BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

    Managing asymmetric conflict

    Dunne, P. and García-Alonso, M. and Levine, P. and Smith, Ron P. (2006) Managing asymmetric conflict. Oxford Economic Papers 58 (2), pp. 183-208. ISSN 0030-7653.

    Full text not available from this repository.

    Abstract

    This paper considers a simple model of asymmetric conflict, between an incumbent, e.g. government or dominant firm, and potential challengers, e.g. guerrillas or entrants. It is not uncommon for challengers to win such conflicts despite their lack of resources. One way they can do this by exploiting a second mover advantage: choosing to attack the incumbent in ways that it had not prepared for, because it was locked in by past investments. To model such asymmetric conflict we use a three stage game. In the first stage the incumbent chooses effort; in the second stage the challengers choose the degree of differentiation from the incumbent and in the third stage each decide whether to attack or defend and collect their payoffs. Although the game is simple, the calculations required from the players are difficult and shed light on the complexities of many conflicts.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 06 Oct 2020 12:58
    Last Modified: 30 Nov 2021 10:40
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40974

    Statistics

    Downloads
    Activity Overview
    0Downloads
    51Hits

    Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.

    Archive Staff Only (login required)

    Edit/View Item Edit/View Item