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Introduction

1. Exile and ideas of civic virtue: two second-century BC examples

The theme of exile often provoked Greek thinkers and citizens to reflect about the foundations of politics, citizenship and civic virtue. A concise example is an inscription from Delphi, dating to *c.* 120–115 BC. This inscription records a decree of the Delphic Amphictyony, the federal body in charge of the whole Delphic sanctuary, in honour of some citizens of Delphi who had been forced into exile after making allegations of corruption against sanctuary magistrates. The decree includes abstract reflections about the ethical qualities of the exiles:

...καὶ ἐπιβουλευθέντες καὶ ἐκπεσόντες ἐκ τῆ[ς πατ]ρίδος, οὐκ ἀπέστησαν τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ καλῶς ἔχοντος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστάσεως, [κατ]α[φυγό]ντες δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον τὴν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ οὐ προϊδόμενοι οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε κακοπα[θίαν οὔ]τε δαπάνην...

... and having been plotted against and forced into exile from their homeland, they did not defect from the just and fine and the supervision of the sanctuary, but, having fled for refuge to the Roman Senate, and not having had any concern about danger or hardship or expense....¹

¹ *CID* 4.118, ll. 6–9; the main verb of the ‘but’ clause is unknown, because the inscription breaks off after more participles.

This decree offers an unusually direct and arresting insight into everyday Greek assumptions and ideas about citizenship, of the kind to which speakers could appeal in the public forum of a political assembly, like the one which endorsed this decree. This is because the authors of the decree, like many other Greek writers about exile, explicitly reflected about the questions of political legitimacy and morality raised by exiles' predicament. In particular, in the extract given here, they sought to identify the basic, abstract, ethical components of citizenship to which virtuous citizens could cling even when in exile, removed from the physical environment and normal social relations of their polis. These individuals, though exiled from their home polis, had not 'defected from the just and fine and the supervision of the sanctuary', but spared no effort in going to the Roman Senate, presumably to campaign for what they perceived as the welfare of the sanctuary. The predicament of these exiles thus provoked a particularly explicit comment on the importance of commitment to justice, the common good and common traditions at all costs: the inalienable kernel of good citizenship is to show very strong civic virtue, which has a crucial religious component. That virtue often demands, as in this case, considerable self-sacrifice.

This inscription can be compared and contrasted with another example of second-century BC rhetoric concerning exiles, this time from a literary work. In the mid-second century, the historian Polybius, himself a type of exile, a citizen of Peloponnesian Megalopolis who had been taken as a hostage to Rome, reflected in his *Histories* on the ethical qualities of a group of earlier exiles from Megalopolis. He criticised the earlier historian Phylarchus for failing to record the most praiseworthy aspects of the behaviour of the Megalopolitans when they were expelled *en masse*

from their polis in 223 BC by Cleomenes III of Sparta. Assembled in exile in neighbouring Messene, the Megalopolitan refugees collectively refused an offer from Cleomenes of a return to their home polis in exchange for alliance with him, preferring to remain loyal to their longstanding allies, their fellow members of the Achaian League:

οἱ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προεῖντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν
 ὀλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἴρεσιν,
 τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς
 ἐξουσίας ἀβλαβῆ ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας,
 τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπάντων συλλήβδην τῶν
 ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιοτάτων χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς
 τοὺς συμμάχους πίστιν. οὐ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἄν;
 ... διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργου μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως
 καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν;

They first gave their territory up to Cleomenes, and after this they completely lost their homeland as a result of their policy towards the Achaians. Finally, when, beyond their hopes and unexpectedly, they gained an opportunity to take their homeland back unharmed, they chose to be deprived of their territory, graves, sanctuaries, homeland and property, in sum, of all the most necessary things among men, for the sake of not betraying their good faith towards their allies. What finer act than this has happened or could happen? ... Through what

other action could an author better urge his audience towards the maintaining of good faith and the sharing of true and firm business?²

In its eulogistic rhetoric, this extract from Polybius closely resembles a Hellenistic honorary decree, like that of the Amphictyony. It is thus an important initial indication of a phenomenon explored throughout this book: the permeability of the boundary between the vocabulary, style and concerns of public political rhetoric recorded in epigraphic form and the rhetoric of contemporary literary authors, especially historians, orators and philosophers.

Moreover, Polybius uses precisely the same rhetorical *topos* as the authors of the decree from Delphi: he uses military and diplomatic language (προδοῦναι, φυλακίη) in claiming that, though physically removed from their home city, the Megalopolitans preserved the most important abstract components of virtue. However, he stresses a different type of virtue: the Megalopolitan refugees set greatest store by ‘not betraying’ (τὸ μὴ προδοῦναι) their good faith towards allies. This was an example of the ‘guarding’ of good faith (φυλακὴ πίστεως), the quality involved in respecting agreements and contracts. Paradoxically, in Polybius’ view, the Megalopolitans could in this case be better citizens, of both Megalopolis and the Achaian League, by remaining in exile, rather than returning to their physical polis. Polybius even explicitly praises the fact that the Megalopolitans chose good faith towards their allies over recovering their territory, graves, sanctuaries, homeland and property. There is thus a pronounced contrast with the Delphic example: whereas the authors of the Amphictyonic decree made self-sacrificing concern for the local

² Polybius 2.61.9–11.

sanctuary, exemplified in perilous diplomacy on its behalf, central to virtue, Polybius gave overriding importance to the sanctity of contracts and agreements. In his view, the requirements of contractual good faith could legitimately oblige citizens even to abandon their home sanctuaries to be sacked by their greatest enemies.

2. The subject and argument of the book

Expulsion from their cities was a perennial risk for citizens of Greek poleis, from the Archaic period to Late Antiquity. This could occur in many different ways, of different frequencies in different periods. Citizens could be sentenced to formal exile by a court; forced to flee their city, like the Delphian exiles considered in the previous section, to avoid condemnation by a court or political persecution; driven out during civil war (the most violent type of *stasis* or ‘civil strife’); or expelled from their city by an external invader, like the Megalopolitan refugees praised by Polybius. In each case, exile³ entailed loss of security and status, devastating for those affected. One indication of this is that philosophers of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods wrote consolatory tracts, a genre otherwise principally concerned with poverty and bereavement, addressed to exiles.⁴

One purpose of this book is to provide a new history of Greek exile in the later Classical and Hellenistic periods, and its causes and consequences. However, the principal aim is to explore the phenomenon evident in the previous section: the way in

³ ‘Exile’ will be understood to refer to the multiple processes caused by human action through which Greek citizens were forced to emigrate from, or prevented from returning to, their homeland or preferred residence, without the original expelling power equipping them with a new place of residence or enslaving them.

⁴ Cf. Giesecke (1891); more recently Garland (2014), 26-9. Teles *On Exile* is the only (partially) surviving example from this period, but Plutarch’s contribution to this genre drew on a rich fourth-century and Hellenistic tradition.

which experience or discussion of exile provoked fundamental political reflection or exposed fundamental political assumptions.⁵

Accordingly, the book uses exile to probe the character, development and influence in this period of Greek poleis' political cultures: the basic shared political ideas, assumptions and ambiguities in circulation within individual poleis, within regional groups of poleis and within the Greek world as a whole. It also examines aspects of the more developed political thought which ancient Greeks built upon the foundations provided by those political cultures, using the resources of those political cultures themselves. To make this project as effective and revealing as possible, the scope of the political activities and debates relevant to exile is very broadly interpreted. Attention is given to the whole range of processes of civic unrest and stabilisation resulting in, or caused by, the exiling of citizens from their cities.

The book also interprets broadly the range of evidence relevant to reconstructing Greek political thinking. The book addresses not only literary and philosophical texts, of types commonly used for this purpose, but also epigraphic texts concerning exile. The latter are often ostensibly routine and administrative, but nonetheless, like the Delphic Amphictyonic decree discussed in the previous section, richly revealing of underlying abstract political ideas and assumptions. Moreover, with the aid of the epigraphic evidence, this book analyses political and legal institutions and their accompanying practices and terminology⁶ as evidence for political assumptions and ideas, treating the design and running of such institutions as themselves forms of implicit 'political thinking'.

⁵ Compare the approach of Forsdyke (2005) to the Archaic and Classical periods.

⁶ For the Classical period, these are now very richly and informatively documented in Hansen and Nielsen (2004).

Taking into account political thinking, speaking, acting and organising at many different levels in these ways makes possible a much richer and more complex picture of the range of ancient Greek ideas about what a polis could and should be, and their interconnections.⁷ The argument of this book is that applying this method reveals the particular importance in Greek civic political culture of contrasting, interlocking basic approaches to politics similar to those evident in the rhetoric about exile of the Delphic inscription and the Polybius extract: strong ideals of virtue, patriotism and community coexisted with strict ideals of good faith, like-for-like exchange and punctilious respect for rules and contracts. The influence and interaction of these two approaches, including the tensions between them, exerted a very significant influence on the course of Greek politics.

This introduction seeks to lay the foundations for making this argument effectively. The next section explains the reasoning behind the book's geographical and chronological scope. Section 4 defends in more detail the notion of political culture central to the book. It also sets out explicitly the method of studying political culture followed here. This section is necessarily written at a much more abstract and theoretical level than the rest of the book, since it deals with fundamental questions about the nature of political thinking and action within a political community. The account is, however, kept as concise and straightforward as possible. Section 5 then explains further why different phenomena involving exile offer particularly useful tools for interpreting Greek political culture. The next step, in section 6, is to introduce leading scholarly interpretations of Greek civic political culture and this

⁷ For earlier works which integrate epigraphic and literary evidence as evidence for political ideas, see, for example, Bertrand (1999); Liddel (2007).

book's relationship to them, which involves defining some of the basic political ideals central to the argument.

3. Geographical and chronological scope

This book examines evidence from throughout the Greek world. The chronological period addressed is the 'long fourth century',⁸ *c.* 404–146, from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Roman conquest of the Greek world. There was probably no great change in the role of exile in the Greek world in *c.* 404. The other chronological limit does, however, mark a significant shift: Roman regulation gradually came to curtail the Greek exile phenomenon substantially, without bringing it to an end.⁹ Similarly, while increased direct Roman involvement after *c.* 146 caused many significant changes in poleis' political cultures, there was much more limited change in the character of poleis' political cultures around 404.

Despite these considerations, the period *c.* 404–146 is suitable for separate study, because the nature, quality and spread of the evidence enable more detailed and wide-ranging consideration of prominent basic political assumptions than is possible for earlier periods of Greek history. This is partly due to the emergence of utopian political writing in prose.¹⁰ It is also because a new, less circumscribed rationalism,¹¹ connected with the full embrace of literacy as a political technology,¹² led to many explicit, relatively unequivocal statements by non-philosopher citizens of basic political assumptions, in the preserved rhetoric of speeches and inscribed decrees.

⁸ Cf. Ma (2000).

⁹ Seibert (1979), 218–19.

¹⁰ Gadamer (1983); Hornblower (2011), 192–5.

¹¹ Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973), ch. 1.

¹² Murray (1990c), 11.

4. The concept of political culture

4.1. The nature of political culture

The notion of political culture is a useful tool for responding to a specific problem faced by the historian of Greek political thinking and events. Citizens of a Greek polis, like members of any other political community, both did and did not possess a shared political consciousness. On the one hand, Greek citizens were inescapably deeply influenced in their thinking, attitudes and emotions by the particular political milieu to which they were exposed. On the other hand, those same citizens could also exercise significant political agency. They did so to different degrees, but often in ways which could not be predicted even with exhaustive knowledge of the milieu which influenced them. The challenge is to find a theory of political thought and action which simultaneously gives adequate weight to both of these aspects of politics.¹³

Study of Plato's political thought is a case in point. It is necessary to find a way of interpreting and explaining Plato's revolutionary political thought as that of an Athenian citizen, keenly aware of wider Greek civic practices, expectations and problems.¹⁴ Plato's political ideas, or, at least, the political ideas with which he made sympathetic characters experiment, were clearly shaped by prevalent Classical Greek political assumptions.¹⁵ In particular, they bear the imprint of Plato's upbringing, in and around the Athenian urban deme of Kollytos, and his exposure to Classical Athenian politics. The broader culture of Classical Athens also exerted an influence:

¹³ For the general problem, compare Habermas (1990a), 102, 199–200; Hurley (1990), ch. 15, esp. 317–18; Frazer and Lacey (1993), 198–201, 203.

¹⁴ See Monoson (2000); Schofield (2006), chs. 2–3. For a recent picture of Plato as a more autonomous cultural critic, less rooted in existing frameworks, see Allen (2010), chs. 2–4.

¹⁵ Consider Bertrand (1999), on overlaps between the approaches to legislation of Plato and other civic Greeks.

for example, the centrality in Athenian civic life of the symposium and its cultural products, including vase-painting and lyric poetry, can be seen as a provocation for the comments on art and imitation in Book X of the *Republic*.¹⁶ Apparently paradoxically, even the vigorous attacks on the Athenian democracy which feature in Plato's works were couched in terms very familiar from democratic culture. As Monoson has emphasised, Plato drew on Athenian democratic expectations and practices of free or frank speech, as well as on Athenian democratic interest in the connections between politics and theatre.¹⁷

Nevertheless, it is impossible to account for all the ideas and rhetoric pursued in Plato's works as results of him unwittingly reproducing, or explicitly engaging with, the ideas and debates of his time and place. On the contrary, Plato set out through the voices of his characters a radical, groundbreaking political philosophy, incorporating original and penetrating criticisms of democracy, which could certainly not be predicted simply by analysing the many strands of contemporary political thinking and their interconnections.¹⁸

To take another example, this time involving someone who was not a philosopher, the notion of political culture is also a useful response to the problems raised by the task of describing and explaining the political career of Polemaios, a prominent later-second-century citizen of Colophon in Asia Minor, well-known from one of the most famous Hellenistic civic inscriptions. As that Colophonian honorary decree¹⁹ makes

¹⁶ Burnyeat (1999).

¹⁷ See Monoson (2000). This aspect of Monoson's analysis can stand independently of her more controversial suggestions that Plato was to some degree himself a democratic sympathiser.

¹⁸ On the need to account for simultaneous cultural embeddedness and free-thinking criticism in interpreting classic works of political thought: Skinner (2002), esp. ch. 4.

¹⁹ Robert and Robert (1989), Polemaios text, pp. 11–17; *SEG* 39.1243.

clear, Polemaios had been comprehensively habituated in such a way that he had an instinctive commitment to the ideals of Colophonian and Greek culture. In addition to his experience of the political assemblies, festivals and other celebrations of Colophon itself, he was educated in the intellectual centre of Rhodes. He also acted upon those ideals, conducting himself as a stereotypical Greek civic benefactor. Like Plato before him, he must have engaged with the basic political assumptions of the majority of fellow citizens, including those of his political opponents and of citizens from quite different socio-economic backgrounds. He could not otherwise have succeeded in gaining and retaining the support of the Colophonian citizen assembly for his policies and honours. On the other hand, even though he must have been firmly rooted in his particular political milieu and was nowhere near as independent-minded as Plato, Polemaios was able to rise to the challenge of innovating significantly in his political methods: he conducted a new type of diplomacy in his interactions with the Roman Senate, showing sufficient political flexibility to establish Colophonian relations with Rome on a favourable footing.

A promising response to these practical problems is to suppose that any coherent political group has a shared political culture of a particular, complex kind, whether or not its members live together. That political culture consists of the fundamental, non-partisan political ideas in circulation which are consensually accepted by members as valid foundations for political claims. This is the common stock of political notions maintained and used by all, which does not belong to any particular individual or section of the group. Not all or even most such ideas become transparent to many or

any of the group's members: many remain at the level of unconscious assumptions about politics, taken for granted but unexpressed.²⁰

The 'fundamental' ideas which make up any political culture include very varied conceptions, paradigms and norms. They include conceptions of the essential nature of community and the individual; of political community and political membership; of the particular political group involved and its members; of valid sources of political legitimacy, secular and religious, especially law; and of the relationships between those things. For example, the political cultures of the Greek civic world included, to consider only conceptions of discrete concepts identifiable with a single word, varying conceptions of 'virtue' (ἀρετή), 'justice' (δικαιοσύνη), 'friendship' (φιλία), 'flourishing' (εὐδαιμονία), 'freedom' (ἐλευθερία), 'equality before the law' or 'the rule of law' (ἰσονομία) and 'piety' (εὐσέβεια), among many other things.

Closely related to such conceptions are fundamental paradigms²¹ of political organisation and behaviour: models of how a polis or citizen should be organised and behave. In the ancient Greek world, for example, a widespread, quite constant paradigm was that of the polis as a simultaneously political and religious community, whose political and religious aspects are inextricably intertwined.²² From such paradigms derive fundamental political norms: implicit rules concerning citizens' political behaviour, in political contexts in general or in specific situations. The widespread Greek paradigm of the polis as a political and religious community

²⁰ Compare Taylor (1995), ch. 9; Freedman (1996), e.g. 21, 34–5, 101–104; Schmidt (2008), 308. This is, of course, only one among many possible ways of understanding political culture: see Welch (1993).

²¹ Cf. Burke (1986), 445–7.

²² Cf. Sourvinou-Inwood (1990).

commonly entailed, for example, norms requiring participation in civic festivals, as a central citizen duty.²³

The fundamental ideas of a political culture are the collective products of ongoing dialogue among members of the group concerned, which builds on and develops the collective self-understanding of their predecessors as members.²⁴ Those collective products are dispersed throughout the minds of individual members, and throughout their communication with one another. In addition, they are in circulation in the group in that they are encoded in the full range of collective institutions, traditions, stories, symbols and practices. Many of these are cultural and religious rather than narrowly political.²⁵ They are also embedded in the often material products of those parts of collective life. In Greek poleis, those products included, for example, inscriptions, coins or monuments, but also, less obviously, the poetry and art associated with civic festivals.

Understood in this way, political culture can explain why Greek citizens, like other political agents, always remained mentally embedded in one or multiple political milieux, even when physically uprooted (compare chapter 6 below). First, it is necessary for anyone to remain mentally embedded in at least one political culture in order to develop and sustain any political identity and understanding whatsoever. This is because the fundamental shared ideas which make up a political culture represent some of the indispensable basic points of orientation which enable individuals to

²³ Note, for example, Goldhill (1987); Parker (2005).

²⁴ Compare Schmidt (2008), esp. 309–321.

²⁵ Some would plausibly argue that all these media for preserving, disseminating and adapting fundamental political ideas should themselves be regarded as part of political culture: for example, that the legend of Harmodios and Aristogeiton was itself part of Classical Athenian political culture.

understand themselves and their world,²⁶ even if they have only a very partial or hazy grip on them.²⁷ Individuals need this general type of understanding as acutely as material goods and the power and knowledge required to obtain them.²⁸ Moreover, for such understanding to be satisfying, it cannot be a simple translation of material interests into ideas and values. The constituent ideas of a political culture can provide a useful framework for such understanding of the world because they are shared by many individuals and expressed in institutions, and have often been subject to selective social processes of critique²⁹ or tailoring to the broad needs of the group and its members. Consequently, they have the authoritative, comparatively stable character required to serve as reliable basic points of orientation. For both Plato and Polemaios, for example, the notion of a polis, widely conceived as a participatory, organised group of citizens, must have provided a crucial initial foothold in developing an understanding of their political environment and their place in it. It provided an irrevocable framework which shaped their subsequent political behaviour and thinking.

Second, it is necessary to remain mentally embedded in at least one political culture in order to be able to participate at all in meaningful political communication with others, which must draw on shared basic points of reference. Shared basic concepts and ideas are required to make possible even political disagreement, let alone

²⁶ On the indispensable role of culture and environment in providing such points of orientation, see Habermas (1987), chs. V–VI, esp. 120–6 (describing Habermas’ conception of the ‘lifeworld’ of a society); also Habermas (1972), 53; (1990a), 67–8, 102, 199. Note also Taylor (1989), esp. 35–40; compare Sandel (1982); Walzer (1983). For the general approach, see also Freedman (1996), e.g. 51.

²⁷ Compare Plato *Phaedrus* 249b3–c4: in order to serve as a human soul, as opposed to an animal’s, a soul must have had at least some experience of the really existing, perfect Forms. Even rudimentary human thought or communication requires at least hazy acquaintance with, or memory of, sophisticated paradigms. The paradigms of a political culture are, however, very different from Platonic Forms: they are mutable social constructs.

²⁸ Cf. Habermas (1972), esp. chs. 2–3.

²⁹ Cf. Habermas (1987), 124–6.

consensus.³⁰ To return to the specific example of Plato, both he and many staunch Athenian democrats were convinced of the need to identify solid ethical foundations for political life, and to protect them against opportunists and relativists. It was probably partly that shared conviction which made it possible for them to participate in vigorous exchanges about the nature of those foundations, and of the identity of the main relativistic threat to them: democracy, for Plato,³¹ or Socratic philosophy, for his opponents. Arena has recently made a similar case about the nature of Roman politics in the late Roman Republic, arguing that the Roman elite and its critics were able to debate strenuously the nature of *libertas* because they collaborated in maintaining a shared framework of language and debate. That shared framework was based on a consensual notion of *libertas* as freedom from even the possibility of arbitrary domination by another, which could be applied in contrasting egalitarian and anti-egalitarian ways.³²

On account of these two broad points, the traditional view that the elements of a group's political culture are comparatively stable, though mutable through long-term processes of reflection and dialogue, is probably preferable to a major modern alternative: the view that a group's political culture should be viewed as a radically mutable process or 'discourse', in which fluid shared concepts and rules are repeatedly constructed afresh.³³ The theory advocated here does, however, need to address some of the concerns motivating this alternative approach.

³⁰ Taylor (1985), 36–7. Taylor advocates the view that the shared political consciousness of a group consists of 'intersubjective meanings', in opposition (cf. Taylor (1985), 31–2) to the view of Almond and Verba, the political scientists who first attempted to make the notion of political culture useful for empirical political-scientific research, that a group's political culture is a composite of the subjective basic political attitudes of its members (cf. Almond and Verba (1963), 12–14, 16).

³¹ See especially Plato *Gorgias*, e.g. 464b2–466a3.

³² Arena (2012), 8, 11–13, 30–1, 44, 78–9, 200, 256–7, 265–6.

³³ For a historiographical example of this alternative approach, see the works on the French Revolution of Chartier, who emphasises, in a reaction against his *Annales* predecessors, the importance for

An immediate important objection to the picture offered here of strong mental embedding of individuals in political cultures might be that it presupposes that political communities are far more insular and simple than is usually the case. However, according to this theory, a group sharing a political culture need not be a stable or closed one. There may be frequent changes in membership, including through exile and migration (compare chapter 6 below). New members can then bring new assumptions and approaches, reinforcing other external influences. Those newcomers may even, through long, difficult processes, shed their earlier political cultures, or combine some or all of them with this new one: individuals are certainly not trapped in one political culture.

Moreover, a political culture is often itself internally dynamic. Indeed, as well as being able to explain the strong embeddedness of Greek citizens in particular political milieux, the conception of political culture followed here can also explain how Greek citizens such as Plato or Polemaios were nonetheless able to exercise substantial, unpredictable personal agency in their political thinking. The fundamental shared ideas of their political cultures provided starting-points and building-blocks of kinds which are, in fact, necessary for independent political reflection and decision-making.³⁴

historical explanation of studying practices, media and a particular notion of discourse, as opposed to ‘mentalities’ and representations; consider Chartier (1988), esp. 13–14, 36–7; 40; (1991), 6–7, 15–17, 42. The approach followed here is not, however, incompatible with less radical approaches to politics as discourse, which treat discourse as wide-ranging communication concerning ideas which are mutable but also durable: see, for example, Schmidt (2008), 309–313; compare the views analysed and partially endorsed in Welch (1993), chs. 6–7, esp. 111–17; 147–58.

³⁴ Compare Brock (2013), xii, on the mutable ‘underlying ideological landscape’ of Greek politics. Also recently on ancient Greece, compare Johnstone (2011), 6 (different socially constructed ‘logics’ and associated practices both enable and restrict individual agency) or van Nijf and Alston (2011a) (on the post-Classical polis). That latter volume borrows from the historian of early modern France L. Hunt

The internal range of even a single political culture is usually sufficiently wide to enable and encourage the extent of individual agency which makes possible both substantial conflict between members of the group sharing that political culture and substantial change in political ideas, even in the absence of strong influence from outside.³⁵ This is precisely because a group's political culture comprises all fundamental political ideas in circulation within it which are consensually accepted as valid bases for political claims. The ideas under this broad umbrella are very unlikely to form a unified whole, even if membership of the group is relatively closed and constant. More probably, the group's political culture will be a dynamic composite of varied, or even contradictory, basic ways of thinking about politics. In many cases, it will also be the case that significant ideas are ambiguous and indeterminate.³⁶ It is possible to point, for example, to the very varied, ambiguous basic ways of thinking about the foundational act of voting which are widely shared, at least unconsciously, by democratic citizens, no matter what policies or parties they tend to vote for. Should good citizens vote for the common good or each for their perceived self-interest? Should they treat voting as a political ritual of unity, or rather as an opportunity to display independence?

With all their variety and ambiguities, political cultures commonly not only enable, but also encourage, independent thought, often including reactions against widely

a conception of political culture as 'the values, expectations and implicit rules that expressed and shaped collective intentions and actions' (van Nijf and Alston (2011b), 11).

³⁵ For the difficulty of accounting for these social phenomena within a traditional 'mentalities' approach: Burke (1986), 443–4, 447.

³⁶ Cf. Ober (2003a), 237–8. Freedman (1996), 55–60, goes so far as to classify political concepts as 'essentially contested concepts' (compare his 60–7: political concepts as 'cluster concepts', with an 'ineliminable core' but an indeterminate, contested 'circumference').

accepted principles.³⁷ Contradictions and indeterminacies in basic shared assumptions can provoke a Socrates or a Plato to attempt to develop coherent, innovative philosophical syntheses of ideas about the good city and soul. For example, the city-soul analogy of Plato's *Republic* develops in a groundbreaking, provocative way the common Greek assumption that a polis is in some way analogous to an individual person or body.³⁸ In a less extreme version of this process, contradictions or indeterminacies within prevailing ideas about the nature of patriotism, and the status of the outside world, could lead a more conventional Greek, like Polemaios or Polybius, to reflect carefully about a particular choice of foreign policy, in a way which yielded an independent perspective (compare chapter 5 below).

Substantial conflict is possible when different individuals and groups seize on ideas with incompatible practical implications, or advocate contrasting interpretations of a single indeterminate idea. Similarly, substantial change occurs when individuals or groups interpret or combine ideas in new ways, for example by conceiving a synthesis of contradictory ideas in a new idea.³⁹ The phenomenon of divergent or even clashing applications of shared basic conceptions of good citizenship is evident in contrasting Roman republican interpretations of a shared notion of *libertas*, or in the two examples with which this introduction began. Polybius and the authors of the decree of the Delphic Amphictyony were each equally influenced by the metaphor of the good citizen's loyalty to certain abstract principles, which he can preserve regardless of his physical location and circumstances. However, they applied that metaphor to exiles' relationships with quite different types of fundamental political obligation,

³⁷ Compare Freedman (1996), 115–16.

³⁸ Compare Brock (2013), 74–6.

³⁹ 'Friction' between basic shared political assumptions as drivers of change and innovation: Lieberman (2002), 702–3; Schmidt (2008), 314–17, 320.

themselves drawn from the very broad repertoire of types of political virtue available within Greek civic political culture.

In addition to underpinning other mental constructions, including political philosophies, the fundamental ideas of political cultures provide the necessary starting-points and building-blocks for the thought and communication required to construct interlocking sets of ideas which are more complex, explicit and specific to particular political questions than the components of a political culture:⁴⁰ for example, different detailed ancient Greek ideas of democratic or aristocratic order, or modern conservative or liberal visions of society. Such more developed sets of practical ideas can be described as ideologies.⁴¹ As Freedon argues, individuals and groups develop ideological positions by interpreting, and giving more precise meaning to, the indeterminate, open-ended political concepts of their conceptual world. The resulting ideologies can themselves be open-ended and mutable, more like a developing, porous language than a fixed canon of principles.⁴² Indeed, unlike necessarily rigorous political philosophies, ideologies can involve varying degrees of intellectual content and supporting argument.⁴³

Unlike the fundamental ideas which make up a group's political culture, an ideology is almost always shaped by its adherents' social position and particular experiences. Moreover, an ideology often gives priority to the partisan interests of a particular group within the broader political community. There is, therefore, strong reason for

⁴⁰ Cf. Welch (1993), 108.

⁴¹ Alternatively, they could be characterised as 'programmatic beliefs', constructed upon a foundation of basic 'public philosophies' and issuing in more specific and pragmatic 'policy ideas': Schmidt (2008), 306–307.

⁴² See Freedon (1996), esp. 14, 39–40, 75–91.

⁴³ Compare the concept of 'intellectual traditions', intermediate between ideologies and philosophies, which Arena (2012), 6–8, 78–9, advocates as an alternative to 'ideologies'.

bearing in mind the Marxist notion of ideology as an important basis of class power.⁴⁴ However, it is not a necessary feature of an ideology that it should be partisan and power-oriented in this way: there can be complex, explicit and specific sets of political notions which are not of this kind.⁴⁵ On the other hand, very few developed ideologies command wide-ranging consensus within any political group. This is the main reason for not including ideologies themselves among the constituents of political culture, something necessarily shared and non-partisan.

Modern attempts, similar to this one, to mark out within the conceptual worlds of political communities a sphere of political culture, containing ideas and assumptions which are non-partisan and consensually accepted as valid foundations for political claims, have been strongly criticised. A major objection has been that all political ideas and norms are in some way oriented towards the assertion or preservation of the power of a partisan group, or even ideological in the Marxist sense.⁴⁶ Many taken-for-granted assumptions and more developed ideas can be described in that way,⁴⁷ but even those assumptions and ideas are often interwoven with non-partisan presuppositions. Indeed, individuals commonly succeed in inducing peers to accept their partisan ideological claims or assumptions only because they successfully manipulate non-partisan, consensual standards: their audience accepts their claims because they appear consistent with fundamental collective objectives.

⁴⁴ For discussion and criticism of the Marxist approach to ideology, see Rosen (1996).

⁴⁵ Compare Freedon (1996), 22–3: ideologies are always connected with political power, but not necessarily with exploitative political power.

⁴⁶ Cf. Pateman (1980).

⁴⁷ Compare Bourdieu's emphasis on taken-for-granted assumptions (the constituents of *doxa*) which are themselves strongly implicated in struggles for 'symbolic domination'; see, for example, Bourdieu (1990), 67–8; (1991), e.g. 50–2.

Consider, for example, Foucault's argument that the laws and institutions of the modern state should be seen principally as products of a political elite's rapacious pursuit of power. Habermas criticises this argument on the grounds that those in power rely on consensually accepted, communally beneficial norms to formulate and successfully advocate even their own partisan projects. For instance, the institutions and norms of bureaucratic, impersonal administration and surveillance which arguably sometimes form a basis for intrusive state control of national populations often, in fact, overlap substantially with the very institutions and norms consensually accepted as necessary for the effective and equitable functioning of a communally beneficial welfare state.⁴⁸ As the modern French historian Rosanvallon puts the general point, also reacting against some of Foucault's ideas, politics must be seen as a sphere, not simply of power and domination, but also of experimentation and exploration concerning shared values and problems.⁴⁹

According to this approach, followed here, ideological manipulation and rhetorical power plays are always parasitical on the conceptual and linguistic products of the cooperative pursuit of collective self-understanding: for effective oppression, oppressors and oppressed must share a common ethical and political language. Accordingly, it is wrong to see (for example) Liddell and Scott's Greek lexicon as a catalogue only of partisan words and ideas, weapons in power politics and class struggle. Any dictionary also records ideas which have been painstakingly developed by the members of political and cultural groups over long periods, through very complex and lengthy processes of collective reflection and pursuit of mutual understanding. These are neutral, consensual, often open-ended points of orientation,

⁴⁸ Habermas (1990b), 286–91.

⁴⁹ Rosanvallon (2006), 74–5.

and foundations for claims in social and political life. According to the approach followed in this book, it is of such ideas that a political culture is composed.

4.2. The relationship between political culture and political action

Political culture contributes to causing political action by helping to shape individuals' intentions and motives. Fundamental political ideas are most obviously relevant to explaining cases in which agents deliberate carefully before acting, especially when they deliberate about the ethical and political status of their action. However, they are also relevant in the case of more unconsidered or even impulsive action: they shape the agent's instincts and horizons, which are always in the background even of swift, situational decision-making.⁵⁰

The influence of one or more political cultures, combined with individual agency, obviously cannot offer a full account of political action. Socio-economic structures (class, status) and institutions, and individuals' interests within them, exert their own constraints. The discussion in the previous section entails, however, that the influence of those factors is not entirely distinct from that of political culture. Rather, the ideas which constitute political cultures themselves underpin social organisation and institutions: they enable agents to participate in the creation and perpetuation of social relationships, hierarchies and institutions⁵¹ and to recognise or conceive personal or sectional interests within them.⁵² The approach followed in this book is not, therefore, unsympathetic to arguments that political explanation must take account of the

⁵⁰ Compare Berman (2001), 241: 'the growing insistence that motivations, interests and preferences be analyzed and problematized rather than assumed or posited is one of the most important contributions that ideational scholarship has made.'

⁵¹ Cf. Godelier (1982), 16–17, 20–1, 32–8, on the necessary 'ideal' element in social relations; Berman (2001), 237–41, on the complex questions which must be tackled in studying 'institutionalisation' of ideas.

⁵² Habermas (1987), 95–6; (1990a), 67–8, 199–200; cf. Welch (1993), 112–13.

influence of both institutions and ideas on individuals' political action.⁵³ It clashes only with the more reductionist assumption that all human agents have predictable egoistic motivations, whose interactions with a given set of institutions can be quite straightforwardly mapped.

To take a concrete example, Polemaios, standing before the Roman Senate, was guided in his political action and speech by a wide range of interconnected factors: his own idiosyncratic preferences, fears and impulses on the day in question; his awareness of his class interest as a member of the landowning, credit-giving elite of Asia Minor, with a material interest in Roman support; but also the particular political attitudes and beliefs, such as patriotic pride in his own particular, small-scale polis, and its territory, traditions and autonomy, which he had assimilated from the political cultures to which he had been exposed.

It is also assumed in this book that there is a symmetrical indirect causal process in the other direction between political action, including the creation and running of institutions, and political culture.⁵⁴ By acting politically, proposing or using institutions or observing the political actions of others, individuals can come to understand better the political conceptions, paradigms and norms influential on them, or recognise new connections or contradictions between them. For example, the particular act of voting may lead citizens to recognise the ambiguous meaning of the vote, noted above. Similarly, the ways of thinking and behaving which individuals develop, or come to understand, through participation in institutions⁵⁵ provide a rich source of new ideas. If new ideas, inferences or associations resulting from action or

⁵³ See, for example, Lieberman (2002) and Schmidt (2008), arguing for 'discursive institutionalism'.

⁵⁴ Cf. Taylor (1985), 33–4.

⁵⁵ Compare Lieberman (2002), 700.

the functioning of institutions are confirmed and disseminated through political communication,⁵⁶ they themselves become part of the political culture affected.

4.3. Studying political culture through interpretation

If political culture is defined in the way outlined here, the problem arises of how any political culture can be studied with any rigour.⁵⁷ Since even survey interviews do not provide direct access, political culture can be effectively studied only through interpretation: political speech, organisation and action by members of a group should be interpreted as evidence for underlying shared conceptions, paradigms and norms, and tensions and ambiguities within or between them.⁵⁸ The aim is to find the best possible explanation, at the level of political culture and habituation, for the attested explicit rhetoric and action. This method is not far removed from that adopted by Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato's dialogues: the probing of common political and ethical statements, and associated practices, in order to discover the fundamental political and ethical paradigms or tensions presupposed or encouraged by them.

It is legitimate to interpret almost all political speech and action in this way: according to the argument developed in this introduction so far, some of the fundamental political ideas which determine agents' self-understanding and political horizons are necessarily at least implicit in much of their political action and speech, whether or not they have a firm or systematic grasp of them. A consequence of applying this approach is that underlying ideas are not fully articulated or represented in many of the pieces of evidence discussed. Indeed, very often, those pieces of evidence testify

⁵⁶ For an interpretation of such processes, see Schmidt (2008), especially pp. 309–314.

⁵⁷ For methodological defences of the use of the concept of political culture in historiography: Welch (1993), 147–58; Formisano (2001), esp. 426.

⁵⁸ Cf. Taylor (1985), 31–2. On the distinction between this 'interpretive' approach and 'behaviouralist' approaches to studying political culture: Welch (1993), 2–6.

only to Greek citizens acting upon basic paradigms and norms simply by thinking, speaking, organising and behaving in accordance with their requirements, without closely inspecting their own assumptions and motivations. For example, by voting to use public funds to support theatrical contests and subsequently attending them, Greek citizens presupposed and implied that cultural activities represented an important element of civic life, as well as actively making that the case. On the other hand, many members of the Athenian audience at any particular Great Dionysia, for example, would never have consciously reflected deeply about the relative importance of military, political and cultural activities in civic life, even though their own attendance was partly inspired by underlying Athenian ideals emphasising the intertwining of culture and politics.⁵⁹

In the face of this difficulty, it is the careful interpretation of a very wide range of contrasting evidence which creates the best chance of uncovering underlying political cultures. It is necessary to study together pieces of evidence drawn from quite different contexts, and of quite different levels of theoretical sophistication. This involves trying to identify the shared presuppositions and ambiguities of these contrasting pieces of evidence, through comparison of more explicit and more implicit, and more theoretical and more practical, expressions of basic political ideas.⁶⁰

It is partly this method of studying political culture which drives a central aim of this book: in the ancient Greek case, this approach demands an attempt to integrate better inscriptions and literary texts as evidence for Greek political assumptions and ideals.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Goldhill (1987), (2000), with earlier bibliography.

⁶⁰ Compare Rosanvallon (2006), esp. 64.

The value of integrating the epigraphic evidence is partly due to the fact that most inscribed decrees of Greek cities necessarily rested upon widely shared Greek ethical and political assumptions, because they had to be accepted by large and heterogeneous civic assemblies. Indeed, many inscribed civic decrees give a particularly direct insight into the processes by which diverse Greeks contributed to the painstaking, mammoth collective task of creating, sustaining and adapting a civic political culture.

In addition, the comparison of epigraphic with literary texts makes widely shared assumptions and ambiguities stand out: overlaps between texts of contrasting kinds strongly suggest the influence of underlying political culture. Each type of evidence also gives insights into the other. Inscriptions often give a sense of the wider conceptual context within which intellectuals made their theoretical interventions, including some of its tensions and ambiguities.⁶¹ In the other direction, some Greek philosophers' arguments and disagreements crystallise tensions within wider Greek ethical and political thinking. This throws into much sharper relief the distinctive aspects of particular pieces of inscribed rhetoric, or the submerged fault lines which cut through an apparently bland assemblage of civic virtues in an honorary decree. For this period, in particular, it is fortunate that Aristotle self-consciously set out to capture in sharper form widespread ethical and political assumptions. The result is that Aristotle's analyses of, for example, different approaches to friendship or political theorising, and also his own equivocation between those approaches (see chapter 1), make it much easier to discern patterns, ambiguities and tensions in non-philosophical Greek rhetoric.

⁶¹ Compare the approach to political thought championed by Pocock, e.g. (1972), and Skinner, e.g. (2002).

Interpretation of varied Greek political texts as evidence for underlying political cultures cannot yield indisputable answers: the resulting picture of political culture will inevitably be open to further debate. Nevertheless, great care can be taken to tie an interpretation very closely to the evidence. A specific danger with the method is that, whatever attested political speech or action is the object of interpretation, the interpreter can easily import the ideas of his own society.⁶² In order to minimise this risk of anachronism, it is important that any reconstructed political conception, paradigm or norm should be amenable to being described using language and concepts attested for the society concerned.

Nevertheless, it is legitimate and often even necessary to use alien terminology to classify and analyse reconstructed political ideas, especially those which remain mainly latent or unconscious in a given society. In the Greek case, as will be argued in chapter 1 and subsequent chapters, common items of Greek political vocabulary often had very varied meanings. Moreover, the Greeks had not always already developed words to describe important political ideas: as Brock has recently emphasised, Greek thinkers and politicians could use political imagery and metaphor to ‘illuminate thoughts which (were) not yet explicitly formulated’.⁶³ The result is that it could be misleading or limiting to use principally individual words to map Greek political culture. The character of Greek political culture can best be captured by identifying, with convenient modern or invented terminology, the basic political ideas evident in

⁶² Welch (1993), 98, 105–106.

⁶³ Brock (2013), xi.

whole pieces of rhetoric, institutions or actions, between which individual Greek terms could be ambiguous.⁶⁴

Despite these complications, the application of this approach to explicit Greek political language is the most straightforward one, which gives the most direct insights into the fundamental assumptions which an individual either himself held or expected his audience to hold. It is much more difficult to accurately identify the basic political ideas which guided Greek citizens' decisions about institutions and actions on the sole evidence of results of those decisions: there are great difficulties in putting into practice the method advocated by Taylor, the identification of the 'view of the agent and his relations to others' which is 'implicit in social practices'.⁶⁵ These difficulties arise from the fact that it was perfectly possible for a Greek citizen to behave in a way which can be analysed in certain terms while being guided by a quite different understanding of his action. For example, it has recently been forcefully argued that participation in Greek political meetings and religious festivals provided excellent means for individuals to develop useful and lucrative networks of acquaintances.⁶⁶ This does not, however, mean that relevant individuals were self-consciously economically rational. The argument could be true even if most Greeks took part in such gatherings exclusively because they were committed to ideals of civic participation and piety.

⁶⁴ Compare Cairns (2008), esp. 49–50, on the plurality of 'scripts' underlying most terms for emotions in ancient Greek (and other languages). Even strong advocates of the importance of studying closely the meanings of individual political words often also stress the need to take account of ways of thinking and underlying assumptions, for which societies sometimes take considerable time to find an appropriate vocabulary (see Skinner (2002), 159–60; compare Arena (2012), 31, 33).

⁶⁵ Taylor (1985), 35.

⁶⁶ On this function of Athenian political meetings, see recently Ober (2008).

As a result of this problem, particular care is taken in this book to justify claims that certain decisions about political institutions and actions are sufficient evidence for the influence of particular ways of understanding politics. At least one of two conditions must be met. First, it is necessary to ask whether it would have made sense to citizens to make particular decisions unless they were guided by relevant political ideas. If this question must be answered negatively, that gives strong grounds for believing that those ideas were influential. Alternatively, it is possible to ask whether significant links can be shown between the types of political assumption reconstructed as underlying particular political decisions, on the one hand, and, on the other, the explicit political principles advocated in other contexts by the agents concerned, or by others exposed to the same political cultures. If such links can be identified, and if the relevant assumptions seem to provide the best explanation for the motivations and decision-making of the agents for whom explicit statements of principles are lacking, that also provides strong grounds for believing that those assumptions were influential.

5. Exile and exiles as a key to understanding the political cultures of Greek poleis

As suggested at the start, later-Classical and Hellenistic rhetoric, action and institutions related to the context of exile provide crucial insights into the political cultures of the Greek civic world as a whole, and also of particular poleis. It is important to bear in mind these two levels of Greek civic political culture, and their interconnections. Certain basic conceptions, paradigms and norms were widely dispersed around the Greek civic world: they made up a single, highly generic Greek civic political culture. Individual poleis' political cultures drew on, and fed into, this

wider civic political culture, not least through exile and migration themselves, but often gave widespread ideas more specific, local forms.

Exile is a particularly good tool for investigating these different levels of Greek political culture because it necessarily brought to the fore fundamental questions about politics: criteria of political exclusion and inclusion; the legitimacy of different forms of political organisation and behaviour; and even the nature of political utopia and dystopia. These issues could be brought into focus when, as in the two examples with which this introduction began, Greeks reflected on particular exiles' ethical qualities.

However, there were also many other ways, examined in the successive chapters of this book, in which exile catalysed fundamental reflection about politics or exposed basic assumptions, ambiguities and contradictions. Chapters 1–3 examine static products of political interaction: texts and institutions, of types widely attested for different poleis, in which ideas and practices relating to citizenship were crystallised. Chapters 1 and 2 address texts regulating and discussing the reintegration of exiles into poleis. Chapter 3 turns to the process inverse to reintegration, examining texts regulating or discussing the criteria for the lawful expulsion or disenfranchisement of citizens.

In these three chapters, the texts and the institutions those texts establish or advocate illuminate relevant political cultures. In producing relevant epigraphic texts, citizens were obliged to define through dialogue criteria for the exclusion and inclusion of citizens, capable of commanding wide-ranging consensus. In doing so, they

necessarily made explicit shared fundamental assumptions and equivocations about the nature of the good polis and the good citizen, and their opposites, as a well as applying and developing those assumptions in revealing ways. These chapters' subject matter also lends itself to productive juxtaposition of relevant inscriptions with discussions of the general problems by intellectuals and philosophers, for the sake of exposing common underlying political cultures.

While chapters 1–3 examine static products of political interaction, chapters 4–6 examine dynamic political interactions, treating them as further evidence for the shape of civic political cultures. Chapter 4 examines the rhetoric and behaviour of citizens in times of civic peace, showing the workings in practice of the paradigms identified in chapters 1–3. A connection is made with the main theme of exile through analysis of the rhetoric of participants in Athenian legal cases in which the exile of one of the participants was a looming possibility. Chapter 5 analyses the political language and behaviour of factionaries in civil wars leading to expulsions of citizens. Turning to a different type of political interaction, chapter 6 considers the political identities and organisation of exiles, predominantly groups of fellow exiles from one place or several places. It examines exiles expelled through a wide range of processes, including both members of factions expelled through *stasis* and whole civic populations expelled in interstate war.

The types of rhetoric and action selected for examination in these last three chapters are particularly revealing of citizens' fundamental political assumptions, and the different ways in which they applied them. Making a speech advocating or opposing calls for the expulsion of a citizen, of the kind considered in chapter 4, forced an

orator to appeal to basic criteria of inclusion or exclusion. Similarly, bouts of *stasis* leading to exile, examined in chapter 5, were periods of existential crisis for many poleis, which forced citizens to fall back on, but also to examine, their basic assumptions about politics, especially their assumptions regarding political membership, entitlement and virtue. As for chapter 6, the political identities and organisation of Greek exiles provide a unique laboratory of political habits, assumptions and ideals. In developing *ab initio* their own political relationships and institutions in exile, exiled citizens, especially when gathered in groups, were forced to make the most basic choices about citizen identity and citizen organisation, which they never faced directly within the established political systems of their home cities.

In addition to revealing underlying political assumptions, analysis of the political speech and action addressed in these three chapters also makes it possible to consider the ways in which the indeterminacies and contradictions of Greek civic political culture enabled and encouraged individual agency. These chapters argue that orators in the courts, rivals in *staseis* leading to exile and groups of exiles adapting to different habitats in exile were able to exercise agency in appropriating, interpreting or modifying established basic political norms in very varied ways.

The forms of political interaction considered in these chapters also illustrate the influence of exile on civic political cultures. The attested speech and behaviour of some exiles, considered in chapter 6, indicates ways in which their experience of exile shaped their political consciousness. In some cases, such modifications of perspective were disseminated into wider Greek civic political culture, with significant consequences for the development of the polis.

6. Recent debates about the political cultures of the later-Classical and Hellenistic polis, and this book's response to them

This section places the book in the context of existing scholarship concerning the political cultures of later-Classical and Hellenistic poleis. The dominant tendency in scholarship concerning Greek political cultures and civic life in these periods has been to emphasise the influence of one particular basic political paradigm: a paradigm of the good polis as a community of participatory, virtuous citizens, united in solidarity and political friendship through civic education, shared civic ideals and collective civic practices and laws.

According to this paradigm, civic education in a wide variety of forms, including both legally regulated and more informal ones, is one of the most crucial means of maintaining citizens' characters and civic harmony. This paradigm requires that the good citizen should, as made forcefully explicit in the decree of the Delphic Amphictyony considered at the start, devote himself to the welfare of his polis and its institutions and culture.

This kind of basic understanding of the nature of a good polis and a good citizen has been widely recognised as underpinning much of Aristotle's political and ethical philosophy,⁶⁷ which was, as mentioned in section 4.3, partly an attempt to capture common fourth-century assumptions. Many scholars have emphasised Aristotle's insistence that the end (τέλος) of a complete, true polis is realised when its citizens

⁶⁷ Cf. Barnes (1990); Cooper (1999), chs. 6, 9–10; (2000); Rowe and Schofield (2000), chs. 15–18, e.g. 316–17; Kraut (2002); Irwin (2007), 208–32. The main evidence for this interpretation of Aristotle's political philosophy is derived from Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* Books I, VI; *Politics* Books II–III, VII–VIII.

all choose,⁶⁸ within the framework of civic law, to satisfy standards of civic virtue (or ‘living well’) inculcated in them through civic education.⁶⁹ Indeed, Cooper has recently argued that Aristotle intended to suggest that an individual can understand and act on full human virtue only through political interaction with fellow citizens who also aspire to it.⁷⁰ In any legitimate constitution, including that of Aristotle’s ideal polis, citizens exercise magistracies in ways conducive to the common good, rather than in ways which further their narrow personal or sectional interests.⁷¹

Although Aristotle’s emphasis on civic virtue and community is often regarded as a reaction against prevailing Athenian democratic norms encouraging individual freedom,⁷² many scholars have emphasised the prevalence of norms of solidarity and civic virtue in Athenian democratic political culture itself.⁷³ The Athenian ideal of democratic citizenship has been interpreted as requiring of the good citizen substantial, enthusiastic engagement in the Athenian civic community, if necessary at the expense of narrow personal interests.⁷⁴ This expectation has been seen to guide a range of specific aspects of Athenian democratic civic life: for example, economic and financial relations between citizens, such as those involved in money-lending;⁷⁵ the shape of religious and dramatic festivals;⁷⁶ attitudes concerning public speaking;⁷⁷

⁶⁸ Nussbaum (1980), esp. 422–3.

⁶⁹ E.g. Kraut (1989), 90–104; (2002), esp. chs. 6–7; Depew (2009), esp. 401–408. Note especially Aristotle *Politics* 1278b21–3; 1280a25–1281a8; 1263b36–7; also *Nicomachean Ethics* 1099b29–32.

⁷⁰ Cooper (2010), 228–48; cf. Cooper (1999), ch. 15.

⁷¹ See, for example, Aristotle *Politics* 1279a25–31.

⁷² E.g. Schofield (2000), 317; compare Christ (2012), 50, 61–7, on the community-oriented ideas of other intellectuals at Athens.

⁷³ For the overlaps between utopian political philosophy and mainstream political debate in the fourth-century: Bertrand (1999); Loraux (2001); (2005); Holmes (2005), 12–15.

⁷⁴ For example, with varying emphases: Humphreys (1978), 239–40; Loraux (1981); Ober (1989), 68, 72, 81, 262–3; Loraux (2001); (2005), 39–40; Wolpert (2002), 78–9; Farenga (2006), 536–7; Herman (2006).

⁷⁵ Millett (1991).

⁷⁶ Seaford (1994), chs. 7 and 10; Parker (2005).

⁷⁷ See recently Saxonhouse (2006).

approaches to dispute-resolution and the courts;⁷⁸ and widespread concern with individuals' character and education as guides to their suitability as citizens or political leaders.⁷⁹

Other scholars have argued for the prominence of civic unity and solidarity as components of the Classical Greek civic ideal more generally.⁸⁰ For example, the common Greek metaphor of the polis as a body which is put under severe strain in *stasis* presupposes that a good polis should have an organic unity.⁸¹ Studies of more theoretical Greek political language have emphasised many Classical Greeks' high evaluation of forms of 'positive' and 'republican' liberty: liberty as self-mastery; liberty as the state of being liberally educated and capable of social interaction through reason, not force; and liberty as the freedom to participate in civic government.⁸² Others have shown similar patterns in Classical Greek evaluations of emotions. An important case is Classical Greeks' frequently high evaluation of 'shame' (αἰδώς). That emotion was commonly conceptualised as a form of concern for others' opinion which reinforced, rather than clashing with, respect for demanding, non-negotiable ethical standards, because it compelled self-restraint and civic commitment.⁸³

These aspects of the Classical Greek civic ideal of unity and fraternity have been shown to have found very varied expression in widespread institutions and practices:

⁷⁸ Herman (2006).

⁷⁹ This last tendency may have become more pronounced in the mid-fourth century: Allen (2006); compare Azoulay (2006b).

⁸⁰ E.g. Veyne (1982), 884–888; Murray (1990c), esp. 21–3; Bertrand (1992), 76–7, 194; Ludwig (2002), 339–40. On special concern with solidarity in Spartan political culture (principally with reference to the Archaic period): Nafissi (2009), 130–1.

⁸¹ Cf. Brock (2000), (2013), 74–6; Kosak (2000), 45–51.

⁸² E.g. Cartledge (2000), 16–20; cf. Laks (2007) on Plato's *Laws*.

⁸³ Cairns (1993), esp. 235–7, 354–60 (discussing in particular Plato *Protagoras* 322b6–323a4); Williams (1993).

rituals of civic commensality, which helped to represent a polis as like a household or family;⁸⁴ collective involvement in, and commemoration of, war;⁸⁵ the development of imagined relations of ‘kinship’ through common descent⁸⁶ or real relations of friendship or erotic love between citizens;⁸⁷ the development of collective traditions about local history and origins;⁸⁸ or the stirring and transformative use of political language and rhetoric.⁸⁹

Studies of the political cultures of poleis after the conquests of Alexander the Great also tend to emphasise features which can be seen to be inspired by underlying commitment to principles of civic solidarity and unity. Many such studies, in which the poleis of Asia Minor tend to figure prominently, stress the expectations of civic virtue, public-spiritedness and participation on the part of civic elites reflected in the phenomenon of civic euergetism, in the ascendant in the Hellenistic polis, and the associated prominence of honorific decrees and portraits.⁹⁰ Some also emphasise other aspects of the civic life of Hellenistic poleis which also reflected and reinforced underlying ideals of solidarity: the holding of civic festivals, including festivals celebrating civic unity or the city itself;⁹¹ the expectation that family life and reproduction would serve the interests of the city, reflected in marriage practices;⁹² the employment of public doctors;⁹³ the publicly administered, ethical and cultural education of young citizens, especially in the gymnasium, designed to socialise them

⁸⁴ Schmitt-Pantel (1992).

⁸⁵ Cf. Raaflaub and Wallace (2007), 35 (on the hoplite phalanx in the Archaic period).

⁸⁶ E.g. Loraux (1981); Lape (2010).

⁸⁷ Schofield (1999b), 35–46; Loraux (2001), ch. 8; Ludwig (2002).

⁸⁸ See, for example, Clarke (2008); or the papers collected in Foxhall, Gehrke and Luraghi (2010).

⁸⁹ Bertrand (1992); (1999), 49–50, 396–400.

⁹⁰ E.g. Veyne (1976); Gauthier (1985); Fröhlich (2005), 239, 255–6; Ma (2013), esp. chs. 1–2. On the corresponding interest in ‘generosity’ in Hellenistic political philosophy: Laks and Schofield (1995).

⁹¹ Thériault (1996); Chaniotis (1995); Chankowski (2005).

⁹² van Bremen (1996); (2003).

⁹³ Davies (1984), 307–8; Massar (2005).

into civic life and to make them identify with their city;⁹⁴ rigorous programmes of military training for young citizens and schemes of military duties for older citizens;⁹⁵ and the corporate solidarity and virtue-oriented rhetoric of Hellenistic poleis in communication with kings.⁹⁶

In opposition to this dominant interpretation, which stresses Greek emphasis on civic solidarity, other scholars argue that later-Classical and Hellenistic civic political cultures and political philosophy gave much greater importance to individualism and to competition between citizens.⁹⁷ The influence of Horden and Purcell (2000), with its emphasis on interconnections between poleis and personal mobility, has been a significant recent bolster to such views. For example, Vlassopoulos, inspired by Horden and Purcell, has argued that the diversity and variability of civic populations was reflected in prominent Greek conceptions of good social and political communities, which gave such communities more fluid boundaries and a greater level of internal diversity than characteristic of a closed, inward-looking, solidaristic polis.⁹⁸

Scholars have long emphasised Greek expectations, institutions and ways of thinking which can be seen to be inspired by one particular basic political paradigm with individualistic colouring: a paradigm of the good polis as an efficient, fair association of mainly self-interested, competitive citizens. Such an association is regulated by laws and procedures of a quite minimalist type, entirely different from those

⁹⁴ See, for example, Gauthier (1995); Gehrke (2004); Kennell (2013).

⁹⁵ Ma (2000); Chaniotis (2005), especially 20–6.

⁹⁶ Ma (2002a).

⁹⁷ Cf. Long (R.T.) (2007). On the polarisation of modern scholarly interpretations of Greek political culture emphasising solidarity and individualism respectively: Loraux (1981), 4–7; Murray (1990c), 2–3.

⁹⁸ Vlassopoulos (2007a), esp. chs. 2–3.

characteristic of the community-oriented paradigm: laws and procedures whose principal roles are to resolve disputes, maintain basic order and identify overlaps between the contrasting interests of different citizens.

Such an association is also regulated by principles of tit-for-tat reciprocity. Those principles have a particular influence on the granting of civic rewards and incentives. Under tit-for-tat reciprocity, benefits and slights are returned in kind, in a context which allows the return to be seen as a direct response to the earlier good or bad turn or even as a repayment of a symbolic ‘loan’,⁹⁹ even if not very close to it in time.¹⁰⁰ As a result, when tit-for-tat reciprocity dominates, individuals give benefits to others in the expectation of a direct return at some stage.

It is very important to be clear that relations of tit-for-tat reciprocity are fundamentally different from other social relations which can also be described as reciprocal. Under an alternative, more ‘generalised’ regime of reciprocity, a citizen might aid another citizen or his polis for a less focussed reason: because he hopes to be in a position to call on the general good-will of the recipient, or of observers of his generosity, if he should find himself in need in some indefinite context at some indefinite future time.¹⁰¹

Indeed, a sociological observer might argue that the forms of civic benevolence treated here as intrinsic requirements of the other, more community-oriented paradigm

⁹⁹ Cf. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1162b31–3.

¹⁰⁰ For the possibility of tit-for-tat reciprocity, in accordance with an agreement (ὁμολογία), with a ‘friendly’ delay, see Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1162b25–9.

¹⁰¹ Compare Sahlins’ distinction between ‘balanced’ and ‘generalised’ reciprocity, critically discussed in van Wees (1998), 22–3. The objection to this distinction raised by van Wees is that a precisely calculated exchange does not involve the performance of generosity intrinsic to reciprocity on his definition (see pp. 18–19), but this book adopts a much broader conception of reciprocity.

are, in fact, usually moves in a more extended and nebulous reciprocal process guided by such hopes.¹⁰² This point is worth exploring, because it bears on a crucial objection to my approach: the objection that the polis-as-association paradigm being introduced here is not really so different from the previous polis-as-community paradigm. Can we not easily reconcile the two paradigms as different applications of vague basic ideas of reciprocity and two-sidedness? The problem with such an objection is that there is limited evidence for Greek political orators and philosophers explicitly accepting the alternative, more nebulous form of reciprocity identified above, still involving strategic pursuit of self-interest, as a positive ethical approach. It is true that that alternative form might offer a valid sociological analysis of some Greek civic benevolence apparently inspired by commitment to community. Nonetheless, Greek political orators and philosophers do not seem to have understood community and solidarity principally in that way. In so far as any Greek political orators and philosophers did explicitly embrace forms of strategic reciprocity, they tended to concentrate on tit-for-tat relations involving clearly identifiable, proportionate obligations of gratitude (χάρσις) between benefactors and beneficiaries.¹⁰³

Probably the closest thing to explicit endorsement of a more nebulous form of strategic reciprocity in attested Greek political oratory and philosophy is the argument that it is worth contributing to the prosperity of one's polis, because one may need to rely on one's polis as a safety-blanket at some indefinite future time of personal crisis.¹⁰⁴ However, that argument does not appeal directly to the instrumental material benefits accruing from good reputation and good social relations, only to those

¹⁰² Compare the interpretation of Athenian credit relations in Millett (1991); see also van Wees (1998), 19.

¹⁰³ For more on these points, see the discussion of Demosthenes *Against Leptines* in chapter 3.4 below.

¹⁰⁴ Consider Pericles at Thucydides 2.60.2–3, discussed in chapter 5.4.2.

deriving from an impersonal collective store of resources, to whose size all citizens can contribute.

To say that alternative forms of strategic reciprocity, lacking clearly identifiable, precise relations of χάρις, are not strongly endorsed in Greek political oratory and philosophy is not to deny that many Greek advocates of more community-oriented values, including Aristotle himself in relevant parts of his work, did regard benefactions to the polis as personally beneficial for the benefactor. It is simply to insist that what most such Greeks regarded as most personally valuable was the intrinsic quality of the social relations and lifestyle involved in engaged civic service, appreciated only by individuals with roots in their civic communities and an elevated, community-oriented understanding of personal well-being. They set much greater store by that than by the contingent accompanying gains in material goods and useful esteem, potentially appreciated by anyone. According to this way of thinking, there is no question of the good benefactor being directly and principally motivated by the prospect of narrow personal gain, in wealth or honour, even if it should happen to accrue to him through his actions. Rather, the focus of the good benefactor's motivations is civic commitment and engagement with his fellow citizens, through which he knows that his self will be changed, and then benefited in its changed form. Indeed, he will become enmeshed with his community to a degree which makes it pointless to think strategically about future benefits for himself in isolation.

A similar case can be made about the overlap between Greek language about civic benefaction and a still more indefinite and nebulous form of 'generalised reciprocity': the 'golden-rule' form, under which an individual acts benevolently because he

wishes to contribute to maintaining or creating a generalised expectation throughout his society that all should behave in a similarly benevolent way, without any expectation of a certain return, when circumstances make it necessary. There is little sign of Greek political orators and philosophers advocating the strategic pursuit of personal advantage through this type of ‘generalised reciprocity’. By contrast, there is good evidence for Greeks recognising the potential of this type of ‘generalised reciprocity’ to reinforce civic community. For example, Greek citizens commonly praised a particular benefactor, in a speech or honorary decree, for being an exemplary model for others. The stress in such cases lay on the considerations emphasised in my account of the polis-as-community paradigm in this section: self-restraint, education of others and a substantial notion of the common good.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, in general, as this book will argue, there is little sign of a middle way in Greek concepts of civic generosity between two extremes, often combined within the political outlook of Greek citizens: on the one hand, stress on tit-for-tat requital, underpinned by a quite narrow conception of what enlightened pursuit of self-interest might involve; on the other, stress on self-sacrifice, civic commitment and exemplarity, which may well bring long-term, broadly conceived happiness to the benefactors involved.

The overarching polis-as-association approach to civic virtue and ethics is evident in a strong form in the extract from Polybius considered at the start: Polybius there explicitly elevates good faith in respect for rules and contracts above direct concern for communal welfare, traditions and institutions. As far as fourth-century philosophy is concerned, Yack has reacted against dominant interpretations of Aristotle’s political

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, *I.Sestos* 1 (c. 120 BC), ll. 70–72; *I.Iasos* 98 (first century BC), ll. 16–19.

philosophy as strongly concerned with political solidarity. In his view, the more pragmatic claims and proposals offered in some parts of the *Ethics* and *Politics* themselves constitute a normative theory of truly political interaction: Aristotle regarded regulated conflict and competition between citizens as a natural part of politics, at least in any polis inferior to the utopia sketched in *Politics* Books VII–VIII.¹⁰⁶ Ober has even defended the view that Aristotle at times treats a polis as a social contract, emphasising that Aristotle argues that individuals and households initially come together in a polis for their mutual advantage (‘for the sake of bare life’).¹⁰⁷

Other scholars have made similar criticisms of the dominant interpretation of Classical Athenian political culture as strongly community-oriented, identifying important elements in Athenian attitudes and practices more suited to a fair association of competitive citizens.¹⁰⁸ Some have emphasised fundamental norms guaranteeing individual freedom and security, especially in the economic sphere: norms giving priority to individuals’ property rights and personal liberty from slavery or imprisonment;¹⁰⁹ or norms granting special importance to everyday formal and informal voluntary agreements between citizens (and between citizens and outsiders).¹¹⁰ Others have emphasised Athenian democratic basic norms encouraging individuals to pursue their self-interest within regulated bounds; making hard bargaining for individual advantage a paradigm of legal and political speech; or promoting the enforcement of principles of tit-for-tat reciprocity and personal

¹⁰⁶ Yack (1985); (1993). Compare Saxonhouse (1992), 203–204, who attributes to Aristotle the quite extreme view that ‘to have factions is to be a polis, so to speak’.

¹⁰⁷ Ober (1996), ch. 11. See Aristotle *Politics* 1252b27–30; compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 1160a8–14.

¹⁰⁸ For a recent extended version of this case, see Christ (2012).

¹⁰⁹ E.g. Kahrstedt (1934), 133–57, with Scafuro (1994a), 3.

¹¹⁰ E.g. Cohen (1973); (2000), chs. 5–6; (2003).

desert.¹¹¹ For example, scholars have drawn attention to Athenian democratic norms making grants of citizenship dependent on concrete financial or political contributions¹¹² and to Athenian democratic norms of punishment and retribution making the attribution of personal just deserts the main function of civic legal institutions.¹¹³ Related to such approaches is Ober's recent attempt to present the Classical democracy as a knowledge-aggregating 'machine', 'fuelled by a variety of incentives'.¹¹⁴

Such interpretations of Athenian democratic basic norms can be compared with scholarly attempts to characterise more widespread Classical Greek ideas of citizenship as grounded in a conception of the good polis as an efficient, fair association. For example, some scholars suggest that a dominant Classical Greek idea of a citizen-body was that of a body of shareholders,¹¹⁵ analogous to shareholders in a company. This interpretation of Greek ideas of citizenship can in turn be put in the context of a broader scholarly tendency to identify reciprocity and reciprocal exchange as cornerstones of Greek ethics.¹¹⁶

A minor strand in scholarship concerning the Hellenistic polis makes norms appropriate to an efficient, fair civic association a determining influence on Hellenistic civic life. Bargaining and reciprocal exchange of favours have been

¹¹¹ Contrast the view of Seaford (1994), esp. 191–206, 303–7, 388–405, that Classical Athenian political culture was marked by a rejection of socially disruptive principles of material reciprocity (the Homeric inheritance) in favour of ideals of civic solidarity.

¹¹² Davies (1977/8), 114–15, 118–20.

¹¹³ Allen (2000), esp. 241.

¹¹⁴ Ober (2008), 121.

¹¹⁵ J.K. Davies, *OCD* s.v. 'citizenship'; compare Todd (1993), 182; Brun (2000), 134; Christ (2006), ch. 1 (on Athens).

¹¹⁶ Cf. most papers in Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford (1998); Balot (2001), e.g. 5–6.

identified as the hallmark of relations between poleis and their benefactors¹¹⁷ and between poleis and their sanctuaries in Hellenistic Asia Minor.¹¹⁸ Moreover, scholars have analysed in similar terms Hellenistic federal states or *koina*, such as Polybius' Achaian League, which incorporated many poleis and usually reproduced familiar civic institutions on a larger scale. For example, Mackil has recently presented the political life of such federal states as distinguished by bargaining, give-and-take and compromise between member states and the central federal authorities.¹¹⁹ Such accounts of Hellenistic civic and federal life can be set alongside accounts of mid- and later-Hellenistic Stoicism which identify the protection of property rights and other individual entitlements as a priority of Stoic political philosophy from the mid-Hellenistic period onwards.¹²⁰

In addition to the paradigm of a good polis as an efficient, fair association, two other basic individualistic paradigms of citizenship have been presented as characteristic of the fourth-century Athenian democracy. First, D.J. Cohen (1995) argues that, in the fourth-century Athenian law-courts, dominant underlying civic norms encouraged competitive self-assertion by citizens, as heads of households. In his view, the relevant norms did not discourage even extremely aggressive, almost anarchic pursuit of personal and family feuds through civic institutions. Second, there has been an increasing tendency, partly motivated in some cases by a desire to differentiate Greek civic political thinking from communitarian or even totalitarian approaches,¹²¹ to assimilate the norms of fourth-century Athenian political culture to what can be called

¹¹⁷ E.g. Davies (1984), 307, 310–11.

¹¹⁸ Dignas (2002).

¹¹⁹ Mackil (2013), e.g. 346, 392–8.

¹²⁰ Long (1995); (1997).

¹²¹ Note, in particular, anti-totalitarian interpretations of the Greek polis developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, such as Arendt (1958), e.g. 24–33, 205–207; Vernant (1962).

‘proto-Kantian’ assumptions: the basic, uncoded assumptions which have been developed into systematic philosophies in both Kantian moral philosophy and ensuing neo-Kantian moral and political philosophy.

I am referring in particular to the basic ethical assumptions about the value of individuals as ends in themselves which are given formal shape in the ‘Humanity’ and ‘Kingdom of Ends’ versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative: the imperative ‘so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’; and the requirement that ‘a rational being must always regard himself as lawgiving in a kingdom of ends possible through freedom of the will, whether as a member or as sovereign’, that is, as a member of a potential community of fellow legislators who treat one another as moral ends in themselves and engage in rational deliberation about morality.¹²² I am also referring to the related basic political assumptions developed into systematic form in subsequent, more explicitly political and pluralist¹²³ developments and adaptations of relevant aspects of Kant’s thought in neo-Kantian philosophies, notably those of Rawls and Habermas.¹²⁴ According to such underlying assumptions, citizens should show unconditional equal respect, for its own sake, towards all individual fellow citizens and their aims in life. Showing such respect involves recognising that all fellow citizens are capable of formulating their own valid ethical and political ideas. This usually makes necessary recognition of the simultaneous validity of a wide

¹²² Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4.429 and 434, in the translation of M. Gregor (Korsgaard and Gregor (1998)).

¹²³ For the view that there are significant pluralistic elements in Kant’s own philosophy, sometimes implicit, see Hill (2000).

¹²⁴ See especially Rawls (1972); Habermas (1996). Admittedly, both Rawls and Habermas diverge substantially from Kant, rejecting the transcendental foundations of his moral theory. However, similarities in basic approach are substantial: Kant’s ideal of a self-legislating ‘Kingdom of Ends’ can be seen as providing the basic structure even of Habermas’ Ideal Speech Situation, even though Habermas makes his ideal community of mutually respectful legislators more social or sociable, in accordance with Hegel’s criticisms of Kant, and more political, in accordance with Marxist thought.

range of divergent, often conflicting points of view. Significantly, according to this set of basic political assumptions, this recognition should not take the form merely of passive, detached acceptance: citizens must put it into practice through participation in extensive pluralistic dialogue and deliberation, in which they each attempt to understand one another and to find common ground.

Few would claim that the ethical universalism of Kant and some of his successors finds many prominent precursors in Classical Athenian political culture, but several scholars have argued that the Athenians did strongly value relevant types of mutual respect in connection with a more limited range of human relationships, those among fellow citizens. One relevant recent example is Liddel (2007), a very thought-provoking previous attempt to weld together the evidence of literary sources and inscriptions, in order to offer a broad account of Greek political thinking. Liddel recognises substantial differences between the good liberal society and the fourth-century Athenian democratic ideal. However, he also identifies substantial overlaps between the two, especially between the basic conceptions of liberty and obligation prominent in each. According to him, in fourth-century Athenian political culture, individual liberty was predominantly interpreted as the liberty to participate in a political community, partly prefiguring Rawls' good society, of mutually respectful, relatively equal citizens with reciprocal political obligations.¹²⁵

In a partly similar vein, Ober consciously draws on Rawls' ideas¹²⁶ in arguing that fundamental Classical Athenian civic norms gave very considerable weight to respect

¹²⁵ For a similar interpretation of Athenian notions of the freedom of the citizen, this time expressed within a civic republican framework: Cartledge and Edge (2009).

¹²⁶ Cf. Rawls (1972); (2000).

for the dignity of individual citizens, including their right to free speech.¹²⁷ Ober makes subtle and effective distinctions between different types of ‘dignitarian’ approach. For example, he has recently endorsed the view that a ‘fully moralized Kantian conception of human dignity as intrinsic worth without price’ is ‘distinctly modern’. This forms part of his argument that the ancient Athenians developed a more limited notion of ‘civic dignity’ as freedom from humiliation and infantilisation, mutually recognised only by fellow citizens of the same polis.¹²⁸

Ober’s discussion leaves two possibilities open. On the one hand, Athenian democrats may have believed that respect for another man’s dignity should be unconditional and for its own sake, provided that he cleared the hurdle of being a fellow citizen. On the other, they may have thought that such respect ought to be more deeply conditional on that other man’s conformity with shared aims or identity. Nevertheless, Ober explicitly presents as central to any form of dignity ‘having one’s claims recognised and respected by others’,¹²⁹ presumably irrespective of the content of those claims, a point which favours the former interpretation of how his argument applies to Athens. Understood in that way, even Ober’s Athenian ‘civic dignitarianism’ can be characterised as proto-Kantian, to the extent that it too anticipates, in restricted form, Kantian concern with entirely unconditional respect for individuals as ends in themselves. This aspect of Ober’s work chimes with parts of Hansen’s picture of Athenian democratic political culture: without explicitly drawing attention to Kantian

¹²⁷ Ober (1996), 101; (2003a), esp. 251–2. Compare Miller (2009).

¹²⁸ Ober (2012), quotation from p. 828.

¹²⁹ Ober (2012), 831; cf. 837, 842 on civic dignity in particular.

or neo-Kantian ideas and assumptions, Hansen has identified basic norms of tolerance as prominent within fourth-century Athenian political culture.¹³⁰

Such emphasis on Athenian tolerance is consistent with a wider recent tendency to view the Athenian democracy as an example of the modern ideal of deliberative democracy: a political system in which citizens participated in unconstrained dialogue, recognising the plurality of important ethical considerations and the possibility that they might be incommensurable. Some have even compared the deliberative practices of the Athenian democracy with those intrinsic to Habermas' Ideal Speech Situation.¹³¹ The broad recent tendency to identify proto-Kantian elements in Athenian political culture has been mirrored in some recent approaches to Aristotle: some historians of philosophy have claimed that Aristotle attributed far more political and ethical importance than generally thought to unconditional respect for the dignity and rational preferences of individuals.¹³²

As is clear from this discussion, many scholars have presented the political cultures of individual poleis in this period as internally homogeneous.¹³³ This is probably partly a result of a widespread belief in the rationality of Greek political cultures.¹³⁴

Nevertheless, there is a rival tendency in modern scholarship, which emphasises the coexistence of different paradigms of good citizenship within individual poleis' political cultures. First, there has been a recent tendency in scholarship to claim that

¹³⁰ See, for example, his comments in *BMCRev* 2006.01.32. For his more general liberal democratic conception of Athenian democracy: Hansen (1999), 73–85; (2006).

¹³¹ For a critical discussion of such views, with bibliography: Schofield (2006), 55–8.

¹³² For example, Miller (1995) even sees Aristotle as an advocate of a theory of 'rights'. For an alternative way of seeing Aristotle as particularly keen to ensure respect for individuals' rational beliefs and preferences, see Irwin (2007), 226–7. Such approaches are criticised as anachronistic in Schofield (1999a), ch. 8; Gill (1996), e.g. 24–5, 338–40; (2006), 365–6.

¹³³ For an explicit claim to this effect: Herman (2006), 100. Compare Cartledge (2009), 18.

¹³⁴ Cf. Murray (1990c).

Classical Athenian and wider Greek political culture, and the political philosophy produced within them, harmoniously united in new syntheses competing ideals of citizenship: in particular, ideals resembling those underpinning modern liberal, communitarian and sometimes also deliberative conceptions of democracy.¹³⁵ Second, other scholars have argued that coexisting paradigms of citizenship were in tension with each other within individual poleis' political cultures, making irreconcilable rival demands on citizens.¹³⁶ The result could be 'doublethink',¹³⁷ or crisis, but also paradoxical flourishing.¹³⁸

This book uses the evidence of exile to evaluate these different interpretations of Greek political cultures in this period, and to offer its own interpretation. The conclusions are gradually unfolded in the following chapters, with detailed summaries in the concluding sections of individual chapters, but they can be partly foreshadowed here.

The examination of the material relating to exile reveals much evidence for the underlying influence of some of the paradigms surveyed here, but little for others.

There is strong evidence for the coexistence and influence of fairly radical forms of the two paradigms emphasised in this section, polis-as-community and polis-as-

¹³⁵ On the Classical Athenian democracy: Ober (1999), 372; (2005), 88–9 (criticising Loraux); Monoson (2000), 237 ('reciprocal exchange' and 'unity' both key to the democratic polis). On the Classical polis more generally: Gill (1996), 340–1 (arguing that norms encouraging cultivation of 'shared life' and norms encouraging maintenance of reciprocal relations were 'complementary' in Greek ethics); (1998) (identifying harmony between altruism and reciprocity); Farenga (2006), 36. On political thought: Balot (2006), 14–15, 54–62; (2009b); (2009c); Salkever (2009b).

¹³⁶ For example, Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1973); Veyne (1976), e.g. 163; Davies (1977/8), esp. 114–21; Ober (1989), e.g. 298–9; (1994), 103; Loraux (1993), 48; (2001), 245–64; Wilson (2000), e.g. 107–108; Davidson (2001), 47; Morgan (2003b), x, xx; Moreno (2007); Ma (2008a), esp. 380–5. Compare arguments for the heterogeneity and internal contradictions of Greek culture in general: Veyne (1983), esp. 52–68; Dougherty and Kurke (2003).

¹³⁷ Moreno (2007), 268–9, 279.

¹³⁸ Cf. Ober (1989); Ma (2008a), 380–5.

association, but relatively little evidence for the pronounced, mainstream influence of the other individualistic paradigms mentioned in this section. It is not surprising that there should be little evidence of explicit theorising along Kantian or neo-Kantian lines in the ancient Greek evidence. It is, however, noteworthy that there is relatively little evidence in mainstream Greek political debate and interaction for the influence of underlying proto-Kantian assumptions favouring unconditional respect for individuals and pluralism, similar to those which were eventually to provide the raw material for Kant and his later followers to develop systematic philosophies.

With the help of the exile evidence, this book offers a new interpretation of the precise character of the two dominant quite radical underlying paradigms, named as ‘Nakonian’ and ‘Dikaiopolitan’, after poleis in which they are particularly clearly attested, in chapter 1. In that chapter and throughout, it reveals the importance of extreme features, indeterminacies, ambiguities and tensions within Greek civic political cultures oriented around these two paradigms. As part of this exercise, the book considers the character of the coexistence of the two paradigms. It is suggested that the two paradigms can be understood as the two contrasting parts of a dialectical pair: each paradigm gained definition and strength from the contrast with the other; and they sustained each other in existence.

In addition, in chapters 4–6, a new interpretation is offered of the complex workings in practice of the dominant underlying paradigms, across the Greek world as a whole and in individual poleis’ political cultures. An argument emerges that the coexistence of the two paradigms could be conducive to civic stability, and even flourishing, when citizens engaged in the imaginative ‘doublethink’ necessary to ignore, tolerate,

negotiate or harness the contradictions and inconsistencies involved. This process did, however, have a devastating corollary: the dominant underlying paradigms, and their extremes, ambiguities and contradictions, often led, individually or in combination, to violent *stasis*, which often forced citizens into exile. This was especially true when external or internal pressures forced citizens to attempt to derive coherent, consistent principles, ideologies and plans of action from the complex, swirling resources of their political cultures. The contrasting ways of imagining the good polis thus had crucial practical roles in both civic peace and civic unrest, both *stasis* and stability.