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    The arms trade game: from laissex-faire to a common defence policy

    Levine, P. and Smith, Ron (2000) The arms trade game: from laissex-faire to a common defence policy. Oxford Economic Papers 52 (2), pp. 357-380. ISSN 0030-7653.

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    Abstract

    Multinational arms export control has been the subject of discussion in a variety of fora, from the United Nations through to the Wassenaar group of arms producers. It is widely recognised that free trade in arms can have negative externalities on national security and there are benefits from the international coordination of controls. However, there has been relatively little economic analysis of these issues, partly because the market for arms is somewhat unusual. This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market and compares a variety of possible regimes from laissez-faire at one extreme, to a common defence policy at the other.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 20 Oct 2020 12:07
    Last Modified: 20 Oct 2020 12:07
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/41004

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