider Agamemnon's case:

> *Agamemnon's love*. Agamemnon needs to choose between sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia so that the Greek army can set out for Troy and win the war and keeping his daughter alive but losing the war. His parental love comes in clear contradiction with his desire to win.

Which of the two is Agamemnon's authentic desire? Perhaps both his love for his daughter and his desire to win are authentic desires but at the same time conflicting. However, he has to choose to act on only one of the two. If both desires are equally authentic, then are both potential decisions to be considered equally authentic too? As I mentioned in the introduction, I shall deal with this in the following chapters. For now, we may concentrate on the fact that whichever desire Agamemnon chooses to follow he is not going to be wholehearted with respect to it. However, that does not mean that he will not be authentic with respect to it either. Especially in the case that both conflicting desires are equally authentic, then whichever desire he decides to follow, his action will be just as authentic as the other. Thus, wholeheartedness is not necessary for authenticity.

This said, two desires may be equally authentic. If these desires conflict, one may experience a representative state of pure ambivalence. This has both an important advantage and an important disadvantage. The advantage is that whichever desire one ends up following, one will be authentic with respect to it. The disadvantage is that one will have to sacrifice a part of oneself in following one of the desires and suppressing the other. This is evident in the case of Agamemnon. Each one of the available choices that he has leads him to an authentic path; however, he cannot move forward without making an unbearable sacrifice, and this is exactly what creates the essence of his tragedy, what makes him a tragic hero.

Nevertheless, Frankfurt might raise a certain objection to this. He might argue that one could be wholehearted with respect to both conflicting desires, i.e. be equally wholehearted in regard to each of them. What if Agamemnon was wholehearted with respect to both of his conflicting desires? But this is not a coherent possibility. Firstly, in order to be wholehearted, one's heart needs to be whole. Secondly, even if we do not take the word literally and we only refer to the abstract concept of wholeheartedness, I cannot see how one could desire absolutely one thing and at the same time desire absolutely another conflicting thing too. When conflicts exist; division takes place. This does not imply that because one cannot desire something in an absolute way, one cannot be authentic. As life goes on and one's inner nature expands, one may experience potentially more and more conflicts. Regardless of this, authenticity may still obtain,, even in conflicting attitudes. Which one, however, is more authentic depends on its degree and not on whether it is endorsed absolutely by a person who identifies with it in an absolute wholehearted way. As I discuss in Chapter V, the self, even though in a certain sense it may seem unified macroscopically, experiences certain conflicts which can be compatible mainly with a fragmented conception of it. Authenticity, nonetheless, is not necessarily obstructed when in ambivalence or conflict. Besides, at times, a person's inner nature may be genuinely authentic when in ambivalence or conflict.

Based on the above, I argue that wholeheartedness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for authenticity. A person can be authentic with respect to an attitude without necessarily being wholehearted towards it.

4. Reflection

As discussed in the previous chapter, the significant majority of accounts of autonomy and authenticity take rational reflection to be a necessary condition, except for Frankfurt's account in which reflection need not be rational. In the first subsection I deal with the condition of rational reflection[7], while in the second subsection I deal with Frankfurt's 'mere' reflection.

[7] I will be using the terms critical reflection and rational reflection interchangeably while referring to the same form of reflection based on the faculty of reasoning.

4.1 Rational reflection

Both in Alfred Mele's and John Christman's conceptions, rational reflection (either actual or hypothetical) is necessary for authenticity. Mele argues that in order for one to be authentic one's beliefs should be conducive to one's informed deliberation and that one should be a reliable deliberator (Mele, 1995: 187), while Christman devotes almost half of his conditions to the capacity of the agent to critically reflect (Christman, 2009: 155). The reason why most theorists tend to provide a condition of rational reflection for authenticity is because they believe that through this they avoid the danger of manipulation or other-directedness, which, as already mentioned, is evident in higher-order reflection theories. This, however, leads to a miscomprehension between the notions of activity, rational reflection and authenticity. In these thinkers' views, in order for one to be authentic one needs to be active, and in order for one to be active one necessarily needs to be able to rationally reflect. That is why they consider the capacity for rational reflection as at least a necessary condition for authenticity.

However, a number of thinkers acknowledge that rational reflection cannot be sufficient by itself as a sole condition for authenticity. Mele, while criticizing higher-order reflection theories, summarises the crucial weakness of rational reflection:

> Possession of a capacity for critical reflection is a plausible requirement for autonomy. But the problem of value engineering…suggests that even a robust and effectively exercised capacity of this kind is not sufficient for psychological autonomy…If the perspective from which an agent critically reflects upon his first order preferences and desires at a time is dominated by values produced by brainwashing and dominated in such a way as to dictate the results of his critical reflection it is difficult to view the reflection as autonomously conducted and the results as autonomously produced. (Mele, 1995: 147)

Mele believes that in order to determine whether values and preferences are authentic we need to look to their history, and that it is therefore possible to solve these problems by supplementing a higher-order reflection theory with some historical condition. The problem, nevertheless, exists not only in the history of the formation of values and preferences, but also in the history of the formation of the processes of rationality and reflection themselves. Obviously there can be authentic preferences formulated and located through rationality and reflection, but it is inadequate to consider them as the sole conditions for authenticity. In the same way as

values, beliefs and desires may be manipulatively imposed on the agent, certain processes of reasoning or reflection may be manipulatively imposed on one too. Besides, this commonly occurs in societies during the upbringing in the early stages of individuals' lives through various forms of social conditioning.

In other words, it is not only the material on which the agent reflects or reasons, i.e. values, beliefs etc., that may be manipulatively imposed, but also the process of rational reflection itself, the way in which the agent interprets, develops and uses those values and beliefs, that may be manipulatively imposed too. Having good reasons for desiring something does not mean that one authentically desires it, but more importantly, even if it did mean that, what the agent considers good or bad reasons for having a desire, i.e. one's way of reasoning, should be formulated authentically to begin with. Thinkers who develop historical conditions for authenticity tend to neglect this latter aspect. I shall elaborate further on this argument in the following chapters.

Since most conceptions require the capacity of rational reflection in order for authenticity to obtain, it can be argued, based on their views, that emotions can compromise authenticity.[8] However, there may be cases in which reason may compromise equally, or even more, the authenticity of emotions. For instance, in the case of Agamemnon, if, for the sake of the argument, we consider parental love a deeper emotion that originates before it is endorsed through reflective reasoning and the desire to win the war an outcome of rational reflection based on good reasons, we understand that, in some cases, rational thinking may compromise and constrain authentic desires through putting limits on the manifestations of our authentic attitudes. Given this, we could assume that sacrificing his daughter is a desire rational for him and the others, but completely inauthentic for him. In this sense we

[8] The roots of this line of thought are merely Kantian, since the Kantian ethical subject and the homo economicus, which have been and still are dominant in the analytic moral and political philosophy, conceive the person as a primarily rational chooser and actor whose degrees of freedom, authenticity, and autonomy are based on one's degree of rationality. However, it should be noted that the homo economicus, in contrast to the Kantian ethical subject, through the use of the capacity for reasoning ranks the desires in a coherent order having as its core aim the maximization of desire satisfaction. Briefly, according to Kant's principle of autonomy one is autonomous when one follows an objective moral law formulated through reason by a maxim that can be universalized. The Kantian concept of the unchanging self, the idea of a Kantian intelligible character in the nooumenal world, relates solely to the rational capacity of humans and not to the one regarding emotions, feelings and non-rational imagination. For both the Kantian and Millian tradition, humanity—and creativity in humans—can obtain only based on the rational capacity of persons. As I shall be arguing, it is my view that authenticity obtains in humans not through a rational self that manages to freely conclude on and impose a universal law on one, as in the Kantian sense, but rather through a creative process based on which one manages to form creatively one's attitudes regardless of laws or rules.

notice that through rational reflection authenticity is not guaranteed, since after serious and even independent rational reflection, one may decide to neglect one's authentic desire in order to follow an inauthentic desire, simply because one's reasoning and rational reflection dictate one to do so. As I shall be arguing, what I am suggesting is that in the same way as autonomy theorists have argued that rationality should be the sole tool for determining the authentic attitudes of a person, the person's creative processes may be in turn the tool for determining her authentic processes of reasoning and reflection. Besides, it is my view that creative attitudes are the ones that create the reasons on which authentic reasoning should be based and not vice versa.

As mentioned, many theorists claim that for one to be authentic with respect to a desire, one must critically reflect on it. This presupposes that an agent must have good reasons in order to identify or endorse a desire, and that one is capable of discovering or developing these good reasons through rational reflection. However, Frankfurt disagrees with this. His notion of reflection, which I discuss in more detail in the next subsection, does not involve rationality. He writes:

> Identification and wholeheartedness are volitional states that necessarily create reasons but that do not otherwise depend upon them. We can identify with various psychic elements, and we can be wholehearted in various thoughts and attitudes, without having any reasons for doing so. On the other hand, it is in virtue of these states of our wills that certain things count for us as reasons. (Frankfurt, 2002: 218)

Take, for example, the passivity, or inauthenticity, of the akratic or schizophrenic. Moran (2002: 192-3) claims that what characterizes her is the absence of rational endorsement, which for Frankfurt is different from mere approval. For Moran an unwilling narcotics addict is passive towards her desire for the drug because she does not endorse that desire rationally. He claims that since a person's intentional attitudes are supported by reasons, one identifies more with them than with one's sensations, as the former reflect more accurately who we are than the latter. For Frankfurt (2002b: 219), on the other hand, whether the endorsement is rational or not does not make a difference in rendering the addict active towards the desire.

Taking Frankfurt's argument one step further, a person may identify with certain desires without having any good reasons, and be completely foolish but still authentic with respect to them. In other words, these desires may be completely irrational but still authentic. On the other hand, a

command or an other-directed desire that you take to be rational need not be authentic; this only means that you have reflected on it and it seems to make sense to you. Perhaps you may rationally agree with it and you may be able to understand that it might be authentic to you, but this alone is not adequate. Considering something rational while reflecting on it and deciding to incorporate it, even through identification, cannot adequately prove that you are authentic with respect to it.

In addition, Frankfurt talks about desires that are so deeply rooted in us that we cannot avoid or reject them. I do not agree with Frankfurt that such desires are necessarily authentic, since as Mele and others have pointed out, those desires might be a product of manipulation. I do agree with Frankfurt though that truly authentic desires determine our thinking whereas our thinking in many cases is unable to determine them, i.e. it is authenticity that creates reasons and not vice versa. These desires are not simply as Frankfurt claims "stronger than we are" (Frankfurt, 2002: 224), they are exactly what we are. They might be stronger than our reasoning and rational reflection, but this is perhaps why they constitute and manifest what we are more faithfully. They reach aspects of us that lie beyond reasons. The fact that one locates certain reasons for a desire is neither necessary nor sufficient for it being actually authentic; on the contrary, the fact that one experiences a desire as authentic is a strong reason by itself to accept it as such and this can itself generate reasons.

In order to shed more light on this argument, we could refer to one of Frankfurt's examples, in which a mother believes that what would be rationally best would be to give up her child for adoption, but she finds that she cannot go through with it (Frankfurt, 2002: 149-151). For Gary Watson this is a defeat, since he claims that: "[T]he second outcome [i.e. to give her child away] leaves her with a kind of volitional or authorial integrity that is not achieved in the other case" (Watson, 2002: 150), while for Frankfurt it may be a liberation (more information about the mother is required in order to reach a conclusion). It seems to me that even if the mother rationally decided to give her child away, this would mean that she would have decided to act inauthentically, i.e. to overcome her authentic desire and act without its influence on her; in other words, to impose on herself a rational necessity in order to overcome her authentic one. The mother, after rationally reflecting, might have more than good reasons to give her child away, but that does not mean that it would be authentic of her to do so. Given this, the mother might act completely irrationally, both in the sense of acting against her best judgment based on good reasons and, as I shall argue, of acting against

other unreflective reasons that she may have, and still be authentic. We do not always agree with or find rational our authentic desires, and we do not always identify with them, but this does not mean that they are not authentic.

In this sense, rationality and reasoning may be inadequate to help us in distinguishing our authentic desires from our inauthentic ones. The concept of the rational agent cannot represent the whole nature of a person and it seems wrong to base our conception of authenticity on an agential idea that excludes other fundamental aspects of our inner nature. The equation of human nature with rationality is a distorted, one-sided ideal that constricts and confines both the actuality and the potentiality of human nature. For reasons already mentioned, like manipulation through implantation of second order desires, I consider self-reflection inadequate too. Thus, the solution lies in understanding how these desires can be authentic without necessarily invoking our ability to critically reflect or our taking ourselves to have good reasons for having them.

Rational reflection is neither necessary nor sufficient for authenticity. One can be absolutely authentic without the use of rational reflection or without even the hypothetical capacity for it. However, that does not mean that I agree with Frankfurt's conception, since, as I argue in the next subsection, I believe that reflection of any kind is not necessary for authenticity either.

4.2 Mere reflection

Frankfurt takes reflection to be a condition for authenticity, but he does not require that this reflection be rational. Having good reasons for identifying with an attitude through reflection may not be involved at all in his view. However, his notion of reflection experiences an unavoidable flaw. The common counterargument to Frankfurt's conception of higher-order reflection is the historical objection to which I referred in the second section of this chapter. Mele and Christman[9] have developed their objection by proving the possibility of manipulation of one's higher-order desires. One cannot be considered authentic based solely on one's processes of reflection and endorsement. This alone is enough to prove that reflection, even without the rational/critical aspect, cannot operate as a sufficient condition for authenticity.

[9] Again, this is discussed in depth in Mele's *Autonomous Agents* (2005) and Christman's "Autonomy and Personal History" (1991) and *The Politics of Persons* (2009).

What is more, Frankfurt is mistaken in considering that we can conclude whether a desire is internal or external only through the processes of reflection and identification. I argue that one can be absolutely authentic without the use of any kind of reflection. Consider the following example:

> *In search of the authentic foot*. I remember that the first time I played football at school, being a left handed kid, I had not figured out yet which one was my good foot. The coach, while talking to me, went behind my back and, without me knowing it, he suddenly pushed me. I instinctively put forward one of my feet in order to avoid falling. The coach told me that this was my good foot.

I could not have figured out which foot is my good one through rationality alone. The reason that the coach pushed me without warning me was because in order to find my good foot I had to trust my instinct without thinking about it. Of course rational reflection was useful afterwards since I told myself that if I put this foot forward when I am in danger then it is this one that I should trust. But in order to find which one was my "authentic" foot in the first place, I needed the help of my instinctive reaction. Obviously, finding one's authentic foot is a physical characteristic of the body and thus significantly different from attitudes. However, I use this example as an analogy in order to argue that the same also stands for attitudes and decisions. Consider another example:

> *Ionesco's Bérenger*. Bérenger is the central character in Ionesco's *Rhinoceros*. In the play the inhabitants of a small, provincial French town turn into rhinoceroses; ultimately the only human who does not succumb to this mass metamorphosis is the central character, Bérenger. The play is often read as a metaphor and criticism of the sudden upsurge of Fascism and Nazism.

Bérenger, before being able to rationalize why he feels the need to go against the 'Rhinoceritidis', experiences that need as an intuitive reaction. He says: "Now I 'll never become a rhinoceros, never, never! I 've gone past changing. I want to, I really do, but I can't, I just can't…People who try to hang on to their individuality always come to a bad end! Oh well, too bad! I 'll take on the whole of them! I'll put up a fight against the lot of them the whole lot of them! I'm the last man left, and I'm staying that way until the end. I'm not capitulating!" (Ionesco, 1960: 107) For the time being, a deeper intuitive reaction is revealing to him his authentic desire and guides him in remaining authentic and loyal to his "mine-self" and not giving in to the "they-self", if we

are to use Heidegger's concepts.[10] Bérenger experiences, in the form of a feeling instead of a reflective conclusion, the need to resist. He does not raise any rational or intellectual arguments against the 'Rhinoceritidis', he simply experiences a strong need for resistance against it and a robust feeling that he would be alienated were he to succumb to it.

According to this, one could argue that Bérenger could be considered a wanton in Frankfurt's sense. Frankfurt defines a wanton as an agent with no second-order volitions who does not care what she wills (Frankfurt, 1988: 16-7). An individual who is a wanton may have rational faculties of a higher order, but she is not concerned with the desirability of her desires, or with what her will ought to be. Frankfurt claims that a wanton's identity is her first-order desires. However, why can there not be cases in which those first-order desires are authentic? Since a wanton's identity is her first-order desires, then if those are authentic, she is authentic too. Besides, a first-order desire might be much more authentic than one's reflective desire to be a person that would desire and will something different. Furthermore, in Frankfurt's view, a wanton has no stake in the conflict between two desires and, as the one desire prevails and the other is left unsatisfied, the wanton is neither a winner nor a loser. But, what Frankfurt has not taken into account is that if the wanton is authentic in the state of ambivalence, i.e. authentically desires to experience ambivalence, then she can be satisfied by remaining in such a state.

Imagine an authentic wanton; for instance, a child dancing freely. Bérenger does resist the transformation and he clearly chooses between becoming a rhinoceros or not. He may not have or acknowledge good reasons for doing so, like the child who dances freely, since his feeling of resistance to this transformation operates as a reason itself. Thus, Bérenger, despite of whether he is a wanton or not, even if he had been "trapped" in a state of ambivalence, he would have had equal chances to be authentic.

That form of resistance is an outcome of authenticity coming from an intuitive feeling as opposed to a more rational way of reflective thinking (which from time to time and from society to society may be conceived differently). Even if at a first glance that non-rational "inner voice" might seem completely irrational, it still remains authentic. That inner voice may be understood as a strong, almost robust inclination that has been formed not

[10] For Heidegger, two ways of living exist: one may simply follow a life proposed and leaded by and for the masses, the 'they-self' as he names it, a life that is doomed to be inauthentic, or one may take responsibility for one's own life, experiencing it as a whole, following the 'mine-self' which is the self that has been taken hold of in its own way (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 167, 231-4). I elaborate on Heidegger's ideas in more detail in Chapters IV and V.

necessarily by rational reflection but by emotions or an intuitive feeling that the agent has not rationalized yet. This may seem to be in line with Frankfurt's point. However, as I shall argue, this by itself is not adequate for authenticity. Bérenger's intuitive feeling is authentic because it also meets the conditions for creativity that I propose in the following chapter. Bérenger's example constitutes a case in which a person may act in the eyes of the others, or even in the eyes of himself, completely unreflectively but completely authentically too. His desire to remain as he is and not to succumb is both unreflective and authentic.

Following from the above, one might be authentic with respect to a desire not only despite a lack of rational endorsement, but also despite a lack of any kind of endorsement or reflection. For example, recall the *Unfaithfulness* example mentioned in Section 2, where two people experience an extreme sexual connection and authentically desire to sleep with each other. Whether they do so or not, this was an authentic desire, whereas the one produced by reflection might be inauthentic and other-directed. I do not intend to suggest that first-order desires are necessarily more authentic than second-order desires. My aim is simply to claim that there are equal possibilities of first-order and second-order desires being authentic or inauthentic. In this sense, reflection in general is not only an insufficient condition for authenticity, but also an unnecessary one.

5. Unreflective Reasons

I have argued that reflection is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of authenticity. However, another path has also been suggested. Nomy Arpaly (2003) argues that one can base one's attitudes and decisions on good reasons that one has not reflected on. A possible extension of Arpaly's view might hold that one can be authentic with respect to an attitude only if one has good reasons for it—even if one has not reflected on these reasons. I shall argue that good reasons of any kind, even unreflective, are neither necessary nor sufficient for authenticity.

More precisely, Arpaly's account implies that in cases that one may act without an articulated reason in mind, one should not come to the conclusion that one is acting irrationally but rather consider the possibility that one is acting on good reasons which one simply has not yet articulated. In the same sense, when one tends to act against one's 'considered judgment'—the judgment one makes on the basis of the reasons one can articulate—one should not automatically conclude that acting on this

inclination would be irrational, but rather one should consider also the possibility that one is acting on good reasons which one may not have articulated yet. Consider Huckleberry Finn's case:

> *Huckleberry Finn*. Finn saves his friend Jim, an escaped slave, by not turning him in to the authorities, even though this was illegal. Arpaly concludes that Finn is praiseworthy because he is responsive to the right reasons. Even though he cannot correctly represent those reasons as moral reasons, and he himself does not understand the nature of his actions, Arpaly suggests that he is right with respect to them.

Finn, however, may have not acted on the basis of a reason. Finn may have acted in the way he did out of an attitude, which is not necessarily based on other kinds of beliefs but mostly on intuitive feelings like empathy and sympathy. However, one could argue that those feelings of empathy and sympathy are responsive to moral reasons to begin with. Given that, an agent that acts based on other beliefs that may not be rational in any sense, reflective or unreflective, may nevertheless still do so authentically. If we assume, for the sake of the argument, that even if there were no good reasons, even unreflective, for saving his friend, i.e. that for Finn neither acting on moral reasons nor saving his friend was important for him, this would not prove that Finn did not save him authentically. It may be important for moral reasons to base the moral worth of actions on having good reasons for such actions, but in relation to authenticity having reasons of any kind is not relevant. Arpaly's theory is fruitful in the sense that she proves the non-importance of deliberation or reflection in actually acting rationally or being self-controlled. However, in terms of authenticity one more step is required in arguing that being rational in any sense and having good reasons for a decision or action is not necessary for acting authentically either.

In my view, in order for an attitude to be authentic, the reasons for it not only should not necessarily be known, but also they should not necessarily be good, and, in fact, they should not necessarily exist at all. What I discussed in the previous section stands for Arpaly's theory too. Attitudes that are authentic to a person may be the source of unreflective reasons and not vice versa or they may operate as reasons themselves and the authenticity of the former should not be based on the latter. Following from this, I believe that reasons of any kind are not necessary for authenticity. They might of course obtain, but it is not they that constitute an attitude's authenticity. The authenticity of an attitude is completely irrelevant to the having of reasons for that attitude.

For instance, in Frankfurt's case of the mother and the adoption, she has explicit reasons for wanting to give away the child, but inchoate reasons for wanting to keep it. None of these reasons, however, are adequate to render her attitude to give her child away or to keep it authentic. The feeling or intuition that creates the attitude of the mother to keep her child need not be based on any kind of reason, reflective or unreflective, in order for her to be authentic with respect to it. In further support of this, let us consider one more example:

> *Authentically self-destructive person*. Her reasons may not be good even for her, they may not make any sense even through the prism of her strong depression, but she continues to act in a self-destructive way that leads her to suicide.

The desire of this person to kill herself, even though she may not have any reason to do so, may still be more authentic than rationally deciding to avoid it. Even in the case that she considers all the good reasons not to act in such a way, they are still not strong enough to overcome her desire to harm herself. Committing suicide in her situation may be something completely irrational. This, however, does not prove that it is also something inauthentic. Irrational persons can be authentic and in some occasions they can be even more authentic than rational persons.

6. Conclusion

For a person to be authentic with respect to an attitude, not only rationality and good reasons but also activity, wholeheartedness, reflection and unreflective reasons are neither necessary nor sufficient. Frankfurt's theory has critical flaws, since it does not take into account the personal history and development of the individual. On the other hand, theories which incorporate the personal history of the agent are restricted to conditions founded solely on rationality, rendering them weak, inadequate and unrealistic. Nevertheless, the historical aspect is required for an adequate conception of authenticity and it should be retained, but without the necessity of the rational or any other kind of reflection, since, as I have claimed, reflection in any form cannot guarantee authenticity. This said, in short, the historical condition required for authenticity that I shall propose is based on the conception of creativity that I shall develop in the following chapter and it is externalist, non-intellectualist, non-rationalist and content-neutral.

Chapter III

[Authenticity-Relevant Creativity: A theory]

1. Introduction

Creativity is commonly identified with bringing something original into existence, i.e. producing original ideas or works. In this sense, we tend to understand creative thinking as having its essence in the questioning of basic assumptions, i.e. thinking outside of the box. If we trace the roots of creativity, we discover that its fundamental meaning is derived from the fact that a product is intimately connected to the source, to that which brought it to existence. Similarly, when an attitude was brought into existence by the person who experiences it, one could claim that this attitude is authentic. Yet even though this may seem to be a promising link between creativity and authenticity, it is not adequate.

In this chapter, I examine the nature of the notion of creativity and I create a map of its various treatments in philosophical thought. I present and discuss a number of prominent conceptions of creativity and I develop my own conception of creativity, which is designed to help us to understand authenticity. I focus on articulating what exactly I consider a creative process to be. My aim is to develop an account of creativity such that an idea or act that meets the conditions for creativity would be also an authentic idea or act. I focus on what a creative process is, and understand it in terms of an advanced conception of novelty and of sensitivity in regard to the intrinsic value of the creative outcome.

In the last section of the chapter, I argue against the widely accepted identification of originality with novelty, which I take to give rise to several misunderstandings. I claim that, etymologically, authenticity has been commonly identified with originality, genuineness, uniqueness and novelty. However, I maintain that, in contrast to the dominant view, originality and genuineness are significantly different from uniqueness and novelty. Following from this, by analysing these notions I aim at a better understanding of their relation to authenticity.

2. Conceptions of Creativity

In the existing literature, creativity is generally understood as the creation of something that is both original and valuable in some way. Let us look closer at some of the most widely accepted contemporary conceptions of creativity. Most current accounts of creativity require either a combination of novelty and appropriateness or a combination of originality and spontaneity. In each of the following sections I refer respectively to conceptions of creativity that are based on different views of novelty and value, i.e. the distinctiveness of each depends on the different way each thinker conceives novelty and on the kind of value each one includes as a core condition for creativity.

2.1 Novelty

2.1.1 A fourfold distinction

As Mumford says, it has widely been agreed and accepted that, "creativity involves the production of novel, useful products." (Mumford, 2003: 110) In order to put some order to the several different conceptions of creativity, we could begin with the distinction that Kronfeldner (2009) attempts by dividing creativity into four categories: anthropological, psychological, historical and metaphysical. While attempting to argue that freedom is compatible with a naturalistic explanation of creativity, she makes a distinction between different kinds of novelty, which mirror each one of those categories.

The anthropological conception conceives people as creators of culture, i.e. each person is potentially a creator of cultural entities. However, since under the term ‘culture’ all kinds of human activity are incorporated, everyone is creative and creativity may be met everywhere. The only requirement for a person to be creative is that they create something numerically new, which, however, need not be novel in any way. As Kronfeldner writes:

> In this anthropological sense, creativity is a conditio humana and a ubiquitous activity. It is everywhere. Even if a craftsman has learnt to make a traditional kind of pot, and makes such pots repeatedly, he is, in the very moment when he creates a numerically new pot, creative. He adds something to the world that can only come

> about through an activity which cannot be inherited genetically but has to be learnt. (Kronfeldner, 2009: 579)

This anthropological view treats creativity as more or less equivalent to human labour; based on it, any form of productivity is considered a creative creation. This notion might be relevant and useful, for example, to historical materialism and Marxist theory, but not to the authenticity-relevant conception of creativity that I intend to develop. Since every person at some point creates something—regardless of whether it is novel—creativity understood in this sense is everywhere and there is no way to distinguish it from common and trivial productions. Given this, anthropological creativity is too broad to operate as a distinctive condition of authenticity.

Furthermore, the concept of anthropological creativity does not ensure that a person's creative outcomes are not the results of manipulation and brainwashing, i.e. defining creativity as simply creating something, e.g. writing a novel, does not ensure us that the person who wrote this novel was not brainwashed into writing it in the exact way she did.

Moving on, the root idea of the metaphysical conception is that creativity is scientifically inexplicable. It has been developed by thinkers who consider creativity to exist out of the scope of naturalistic explanation and who believe that science is unable to explain it, i.e. creativity is indefinable and it should remain so. This approach begins with Plato's idea of divine inspiration in *Ion* and *Phaedrus* and continues today with a number of contemporary theorists who consider creativity incompatible with determinism and naturalistic explanation more generally, such as Carl Hausman (1976: 3-26). Kronfeldner claims that:

> Hausman denies that creativity is compatible with determinism, and urges that creativity is unpredictable in principle…Determinism excludes this metaphysical or genuine novelty, since determinism assumes that novelty is reducible to something old, the sum of the antecedently given conditions…Hausman's account equates creativity with metaphysical freedom. Consequently his account leads to the same kind of incompatibility with a causal explanation as is usually assumed for metaphysical freedom. (Kronfeldner, 2009: 582)

On the one hand, I disagree with the idea that creativity needs to be compatible with determinism in order to be naturalistically explained, but on the other hand I do not believe that a metaphysical concept is able to provide us with the answers we seek regarding creativity either. However, the question of compatibilism is irrelevant here. For the advocators of

metaphysical creativity, genuine creativity either does not exist or cannot be comprehended. Thus, metaphysical creativity experiences the exact opposite problem from the anthropological; instead of being too broad, it is too narrow, to the degree that it is almost unreachable. While there may be other conceptions of creativity and authenticity for which the metaphysical approach is appropriate, for the one I develop here it is not. My purpose is to formulate a compatibilist conception of creativity and, in extension, authenticity. (This said, in my view, it does not matter whether the creative processes are ultimately deterministic or indeterministic; that is for the neurologists to deal with.)

Next is psychological creativity, which is the most widely accepted concept of creativity in contemporary psychological and neurological accounts. It requires both originality and spontaneity.[11] The anthropological concept of creativity ignores originality and spontaneity, while the metaphysical requires overly demanding degrees of them. I shall concentrate on discussing the concepts of 'psychological' creativity (P-creativity) and 'historical' creativity (H-creativity). P–creativity involves coming up with a surprising, valuable idea that is new to the person who comes up with it. It does not matter how many people have had that idea before. However, for a new idea to be H–creative, no one else should have had it before: it should have arisen for the first time in history. H-creativity can, in turn, be divided into "relative historical creativity" which refers to a creation that is new for a group of people who are bound together diachronically and synchronically as a tradition, and "objective historical creativity" which refers to a creation that is new in the sense of being its first appearance in the whole world. Thus, based on the difference of P-creativity and H-creativity, 'new' may take two distinct meanings. While objective H-creativity is important, it is P-creativity and relative H-creativity that refer to what we are interested in terms of everyday life. In art it may be crucial to know who thought of an idea or who created an artwork for the first time in history. Nevertheless, in everyday life it is equally important to know how a person managed to come up with an idea that she had never thought of and had never come into contact with before, even if other people had thought about it before.

[11] For contemporary philosophers, originality and spontaneity are commonly understood in the way Kronsfeldner defines them: "Originality is displayed if someone does not copy the traditional form. It refers to a partial opposition between learning and creativity. Spontaneity refers to a certain independence from the intentional control and the previously acquired knowledge of the person whose creativity is at issue. It includes a partial opposition between routine production and creativity." (Kronsfeldner, 2009: 579)

Furthermore, Barnes, while forming conditions for freedom-relevant potential creativity, develops the notion of communal creativity, which as he writes: "requires that creative actions are those that the subject's community did not 'communicate' to her," (Barnes, 2013: 11) and elsewhere: "I propose to count as a creative idea an idea that an individual has not acquired because his community communicated the idea to him—such an idea would count as instantiating 'communal creativity'." (Barnes, 2013: 9) He claims that Kronsfeldner's (2009) conception of psychological creativity (2009), together with the one of Simonton (1999, 2004), which is a combination of originality and randomness, seem to be a more precise version of his communal creativity, since Kronsfeldner's originality and spontaneity requirement and Simonton's randomness requirement ensure that any genuinely creative action is one that was not communicated to the person by her community. In short, Kronsfeldner and Simonton's conceptions can be summarized in the idea that creative thought processes are characterized by originality and spontaneity/randomness, which require partial independence in thought processes from the intentional control and plans of the individual. What Barnes adds to the condition of spontaneity/randomness is that for one's thought processes to qualify as 'random' or 'blind' in regard to creativity, they should be uncontrolled not only by the creative person but also by whoever is in the community of the person too.

It seems to me, however, that his conception is in fact equivalent to relative historical creativity, since the group of people who are bound together diachronically and synchronically in a tradition that relative h-creativity refers to, is just the community to which Barnes' communal creativity refers. Furthermore, I find his notion of "communal creativity" problematic in regard to his decision to name it "communal". It seems that "communal creativity" as a term would rather refer to the creativity formulated and produced jointly by the members of a community, and not to the creativity of a person who is free from the influence of one's community and possibly its collective forms of creativity.

2.1.2 A twofold distinction

Moving on, in Margaret Boden's (2004) conception, creativity is defined as the ability to come up with ideas or artefacts that are new, surprising and valuable, where 'surprising' may take three different dimensions: firstly, making unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas;

secondly, exploring conceptual spaces in one's mind; and thirdly, transforming conceptual spaces in one's mind. This brings us to another crucial distinction between kinds of creativity: improbabilist and impossibilist creativity.[12] The former refers to creative outcomes that occur out of novel combinations of familiar ideas, i.e. the surprise of their novelty depends on the improbability of the combination. The latter refers to creative outcomes that could not have previously arisen in the person's mind,[13] meaning that based on the conceptual spaces that existed it could not be possible for a person to create such an outcome. In Boden's words:

> The deepest cases of creativity involve someone's thinking something which, with respect to the conceptual spaces in their minds, they couldn't have thought before. The supposedly impossible idea can come about only if the creator changes the pre-existing style in some way. It must be tweaked, or even radically transformed, so that thoughts are now possible which previously (within the untransformed space) were literally inconceivable. (Boden, 2004: 6)[14]

The distinction between improbabilist and impossibilist creativity may also bring to our minds Schopenhauer's distinction between talent and genius: "Talent is like the marksman who hits a target which others cannot reach; genius is like the marksman who hits a target, as far as which others cannot even see." (Schopenhauer, 1966: 391) For these kinds of creativity to exist, either exploration or transformation of an existing conceptual space would be necessary. However, what exactly is a conceptual space? Boden conceives the notion of the conceptual space as a structured style of thinking, of which the "dimensions are the organizing principles which unify, and give structure to, the relevant domain. In other words, it is the generative system which underlies that domain of thinking and which defines a certain range of possibilities: chess moves, or molecular structures, or jazz melodies." (Boden, 1996: 79) She writes elsewhere:

> They [conceptual spaces] are normally picked up from one's own culture or peer-group, but are occasionally borrowed from other cultures. In either case, they're already there: they aren't originated by one individual mind. They include ways of writing prose or poetry; styles of sculpture, painting, or music; theories in chemistry

[12] It should be noted that in her later writings Boden (1998, 2000) instead of the terms improbabilist/impossibilist prefers the terms *exploratory* and *transformational* creativity, in order to distinguish the kinds of creativity she refers to from the *combinatorial* creativity that other thinkers have proposed.
[13] As Boden clarifies 'could not' here is used in the relevant sense.
[14] In both the exploration and the transformation of conceptual spaces (or bodies of knowledge, if we prefer to use a less debatable term) lies the strong link between creativity and imagination, as both have to do with seeing new possibilities.

> or biology; fashions of couture or choreography… in short, any disciplined way of thinking that's familiar to (and valued by) a certain social group. Within a given conceptual space, many thoughts are possible, only some of which may have been actually thought. Some spaces, of course, have a richer potential than others. (Boden, 2004: 4)

Following from the above, note that for all kinds of creativity, even the impossibilist one, certain constraints are required. That is, merely random processes do not constitute creative processes and do not produce creative outcomes. In order for creativity to obtain some reference and relevance to certain generative rules is necessary. Note also that the distinction between the psychological and historical notions of creativity is independent of that between improbabilist and impossibilist notions, and that all four combinations are possible. For example, a case of historical impossibilist creativity would be one in which no other person in the history of the world had ever formulated the same creative outcome before, for instance Rimbaud's *A Season in Hell*, whereas a case of psychological improbabilist creativity would be one in which a person produced a creative outcome that was novel to her but a combination of familiar ideas, for instance an ironical post-modern performance based on popular references.

It is perhaps useful here to recall Chomsky's (1957, 1968) conception of linguistic creativity, based on which, one is creative when one forms a new and original sentence that has never been formed before. Chomsky explored the capability of persons, who have the capacity to speak a language, to generate innumerable historical novelties, since language can be infinitely fertile. Based on this, he characterized language as creative. However, as Boden maintains: "But the word 'creative' was questionable. It expressed the fact that people come up with new sentences when they explore the possibilities of English grammar. But it said nothing about moving outside those grammatical rules." (Boden, 2004: 49) Language indeed provides us with the ability of forming an infinite number of newly generated sentences. However, for Boden this is not a case of genuine creativity. In this sense, first-time novelty is distinguished from radical novelty, which is manifested in impossibilist creativity, since the former refers to outcomes that have simply arisen for the first time, like an original and unique sentence in Chomsky's conception, and the latter refers to outcomes that could not have occurred before, since the generative system, based on which such an outcome could have arisen, did not exist before. Hence, 'radical originality' is used by Boden in order to describe what could not have arisen before, since there did not

exist a generative system with rules that could have generated such an outcome.

We are now able to focus on the issue of *degrees* of creativity. Boden's reference to Mozart and Haydn seems fruitful. While Mozart explored significantly an existing conceptual space, Haydn was more willing to transform that conceptual space and to create new ones. Mozart could explore in a fuller way all the possibilities of the musical space of his time and that is why he is considered by most critics to be a better musician. Haydn, on the other hand, had more chances to transform the already existing musical space of his time. Who between the two, however, is to be considered more creative? One might say that Mozart was a better musician than Haydn, but that Haydn was more radically creative than Mozart. We shall see what implications this distinction has in regard to authenticity in the following chapter.

At this point, however, we need to concentrate also on the distinction between active and passive creativity and the role of novelty in regard to it. Passive creativity obtains when a new idea simply appears in one's mind without conscious involvement in its creation. Active creativity, on the other hand, involves some process of deliberation. As I shall be arguing, such a distinction may be unnecessary or at least may not do justice to the nature of creativity, especially to passive creativity. Whatever appears in one's mind, even when deliberation is not involved, may be an outcome of the person's creative processes, and in a sense may therefore still require an active, even if unconscious, engagement. In both types of creativity, nonetheless, all kinds of novelty mentioned can be possible. For instance, one may be passively creative and still one's creative outcome may be impossibilistly novel: one could argue that Pollock's creations of *No. 5, 1948* or *Number 1, 1950* were formulated in a certain sense passively, but still they constitute examples of impossibilist novelty.

It seems, however, that for most theorists, connection and combination is a significantly more crucial aspect of creativity than transformation. A combination of novelty and appropriateness, which is common in many other accounts of creativity, is exemplified in Johnson-Lairds' account. Let us discuss Johnson-Lairds' three conditions for creativity by referring to the characteristic properties that he believes that the products of creation should have:

1. They are novel for the individual that creates them.
2. They reflect the individual's freedom of choice and accordingly are not

constructed by rote or calculation, but by a nondeterministic process.
3. The choice is made from among options that are specified by criteria. (Johnson-Laird, 1988: 218)

In his first condition we notice that Johnson-Laird, as most thinkers, refers to a form of psychological personal novelty, since he argues that the creation needs to be novel only for the person that creates it. His second condition is an attempt to waive the debate regarding the concept of metaphysical creativity. He suggests a compatibilist approach and, based on a similar idea to spontaneity, claims that a person enjoys freedom of choice and that the products of creation are genuinely creative when they are outcomes of nondeterministic processes. However, it should be noted that when Johnson-Laird refers to 'nondeterministic processes' he does not intend this in the traditional philosophical sense. His point would be clearer if he referred to non-*mechanistic* processes. For instance, the waves of the sea cannot be predicted since they are extremely complex, and clearly they do not operate in a mechanistic way, but still their movements remain deterministic. In the same sense, the processes of a person are not mechanistic, i.e. they are not simply automatic, when they are creative, but they may still be deterministic in their nature. I do not aim to argue that all creative processes are deterministic, but rather that we should not exclude the possibility that a person's deterministic processes may be creative too.

Nevertheless, a distinction should be attempted between mechanistic and non-mechanistic impulsive attitudes. Obviously, many of our impulsive attitudes are mechanistic, like the feeling of pain that we experience when somebody hits us. As I shall be arguing in the following chapter, this is neither authentic nor inauthentic, but rather non-authentic. Nevertheless, there are certain cases in which attitudes of ours are both impulsive and creative. For instance, a free jazz drummer who experiences anger and responds to it impulsively by expressing it through a creative drum rhythm. Causal mechanistic explanations can be either deterministic or probabilistic. In the way I conceive creativity, it may be an outcome of causal deterministic processes, but it cannot be an outcome of mechanistic ones.

In addition, Johnson-Laird's third condition refers to the necessity of certain criteria, which may be relevant to a notion of creativity that refers to specific fields, like art genres, but in my view they are unnecessary for creativity in general. There is no need to introduce such criteria in the form of constraints to the creativity of attitudes, making creativity an even more demanding concept. More specifically, no such criteria or constraints for

appropriateness, value and usefulness are required for creativity in regard to authenticity. As I argue in the next section, one's creativity in regard to one's attitudes does not need to be appropriate or relevant to anything specific; it may even be pointless, or with no meaning—indeed, in such cases it may be even more creative.

We should not, however, miscomprehend creativity as an extraordinary capacity that only an elite has and is able to cultivate. Creativity is involved constantly in the everyday life of most people. Hence, the critical question that we need to answer is not mainly whether an idea or artifact is creative, but to what degree it is. Many thinkers also argue that creativity requires some form of self-reflection. For instance, Bundy claims that: "'Mere novelty' may arise as the unreflective generation of new objects from an existing conceptual space. 'Real creativity' may arise when that generation involves some aspect of self-reflection, that is, the simultaneous reasoning about the generation process at the metalevel." (Bundy, 1994: 534) As I shall argue, a creative process may be either conscious or unconscious, and in order for creativity to obtain no kind of self-reflection is therefore necessary.

In light of all this, the conception of novelty that shall constitute a core necessary condition for my account of creativity is the following:

> *One's attitudes and actions are novel when they are new in regard to both the person and the person's social environment and they manifest an exploration and/or transformation of a conceptual space.*

The account of novelty proposed here is personal, psychological and relative-historical. It can be either improbabilist or impossibilist. However, novelty alone cannot guarantee creativity, and an equation or identification of creativity with any kind of novelty, even the most demanding, would be misleading and inadequate. A machine or a computer can provide extremely novel outcomes, yet this alone is not adequate to prove that a computer can be creative. Something is missing; something more is required.

Many thinkers have argued that computers should not be considered creative because of the possible randomness of the mechanistic processes on which they operate. My view is that the relation and distinction between creativity and randomness can be better conceived if we understand their connection in the form of a spectrum. Let us imagine that on the one side lies an obsessive painter, whose processes of creation are not creative because they are bypassed by the obsession. In between lie creative creations, for example an abstract expressionists' way of painting, like the one of Pollock or

de Kooning, which meets the conditions for creativity that I shall propose. On the other extreme lies a machine, which paints in a completely random and mechanistic way. It is my view that creativity and authenticity often begin where randomness ends (though in some cases the later may enrich the former).

Nevertheless, the possible randomness of the outcome or the process that caused it does not constitute in itself an obstacle to considering an idea or work creative. What worries me most, as I shall further argue, is the inability of a computer to acknowledge either cognitively or emotionally the value of its creation. What primarily distinguishes human from machine production is the sensitivity of the former towards the intrinsic value of his or her creation, which the latter lacks. (If some time in the future a computer is developed, which has the capacity to be aware of the value of what it creates, I would consider it creative. For the time being though such a possibility remains science fiction.) In the next section I discuss the different kinds of value that have been proposed by thinkers as necessary conditions for creativity and I introduce my own in order to complete my conception of creativity.

2.2 Value

If we turn to Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* we notice that he bases his definition of a genius on the concept of "exemplary originality", i.e. an originality that can be set as an example or model for other persons to follow (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 186, 195-6). Thus, for Kant the value of creativity is manifested in the exemplariness of its originality. In other words, for Kant creativity consists of originality and a certain kind of value that is caused through the exemplariness that originality creates. Hence, on the basis of the concept of exemplary originality, a genius puts "to exercise freedom from coercion in his art in such a way that the latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as exemplary." (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 195-6) Genius, then, is a talent for creating ideas which can be characterized as non-imitative: "Everyone agrees that genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of imitation." (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 187)[15]

[15] Kant's conceptions of the genius and artistic creativity were well received by the Romantics in the early 19th century. In Kant's view, genius is the capacity to arrive independently at and comprehend concepts that would need ordinarily to be taught by another person: "Genius 1) is a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some

Since Kant, most thinkers have attempted to make a distinction between meaningful or valuable and meaningless or arbitrary combinations based on the idea that creativity requires not only originality or novelty but also some kind of meaning or value. In contemporary thought, for instance, Gaut (2003) is clear in claiming that creativity obtains when its outcome is both original and valuable. Gaut refers to the cubist paintings of Picasso and Braque, which are not creative only because of their originality but also because of their artistic merit.

Given this, the mere mechanical generation of a creation is not considered creative; for Gaut intentionality needs to be involved too. The creativity of a creation is directly connected with the recognition and development of the creative outcome. It is at this point that Gaut introduces his condition regarding the flair of the creator. In short, in his view, creativity obtains when one makes something original and valuable by flair. Hence, besides originality, as Beaney (2005) underlines too, creativity requires for Kant 'exemplariness', for Gaut 'flair' and for Boden, as mentioned above, 'radical originality'.

Beside these three different kinds of value, Novitz (1999, 2003) involves also moral value, considering it a significant condition for creativity to obtain. He begins by arguing that a transformation of a conceptual space is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for creativity. He claims that: "[P]eople may be radically creative even when they do not transform anything as well-defined as a conceptual space." (Novitz, 1999: 76) He instead develops a theory of his own which he calls "the recombination theory". His theory focuses strongly on the elements of combination and value as conditions and not on the transformation of generative systems. However, what seems problematic is that based on his theory moral evaluation becomes a necessary condition for creativity too. As I shall argue, no moral constraints should exist in relation to either creativity or authenticity.

---

rule, consequently that originality must be its primary characteristic." (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 186) For Kant, originality is the essential character of genius, nevertheless, "since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e., exemplary, hence, while not themselves the result of imitation, they must yet serve others in that way, i.e., as a standard or a rule for judging." (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 186-7) Thus, in short, the four characteristics of genius that Kant puts forward are: firstly, genius is manifested through a talent that does not follow any rule and hence originality is at its center; secondly, the art created by genius is exemplary and hence not imitative or derivative; thirdly, genius and artistic creativity cannot be calculated and their rules cannot be articulated, i.e. the artist/genius is not able to define the canons of her art; fourthly, the rule of genius should not be attributed to science, but solely to art and, more specifically, to beautiful art. (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 186-7)

Novitz's revised conditions for his recombination theory of creativity were presented in his paper "Explanations of creativity" (2003), and based on them an act is creative if and only if it involves:

1. the intentional or chance, yet intrinsically valuable, recombination of existing cluster of ideas, techniques, or objects—where this recombination is subsequently deliberately used or deployed
2. in ways that result in something that is (or would have been) surprising to—hence, not predicted by—a given population; and, furthermore,
3. in ways that are intended to be, and are either actually or potentially, of instrumental value to some people. (Novitz, 2003: 191)

However, an obvious objection to this analysis, that Beaney (2005) raises among others, is that something like a nuclear or terrorist attack can meet all of Novitz's conditions. Such an attack could have been extremely well planned and co-ordinated, surely surprising to the majority of the population and of significant value to the people that caused it. Novitz acknowledges this possibility, since he mentions that: "a single, intrinsically valuable, recombination can be intended both to harm and to benefit different groups of people" and later on that: "there are robust moral constraints on creativity, for an intentionally immoral act—one that is designed to hurt and to harm—cannot also be a creative act." (2003: 187) Thus, he clearly adds a strong moral constraint on what can be considered creative and what cannot.

The conception of creativity, and in extension authenticity, that I shall develop is free from such constraints. I believe that creativity should remain a morally free conception, a notion that is free from any kind of ethical constraints. In doing so, I am willing to bite the bullet in accepting that terrorist attacks like the ones mentioned by Novitz might have been indeed creative, albeit significantly immoral. That is, as long as an attitude or work meets the conditions that I shall outline, it can be considered creative, even if both the creation and its results are morally blameworthy and ethically unacceptable. The moral evaluation of an attitude or work has nothing to do with the fact that it may be creative. For instance, Marquis de Sade both wrote and did morally blameworthy things; however, he was undeniably one of the most creative minds of his era.

Besides Novitz's insistence on moral value, his third condition emphasizes the significance of something having instrumental value in order to be creative. In my conception this kind of value is neither sufficient nor necessary. For something to be creative, it does not necessarily need to

operate as a means to an end, i.e. have instrumental value. For example, one may create a novel poem and then throw it away. This poem may be creative, even though from the beginning it had no purpose and no further value besides its own intrinsic one as a creative act. As I shall argue, the originator of the creation should only be sensitive to the intrinsic value of it, meaning that for a creation to be considered creative, it need not serve any kind of further purposes. Of course, any creative product may also have instrumental value, but this property should not operate as a necessary condition for it to be considered creative.

Similarly to Novitz, Sternberg and Lubart (1999) conceive creativity as a combination of novelty and appropriateness: "Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)." (Sternberg and Lubart, 1999: 3) Given this, the idea of appropriateness can be understood as a certain kind of value of a novel outcome that renders it creative. More precisely, the attitude or the work should be useful or meet specific constraints that relate to the reasons why it was created. I consider this kind of value irrelevant to creativity too. One may create something that may be proven completely useless and may not meet any specific constraints that render it appropriate to a certain task. In this sense, appropriateness does not need to be considered either a sufficient or a necessary condition for a creative outcome.

In light of all this, my account of creativity can be articulated through the following conditions based on which a *creative process* is:

i) a conscious or unconscious process, which originates from either the conjunction of the person's imagination and intellect, or imagination alone,

ii) and tends to result in novel ideas that are new in regard to both the person and the person's social environment and that manifest an exploration and/or a transformation of a conceptual space,

iii) while the person is sensitive in regard to the value of its outcome.

Let me further elaborate on these three conditions. The first one aims at suggesting that all psychological processes can potentially be creative despite their nature. That is, any process having its source either in the conscious or the unconscious mind, whether rational or irrational, may

produce creative outcomes. There should not exist any rational constraints. Creativity can obtain either deliberately or unconsciously. For most theorists of creativity, creative actions are results of creative cognitive thought processes. By contrast, I hold that processes of imagination combined with emotional and non-cognitive processes might also lead to extremely creative outcomes. Of course, imaginative processes do not necessarily always have their origin in the unconscious. Imagination, and especially radical imagination, although often non-rational, and in many cases even irrational, may be completely conscious.

As Castroriadis notes, it has been surprisingly neglected that Aristotle in Book III of the treatise *De Anima* speaks of two different kinds of *phantasia*. The first one, which is the one that has been noticed and majorly discussed, is the imitative, reproductive and combinatory imagination, i.e. what has been understood as imagination throughout the centuries. The second one, which has been ignored, is "a totally different *phantasia*, without which there can be no thought and *which possibly precedes any thought*." (1997: 319; emphasis mine) It is this kind of imagination, the one that precedes any thought, which may be called *radical imagination* and that operates as the origin of anything yet unthinkable; the genuinely novel and innovative creation.

Following from this, when I speak of imagination, I do not refer only to a capacity that simply re-creates visual images of things that the person has already experienced. The kind of imagination referred to here entails the triggering of the person's ability to create potentially what has not existed before in exactly that form. When this occurs we may speak of *imaginative creativity,* which is based on a kind of imagination that we may call *radical* in order to differentiate it from the simple everyday form of it. Through radical imagination the constitution of one's creative and authentic internal world is almost ensured. Even though Kant, through the concepts of reproductive and productive imagination, brought imagination back to the centre of philosophical focus, Parmenides and, especially, Socrates may have approached more directly the essence of its radical nature. As Castoriadis explains:

> In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (§24, B151) a proper definition is given: 'Einbildungskraft ist das Vermogen einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen' - 'Imagination is the power (the capacity, the faculty) to represent in the intuition an object even without its presence.' One may note that Parmenides was already saying as much, if not more: 'Consider how the absent (things) are with certainty present to thought (noo).' And Socrates was going much further when he asserted that imagination is the power to

> represent that which is not. Kant goes on to add: 'As all our intuitions are sensuous, imagination therefore belongs to the sensibility. ' Of course, just the reverse is true. (Castoriadis, 1997: 322)

In addition, James Grant highlights the illuminating distinction between (i) doing or producing something imaginative, and (ii) doing or producing something by using the imagination.[16] He writes: "It is not the case that whenever one has imagined, one has done or produced something imaginative, as opposed to unimaginative. There can be imaginative imagining and unimaginative imagining. Many works of imaginative literature are unimaginative." (Grant, 2013: 67) On his account: "Something is an imaginative f to think of only if (1) It is an unobvious f to think of, and (2) It is plausible to believe that it is reasonably likely to be an achievement." (Grant, 2013: 77) In a parallel manner with Grant's view, I refer mostly to radical imagination—which in my view may be identified with imaginativeness—and not plain imagination. In contrast, however, with Grant, the conception of imaginativeness referred to here is restricted to the first condition, which entails that an imaginative creation needs to be an unobvious creation to think of. I consider his second condition irrelevant to creativity, since in order for creativity to obtain other conditions, like the ones proposed above, are required. Moreover, Grant equates creativity with imaginativeness since he regards them as the same property (Grant, 2012: 275). This is not the case for the conception of creativity proposed here. Even though Grant does not consider sufficient the first condition for his account of imaginativeness, I consider it sufficient in regard to its role with respect to creativity. Given this, an imaginative creation is conceived here as a creation that is not a derivative of a previous creation in an obvious sense. Grant's example is helpful in shedding more light on this:

> Suppose that a poet, knowledgeable about the history of literature, chooses to write a poem in a form not used for centuries, as a result of reading poems written in that form. This form turns out to be strikingly effective and appropriate. Using that form could be an imaginative way of writing a poem today. But it is a derivative way of writing a poem today. So being a derivative f is consistent with being an imaginative f. A better suggestion is that imaginativeness is necessarily connected, not with the new or the underivative, but with the unobvious. Using the archaic poetic form is an imaginative way of writing a poem today, despite being derivative, partly because, nowadays, using that form is not an obvious way of writing a poem. If it had been an obvious way of writing a poem, it would not have been an imaginative way of writing

[16] For further discussion, Gaut in his "Creativity and Imagination" (2003: 151) argues that imagining does not *always* lead to creative acts.

a poem. (Grant, 2013: 71)

Given the example of writing a poem in a form not used for centuries, we may also conclude that imaginativeness is relative to persons and to contexts, since a creation needs to be unobvious in relation to the current context from within and to persons from whom it arises. Grant argues that the unobvious, rather than the new or the underivative, is the required notion for his account. What kind of obviousness, however, are we to oppose to imaginativeness? He claims that the kind of obviousness required can be attributed with the construction:

> 'Such and- such is an obvious f to ϕ'. We can describe something as an obvious move to make, an obvious strategy to adopt, or an obvious description to come up with. Here, we are not making a point about how perceptually salient something is, or how evident it is that something is true…The OED, however, supplies a rough equivalent: roughly (but only roughly), what is obvious in this way is 'such as common sense might suggest'. We do not always use the construction 'an obvious f to ϕ' when attributing this kind of obviousness. We might describe the use of a certain poetic form simply as 'obvious' or as 'an obvious way of writing a poem', meaning that it is an obvious way of writing a poem to think of…Being an unobvious f to think of is, I suggest, the notion we need. (Grant, 2013: 72-3)

In order therefore for a creation to be imaginative it needs to be an unobvious creation *to think of*. In my view, however, it is not imagination that is creative, but creativity that is imaginative. In other words, it is creativity that requires a specific form of imagination, here referred to as radical imagination or imaginativeness, and not imagination that requires creativity. Although I do not embrace a concept of imagination similar to the one proposed by Kant, since imagination here is free from any *necessary* relation to reason, Kant's following claim synopsizes one of its main roles: "Now if we add to a concept a representation of the imagination that belongs to its presentation, but which by itself stimulates so much thinking that it can never be grasped in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in an unbounded way, then in this case the imagination is creative, and sets the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion." (Kant, 2000 [1790]: 193, 5: 315)

The second condition refers to a conception of novelty that, based on the various different types mentioned above, is: i) personal and psychological, since it should be novel in regard to the person, ii) relative-historical, since it should be novel in regard to the person's social

environment, and iii) either improbabilist or impossibilist, since an exploration and/or a transformation of a conceptual space is required, meaning that the person should have the capacity to produce ideas or works that either expand the already known limits of an existing cognitive field or transmute its very nature by rearranging its elements while creating a new one. In this sense, for a creation to be truly creative, it needs to be an unprecedented creation. Such a creation should not be misunderstood as either an ex nihilo, in nihilo and/or cum nihilo creation or as a creation of parthenogenesis. It should be self-evident that the origination of every creation has a number of certain roots and influences. However, for a creation to be unprecedented, it means that its degree of novelty and innovation render it a creation of which the influences and starting points cannot be traced in an obvious way. I believe that this extra aspect of creativity also sheds further light on the improbabilist and impossibilist types of creativity. A creation can never emerge out of nothing; a creation always emerges out of a number of things. However, if this creation before its emergence was something unsaid, unwritten, and, more importantly, previously unthinkable, then when it emerges it is so radically new that it creates its own novel space. Nevertheless, it is imagination that can give birth to what has not been thought before and that is why imagination plays such a crucial role in this account of creativity. This seems in line with the Romantic Ideal of creative imagination and, although, as I argue, my analysis involves crucial digressions from it, my overall approach stands close to the one of the Romantics. However, my view is concentrated more on a concept of *imaginative creativity* rather than *creative imagination*.

Theories of production and deduction are based on conceptions of "difference" that explain the new as either solely a derivative, i.e. a modified sameness, or in many cases an already-existing thing. However, 'new' comprehended in these ways cannot grasp the essence of novelty and creative creations. For instance, if we attempt to explain the radical novelty of an individual or collective creation, e.g. Edvard Munch's *Madonna* or the Athenian Democracy, in terms of what already existed in the specific social environment at that time, we would not be able to fully comprehend its essence. What makes such a creation radically new is that it broke through the conditioning constraints of the existing social status quo and that is why it may be considered genuinely creative.

The third condition outlines the kind of value that I believe is necessary for a novel attitude or work of any nature to have in order to be creative. It refers to the person who is the source of this attitude or work and it depends

on whether one can actually acknowledge the existence of one's creation and appreciate its value. The value of the creation that one should be consciously or unconsciously aware of may be either positive or negative. One, nevertheless, must be able to acknowledge even to a minimum degree its existence or to form some opinion about it. As I shall argue in the following chapter, this does not entail either that one must necessarily be expressed through one's creation or that the creation should have any kind of causal or other relation to the person's self. In this sense, a computer cannot be, at least in our present days, creative, since it lacks the ability to acknowledge, even to a minimum degree, the either positive or negative value of its creation.

3. Originality and Genuineness vs. Novelty and Uniqueness

It is evident that the significant majority of thinkers, including the ones mentioned in the previous section, consider originality as a condition for creativity and, even though they might not directly articulate it, they identify either objective or relative historical originality with authenticity. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, I conceive originality in a significantly different sense and I define authenticity in a crucially different way.

Etymologically, authenticity has been commonly identified with originality and originality has been widely equated in both philosophical and everyday language with uniqueness, genuineness and novelty. Since the account of creativity proposed in this chapter is partly based on a certain idea of novelty, I believe it would be fruitful to clarify how I understand the notions of originality and novelty and more importantly to highlight their differences.

To begin with, Mill famously discussed originality in the chapter "Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being" of his *On Liberty* in which he referred to Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt's definition of it: "[T]he object 'towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;' that for this there are two requisites, 'freedom, and a variety of situations;' and that from the union of these arise 'individual vigour and manifold diversity,' which combine themselves in 'originality.' (Mill, [1869] 1975: 83) It would not be an exaggeration to argue that this has been more or less—while articulated through different variations—the dominant widely accepted understanding of

what originality is until today. In addition, W.H. Auden, when he referred to the authenticity of writers, claimed that: “Sincerity, in the proper sense of the word, meaning authenticity, is, or ought to be, a writer’s chief preoccupation…Some writers confuse authenticity, which they ought always to aim at, with originality, which they should never bother about.” (Auden, 1963: 19) What Auden seems to mean is that if one expresses one’s self sincerely, then one will automatically achieve novelty too, i.e. as long as one is able to reach and express one’s authentic self, newness will come by itself, there is no need for the writer to chase it. Hence, for Auden authenticity is equated with sincerity and originality is equated with uniqueness, while the latter always follows the former.

My conception of originality does not necessarily entail newness or uniqueness. It is not necessary for something to be original and genuine, that it also be unique and significantly different. If we look closer at the etymology of the word ‘originality’, we notice that its root is the word *origin*, i.e. the point or place of beginning. In other words, in regard to our discussion, we are interested in *who* is the source of the attitudes, and not in whether these attitudes are novel or unique, meaning that for an attitude to be original the origin, or in other words the source, of the desire or belief needs to be the person.

In this sense, there is a crucial difference between originality and novelty. Novelty necessarily involves the idea of uniqueness and of something being new, whereas a person can be original with respect to an attitude, even if this attitude has been felt by this person previously in the past. For one to be original one needs to be able to think and to feel independently and inventively. However, what one invents may be original, since one invented it, but it need not be necessarily new, novel or unique. One could argue that it need not be new for the world but at least new for the person, but then again one can have an attitude at the present that one has also experienced in the past and yet it may still be original if one is nevertheless the source, i.e. the originator, of it. Given this, even if it has existed in the past or an exact equivalent of it exists in the present, it can be original as long as its origin lies in the person alone. However, this does not prove that it is also either creative or authentic. Being the origin of an attitude or work makes it one’s creation, but not necessarily one’s creative creation. Thus, one may be original with respect to one’s creation without necessarily being also authentic with respect to it.

Mill’s discussion of the influence of customs and conformity (Mill,

1975: 83)[17] may help us in developing the distinction between originality and novelty. Taking Mill's words one step further, one could argue that a person who follows certain customs, while her desire to do so has its origin in her, may be original, but she cannot be considered novel. For example, following the custom of a traditional marriage may be original if the desire to do so has its origin in the person and is not just an outcome of social conformity or manipulation, but it is certainly not novel or unique. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility that there might be cases in which such a marriage may also have a number of novel elements. Whereas following customs may be original, it cannot be novel or creative.

Following from the above, even though one may be the origin of one's attitude, one's attitude may not be necessarily novel or creative. Hence, I have proposed a different understanding of originality than the one that is widely accepted. My aim is to highlight the etymological understanding of originality of an attitude (i.e. one being the origin of the attitude) and to shed more light on the distinction between this, on the one hand, and creativity and authenticity, on the other.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented and discussed the dominant conceptions of creativity, while I developed my own, which I consider the most appropriate for authenticity. I based my conception of creativity on an account of novelty, which consists of a combination of the psychological, relative-historical, improbabilistic and impossibilist views, and on the person's sensitivity in regard to the intrinsic value of the creative outcome, while I suggested that creativity is a concept free from moral and rational constraints. I also discussed the distinction between originality and novelty.

[17] Mill claims that: "The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used. The faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason, his reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it: and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character (where affection, or the rights of others are not concerned), it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid, instead of active and energetic" (Mill, 1975: 72), while he also argues that: "The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement." (Mill, 1975: 87)

In light of this, I am now able to move on to developing the necessary and sufficient historical condition for authenticity based on the conception of creativity presented here. I shall then concentrate on articulating exactly how I conceive authentic attitudes, i.e. authentic desires, emotions and beliefs, and by making use of certain examples I shall present in which ways the condition I propose operates in regard to them and to the possible conflicts that may occur between them.

Chapter IV

[Authenticity and Inauthenticity]

1. Introduction

Authenticity seems restricted within the limits of rationality, self-reflection and reasons. It can be neither wholly understood nor wholly experienced if it is conceived solely under these terms. In this chapter, I develop a new account of authenticity that avoids the weaknesses mentioned in the previous chapters. In short, the conception I put forward is historical/developmental, externalist, non-intellectualist, non-rationalist, and content-neutral. I formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for authenticity based on the account of creativity developed in the previous chapter and according to which an authentic attitude may arise either from a creative process or directly from a prior authentic attitude. I supplement it with an account of inauthenticity and an account of non-authenticity. I then concentrate on articulating in which sense exactly I conceive authentic attitudes, i.e. authentic desires, emotions and beliefs, and by making use of certain examples I present in which ways the condition I propose operates in regard to them and to the possible conflicts that may occur between them.

2. The Historical Condition

Although the conception of creativity developed in the previous chapter is partly based on the ideas of relative historical and psychological creativity, it is significantly different from existing conceptions since it does not require either originality and appropriateness or spontaneity and randomness. On the contrary, I argue that originality, appropriateness, spontaneity and randomness may require creativity. Following from this, the conception of authenticity I propose involves just one condition, which requires the non-bypassing of the person's creative processes. Thus, when it comes to understanding authenticity as creativity the question of an attitude's authenticity is a question of that attitude's history. This condition is both necessary and sufficient for *authenticity* and it can be phrased as such:

A person is authentic with respect to an attitude if this attitude either arises from a creative process or arises directly from a prior authentic attitude of the person.

As I have argued in the previous chapter a *creative process* is:

i) a conscious or unconscious process, which originates from either the conjunction of the person's imagination and intellect, or imagination alone,
ii) and tends to result in novel ideas that are new in regard to both the person and the person's social environment and that manifest an exploration and/or a transformation of a conceptual space,
iii) while the person is sensitive in regard to the value of its outcome.

Following from this, an account of *inauthenticity* should be formulated too. I argue that:

A person is inauthentic with respect to an attitude if she was caused to have that attitude by another person in a way that bypassed her creative processes, or if that attitude arose from a prior inauthentic attitude.

According to the conditions outlined, an attitude can be authentic either if it is an outcome of the person's creative processes or if it is an outcome of her previous authentic attitudes. Given the latter, not all attitudes need to be creative in order to be authentic. Attitudes can be authentic if they are simply by-products of other authentic attitudes, so long as their generation has not bypassed the person's capacity for creativity. Hence, creativity is sufficient, although not always necessary, for authenticity. But what exactly does it mean for an attitude to arise directly from a prior authentic attitude? In order to provide an answer to this, I discuss a number of relevant examples in the final sections of this chapter.

My account of authenticity is partly asocial, while my account of inauthenticity is social. By this, I mean that when we refer to a person as being authentic, we refer to her internal creative processes, i.e. to her capacity to be creative. However, as I have argued, creativity can thrive merely in a social/relational context. Given this, my account of authenticity is

positive. By contrast, when we refer to a person as being inauthentic we are interested in her relation to others, i.e. we focus on whether her capacity for creativity has been bypassed by other persons. Hence, my account of inauthenticity is negative. The above conditions show that my theory of creativity is based on a functional definition of it. Given the distinction between form and substance, the focus of my account lies on how a creative process is to be realized and not what a creative process is exactly like. In addition, as argued, while following a compatibilist path, I accept that determinism can be compatible with creativity and by extension with authenticity. Even if we are completely determined, this does not imply that our creative processes play no essential role in what happens. In regard to authenticity it is irrelevant whether a creative process is ultimately deterministic or indeterministic—this is for the neuroscientists to deal with.

If an attitude is novel in either the objective or the subjective historical sense then it is both creative and authentic, since there is no possibility of it being an outcome of manipulation, as the person is the first to have conceived and created it. Contrariwise, if it is novel in the psychological sense, the possibility of external manipulation does exist, and in this case for an attitude to be authentic it is also necessary that the creative processes of the person have not been bypassed in any way.

What if, however, the creative processes of the person are not bypassed but, on the contrary, enhanced, through manipulation, without the person knowing it? The attitudes that result in such a case are still creative as long as the manipulation occurs only in regard to the capacity for creativity, and not in regard to the outcomes of the creative processes. For instance, suppose that my girlfriend secretly throws pills in my coffee in order for me to become more creative. If, through this, I only become more creative than I was before, while the nature and source of my attitudes, ideas, and actions do not change in any sense, then I remain authentic with respect to them. One may not be free in being forced to be creative, but one is still creative; as long as one has the ability to be creative, whatever ideas result from this are creative. In the same sense, the fact that these creative ideas or actions are results of a decrease of freedom does not prove that they themselves are not free. The capacity of being creative is different from the creative outcomes of that capacity. In this sense, one cannot be free at the level of one's capacity to be creative, i.e. to form creative ideas or actions, but free at the level of the creation of those ideas or actions.

In Mele's (1995) widely discussed case of Ann and Beth, their employer brainwashes Beth through neurosurgery in order to become a

psychological twin of Ann. According to the account of authenticity proposed here, in order for an attitude of a person to be authentic, a person should not only have the capacity for creativity but also no one should bypass it. Even though a person may be manipulated into being more creative and still be authentic, a genuinely creative person cannot be manipulated into having specific attitudes and beliefs. That is, one cannot be creative and be manipulated at the same time: the one excludes the other. This said let us consider a case in which the manipulator brainwashes the manipulatee into being constantly creative. Let us assume that the neurosurgeon in Mele's example of Beth and Ann does not alter Beth's attitudes and beliefs but rather makes her more creative. In this case, bypassing would exist only in regard to the potentiality of her being creative and not to the actual creativity of her attitudes and beliefs.

According to some of the other conceptions of creativity reviewed in the previous chapter, one could be creative but inauthentic and metaphysically unfree, since one may have been manipulated into being unique; for example, one could be manipulated into creating a unique painting or into feeling a unique emotion. However, if the idea is novel both to the person and to her social environment, then there can be no manipulator that has conceived this idea before the person in order to impose it on her. Thus, as understood here, creativity rules out the possibility of manipulation in regard to the outcomes of creative processes. Nevertheless, manipulation in regard to the existence of the capacity of creativity may exist. For instance, a society in which persons are manipulated into being constantly creative would be a good society full of creativity with novel outcomes, and one full of authenticity. One is not less authentic if one is manipulated into being authentic, since the ability to be authentic is a different thing than the authentic outcomes of this ability, i.e. attitudes and actions. One is simply more authentic if one is manipulated into being more authentic.

An oppressive upbringing might block a person's potential to become creative, and thus her capacity to originate her own attitudes. Based on the condition of creativity outlined here, it can be argued that no one is authentic per se, i.e. no one is born authentic and need only defend her authenticity throughout life, but rather that one becomes authentic by exercising one's capacity for creativity. Authenticity arises from the constant authentic creation of one's attitudes and actions.

Nonetheless, most of the main criticisms of authenticity have been based on the fact that it is an individualistic and subjective capacity of persons. *Authenticity-as-creativity* is inherently intersubjective. In exploring

authenticity, there is no need to follow manichaeistic dipoles like the ones of inner vs. outer and individual vs. social. One's authentic attitudes do not express any kind of one's inner world; they rather are themselves one's inner world. In the same way, it would be illusory to draw clear lines between the individual and the social. One creatively creates attitudes within and, in this sense, together with the social world into which one exists. As argued in Chapter III, one cannot be authentic while one creates autistically. Creativity and authenticity require the social world in order to obtain. A person develops her full creative potentiality and reaches her ultimate authentic state within a social reality through transmuting already existing stimuli to something radically new. Both cooperation and conflict are equally important and fruitful for authenticity. Authentic creations cannot only be found through an inward turn based on self-reflection, like the Romantics have argued; authenticity feeds also on social interrelations within the social and natural environment. Interacting with other human beings and observing nature triggers creativity and thus enhances authenticity.

Heidegger calls the social reality into which we are "thrown" when we are born, 'Geworfenheit' (thrownness). He asserts that our birth and upbringing take place in our narrow social milieu which is surrounded by rigid attitudes, archaic prejudices and necessities not of our own making (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]). In this sense, for one to be authentic a continuous struggle against this social status quo is required. We should not, nonetheless, overlook that Heidegger admits that our existence is always a 'co-Dasein' or a 'being-with', i.e. the path towards authenticity of Being may not necessarily be individualistic. Heidegger attempts a distinction between the individual authentic self and the social inauthentic self, between the 'mine-self' and the 'they-self': "The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way." (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 167) For Heidegger, therefore, two ways of living exist: one may simply follow a life proposed and led by and for the masses, a life that is doomed to be inauthentic, or one may take responsibility for one's own life, experiencing it as a whole (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 231-4). In Heidegger's *Being and Time* das Man, i.e. what I call here the social world, is described as a "dictatorship" (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 164) and everydayness is characterized as a mode of Being in which Dasein "stands in subjection to Others." (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 164) Our values, beliefs, and actions are mostly determined by 'the They' (das Man), which refers to the collective opinion and social conformity: "We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they

take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge." (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 164) In the same way that for Heidegger the Dasein lives in das Man and this is a fundamental aspect of its existence, the individual lives in the social world of shared meaning and its existence in this everyday world seems to condemn, restrict and constrain her to an inauthentic mode of Being. Everydayness, however, can undergo an authentic transformation.

I endorse Heidegger's (1962 [1927]) and Sartre's (1992 [1943]) views, on which I elaborate on Chapter V, that one needs to struggle against the possible oppression and exploitation coming from one's social milieu. This cannot, nevertheless, be achieved through a form of social self-exile. Creativity and authenticity are significantly enhanced when the person develops her creative processes within a social environment through fruitful interrelations. In order for one to be creative one does not need to isolate oneself from other human beings and their socially constructed reality; on the contrary, one should be part of the socio-political reality in which one was born, while at the same time defend oneself from the potential oppression and exploitation that may bypass one's capacity for creativity. Since most of the elements that enhance our capacity for creativity are socially constructed, e.g. language, one's creativity would be diminished in an asocial environment.

The account proposed here, nevertheless, as I shall argue also in the following chapter, differs significantly in many aspects from the existentialist ones—from Kierkegaard's to Nietzsche's and from Heidegger's to Sartre's. Only to mention an example, for instance, as Guignon claims, "Heidegger claims that his own conception of authenticity requires coherence (Zusammenhang), clear-sightedness, resoluteness, steadfastness, loyalty, and even reverence." (Guignon, 2008: 287) In my account, authenticity does not necessarily require any of these aspects either as sources or as outcomes, since it involves only creativity and its various possible derivatives. In addition, I also disagree with Guignon on a core point. He takes authenticity to be a character trait (Guignon, 2008: 287-8), whereas for me it is a capacity and/or a state reached through one's creative processes.

Being authentic requires authentically creating one's attitudes and works based on one's authentic interpretations and transformations of one's social environment and its elements. One should not reject one's social environment, but rather one should incorporate and transmute the stimuli one receives from it in one's own way. By using the phrase 'one's own', on the one hand, I intend to strongly relate the authenticity of one's creations to

one's ownership of them; while, on the other hand, I do not intend in any sense to suggest or propose an ideal of authenticity that is based solely on individualistic grounds, i.e. that in order for a person to be truly authentic, one needs to be developed in solitude and isolation from one's social environment. Besides, one cannot create one's own attitudes, in any degree or level, without the simultaneous development of one's relations within one's social world. Even if, in my view, authenticity is based on one's own capacity for creativity, one could never be creative and, in extension, authentic, without the cultivation of social interrelations. The capacity of a person to form creative processes is significantly developed and enriched through the person's interrelation with other members of one's social environment and their creations, as well as with the historical, current and potential life and collective creations of one's society. Hence, needless to say, one's creativity is enhanced when it obtains in a social-relational context.[18]

3. Authenticity, Personal History, and Manipulation

The conception of creativity I am proposing is psychological and historical and entails that any genuinely creative idea is one that was not communicated to the person by her social environment, meaning not that she was in no way influenced by the social environment, but rather that she was not fully shaped or manipulated by it so as to merely imitate it. In other words, creativity can be understood as an innovative synthesis of already existing influences, which, however, the person transmutes into a novel outcome, while also, in some cases, adding radically new elements.

Let us, however, concentrate further on the nature of bypassing to which I have been referring, since it may take different forms and obtain in various degrees. What exactly does the non-bypassing of a creative process mean? Mele bases his autonomy conditions on the absence of compulsion and bypassing (Mele, 1995: 171-2). As mentioned in Chapter I, his history-

[18] Beside individual creativity and authenticity, collective authenticity and creativity exist too. Most institutions in our societies embody social imaginary significations, which clearly are collective creations, as we cannot but impute them to the creative capacity of the anonymous human collectives. Political life could not exist without human collective creations; it is the anonymous collective that through its instituting social imaginary creates the various social entities. However, the crucial question is when and how can these creations be creative and authentic? Ancient Greek Democracy and the French Revolution constitute two examples, as well as many other collective emancipatory movements. In this sense we can speak of a radical instituting imaginary, but this topic needs deep and thorough examination, which the available space of this thesis does not allow. Nevertheless, what should be noted is that beside sociopolitical creativity, collective authenticity and creativity are also manifested in primordial productions like the one of language.

sensitive account of psychological autonomy, which is compatible with compatibilism, is based on a twofold condition consisting of the capacities for self-control and authenticity. Based on the Aristotelian distinction of *enkrateia* and *akrasia*, he equates the notion of self-control with the one of the absence of weakness of will. For him, the capacity for self-control entails the ability to rationally assess and revise one's values and principles, as well as to identify with values based on informed, critical reflection.

He formulates his account in the following way: "a necessary condition of an agent S's authentically possessing a pro-attitude P (e.g. a value or preference) that he has over an interval t is that it be false that S's having P over that interval is ... compelled*"[19] (Mele, 1995: 166), while he also argues that: "An externalist may suggest that the autonomous possession of a pro-attitude requires authenticity regarding that pro-attitude." (Mele, 2002: 540) But what exactly does it take for a pro-attitude or an attitude to be compelled? We should keep in mind Mele's notion of practical unsheddability. When developing his final approximation of a sufficient condition of compulsion*, he claims that an agent S is compelled* to possess a pro-attitude P if: "[A] S comes to possess ... P in a way that bypasses S's (perhaps relatively modest) capacities for control over his mental life; and [B] the bypassing issues in S's being practically unable to shed P." (Mele, 1995: 171-2).

In Mele's view then, for one to autonomously possess a pro-attitude, one must authentically possess it. In order, however, to authentically possess a pro-attitude, either the pro-attitude should have come about in a way that does not bypass the agent's capacities for control over her mental life, or the agent should be currently able to rid herself of the pro-attitude. If one did not play any role in originating a pro-attitude and if one is now unable to shed it, then that pro-attitude cannot be one's own. On his account, for a pro-attitude to be autonomous, it is not sufficient simply that the agent is able to shed this pro-attitude, since, in order for a pro-attitude to be considered compelled*, it must both have come about in a way that bypassed the agent's capacity for self-control and also be currently practically unsheddable. In other words, the unsheddability of a desire is not a sufficient condition for non-autonomy. I do agree with Mele on his first condition that an agent may be unable to shed a pro-attitude even though this pro-attitude may be truly authentic, since an attitude may be so authentic as to overcome one's control over it. It is it that controls the agent and not vice versa.

[19] The asterisk in Mele's use of the term compulsion aims at underlining the difference between his conception and various other conceptions of it.

However, for Mele, as for most philosophers, control is equated with reflective rationality. In my view, control is irrelevant to authenticity, while creativity is fundamental. Thus, I understand inauthenticity in terms of the bypassing of creative processes. In a parallel manner with Mele, who describes the non-bypassing of the agent's capacities for rational control, I base my conception of authenticity on the non-bypassing of the agent's capacity for creativity. In order to clarify my position in regard to the condition of bypassing, let me provide three examples: one in regard to a person who meets my condition but fails Mele's condition; one in regard to a person who meets Mele's condition but fails mine; and one in regard to a person that meets both Mele's and my condition:

Think of Mozart. His extraordinary talent has inspired a huge debate over the centuries, and scholars have posited various neuropsychiatric conditions to explain his character and behavior; numerous mental illnesses have been ascribed to him (Huguelet, Perroud, 2005: 136-8). Biographers and psychiatrists have posthumously diagnosed him as being a manic depressive and a pathological gambler, while also having numerous psychiatric conditions, as, for example, attention deficit/hyperactive disorder, paranoid disorder, obsessional disorder, dependent personality disorder and passive-aggressive disorder only to name a few. However, what is notable is that he suffered from these during most of his incomparable bursts of productivity (Huguelet, Perroud, 2005: 136).

Hence, at many instances during his life, it may have been that he could not exercise self-control over his mental life and that he was not thinking or acting rationally. In Mele's view, in these cases Mozart could have been neither authentic nor autonomous. However, since there is no doubt that Mozart in these instances was creative, in my view, he was clearly authentic, even though completely irrational and possibly mentally ill. Furthermore, the fact that Mozart was unable to shed most of his attitudes does not prove that he was not authentic in regard to them. Attitudes that both came about in a way that bypassed Mozart's capacity for self-control and were unsheddable at the moment he was experiencing them, such as melodies that were outcomes of his paranoid disorders, were creative and hence authentic.

On the other hand, think of a conformist who never suffers from akrasia and weakness of the will and always follows a rational path of absolute self-control over her mental life through constant critical self-reflection. In Mele's account, this person is authentic since her capacities for reasoning and self-control have not been bypassed. However, even if this

person is also able to shed her attitudes, it may be that she makes no use of her creative processes in formulating them. Thus, in my account this person cannot be authentic. Such a person is rational and capable of critical reflection but in my view this is inadequate for authenticity.

Now think also of Kant, who, in his everyday life, at least as Heine (1962: 461) mentions—although Kuehn (2001: 14-5) argues for a different view—, was a conformist who managed to follow a rational path of self-control over his mental life through constant critical self-reflection, while avoiding akrasia and weakness of the will: “The history of Kant's life is difficult to describe. For he neither had a life nor a history. He lived a mechanically ordered, almost abstract, bachelor life in a quiet out of the way lane in Königsberg, an old city at the northeast border of Germany. I do not believe that the large clock of the Cathedral there completed its task with less passion and less regularity than its fellow citizen Immanuel Kant. Getting up, drinking coffee, writing, giving lectures, eating, taking a walk, everything had its set time, and the neighbors knew precisely that the time was 3:30 PM.” (Heine, 1962: 461) On the other hand, no one could deny that Kant during his lifetime was also extremely creative. Hence, Kant was at the same time rationally self-controlled and creative. Following from this, both in Mele’s account and mine, Kant was authentic, since neither his capacities for reasoning and self-control nor his capacity for creativity had been bypassed by others or by his mental and emotional nature activity.

4. Non-authenticity

Consider an example of an attitude that just popped up in a person; an attitude that comes about as a flux of physiology or psychology. What if, for example, one simply feels that one authentically desires to eat a juicy hamburger? Let us assume that there is nothing creative in this desire and it is a completely basic desire. Can it be authentic? This may be a basic desire that actually is not related to prior authentic or creative attitudes. Desires like this are neither authentic nor inauthentic; they are simply *non-authentic*. Other examples of non-authentic attitudes are basic perceptions. For instance, when I perceive a table, this is neither authentic, since there may not be any creativity involved but rather only a representation, nor inauthentic, since no bypassing or manipulation take place.

Besides, it seems odd to describe a person who is not yet able to formulate authentic attitudes as inauthentic. For example, a child may not be

considered authentic since she may have not yet created any authentic attitudes, but this does not mean that she is inauthentic; she is simply non-authentic. The same may stand for persons with severe bipolar disorders, which bypass their creativity. Not being authentic does not necessarily mean that they are inauthentic but rather non-authentic.

Imagine that you are in a room listening to a conversation between another person and me. I am trying to persuade the other person to try a psychedelic drug. Perhaps I want to convince you indirectly too, and by listening to our conversation I manipulate you and you do feel convinced to try it. In this case, you are inauthentic with respect to this desire. Contrariwise, if you feel persuaded while I do convince you and your desire is an outcome of creative processes or a by-product of previous authentic desires, then you are authentic with respect to this desire. However, if you completely ignore our conversation and you are lost in other thoughts, while suddenly you experience a desire, caused simply by your physiology, to try this drug then your desire is non-authentic.

Given this, it would be a miscomprehension of my account if one understood authenticity as simply an outcome of impulsive urges. A young child that thinks and acts based completely on certain impulses cannot be considered thereby authentic. In order for those impulses to be authentic, they must also be in some sense creative. For instance, impulsively created paintings of abstract expressionism, like Pollock's, are authentic because they meet the conditions of being creative.

Everything that is not authentic or inauthentic is non-authentic. Thus, the distinction between an attitude being authentic and inauthentic depends on whether creativity is involved or not and the distinction between an attitude being inauthentic and non-authentic depends on whether it was caused by another person or caused by nature. The introduction of the idea of non-authenticity is crucial, since most conceptions of authenticity categorize all persons and attitudes that are not authentic as being inauthentic, whereas I am of the opinion that in reality some of them are simply non-authentic.

5. Authenticity and Rationality

I loved her against reason, against promise,
against peace, against hope, against happiness.
—Charles Dickens, *Great Expectations*

For many thinkers, from Kant to Mill and from Locke to Spinoza, rationality is equated with freedom, autonomy or authenticity, or even all of them together. Their theses may differ importantly in regard to details but, in general, the prominent position, especially in analytic philosophy, can be synopsized in Spinoza's words: "The more a man is guided by reason, the more he is free." (Spinoza, 2002: 691) This view continues to be the dominant one today and it is this that I want to challenge.

For instance, for Charles Taylor, being human means being capable of agency and for him agency cannot exist without rationality and self-reflection. The same stands, as discussed in Chapter I, for many contemporary writers on authenticity and autonomy from Mele to Christman. In addition, Frankfurt claims that for one to be either authentic or autonomous (depending on whether one believes that Frankfurt talks about authenticity or autonomy) in regard to one's attitudes and one's will, the capacity to reflectively evaluate one's desires is both necessary and sufficient. Frankfurt refers to a form of reflection that may not necessarily require rationality, but still remains a form of self-evaluation that is expressed through the development of second-order desires, i.e. one's desires concerning which desires one wants to have or to act upon. In his own words: "[N]o animal other than man…appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (Frankfurt, 1988: 12), and elsewhere: "It is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will." (Frankfurt, 1988:19) These claims by Taylor and Frankfurt go beyond the merely pragmatic observation that a reasonable degree of self-reflection and reasoning is required for authentic attitudes and actions.

Taking a step backwards and rationally reflecting on what is one's own does not ensure that what one settles on is truly one's own authentic creation. Rationality and all kinds of reasoning need to be authentic too, in order to be adequate to be used as tools for distinguishing what is authentic from what is not. They need to have been formulated and developed creatively—not solely rationally—in order to be one's own and not simply externally generated. Given this, authenticity comes before rationality and reflection,

and not vice versa.

Epicurus famously taught that: “Knowledge liberates by automatically eliminating irrational fears and desires.” (as quoted in Berlin, 1958: 189) However, this does not mean that we are not authentic with respect to these irrational fears and desires. Epicurus may be right in arguing that through knowledge we are liberated from them, but, in some cases, this may be equivalent to saying that knowledge liberates one from one’s current authentic attitudes, since those fears and desires may constitute one’s creative outcomes. In this sense, rationality and the knowledge produced by it can be understood as something close to the idea of the Freudian superego. In other words, a voice in us that drives us away from authentic attitudes, while leading us towards not what we *do* believe, feel, or think but towards what we *should* believe, feel, or think. We should not neglect the fact that certain irrational attitudes that we experience may be authentic if they meet the conditions for creativity outlined above. Thus, rationally suppressing them due to new and externally formulated knowledge that we have acquired, means that we may take a step away from an authentic attitude towards a more rational and inauthentic or non-authentic one. Consequently, since intellectual authenticity and autonomy are based exclusively on the ability of one to reflect critically on one’s commitments, the account proposed here is clearly non-intellectualist.

Following from this, it seems arbitrary to accept the view that a person’s authentic attitudes are only those which are acceptable to the person’s reason. Accepting such a view would automatically diminish the place and role of other capacities, like imagination. This has its roots in the widely accepted belief that what distinguishes humans from animals is rationality. However, one could equally argue that what distinguishes humans from animals is primarily imagination and creativity, and only subsequently rationality. I find our ability to imagine and then create something innovatively new more human than our ability to rationally reflect. Reason and rationality may imitate the socially constructed entities and norms, which are evident in one’s social environment, whereas imaginative creativity does not. Imaginative creativity cannot imitate by definition. Baudelaire’s words seem illuminating: “Imagination is the queen of the faculties…Without her, all the faculties, sound and acute though they may be, seem nonexistent; whereas the weakness of some secondary faculties is a minor misfortune if stimulated by a vigorous imagination. None of them could do without her, and she is able to compensate for some of the others.” (Baudelaire, 1972: 299)

Creativity is the human capacity that provides us with novel ideas and

attitudes. Given that, what is both necessary and sufficient for being authentic, is not the capacity for rationality but rather the capacity for creative self-production. Of course creativity may be rational too, i.e. it may involve the capacity for reasoning, but not always and not necessarily. Creativity may be irrational and/or imaginative, emotional and intuitive. In this sense, even though when rational reflection is involved, we may be led to an authentic creation, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for it. Contrariwise, the ability to create creatively is the sole sufficient condition for authenticity.

Living based on and according to existing social norms and public modes of our cultural and social context, feeling complacent that, because we choose rationally among them, we are authentic, is an illusion. We can be authentic only when within this context we creatively create are own. We can claim that an attitude is one's truly own, not when one rationally decides its adoption or endorsement, bur rather when one creatively creates this attitude. Ownership, therefore, is primarily obtained by authenticity and not autonomy. Through autonomy, you may come *to own* an attitude, but it is through authenticity that an attitude can be truly *your own*.

I am not arguing that we should completely abandon rationality in favour of imagination, intuition or emotions. I am only arguing that we should put the necessary weight on imagination, emotions and intuition, as we have been doing until now for rationality. Creativity and by extension authenticity are based on all human attributes, none of which should be given a dominatingly primary role over the others. Besides, to argue that irrational persons are inauthentic is to argue that many of the greatest poets and artists of human history were inauthentic. Think of William Blake as an illuminating example. If we are to aim at reaching the essence of authenticity, both in its everyday and radical aspects, we should free our thoughts about it from the "monopoly" of reason.

6. Authenticity and Imitation

We may now focus more on what differentiates a creative process (which leads to an authentic outcome) from a non-creative process (which leads to an imitative outcome). Imagine a case in which a person formulates a creative authentic attitude at a certain place and time that is exactly similar to another person's creative authentic attitude, which has been formulated some time previously, and suppose that both share the same social environment. Suppose further that there is no way for the former to have

known of the latter's attitude. Since the former formulated her attitude creatively and authentically without imitating the latter—she could not have known anything about it—she is still authentic, despite the fact that she was not the first one to have done so. (This is the main difference between historical and psychological creativity, which were discussed in the previous chapter.)

At this point, however, it may be fruitful to highlight the differences between imitation, shaping, and influence from society in regard to one's creativity and whether the outcomes produced by them can be regarded as authentic. Think of a person who constantly follows what is in fashion. He changes attitudes based on what is cool in the current period; he blindly follows trends which he fully endorses but in the creation of which he has no participation. Such attitudes seem clearly inauthentic, given that they are merely the outcomes of marketing manipulation. Consider, also, the example of the new-age hipsters—not the original hipsters and beatniks of the 50's, but their unfortunate failed revival, the ones of my generation who pay more attention to the stylistic and marketing aspect of things than to their meaning, who are interested more in the wrapper than in the content. The fact that they value so highly what they conceive as individuality, novelty and authenticity, comes into complete contradiction with the fact that they end up intensely imitating each other. This is clearly a paradox. One may reasonably wonder: Can a person, who seems to do everything possible to challenge and reject the conventional and traditional rules of society, but ends up simply imitating the norms and styles of another specific group of this society, be authentic?

Let us concentrate, however, on a more interesting example. This is not a simple case of manipulation, like being a victim of marketing strategies, but rather one of having an inclination to constantly mimetize, i.e. a pre-disposition towards mimetism, which is so deeply grounded in one that it might be considered a fundamental aspect of one's individuality. Could it ever be the case that a person authentically desires to copy others? Can one authentically imitate? What needs to be underlined here is that we are referring to two different attitudes. Firstly, one that has to do with the desire to copy others and secondly, one that is the actual desire that has been copied from others. Based on this distinction, one can be authentic with respect to one's desire to constantly copy others, but one cannot be authentic with respect to the specific attitudes that one has blindly copied from others. Hence, a desire to imitate may be authentic under certain circumstances, but the outcome of imitation can never be authentic by definition. Blind imitation, in general, is tantamount to the bypassing of the person's creative

processes. A degree of influence may be compatible with authenticity, but imitation usually is not. In most ordinary cases a desire to imitate is a non-creative desire and thus inauthentic. However, one may form a creative desire to imitate another person. That is, even if it is highly scarce, one may creatively desire to imitate another person and both this desire and the following by-products of this desire may be authentic. For instance, consider an upper class person who falls in love with a servant and spends all her time with him and his friends, who are servants as well. If she forms a desire to imitate their vocabulary and their ways of dressing and moving when walking or dancing, then there is a chance that this desire may be creative, if the outcomes of imitating them are presented in a context of her class. In this case, all her acts of imitation may be authentic too, as they will be by-products of her prior creative desire to imitate. This also shows that creativity and authenticity are context specific concepts.

Imagine also the case of two musicians and their desire to join a Glam Rock band by painting their nails and putting on make-up and glitter. Although they may experience the same feeling of authenticity when they do so, one of them may be simply imitating other Glam rockers in order to achieve his end of joining the band, whereas the other may be doing so because he authentically desires to put glitter and have his nails painted. In other words, what I want to underline, is that their desires may be introspectively the same, but they are not the same extrospectively; they have different histories. The one is using his attitude as a means to an end, i.e. using glitter in order to join a band, whereas the other's desire to use glitter is an end-in-itself. In the case, however, that the attitude of the former is a creative idea about how to get into the band, it may be authentic—one may come up with an authentic means to achieving some end.

Based on the above, the distinction between a mimetic and a creative creation should be self-explanatory. Given that and taking into consideration, for instance, an authentic poem, which even if its aim is to describe the world, it creates a world of its own, we may argue that a creative creation can be considered the exact opposite of a mimetic one. In the following section, I further elaborate on what differentiates a *creative* creation from a *plain* creation.

7. Authentic Attitudes

Almost anybody can learn to think or believe or know, but not a single human being can be taught to feel … the moment you feel, you're nobody-but-yourself.
—e.e. cummings

I shall now concentrate on articulating in which sense the desires, emotions and beliefs of a person can be considered creative, i.e. outcomes of the creative processes of that person, and thus, based on the condition I proposed, authentic. Creativity comes in degrees. Some people seem to be more creative than others. For example, the creative perception of Shakespeare was much broader and higher in degree than the average. Besides this, however, each person can be creative in different degrees and in different ways in regard to aspects of their own attitudes and works. A person may be more creative with respect to her desires than with respect to her emotions and another person may be more creative with respect to her emotions than with respect to her desires.

7.1 Authentic Desires

All the knowledge I possess everyone else can acquire, but my heart is all my own.
—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

Let us consider again the example of *Unfaithfulness* from Chapter II, in which there is a strong sexual desire between two persons. If the desire arises in each of these persons without anyone or anything bypassing their creative processes, then they are creative and thus authentic with respect to it. Although whether they should follow their authentic desire and be unfaithful to their partners is a different question—one of rationality and morality—authenticity does obtain as long as no bypassing exists. More precisely, suppose that the desire to remain faithful comes solely from externally imposed religious beliefs. These externally engineered religious beliefs block, manipulate or bypass the ability of the persons to create a novel desire that will be authentic. On the other hand, suppose instead that the sexual desire towards the other person may be a desire that manipulates the authentic belief of the person not to hurt her husband. Hence, it depends upon the individual in which case her creative processes are bypassed and

in which they are not.

Alternatively, the sexual desire might be a basic desire, in the sense that it is simply a strong form of appetite and not an outcome of any creative process. By analogy with what I discussed regarding the example of the person who simply desires to eat a hamburger, if such a sexual desire is only an appetite then it is either authentic (if it is a by-product of another prior authentic attitude) or non-authentic (if it is simply a basic desire). Nevertheless, the fact that an attitude may be a basic desire with no link to any prior authentic desire does not mean that it is necessarily non-authentic. Basic desires, like appetites of any nature, can be creative, as long as the desire is novel in such a way that it either explores or transforms the conceptual space of existing desires in their specific social environment. For instance, schematically and simplistically, in the *Unfaithfulness* case, if everything takes place in an overly moral, traditional and conservative society, then an act of unfaithfulness expresses a highly novel desire both for the persons and the society of which they are members. Contrariwise, if the society of which they are members is the exact opposite and people are keen on having free relationships and on cheating on each other, their desire to be unfaithful is not to any degree novel and thus it is not to any degree creative either.

Furthermore, consider the case of a mentally ill person. If her creative processes are not bypassed by an obsessive thought, even though she might be completely irrational, she can be authentic with respect to certain of her desires, i.e. her desires may be absolutely creative and thus authentic. In the case of the authentically self-destructive person, her irrational desire to hurt herself, even when she is in an ideally perfect situation, may be creative and thus authentic, as long as this desire constitutes a novel outcome (in the sense discussed in Chapter III) of her conscious or unconscious processes, without any bypassing of them. So even if she may not be able to rationally comprehend the value of her creation, she may be sensitive, meaning that she is able to sense, feel or acknowledge in some way, the fact that this is a creation.

Nevertheless, even if there is nothing novel about irrational desires, they may still be authentic in the case that they are direct by-products of prior authentic desires. On the other hand, if the mentally ill person or the suicidal person lack the ability to be creative or to form any authentic attitudes to begin with, then those desires should not be considered inauthentic, but rather non-authentic.

7.2 Authentic Emotions

> *I think,' said Anna, playing with the glove she had taken off, 'I think...if so many men, so many minds, certainly so many hearts, so many kinds of love.*
>
> —Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*

In order for an emotion to be creative it does not necessarily have to be a novel *type* of emotion, i.e. when I refer to an emotion being novel, I do not imply that one should necessarily invent new types of emotions. The formulation or the experience of an emotion may be novel in regard to the even slightly unique way one reformulates or transforms a rather common emotion or in regard to the exact way through which one experiences it. Some emotions may be the outcomes of creative processes, but some others may also be originators of new creative emotions. An emotion of love may be creative either in the sense of it being an outcome of a creative process or a by-product of another creative attitude. The fact that we all experience at some point of our lives the emotion of love does not mean that one cannot love in a novel or authentic way. One may experience a universal type of emotion while formulating it and experiencing it in a novel and different way. We all experience the emotion of love, but each one of us has the potential to experience it in a different and unique way. As long as the emotion of love is created without one's creative processes being bypassed, one may be authentic with respect to it.

Many would argue that love is something passive that simply grabs you. An authentic emotion of love, however, can be an outcome of our creative processes and in this sense authentic. The authentic emotion of love is a creative passion. One formulates such an emotion as a response to certain stimuli, such as a look or a smile of someone that generates the emotion. Thus, even when love is unconscious, impulsive or instinctive, and therefore what many would consider passive, it is still something that we create, and in *this* sense it is active. Each authentic emotion of love is unique and distinct; the number of authentic emotions of love equals not only the number of persons that have created such an emotion, but also the number of times that each of these persons has authentically loved. Depending on their distinctiveness and uniqueness, there is a certain spectrum of emotions from an imitative inauthentic emotion to a completely genuinely creative one.

For example, a person can never love authentically in the same way two different people. The only way of that happening is if her creative processes are bypassed and she experiences the emotion of love as she

has been dictated to do so by, for instance, certain social structures, e.g. the mass media and aspects of the commercialised pop culture. Moreover, there is of course always the possibility of love's being a non-creative basic attitude, and thus a non-authentic attitude, but this refers to a person that at that moment lacks the tendency, ability or will to formulate such an authentic desire. However, a desire that is a by-product of this emotion of love may not be creative in the sense discussed, i.e. an outcome of creative processes that lead to something novel to the person and the person's social environment, but only a simple basic desire, e.g. to give a kiss to the loved one. This desire is still authentic, since it is a direct product of an authentic attitude, i.e. the love of this person for another person, and the capacity for creativity of this person is not bypassed.

The conception of creativity regarding a person's attitudes, which is proposed here, might seem too demanding since it is constituted by a type of relative historical novelty, but on the other hand, it is because of it that the exclusion of any possible form of manipulation is ensured. A person only needs to have certain creative attitudes that form the basis of her authenticity. The condition for authenticity is not as demanding as for creativity, since one can be authentic with respect to an attitude that is not creative, but it is simply directly related to a prior creative or authentic attitude of her.

Nevertheless, it is not my aim to equate creativity with novelty, but rather highlight their relation, since the former, in the sense discussed here, operates as a condition for the latter. There is a clear distinction between a novel attitude and a creative attitude, which can be clearly noticed in the difference between a novel result and a creative process. For instance, counting higher than anyone else has ever done provides you with a novel result, but this is not an outcome of a creative non-mechanistic process. A mechanistic creation, even in the extremely improbable case that it is highly novel, can be neither creative nor authentic. Something more is required: sensitivity in regard to the value of one's creation—besides, that is also what differentiates the creative creativity of a human being from the plain creativity of a machine.

7.3 Authentic Beliefs

Creativity is to think more efficiently.
—Pierre Reverdy

If a belief is formulated in one's mind through one's creative processes the person is authentic with respect to it, while if a belief is formulated in one's mind without one's creative processes being bypassed by any manipulative person or social structure, the person is just not inauthentic with respect to it. To begin with, however, we should distinguish between two kinds of beliefs. There are basic perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that there is a table directly in front of one, and then there are more inferential beliefs, such as belief in God. The former may or may not be creative depending on their kind and degree of novelty. For instance, Monet's perceived water lilies in a creative way, and Modigliani developed a creative way of perceiving female faces. Moreover, if a person experiences a perception in a distorted form, i.e. in a different and novel way in relation to the way most persons experience it, for example, if one experiences a perception that could be characterized as a hallucination, one's belief may be considered authentic, even in the case that it is false, as long as one's creative processes are not bypassed. In regard to authenticity, it does not matter whether an attitude is true or not.

Consider the example of Ionesco's Bérenger. The belief that he should become a rhinoceros like everybody else would have been imposed on him by bypassing his creative processes, while the belief that he should stay as he is was an outcome of his creative processes and no bypassing existed. His belief was an outcome of an original idea of his, which showed a transformation of the existing dominant view that all persons should become rhinoceroses, while he was also sensitive to its value. Moreover, in the case of Bérenger the resistance to the bypassing is itself an outcome of a creative process. Bérenger's belief that he ought not to succumb to the metamorphosis was novel both to him and to his social environment, since everybody else had already chosen to do the opposite. Following from that, his belief was creative, and since no bypassing of his creative processes regarding his belief not to succumb existed, one can confidently argue that he was authentic with respect to it.

Consider also the example of Huckleberry Finn. The belief that he should turn in Jim, the runaway slave who has become his friend, seems to have been created in him through a bypassing of his creative processes and

imposed on him through external social structures. However, the belief that one should protect and save one's friends, despite their colour and whether doing so is illegal, may well have arisen without any bypassing from an external source. In the same way as with Bérenger, Finn's belief may be a creative belief, insofar as it was novel both to him and to his social environment, and it manifested an exploration and even transformation of the dominant views on discrimination and friendship. Alternatively, perhaps the strength of his love for his friend, which might have created this belief, operated as a form of bypassing of the belief that one should always follow the laws. Nevertheless, as long as no bypassing took place during the formulation of this emotion of love, meaning that this emotion is a prior authentic attitude of Huckleberry Finn, then the belief created as a by-product of this emotion is authentic too.

8. Degrees of Authenticity

What happens when two attitudes, which are both outcomes of creative processes, come into direct conflict? How can the person know which is the more authentic? In short, the answer lies in the degree of authenticity of each attitude. Authenticity is merely a matter of degree based on creativity, i.e. attitudes are not simply divided between the authentic and the inauthentic, but rather exist within a spectrum; some attitudes are more authentic than others. However, authenticity may involve conflicts like it may involve ambivalence. Not only can one be authentic while experiencing a strong conflict, one can also be authentic in virtue of such a conflict, i.e. internal conflicts may be a source of the creative creation of attitudes. Hence, a person may formulate two antithetical and conflicting attitudes that are equally creative and authentic. There is no reason to believe that such a person may not be equally authentic with respect to both of them.

As mentioned, the creative processes are in part defined by the novelty of their outcomes. In order for an attitude to be creative, it must be novel to a certain degree, but the degree of novelty may vary extremely from attitude to attitude. Consider a castle made out of Lego. Rearranging its structure, by taking one piece and moving it to a different position, creates something novel. However, since one only moved one piece the *degree* of novelty of the new creation is low. If one rebuilds the whole castle in a completely novel way, by contrast, the new creation is highly novel and much more creative. In the same sense, attitudes may be distinguished by being

either minimally or highly novel. A desire of one to change one's life plan may be extremely novel and thus highly creative or it may be strongly influenced by one's role models and thus creative only to a very low degree. However, although novelty is necessary for an attitude to be creative, it is not necessary for an attitude to be authentic. In order for a desire to be creative it needs to be at least novel to a low degree; a minor change of a piece in the Lego castle may still be authentic but to a very low degree. The question of the degree of novelty depends on the degree of transmutation of the form and the nature of the stimuli taken in from the external environment.

Novelty, nonetheless, should be met not only in the outcome of the creative *processes* (attitudes) but also in the *material* (images, thoughts, intuitions etc.) that those processes incorporate and use in order to provide the person with a creative outcome. It would be out of the intentions of this account of authenticity to be misunderstood as a conception of eccentricity. Novelty does not have to be eccentric. The most creative attitude is not necessarily the most extreme or eccentric, but the most novel creation of the person, which will prove that the external influence was significantly limited, while the creation of the attitude was not only solely an outcome of the processes of the person alone but also based mostly on material, information and elements of the person and not of other external stimuli. For something to be novel, it does not need to be extreme or reactionary, but mostly new and unique. The invention of the airplane was not extreme or necessarily eccentric, but it was highly novel.

At this point, we should explore the distinction between *desiring* something *authentically* and having an *authentic desire*. It may seem that there may be cases in which the two conflict. An actress may authentically create a new persona, but this does not necessarily mean that she is authentic with respect to this persona. This persona may have arisen from her creative processes, and yet it may not agree with her authentic inner world. In the same sense, one may authentically create an attitude, while one is not expressed by this attitude. However, as I shall argue in the following chapter, authenticity should not continue being misunderstood as simply a form of self-expression, since no robust entity, like the self, is necessary for it to obtain. Therefore, according to the conception of authenticity proposed here such a need, for a distinction between desiring something authentically and having an authentic desire, is not required and a serious complication is avoided.

9. Conclusion

The conception of authenticity that I have proposed is positive, historical, externalist, non-intellectualist, non-rationalist and content-neutral. In contrast to the vast majority of prominent thinkers of autonomy and authenticity, who base their conceptions of authenticity on reflective rationality, I have based mine on *creativity.* Part of the strength of conceiving authenticity as a product and/or by-product of creativity is the ability to understand it in its full essence, while accepting as authentic all creations that even though may be authentic, they are neglected or unjustly considered inauthentic by the dominant conceptions. My principal aim is not to argue that authenticity should be completely separated from reflective rationality, but rather to suggest that we should devote equal attention to other faculties of our inner nature too, e.g. imagination, emotions and intuition. Both creativity and authenticity may arise from all human attributes and thus none should be given a controlling and dominating role over the others. Furthermore, I have claimed that authenticity is not an individualistic concept, since it requires and involves important social/relational aspects. I hope that the conditions proposed here for authenticity, inauthenticity and non-authenticity involve almost all aspects of these notions and formulate a more complete view by advancing our understanding of them.

Chapter V

[Authenticity and the Self]

1. Introduction

Philosophers of authenticity and autonomy have almost always based their accounts on the idea of some kind of true self, the idea being that authenticity is to be understood as some form of self-expression. Let us call this:

> The Self-Expression view: One acts authentically when one expresses one's true self.

These accounts must necessarily involve a convincing theory of the self. By contrast, my account of authenticity requires neither the expression nor the existence of a true self. The conception of authenticity proposed here does not depend on one's view of the self. Thus, in this chapter I argue against the pre-modern and modern dominant idea that an authentic attitude is one that expresses one's true self, as well as certain postmodern views, by claiming that authentic attitudes are authentic not because they arise from one's true self, but because they arise from one's creative processes.

As I have already discussed and as I shall discuss again in the following sections, one's capacity to be authentic is irrelevant to one's capacities for rationality and self-reflection. In this sense, I consider the dominant conceptions of the self, throughout their numerous manifestations in various views and approaches, inadequate and insufficient for authenticity. I shall concentrate on theories that develop conceptions of both authenticity and the self, since they necessarily require the latter for the former to obtain; in other words, I shall explore the self-expression theories of authenticity, which constitute the vast majority of, if not all, existing conceptions of authenticity. Then, I shall point out a number of weaknesses of these theories that I believe make them deeply problematic, in order to shed light on the comparative advantage of a theory of authenticity, such as mine, that does not require the existence of any kind of self.

2. Authenticity as Self-Expression

According to the tradition of the ideals of authenticity and the self that has its source mainly in Rousseau, one is authentic when one discovers or expresses one's inner self, which consists of a variety of stable, robust and pre-given states and attitudes, and one accesses them through a process of introspection. Rousseau famously argued that the motivations of one's conduct should arise from one's deeper essential source. It was in his *Confessions* (1957 [1770]) that he explored and addressed relevant questions in regard to inwardness, self-reflection and introspection. From this exploration was originated the distinction between the central, essential and deepest motives and attitudes of one in contrast to the more peripheral ones. Rousseau maintained that adopting and following attitudes of the latter kind results in the denial of the one's deeper true self to such a degree that the self is annihilated. In his *The New Heloise* (1997 [1761]), he underlined the actual self-alienation that obtains when one neglects or represses one's deepest attitudes.[20]

Charles Taylor, nevertheless, refers to Rousseau and the Romantics as, "major early articulators [of authenticity], rather than its originators." (Taylor, 1991: 28) A prominent Romantic figure in whose writings this idea bloomed was Friedrich Hölderin. Varga writes: "Hölderin's work displays another feature, which is added to the idea of authenticity during the Romantic period…This is the attempt to recover a sense of wholeness by turning inward—a wholeness that is assumed to be lost with the emerging modern world." (Varga, 2012: 22) The form of authenticity, which flourishes during the Romantic period, is clearly one of introspection. Therefore, what we find with Rousseau, Hölderin and the Romantics is an attempt to discover an essential-self. Advocators of the introspectivist view, equate the question of what authenticity is with the question of how one can express who one truly is. The authenticity of one's attitudes and actions depends on whether they express and have their source in the essential core traits of the person's identity or they simply originate in a place peripheral to the person's true self.

In the following sections I focus on the most prominent theories of authenticity and the self. These theories can be categorised as either subjectivist or social-relational, and as either essentialist or existentialist. The

[20] In a parallel manner, in Aesthetics, an authentic artwork is an artwork that, instead of being conformed to external social values such as historical tradition, popular opinion and commercial worth, is faithful to the artist's true self, while in Moral Psychology, authentic is the person that lives her life based on what her deeper self desires, instead of what society or one's early conditioning dictates.

subjectivist theories concentrate on the subjective and individual traits of the person, while the social-relational theories focus on the person's social involvement and social interdependencies. I go on to suggest that the Existentialist approach and Frankfurt's account belong to the former category, whereas Charles Taylor's conception belongs to the latter. Almost all accounts of authenticity share more or less the same ideal[21], which suggests that one should be true to oneself and lead a life expressive of what one takes oneself to be. However, the existentialist view differs importantly from the essentialist views of thinkers from Rousseau to Frankfurt and, to a certain degree, Taylor. It maintains that self-actualization originates from creating a self in the course of what one does. In this sense, *discovering* or *finding* one's self is transformed into *formulating* or *making* one's self.

Authenticity has been conceived until now as a form of self-expression, while the self is understood as a true entity that is either pre-given and can be discovered or as something that is created through action. My aim is to argue that in order for authenticity to obtain neither self-expression nor a specific self, either true or not true, is required.

2.1 Frankfurt's Account of the Self

Frankfurt is considered one of the main contemporary advocators of the view that authenticity is a human capacity related to the essential nature of the person. His theory has been commonly identified as a 'Real Self Theory' (Wolf, 1990: 29).[22] While Frankfurt explores which kind of freedom is required for a person to be held morally responsible for one's action, he concludes that what is crucial is whether one manifests one's self while acting as one does, or if one's actions are outcomes of alienation from one's self. For him, the self is defined in volitional terms and is identified with what we fundamentally care about. He suggests that the true self is partly constituted by a certain form of reflective consciousness. In this sense the motives of one's attitudes belong to one, i.e. are one's own and thus they

[21] The ideal of authenticity throughout time, both in the pre-modern and modern eras, may be synopsized in Bernard Williams simple words, 'If there is one theme in all my work it's about authenticity and self-expression. It's the idea that some things are in some real sense really you, or express what you are, and others aren't.' (Interview with Bernard Williams by Stuart Jeffries in The Guardian, November 30 2002)

[22] In the same sense, Dworkin's theory is a 'True Self Theory', since, for Dworkin, second-order desires reveal what one really wants; i.e. one's higher-order preferences constitute one's "true self". (Dworkin, 1989: 59)

reflect one's true self. However, what exactly is a person's substantial self for Frankfurt? In his own words:

> The essential nature of a person is to be understood similarly, as including the characteristics that define his essential identity… The essence of a person, on the other hand, is a matter of the contingent volitional necessities by which the will of the person is as a matter of fact constrained. These constraints cannot be determined by conceptual or logical analysis. They are substantive rather than merely formal. (Frankfurt, 1999: 138)

The constraints that are dictated by the volitional necessities of the person are an outcome of what the person deeply loves, i.e. the source of them has its roots in what the person cannot but care about. Hence, Frankfurt maintains that one unavoidably cares about certain things, meaning that one has an already given essential nature and one's goal is to discover it. For Frankfurt, one also needs to endorse one's caring, in order for it to become one's own. Thus, volitional necessities, which are what the self is, are not altered if one simply refuses to endorse them. If a person attempts to refuse them then the person falls into ambivalence within one's self, which results in the abolition of one's true self. He writes:

> They [the constraints] pertain to the purposes, the preferences, and the other personal characteristics that the individual cannot help having and that effectively determine the activities of his will. In other words, they are specified for any given person by what he loves. Our essential natures as individuals are constituted, accordingly, by what we cannot help caring about. The necessities of love, and their relative order or intensity, define our volitional boundaries. They mark our volitional limits, and thus they delineate our shapes as persons. (Frankfurt, 1999: 138)

In order for a person to be autonomous, she needs to decide and act based on the expressions of her self. In this sense the notion of autonomy is not only based on but also identified with that of authenticity. In any case, in Frankfurt's theory the idea of expression of the self is both necessary and sufficient for authenticity and autonomy. We are once again left, however, with the crucial but still not adequately addressed question of what exactly is the self and how it can be traced.

Frankfurt's thesis goes against the idea of both existential freedom and radical choice. More precisely, on the one hand, as I shall discuss, the existentialist approach maintains that autonomy, through radical choice, leads to authenticity, while on the other hand we see that for Frankfurt and Taylor, whose theory I discuss in a later section, autonomy presupposes

authenticity, and more precisely a given authentic self, rendering it a necessary core condition of it.

2.2 Christman's Account of the Self

Christman's core aim in *The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves* is to develop a liberal theory based on a socio-historical view of the self and individual autonomy. In the first part of his book, in which he examines the concept of "selves", his interest is to highlight that the self is not only social but also historical in the sense of being diachronically structured and subject to change over time. He argues in the light of an empirical thesis that selves are social beings (Christman, 2009: 30). The self of the person is formulated through interpersonal relationships, social institutions, historical development, group-based identities, and narrative meaningfulness (Christman, 2009: 2, 8–9). However, he claims that the nature of the self is not only social, but also diachronic; persons are "socio-historical" selves and memory is a core and essential aspect of them (Christman, 2009: 96–97). Hence, on the one hand he rejects the claim that the self is essentially social, but on the other hand he retains the view that the self is in an important way social.[23]

Having discussed and defended the notion of the social self, which is neither fixed nor stable, Christman develops his own notion of the self, which is based on the idea of the narrative self, through which he adds the element of personal history. In this sense his notion of the self is socio-historical. He explains that the idea of the narrative self is that: "the conditions that make for a single (as opposed to multiple) entity, the particular "contents" of that entity must be shaped in the form of a narrative. The idea is that selves, persons, personalities and so on contain elements such as experiences, acts, and bodily characteristics." (Christman, 2009: 66-67)

Nevertheless, Christman does go partly against the post-modern direction as he retains and further develops individualist views of the self, authenticity, and personal autonomy. Given this, we notice that his theory combines a social conception of the self with an individualist conception of autonomy. Individual, rational self-reflection remains at the center of his

[23] For instance, on the one hand he supports that the self is socially constituted, but on the other hand he does not claim that autonomy is solely a relational property. For Christman, the self is formed under social, historical, and political conditions; however, this does not entail that it is also determined by any specific arrangement.

requirements for both authenticity and autonomy, like it does in the majority of the prominent theories. The account highlights the historical dimensions of authenticity and personal autonomy by requiring the self to reflect on its commitments in light of the history of their development (Christman, 2009: 137). He insists that selves are not solely self-created, a point that, as we shall see, comes into conflict with the existentialist view. In my view, the capacity for self-creation and self-constitution of attitudes is central and I would only agree with Christman to the degree that parthenogenesis cannot exist. Many of our social relations and the social context in which we define ourselves are not chosen by us and most of the times we are unable to escape them, but this does not entail that some form of self-constitution is not possible.

However, his type of self-reflection does not involve a subject that stands outside her own social and cultural commitments. In this sense self-reflection becomes compatible with various identity-based demands, as it does not separate the self from one's own social and cultural commitments. For Christman, a person is authentic if she is not alienated from her 'true self' after embedded self-reflection. He considers a person authentic, and in extension autonomous, if her way of life is expressive of her "true self", or, in other words, if she is not alienated from her existence, and he suggests that the way to discover that is by sustained self-reflection. When Christman outlines his conditions for autonomy, he introduces one condition for competence (which consists of two subconditions) and one condition for authenticity (which consists of three subconditions). Let us concentrate on his condition for authenticity:

> Relative to some characteristic C, where C refers to basic organizing values and commitments, autonomy obtains if:
> [...]
> (Hypothetical Reflection Condition – Authenticity):
>
> 3. Were the person to engage in sustained critical reflection on C over a variety of conditions in light of the historical processes (adequately described) that gave rise to C; and
> 4. She would not be alienated from C in the sense of feeling and judging that C cannot be sustained as part of an acceptable autobiographical narrative organized by her diachronic practical identity; and
> 5. The reflection being imagined is not constrained by reflection-distorting factors. (Christman, 2009: 155)

We may notice that the third and fifth subconditions require the person's capacity for undistorted and non-manipulated actual or hypothetical critical reflection. Nevertheless, it is the fourth condition that conveys what exactly Christman considers the self to be. That is, for Christman, the essence of the self can be conceived as a narrative that incorporates the person's autobiography and it is formulated and accepted by the person's diachronic practical identity. Having therefore clarified in which sense exactly Christman conceives authenticity and what exactly is the self, as well as its relation to authenticity, we may conclude that at the heart of Christman's theory lies a self-expression view of authenticity.

2.3 Taylor's Account of the Self

Both in *Sources of the Self* and in *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Taylor argues that the concept of authenticity and its practices should be retained, since in his view the original and undistorted idea of authenticity involves a clear element of self-transcendence (Taylor, 1991: 15). He argues that self-transcendence, which once was a crucial element in the ideal of authenticity, is practically lost from the contemporary version, giving rise to cultures of self-absorption, which ultimately deteriorate into the malaise of absurdity. Taylor's aim, while recovering an undistorted version of authenticity, is to overcome meaninglessness, which he considers one of the "malaises of modernity" and connects it to the trivialized forms of the culture of authenticity. He admits that his ideal of being true to one's self has its roots in Herder's idea that each human being 'has an original way of being human', a way of being that is distinctively one's own:

> There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me. (Taylor, 1991: 28–9)

While enriching authenticity with a social-relational aspect[24] (Taylor, 1985), he distinguishes between inner and outer nature. While in modernism,

[24] The main distinction between subjectivist and social-relational accounts of the self is that the latter argue that the self is generated and formulated because of and based on social and cultural contexts. As Ferrara (1993) and Varga (2012) have argued, in earlier periods of time the moral advice to be authentic suggested that one should be true to oneself in order thereby to be true to others. In this sense, being true to oneself was conceived as a means to the end of developing stable and meaningful social relations.

the turn inward still contained a self-transcending moment, the critical point where the ideal of authenticity becomes flattened is when it becomes 'contaminated' by a certain form of 'self-determining freedom' that also contains elements of inwardness and unconventionality (Taylor, 1991: 38). For Taylor, self-determining freedom should not necessarily be part of the ideal of authenticity. As he writes, "There is nothing inherently individualistic or self-centered about 'fulfilment, or self-development, or realizing [one's] potential.'" (Taylor, 1991: 75) 'Low and self-indulgent' forms of the ideal of authenticity that can be labeled as narcissistic, egoistic and self-absorptive may always exist, however, that does not mean that the ideal runs this danger in general (Taylor, 1991: 56). For Taylor self-determining-freedom is:

> [T]he idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences. It is a standard of freedom that obviously goes beyond what has been called negative liberty (being free to do what I want without interference by others) because that is compatible with one's being shaped and influenced by society and its laws of conformity. Instead, self-determining freedom demands that one breaks free of all such external impositions and decides for oneself alone. (Taylor, 1991: 27)

Following from this, self-determining freedom not only is not a necessary part of authenticity, but also is counterproductive, since its self-centeredness flattens the meanings of lives and fragments identities. The process of articulating an identity involves adopting a relationship to the good or to what is important, which is connected to one's membership in a language community (Taylor, 1989: 34–35). As he clearly states, "authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it presupposes such demands." (Taylor, 1991: 41) The person cannot take all the burden of deciding what is important, since this would be self-defeating. On the contrary, whatever is important for one must connect to an inter-subjective notion of the good, wherefrom a good part of its normative force lastly emanates. In this sense, authenticity simply requires maintaining bonds to collective questions of worth that point beyond one's own preferences.

We notice, therefore, that Taylor's approach towards authenticity is clearly antithetical to the Sartrean idea of existential freedom and authenticity, which are based on the notion of radical choice that I shall discuss in the following section. Taylor's aim is to prove that ideals within the contemporary culture that discuss self-fulfilment with no reference "(a) to the demands of our ties with others, or (b) to demands of any kind emanating from something more or other than human desires or aspirations are self-

defeating" (Taylor 1991: 35) eliminate the conditions for realizing authenticity itself. This is also evident in Taylor's notion of our commitments as being articulations of publicly shared values. Society and its culture provide certain tools, e.g. the necessary concepts, for one to be able to express one's self, i.e. for one to be authentic. Thus, not only the recognition of other persons is required for one to develop one's self and identity, but also one should be able to adopt and further develop a vocabulary that is shared among the individuals of one's social environment and that consists of certain value directions. Given this, authenticity requires the critical engagement with values that constitute our collective conceptions.

In his view, when one evaluates how to be, one makes one's choices for reasons; however, reasons are not themselves part of what one can choose. Given this, we notice a strong agreement with Frankfurt's view; especially when Frankfurt speaks of a "capacity for reflective self-evaluation… manifest in the formation of second-order desires." (Frankfurt, 1971: 7) In terms of the place of the self, Taylor argues that it is in the very nature of the self to be able to raise the question of how to be, and to resolve to be in a particular way. In this sense one is responsible for one's self.

So while Taylor's theory of the self is fundamentally distinct from the existentialist ones, it is clearly related to Frankfurt's hierarchical account. However, he introduces two social-relational supplements to this: firstly, he makes a distinction between weak and strong evaluations concerning one's first-order desires, and secondly, he develops the concept of *articulation*. Taylor regards a person's self as a product of articulation. He assumes certain given psychological states and attitudes, like desires, motivations, inclinations, feelings and emotions, which, however, are not yet identical with a person's self. All of these psychological attitudes and states do not yet provide a person with a fully fleshed out identity, but are often still vague and inchoate. Therefore, they have to be articulated, i.e. one has to interpret, and thereby finally constitute, them in a certain way. However, in order to articulate one's own inchoate attitudes, one is in need of appropriate concepts that can only originate from language. Given this, it is clear that a certain kind of openness is involved, since while articulating and revising one's fundamental commitments one may discover new ways of interpreting them, due either to one's new vocabulary or to one's relations and discussions with others.

Taylor gives the person in question a more active role than Frankfurt does, since for Taylor a person must not only discover what she cares about, but also actively formulate her fundamental commitments within her social

and cultural context. Since one, while re-evaluating one's fundamental articulations, has to choose between various alternative possibilities, Taylor is willing to accept a degree of ontological openness and libertarian freedom, while Frankfurt rejects the idea that the principle of alternative possibilities, and thus ontological openness, plays any significant role in regard to authenticity (Taylor, 1976: 289-90; 298-9).

According to Frankfurt, defining one's commitments is merely a matter of discovery. We discover them by getting to know what we most deeply care about. In contrast to this, Taylor holds that the mental attitudes we can discover within ourselves are still inchoate and therefore have to be articulated. Only then is it possible to accomplish a definite fundamental commitment. In any case, for both Frankfurt and Taylor a certain form of reflection is necessarily required in order for authenticity to obtain. Following from this, we notice that Taylor's theory of authenticity is clearly based on an essentialist conception of the self, constituting his account a self-expression view of authenticity.

This said, the subjectivist accounts, like the ones mentioned, maintain that all aspects or at least some core aspects of the self are given, and that one makes them one's own through processes of endorsement and identification, which have a certain constancy and consistency throughout one's life and thus unify the self. However, they disagree over the exact nature of these aspects and the degree to which they are given, and more importantly over the nature of the endorsement process. As I shall claim, for existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre, there might not be a specific pre-existing self on which one can reflect, but the process of reflection itself is the one that constitutes the self. In my theory of authenticity, however, neither the pre-existence of a specific, robust, pre-given self nor any kind of a process of reflection are required.

The idea of the existence of a true self also entails the idea that it is possible to act *without* expressing your true self, meaning that there is always the possibility of a failure of expression your true self. For instance, for Frankfurt to fail to express your self is to follow something that is alien to you, something that contradicts your volitional necessities. For Christman, it is to follow something that contradicts a narrative that incorporates your autobiography and is formulated and accepted by your diachronic practical identity. For Taylor, it is to follow something that contradicts psychological attitudes and states that have been articulated, i.e. interpreted and constituted, by you, formulating your fundamental commitments within your social and cultural context. For Sartre, failing your self is identified with what

he calls ‘bad faith’. As I shall discuss, one is in bad faith whenever one tells oneself that things have to be exactly a certain way and that no other options can exist: in other words, whenever one, under pressure from societal forces, adopts false values and repudiates their inherent freedom. What all of these views have in common is the fundamental idea of expressing or failing to express a true self. Contrary to that, in my view, the possibility of failure is not necessarily involved, since the account of authenticity proposed here does not depend on the existence of a true self.

3. Weaknesses of Self-Expression Accounts of Authenticity

Life isn’t about finding yourself.
Life is about creating yourself.
—George Bernard Shaw

As discussed in the previous section, the vast majority of theories of authenticity are based on the idea of self-expression, which means that they necessarily require the existence of a self. However, this idea generates certain weaknesses that arise from the difficulty of defining and locating the exact nature of the self. In this section I discuss some of the most crucial problems of these theories. My aim is not to resolve them, but rather to demonstrate that a theory of authenticity that does not require an extensive theory of the self, like the one I am proposing, has a crucial comparative advantage over them.

3.1 The Illusion of the Self

3.1.1 The Empiricist Critique

One of the major lines of critique against theories of the self has its origins in the empiricist tradition and includes thinkers from Hume to Dennett, as well as many contemporary neuroscientists. In short, they claim that it is empirically impossible to locate the self, that when we put human nature under the microscope we cannot find it. Neuroscientists claim to be able to ‘locate’ the parts of the brain responsible for mental phenomena such as aesthetic appreciation, religious experience, love, depression and so on, but

they have not found yet a part of the brain associated with our underlying sense of self. Therefore, they confidently argue that it does not exist.

For instance, Thomas Metzinger maintains that, "no such things as selves exist in the world." (Metzinger, 2003: 3) According to Metzinger, the "self-y feeling" we all nonetheless carry is caused by a fundamental confusion. We, as organisms, use representational models on all kinds of biological levels, in order to lead our lives. Consciousness itself is also a kind of representational model, a model which is invisible and thus confuses itself with reality. Hence, we are a collection of "phenomenological self representational models", which are not fixed entities but dynamic processes, constantly interacting with different objects, and simultaneously representing the representational relations themselves (Metzinger, 2003). We 'are' these models which cannot turn around and catch themselves in action, and so confuse their contents with "themselves". This confusion is the self-y feeling. We feel as if we are looking directly at the world, while we are unable to separate 'ourselves' from the representational model that is maintaining our lives as a process of interaction with the world, and in the process producing our selves.

Similarly, the cognitive scientist Bruce Hood (2012) argues that the self is an illusion, while illusion is defined as a subjective experience that is not what it seems. Hood does not reject the idea that each person experiences a sense of self and that this experience is real, but he does deny the possibility that there is anything behind this experience, like an underlying self.[25] However, it would be an omission to neglect the fact that something provides the stimuli for this experience and that the source of this experience may be what the self is. In this connection, William James (1890) distinguished between two kinds of "self". For him, there is the self that is consciously aware of the present, and we refer to this self with the term "I", and there is also the self, which characterizes and expresses our personal identity, the persons we think we are, to which we refer with the term "me". For Hood, both "I" and "me" can be conceived as a narrative that associates

[25] It would be interesting to consider also the similarity of the empiricist view of the self being an illusion with the one held in early Buddhist texts, in which the Buddha refers to the term *Anatta*, which can be translated as "not-self", i.e. that the self does not actually exist but it is an illusory construction of humans. Buddhism rejects the idea that there is a permanent entity that remains constant behind our thoughts. For Buddha, as well as for Hood and many other theorists who share the same view, the self is experienced through an impression, not as a distinct real entity. What is equally interesting though is that while in the western tradition the inability of experiencing a sense of self, even if the self is an illusion, is considered a fundamental cause of unhappiness, in the eastern Buddhist tradition the Buddha claimed that even though reality is perceived by senses, it is not perceived by a certain "I" or "me", and the self, besides being an illusion, is also a fundamental cause of unhappiness.

the aggregate of our experiences and constitutes us as capable of operating in society. In this sense, we see a strong influence and connection with Hume's idea of the self as a "bundle" of experiences.

Nevertheless, even if the self is an illusion, it need not be a pointless one. The self, or at least the illusion of the self, may be a crucial illusion that persons experience, both in evolutionary and social terms, without which one could not function in one's environment. Dennett (2007) refers to the illusion of the 'Cartesian theatre,' the idea based on which there exists 'someone' who spectates on the world 'out there', while also watching one's own thoughts pass by. However, in his view all these are only mental processes. There are streams of thoughts, sensations and perceptions passing through our brains, while there is no central place where all of these phenomena are structured and organised.

Hence Dennett, incorporating the neuroscientific line of thought, seems to agree with the already mentioned advocators of the idea of the self being an illusion, since he argues that it is not possible to physically detect the self as a distinct tangible entity (Dennett, 1992: 103-15). For him too, the self is a convenient fiction, a subjective narrative that a person forms with one's self as the main character. He attempts an analogy between the self and the idea of centres of gravity, which, even though it is a useful concept in physics, does not refer to anything actual. In the same sense, the self is a useful concept but it does not refer to anything actual. Through Dennett's argument that the self is not something apt but rather a useful and necessary fiction created by us in order to be able to function, we may conclude that for thinkers who follow this direction, the self, at best, is an imaginary entity. These conceptions are closely related to the theoretical direction developed by neuroscientists.[26] Either way, as I shall argue, accepting or rejecting the neuroscientific claims about the self does not affect my theory of authenticity.

This said, we may trace the origin of this line of thought in Empiricism and more precisely in Hume. Hume argues that one cannot directly capture

[26] For a deeper and more enriched discussion of the neuroscientific views and arguments in regard to the self see: Westerhoff, J., *Reality: A very short introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2011; Thau, M., *Consciousness and Cognition*, Oxford University Press, 2011; Metzinger, T., *The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self*, Basic Books, 2010; Leung, S. K., & Bond, M. H., 2001, "Interpersonal communication and personality: Self and other perspectives", *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 4, 69-86; Kurak, M., 2003, "The Relevance of the Buddhist Theory of Dependent Co-Origination to Cognitive Science", *Brain and Mind* 4: 341–351; Metzinger, T., 2003, *Being No One*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

one's self.[27] For him, the self is not a concrete robust distinct entity, but rather simply a collection of experiences, a non-substantial "bundle" of perceptions:

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (Hume, 2000 [1738-40]: 165)

On Hume's view, these perceptions do not belong to anything. Rather, he compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements. The question of personal identity then becomes a matter of characterizing the loose cohesion of one's personal experience. That is, for Hume what can exist is only state self-consciousness, i.e. consciousness of particular mental states and processes, which involves an awareness of particular attitudes, and not creature self-consciousness, i.e. consciousness of whole organisms, which involves an awareness of self or selfhood. He writes:

> We are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement. (Hume, 2000 [1738-40]: 165)

However, Hume does not completely deny the existence of a self; he simply rejects the existence of a substantial self. He rejects the idea of the existence of an underlying self, i.e. that the features of a person belong or have their source in a distinct entity that can be called 'self'. In other words, a self which is understood as a bundle of experiences may exist, but no entity which creates, connects, or reflects those experiences exists—the self is nothing more than a constantly varying bundle of experiences.[28]

For these reasons, we cannot be confident that a specific, robust and substantial self exists. In this sense, some might argue that authenticity

[27] In this Hume seems to agree with Descartes who claims that the self, as every other substance, is conceived solely through its properties. However, the crucial difference between Descartes and Hume is that the latter is led to the conclusion that a substantial self or anything similar to it does not exist at all.

[28] On the contrary, for Locke, the self is defined by what we do or at least what deeds we attribute to our self through recollection and/or appropriation. However, Descartes, Locke and Hume seem to agree that the nature of the self is in some direct way based on, or at least strongly related to, the rational reflections of a person on the person's states.

cannot exist either, since most conceptions of authenticity demand a kind of self-expression. If this line of thought is correct, therefore, then on a self-expression view there can be no such thing as authenticity. However, by not requiring a substantial theory of the self, my conception stands intact regardless of whether the empiricist critique is correct or false.

3.1.2 The Post-Modern Critique

One of the thinkers with whom the questioning of the existence of a robust coherent pre-given self originates is Nietzsche. As Gemes puts it, “The dogma of a pre-given unified self generates certain complacency and that is the core of Nietzsche's objection. Assuming a world of ready-made beings it allows for the suppression of the problem of becoming.” (Gemes, 2001: 342) Many feminist philosophers argue that it is false to conceive the ideal self as transparent, unified, coherent, and independent, since they locate misogynist subtexts in the atomistic individualism of the Kantian ethical subject and homo economicus. They have proposed reconstructions of our theories of the self based on classic psychoanalysis, object relations theory, and post-structuralism. Following their critique against traditional views of the self, these approaches present the self as non-homogeneous, non-transparent, incoherent and multiple-voiced (Meyers 1989, 1997; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Friedman 1997; Keller 1997; Hill 1975). Christman maintains that postmodern views with regard to the self suggest that the self is unstable, not amenable to precise categorization and not always transparent, while constituted and continuously shaped by changing power dynamics (Christman, 2009: 54, 245). Following from this, narrative theories of the self add the insight that selves can engage in self-interpretation by reflecting on their experiences. Nevertheless, many feminist conceptions of the self still significantly privilege reason and rational reflection over other capacities such as imagination and emotions.

For instance, Benhabib argues that a conception of the self understood as a narrative renders the idea of a core self and a coherent identity intelligible without suppressing the potentiality for difference and without isolating the self from social relations (Benhabib, 1999). Having one’s own autobiographical story does not mean that it cannot be multi-voiced and that our relationships and social experiences are excluded. One’s personal narrative can always be under revision and this does not mean that it must collapse into incoherence. However, Benhabib too, agreeing with the

theorists mentioned above, argues that the existence of the self presupposes a core capacity to describe and reflect on one's experience. For her, both the narrative view of the self and the capacity for reasoning are fundamental to feminist emancipatory aims.

On the other hand, Judith Butler maintains that the idea of the self, i.e. the possibility of the existence of answers to questions like who one is and what one is like, is an illusion (Butler, 1990). The self can only be conceived as a non-stable incoherent knob and any form of identity that is sexed or gendered is mainly a 'corporeal style', i.e. the looping recreation and depiction of omnipresent patterns. In her opinion, even psychodynamic conceptions of the self, like the ones of Kristeva (1987)[29] and Chodorow (1981), obscure the performative nature of the self and promote the dominant illusory view that persons have a psychologically coherent and stable interior identity the roots of which lie in the biology of the person and which is manifested in one's genitalia.

In addition, Adorno maintains that the "liturgy of inwardness" is based on the mistaken belief that a person can be self-transparent and capable of choosing herself (Adorno 1973: 70). The doubtful picture of the self-centered individual covers up the constitutive alterity and mimetic nature of the self. Also, for Foucault and others[30] the subject and by extension the self are conceived mainly as a social construction. For Foucault, the self or the subject is an outcome formulated through power and discipline. He clearly opposes any conception of a hidden authentic self, which he critically refers to as the "Californian cult of the self" (Foucault, 1983: 266). The recognition that the subject is not given to itself in advance leads him to the practical consequence that it must create itself as a work of art (Foucault, 1983: 392). Rather than searching for a hidden true self, one should attempt to shape one's life as a work of art, proceeding without recourse to any fixed rules or permanent truths in a process of unending becoming (Foucault, 1988: 49). Given this, we see a strong relation of Foucault's ideas with the ones of Existentialism and especially of Sartre that I shall discuss in the following section.

In response to this, Christman, while discussing the postmodernist claim that the notion of the self is obsolete, clarifies that together with others he rejects the view that there is a robust, core self that can be specified

[29] Kristeva understands the self as a dynamic interplay between the feminine semiotic and the masculine symbolic. She focuses on challenging the homogeneous self and the ambiguous line between reason and emotion and desire. (Kristeva, 1987)
[30] For example, thinkers in the line of thought of Althusser and Bourdieu.

psychologically or philosophically and which functions across contexts in our lives. However, he points out that, even if one accepts the postmodernist claim that there is not a stable subject or self, there is still an entity (which, may be called 'the self') that is responsible for the formation of meanings and for self-government, at least, in order for the person to be capable of public, interpersonal interactions and communication. Furthermore, although Taylor argues against self-determining freedom, a critique with which most postmodernists would probably agree, he reconstructs a theory of authenticity and the self based on an original understanding of this concept as achieving self-transcendence (Anderson, 1995), while trying to respond to criticisms that understand authenticity to be a self-indulgent, aesthetic and individualistic concept.[31] Such criticisms, he claims, cannot justify the total condemnation of the idea itself (Taylor, 1991: 56). He correctly locates the increasing tendency of thinkers towards what he calls “inwardness” or “internal space”, which results in the formulation of a distinction between one's private and unique individuality and one's public self (Taylor, 1991). Along the same lines, Frankfurt could argue that without the existence of a form of essential self, we would not be able to speak about authenticity to begin with. More precisely, if no stable essential nature exists within the person, one would not be able to reflect on one’s preferences.

Despite, nevertheless, the ways in which one could argue against claims emerging from social critical theory and feminism, postmodern thought considers the self an illusion that at best remains useful and convenient. Everything is radically socially constituted to such a degree that the idea of the self makes no sense anymore. This comes into clear conflict with the Cartesian idea of the self. In any case, these objections highlight a crucial problem for self-expression theories of authenticity.

3.2 Irrationality, Incoherence, and Instability

As I have argued, rationality is irrelevant to authenticity. If we are to tie something to rationality, it should be autonomy instead. The traditional conception of the true self is often identified with the capacity of the person

[31] In contemporary thought, authenticity as a virtue term is understood as referring to a way of thinking and acting that is worthy in itself; it is understood as a virtue that entails one being true to oneself for one's own benefit. Under this light, the contemporary ideal of authenticity seems overly individualistic. Given this, many contemporary thinkers have claimed that it has increasingly turned into a kind of aestheticism and egoistic self-indulgence. Taylor belongs to the thinkers that have attempted to defend authenticity against that criticism.

to be rational and to critically reflect. Following from this, all persons that lack this capacity are considered incompetent to have and to form a self and, because of this, unable to be authentic. In my theory, irrational persons, who may have incoherent or fragmented selves, may be authentic too; my conception is free from any necessary requirement of rationality or self-reflection.

Let us consider a case with which Sacks deals in his book *The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat* (1985: 22-41). He refers to a patient, whom he calls Jimmie G., who does not have the ability to formulate new memories. Sacks argues that because of his condition, Jimmy is not able to experience a sense of self, since he does not have the ability to construct a complete and coherent life narrative. Given this, according to a self-expression view of authenticity, Jimmie G., while not being able to form a self, is considered not able to have the capacity for being authentic with respect to any of his attitudes or actions. However, is our experience of self based only on memory and on our ability to form a narrative out of our lives? Most importantly, is authenticity based on or related to such a capacity for forming a narrative based on memory? It is my view that even if one is incapable of having any sense of memory or even understanding what it is to experience life in the form of a narrative, authenticity may still exist and be manifested through the thoughts, reactions and general attitudes of the person. For instance, the various ways one may react to a work of art or a joke can prove that, even though one may have no memories, one's attitudes may still be authentic, so long as one retains the capacity to be creative. Besides, the previous experiences of one's life may be recorded and still apparent in the person's reactions, and, in this sense, they may still exist, even though the conscious memory of them has been erased. Despite, however, whether this is true or not, even if none of one's previous life experiences remained, one could still be authentic, so long as one is able to exercise one's capacity for creativity here in the present. Even if Sacks is right and this person does not have a self, nothing proves that he cannot still be authentic. In my view, one does not need to have a self in the form of a specific innate entity which is built on memories in order for one to be authentic. One need not even have a sense of self, in order to be authentic.

For authenticity and creativity to obtain, one must be sensitive to the value of one's creation, but one need not be aware of one's own existence. In other words, for one to be authentic with respect to an attitude one does not have to be aware of that attitude or its authenticity. One could have no sense of self, and still be authentic with respect to one's attitudes. The fact that we

may constantly throughout our lives formulate new attitudes or alter and recreate previous ones does not mean that one cannot be authentic with respect to them, it may simply be that we should speak about authenticity with respect to what one feels or experiences only at a specific time.

Whether the self is identified with pure abstract reason or with the instrumental rationality of the marketplace, feminists and critical theorists argue that these conceptions of the self isolate the individual from personal relationships and larger social forces. Despite this critique, which I find fruitful and well targeted, I believe that these conceptions of the self also isolate one from other capacities of one's inner nature, e.g. emotions, intuitions and imagination. In any case, in my view, the question of the self constitutes a pseudo-dilemma, irrelevant and unnecessary in the discussion of authenticity.

The distinction between authentic and inauthentic attitudes is better characterized through the idea of ownership of actions and attitudes rather than through that of expressing a true self. In order for attitudes to be authentic they only need to be one's own attitudes, they need to neither express a certain true underlying robust entity, i.e. a specific true self, nor arise from such an entity. The aspect of ownership is ensured through the condition for creativity. Since one of my core conditions for authenticity is the non-bypassing of the person's creative processes, the fact that one's attitude or action is the outcome of one's creative process entails that it is one's own, meaning that it has been originated through this person's capacities and not simply communicated to or imposed on her.

4. The Existentialist Self

Throughout the twentieth century, debates regarding the concept of authenticity have often focused on the theories of a number of core existentialist thinkers. The Existentialists seem to reject the idea of the pre-given robust self too; however, they do not completely abandon the necessity of some kind of self in order for authenticity to obtain. They simply have a different way of approaching it. Even though 'existentialism' as a term remains ambiguous, as it groups together a number of thinkers who express contradictory views, it will be defined here broadly to incorporate the following approaches: i) proto-existentialism, to which Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche may be ascribed; German existentialism, for which

Martin Heidegger is representative; and French existentialism, which will be characterised by Jean-Paul Sartre. More precisely, for our purpose here, it would be worthwhile to concentrate mainly on Jean-Paul Sartre, with some attention to Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger.[32] According to the views of these philosophers, one should aim during one's life to either discover or create one's unique true self and to manage to retain it as true, since its authenticity is constantly threatened by the dictates of external influences coming from social reality leading one towards inauthenticity.[33]

4.1 Sartre's Account of the Self

One determines one's existence based on the way one deals with the various possibilities with which one comes into contact within one's current historical culture. The existential conception of authenticity is not relevant to the idea of being true to one's own pre-given attitudes. Individuals can create their selves. However, the idea of "being true to oneself" remains relevant. The true self for Sartre, following Heidegger's view[34], may not be a pre-determined, already given entity, but rather an entity that is being constantly

[32] Kierkegaard emphasized on the importance of inwardness and 'infinite passion' through the experience of one's life. Later on, Nietzsche exalted the person whose life is characterized by intellectual integrity, Dionysian intensity, and a willingness to break out of traditionally defined boundaries in order to incorporate in one's self the whole of human experience and capacities. Heidegger, influenced by both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, developed his notion of 'authenticity' and in turn influenced deeply Sartre's theory that followed.

[33] Kierkegaard was one of the firsts to discuss the necessity of one recovering one's true self from the mass and society, which are responsible for the loss of our authentic selves. However, Kierkegaard's discussion of leading an authentic life was concentrated, and partly restricted, on a theistic context. Kierkegaard's work on authenticity and his suggestion that each of us is to "become what one is" (Kierkegaard, 1992 [1846]: 130) may best be understood as linked to his critical stance towards a certain social reality. He developed a critique against modern society holding it responsible for making its subjects "inauthentic". Since "massification" constitutes a core characteristic of modern society a widespread "despair" that comes to the fore as spiritlessness, denial, and defiance is caused to individuals. However, he did not accept a view that would suggest that a person should be conceived as a substance with certain essential attributes. He conceived the self in relational terms: "The self is a relation that relates itself to itself…" (Kierkegaard 1980 [1849]: 13) In his view, the self is defined by concrete expressions through which one manifests oneself in the world and thereby constitutes one's identity over time. Thus, for Kierkegaard authenticity is achieved through a constant expression of our selves, which in a sense recreates our selves and a kind of reflection towards it since one needs to relate one's self to itself.

[34] In the same sense the search for authenticity implies search for one's own unique identity. Heidegger does not accept an 'essentialist' view of authenticity, i.e. that there is a substantive deeper nature in human beings that dictates an appropriate way for all humans to be human. His view is that, although all possibilities for self-definition are taken from the cultural context in which we are located, each of us takes up those possibilities and configures them into the self-interpretations that define our own personal identity. Heidegger, while using the word Dasein to refer to human existence writes, "Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or neglecting. The question of existence [i.e., what determines our identity or being as humans] never gets straightened out except through existing itself." (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 12)

constructed in the form of a narrative through introspective reflection and inwardness. There is no substantive content we must attain in order to be true to our selves.

In *Being and Nothingness*, Jean-Paul Sartre, while discussing the essence of existential freedom and the role of autonomy in it, introduces his conception of authenticity as a core constituent of it. In Sartre's view, for one to be authentic one needs to acknowledge existential freedom as the primary mode of existence, which means that one must take responsibility for being unavoidably forced to choose one's attitude towards how to live one's life in every single action. Based on this, one is constantly able to define and re-define one's own self through one's actions. From this idea arises Sartre's widely known phrase "existence precedes essence," or in other words, that existential freedom precedes the self. What we do and how we act in our life determine us. Besides, in Sartre's words, "One can't take a point of view on one's life without one's living it." (as quoted in Jopling, 2002: 14) It is not that one is loyal because one does not betray another, but rather one defines oneself as loyal by continuously remaining loyal. Sartre rejects determinism, saying that it is our choice how we respond to determining tendencies. For him, one is one's choices; one is not able to not choose, since if one does not choose, this still constitutes a choice. In the extreme case that one is faced with inevitable circumstances, one can still choose how one is in them. He writes:

> I believe that a man can always make something out of what is made of him. This is the limit I would today accord to freedom: the small movement which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him. Which makes of Genet a poet when he had been rigorously conditioned to be a thief. (Sartre, 1974: 34-5)

Nevertheless, this does not mean that for Sartre there are no limits in the formulation of one's self. He maintains that the creation of one's self is based on two aspects: *facticity* and *transcendence*. More precisely, Sartre speaks about a dual nature of freedom which involves the co-existence of facticity and transcendence, and on which he founds his notion of authenticity. *Facticity* refers to the elements of the self that can be located from a third person point of view, for instance one's bodily properties, social integration, psychological traits or individual history (Sartre, 1992 [1943]: 79-83). These are pre-given and most of them cannot be modified or altered based on the will of the person. *Transcendence* refers to the elements of the

self that originate from the first person point of view, since one's (existential) practical capacity enables one to adopt not simply a third person perspective towards oneself, i.e. recognizing something about one's self, but also an engaged first person stance toward these traits of facticity (Sartre, 1992 [1943]: 171-9).

In Sartre's theory, bad faith is equated with inauthenticity. One would fall into bad faith, if one pretended to be free in a world without facts or to be a fact in a world without freedom. The former means that the person ignores the factical dimension of every situation, i.e. one can do anything by just wishing it, while the latter means to deny the freedom or transcendence component, i.e. one cannot do anything about it. He conceives consciousness as an entity consisting of a dual nature: pre-reflective and reflective. The pre-reflective mode of consciousness refers to the raw state of consciousness, which is intentional and directed outwards towards objects in the world, while the reflective mode refers to consciousness which deals with its object and its own actions, i.e. self-reflection (Detmer, 2009). In this sense, since consciousness is always self-aware but not always self-reflective, bad faith or inauthenticity may obtain within the dichotomy between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. We notice, however, that in Sartre's view too, self-reflection is the core condition for authenticity (Sartre, 1992 [1943]: 86-116).

As Jopling maintains, "Sartre argues that our identities as persons and moral agents are not ready-made, imposed, or discovered; nor are they the product of conditioning, genetic inheritance, neurophysiology, or an economy of unconscious drives. Instead, they are chosen as a kind of ultimate end, and the way this choice of identity is realized across many years of experience is best characterized in teleological terms as a kind of project; that is, it is a long-term endeavor of making ourselves who we are." (Jopling, 1992: 111) The question is thus a practical one of whether I choose to endorse or disapprove of these traits, thereby making them my own or disavowing them. Accordingly, one's authentic self comprises only those traits of facticity that one has made one's own from the practical first person point of view of transcendence. In this idea we see an important similarity with Frankfurt's theory and the significant majority of analytic theories of autonomy, authenticity and the self: the processes of deliberation, articulation and critical evaluation as core requirements are common to all. However, Sartre, by rejecting the traditional picture of consciousness, the ego and the self, provides an account of self-consciousness that does not rely upon a

pre-existing ego, a certain robust self, since he claims that the self is formulated in and through the process of reflection, i.e. the process of reflection constitutes the self.

As long as one can constantly raise to oneself the aforementioned practical question and answer it accordingly, one is able to define and redefine one's authentic self throughout time. In this sense, we are existentially free to choose who we want to be through a radical and criterionless choice of self. No value or form of normativity binds a person if this person has not constituted it while choosing it to be one's own. Therefore, there are no given criteria to restrict or construe any choice unless the person has created them in the first place. In this sense, the kind of choice that constitutes a person's state of existential freedom is always a radical choice. One's authentic self[35] is created, while being defined and redefined, by one's ongoing radical choices.[36]

Following from this, Sartre's theory is not directly subject to either the empiricist critique or the postmodern critique, since his account does not require the existence of a robust true self in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, his theory raises a question in regard to the possibility that, with no preexisting criteria, one can become lost in an infinite regress, giving ground to a strong objection against the existential theory from analytic philosophers; such a criticism, as I discuss in the following section, has been clearly articulated by Taylor. Through radical freedom Sartre proposes that we are engaged with our selves and our lives to such a degree that we decisively and wholeheartedly involve ourselves in what our current position demands. Once we have discarded the spirit of seriousness, we will acknowledge that there exist no pre-given principles or values to direct the right path for our existential engagement—this realisation will constitute any commitment insubstantial and weak. One is authentic when one is able to achieve the terrifying freedom of being the ultimate source of one's own values, when one embraces this possibility and acts accordingly to one's own understanding of what is right and wrong. We thus see that Sartre's conception of authenticity includes and incorporates the ideal of being true

[35] At this point, we may recall Heidegger's distinction between the 'mine-self' and the 'they-self' mentioned in the fifth footnote of Chapter II and in Chapter IV.
[36] This may make us recall John Dewey's view that, "The self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action" (Dewey, 1976: 361) making us realize that the self is not an entity or a thing but a process. However, Sartre's notion of "absolute freedom" has been characterized by Erich Fromm as "the illusion of individuality" (Fromm, 1941: 207-220) who opposes it to the genuine individuality which results from authentic living.

to ourselves.[37] Jopling, in his attempt to clarify Sarte's view, writes:

> At a certain depth, human agency is explained by itself, and no further explanation is possible. The explanation of a particular action, for example, will refer to an agent's desires in a given situation, the explanation of which will refer to a larger frame of attitudes, dispositions, and beliefs, which in turn will refer to a larger framework of projects. Ultimately this chain of explanation will terminate, not in something external and antecedent to the agent (in facticity, or in the causal iceberg), but in the agent itself. Whatever lies at these depths, Sartre argues, it must be fundamental; that is, it must represent the most basic set of terms by means of which we, qua moral agents, define ourselves—and it must not be derived from or conditioned by anything else. In Kantian terms—and Sartre's argument has a strong Kantian bearing here—it must represent the condition of possibility of personal experience. (Jopling, 1992: 110)

Besides, for Sartre there are significant consequences when one chooses to act contrary to what one's deeper commitments dictate (Sartre, 1992 [1943]: 454). When one fails to act according to one's fundamental commitments, one sacrifices who one is by transforming one's own self. Given these aspects of Sartre's conception of authenticity we may notice an interesting relation to the one proposed by Frankfurt. As I have argued, Frankfurt also bases his account on the existence of volitional necessities, which are close to the idea of the deepest commitments, and on the idea that one should desire something wholeheartedly in order for one to be authentic with respect to one's desire.

Even though Sartre's conception of authenticity involves a form of being that manifests the acceptance that one is a Dasein, Sartre's conception entails much clearer practical aspects than Heidegger's. Sartre introduces his notion of freedom, on which his notion of authenticity is based, as the ability of the person to make, and not be able to avoid making, choices in any circumstances. Hence, a person is always free to make choices and lead her life towards her own chosen 'project'. As mentioned, in Existential thought this view entails that persons cannot escape—even in paralyzing circumstances—their freedom. Despite extreme external circumstances, which may limit the freedom of the person (facticity), the person cannot be forced to follow any specific option over an alternative. Even not making a choice constitutes a choice. Man, in Sartre's view, is condemned to be free.

[37] Eigentlich (authentic), which is the term used by Heidegger for authentic existence, in German contains the word "eigen" which means "one's own". Given this, authenticity incorporates "one's own unique self."

4.2 Critique of the Existentialist View of the Self

There exist, however, a number of crucial weaknesses of the Existentialist view of authenticity and the self, which threaten to prevent it from overcoming the problems faced by the analytic views. As mentioned, the existential account presupposes givenness and facticity only from the third person point of view, while constituting one's authentic self through radical choice presupposes freedom of choice from the first person point of view. For the Existentialists, we are able to radically choose what formulates our self, but for Frankfurt the idea of the radical choice is incompatible with authenticity and autonomy. That is because in a state in which the human will exists without any limitation, one would be completely disoriented in regard to what one desires to choose, i.e. one would not even be able to know one's preferences in order to prioritize one's attitudes. In Frankfurt's view, there should exist certain criteria that make a choice authentic and that ensure that one's choices directly manifest one's true nature. In a absolutely free state, like the one discussed by the Existentialists, one would also have to choose the criteria, in other words, one's essential nature would need to be freely chosen. However, even for that we would need certain criteria in order to be sure that this nature is truly one's own. Therefore, what the Existentialists lack is the proposal and description of such criteria, without which their theory runs the danger of an infinite regress.

To begin with, recall Sartre's view that human beings are condemned to be free. What Sartre does not properly recognise is that even though one may be physically free to choose one's action, one is not necessarily metaphysically free to do so. Given the facticity of the world, the person can choose one option over another. However, part of this facticity may be an act of manipulative conditioning or brainwashing, which renders the person unable to freely choose and thus to be authentic. We are not condemned to be free, since in many cases one is not competent to be either free or authentic. In my view, for one to be authentic, one needs to be creative, and there is no assurance that one will always have the ability to be creative, since even if one possesses such a capacity, one's creative processes may be bypassed in various ways.

Taylor claims that, "The reception of the work of Sartre and Heidegger has surely contributed to the popularization of the idea of authenticity, and the decisive impact of this idea first began to manifest itself after the Second World War." (Taylor, 2007: 475) Nevertheless, he is even more critical

towards the existentialist account of authenticity and the self than Frankfurt. While the latter argues that based on the existentialist account of the self and radical choice, we cannot decide authentically, Taylor argues that within the limits of the existentialist view we cannot decide at all. That is because for Taylor in order for one to choose authentically one needs to base one's choice on reasons. However, existentialist accounts which base their conceptions of authenticity on variations of what Sartre has named radical choice do not require that one base one's choice on reasons. On the contrary, if reasons existed for this choice, it would not be radical. Thus, for him the existentialist account of the self is inconsistent because of the account of radical choice on which it is based. He writes, "The theory of radical choice in fact is deeply incoherent, for it wants to maintain both strong evaluation and radical choice. It wants to have strong evaluations and yet deny their status as judgments." (Taylor, 1976: 293)

Taylor's main aim in "Responsibility for Self" is to propose a different way of defending moral responsibility, while claiming that a person is a being who can raise the question 'Do I really want to be what I now am?' through a process of self-evaluation. His line of argumentation is interesting in terms of advocating Heidegger's idea of fundamental self-evaluation, while criticizing Sartre's idea of radical choice. In his words:

> This is perhaps Heidegger's notion in *Sein und Zeit* quoted above that human beings are such that their being is in question in their being, that is, their fundamental evaluations are by the very nature of this kind of subject always in question.
>
> And it is this kind of responsibility for oneself, I would maintain, not that of radical choice, but the responsibility for radical evaluation implicit in the nature of a strong evaluator, which is essential to our notion of a person. (Taylor, 1976: 299)

This said, what Frankfurt and Taylor have in common is that they argue against the existential thesis and in favor of the essential nature thesis. As mentioned, Frankfurt maintains that one is autonomous iff one is able to decide and act in accordance with one's true essential nature, i.e. with the volitional necessities that constitute one's self. He then argues that only if this condition is met are one's decisions authentic. Hence, on he one hand, we notice once again the identification of autonomy and authenticity in Frankfurt's theory, while on the other hand we notice the necessity of the existence of a true essential nature, i.e. a deeper true self which constitutes the self that dictates which decisions and actions are authentic and which are not. Taylor seems to agree that autonomy is identical with actual self-

realization, which is what he considers authenticity to be. In contrast to Frankfurt though, he formulates a different metaphysical condition for his theory and he gives a more significant role to the person in regard to the formulation of one's essential motivations.

Whereas Taylor accepts Heidegger's view of fundamental self-evaluation, he rejects Sartre's view of radical choice. He admits that strong evaluation is unavoidably bound up with our notion of the self and in extension with authenticity. He claims that, "This kind of re-evaluation will be radical, not in the sense of radical choice, however, that we choose without criteria, but rather in the sense that our looking again can be so undertaken that in principle no formulations are considered unrevisable" (Taylor, 1976: 296) I do agree with Taylor's critique against Sartre but I disagree with his and Heidegger's view in regard to the constitution of the self through self-evaluation. My theory does not require such a condition, since, as long as creativity obtains, no evaluation, which demands always a kind of self-reflection, is necessary for authenticity to obtain. Returning to the beginning of Taylor's essay, he writes:

> We can invoke Heidegger's famous formula, taken up by Sartre: 'das Seiende, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht' (Sein und Zeit, 42). The idea here, at a first approximation, is that the human subject is such that the question arises inescapably, which kind of being he is going to realize. He is not just de facto a certain kind of being, with certain given desires, but it is somehow 'up to' him what kind of being he is going to be. (Taylor, 1976: 281)

Heidegger and Sartre are right on the fact that what kind of human being one is going to be depends on one. However, in my theory this is met by the capacity of a person to be creative, i.e. to have creative processes in the way defined in Chapter III, and not by a capacity for rational, radical or evaluative reflection. The origin of authenticity lies neither in a concrete human essence, as traditionally argued, nor in a capacity for rational reflective radical choice, as argued in existentialist thought, nor solely in a collection of personal feelings and transient desires, as argued within Romanticism. My conception is significantly different from both subjectivist and social-relational substantive self-expression theories and existentialist theories, since it requires neither a substantive theory of the self nor a capacity for rational reflection and radical choice. In other words, the conditions of the majority of prominent conceptions, which require the person to have the capacity for either one or more of the following: strong evaluation,

rational reflective self-evaluation, second-order desire, participatory reflection, reflexive knowledge, or radical choice, are neither necessary nor sufficient for my theory. Therefore, as my view remains neutral, in order to accept it one does not need to accept *any* theory of the self, not even the existentialist or the various post-modern ones.

5. Conclusion

Most theories of the self since Plato and Aristotle refer to an idea of a static robust self with certain stable character traits. However, there exist a number of theories which hold that such a self does not exist at all, while others claim that even if a self does not exist, it is just a necessary illusion required for us to form an identity within our socially constructed realities. Intuitively, when we speak of authenticity we often equate it with an idea of self-expression. Most theories of authenticity require or at least entail an aspect of self-expression. The main difficulty and weakness of such views is that they necessarily require the existence of a self.

Postmodern thought has vividly challenged the existence of a self as an inner entity with essential properties which can be approached through inwardness and introspection. Thinkers in this tradition have argued that the notion of something being authentic in the sense of being essential is misleading and mistaken. I do not intend either to strengthen the postmodern criticism of the self or to address the problems that they have pointed out. I only intend to highlight that authenticity may remain intact from these criticisms as long as a self is not involved in it. Given this, I believe that one important contribution of my theory is that I put forward a view of authenticity that is not a self-expression view, i.e. it does not require a substantive theory of the self.

For authenticity to obtain neither processes of endorsement and deliberation nor certain inner motivations that have to be discovered are required. As Taylor has shown in his *Sources of the Self* (1989: 462), the inward turn discussed by theories of authenticity and the self on the one hand developed a mechanistic conception of the self related mostly to disengaged reason and, on the other hand, a Romantic ideal of a faultless alignment of inner nature and reason. In my view, the properties that all these thinkers relate to the self are irrelevant to authenticity. The conception proposed in this thesis avoids both paths and proposes a new approach in

regard to what is required for a person to be authentic. Perhaps it may be true that there is no self besides the expressions of it. That is, the self as a distinguished specific robust entity may not exist, but it may rather be the sum of a number of attitudes that can be characterized as the expressions of it. The self may be either real or imaginary. In either case, in my view, whether the self exists or not is irrelevant to the question of authenticity.

Therefore, having discussed various prominent conceptions of the self, I argue that since in my theory in order for attitudes to be authentic they only need to be one's own attitudes—i.e. ownership is still involved, while ensured by creativity alone—they need to neither express a certain true underlying robust entity, i.e. a specific true self, nor arise from such an entity. I argue that not only is a robust coherent entity not required for one to form an authentic attitude, but also no kind of reflective process in regard to one's attitudes is required either.

Chapter VI

[The Relationship between Authenticity and Autonomy]

1. Introduction

As argued previously, autonomy should neither be equated with authenticity nor treated as a necessary condition for authenticity. Indeed, in some cases they are in direct conflict. I begin this chapter by discussing the dominant modern view of autonomy, based on the traditional idea of rational self-legislation. To understand the notion of autonomy we need to know both what an autonomous choice is and what it is to respect an autonomous choice. In the first section I discuss autonomy as competence, and explore the competence conditions of several prominent accounts of autonomy. In the second section—since the main duty in order for persons to respect the autonomy of others is the duty of non-paternalism—I elaborate on the way I conceive non-paternalism, and I briefly examine the distinctions between influence, persuasion, manipulation, oppression, and coercion.

In the following sections, I focus on discussing cases in which authenticity obtains without autonomy and vice versa. A central aim of my theory is to prove that it is possible for a person to be autonomous while inauthentic, as well as to be authentic while non-autonomous. Following from this, I describe various types of conflict between authenticity and autonomy. Authenticity may be irrelevant or even in conflict with autonomy and each concept needs to be understood in its own terms. I conceive autonomy and authenticity as embedded in two different normative principles. Autonomy is a moral concept, which relates to what is morally right and is used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions, while authenticity is an ethical concept that picks out part of what is good. I shall explore autonomy as a constraint in the pursuit of authenticity, while considering some case studies in bioethics. My conclusion shall entail that in the majority of cases we should respect the autonomous decision even if it goes against the authentic one.

My account, however, also suggests how we should treat people who may not be competent for autonomy, but may be capable of authenticity. I shall, therefore, examine the notion of authenticity in cases of non-autonomous persons. Despite the fact that in terms of regulation we should mainly respect the autonomous over the authentic attitudes of a person, I am

of the opinion that an ideal society would be one in which the autonomous attitudes would be identical to the authentic ones. Thus, we should aim at developing social structures that promote and cultivate authenticity; since for a human life to flourish, it needs to be to some extent authentic.

2. Autonomy

2.1 Autonomy as Competence

At a first level, we need a theory of autonomy which tells us who is competent to be autonomous and who is not. Most dominant conceptions of autonomy are based on the traditional idea of rational self-legislation. As mentioned in Chapter I, it was Kant that brought the concept of autonomy into philosophical focus and Mill that contributed crucially, albeit in a different direction, to its normative and descriptive significance. Until today, the prominent conceptions of autonomy and authenticity can be roughly divided between these two approaches: the Kantian and the Millian.

In the field of bioethics, Beauchamp and Childress focus mainly on competence for autonomous choices and not on competence for autonomy in general, since autonomous persons may sometimes make non-autonomous choices. For them, an autonomous action can be made by "normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that determine the action." (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989: 69) Let us concentrate on Beauchamp and Childress' third condition, which seems to be a core condition that most autonomy conceptions share. In contemporary thought, autonomy conditions are fundamentally based on rationality and self-reflection. For instance, Frankfurt's and Dworkin's conceptions are based on high-order endorsement through self-reflection and Mele and Christman's conceptions[38] necessarily require the person to be competent for rational reflection. The latter two, however, agree on their strong criticisms of the higher-order reflection theories, as they devote important parts of their argumentation in pointing out their weaknesses and in proving in which sense they believe that their newly formulated theories overcome them.[39]

[38] The theories of these four thinkers have been discussed also in Chapter I and II.

[39] Anderson (2008: 19), however, has argued that Dworkin should not be grouped with Frankfurt since the theory of the former is anti-metaphysical whereas the theory of the latter is metaphysical.

These theories are procedural and not substantive. In their conceptions, the individual is autonomous with respect to an important commitment if she reflects on it in the right way procedurally—i.e. with no restrictions in regard to the content of the person's attitudes—and is not alienated from it.[40] By contrast, substantive conceptions of autonomy hold that in order for an agent to be autonomous with respect to an important commitment, beside reflecting on it in the right way, her commitments overall should also have certain substantive features, e.g. a commitment to autonomy itself. Given this, their procedural, and not substantive, conceptions also avoid perfectionist claims regarding autonomy. They are atomist and individualist in the sense that: "the fulcrum of the determination of autonomy remains the point of view of the agent herself." (Christman, 1991: 22) However, their views are not thoroughly or solely externalist since they retain internalist elements too. Consequently, autonomy-as-competence retains these aspects of externalist and procedural nature, while, however, remaining individualist and avoiding any substantive and perfectionist aspects.

As discussed in Chapters I and II, Christman's and Mele's self-reflection models focus on the importance of the personal history of the agent as an element of her autonomy. Whether a person is autonomous at a certain time depends on the processes by which she came to be the way she is. Their procedural accounts are based on conditions which provide total authority to critical reflection. Mele's account of autonomy is based on his necessary and sufficient conditions that one should meet in order for one to possess an attitude authentically, or in other words for one's pro-attitude to be not compelled, where compulsion is conceived as having one's decision-making processes bypassed (Mele, 1995: 149-155). His conditions entail that for an agent to be autonomous she must have the capacity of critical reflection in regard to her desires and, after such reflection, to be capable of altering them. Similarly, Christman's conditions are based on the ability of the agent to reflect in a "minimally rational" way on the process through which she acquired an attitude. He puts much weight on the procedural condition that one is autonomous with respect to a desire only when one would not reject it if she were to reflect on its creation. In addition, the conditions of both focus on the manner in which the processes of reflection should be made, mainly that it needs to be free of distorting factors and it should

[40] We may notice here a connection with Existentialist or Marxist notions of alienation, as an aspect of being estranged from something. Beside this, however, their notion of alienation stands closer to the one of Feinberg discussed in the following section.

manifest an adequate causal history (Christman, 1991; Mele, 1995).

Based on the conditions of the above theories, one may be driven to the conclusion that even an agent who possesses evil and subservient desires may be considered autonomous. This does not raise, nevertheless, any problems for such conceptions, since, for instance, Christman believes that there are strong advantages for a conception of autonomy that is content-neutral. What is important for autonomy is only the origin of the desire and not the content of the preference itself. In a parallel manner, Mele (1995: 161-5) claims that the idea of following an external objective "Good" is irrelevant to whether an agent is autonomous in the sense of being self-governed. As he says, Charles Manson may be self-governed even if he does not govern himself in the light of an external "Good". Indeed, one could argue that in this sense the agent is even more self-governed, since governing yourself based on anything external, even if that is an external "Good", diminishes your autonomy instead of increasing it. Both thinkers, therefore, develop content-neutral conceptions of autonomy with conditions that do not have any moral constraints. In addition, they are negative, meaning that it is not required for the agent's pro-attitudes and preferences to arise through a specific kind of history, but it is necessary to not be subject to certain elements, e.g. compulsion. As a result, they overcome the rather ambitious project of proposing a specific kind of personal history that is required in order for an agent to be autonomous in a positive sense.[41]

The notion of autonomy-as-competence, therefore, that will be referred to here can be synopsised in the idea of a person having the capacity for rational self-reflection, while being free from any external or internal interference that may constrain or bypass this capacity. It should be noted that the capacity for rational self-reflection and the idea of non-interference is conceived in the traditional account of autonomy as rational self-control, which, as mentioned in Chapter I, was first introduced by ancient Greek philosophers, re-approached and reinforced by Mill, and reflected, while enriched, in most contemporary conceptions. Thus, the conception of autonomy referred to here is negative, historical/developmental, externalist, individualist, intellectualist, procedural and content-neutral.

[41] Compare Michael Garnett's (2014, 2015) pure social procedural view of autonomy, conceives the idea of self-rule in a negative social sense, i.e. requiring resistance to the rule of other persons, whereas the traditional theories conceive the idea of self-rule in a positive sense, i.e. requiring rule by a rational or authentic self.

2.2 What it is to respect Autonomy

In addition to this, we need a theory of autonomy which tells us what it is to respect autonomy, i.e. what kind of actions violate one's autonomy. More precisely, we need to know in which ways the autonomous choices of a person are to be respected and not violated. Beauchamp and Childress clarify that to be autonomous and to choose autonomously are not the same as being respected as an autonomous agent. In their words: "To respect an autonomous agent is, first, to recognize that person's capacities and perspective, including his or her right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and beliefs." (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989: 71) As they clarify, however, respect for autonomy requires more than the above. To be respected as an autonomous agent means that that an agent is treated in a way that enables her to act autonomously: "true respect includes acting to respect, not the mere adoption of a certain attitude." (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989: 71)

The idea of respect for autonomy derives mainly from the principle of non-paternalism. The roots of non-paternalism lie in Kant's formula of the end in itself (FEI) (Kant, 1998 [1785]: 41 [4:429]) and Mill's harm principle (Mill, (1991 [1859]): 13-4), based on which I claim that autonomy is a moral concept, which should be used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions and should be respected. On the other hand, having Mill's ideas in regard to individuality as one of my starting points, I argue that authenticity is an ethical concept, which picks out part of the good that should be promoted.

In general, morals deal with what is 'right or wrong', while ethics deals with what is 'good or bad'. The latter refers mainly to guiding principles of conduct of an individual or group as to decide what is good or bad. One may argue that these operate as the standards which govern the life of a person. Thus, between moral and ethical concepts, the former have to do with the right and the latter with the good. Even though, ethical concepts may seem more descriptive than the moral ones, both are still normative. This said, and in accordance with the conceptions of authenticity and autonomy proposed here, I conceive authenticity as an ethical concept which is part of the good, whereas I conceive autonomy as a moral concept which is part of the right. In addition, I refer to autonomy as a moral concept due to the aspect of non-paternalism, which is fundamental in respecting it, and not necessarily because moral terms are involved in its definition.

In the Kantian sense respect for autonomy is, as Kant famously claimed in the FEI, to treat each person as an end in itself and not merely as a means: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (Kant, 1998 [1785]: 41 [4:429]) This implies that all persons should have unconditional value and that each person should be able to choose her own life plan and own way of living. If you treat a person merely as a means to an end of yours, then you fail to respect her autonomy, i.e. her ability to freely choose for herself. In the Millian sense respecting autonomy—or individuality as Mill referred to it—is directly related to the idea of non-interference. The only kind of social control towards a person that he considered justifiable was the one that aimed at preventing harm to other citizens. In his theory, respect for autonomy is achieved when one is permitted to develop and follow one's true character without any kind of external interference—except of cases in which following one's character means harming others and thus interference is permitted (Mill, 1991 [1859]). For Mill, therefore, agents should be left to develop freely their full potentiality in terms of their character, as long as they do not harm others.

Following from this, the contemporary general principle for respecting autonomous choices and actions is negative and can be formulated, in the words of Beauchamp and Childress, as follows: "Autonomous actions are not to be subjected to controlling constraints by others." (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989: 72) However, especially in bioethics, the principle of respecting autonomy also entails a number of positive requirements. For instance, in regard to the relationship between a doctor and a patient, there exists an obligation of the doctor to disclose certain information, ensure clear understanding and foster voluntary decision-making, in order for the autonomy of the patient to be respected. Hence, part of respecting an agent's autonomy is letting the agent decide and act voluntarily.[42] Hence, respecting autonomous attitudes and actions involves not subjecting them to controlling constraints and helping to ensure that they are outcomes of informed and voluntary decision-making based on clear understanding.

[42] Voluntariness has often been equated with autonomy in the sense that many theorists, for instance Joel Feinberg (1973: 48), have referred to it as the presence of adequate knowledge, absence of psychological compulsion, and the absence of external constraints. Beauchamp and Childress, in order to avoid this equation, restrict voluntariness in claiming that: "a person acts voluntarily to the degree he or she wills the action without being under the control of another agent's influence" (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989: 107) and they also add that it can be affected by physical and psychological conditions, for instance compulsion and drug addiction.

The crucial question then can be phrased as such: What duties are there upon others in order for one's autonomous decisions to be respected? The core duty is the duty of non-paternalism. In short, what non-paternalism suggests is that one is not allowed to override another person's choice, even if such an act promotes the other person's best interests. However, non-paternalism should not be accepted without limitations. One should be allowed to override it when one has other duties. Choices, in general, should not be absolutely respected only on the basis that they are autonomous; in order to be respected they need to not compromise or constrain the autonomy of others too. As mentioned, the discussion regarding paternalism begins with Mill and more precisely with Mill's harm principle:

> [T]he sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. (Mill, (1991 [1859]): 13-4)

The above moral principle has both a positive and a negative part. The positive part is the harm principle, which ensures that in order to prevent harm to others interference with liberty is valid. The negative part is that no other purpose, besides the one mentioned, is valid. For Mill neither the state nor any individual or collective is ever justified in interfering with a person's freedom, against one's will, simply for one's own good.[43] But what exactly does paternalism stand for? Paternalism obtains when there are limitations on one's autonomy in order to promote one's best interests. In other words, paternalism, in general, obtains when a person's attitude is overridden only for the person's own benefit.[44] It can be justified when individuals either are

[43] Mill allows the restriction of a person's freedom only in order to prevent harm or to positively benefit another person, but he does not allow restriction of a person's freedom in order to prevent one from harming oneself. However, paternalism at most cases cannot be justified since he argues that the person is the most appropriate individual to choose what is in her best interests, that one cares more for one's best interests than the state or others do, that if the state is allowed to make such decision for the person then the mistakes and corruption become possible, that freedom of action in regard to everything that affects oneself promotes experimenting in ways of living and that even though a person may act against their own best interests coercing her in acting differently will not be efficient.

[44] There are several distinctive forms of paternalism. A first distinction that may be attempted is between pure paternalism, i.e. cases in which only the person benefited suffers from diminution of autonomy (e.g. restriction of freedom of one to take one's own life) and impure paternalism, i.e. cases in which others' autonomy is restricted too (e.g., limiting cigarette sales, advertising etc.).

not able to know the risks or benefits of an action or they do know but they are weak-willed, and it

To begin with, let us focus on the crucial distinction between *soft* and *hard* paternalism. In Feinberg's words: "Hard paternalism will accept as a reason for criminal legislation that it is necessary to protect competent adults, against their will, from the harmful consequences even of their fully voluntary choices and undertakings. Soft paternalism holds that the state has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct…when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not." (Feinberg, 1986: 12) Soft paternalism is thus defined as the principle that the state or an authorized person, for instance a doctor, may limit a person's liberty for her own good when and only when her conduct is not voluntary enough, or if intervention is needed to establish how voluntary it is. Advocators of soft paternalism therefore argue that paternalism is justified only in order to determine whether the actions of the interfered person are voluntary and knowledgeable.

For Feinberg (1986: 115) the basic factors that make conduct voluntary are basic competence (i.e., not an infant or insane or comatose); absence of manipulation, coercion and duress; informedness; and absence of distorting circumstances (fatigue, agitation, passion, drugs, pain, neurosis, time pressure). When one fails to meet these criteria, one is alienated from what Feinberg calls one's "true self". In this sense constraining one's non-voluntary actions cannot exactly be identified with interfering with one's liberty, since a "true self" in these cases does not exist in the first place. The difference with the harm principle is that while the harm principle fully protects the liberty of a person from all others, Feinberg's soft paternalism protects one from one's non-voluntary attitudes, which, as they are not outcomes of one's true self, are not one's own to begin with. When, nevertheless, one meets the criteria, interference is not valid. One may cause any harm one wants to oneself as long as it is done voluntarily. On the other hand, according to hard paternalism it is valid to interfere with one's liberty even when one's conduct is fully voluntary. Along the same lines Coons and Weber claim that paternalism is characterized by actions aimed at the good of subjects who are not acting "sufficiently, knowledgeably and voluntarily." (Coons and Weber, 2013: 2)

In order to move on, however, the differences between forms of influence, like persuasion, manipulation, and coercion, need to be clarified. To respect one's autonomy is to influence one only in permissible ways. As

Beauchamp and Childress (1989) have argued, there exist three core types of influence: persuasion, manipulation, and coercion. In Mandava and Millum's (2013) view, offers also constitute a form of influence; but while persuasion and offers respect autonomy, manipulation and coercion do not. According to them, manipulation can be divided into the following three kinds: deceptive, motivational, and circumstantial manipulation. These forms of influence differ with respect to the influencer's motivational method. The motivational method followed by the influencer in persuasion, deceptive manipulation and motivational manipulation is altering the perceptions of the options available to the influenced. Conversely, the motivational method followed by the influencer in offers, circumstantial manipulation and coercion is altering the options themselves available to the influenced. However, why do persuasion and offers respect autonomy, while the others do not?

Persuasion obtains when one person motivates another to adopt a belief or pursue an action by manifesting rational links between the influenced person's existing set of reasons and the attitude or action. More precisely, rational persuasion occurs when one presents certain facts by developing an argument and tries to convince another of a belief one holds by giving reasons. Since the influencer does not unjustly interfere with the decision-making process of the influenced, persuasion as an act of influence respects autonomy. An *offer* entails a form of proposal that may make a person better off, whereas *coercion* implies a form of proposal that makes a person worse off. Coercion is the action or practice of making someone do something by using force and/or threats instead. Thus, an offer is the exact opposite of coercion.

Turning to manipulation, all forms that are mentioned here disrespect autonomy since the manipulator uses illegitimate means, e.g. deception of facts or options in regard to decision-making, in order to gain control over the manipulatee. Psychological manipulation obtains when one aims at formulating or altering an attitude of another with deceptive and abusive means. In other words, it obtains when one interferes with the decision-making processes of a person and not simply with one's choices, i.e. altering through deception the ways through which one forms attitudes. It is a form of exploitation and abuse.

More precisely, *deceptive manipulation* involves an act of deception in regard to the relevant facts to the reasons that the manipulatee has for pursuing an action. *Motivational manipulation* obtains when a person makes another person act based on attitudes that, if she had reflected upon them, she would not have considered sufficient reasons to pursue this action. We

thus notice that while persuasion and deceptive manipulation involve the person's capacity of reasoning, motivational manipulation does not, since it is mainly based on non-rational feelings and emotions. Last but not less important, *circumstantial manipulation* involves a change by illegitimate means of the options that are available to the manipulatee in such a manner that causes her to act in a specific way and that results in her deception (Mandava and Millum, 2013: 39-40).

Both manipulation and coercion violate one's autonomy. However, persuasion does not, as it may even promote one's autonomy in certain cases. In short, the substantial difference is that while in persuasion the influenced person acts voluntarily, in manipulation and coercion she acts involuntarily. Consider a doctor presenting a patient with a number of facts regarding her medical situation and future options, in this case, the person's autonomy is both respected and promoted, since she is able to decide based on more facts, which she was unaware of before. Rational persuasion is at least a sign of respect for the autonomy of the other. However, could persuasion through rational arguments operate in a manipulative way too? It seems that this is the reason why theorists argue that the motives of the doctor towards the patient are important in concluding whether she is trying to persuade or manipulate her. When full information is disclosed, persuasion through rational argumentation does not fall under the category of paternalism, while if such a condition, e.g. information disclosure, does not exist, manipulation obtains—even unintentionally—despite the nature of the doctor's motives.

Beside the distinction between soft and hard paternalism, Dworkin (2014) also suggests a parallel distinction between weak and strong forms of paternalism. According to weak paternalism it is sometimes justified to interfere with one's chosen means to one's ends if those means might undermine those ends. Contrariwise, according to strong paternalism if the ends of a person are false or irrational, one can justifiably interfere with the person's liberty restricting her to achieve these ends. As Dworkin puts it, "We may interfere with mistakes about the facts but not mistakes about values. So if a person tries to jump out of a window believing he will float gently to the ground we may restrain him. If he jumps because he believes that it is important to be spontaneous we may not." (Dworkin, 2014, "Paternalism") This example is useful because it brings us right to the heart of our discussion regarding the validity of paternalism with respect to authenticity and autonomy. If one authentically decides to be spontaneous and to jump out of a window, but autonomously desires to avoid doing so, then

paternalism may be justified. If one both authentically and autonomously desires to be spontaneous and jump out of a window then paternalism is not justified. What should we do, however, if one autonomously desires to jump out of a window, while authentically desires not to?

A major problem, especially in bioethics, has to do with how exactly we are to know whether the outcome of an attitude or action causes more good than harm. This clearly depends on each individual and what each one understands as good for oneself. Mill is clear on arguing that regarding oneself, one should be free to harm or benefit one in whichever way one wants, as long as no harm is caused to others. What if, however, the person is incompetent for autonomy, but competent for authenticity? What if a person authentically but non-autonomously desires to harm herself? I explore these questions in the following sections.

Dworkin, when constructing his argument for liberty-preserving paternalism, claims that: "By paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced."[45] (Dworkin, 1972: 65) Understood in this sense paternalism may be identified with benevolent interference and it seems closely related to the anti-paternalist part of Mill's liberty principle. Respecting, therefore, one's autonomy does not mean respecting or promoting what one believes to be good for the other, but primarily respecting what the other person has autonomously decided that she wants. This, of course, does not mean that the patients must be abandoned to deciding blindly what they want. Rational persuasion respects autonomy and, in cases, even enhances it.

Contemporary Kantian views are in their majority anti-paternalist as they suggest that the rational agency of a person must always be respected. Even if an attitude seems false from a certain point of view, as long as a person is procedurally rational in regard to it, her liberty should not be limited, since doing so would mean treating this person merely as a means to her own good and not as an end in herself. However, one could argue that

[45] For Dworkin, paternalism equals limitations on personal freedom or choice, done to benefit the person whose freedom is restricted. Dworkin's position is that paternalism should be allowed in some cases, since at sometimes it is also our duty. He claims: "Paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in question" (Dworkin, 1972: 74) and he formulates two principles: "In all cases of paternalistic intervention there must be a heavy and clear burden of proof placed on the authorities to demonstrate the exact nature of the harmful effects (or beneficial consequences) to be avoided (or achieved) and the probability of their occurrence…If there is an alternative way of accomplishing the desired end without restricting liberty although it may involve great expense, inconvenience, et cetera, the society must adopt it." (Dworkin, 1972: 82-83)

there are cases in which a person's long-term autonomy is promoted if her short-term autonomy is restricted. Probably the most famous example is Mill's argument against letting people become, even by contract, slaves. Another classic example of this possibility is the case of individuals who are allowed to take autonomously mind-destroying drugs, ending up with a diminution of their autonomy in the long run.

The interference with one's autonomy cannot be legitimate or permissible, unless the autonomy of others is at stake. It is my view that hard paternalism should not be allowed in any case. On the other hand, soft paternalism may be allowed in some cases—when the competency for autonomy does not exist—, but it always needs to be highly informed by considerations of authenticity as a component of the good—since the theory of the good includes not simply living a healthier and wealthier life, but also authenticity as one of the goods. When we exercise soft paternalism, we should also take into serious consideration authenticity by taking into account how one could be better or worse off with or without following one's authentic attitudes. Besides, it also depends on how much distress or joy each one may take from creative creation and authenticity. In the following sections, I explore what it means for one to be competent for autonomy but not for authenticity and vice versa; and in which cases the principle of non-paternalism is valid in regard to persons who are competent for both, but the one comes into conflict with the other.

3. Autonomy without Authenticity

At first sight, we may notice certain similarities between the account of authenticity developed in Chapter IV and the account of autonomy discussed in the previous section. Both conceptions, for instance, are externalist and content-neutral. (I have insisted on the content-neutral aspect of them, since accounts of this kind accord better with models that accommodate pluralism in values and ways of life.) While taking a closer look, however, we notice a number of crucial differences, which outweigh the mentioned similarities. The most crucial one is that while the conception of autonomy is clearly rationalist and intellectualist, the conception of authenticity is non-rationalist, meaning that rationality may be involved, but it is not necessary, and non-intellectualist, meaning that no kind of reflection is necessary either. Furthermore, while autonomy is understood as a negative conception, authenticity-as-creativity is approached as a positive conception. These

fundamental differences render the two notions incompatible in many cases, resulting in the impossibility of their equation and of the one being either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the other. A person, while being insensitive to what is one's own, i.e. an outcome of one's creative processes, may act in a rational (either purposive or value-laden) autonomous way, which nevertheless is inauthentic.

Habermas in his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* characterized the distinction between autonomy and authenticity at the level of moral theory as counterfeit, since in his view their distinction should be understood as one between two varieties of autonomy: autonomy as the quality of a rigid moral consciousness and autonomy as the property of a mature moral actor who flexibly and with good judgment can apply a moral point of view. As Ferrara notes, "the transition from the early modern 'age of autonomy' to the so-called 'age of authenticity' was then conceived as the transition from a rigid to a flexible postconventional moral consciousness. The Kantian notion of autonomy, interpreted along intersubjective lines—namely, as the willingness to submit candidate norms to the test of dialogical generalization—and purified of Kant's rigorism, was assumed not to miss any of the qualities of moral agency that the notion of authenticity was supposed to capture." (Ferrara, 1998: 9) The conception of authenticity proposed here clearly opposes such absorption of the notion of authenticity into the one of autonomy. Authenticity understood solely as a different form of autonomy miscomprehends its very essence. Habermas, nevertheless, in his later work admitted that the traditions of autonomy (Selbstbestimmung) and authenticity (Selbstverwirklichung) "[do] not harmonize with each other without difficulty." (Habermas, 1992: 128) In any case, Ferrara is right in pointing out that in the case of Habermas, as in Weber's too, lies a crucial ambiguity, "While developing an increasing receptiveness for the dimension of authenticity, both seem reluctant to draw the methodological implications of a normative notion of authenticity." (Ferrara, 1998: 9) In the accounts proposed here this problematic ambiguity is waived, since authenticity is approached as an ethical concept and autonomy is approached as a moral one.

This said let us concentrate on cases in which autonomy exists without authenticity or in which autonomy restricts authenticity. It seems that most adult people, who in general are competent for autonomy but may be inauthentic, fit this category. We could think of a fashion victim who always follows other people's trends. One may autonomously, after rational deliberation and self-reflection, decide that one wants to blindly follow the dominant latest trends in fashion. This person may be autonomous, but she is

not in any sense creative—a fact that renders her inauthentic. She is competent to sign legal papers and make crucial choices in regard to her life, and in terms of these her autonomy is respected, but in terms of owning and being authentic with respect to her attitudes and actions her life goes very badly.

Consider also another case in which a writer has the capacity for authenticity but autonomously decides to restrict it. This writer may have a truly creative idea, and in this sense one that is deeply authentic, to write a uniquely original novel. However, while she is writing it, she autonomously decides to avoid telling what she had intended to by giving all the details in the creative way she desired. She decides to change its form and content resulting in a diminution of her creativity because she does not want to hurt her family and friends to whom she refers throughout the novel. In this sense, the writer autonomously decides to repress her authenticity.

Moreover, whereas a person's attitude may be externally generated and still be autonomous, it cannot be externally generated and still be authentic. In other words, a person after rational self-reflection may autonomously incorporate, adopt and then follow an externally generated attitude. Nevertheless, this person cannot be authentic with respect to this attitude since the condition for creativity is not met and this attitude is entirely externally generated, while also it cannot be a direct by-product of a previous authentic attitude of this person either. Whereas externally generated attitudes that have been endorsed by the agent and have been retained in their primary form may be autonomous, they can never be authentic. One can autonomously be a follower of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, i.e. following after rational reflection all his sayings exactly as Zarathustra articulated them. However, this person could not be authentic, neither for Zarathustra nor for the, albeit significantly different, conception of authenticity proposed here, as the views that she would be following are externally generated.[46]

---

[46] Zarathustra accumulates many followers, who wish to become what they are or what they can be, aspiring to the path of the Übermensch. However, having taught all he can, he departs from his disciples, explaining to them, '"This – it turns out – is my way – where is yours?" – That is how I answered those who asked me "the way." The way after all – it does not exist!" (Nietzsche, 2006 [1883-5]: 156) suggesting that an authentic existence cannot be taught, but instead must be individually discovered. For Zarathustra, therefore, and his students what is primarily important is to be authentic, regardless of whether they are also autonomous or not. We may use the example of Zarathustra as a fruitful case in which one finds one's own way through developing one's individual path. What may be stressed by using Zarathustra and his followers as a case, is that the ownership of one's attitudes obtains when one forms one's own ones, rather than when one reflectively concludes based on reasoning which ones to follow. For attitudes to be authentic, one needs to form one's own ones, even if one does so irrationally. On what, however, Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, may be wrong, as well as most other views of authenticity, is on his insistence that in order

In the previous section, I discussed autonomy as rational self-legislation. Respect towards autonomy derives from our fundamental duty to not only not harm others—as philosophers from Mill (1991 [1859]) to Ross (1930: 21-22) have pointed out—, but also to not intervene in their lives. These two duties are basic moral requirements, which cannot be reduced to a more fundamental principle. What we morally ought to do is what is morally preferable and respecting the autonomy of a person is a duty. I consider, therefore, autonomy to be a fundamental right.[47] If authenticity, nevertheless, is part of what constitutes the good and autonomy is part of what constitutes the right, the crucial unavoidable question is which of the two are we to prioritize over the other?

The first question to ask is: How do we treat one who follows what one considers to be the good, i.e. what do we enforce on one? As Garnett argues, “A complete account of the human good would detail every aspect of the good life and indicate how these competing values are to be weighed and traded against one another. There is no reason to think that autonomy should be the supreme or even the most important of these values; a rich human life is most probably not one that sacrifices all other goods at the altar of autonomy.” (Garnett, 2014: 149) The same stands for autonomy in regard to the doctrine of the right. A complete account of the human right would require an exhaustingly detailed analysis of each aspect of it, a task that would be out of the scope of this thesis. Autonomy, however, should not be misunderstood as being the supreme value in regard to what is right. The same also applies for authenticity. In a parallel manner, there is no reason to think that authenticity is or needs to be the supreme value of the human good. Hence, I do not argue that autonomy is the only right, but that it is a very important duty among others; and I do not claim that authenticity is the only good, but that it is an important aspect of the good. Based on cases of everydayness and especially ones relevant to bioethics, while also following

---

for one to reach authenticity one needs to look only inwards and to exile oneself from society. On this Heidegger may help us more. Since for Heidegger, das Man, i.e. the social world, and the “they-self”, besides the threat that hide to constrain us to "the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable - that which is fitting and proper" (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 239) losing thus our potentiality for authenticity, also constitute the basis through which we open up onto a social reality that provides us with everything required in order to be human (Heidegger, 1962 [1927]: 334, 344), i.e. the tools through which we may attain authenticity.

[47] The approach to ethics that emphasizes rightness is the deontological, from the Greek word *deon* that means "duty". One does one's duty when one acts according to the moral rules. We may also call this a rule-based approach. According to the deontological approach, an action is justified on the basis of a quality or characteristic of the act itself, regardless of its consequences. For instance, the core moral rule with respect to autonomy is the following: It is wrong to intervene manipulatively to the decision or an attitude of another person.

the liberal tradition, the duty to promote the good seems to come after the duty to avoid harm and interference, meaning that we should primarily respect the autonomy of persons. Beside this, however, what we should aim at in general is to autonomously [through following what is right] desire to be also authentic [aiming at what is good].

This congruence between the paradigms of authenticity and autonomy may remind us of the congruence of the paradigms of right and good that Rawls attempted in his *A Theory of Justice*, where he tried to include elements from both the deontological (right-oriented) and naturalistic (good-oriented) systems of ethics.[48] Rawls (1971) clearly maintains that the right is prior to the good, and that, as for Kant, it is so in two respects. First, the right is prior to the good in the sense that certain individual rights outweigh the consideration of the common good; in other words, persons who live in a just society should restrain the pursuit of what they consider as the good within certain limits of what is right. Neither should justice be violated in order for good ends to be pursued nor should what is intrinsically unjust be valued as good. Second, the right is prior to the good in that the principles of justice that specify our rights do not depend for their justification on any particular conception of the good life. The theory of the right is developed independently of any particular theory of the good, except for the relatively uncontroversial notion of primary goods. The concepts therefore of the right and the good are distinct, and the question of their possible compliance or conflict arises. We may then ask whether a commitment to justice is likely to conflict with our good and in the same sense a commitment to autonomy may conflict with our authenticity.

In order to shed more light on the above, let us imagine a mother who is persuaded to modify the genes of her embryos in order to enhance the abilities of her future child. She may authentically desire, i.e. creatively or as a direct outcome of previous authentic attitudes, to reject it, while, after rational deliberation on facts such as that her child's life will be significantly better in the kind of world we live in, she autonomously decides to accept it. In this case, the doctors would primarily respect her autonomous decision to accept it. However, if at the same time she authentically desired to reject it, without, however, being able to rationally support this desire, i.e. she desired to reject it on seemingly irrational reasons, should the doctors still deny the genes modification? Approaching the same problem from the other side,

[48] Rawls claims that 'justice as fairness' is congruent with the notion of 'goodness as rationality' or, more precisely, that: "it is rational for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life." (Rawls, 1971: 568)

when a patient who is competent for autonomy makes a rational choice, which however contradicts her authentic choice, which one should be primarily respected?

As mentioned, I maintain that autonomy is a moral concept, whereas authenticity is an ethical one. The former is a component of principles of moral right, whereas the latter describes something that is good, and, while regarding regulation we should merely respect autonomy, we should generally promote and cultivate authenticity. If we choose to view the question of the conflict between authenticity and autonomy deontologically, i.e. to see the right as the preeminent concern of a well-ordered society and to adhere to the Kantian and Rawlsian "tightness" as the prominent concern of the individual in that society, it will be one more attempt at a rationalistic ethics. Hence, the necessity for the promotion of authenticity is fundamentally important, since without it the theory proposed here would be limited from its initial and primary premises solely to the rational nature of persons. As, however, digging deeper to this dilemma would be out of the scope of this project, I confine my discussion to the fact that my argumentation is developed within the liberal framework that the right at many cases may need to constrain the good, i.e. respect the right prior to the good, meaning that autonomy may need to constrain authenticity, but still what we should aim in the long term is the promotion of the latter.

As an illustration, imagine a Jehovah's Witness who authentically desires to accept a blood transfusion after a creative desire to live her life in an independent way free from religious beliefs. However, this desire of hers is not based on rational deliberation. She still autonomously concludes that she should reject blood transfusions because she does not want to betray her religion. Authenticity and autonomy come into direct conflict. The doctors should respect her autonomy, but, as I shall argue, it would be an omission to do so without also taking into consideration her authentic, albeit subjectively irrational, desire to continue her life liberated from religious constraints. In any case, according to the liberal view the decision which is based on the person's capacities for reflective deliberation and choice, i.e. autonomy, must be respected and accepted in all forms of consent. In the case of the genes modification, for instance, if the mother chooses to sacrifice her authenticity for something else, leaving aside whether she has the right to make such a choice in regard to her future child, in the end it is her decision to make such a sacrifice, and it should be respected.

4. Authenticity without Autonomy

Let us now consider cases in which authenticity obtains without autonomy. Consider the case of Vincent van Gogh. Based on the autonomy conceptions discussed, he probably could not have been competent in terms of being able to give a valid consent to a legal paper. More generally, in many cases mental illness may bypass a person's capacity for reasoning and reflection. However, that does not mean that mental illness necessarily also bypasses the person's capacity for creativity. Hence, even though van Gogh life was going badly in various ways regarding his everyday moments, there was one way in which it went extremely well: he was able to be highly creative and thus competent for authenticity.

In addition to examples of artistic creation, consider also the case of a repressed homosexual. Since she is repressed, she may see it as irrational to follow her deeper desire, and so after rational deliberation she may autonomously decide to supress her homosexuality. If one manages, however, to act out and follow one's irrational but authentic desire, it seems that on the one hand one's capacity for reasoning is bypassed, but, on the other hand, one's capacity for creative creation of independent desires and emotions is enhanced. Such a leap of a point of view can only occur through creativity, which seems necessary in order for oppressive externally generated principles to be overridden. In this case, authenticity wins out and in this sense the person's life is significantly advanced.

To return to bioethics, let us also consider the example of a person who decides to undergo certain surgeries in order to enhance her mind and bodily capacities (e.g. memory and sight). On a first level, it seems that we should absolutely respect her individual autonomous decision.[49] However, even if she has reached this decision after independent reasoning, still this decision may not be authentic. In regard to autonomy, based on a Millian

[49] As argued in the previous chapters, philosophers, and especially bioethicists, refer to authenticity as either a core condition for autonomy or as identification of autonomy. For example, Brudney and Lantos (2011) focus on two elements of autonomy, which they consider to be fundamental and directly connected to basic human capacities. Firstly, based on the Kantian idea that we have the capacity to filter our desires, i.e. to accept or reject them, while being independent of them, they refer to autonomy understood as our capacity for agency. As mentioned above, the patient who is able to exercise her will, i.e. who is competent to make a certain decision, is autonomous. Secondly, based on the Millian idea of the self-directed individual, they refer to an understanding of autonomy as authenticity. They then argue that while agency is a momentary achievement, authenticity is a sustained one. Their conception of authenticity synopsizes the dominant understanding of authenticity in bioethics, but as I have argued in the previous chapters, my conception of authenticity differs significantly, since rationality and reflection are not involved. I may conceive authenticity as the capacity of one living one's own distinctive life, based on one's own attitudes, but I do not consider authenticity to be necessarily an outcome of rational and reflective processes as most thinkers do.

approach of non-paternalism, even in cases that the autonomous attitudes of a person go against one's best interests, the doctor should primarily respect the former and neglect the fact that the latter may be compromised.

Nonetheless, what should happen when a person is not competent for autonomy but is capable of authenticity? The answer is that the doctor should also take into serious consideration the person's authentic attitudes, insofar as they are knowable, despite the fact that the person may be non-autonomous. In this way, the account proposed here suggests how to help and to treat people who are not competent for autonomy. Based on the conceptions of autonomy and authenticity that I have proposed, irrational persons may not be competent for autonomy, but can nevertheless be authentic. As mentioned, authenticity is part of the good and thus one's best interests always include an interest in authenticity. That is, following an authentic life is part of the good and it promotes by itself one's best interests. Besides, it is through authenticity that each of us can develop his or her full potentiality. Depriving irrational persons of the opportunity to lead their lives authentically equals with depriving them of the opportunity to develop their full potentiality. Doctors should respect what is better for their patients and aim at securing their best interests; they should, therefore, promote one's authentic attitudes. However, they should also aim at promoting their patients' best interests insofar as this is consistent with their patients' autonomy.

Authenticity may make aspects of one's life better or it may make it worse. Whichever way, the important fact is that the life that follows after an authentic choice is one's own creation and thus overall is good for one nevertheless. Whether the authentic choices of a person lead to a better condition or to a worse may be of a lower importance in comparison to the fact that these choices were one's own. The ability of one to follow the life plan one wants constitutes by itself a definition of well-being. In this sense, authenticity may operate as an ethical ideal[50], insofar as it provides the

[50] Authenticity's ethical reflection, which "focused on the relation between acting ethically and 'being oneself'" and was "inaugurated by Rousseau and enriched by the contributions of, among others, Herder, Schiller, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, is the seed-bed where the contemporary normative notion of authenticity was shaped." (Ferrara, 1998: 8) Existentialist ethics was developed around the notions of disalienation and authenticity. Besides, Sartre's (1992 [1943]) concept of authenticity is often referred to as the sole existentialist "virtue", although it is criticized as expressing more a style than content, as his predecessor, Heidegger (1962 [1927]), is as well, meaning that their theories focus more on how one may live and not what one may do. For the existentialists, we live in a society of oppression, which is primary and personal, and exploitation, which is structural and impersonal; within an otherwise absurd universe, the acquisition of authenticity makes life meaningful. It is precisely this insistence on being authentic which involves the aspect of value in their thought. Taylor implies that existentialists were criticised unfairly as having an aesthetic approach on authenticity. Since for them it is authenticity that provides all the

means to significantly improve the quality of one's life and provide meaning to it. In regard to persons that are not able to formulate autonomous decisions but are able to formulate authentic ones, the latter need to be cultivated and promoted, in accordance of course with their other interests, and as long as their own authenticity and the authenticity and/or autonomy of other persons are not diminished.

If, however, certain authentic attitudes seem to compromise the ability of the person to continue being authentic, i.e. the capacity for creativity, then the doctors should interfere with her authenticity. For instance, consider a mentally ill girl who creatively formulated an authentic desire to compose and play an extremely obscure and odd melody. The doctors constantly inform her and her family that playing and listening to this melody worsen her situation. However, this melody does not harm anybody else, contrariwise to some it may even be pleasurable. This girl is not competent to decide autonomously whether she wants to be restricted from playing this melody, but she is competent to formulate authentic attitudes. She authentically decides, as a by-product of her prior authentic attitude, to continue playing the melody no matter what. The pleasure and peace she finds in it help her, at least in her view, more than any other treatment. Doctors should also take into account her authenticity, since it is part of the good and thus one's best interests always include an interest in authenticity. They should thus consider the possibility of letting her play the melody, despite the fact that doing so might be against her other interests, since her authentic desire to do so may outweigh them. Besides, nothing ensures us that doctors have always the ability to know what the best interests and the good reasons of each person are in order to make a decision on behalf her. As Anderson writes, "Judges, doctors, and psychiatrists have neither privileged access to good reasons nor any guaranteed ability to recognize good reasons. The possibility that one is operating under conditions that are not actually those of procedural independence applies symmetrically to the person whose autonomy is in question and those who are trying to assess her autonomy." (Anderson, 2008: 21)

On the other hand, imagine a person who has an impulse to hit constantly her head against the wall. Even in the extreme case that this desire is authentic, it results in blocking and bypassing her creative processes, while causing her an inability to continue to be authentic. In this case, doctors should intervene and protect the person in order to help her

---

necessary means for one to significantly improve one's life, it cannot but be an ethical ideal.

retain her ability to continue to be authentic in the long term as well as her other interests. This may be understood as an attempt of the clinicians to balance the patient's interests. When the person passes through this phase, she should then be allowed to decide authentically what she desires. The same stands for all the cases in which a desire -authentic, inauthentic or non-authentic- of a non-autonomous person bypasses the capacity for creativity of the person. In these cases, doctors should interfere with the person's temporary authenticity in order to secure the person's capacity for authenticity in the future. However, since authenticity is part of the good and not the good itself, doctors should save the person not only in order for her to remain authentic, but also because of other considerations too, for instance, save her pain etc. This is directly connected and in line with the idea of soft paternalism to which I have referred. According to this, one could argue that since, for instance, dying causes complete loss of authenticity in the long term, as the person ceases to exist, doctors should intervene in cases of suicidal attempts. Nonetheless, as argued, the authenticity of one's desire depends on the history of its formulation. Thus, as long as during the formulation of one's desire, one's creative capacities were not bypassed, doctors should take into serious account one's authentic desires and restrict them only in cases that other considerations, which are part of the good as well, are seriously diminished because of it.[51]

Authenticity constitutes an important aspect of the human good in the sense that renders one capable of creating and following one's own path in life, i.e. one being the creator of one's life. Hence, if persons, who are incompetent for autonomy, are denied their authenticity, there occurs a serious diminution of their capability to live a fulfilling good life created to the maximum possible degree by them. Acting paternalistically towards non-autonomous persons, who, however, have the capacity for creativity and thus are capable of authenticity, means that we are depriving these persons of the opportunity to live their lives in their own way. Besides, as Matthew Arnold writes:

> The critical power is of lower rank than the creative…It is undeniable that the

[51] Other values might also conflict with the autonomous attitude of the patient. In cases of assisted suicide the fact that a competent person autonomously and/or authentically desires to die does not mean that the doctor is obliged to help this person die. If the doctor's morality does not allow her to make that action it should be respected too. Autonomy and authenticity should be secured and enhanced as long as the autonomy and authenticity of other persons are not violated. If a doctor, however, is willing to assist a competent patient to follow her autonomous desire then the doctor should be allowed to do so.

> exercise of a creative power, that a free creative activity, is the highest function of man; it is proved to be so by man's finding in it his true happiness. But it is undeniable, also, that men may have the sense of exercising this free creative activity in other ways than in producing great works of literature or art; if it were not so, all but a very few men would be shut out from the true happiness of all men. They may have it in well-doing, they may have it in learning, they may have it even in criticising. (Arnold, 1962: 260)

I cannot but agree with Arnold that creative activity is the highest function of human beings. Like I have argued for authenticity, I take creativity to be part of the theory of the good and I believe that one's best interests always include an interest in creativity. Moreover, equally important is the fact that creative activity does not only refer to ingenious writers and artists, but also to any human being that has and exercises such a capacity. No matter towards which activity one directs it, creativity may be exercised and lead to authenticity, as long as it meets the conditions proposed.

It seems to me that a process of rational self-reflection tends to lead more towards a life based on means (instrumentalist approach of life), whereas a creative process allows us to experience the moment for the sake of the moment (constituent-ends approach of life). As Guignon notes when analyzing Heidegger's notion of "authentic temporality", "Where the means-ends attitude trivializes the present by keeping us preoccupied with the carrot at the end of the stick, the constituent-end approach, by making us realize that what we are doing at this moment just *is* realizing the goals of living, throws us intensely into the present moment as the arena in which our coming-to-fruition is fulfilled." (Guignon, 1993: 231) In this sense, leading an authentic life based on creativity may be more fulfilling than leading a life based solely on reflective rationality. Through rationality one reflects on already given possibilities, whereas through creativity one develops new ones. The dilemma thus lies between making a rational choice among existing possibilities and taking a leap into the openness of everlasting novel possibilities.

The conception proposed here does not suggest that some moral outlooks are superior to others, i.e. it is not concerned with either values or metavalues. Social approvals and conformities are irrelevant to its presence and essence. If, however, one's creativity is directed towards immoral attitudes and works creating a life awfully unethical, then we could evaluate it based on certain ethical grounds, but not on grounds of whether is authentic or not. If we are to deprive one of the opportunity to live one's own life created in the way one desires, then this can be done only on the basis of

principles like the harm principle and its derivatives, and not on the widely accepted misconception that since one cannot be autonomous, one cannot be authentic either.

In any case, a society that aims at promoting and cultivating creativity will more likely consist of more authentic persons, than one that focuses on bypassing and neutralizing the creative processes of its members through pre-determined and externally generated dogmas—whether these imply to irrationally follow obscurantist views or to blindly adopt scientific rational reasoning. We may, through rational self-reflection, let ourselves consciously be fully absorbed into the already existing social world. We can never do so, however, creatively. Living authentically means not deciding which side you are on, but rather creating your own. To me authenticity-as-creativity seems to be one of the last tools with which we are left in order to transcend the predictable average externally generated everydayness; to reattempt an approach towards what Heidegger (1962 [1927]: 358) called "sober joy" of an authentic existence, a joy which obtains when one leads one's life with uncompromised openness. Besides, managing to be genuinely authentic in our postmodern world may be one of the few ways left to fill the moral gap that the loss of an objective and universal deity (God) or entity (Logos) has created.

5. Conclusion

Most thinkers seem to conceive authenticity and autonomy as either more or less the same notion or at least as strongly interrelated. My aim, by contrast, has been to pull them apart. I claim that authenticity should not be equated with autonomy and that the former should not operate as a core condition for the latter (as it often does in most theories). Autonomy and authenticity do occasionally come into conflict. One may restrict or constrain the other. Still, based on the conceptions developed here, one can autonomously choose to follow an inauthentic path and while we should respect one's autonomous decision, we should also often seek to promote the authentic one. Thus, autonomy is part of a principle of right, whereas authenticity is part of the theory of the good.

By recognizing the above, our self-understanding becomes more illuminated constituting us more aware of the weight each attitude and each decision about our attitudes has. Understanding that an attitude being authentic is different from an attitude being autonomous allows us to

acknowledge the difference between creating and developing our attitudes and works authentically, i.e. creatively, and doing so autonomously, i.e. rationally. Nevertheless, an ideal life in an ideal society would be one in which the autonomous attitudes were identified with the authentic ones. Therefore, while respecting autonomy, we should primarily aim at developing social structures that promote and cultivate authenticity, since a human life worth living is one that is at least to some extent authentic—cumming's following verses shed some light on the reasons why: "To be nobody-but-yourself — in a world which is doing its best, night and day, to make you everybody else — means to fight the hardest battle which any human being can fight; and never stop fighting…Does this sound dismal? It isn't. It's the most wonderful life on earth. Or so I feel." (e.e. cummings, 1958: 13)

Conclusion

A principal aim of this thesis has been to renew our understanding of *authenticity* and its relation to *autonomy*. As argued, most thinkers either identify authenticity with autonomy or else take the one to be a core condition of the other. My intention, by contrast, has been to distinguish the two notions in regard to their very essence, function and role in our political and moral thought. While liberating authenticity from the necessity of reflective rationality and of a substantial theory of the self, as well as illuminating its role as a crucial aspect of the theory of the good, I have proposed a novel conception of it based on *creativity*. If my arguments have succeeded, I hope that they have given us a better comprehension of the nature of creativity, authenticity, and autonomy, as well as their interrelation in our everyday life.

The first step was to survey prominent theories of the relationship between authenticity and autonomy in the philosophical literature and divide them into three main categories based on whether authenticity is a necessary and/or sufficient condition of autonomy. Then, while arguing that these views are false or poorly supported, I discussed what I believe that authenticity is not. I elaborated on the weaknesses of the higher-order endorsement models and the externalist historical models of authenticity by concentrating on the reasons why activity, wholeheartedness, reflection and rationality are inadequate to operate as either necessary or sufficient conditions of authenticity. Overall, I claimed that taking a step backwards and rationally reflecting on what is one's own does not in any way ensure that what one settles on is truly one's own authentic creation. Rationality and all kinds of reasoning must also be authentic if they are to be adequate tools for distinguishing what is authentic from what is not. They need to have been formulated and developed creatively—not solely rationally—in order to be one's own and not simply externally generated. Given this, authenticity comes before rationality and reflection, and not vice versa.

The hitherto dominant view has been that those who cannot control their attitudes through reason are slaves to their desires and emotions. In regard to authenticity, I have argued that one can also be equally enslaved to reason and that in order for one to be truly authentic one should not necessarily suppress one's desires based on one's reflective rationality, but rather one needs to formulate one's desires creatively. Since we are often subject to many strong influences that attempt to manipulate our desires—

from advertising, marketing and fashion to more sinister methods—in order to be ensured that they are authentic, reasoning alone is not adequate; creativity, by contrast, is.

While therefore almost all theories of authenticity are based on reflective rationality or at least some form of self-reflection, I have based my account of authenticity on a novel conception of creativity. I focused on what a creative process is, and I defined it in terms of a psychological conception of novelty and of sensitivity in regard to the intrinsic value of the creative outcome. Recognizing that authenticity is an externalist, historical/developmental, non-rationalist, non-intellectualist and content-neutral concept, which is distinct from both the concepts of autonomy and identification, provides us with a more complete comprehension of it. In addition, I have also proposed a novel understanding of originality in an attempt to highlight its etymological roots and to shed more light on the distinction between it, on the one hand, and authenticity, on the other.

The concept of the rational agent is inadequate to represent the whole nature of persons and it seems wrong to base our conception of authenticity on an agential idea that excludes other fundamental aspects of our inner world. In my view, what primarily distinguish humans from animals are imagination and creativity, and only subsequently rationality. While, in certain cases, we may cease to reflectively reason, we almost never cease to imagine. There is a continuous flow of images, desires, emotions and ideas constantly running through our minds. I therefore described our ability to imagine and then create something new as a more wholly human faculty than our ability to rationally reflect.

Furthermore, the account proposed here allows us to move on from the conflict between disengaged instrumentalism and the approach of the Romantic and Modernist movements. My view liberates authenticity both from the 'monopoly' of reflective rationality and from the necessity of expressive fulfillment. Despite first appearances, my account of *imaginative creativity* differs indubitably from the Romantic account of *creative imagination*. However, whether an aesthetically realized life could also be moral, and whether philosophical argument could prove this morality, remain open questions.

Another widespread presupposition underlying many theories of authenticity is that there is a substantial self lying deep within each of us, a self with attributes that are both distinctively our own and profoundly important as guides for how we ought to live. Up until now, the project of authenticity has involved living in such a way that in all actions one

expresses one's true self. However, as discussed, empiricist, neuroscientific and postmodern lines of thought have vividly challenged the existence of the self. We cannot confidently refer to a privileged truth lying within the individual self or to a form of steadiness that is reached through identifying wholeheartedly with attitudes. The premises to "be yourself" or "be true to who you are" are misleading. I have argued that authenticity lies in the activity of creation itself and not in a form of self that is hidden within the person. It is not a matter of having an authentic mind, but rather of the ability of the mind to create authentic attitudes. Thus, the conception that I have put forward is not a view of authenticity as self-expression. Besides, taking for granted that our selves are pre-given and unified, means accepting that they are ready-made, which results in the suppression of our potentiality to become what we would like to be.

Authenticity, nevertheless, is not a purely personal end. One should not reject one's social environment; rather, one should incorporate and transmute the stimuli one receives from this environment in one's own way. It has therefore not been my intention to propose an ideal of authenticity that is based solely on individualistic grounds. On the contrary, the capacity of a person to form creative processes is significantly enhanced and enriched through the person's interrelation with other members of one's social environment and their creations, as well as with the historical, current and potential collective creations of one's society.

We should thus not neglect the fact that there exist *collective* as well as *individual* forms of creativity, authenticity, and autonomy. Most institutions in our societies embody social imaginary significations, which are collective creations, as we cannot but attribute them to the creative capacity of the anonymous human collectives. However, developing and discussing the necessary and sufficient conditions of such collective creativity, authenticity and autonomy, falls beyond the bounds of the current study and must be reserved for future research.

Creativity, authenticity, and autonomy constitute complex philosophical concepts, which, if we aim at developing a transformative socio-ethical philosophy, cannot but play a significant role towards it. I therefore hope that *authenticity-as-creativity* may be capable of playing a core emancipatory role, both at an individual and a collective level. First, by shedding light on how we can conceive the socio-political as an aesthetic domain open to creative engagement in much the same way as a work of art; and second, in bringing together the political and the (post-)modern artistic domains by locating the similarities in the creative and authentic aspects of

their structure and dynamic. However, developing these possibilities would require yet another thesis.

Moreover, I have claimed that the possibility of authenticity coming into direct conflict with autonomy has been seriously neglected and unexplored. The distinction between authenticity and autonomy is important, since only if each of these concepts is understood in its own terms, can their different dimensions be revealed. I have thus concentrated on bringing to light the various conflicts that may exist between them. Seeing this allows us to understand what is wrong with equating authenticity with autonomy and what is right about conceiving each notion in its own terms. Following from this, a primary concern of this thesis has been to distinguish the different roles that authenticity and autonomy play in our moral thought. As we saw, authenticity is an ethical concept, which is part of the theory of the good and ought to be promoted, whereas autonomy is a moral concept, which ought to be used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions and ought to be respected. I concluded that while respecting autonomy, we should primarily aim at developing social structures that promote authenticity.

If I am right about this distinction, my view gives us a new answer to the question of how we might treat people that may be incompetent with respect to autonomy but that are capable of authenticity. My aim was to suggest that, in contrast to the belief that some aspects of human nature are failing to meet the existing dominant criteria for authenticity, it is the criteria that are failing to meet them. In this sense, I tried to propose ways of dealing with the ever-present possibility that the persons who are commonly considered incapable of authenticity may in fact be authentic and vice versa.

One may choose between living a life based on what one *rationally* believes is best for one, i.e. a life in which one acts on one's good reasons, and living a life based on what one *creatively* creates, regardless of whether it is good or bad for one, but with the certainty that it is truly one's *own* creation. It seems to me that the breaking down of barriers between art and life, i.e. living creatively and thus authentically, may bring the quest of realising a thriving artistic culture back to the centre of philosophical inquiry.

Authenticity-as-creativity does not follow the main philosophical assumptions in regard to being authentic. If we conceive creativity as the root and source of authenticity, our understanding of the latter would then involve an aspect of openness, which I find essential for a complete comprehension of authenticity. It is through this creative openness to the yet unthinkable and unimaginable that genuine authenticity may obtain. This has been a core underlying point of this thesis. There is no possible way to

predict exactly what may occur through such a leap into the open and what its consequences could be, but this is also the main source of its beauty—besides, as Hölderlin writes in the opening verses of *Patmos*: "where the danger is, also grows the saving power."

Under an apparent Nietzschean influence, Sartre wrote: "As far as men go, it is not what they are that interests me, but what they can become." (Sartre, 1989 [1948], *Dirty hands*: Act 5, sc. 3) Although, my theory differs importantly from Nietzsche's and Sartre's lines of thought, it runs in a similar direction. The question, nonetheless, always remains: How can one *authentically become* that which one *authentically wants*? I hope that the account proposed in this thesis has provided, at least to some extent, an answer to this question. One cannot *discover* or *be* oneself; one can only *become* oneself, and if one wants to do so *authentically*, then one needs to do it *creatively*.

Bibliography

- Adorno, T. W., 1973, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Anderson, J., 2008, "Disputing Autonomy", *Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 7-26.
- Arnold, M., 1962, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time", in *Lectures and Essays in Criticism*, ed. R. H. Super, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962.
- Arpaly, N., 2003, *Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Auden, W. H., 1963, *The Dyer's Hand, and Other Essays*, New York: Random House.
- Barnes, J., ed., 1984, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volumes I and II, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Barnes, C. E., 2013, "Freedom, creativity, and manipulation", *Noûs* 47, (2013), 1–29.
- Baudelaire, C., 1972, *Selected writings on art and artists [of] Baudelaire*, trans. Charvet, P., Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Beaney, M., 2005, *Imagination and Creativity*, Milton Keynes: Open U.
- Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., 1979, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Benhabib, S., 1999, "Sexual Difference and Collective Identities: The New Global Constellation", *Signs,* 24: 335-361.
- Berlin, I., 1958, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in Berlin, I., *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press.
- Boden, M. A., 1996, *Dimensions of Creativity*, MIT Press.
- Boden, M. A., 2004, *The Creative Mind*, 2nd edn, Routledge, London.
- Brudney, D., Lantos, J., 2011, "Agency and Authenticity: Which Value Grounds Patient Choice?", *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics*, vol. 32, no. 4.
- Bundy, A., 1994, "What is the difference between real creativity and mere novelty?", *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 17 (3): 533–534.

- Butler, J., 1990, “Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse”, in *Feminism/Postmodernism*, ed., Linda Nicholson, New York: Routledge.
- Castoriadis, C., 1997 [1987], *The Imaginary Institution of Society,* trans. Kathleen Blamey, MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Castoriadis, C., 1997, “Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary”, in *The Castoriadis Reader*, trans. and ed. David Ames Curtis, New York: Blackwell Publishing.
- Chodorow, N., 1981, “On The Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodological Debate”, *Signs* 6: 500-514.
- Chomsky, N., 1957, *Syntactic Structures*, The Hague: Mouton.
- Chomsky, N., 1968, *Language and Mind*, New York: Harper and Row.
- Christman, J., 1991, “Autonomy and Personal History”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 1-24.
- Christman, J., 1993, “Defending Historical Autonomy: A Reply to Professor Mele”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 281-289.
- Christman, J., 2005, “Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy”, in: Taylor, J. S. (2005) (ed.), *Personal Autonomy. New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 277–298.
- Christman, J., 2009, *The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Coons, C., and Weber, M., (eds.), 2013, *Paternalism: Theory and Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper, J. M. (ed.), 1997, *Plato: Complete Works*, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Cooper, J., 2003, “Stoic Autonomy”, in *Autonomy*, eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1-29.
- cummings, e. e., 1958, *e.e. cummings, a miscellany*, edited by George James Firmage, New York: Argophile Press.
- Dennett, D. C., 1992, *The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity*, in: F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson (eds.) *Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

- Dennett, D., Bennett, M., Hacker, P., and Searle, J., 2007, *Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language*, Columbia University Press.
- Detmer, D., 2009, *Sartre Explained: From Bad Faith to Authenticity*, USA: Open Court.
- Dewey, J., 1976, *The Middle Works*, 1899–1924, J. A. Boydston (ed.), Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Dworkin, G., 1972, "Paternalism," *The Monist*, 56: 64–84.
- Dworkin, G., 1976, "Autonomy and Behavior Control," *The Hastings Center Report*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1976), pp. 23-28.
- Dworkin, G., 1988, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Dworkin, G., 1989, "The Concept of Autonomy," in *The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dworkin, G., 2014, "Paternalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/paternalism/.
- Feinberg, J., 1986, *Harm to Self*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferrara, A., 1993, *Modernity and Authenticity: A Study of the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Albany, NY: Sunny Press.
- Ferrara, A., 1998, *Reflective Authenticity*, London: Routledge.
- Foucault, M., 1983, "The Subject and Power", in Michel Foucault, *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Frankfurt, H., 1971, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan. 14, 1971), pp. 5-20.
- Frankfurt, H., 1988, *The importance of what we care about: philosophical essays*, Cambridge [England]; New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Frankfurt, H., 1999, *Necessity, Volition, and Love*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Frankfurt, H., 2002a, “Reply to Gary Watson” in Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton, 2002, *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from* Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 160-164.
- Frankfurt, H., 2002b, “Reply to Richard Moran” in Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton, 2002, *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt*, Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 218-225.
- Friedman, M. A., 1986, “Autonomy and the Split-Level Self”, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 24, 19-35, Spring 1986. Also in: *Feminist Social Thought*, Meyers, Diana Tietjens (ed.), New York: Routledge, 1997.
- Fromm, E., 1941, *The Fear of Freedom*, Farrar &Rinehart, USA.
- Garnett, M., 2014, “The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 92:1, 143-158.
- Garnett, M., 2015, “Autonomy as Social Independence: Reply to Weimer”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy,* 93:1, 155-159.
- Gaut, B., 2003, “Creativity and Imagination”, in Gaut, B. and Livingston, P. (eds) (2003) *The Creation of Art*, ch. 6, pp. 148-73.
- Gemes, K., 2001, “Postmodernism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 62:2 (2001), 337-360.
- Grant, J., 2012, “The Value of Imaginativeness”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 90:2, 275-289.
- Grant, J., 2013, *The Critical Imagination*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guignon, C., 2008, “Authenticity”, *Philosophy Compass* 3/2: 277–290.
- Guignon, C., 1993, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy”, in C. Guignon (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–39.
- Habermas, J., 1987, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J., 1992, *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zu Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; English translation by William Rehg, 1996, *Between Facts and Norms. Towards a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hausman, C. R., 1976, “Introduction: the Creativity Question”, in C.R. Hausman and A. Rothenberg (eds), *The Creativity Question*, Duke UP, 1976, pp. 3-26.

- Heidegger, M., 1962 [1927], *Being and Time*, translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Heine, H., 1962, *Lyrik und Prosa*, 2 vols., ed. Martin Greiner (Frankfurt [Main]: Büchergilde Gutenberg.
- Hill, S. B., 1975, "Self-Determination and Autonomy" in *Today's Moral Problems*, Wasserstrom, Richard (ed.), New York: Macmillan.
- Hood, B., 2012, *The Self Illusion: Why there is no 'you' inside your head*, Constable.
- Huguelet, P., Perroud, N., "Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's psychopathology in light of the current conceptualization of psychiatric disorders", *Psychiatry*, 2005; 68(2): 130-9.
- Hume, D., 2000 [1738-40], *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ionesco, E., 1960, *Rhinoceros and Other Plays*, trans. by Derek Prouse, Grove Press, New York.
- James, W., 1890, *The principles of psychology*, New York: H. Holt and Company.
- Johnson-Laird, P. N., 1988, "Freedom and constraint in creativity" in ed. Sternberg, J., R., *The nature of creativity*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988.
- Jopling, D., A., 2002, *Self-knowledge and the Self*, London: Routledge.
- Jopling, D., A., 1992, "Sartre's Moral Psychology", in Howells, C. ed. (1992) *Cambridge Companion to Sartre*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kant, I., 1998 [1785], *Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals*, trans. by Gregor M., Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I., 2000 [1790], *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, edited by Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Mathews, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Keller, J., 1997, "Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics", *Hypatia*, 12(2), 152-164.
- Kierkegaard, S., 1992 [1846], *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to "Philosophical Fragments"*, Vol. 1, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Kierkegaard, S., 1980 [1849], *The Sickness Unto Death: The Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening*, trans., H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kristeva, J., 1987, *Tales of Love*, Leon Roudiez (Trans). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kronfeldner, M., 2009, "Creativity Naturalized", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 59, 577–592.
- Kuehn, M., 2001, *Kant: A Biography*, Cambridge University Press.
- Kurak, M. (2003) "The Relevance of the Buddhist Theory of Dependent Co-Origination to Cognitive Science", *Brain and Mind* 4: 341–351.
- Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, H., S., and McKenzie, R., 1996, *A Greek-English Lexicon,* Oxford: Clarendon.
- Mackenzie, C. and Stoljar, N., 2000, *Relational Autonomy*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mandava A., and Millum, J., 2013, "Manipulation in the Enrollment of Research Participants," *Hastings Center Report* 43, no. 2: 38-47.
- Mele, A., 1993, "History and Personal Autonomy", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 271-280.
- Mele, A., 1995, *Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy*. Oxford University Press.
- Mele, A., 2002, "Autonomy, Self-Control and Weakness of Will," in Robert Kane (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Metzinger, T., 2003, *Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Meyers, D. T., 1989, *Self, Society, and Personal Choice*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Meyers, D. T. (ed.), 1997, *Feminists Rethink the Self*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Mill, J. S., 1975, *Three Essays: On Liberty; Representative Government; The Subjection of Women*, Oxford University Press.
- Mill, J. S., 1991 [1859], *On liberty and other essays,* ed. By Gray, J., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moran, R., 2002, "Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life" in Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton, 2002, *Contours of*

Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 189-217.

- Mumford, M. D., 2003, "Where have we been, where are we going? Taking stock in creativity research." *Creativity Research Journal*, 15, 107–120.
- Nietzsche, F., 2006 [1883-5] *Thus spoke Zarathustra: A book for all and none*, trans. by Caro, A., Cambridge: Cambrige University Press.
- O' Conor, T., 2005, "Free Will" in Fischer, J., 2005, *Free will: Critical concepts in philosophy*, London: Routledge.
- O'Rourke, J., 1994, "The generative–rules definition of creativity", *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 17(3): 547.
- Rawls, J., 1971, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (1999), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ross, W. D., 1930, *The Right and the Good*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rousseau, J. J., 1957 [1770], *The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Lester Crocker (ed.), New York: Pocket Books.
- Rousseau, J. J., 1997 [1761], *Julie, or, The new Heloise: Letters of Two Lovers Who Live in a Small Town at the Foot of the Alps*, P. Stewart and J. Hanover (trans.), Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England.
- Sacks, O., 1985, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, and Other Clinical Tales*, Summit Books.
- Sartre, J. P., 1974, "Itinerary of a Thought', in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, tr. John Mathews, NewYork: William Morrow and Company.
- Sartre, J., P., 1989 [1948], "Dirty Hands", *No exit, and three other plays*, trans. Stuart Gilbert, Vintage International, New York: Vintage International.
- Sartre, J. P., 1992 [1943], *Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology*, New York: Washington Square Press.
- Schopenhauer, A., 1966, *The world as will and representation*, Volume II, trans. by Payne, E., New York: Dover Publications.
- Simonton, D., K., 1999, *Origins of Genius: Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity,* Oxford University Press, New York.

- Simonton, D., K., 2004, *Creativity in Science: Chance, Logic, Genius and Zeitgeist*, Cambridge University Press.
- Spinoza, B., 2002, *Spinoza: The Complete Works*, edited by Michael L. Morgan and translated by Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Sternberg, R., J. and Lubart, T., I., 1999, "The Concept of Creativity", in R.J. Sternberg (ed.), *Handbook of Creativity*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 3-15.
- Taylor, C., 1976, "Responsibility of the Self", in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (ed.), *The Identities of Persons,* University of California Press, 281-299.
- Taylor, C., 1989, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, C., 1991, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, C., 2007, *A Secular Age*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, J. S., 2009, *Practical Autonomy and Bioethics*, New York: Routledge.
- Trilling, L., 1972, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Varga, S., 2012, *Authenticity as an ethical ideal*, New York: Routledge.
- Velleman, D. J., 2002, "Identification and Identity" in Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton, 2002, *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt*, Cambridge, MA: MIT.
- Watson, G., 2002, "Volitional Necessities" in Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton, 2002, *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt*, Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 129-159.
- Wilde, O., 1997, "The Soul of man Under Socialism", *Collected Works of Oscar Wilde*, Wordsworth Editions.
- Wolf, S., 1990, *Freedom within Reason*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.