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
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


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THE POLIS BECOMES HUMANE?
ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΑ AS A CARDINAL CIVIC VIRTUE
IN LATER HELLENISTIC HONORIFIC
EPIGRAPHY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY*

BENJAMIN D. GRAY

1. INTRODUCTION

THE virtue of *φιλανθρωπία* («humanity») did not always sit easily with Classical Greek ideals of citizenship. As argued in section 2 below, this was due to two central elements of *φιλανθρωπία*. First, as a result of the word's etymology, attributing *φιλανθρωπία* to an individual usually implied that he or she showed strong concern for fellow humans as fellow members of humanity. Showing such concern required individuals to set aside distinctions of status and citizenship, at least temporarily: something not easy to square with unfailing particularist commitment to one's own polis. Second, the concern for the welfare of one's fellow humans as fellow humans intrinsic to *φιλανθρωπία* was usually taken to involve gentle attitudes: attitudes of sympathy, benevolence and charity, involving special, unconditional sensitivity to the weakness and misfortune of others.¹ Such attitudes were not always easily reconcilable with the more solemn, sober, hard-headed and martial elements in mainstream Classical Greek ideals of citizenship.²

The argument of this article is that, in the course of the Hellenistic period, some citizens of Greek poleis attempted to reconcile *φιλανθρωπία* with ideals of civic virtue. As argued in section 3, this is most clearly evident in the public honorific language of Hellenistic poleis. In the early Hellenistic period, poleis praised only foreigners for *φιλανθρωπία*. Around the middle of the second century BC, however, a change is attested: some honorary decrees praised even home citizens for showing *φιλανθρωπία* in their social and political relationships, including their relationships with fellow citizens.

By giving prominence to citizens' *φιλανθρωπία* in inscribed decrees and in the assembly speeches on which they were based,³ the authors of relevant decrees

* I would like to thank the editors of this volume for very helpful comments on a draft of this article, and A. Chaniotis, S. Hornblower and J. Ma for discussion.

¹ Compare J. DE ROMILLY, *La douceur dans la pensée grecque*, Paris, 1979, p. 2; G. HERMAN, *Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens: a Social History*, Cambridge, 2006, p. 266.

² Compare DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, pp. 3, 32, 43-44. For mainstream Classical ideals, see, for example, N. LORAUX, *L'invention d'Athènes: histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la 'cité classique'*, new abbreviated edition, Paris, 1993, esp. chs. 1-2.

³ For assembly speeches as the basis of the texts of honorary decrees, see P. FRÖHLICH, *Dépenses publiques et évergétisme des citoyens dans l'exercice des charges publiques à Priène à la basse époque hellénistique*, in

arguably even elevated *φιλανθρωπία* into a cardinal civic virtue: a type of virtue, attitude and relationship which should play a central role in citizens' civic interactions with one another. More particularist forms of civic commitment continued to be enthusiastically celebrated, often in the very same poleis and even in the very same decrees, but they now had to coexist with this new notion of humane civic virtue.

Section 4 below attempts to explain this development in the context of social and political developments and of mainstream Hellenistic reflection about ethics and politics. The picture offered by honorary decrees themselves can be very greatly expanded by drawing on the other main source of evidence for mainstream Hellenistic political rhetoric explored in this volume: Hellenistic historiography. Indeed, there are signs in second- and first-century BC historiography of particular interest in *φιλανθρωπία* as a central ethical virtue, and even as a cardinal civic virtue.⁴ Consideration of the ethical approach to *φιλανθρωπία* of mid- and later Hellenistic historians alongside that attested in inscriptions brings into focus multiple, overlapping motivations and underlying lines of thinking. It suggests that the new interest in *φιλανθρωπία* between fellow citizens was simultaneously a reflection both of the dilution of the traditional polis ideal and of citizens' adaptation and reassertion of it in new circumstances.

2. THE GAP BETWEEN *PHILANTHROPIA* AND PROMINENT CLASSICAL NOTIONS OF CIVIC VIRTUE

Aristotle's only engagement with the notion of *φιλανθρωπία* in his *Nicomachean Ethics* occurs when he introduces his discussion of friendship (*φιλία*) at the beginning of Book VIII by seeking to show that *φιλία* is a pervasive force in social life. There is always a natural friendship among members of the same species (*τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα*): this is especially true among humans, which is why we commonly praise men for being humane (*ὄθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν*).⁵

The sequel to this praise of *φιλανθρωπία* makes clear that Aristotle envisages a different form of *φιλία* as the cement which holds together a polis. Marking a change of subject, he says that «it seems that friendship also holds poleis together» (*ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἢ φιλία*). He then suggests that it is *φιλία* at which lawgivers aim. This claim makes clear that the *φιλία* which binds together citizens of an Aristotelian polis is not natural, like *φιλανθρωπία*, but a social construction. It is also something much stronger and more concentrated than generic fellow-feeling: Aristotle suggests that indispensable concord (*ὁμόνοια*), the solidarity and unity which can avert *stasis*, is itself similar to this type of

P. Fröhlich, Chr. Müller (eds.), *Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique*, Geneva, 2005, pp. 225-256, at 255, with n. 118.

⁴ Contrast the almost complete absence of language of *φιλανθρωπία* from the historical works of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon (but note XENOPHON, *Hellenica* I, 7.18).

⁵ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a16-22.

φιλία. Moreover, he thinks that true *φιλία* between citizens can even render strict justice superfluous.⁶

An ideal Aristotelian lawgiver, or drafter of an honorary decree, would, therefore, accept as a natural given, with limited political significance, the existence of basic ties of *φιλανθρωπία* among citizens. What he would try to promote through law and rhetoric would be stronger, more particularist and complex relationships of *φιλία* and *ὁμόνοια*, and associated virtues. Politically-active citizens in the Classical Athenian democracy seem to have tended to follow this overall approach. Indeed, *φιλανθρωπία* is strikingly absent from the rhetoric of surviving inscribed honorary decrees of the Athenian polis: in setting out the cardinal virtues of benefactors of the democracy, both citizens and non-citizens, Athenian honorary decrees apparently gave no place at all to humane tendencies. It was *ἀρετή* («virtue»), *εὐνοια* («good-will»), *φιλία*, *φιλοτιμία* («love of honour»)⁷ and related virtues and attitudes which were held to sustain honorands' civic service.⁸

The only attribution of *φιλανθρωπία* in a surviving decree from Classical Athens involved no violation of the Aristotelian approach: it concerned social relationships quite far removed from political relations between fellow citizens. A fourth-century BC deme decree of Eleusis praises Damasias of Thebes, a teacher, on the grounds that he shows *φιλανθρωπία* towards all those living in the deme (*φιλανθρώπως ἔχει πρὸς πάντ[α]ς τοὺς ἐν τοῦ δήμου οἰκοῦντας*).⁹ A foreigner was thus praised for bestowing the gentle service of teaching in a universalistic way on all those living in the cosmopolitan deme of Eleusis, few of whom would have been fellow Thebans.¹⁰

Similar neglect or avoidance of *φιλανθρωπία* is also evident in the other principal source for Classical Athenian cardinal civic virtues: public funeral orations for the collective war dead. As Loraux argues, what primarily interests the authors of Classical funeral orations is Athenian virtue, involving military heroism, strenuous, sober civic participation and devotion to the Athenian polis and its particular culture. This approach leaves little room for a cardinal civic virtue integrating universalism and gentleness. Aspects of both of these elements of *φιλανθρωπία* are present, but most are subject to qualifications. The Classical funeral oration does not have parochial horizons, but it is notably particularist: it does not ignore non-Athenians, at least as potential beneficiaries of Athenian military prowess and education, but, as Loraux says, «à l'école d'Athènes seuls les Grecs sont admis et la leçon n'est pas de *philanthropia*, mais encore et toujours d'*arete*, et d'*arete*

⁶ ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a22-28. On the Aristotelian understanding of *φιλία* as quite a substantial form of mutuality, and the similar notion prominent in Hellenistic political rhetoric, see P. PASCHIDIS, this volume.

⁷ For an analysis of this ambiguous virtue, partly egoistic and partly public-spirited, see S. FERRUCCI, this volume.

⁸ For full analysis, see C. VELIGIANNI-TERZI, *Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der klassischen Zeit*, Stuttgart, 1997.

⁹ IG II² 1186, ll. 4-5; DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, p. 51; VELIGIANNI-TERZI, *Wertbegriffe*, p. 293. For another rare attribution of *φιλανθρωπία* in extant fourth-century epigraphy, see *Inscr. Cos* ED 51, l. 1.

¹⁰ Compare XENOPHON, *Memorabilia* 1, 2.60: Socrates is presented as a non-elitist and humane (*δημοτικός και φιλόανθρωπος*) teacher who associated with all, both Athenian residents and foreigners, for free.

athénienne». ¹¹ Similarly, concern for the weak and disadvantaged is praised as an Athenian attribute, but what is emphasised is support for victims of injustice, not unconditional benevolence, charity or mercy. ¹² Moreover, considerable weight is given to pursuits other than military service and sober political participation, especially cultural and intellectual pursuits, as central features of the Athenian character, but care is taken to show that these pursuits do not lead to «softness». ¹³

Admittedly, this picture of Classical Athenian approaches to φιλανθρωπία and civic virtue must be given further nuances in the light of the evidence of other Athenian oratory. J. de Romilly shows that the ‘soft’ virtues, including φιλανθρωπία, did gain some prominence in everyday Athenian legal and political speeches, even as dispositions to be shown to fellow citizens, despite the unfavourable political climate. ¹⁴

However, this tendency was far from uniform. The passages in which φιλανθρωπία is treated as a desirable guiding influence on civic life are overwhelmingly concentrated in the corpora of Demosthenes and Isocrates. ¹⁵ Φιλανθρωπία does not feature at all in the speeches of Lysias. Aeschines does refer to it, but he treats it, not as a mainstream element of civic solidarity, but as a circumscribed quality appropriate to contexts requiring considerate treatment of outsiders or display of intense human sympathy. ¹⁶

Even the cases of Demosthenes and Isocrates themselves are complex. Both embrace φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens as an admirable citizen quality in passages which anticipate Hellenistic political and cultural developments, associating it with, for example, civic euergetism and honours ¹⁷ and the public role of the educated, culturally engaged intellectual. ¹⁸ Also in the Demosthenic corpus, the speaker of the first speech *Against Aristogeiton*, in a highly unusual passage, foreshadows the Hellenistic approaches considered in section 4c.III) below: he argues that φιλανθρωπία is the natural bond of tolerance, undermined by Aristogeiton, which holds together the Athenian polis, deterring both young and old from pressing their demands too aggressively. ¹⁹ The examples cited in this paragraph do not serve immediate pragmatic goals in the speeches concerned, such as the

¹¹ LORAUX, *L'invention*, pp. 343-344; cf. pp. 269-270.

¹² Note, for example, THUCYDIDES II, 37.3: the Athenians pay particular attention to laws which aid οἱ ἀδικούμενοι. Compare LYSIAS II, 12: the early Athenians chose to help the children of Heracles, preferring to «fight on behalf of the weaker with justice on their side» (ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου διαμάχεσθαι). Along similar lines, ISOCRATES in his *Panathenaicus* contrasts Spartan injustice with Athenian justice towards weaker communities (XII, 91-94); it is this and similar examples which Isocrates uses to justify his claim that the Athenians were a «mild» leader of the Greeks (see XII, 56).

¹³ See THUCYDIDES II, 40.1.

¹⁴ DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, ch. 6. Compare K. J. DOVER, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*, Oxford, 1974, pp. 201-202.

¹⁵ See the examples in DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, e.g. pp. 49, 100-102.

¹⁶ For example, treatment of foreigners in diplomatic contexts (AESCHINES II, 13; 30; 39), romantic intimacy (I, 137; 171) and theatrical acting (II, 15). Compare XENOPHON, *Poroi* 3.6 for the advantages of humane public treatment of foreigners.

¹⁷ DEMOSTHENES XVIII, 5; 112; cf. 268-269.

¹⁸ ISOCRATES XV, 276. On the anticipation of Hellenistic developments, compare V. AZOULAY, *Isocrate, Xénophon ou le politique transfiguré*, «REA», 108 (2006), pp. 133-153.

¹⁹ DEMOSTHENES XXV, 87-89.

pursuit of 'humane' leniency from the audience: it is reasonable to see them as seeds of the articulation of an ideal of humane citizenship.

In other places, however, both Demosthenes and Isocrates make programmatic criticisms of the application of *φιλανθρωπία* in political and legal decision-making concerning fellow citizens, at the expense of the common good and justice. As de Romilly herself shows, their reservations form part of a broader tendency among Athenian prosecutors to associate gentle virtues with indulgence and weakness.²⁰ In his *Against Timokrates*, Demosthenes claims that it is in the people's interest that laws governing private affairs should be arranged in a gentle and humane way (*ἡπίως κεῖσθαι καὶ φιλανθρώπως*), whereas those governing public behaviour should be arranged in a harsh and severe way (*ἰσχυρῶς καὶ χαλεπῶς*).²¹ He has earlier given an example of the latter type of law: the Athenian law forbidding citizens to appeal against public fines which they have not yet paid is designed to compensate for the Athenians' *φιλανθρωπία* and *πραότης*, which have commonly led them to show excessive leniency towards public debtors, to the detriment of common revenues and penal justice.²² Demosthenes undoubtedly manipulated available language and ideas at this point, to suit his purposes as prosecutor, but the fact that he did so suggests that such attitudes were quite widespread: he must have expected his audience to be receptive to an extended argument based on scepticism about gentleness and leniency.

A criticism of civic *φιλανθρωπία* which less obviously serves an immediate pragmatic purpose occurs in Isocrates' *Antidosis*: Isocrates suggests that politicians in the democracy should work hard to ensure that they appear to be speaking and acting in a gracious and humane way (*ἐπιχαρίτως καὶ φιλανθρώπως*), not because *φιλανθρωπία* is a desirable civic virtue, but because it is necessary to take account of the selfishness of the democratic majority. The masses prefer those people who court their favour over those who truly do them good. Likewise, they prefer those who pose as civic leaders with joyfulness and humanity (*τοὺς μετὰ φαιδρότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας φενακίζοντας*) over those who help them with dignity and gravitas (*τοὺς μετ' ὄγκου καὶ σεμνότητος ὠφελούντας*).²³ According to Isocrates' approach at this point, to show *φιλανθρωπία* in civic contexts is a departure from the *σεμνότης* of the truly virtuous civic patriot: a departure from dignity, sobriety and considered, unswerving commitment to the common good.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF *PHILANTHROPIA* AS A CARDINAL CIVIC VIRTUE IN SOME HONORARY DECREES AFTER C. 150 BC

The same obliviousness or suspicion towards the possibility of *φιλανθρωπία* serving as a guiding influence on interactions between fellow citizens evident in Clas-

²⁰ DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, pp. 116-125.

²¹ DEMOSTHENES XXIV, 192-193; DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, p. 124.

²² DEMOSTHENES XXIV, 51-52. For *ad hominem* application of this approach, see DEMOSTHENES XXI, 148-150; compare XXV, 81.

²³ ISOCRATES XV, 132-133.

sical Athenian texts can also be seen in much of the surviving honorific rhetoric of Hellenistic poleis, especially that of the earlier Hellenistic period. Φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens was not one of the stock virtues attributed to home citizens. Rather, like the drafters of Classical Athenian honorary decrees, drafters of Hellenistic honorary decrees tended to give prominence to virtues which were more particularist, more energetic and more hard-headed: ἀρετή, εὐνοία, φιλία,²⁴ φιλοτιμία,²⁵ προθυμία («enthusiasm»), σπουδή («zeal») and related virtues, all exercised in giving help to the home δῆμος and to individual fellow citizens.²⁶

The same particularist, unsentimental type of political loyalty and commitment could also be conveyed in Hellenistic honorary decrees by praising a citizen for his προαίρεσις or αἵρεσις, his particular «policy» or «attitude» or «disposition».²⁷ These terms usually designated a specific attitude towards the home polis: a citizen's προαίρεσις or αἵρεσις was sometimes explicitly said to be directed «towards the people» (πρὸς τὸν δῆμον) or the polis,²⁸ but this orientation was usually taken for granted.²⁹ The implication of attributing a specific, patriotic προαίρεσις or αἵρεσις to a citizen benefactor was that his benefactions to the polis were motivated by a specific, acquired, rationally considered³⁰ attitude of good-will, political agreement and ethical appreciation: a quite different attitude from the almost instinctive universal human kindness conveyed by the word φιλανθρωπία.³¹ The attitude of εὐνοία commonly attributed to civic benefactors probably came closest to the latter,³² but it did not necessarily involve any of the universality and gentleness associated with φιλανθρωπία: that term could easily represent an attitude of spirited loyalty, or merely prudential good-will, towards a particular polis.

Nevertheless, the virtue of φιλανθρωπία did impinge on the political rhetoric preserved in Hellenistic inscriptions. The following discussion concentrates on cases in which φιλανθρωπία, φιλόανθρωπος and φιλανθρώπως were used in such a way as to convey an abstract ethical meaning: to refer to the abstract virtue of

²⁴ The bonds of φιλία seem to have been generally regarded as stronger than those of εὐνοία (see PASCIDIS, this volume).

²⁵ See FERRUCCI, this volume.

²⁶ Among very many examples of praise of patriotic civic virtue of this kind, see, for instance, SEG 28 (1978), 60 (Athens, 270/69 BC), ll. 38-39 or I. Priene 82 (c. 200 BC), ll. 12-15. On the continuity in the particularist, participatory, solidaristic notion of good citizenship dominant in the honorific language of the fourth, third and early second centuries BC, see PH. GAUTHIER, *Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs*, Athens, 1985, esp. pp. 67-68. Also on the virtue rhetoric of Hellenistic euergetism, see P. VEYNE, *Le pain et le cirque: sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique*, Paris, 1976, pp. 234-240; F. QUASS, *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens*, Stuttgart, 1993, pp. 32, 49-50; M. WÖRRLE, *Vom tugendsamen Jüngling zum 'gestreiftsten' Euergeten. Überlegungen zum Bürgerbild hellenistischer Ehrendekrete*, in M. Wörle, P. Zanker (eds.), *Stadtbild und Bürgerbild im Hellenismus*, Munich, 1995, pp. 241-250.

²⁷ For decree drafters' interest in individuals' long-term dispositions, see P. LOMBARDI, this volume.

²⁸ See, for example, E. SAMAMA, *Les médecins dans le monde grec: sources épigraphiques sur la naissance d'un corps médical*, Paris, 2003, n° 164 (Andros, second century BC), l. 16; compare I. Magnesia 92b (Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, early second century BC), l. 10.

²⁹ See, for example, I. Priene 109 (Priene, c. 120 BC), l. 213; IG XII 6, 1, 11 (Samos, shortly after 243/2 BC), l. 54.

³⁰ For the association of προαίρεσις with deliberation and judgement, see IG V 1, 1370 (Kalamai, Messenia, first century BC), l. 4: a citizen's «προαίρεσις of mind [or judgement]» (προαίρεσις γνῶμης).

³¹ Compare DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, p. 43.

³² Compare DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, p. 37.

φιλανθρωπία or the social bonds resulting from it. This usage should be distinguished from another usage which became common in Hellenistic epigraphy: the more concrete, routine use of the neuter noun τὸ φιλόκωρον, and especially its plural τὰ φιλόκωρα, to refer to specific benefactions, benefits or privileges.³³ The noun φιλανθρωπία was even sometimes used in a similar concrete way, to refer to specific material benefactions³⁴ or specific acts of hospitality,³⁵ rather than an abstract underlying motivation.³⁶ Such usages probably often did themselves carry the abstract ethical implication that the act in question was one of humanity, involving universality and kindness.³⁷ This association with abstract humanity was, however, less immediate and strong than that of the more abstract usages investigated below.

Abstract ethical usage of φιλανθρωπία, φιλόκωρος and φιλόκωπως, attested extremely rarely in preserved inscriptions of the fourth century BC,³⁸ became much more common from the third century BC onwards. It is especially well-attested for Asia Minor, but it is also attested for the Aegean and mainland Greece. In the third century and early and mid-second century BC, the words were occasionally mentioned by kings and monarchical or Roman officials in their communications with poleis, mainly to refer to their own benevolent attitudes.³⁹ However, they were more commonly used in decrees of poleis, and also in decrees of federal

³³ The term τὰ φιλόκωρα was commonly used, for example, to refer to privileges and benefits bestowed by one polis on another: see, for example, *IG* II² 844 (217/6 BC), ll. 11-12, 18-20; *I. Byzantion* 2 (second century BC), ll. 6-8. In another common usage, the honours, privileges and rewards awarded to a benefactor could themselves be described as φιλόκωρα: e.g. *FD* III 4 55 (early first century BC), ll. 8-9. This usage was applied with overwhelming predominance to honours granted to foreign benefactors (note, however, for example, *IG* V 1, 1144 [Gytheion, c. 80 BC], ll. 21-29).

³⁴ E.g. *I. Sestos* 1 (120s BC), ll. 73-74 (of grants of gymnasium oil); *I. Ilios* 52 (second century BC), ll. 8-10 (of a particular set of benefactions to the citizen-body).

³⁵ E.g. *ID* 1508 (c. 150 BC), ll. 3-7 (the honorand gave ξένια to certain visitors and provided the other hospitality required: τὴν ἄλλην φιλόκωραν ἐποιήσατο); *I. Priene* 55 (decree of Ionian κοινόν, 128/7), ll. 22-24 (the honorand provided libations and the other hospitality required: μεταδιδούς σπονδῶ[ν] τε καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς φιλόκωρας, ἧς καθήκει). See also, for example, *IG* IX 2, 1107b (Demetrias, second century BC), ll. 16-18; *I. Pergamon* II 252 (late Hellenistic), l. 24; *I. Stratonikeia* 17 (Imperial period), ll. 5-6.

³⁶ In a related way, the noun φιλοτιμία sometimes took on quite concrete meanings (see, for example, *POLYBIUS* IV, 21.5).

³⁷ Note, for example, use of φιλανθρωπία as a concrete noun to refer to hospitality to visitors (see n. 35 above) or to wider grants of public largesse and hospitality from which non-citizens were generously not excluded: *SEG* 39 (1989), 1244 (Claros, 120s BC), ll. 39-41 (Menippos extended his φιλανθρωπία, on the second day of a public feast, to the *isoteleis* and metics); note also *I. Priene* 113 (after 84 BC), ll. 53-56, discussed in section 4b.11 below. From the Imperial period, compare *IG* VII 2712 (Akraiphia, after AD 37), ll. 71-74 (the citizen honorand did not want anyone, including outsiders, to be without a share of his φιλόκωρα; this usage is ambiguous between a concrete and an abstract sense of φιλανθρωπία, between «benefaction» and «humanity»). As far as use of τὰ φιλόκωρα is concerned, it is probably significant that its two most common usages (see n. 33 above) principally concerned relationships which cut across polis boundaries, rather than relationships between citizens of the same polis.

³⁸ See K. J. RIGSBY, *Asylia. Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1996, n° 12 (Cos, 242 BC; probably a letter of a Spartokid king), ll. 30-33; *RC* 18 (205 BC; letter of Antiochos III), ll. 16-18 (cf. *RC* 19, ll. 15-17); J. MA, *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor*, Oxford, revised paperback edition, 2002, n° 31A (Herakleia-under-Latmos, 196-193; letter of Antiochos III), ll. 6-7. Contrast, however, the different usage in *RC* 52 (167/6; letter of Eumenes II to the Ionian League), l. 5 (a reference to an honorary decree of the Ionian League delivered to Eumenes as καλὸν καὶ φιλόκωρον).

bodies and local associations (κοινά), with increasing frequency in the course of this period. In relevant documents, φιλανθρωπία could be presented as an actual or expected attribute, in relations with foreigners, of a king or monarchical or Roman official;⁴⁰ of a non-monarchical foreign benefactor;⁴¹ or of a whole polis.⁴²

Such uses continued after the mid-second century BC, but in the later Hellenistic period they were joined by a significant new usage, crucial for this article: in the later second and first century BC, some poleis began also to praise their own citizens for showing φιλανθρωπία. Traditional polis-centred, particularist rhetoric about civic virtue was also prominent in later Hellenistic honorific rhetoric: indeed, it was expanded and enriched. However, in some cases, explicit attention was also given to citizens' humane dispositions.

In a minority of relevant later Hellenistic cases, poleis praised home citizens for their φιλανθρωπία towards non-citizens or foreigners. For example, in the 120s BC, the great benefactor Menas of Sestos was praised for acting «humanely»

⁴⁰ In approximate chronological order: *I. Milet* 1 2, 10 (289/8 BC; decree of Ionian League for Hippostratos of Miletus, φίλος of Lysimachus), ll. 4-6; *FD III* 4 414 (Delphi, 276/5 BC; decree for King Kotys), ll. 9-12; *I. Iasos* 150 (Iasos, 220-213 BC; responses of the Rhodians to the Iasians), ll. 74-76 (of the behaviour expected of Olympichos and a general under him by Philip V); *I. Amyzon* 14 (202 BC; decree for Chionis, Seleucid governor at Alinda), l. 11; *I. Stratonikeia* 4 (Panamara, 198 BC; decree of κοινόν of Panamara for an Antigonid governor), ll. 20-22; *I. Cret.* II III 4C (Aptera; honorary decree for Attalus I, perhaps from the second half of his reign), ll. 5-6; *I. Ilios* 56 (after 188 BC; decree for Attalid official), ll. 9-10; *IG Bulg* 1² 40 (Odessos, 185-170/69 BC; decree for King Pharnakes of Pontos), ll. 9-10; *IG II²* 1330 (Athens, 163-130; decree of Dionysiac artists), l. 14; *FD III* 3 239 (Delphi, 160/59 BC; decree for Eumenes II), ll. 10-11; *FD III* 1 453 (Delphi, c. 150 BC; decree for King Pairisadas and Queen Kamasarya of Bosphoros), ll. 7-10; *IG XII* 3, 1296 (Thera, second century BC; decree of Bacchistai for a Ptolemaic official), ll. 15-17. Cf. F. CANALI DE ROSSI, *ISE* III, n^o 184 (decree of a Mysian polis for the citizen benefactor Machaon, later second century BC): Machaon received a «humane response» (ἀπόκρισις[ν] φιλανθρωπων) from the Romans when he went on an embassy to Rome.

⁴¹ In approximate chronological order: G. DAUX, «BCH», 78, 1954, pp. 382-384, n^o 13 (Delphi, probably 290-280 BC), a, ll. 1-2, and b, l. 3; *Tit. Cal.* 17 (Calymna, 280 BC), ll. 2-3; *FD III* 3 156 (Delphi, 279/8 or 276/5 BC), l. 2; *FD III* 3 157 (Delphi, 279/8 or 276/5 BC), ll. 2-3; *FD III* 3 158 (Delphi, 279/8 or 276/5 BC), ll. 2-3; *FD III* 3 159 (Delphi, 279/8 or 276/5 BC), ll. 2-3; *FD III* 2 72 (Delphi, c. 277 BC), ll. 3-4; *FD III* 4 156 (Delphi, after 247 BC), ll. 5-6; *SGDI* II 2613 (Delphi, 240-200 BC), ll. 4-5; *SEG* 24 (1974), 344 (decree of the Boeotian κοινόν for Straton of Smyrna, 230-212 BC), ll. 6-7; *Gonnoi* II, n^o 109 (late third century BC; Athenian decree praising foreign θεωροδόχοι), ll. 10-14; *IG XI* 4, 1054 (Delos, later third century BC), b, ll. 19-20; *IG IX* 2, 489a (Phayttos, third century BC), ll. 9-10; A. MAIURI, «ASAA», 8-9 (1925/6), pp. 313-315, n^o 1 (decree of Araxa, 278/7 or 240/39 BC), ll. 11-14 (in the hortatory clause, referring to the ideal qualities of civic benefactors; since the honorand was a foreigner, the hortatory clause was probably directed principally at foreigners); *IG XII* 5, 814 (Tenos, early second century BC), ll. 7-9; *I. Iasos* 153 (decree of Samothrace, early second century BC), ll. 15-17; *I. Stratonikeia* 6 (honorary decree of the κοινόν of Panamara giving citizenship to a Rhodian, 197-166 BC), ll. 1-2; *IG XII* Suppl. 142 (Pergamon, before 138 BC), ll. 85-86; *IG IX* 2, 1111 (Spalauthra, 130-126 BC), ll. 15-16; *SEG* 3 (1927), 109 (Athens, second century BC), ll. 3-4; *IG IX* 2, 1112 (second century BC?), ll. 9-10; *IG IX* 2, 1230 (Phalanna, second century BC), ll. 3-5; *I. Ilios* 54 (second century BC), ll. 3-4.

⁴² In approximate chronological order: P. ROESCH, *Études Béotiennes*, Paris, 1982, p. 410 (Delphi, 250-200 BC, possibly 217-212 BC), ll. 2-3; *I. Milet* 1 3 143 (218/7 BC), a, ll. 33-34; *I. Milet* 1 3 146 (215/4 BC), a, ll. 43-44; *I. Milet* 1 3 144a (third century BC), ll. 1-2; *IPArk* 18 (Elateia, c. 190 BC), ll. 2-3; *FD III* 3 383 (Delphi, 180/79 or 179/8 BC), ll. 9-10; *I. Thrac. Aeg.* 6 (Abdera, 166-160 BC), l. 11; *I. Magnesia* 87 (reign of Attalus II; decree of unknown city), ll. 4-5; *SEG* 2 (1924), 287 (Delphi, 155-130 BC), l. 5; *FD III* 3 146 (Delphi, c. 154 BC), l. 9; *IG XII* Suppl. 147 (Erythrae, c. 150 BC), ll. 2-3; *FD III* 1 458 (Delphi, 150-100 BC), l. 5; *SEG* 12 (1955), 511 (Magarsos, c. 140 BC), ll. 2-3; *SEG* 2 (1924), 281 (Delphi, 138-135 BC), ll. 5-6; *SEG* 2 (1924), 282 (Delphi, 138-135 BC), l. 5; *FD III* 3 120 (Delphi, probably c. 134 BC), l. 6; *IG XII* 6, 1, 145 (Samian copy of second-century BC decree of Baryglia), ll. 3-5; *I. Priene* 44 (Priene, second century BC), ll. 8-10; *I. Magnesia* 55 (decree of Rhodes), ll. 10-13.

(φιλανθρωπῶς) towards visiting lecturers who lectured in the civic gymnasium.⁴³ Similarly, in Mylasa in the later Hellenistic period, the leading civic benefactors Ouliades and Iatrokles were praised for showing φιλανθρωπία towards foreigners, Ouliades towards visitors and Iatrokles towards more established foreigners.⁴⁴

This usage probably reflected an increased interest in relevant poleis in the attitudes and behaviour which good citizens should show towards outsiders. It was not, however, much of a challenge to the Classical attitude to the relationship between φιλανθρωπία and civic virtue considered in section 2 above: even if benefactors were expected to show some humanity towards foreigners whom they happened to encounter during their civic careers, there was no necessary implication that more universalist, gentle attitudes should displace traditional, thicker and more particularist types of solidarity in their relations with fellow citizens. Indeed, even well into the Imperial period, praise of a citizen's humanity towards outsiders could be juxtaposed with praise of his special attachment to his home polis, in a way suggesting a qualitative difference between the two attitudes.⁴⁵

Much more threatening to the Classical sharp differentiation between φιλανθρωπία and civic virtue was the type of φιλανθρωπία more commonly attributed to home citizens in later Hellenistic inscriptions, in a usage which endured into the Imperial period:⁴⁶ φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens. In some cases, φιλανθρωπία was attributed to citizens as a generic praiseworthy quality of their civic conduct, with the inevitable implication that it could be legitimately exercised towards fellow citizens. In others, specific reference was made to a citizen's φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens.

It was not simply a question of the scope of honorary decrees expanding in the later Hellenistic period to encompass benefactors' private kindnesses to fellow citizens, peripheral to their main citizen role.⁴⁷ On the contrary, in relevant decrees, φιλανθρωπία was usually made central to the civic virtue of the honoree. For example, in an honorary decree of the Phrygian polis of Synnada for the recently deceased young citizen Philonides, probably dating to the later second century BC, it was claimed that his grandfather, a major civic benefactor also called Philonides, showed «sincerity and humanity towards every single citizen» (τὴν πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον [τῶν] πολιτῶν γνησιότητά τε καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν).⁴⁸ Very similar rhetoric occurs in an honorary decree from another region

⁴³ *I. Sestos* 1, ll. 74-75.

⁴⁴ *I. Mylasa* 101, ll. 22, 51-52. *I. Mylasa* 109 (decree of the civic sub-division of the Otorkondeis, 76 BC), l. 10.

⁴⁵ See, for example, *IOSPE I²* 40 (honorary decree of Olbia for Satyros, late second or early third century AD), ll. 44-45: the decree should show all that Satyros behaves in a way characteristic of a «saviour» towards fellow citizens and in a humane way towards foreigners (πρὸς πολείτας σωτήριον καὶ πρὸς ξένους φιλάνθρωπον) (cf. ll. 15-16). Compare J. REYNOLDS, «ZPE», 43, 1981, pp. 320-322, n^o 4 (Aphrodisias), l. 2.

⁴⁶ Surviving later Hellenistic examples are discussed in the main text of the following paragraphs; parallels for particular usages from the Imperial period are detailed in footnotes.

⁴⁷ On this phenomenon, compare R. VAN BREMEN, *The Limits of Participation: Women and Civic Life in the Greek East in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods*, Amsterdam, 1996, pp. 163-164.

⁴⁸ A. WILHELM, *Neue Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde*, Wien, 1911-1932, I, pp. 56-57, ll. 18-19. WILHELM, pp. 55, 60, supports the attribution to Synnada and the dating to the second century BC; and the decree's elaborate rhetoric is more consistent with the honorific style of the later second century than

of Asia Minor, the honorary decree of Carian Alabanda for Pyrrhakos, a leading citizen and envoy to the Romans, which probably dates to the 80s BC. After an initial account of Pyrrhakos' public service, it is commented that he behaved humanely towards each citizen in private matters (καθ' ἰδίαν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐκάστωι προσεφ[έρε]το φιλανθρωπῶς).⁴⁹ In a further example from inland Asia Minor, the citizens of Maionia in Lydia declared, possibly in 61/0 BC, that the leading citizen Ploutarchos was being honoured both on account of previously mentioned service as a magistrate and on account of his conduct and moderation throughout his life (τὴν παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον ἀγωγὴν καὶ σωφροσύνην) and his assiduousness and humanity towards all citizens (τὴν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας ἐκτένειαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν).⁵⁰ Similar generic uses of language of φιλανθρωπία to characterise particular citizens' good conduct, including their conduct in relation to fellow citizens, have also been plausibly restored in other later Hellenistic decrees, including decrees from Priene,⁵¹ but also decrees from outside Asia Minor.⁵²

In addition to making *ad hominem* attributions of φιλανθρωπία as a cardinal civic virtue,⁵³ honorary decrees could even explicitly represent φιλανθρωπία as a principal virtue of civic benefactors in general. A relevant case is a decree for a certain Chares, passed by the citizens of either Carian Eriza or Phrygian Themisonion in 115 or 114 BC. After a detailed account of Chares' virtuous contributions to the polis, it is remarked, in the hortatory clause, that it is just (δίκαιον) that men «who behave strenuously and humanely in this way» (τοὺς οὕτως ἐ[κτεν]ῶς τε καὶ φιλανθρωπῶς ἀναστρεφο[μέν]ους) should receive suitable honours, in order to encourage others.⁵⁴

Particular and generic attributions of φιλανθρωπία to the good civic benefactor are combined in an early first-century BC honorary decree from Aigina, for the

with that of the earlier second century. Note that J. STRUBBE, *Epigrams and Consolation Decrees for Deceased Youths*, «AC», 67 (1998), pp. 45-75, at p. 70 n. 82, suggests dating this text to the second century AD, on the basis of its «highly emotional tone».

⁴⁹ CANALI DE ROSSI, *ISE III*, n° 169, ll. 9-10. Although M. HOLLEAUX, *Epigraphica*, «REG», 11 (1898), p. 260, dated this text to c. 190-188 BC and CANALI DE ROSSI himself dates it to 164 BC, the reference to a humane disposition towards fellow citizens adds to the probability of a date in the later second or early first century BC, in the light of the overall pattern in φιλανθρωπία rhetoric identified here. The most plausible date is probably the 80s BC, in the context of the Mithridatic War, as argued by PH. GAUTHIER, *Trois exemples méconnus d'intervenants dans des décrets de la basse époque hellénistique*, in Fröhlich, Müller (eds.), *Citoyenneté*, p. 87, with n. 9, citing earlier bibliography.

⁵⁰ TAM V 1 514, ll. 8-13.

⁵¹ *I. Priene* 110, ll. 13-15. See also *I. Priene* 115, l. 8 (compare l. 5).

⁵² *IG XII 9*, 899 (Chalkis, probably second century BC), ll. 6-8; *IG Bulg 1²* 45 (Odessos), l. 4.

⁵³ For parallels for this first usage from the Imperial period, see *Agora* 15, 295 (Athens, Augustan), ll. 8-9; TAM II 905 (Rhodiapolis, mid-second century AD), col. II.5, l. 50; *IG IV 719* (Hermione, Imperial), ll. 7-9; *I. Didyma* 291 (Didyma, Imperial), ll. 2-4 (praise for the honorand for behaving «piously towards the gods and humanely towards the citizens»); *La Carie*, n° 70B (Heraklea Salbake, Imperial), l. 8 (praise for the citizen honorand for behaving «finely, decently and humanely», καλῶς καὶ ἐπιεικῶς καὶ φιλανθρωπ[ῶ]ς).

⁵⁴ G. COUSIN, CH. DIEHL, «BCH», 13, 1889, pp. 336-338, n° 4, ll. 29-37. On this text, see A. WILHELM, *Neue Beiträge*, VI, pp. 45-48. Compare the praise for Chares himself acting φιλανθρωπῶς by meeting the cost of his honours (ll. 47-49). For language of φιλανθρωπία in a hortatory clause, compare the plausible restoration of *IG VII 18* (Megara, later second or first century BC), ll. 4-7. For an Imperial parallel, see M. B. HATZOPOULOS, L. LOUKOPOULOU, *Recherches sur les marches orientales des Téménides (Anthémonte-Kalindoia)*, («Μελετήματα», 11), Athens, 1992, K2 (Kalindoia, AD 1), ll. 46-48.

leading citizen Diodoros. Diodoros is praised for his devotion to the δᾶμος and the good of the citizens, which is evident in the way he behaves humanely (ποτιφέρεται φιλα[ν]θ[ρ]ώπως), probably «towards all» ([παῖσ]ι): implicitly, towards all citizens, or possibly towards all residents of the polis, including the citizens. In a reinforcement of this rhetoric, it is later commented that the purpose of the decree is that it should be clear «to all those who are strenuously and humanely disposed to itself» (παῖσι [τ]οῖς ἐ[αυτῶι ἐκτ]ενωῶς καὶ φιλα[ν]θ[ρ]ώπως διακε[ι]μένους) that the people honour the virtuous with suitable rewards.⁵⁵

It might be objected to the suggestion that this new usage reflected new thinking about citizenship that, in the language of civic decrees, as opposed to that of literary and philosophical texts, φιλανθρωπία never possessed a distinctive meaning, conveying universality and gentleness: it was simply a later-developing synonym for εὐνοία which only slowly entered honorific language. This view is, however, undermined by the fact that, as noted above, decree drafters used φιλανθρωπία and εὐνοία in contrasting ways in the earlier Hellenistic period: they used εὐνοία to describe honorands' attitudes both towards their fellow citizens and towards foreigners, but used φιλανθρωπία only in connection with relations between people who were not fellow citizens. This suggests that they were sensitive to the more universalistic connotations of φιλανθρωπία.

This does not, however, exclude another possible objection: it could be objected that φιλανθρωπία had become diluted by the later Hellenistic period into a bland term for a benevolent attitude little different from εὐνοία. The concrete use of the term and related words to describe benefactions and hospitality, discussed above, might be thought conducive to such a linguistic change.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the etymological associations of the word with universalist benevolence towards all men necessarily remained on the surface, and difficult to efface. As suggested above, even concrete usages of the word and associated terms often retained associations with universal kindness, shown to foreigners and fellow citizens alike.⁵⁷ Moreover, relevant abstract words were also sometimes used in decrees to describe citizens' relations with fellow citizens in such a way as to directly evoke universality or kindness. For example, in the examples mentioned above from Synnada, Alabanda, Maionia and Aigina, it was made explicit that the honorand's φιλανθρωπία was directed towards all citizens or even explicitly towards «each and every citizen» (πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον [τῶν] πολιτῶν).⁵⁸ In a similar way, the first-century BC citizens of Pergamon praised the deceased benefactor Athenodoros for giving each citizen a humane reception on meeting him (τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπάντησιν ποιούμενον φιλάνθρωπον).⁵⁹ In all these cases, the benefactor showed good-will universally to all citizens of his polis. This is, admittedly, a different type of universality from the cosmopolitan,

⁵⁵ IG IV² 2, 750 (82 BC [?]), ll. 14-24.

⁵⁶ See J. FERGUSON, *Moral Values in the Ancient World*, London, 1958, p. 105; compare DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, pp. 2, 50-51.

⁵⁷ See nn. 35 and 37 above.

⁵⁸ For parallels from the Imperial period, see *Aphrodisias and Rome* 29 (Aphrodisias, late first century BC or first century AD), ll. 2-3; TAM V 1, 166 (from the κατοικία in the village of Encekler, Imperial), ll. 6-9.

⁵⁹ CANALI DE ROSSI, *ISE III*, n^o 195, ll. 9-11.

border-crossing type intrinsic to traditional *φιλανθρωπία*, but the two types are not necessarily far distant. Given that they chose to invoke the distinctive quality of *φιλανθρωπία* at all, it is quite likely that those responsible for relevant decrees thought or assumed that the citizens of their respective poleis were all, without exception, entitled to humane treatment, because they were all equal members of the wider community of all humanity.

As for the association between *φιλανθρωπία* and kindness or gentleness, a first-century Peloponnesian benefactor was explicitly praised for showing humanity to those in need.⁶⁰ Similarly, the praise for the generic humanity of Pyrrhakos of Alabanda was followed by the claim that he had rescued some fellow citizens from slavery abroad.⁶¹ In an example of relief of distress closer to home, in Colophon in c. 120 BC, the great benefactor Polemaios was praised for having shown his humanity by remitting many debtors' debts; relevant debtors almost certainly included poor citizens of Colophon.⁶² The relieved debtors had even lodged in the public archives testimonies to the «humanity of the remission» (*τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς παρέσεως φιλανθρωπίαν*).⁶³ Citizens had been praised for generous financial help to fellow citizens in the earlier Hellenistic period, but the praise was couched in different terms: for example, in the third century BC, Boulagoras' loans to fellow citizens were presented by the Samians as evidence for his «enthusiasm» (*προθυμία*) and «good-will» (*εὐνοία*).⁶⁴

The gentle aspects of the *φιλανθρωπία* towards fellow citizens praised in some later Hellenistic decrees were not, however, confined to charity towards the vulnerable.⁶⁵ They also included positive attempts to soften or enliven the lives of fellow citizens. In particular, abstract *φιλανθρωπία* could take the form of hospitality: for example, after c. 130 BC, the great female benefactor Archippe was honoured at Kyme for having made «a donation of things proper to a humane disposition» (*τῶν πρὸς φιλανθρωπίαν ἀνηκόντων ἐπίδοσιν*) and provided the funds for public sacrifices and feasts involving all citizen tribes, metics and freedmen.⁶⁶ Abstract *φιλανθρωπία* could also take the form of provision of education: for example, the Chares attributed generic *φιλανθρωπία* by later Hellenistic Eriza or Themisionion was a *paidonomos* and gymnasiarch, whose contributions to civic education are described at length in the preceding part of the decree.⁶⁷ The two

⁶⁰ IG V 2, 446 (Megalopolis, decree of the Lykoatai), ll. 4-6.

⁶¹ CANALI DE ROSSI, *ISE* III, n° 169, ll. 10-11.

⁶² The discussion appears to move on from the preceding topic of Polemaios' treatment of refugees: see J. and L. ROBERT, *Claros I*, Paris, 1989, p. 43.

⁶³ SEG 39 (1989), 1243, col. III, ll. 35-47.

⁶⁴ IG XII 6, 1, 11, ll. 49-52.

⁶⁵ Medical healing was another type of aid which could be described as humane: see *I. Magnesia* 113 (Magnesian decree, after AD 41), ll. 13-14.

⁶⁶ *I. Kyme* 13, ll. 71-76; cf. 37-50. For confirmation that the construction τῶν πρὸς φιλανθρωπίαν ἀνηκόντων refers to abstract humanity, compare ll. 27-28, 67-68 (τῶν πρὸς φιλαγαθίαν καὶ ἐκτένειαν ἀνηκόντων). For an Imperial parallel for the association between abstract humanity and provision of hospitality, see IG VII 2712 (Akraiphia, after AD 37), ll. 18-19.

⁶⁷ G. COUSIN, CH. DIEHL, «BCH», 13 (1889), pp. 336-338, n° 4, ll. 1-37. Praise for behaving *φιλανθρώπως* towards fellow citizens has also been restored in a comparable decree for a gymnasiarch, SEG 30 (1980), 546 (Amphipolis, second or first century BC), ll. 30-32.

central concerns of the ‘humane’ civic benefactor with hospitality and education came together in the case of the *paidonomos* Chrysippos, honoured at late Hellenistic Hydai (a sub-division of Mylasa at this date): he was praised for having many times provided hospitality for the boys and their teachers, «wishing to behave humanely towards them» (φιλανθρώπως βουλό[με]νος προσφέρεισθαι).⁶⁸

Overall, therefore, there was a very significant development in later Hellenistic honorific language: in a phenomenon attested for a range of poleis, φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens emerged as a cardinal civic virtue, relevant to relations with fellow citizens, without losing its connotations of universality and kindness. The contrast with earlier periods should be kept in proportion. As the examples from Isocrates and Demosthenes mentioned in section 2 show, it was not impossible in an earlier period for a citizen to praise benefactors for φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens. It was, however, only in the later Hellenistic period that such a disposition began to be treated with any frequency as a central, highly admirable part of the good citizen’s psychological profile, worthy of praise in official civic documents.

This reveals something distinctive about later Hellenistic euergetism, and contemporary attitudes to euergetism. The ideal of the good citizen as a generous civic benefactor and helper of fellow citizens was a long-established Greek civic ideal: it was not an innovation of the Hellenistic period, let alone the later Hellenistic period.⁶⁹ However, the dispositions and behaviour of the citizen benefactor did come to be conceptualised in a radically different way by some later Hellenistic citizens: they were sometimes conceptualised, not as characteristic of a spirited, solemn civic benefactor committed to his particular polis above all else, but as characteristic of a gentle «lover of humanity». More particularist ‘Aristotelian’ virtues continued to be given great prominence, even in the very same decrees: consider, for example, the Aiginetans’ praise for Diodoros’ devotion to his polis and its citizens.⁷⁰ However, this traditional ‘Aristotelian’ approach now faced significant competition from a universalist alternative, embraced by some decree drafters.

4. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF *PHILANTHROPIA* AS A CARDINAL CIVIC VIRTUE: LATER HELLENISTIC INSCRIPTIONS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY COMPARED

a. Introduction

This section attempts to offer explanations for the new tendency in some later Hellenistic honorary decrees to represent φιλανθρωπία as a cardinal civic virtue,

⁶⁸ I. Mylasa 909, ll. 11-14.

⁶⁹ See, for example, VEYNE, *Le pain*, pp. 184-200; P. SCHMITT-PANTEL, *La cité au banquet. Histoire des repas publics dans les cités grecques*, Rome, 1992, e.g. pp. 201, 208. For a similar point about the continuity between Classical and Hellenistic political philosophy in the interest taken in generosity and benefactions, see M. T. GRIFFIN, *When is Thought Political?*, «Apeiron», 29 (1996), pp. 269-282, esp. 281-282.

⁷⁰ IG IV² 2, 750 (82 BC [?]), ll. 14-20.

which should be demonstrated towards fellow citizens. It supplements the evidence of the decrees themselves with that of three historians: Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The three historians' texts provide some of the best evidence outside of inscriptions themselves for the assumptions and preoccupations of mid- and later Hellenistic civic Greeks: Polybius for the second century BC and Diodorus and Dionysius for the first. Although all three historians were strongly influenced by Roman ideals, they were also all shaped by an upbringing in, and a continuing engagement with, the Greek civic world. Moreover, they each wrote for an audience in which civic Greeks must have been very prominent.

Polybius and Diodorus used language of *φιλανθρωπία* most commonly to describe relations between foreigners. Indeed, Diodorus, glancing towards Rome in a way probably influenced by the ideas of the leading first-century Stoic Posidonius, argued that imperial powers in general should exercise gentle *φιλανθρωπία* towards all subjects, in order to preserve their empires.⁷¹ However, as will emerge in the following discussion, both Polybius and Diodorus also both sometimes represented *φιλανθρωπία*, and related types of gentle disposition, as cardinal civic virtues, foundations of reliable bonds between fellow citizens. Moreover, this usage is prominent in the portrayal of early Roman civic life by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The historians' more discursive treatments of *φιλανθρωπία* and related dispositions reveal in much greater detail than most decrees some of the reasons why *φιλανθρωπία* towards fellow citizens became a particularly attractive virtue for some mid- and later Hellenistic citizens to emphasise.

Parallel consideration of inscriptions and historiography suggests that the new interest in *φιλανθρωπία* between fellow citizens should partly be interpreted as a result of the dilution of traditional ideals of citizenship with new ethical and political values: it was partly a reflection of the erosion of the ideal of the devotedly political, particularist citizen, committed to his polis' common good and to its traditions, laws and institutions above all else. However, it should also be seen in a quite different light, as a reflection of citizens' attempts to preserve and reassert the importance and political effectiveness of the small-scale, participatory polis in a new world.⁷²

b. *Praise of φιλανθρωπία between Fellow Citizens as Evidence for the Dilution of the Polis Ideal*

I. Depoliticisation and 'King-Citizens'

As Gauthier has shown, the most striking social and political development in the later Hellenistic polis was the emergence of a very narrow elite of 'great benefac-

⁷¹ See K. SACKS, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*, Princeton, 1990, pp. 42-44; compare ROMILLY, *La douceur*, ch. 14. At a more general level, SACKS' book demonstrates the legitimacy of attributing distinctive ethical ideas which permeate Diodorus' work to Diodorus himself, rather than to his sources; compare L. YARROW, *Historiography at the End of the Republic: Provincial Perspectives on Roman Rule*, Oxford, 2006, pp. 116-117.

⁷² On the simultaneous relevance of paradigms of the 'decline' and 'vitality' of the Hellenistic polis, see J. MA, *Paradigms and Paradoxes in the Hellenistic World*, in B. Virgilio (ed.), «Studi Ellenistici», 20 (2008), pp. 371-385.

tors', whose voluntary generosity sustained civic life.⁷³ Gauthier may, as some have alleged, exaggerate the contrast with earlier periods and the parlousness of public finances.⁷⁴ It is, however, difficult to dispute that, in most later Hellenistic poleis, a few leading citizens played a very dominant civic role, exercising power and influence, not only through formal magistracies and liturgies, but also through informal, unregulated means, especially voluntary grants of money and hospitality to private individuals and to the polis as a whole. This has been interpreted as a process of 'depoliticisation': wealthy citizens were no longer constrained to exercise power only through regulated, intermittent political office-holding, or to justify all their significant interventions in civic life before political bodies. They could even offer hospitality in their private houses as a means of garnering public support.⁷⁵

It would not be surprising if this institutional depoliticisation was reflected on the ideological plane in a new conceptualisation of leading citizens' benefactions as acts of largely apolitical kindness and generosity: acts which were not principally inspired by concern for justice, equality or the common good, and were not subject to criticism in the light of such values. Encouraging such a reconceptualisation would have been a very effective means for wealthy citizens to entrench their partisan advantages and avoid political scrutiny.

The new emphasis on leading benefactors' *φιλανθρωπία* towards fellow citizens must be interpreted partly as evidence for an ideological development of this kind. Making paternalistic, humane concern towards less fortunate fellow citizens central to benefactors' civic virtue safely ignored questions about the justice of extreme inequalities of wealth: indeed, it took those inequalities for granted, as inevitable circumstances requiring mitigation through elite good-will.⁷⁶

A similar later Hellenistic attitude to citizenship and the polis is evident in the historiography of Dionysius of Halicarnassus: in his attempt to present Rome as a Greek city, whose citizens show Greek virtues,⁷⁷ Dionysius repeatedly refers admiringly to the good-natured, often charitable *φιλανθρωπία* shown by wealthy, well-born Romans towards needy and destitute fellow citizens in early Roman history.⁷⁸ In a clear sign of a new conceptualisation of appropriate 'civic' relations, Dionysius even characterises as «humane and suitable for fellow citizens» (*φιλάνθρωποι καὶ πολιτικάι*) the necessarily inegalitarian, scrutiny-free, charitable rela-

⁷³ GAUTHIER, *Les cités*, pp. 53-66.

⁷⁴ See, for example, QUASS, *Die Honoratiorenschicht*, e.g. pp. 15-16; CHR. HABICHT, *Ist ein 'Honoratiorenregime' das Kennzeichen der Stadt im späteren Hellenismus?*, in Wörrle, Zanker (eds.), *Stadt und Bürgerbild*, pp. 87-92, esp. 89.

⁷⁵ See especially VAN BREMEN, *Limits*, pp. 156-170; compare SCHMITT-PANTEL, *La cité*, pp. 262-263, 346, 372-373.

⁷⁶ For a parallel interpretation of Hellenistic notions of humane slave-holding, see M. MAZZA, *Sul lavoro servile nella Sicilia romana. Ideologia e antropologia in un passo di Diodoro (34-35, 2, 28-30)*, in ID., *La fatica dell'uomo. Schiavi e liberi nel mondo romano*, Catania, 1986, pp. 72-73.

⁷⁷ On this see, for example, H. HILL, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Origins of Rome*, «JRS», 51 (1961), pp. 88-93; E. GABBA, *Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome*, Berkeley, 1991, esp. chs. 1 and 6.

⁷⁸ See, for example, DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* VI, 67.2; X, 19.1; XII, 1.3; compare V, 19.4 (on humane laws, favourable to the poor); also V, 65.2; VI, 81.4 (for related rhetoric in reported speeches attributed to respectable figures).

tions (συζυγίαι) between rich and poor citizens made possible by the system of patronage supposedly introduced by Romulus.⁷⁹

In the case of later Hellenistic honorary decrees, the depoliticising attribution of φιλανθρωπία to benefactors can be seen as part of a wider process: the attribution to leading citizens of panegyric tropes previously reserved for the kings whom they had now replaced as their poleis' main benefactors.⁸⁰ Earlier Hellenistic inscriptions published in poleis contain both claims to φιλανθρωπία by kings and attributions of φιλανθρωπία to kings by poleis.⁸¹ Humanity was also presented as a desirable attribute of kings in Hellenistic historiography.⁸² Probably significantly, Diodorus Siculus, who is quite sparing in praising individuals for φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens, does so in relation to some monarchical rulers of poleis, figures intermediate between citizens and kings, such as Dionysius I of Syracuse and Demetrius of Phaleron:⁸³ humane generosity was a suitable attribute for a 'king-citizen'.

The first-century Pergamene posthumous decree for Athenodoros provides a particularly striking indication of the transference of monarchical φιλανθρωπία to leading citizens. Athenodoros reportedly gave each fellow citizen a «humane reception» (ἀπάντησις φιλόανθρωπος),⁸⁴ like a paternalistic king holding court or travelling around his kingdom. Identical language was used of kings in historiography.⁸⁵

To some extent, therefore, relevant later Hellenistic drafters of honorary decrees praised benefactors for φιλανθρωπία as part of a broader tendency to construct them as 'king-citizens', paternalistic benefactors standing above the political fray. This tendency does not, however, fully explain the emergence of φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens as a cardinal civic virtue. This is partly because poleis did not necessarily expect only leading benefactors, capable of charitable largesse, to show φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens: a motivation or hortatory clause could state the aspiration that a wider range of citizens should emulate the φιλανθρωπία of the honorand.⁸⁶ The implication that those outside the euergetical elite had obligations of φιλανθρωπία was not inconsistent with the meaning of the term. Φιλανθρωπία was not always exercised from the top down, even if that was its usual direction;⁸⁷ it could also be exercised towards equals,⁸⁸ or even towards superiors.⁸⁹

⁷⁹ DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* II, 9.3.

⁸⁰ Cf. GAUTHIER, *Les cités*, pp. 56-59.

⁸¹ See nn. 39-40 above.

⁸² See POLYBIUS V, 10.1; 11.6; DIODORUS SICULUS I, 51.4; XIX, 92.5.

⁸³ DIODORUS SICULUS XIV, 45.1; XVIII, 74.3; compare IX, 11.1 (on Pittakos of Mytilene). On DIODORUS' ambivalent representation of Dionysius I, see S. DE VIDO, this volume.

⁸⁴ CANALI DE ROSSI, *ISE* III, n° 195, ll. 9-11.

⁸⁵ Cf. POLYBIUS V, 63.7; XXX, 27.2; compare V, 62.2. I thank J. Ma for this observation.

⁸⁶ See G. COUSIN, CH. DIEHL, «BCH», 13 (1889), pp. 336-338, n° 4, ll. 29-37 (expression of the hope that rewarding the strenuous and humane will encourage other virtuous citizens to redouble their efforts and inspire «the rest» to imitate the finest actions); compare *IG* IV² 2, 750, ll. 14-24 (appealing to all those who are humanely disposed).

⁸⁷ Contrast the usually egalitarian connotations of φιλία: see P. PASCHIDIS, this volume.

⁸⁸ For example, in the earlier Hellenistic period, poleis praised for φιλανθρωπία towards themselves foreign polis citizens or whole poleis more commonly than kings (see footnotes 31-33).

⁸⁹ See POLYBIUS XX, 7.5; XXIX, 11.5; DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* X, 5.5; 42.2.

II. Universalism and Cosmopolitanism

Alternative explanations need not necessarily, however, deviate from the picture of a dilution of the polis ideal. Indeed, a factor which was probably very significant was the increasing importance of cosmopolitan ethical ideas in the Hellenistic world. As has long been recognised, the emergence of the large Hellenistic kingdoms, and associated standardisation of institutions and language, was an important stimulus to mainstream universalist thinking. The coming of the Romans can only have reinforced this process: a simplistic dichotomy between Greeks and barbarians became inappropriate. Celebration of *φιλανθρωπία* towards all men, in place of pride in Greek ethnicity, was probably part of the ideological process by which civic Greeks reached an accommodation with Roman dominance.

Relevant developments in mainstream, everyday Hellenistic ethics partly reflected, and partly themselves shaped, parallel tendencies among some ethical philosophers. In the fourth century BC, the Cynic founder Diogenes advocated a strong version of cosmopolitanism, foreshadowing Hellenistic developments: the ideal polis would be a type of anti-polis, a world polis of the perfectly virtuous, living «according to nature».⁹⁰ The Stoic founder Zeno may also have advocated a worldwide cosmopolis of this kind,⁹¹ although it is possible that his *Republic* simply portrayed a traditional small-scale polis for which perfect virtue and wisdom were the qualifications for membership.⁹² In any case, full-blooded forms of cosmopolitanism were certainly prominent in Stoic thought from Chrysippus onwards.⁹³ Earlier Stoics who advocated this kind of view probably avoided language of *φιλανθρωπία*: their cosmopolis was a cosmopolis of sages, not of all men. In the later Hellenistic period, however, some Stoics may have embraced *φιλανθρωπία* as a foundation of a new, more inclusive cosmopolitanism: some scholars have seen the prominence of *φιλανθρωπία* in sections of Diodorus Siculus partly inspired by Posidonius' historical writings as evidence that a leading first-century Stoic made *φιλανθρωπία* central to his ethics.⁹⁴ By the later Hellenistic period, however, even members of other philosophical schools, including Peripatetics advocates of Aristotelian polis-centred ethics, were seeking to take account of more universalist ethical expectations.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ See J. MOLES, *The Cynics*, in C. Rowe, M. Schofield (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 415-434.

⁹¹ A. ERSKINE, *The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action*, London, 1990, pp. 18-27; D. DAWSON, *Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought*, Oxford, 1992, p. 175; O. MURRAY, *Zeno and the Art of Polis Maintenance*, in M. H. Hansen (ed.), *The Imaginary Polis*, Copenhagen, 2004, pp. 202-221, esp. 211-214.

⁹² M. SCHOFIELD, *The Stoic Idea of the City*, expanded edition, Chicago, 1999, chs. 1-2; D. S. RICHTER, *Cosmopolis. Imagining Community in Late Classical Athens and the Early Roman Empire*, Oxford, 2011, pp. 57-66.

⁹³ See SCHOFIELD, *Stoic Idea*, chs. 3-4; RICHTER, *Cosmopolis*, pp. 67-86.

⁹⁴ See H. STRASBURGER, *Poseidonios on Problems of the Roman Empire*, «JRS», 55 (1965), pp. 40-53, at p. 48; ERSKINE, *Hellenistic Stoa*, pp. 198-199, 202.

⁹⁵ See J. ANNAS, *Aristotelian Political Thought in the Hellenistic Period*, in A. Laks, M. Schofield (eds.), *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 74-94; compare RICHTER, *Cosmopolis*, pp. 75-76.

Exposure both to mainstream rhetoric and to philosophy probably made Hellenistic civic Greeks increasingly aware of what they had in common with those who were not their fellow citizens. Indeed, as suggested in section 3, the new phenomenon of poleis praising citizens for *φιλανθρωπία* towards outsiders, including slaves, should be seen in this light.⁹⁶ Such a growing awareness probably in turn led to doubts about the suitability of the particularist, closed polis. Indeed, there are hints in later Hellenistic honorary decrees of a sense of the artificiality of the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, or of status distinctions in general. For example, in the early first century, Zosimos of Priene, himself a naturalised citizen, was praised for giving «the benefaction of breakfast» (ἡ τοῦ ἀκρατίσματος *φιλανθρωπία*) in his house on his first day in a new office «to all on an equal basis» (πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσον), such that, at least during the occasion itself, the «chance fate» of slaves and the status of foreigners could be assigned minimal importance (ἐν ᾗ καὶ δούλου τύχη[ν] καὶ ξένου χρ[ηματισμὸ]ν ἦν ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ τίθεσθαι).⁹⁷

It is quite probable that relevant drafters of decrees were influenced by similar considerations in praising benefactors for *φιλανθρωπία* towards fellow citizens: it became normal, or moral, to regard even fellow citizens as members of a broader humanity, rather than observing sharp barriers between insiders and outsiders. Nevertheless, it is historiographical texts which attest most directly the influence of cosmopolitanism on mid- and later Hellenistic thinking about the types of political virtue and political relationship suitable for fellow members of particular states. Dionysius of Halicarnassus makes a sympathetic speaker, the Roman king Tullus Hostilius, characterise as *φιλανθρωπία* the Romans' systematic tendency to admit foreigners to citizenship, supposedly inspired by the Athenians' example. According to Tullus Hostilius, such universalism has, paradoxically, proved crucial to the success of Rome as a particular polis: it has given Rome the manpower to put into effect the proposals of its virtuous citizens.⁹⁸

Also relevant is one of the rare cases in which Polybius mentions *φιλανθρωπία* between members of the same state. In his praise of his home state, the Achaian League, Polybius emphasises the Hellenistic Achaians' unprecedented achievement in uniting the Peloponnesians in a stable political unit: they have made the whole Peloponnese resemble a polis, except for the trivial matter of its lack of a circuit wall.⁹⁹ According to Polybius, this is partly due to the League' culture of equality, free speech and democracy: in particular, all member states are put on an equal footing, including new members. Crucially, Polybius presents the League's impartial, accommodating approach to new members as due, not only to «equality», but also to *φιλανθρωπία*. Indeed, he here presents these two quali-

⁹⁶ Compare GAUTHIER, *Les cités*, pp. 72-73.

⁹⁷ I. Priene 113 (after 84 BC), ll. 54-56, with L. ROBERT, *Études anatoliennes: recherches sur les inscriptions grecques de l'Asie mineure*, Paris, 1937, p. 388 n. 2; compare I. Priene 123, ll. 11-12.

⁹⁸ DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* III, 11.4-6; GABBA, *Dionysius*, pp. 156-157 (compare pp. 87, 194).

⁹⁹ POLYBIUS II, 37.9-11; cf. G. A. LEHMANN, *Ansätze zu einer Theorie des griechischen Bundesstaates bei Aristoteles und Polybios*, Göttingen, 2001, pp. 58-60.

ties as cardinal political virtues: the League has made use of «two of the strongest collaborators, equality and humanity» (δύο συνεργοῖς χρωμένῃ τοῖς ἰσχυροτάτοις, ἰσότητι καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ).¹⁰⁰

This was probably a highly controversial claim. Others would have seen Achaian expansion in the Peloponnese as anything but a humane process: for example, Polybius himself admits that both the Mantineians and Aristomachos' Argos revolted from the League shortly after receiving what he describes as humane, generous receptions into it.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, even if Polybius here used the rhetoric of *φιλανθρωπία* tendentiously to conceal some heavy-handed Achaian treatment of Peloponnesian states,¹⁰² he must have expected contemporary Greeks to regard humanity as in principle an admirable basis for political unity.

These two extracts from Dionysius and Polybius can be seen partly as reflections of attempts to infuse traditional civic ideals with new cosmopolitan ones. Dionysius' notion of Rome as a community open to all willing citizens, showing *φιλανθρωπία* towards immigrants, could have appealed to advocates of both sets of values. Similarly, Polybius' Achaian League realised the best of both worlds, being a traditional democracy made permeable and extended across the whole Peloponnese. Because of its size and cosmopolitan membership, this new type of political formation required members to show, not only respect for equality, but also *φιλανθρωπία* towards one another. The same general type of hybrid thinking could well have been among the factors which inspired some drafters of later Hellenistic decrees to characterise relations between fellow citizens as relations of *φιλανθρωπία*: citizens must remain rooted in their particular polis, but show political attitudes which can potentially be extended to a much wider group.

c. Emphasis on φιλανθρωπία between Fellow Citizens as a Means of Preserving and Reasserting the Relevance of the Small-Scale, Participatory Polis

1. The Local as the Key to the Universal:
the Small-Scale Polis as School and Stage of *φιλανθρωπία*

The picture of dilution of traditional civic values sketched above must be counterbalanced with a quite different interpretation: the emergence of *φιλανθρωπία* towards fellow citizens as a cardinal civic virtue also reflected relevant citizens' continuing attachment to the polis ideal. Indeed, some later Hellenistic decrees confronted directly the challenge posed to particularist civic patriotism by cosmopolitan realities and ideals: they used honorary decrees to suggest that, paradoxically, the small-scale institutions of the traditional local polis offer an excellent means to imbue individuals with humane, cosmopolitan attitudes and habits.

Emphasis could be laid on the humanising potential of the civic gymnasium: in the early first century BC, the Prieniens praised Zosimos for organising athletic

¹⁰⁰ POLYBIUS II, 38.5-8.

¹⁰¹ See POLYBIUS II, 57-8; 60.4-8.

¹⁰² Compare P. PASCHIDIS, this volume, on the ways in which language of *φιλία* was sometimes used in Hellenistic public rhetoric to conceal inequalities.

activities and philological education in the gymnasium, with the result that the bodies of the young participants became unhesitating and their souls were led towards virtue and «humane emotion» (πάθος ἀνθρώπινον).¹⁰³ Moreover, wider civic institutions and culture could also be represented as providing an education in humanity. In later second-century Colophon, Polemaios' «humane» assistance to debtors was presented as consistent with the «character» (ἦθος) of the polis of Colophon: he had shown himself «humane and in keeping with the character of the city» (φιλόανθρωπον καὶ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἦθους οἰκῆον). The implication was that it was the ethical milieu of the polis of Colophon which had imbued Polemaios with his humane dispositions and provided a model for him to emulate.¹⁰⁴ This implication was consistent with that of the decree's earlier suggestion that, by helping refugees in Colophon, Polemaios had acted in both a «civic» and a «humane» way (πολιτευτικῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως):¹⁰⁵ humanity towards outsiders in need is an intrinsic part of the conduct of a well-habituated citizen.

In Polemaios' case, his polis was held, not only to have imbued him with humane dispositions, but also to have provided an ideal stage on which to exercise them: secure citizenship in a small-scale, settled polis enabled him to develop humane relations with poor fellow citizens, which he could then replicate when confronted with needy outsiders. The same kind of thinking could well underlie other honorary decrees' praise of citizens for showing φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens: the social life of a small-scale polis is an excellent stage on which to demonstrate and develop habits of philanthropy and impartial concern for particular others.

Epigraphic representations of the humanising potential of the small-scale polis represented an implicit plea for the relevance of the traditional Greek city in a cosmopolitan world.¹⁰⁶ A related strategy in contemporary historiography is the attempt of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to reconcile universalism with particularist Hellenic pride by tying φιλανθρωπία very closely to Greek culture in general: φιλανθρωπία is a special Greek virtue, which distinguishes Greeks from barbarians, even if mainstream Greeks have not always shown it.¹⁰⁷ A similar association of φιλανθρωπία with Greek culture, or even specifically with Greek civic culture, is detectable in Diodorus Siculus' identification of φιλανθρωπία and παιδεία (education on the traditional Greek civic model) as important signs of one individual's self-control (σωφροσύνη).¹⁰⁸ First-century BC philhellenic Roman intellectuals took the same approach: the Latin word *humanitas* was used to express a concept incorporating both gentleness and learning, both φιλανθρωπία and παιδεία.¹⁰⁹

According to the various lines of thinking mentioned here, particularism is the key to successful universalism. Paradoxically, it is the particularities of Greek

¹⁰³ I. Priene 112, ll. 74-76.

¹⁰⁴ SEG 39 (1989), 1243, col. III, ll. 35-47.

¹⁰⁵ SEG 39 (1989), 1243, col. III, ll. 25-35.

¹⁰⁶ For a similar attempt in a literary text (of a later period), see AELIUS ARISTEIDES, *Panathenaicus* (1), 225-230, with LORAUX, *L'invention*, pp. 269-270.

¹⁰⁷ DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* XIV, 6.4-6 (cf. I, 89.1), with J.-L. FERRARY, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate*, Rome, 1988, p. 513 n. 30; GABBA, *Dionysius*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁰⁸ DIODORUS SICULUS XXXVII, 8.2.

¹⁰⁹ See FERRARY, *Philhellénisme*, pp. 512-513.

ethnicity and culture which offer the surest guarantee of humane, cosmopolitan values.¹¹⁰ Crucially, these particularities include the persistence of small-scale, particularist poleis and gymnasia. Some later Hellenistic Greeks thus put into practice a line of thinking which resembles one which may have been first proposed by the Stoic founder Zeno, in his *Republic*: the ideal polis is a world state of the virtuous, comprising innumerable small-scale poleis of the virtuous, which each represent the cosmopolis in microcosm.¹¹¹

II. Encouragement of φιλανθρωπία between Citizens as a Means of Softening the Strict Functioning of Law, Procedures and Contracts

Some later Hellenistic citizens' emphasis on φιλανθρωπία between citizens can also be regarded as a more inward-looking development: it can be seen as a reflection of concern to find ways of preserving the viability and success of poleis as political communities, within the constraints of new conditions and values. In some cases, emphasis on φιλανθρωπία between citizens was part of a quite innovative wider vision of the functioning of a good polis: in a good polis, citizens should aim to enforce strictly the letter of the law, procedures and private contracts, but that aspiration should be tempered by humane concern for the welfare of all individual fellow citizens.

Emphasis on the importance of the strict, punctilious enforcement of laws and contracts was certainly not anything new in Greek civic political culture, but that line of thinking was very probably given an important stimulus by Roman civic values. In Cicero's ethical and political thought, for example, «good faith» (*fides*) in the observance of legal and contractual obligations and entitlements, especially those related to property, is a «foundation of justice» and a guarantee of the stability and success of the good *res publica*.¹¹² It is probably not coincidental that there emerged in Greek civic honorary decrees of the second century BC an honorific formula which makes central the Greek equivalent of Roman *fides*: an honorand could be explicitly praised for having preserved the faith placed in him (τὴν ἐγγχειρισθεῖσαν ἑαυτῶι πίστιν).¹¹³ In a more explicit case of embrace of «good faith» as a cardinal ethical and political value, a later second-century decree of the Delphic Amphictyony claims that the Athenians taught the rest of the Greeks that the «greatest good» among men is χροῖσις («acquaintance») and πίστις among one another.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Compare DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, p. 4; ch. 15.

¹¹¹ See DAWSON, *Cities*, p. 175; compare the slightly different view of MURRAY, *Zeno*, esp. pp. 211-213. Note, however, criticism of such views in SCHOFIELD, *Stoic Idea*, appendix A.

¹¹² See especially A. A. LONG, *Cicero's Politics in De Officiis*, in Laks, Schofield (eds.), *Justice*, pp. 213-240, discussing, for example, CICERO, *De Officiis* I, 23. GRIFFIN, *When is Thought Political?*, pp. 278-280, thinks Long places too much emphasis on Cicero's interest in property rights. It is, however, striking that Cicero's advocacy of altruism and solidarity is usually entangled with concern for strict justice, reciprocity, *fides* and property rights (see especially *De Officiis* I, 22; II, 85).

¹¹³ See IG II² 1006 (Athens, 122/1 BC), l. 57; IG II² 1028 (Athens, 100/99 BC), l. 72; IG IX 1², 3, 750 (Amphissa, 200-150 BC), ll. 14-15; IG XII Suppl. 253 (Andros, 150-100 BC), ll. 3-4. I thank A. Chaniotis for this point.

¹¹⁴ CID IV 117 (121-117 BC), l. 14.

A Roman advocate of the importance of strict *fides* in a good polis could himself suggest that it needed to be tempered by gentler, more humane dispositions. Alongside strong emphasis on *fides*, Cicero's *De Officiis* includes a compensatory emphasis on the milder virtues of benevolence.¹¹⁵ Similarly, in the *De Re Publica*, Cicero makes Scipio praise the early Roman king Numa Pompilius for guaranteeing *iustitia* and *fides* in Rome, but also for influencing citizens «towards a humane disposition» (*ad humanitatem*) through markets and festivals.¹¹⁶

Among Greeks, Polybius can be shown to have adopted a similar approach in his praise of the Achaian League. Polybius lays great stress on the qualities of the League's shared institutions and its members' studied fidelity to them, even when such «good faith» is detrimental to their immediate interests.¹¹⁷ However, he also suggests at some points that political mildness eases the strict functioning of the League. For example, in a passage first considered in section b.11) above, he claims that the League's successful incorporation of new members is due to *φιλανθρωπία* as well as to a necessarily more hard-headed concern for equality.¹¹⁸ Polybius' accounts of the third-century Achaians' treatment of Mantinea and Argos also fit into this pattern: Aratus showed *φιλανθρωπία* towards the Mantineians, despite their disloyalty; and the Achaians showed «mildness and virtue» (*πραότης καὶ καλοκάγαθία*) in admitting Argos to the League after Aristomachos renounced his tyranny, and even permitting Aristomachos himself to serve as League general.¹¹⁹ The implication of Polybius' claims is that, while strict justice might have demanded a harsh approach to Mantinea and to Aristomachos and Argos, the League showed notable compassion. Polybius presents this approach as praiseworthy, even though, as noted above, a revolt soon followed in each case.

Polybius also thought that individual admirable Achaian statesmen showed mild virtues, which could presumably compensate for their strict fidelity to law and procedure: he praised Aratus of Sikyon for his ability to bear political disputes mildly (*ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς πράως*).¹²⁰ This particular claim evokes a distinctive notion of political civility: it is quite legitimate that disagreements should come into the open in the political sphere, but good citizens should approach them in a mild, civil way which defuses conflicts. This distinctive ideal is also evident in Polybius' contrast between the reactions of two groups within the Aetolian League to a visit of a representative of the Romans, in the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War: some Aetolians addressed their Roman visitor in a «mild and civil» or even «mild and civic way» (*πράως καὶ πολιτικῶς*), politely drawing attention to Roman neglect of the Aetolians and their treaty obligations to them, whereas others resorted to angry rhetoric.¹²¹ The former group of Aetolians showed political skills and attributes which Polybius would have associated

¹¹⁵ See FERRARY, *Philhellénisme*, p. 419; J. ANNAS, *Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property*, in M. Griffin, J. Barnes (eds.), *Philosophia Togata 1: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, Oxford, 1997², pp. 151-173, at 168-169.

¹¹⁷ See especially POLYBIUS II, 37.10; 38.6-8; 61.9-11.

¹¹⁹ POLYBIUS II, 57.8; 60.4-5.

¹²⁰ POLYBIUS IV, 8.2; possibly compare *I. Priene* 110, ll. 13-15.

¹¹⁶ CICERO, *De Re Publica* II, 26-27.

¹¹⁸ POLYBIUS II, 38.8.

¹²¹ POLYBIUS XVIII, 48.7-9.

with good Achaians: they upheld the letter of contractual obligations, but did so in a mild, civilised way. Under this view of politics, civility quickly becomes an intrinsic characteristic of the good citizen: it becomes normal to commend individuals for speaking in the assembly *πράως καὶ πολιτικῶς*.

A similar concern that strict observation of rules and obligations should be counterbalanced by humane concern is evident in some of the later Hellenistic honorary decrees under consideration here. For example, the people of Synnada claimed to have the benefit of the elder Philonides' benefactions, and «also of his good faith and integrity in office and his humanity and sincerity towards each and every citizen» (ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖ[ς] πίστιν τε καὶ καθα[ριότητα] καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον [τῶν] πολιτῶν γνησιότητά τε καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν).¹²² This juxtaposition of attributes could easily have been taken to imply that the moral rectitude of the incorruptible Philonides was appropriately tempered by humane concern for individual fellow citizens' needs. The same line of thought could well also underlie the first-century Pergamenes' praise of Athenodoros for treating citizens equally and justly while in office, but also giving each citizen a humane reception.¹²³ Moreover, the «humane» remission of debts by Polemaios of Colophon can be seen in a similar light: Polemaios did not challenge the principle that financial contracts should be fulfilled, but considerately excused some debtors from repayments, refraining from an inflammatory insistence on his literal entitlements.

III. Cultivation of *φιλανθρωπία* between Citizens as a Solution to Traditional Problems of *Stasis* and Civic Unrest, and their new Forms

It is clear from the historians that *φιλανθρωπία* among citizens was not always regarded in the later Hellenistic period merely as an effective lubricant of civic regimes based on punctilious enforcement of rules and contracts. It could also be identified as a barrier to the full-scale civic disintegration of a civil war or *stasis*. This was a distinctive feature of later Hellenistic approaches to *stasis*. The best means to avoid or minimise *stasis* had long been a major concern of Greek historiography and political philosophy, but the cultivation of gentle, universalistic mutual concern did not feature prominently among the methods suggested. Rather, authors interested in the problem laid stress on the need for political rationality, well-designed political institutions (including checks and balances), social justice and particularist solidarity between citizens. For example, it is considerations of this kind which dominate two of the most extensive surviving Classical discussions of avoidance of *stasis*, the text of the Anonymus Iamblichi¹²⁴ and Aristotle's *Politics* Book v.

In some cases, later Hellenistic historians made central the way in which human kindness could seemingly alleviate the effects of sharp inequalities, argu-

¹²² WILHELM, *Neue Beiträge*, 1, pp. 56-57, ll. 17-19.

¹²³ CANALI DE ROSSI, *ISE III*, n^o 195, ll. 7-11.

¹²⁴ See especially ANONYMUS IAMBlicHI 3.6; 7.10-16 DK.

ing that wealthy, elite citizens should show gentle consideration to their less fortunate compatriots in order to reduce the risk of *stasis*. Diodorus, probably inspired by Posidonius,¹²⁵ makes a programmatic statement of this approach, in the context of the First Sicilian Slave War. Not only must those superior within particular political regimes behave «decently» (ἐπεικῶς) towards their inferiors, but also in private life the prudent behave mildly (πράως) towards slaves. These types of behaviour are necessary because arrogance and severity (ὑπερηφάνια καὶ βαρύτης) can cause disruption at both levels: they cause *staseis* in poleis and lead slaves to plots against their masters within households, which can lead to broader revolts. The humble citizen tolerates the privileges due to excellence and reputation, but, «when deprived of appropriate humane concern, he becomes an enemy of those ruling in an ungentle way» (τῆς δὲ καθηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας στερισκόμενος πολέμιος γίνεται τῶν ἀνημέρως δεσποζόντων).¹²⁶

Diodorus himself occasionally praises leading individuals for showing φιλανθρωπία towards the mass of their fellow citizens,¹²⁷ or in such a way as to assuage discontent.¹²⁸ Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus praises some elite early Romans for showing φιλανθρωπία towards the poor in such a way as to win the support of the masses, obviating the need for formal constitutional change.¹²⁹ He even makes a sympathetic speaker explicitly urge fellow wealthy Romans to make the poor allies, rather than enemies, of the city through φιλανθρωπία.¹³⁰

The calming of tensions between rich and poor was not, however, the only *stasis*-preventing function φιλανθρωπία could be expected to serve: it could also be expected to render more moderate and peace-loving the behaviour of a whole citizen-body. Polybius was not averse to very traditional explanations of *stasis* as a failure of political rationality: in his account of *stasis* at Bithynian Kios, he attributes the unrest to the lack of judgement and bad government (ἄβουλία καὶ κακοπολιτεία) of the Kianoi themselves, which led them to honour corrupt politicians and punish their virtuous opponents.¹³¹ Nevertheless, in his famous account of third-century *stasis* in the small Arcadian polis of Kynaitha,¹³² he offers a far more distinctive hypothesis: he stresses as the cause, not collective irrationality, but a widespread lack of humanity and gentleness.

According to Polybius, the Kynaithans had suffered repeated acute *staseis*.¹³³ Institutions and agreements were no bar: in the particular case which he narrates, one faction had shown complete contempt even for solemn oaths.¹³⁴ According to Polybius, the root of the Kynaithans' severity and savagery was their abandonment of some traditional Arcadian customs. Polybius comments that the Arcadians, his home *ethnos*, were in general distinguished for «the love of foreigners

¹²⁵ See FGrHist 87 F108c; STRASBURGER, *Poseidonios*, p. 48.

¹²⁶ DIODORUS SICULUS xxxiv-xxxv, 2.33. Compare MAZZA, *Ideologia e antropologia*, esp. pp. 65-68, 71-72.

¹²⁷ See DIODORUS SICULUS x, 28.3; xiv, 70.3.

¹²⁸ Cf. DIODORUS SICULUS ix, 11.1; xiv, 45.1; xviii, 74.3.

¹²⁹ See DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* x, 19.1; xii, 1.3.

¹³⁰ DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, *Antiquitates Romanae* v, 65.2.

¹³¹ POLYBIUS xv, 21.3.

¹³² POLYBIUS iv, 17-18; 20-21.

¹³³ See POLYBIUS iv, 17.4.

¹³⁴ See POLYBIUS iv, 17.9-18.6.

and love of humanity in their characters and lives» (διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσι καὶ βίοις φιλοξενίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν).¹³⁵ One traditional expression, and cause, of these ethical leanings was the practice of organising publicly-funded musical festivals for young citizens. The early Arcadians had introduced these festivals in order to «soften and temper the stubborn and hard elements in their nature» (μαλάττειν καὶ κερναῖν τὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐθαδὲς καὶ σκληρόν), compensating for the effects of hard labour in infertile fields and an inhospitable climate.¹³⁶ In Kynaitha, in the absence of this practice, the harder elements of the Arcadian personality found full, unconstrained expression, with devastating consequences for civic stability.

Polybius' comments must be interpreted partly as a reflection of a particular anxiety on Polybius' part to dissociate the lawless Kynaithans from the rest of the Arcadians. His comments were, however, also a practical contribution to debates about the causes of *stasis*, or of its extremes, and the best means to avoid them. Polybius would presumably have insisted that traditional Arcadian musical practices did help to prevent outright *stasis* elsewhere in later third-century Arcadia: for example, he reports elsewhere that civic divisions in his native Megalopolis remained within reasonable bounds at a moment of extreme distress.¹³⁷ Moreover, he claims that he wants his remarks about Kynaitha to make clear to other Arcadian poleis the dangers of abandoning music, and to offer a potential future lesson for the Kynaithans themselves, available if they ever achieve sufficient stability to put it into effect.¹³⁸ The implication of Polybius' account, applicable to Arcadian poleis but also to any other whose citizens' lives were tough and strenuous, was that a measure of state-encouraged participation in gentle cultural pursuits and widespread φιλανθρωπία could be an effective barrier against civic unrest and extreme violence, a guarantee of civic order stronger than mere institutions and agreements.

As Eckstein suggests, Polybius can even be seen to be suggesting here that cultural education is required to make citizens truly human, preventing them from lapsing into the savage behaviour evident at Kynaitha, worthy only of beasts.¹³⁹ Diodorus adopts a similar approach in his argument that gentle virtues can avert *stasis*, first discussed above. According to him, the more those in power turn to savagery and lawlessness (εἰς ἀμότητα καὶ παρανομίαν), the more their subjects' characters come to resemble those of beasts in their senselessness (πρὸς ἀπόνοιαν ἀποθηριοῦται). Conversely, the more gentleness the rulers show, the greater the chances of stability.¹⁴⁰

There is no direct attestation of this line of thinking in the honorary decrees under consideration here. However, it is plausible that such ideas about civic order were at the back of decree drafters' minds. For example, in some cases, φιλαν-

¹³⁵ POLYBIUS IV, 20.1.

¹³⁷ POLYBIUS V, 93.

¹³⁹ A. M. ECKSTEIN, *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1995, pp. 137-138, noting especially POLYBIUS IV, 21.6; compare C. B. CHAMPION, *Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 2004, pp. 82-83.

¹⁴⁰ DIODORUS SICULUS XXXIV-XXXV, 2.33; MAZZA, *Ideologia e antropologia*, pp. 69-70.

¹³⁶ POLYBIUS IV, 21.3.

¹³⁸ POLYBIUS IV, 21.10-11.

θρωπία was juxtaposed with assiduousness (ἐκτένεια) as a quality of the good citizen, almost as a foil.¹⁴¹ Relevant drafters could well have been conscious of a need, identified by Polybius, to balance harder with gentler virtues, in order to prevent citizens' striving and determination finding expression in *stasis*.

5. CONCLUSION: THE RHETORIC OF CIVIC HUMANITY BETWEEN EPIGRAPHY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

This article has shown an important area of overlap between the political and ethical rhetoric of some civic epigraphy and Greek historiography in the mid- and later Hellenistic period: drafters of honorary decrees and historians both sometimes elevated φιλανθρωπία into a cardinal civic virtue, which must be shown towards fellow citizens. This overlap confirms that Polybius, Diodorus Siculus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus were all very sensitive to developments in the ethical and political cultures of the Greek civic world: for example, Dionysius represented the early republican Roman elite as philanthropic benefactors, almost like the 'great benefactors' of later Hellenistic civic epigraphy. A new model of gentle, universalistic civic euergetism, quite different from traditional euergetism, was thus gaining significant support, even though more traditional civic ideals appear to have remained predominant in most poleis.

Moreover, this article has shown that consideration of historians' often more extended and reasoned ethical rhetoric can illuminate the conscious and unconscious patterns of thought underlying the panegyric language of honorary decrees. In this particular case, parallel consideration of honorary decrees and historiography reveals that embrace of φιλανθρωπία towards fellow citizens as a cardinal civic virtue was partly a reflection of tendencies towards depoliticisation and cosmopolitanism, antithetical to traditional civic ideals. To some extent, therefore, the two bodies of evidence together vindicate a very traditional picture of Hellenistic ethical attitudes: there were new tendencies towards idealisation of universalist gentleness and charity, partly foreshadowing aspects of Christian ethics.¹⁴²

However, parallel consideration of the two bodies of evidence also suggests quite different interpretations. Some later Hellenistic Greeks suggested or implied that, paradoxically, universalist dispositions of φιλανθρωπία could best be inculcated in individuals through education in a particular small-scale Greek polis, with all the resources of Greek culture and civic traditions at its disposal. Moreover, some suggested that φιλανθρωπία between fellow citizens could ensure the efficient, prosperous functioning of civic institutions. Indeed, some even innovatively identified as the best antidote to polis-destroying *stasis*, not better institutions, the enforcement of justice or the cultivation of particularist civic pride and virtue, but the gentle, humane understanding between citizens intrinsic to φιλανθρωπία.

¹⁴¹ IG IV² 2, 750, ll. 21-22; TAM V 1, 514, ll. 10-12; possibly also G. COUSIN, CH. DIEHL, «BCH», 13 (1889), pp. 336-338, n° 4, ll. 29-30. For an example involving a foreigner, see *I. Stratonikeia* 4, ll. 18-22. Compare also, from the Imperial period, the juxtaposition of φιλανθρωπία with σεμνότης in *I. Magnesia* 113, ll. 11-16.

¹⁴² Compare DE ROMILLY, *La douceur*, pp. 5-6, 196.

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