BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

Van Den Bos, Matthijs (2022) The promised land of Fadak: locating religious nationalism in Shiite politics. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 49 (5), pp. 769-791. ISSN 1353-0194.

Downloaded from: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/41689/

Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.

Author's Accepted Manuscript, 23 November 2020 © The Author
van den Bos, M. [exp. 2021.] The Promised Land of Fadak: Locating Religious Nationalism in Shiite Politics. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*.

THE PROMISED LAND OF FADAK:

LOCATING RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN SHIITE POLITICS

Matthijs van den Bos
Department of Politics
Birkbeck College, University of London
m.van-den-bos@bbk.ac.uk, +44(0)2039261539

12906 words (all inc.)

Yāsir al-Ḥabīb is a Britain-based cleric of Kuwaiti origin who aims to establish a religious state in the Persian Gulf region. This article assesses his project as a particular form of Shiite politics, in light of Peter van der Veer's transnational theory of religious nationalism. It first examines religious conceptions of land in Twelver Shiism to situate Fadak, an oasis on the Arabian Peninsula. Fadak has been "promised land," pledged by the Prophet Muḥammad to his daughter Fāṭima. Ḥabīb reverts back to this sectarian trope in his legitimization of a Shiite state but reframes it in the language of religious nationalism. Three nodes in van der Veer's rendering of religious nationalism guide the analysis: the modern union of the nation's territorial embodiment with sacred geography, transnational migration enabling larger national identifications, and its "indigenous" crafting. They are traced in Ḥabīb's British operations, which mobilize local "citizenship" in unbounded sectarian confrontation for the religious "nation," while cohering paradoxically in the "freedom" discourse of his Shīrāzī Shiism. The epilogue finds heuristic value in Fadakism's comparison with Zionism, centered on the question of assimilation – in the shape more of outward pressure in the second and elective affinity in the first.

Author's Accepted Manuscript, 23 November 2020 © The Author
van den Bos, M. [exp. 2021.] The Promised Land of Fadak: Locating Religious Nationalism in Shiite Politics. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*.

THE PROMISED LAND OF FADAK:

LOCATING RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM IN SHIITE POLITICS

Matthijs van den Bos

INTRODUCTION

Yāsir al-Ḥabīb is a Britain-based Islamic cleric of Kuwaiti origin who has sought to establish a religious state based in the Persian Gulf region. His *modus operandi* is characterized by radical sectarianism, an assimilation of choice, and geopolitical realignment on the axis of Iran-West confrontation. This article assesses his project as a particular form of Shiite politics, in light of Peter van der Veer's transnational theory of religious nationalism.

The work of van der Veer presents a series of vital anthropological interventions in the study of both nationalism and religion. The argument here engages especially with his studies of religious nationalism, which "articulates discourse on the religious community and discourse on the nation" (1994:x). Van der Veer's main contribution is set among Hindus and Muslims in India (1994) and must be seen principally as a challenge to the equation of modernity and secularism central to constructivist accounts of nationalism such as Gellner's (1983) or Anderson's (1983). The historiography of West European politics has later challenged these secularist-modernist accounts on related lines by arguing that religious exclusions, not civic integration, lay at the basis of nationalist state building (Marx 2003).

The Indian study contests clean slate ideas of the nation, for instance, as implied in Ranger and Hobsbawm's emphasis on the "invention" of tradition (1983). This suggests sharp secular rupture, observes van der Veer (1994:197), whereas his argument has been for "the processual character of the formation of nationalism" (Dressler 2013:82; cf. Greenfeld & Eastwood 2005:264 for kindred theory in the field of political history), that reworks cultural including religious material (see van der Veer 1994:197). Ethnosymbolism provides common ground in this emphasis on nationalism's prior cultural resources (see Smith 2009:25-6), but van der Veer's approach is distinct in the particular processes analyzed to account for religious nationalism, focused on ritual communication, pilgrimage, and migration (see Zachariah 1998:252). Such praxis sets it apart too from Greenfeld's rejection of the constructivists, which presents nationalism first and foremost as a "style of thought" (1992:3-4; cf. Conversi 2002:11). Cesari's recent work on political Islam (2018a, b) proceeds from a focus similar to van der Veer's, on the modern casting in the shape of religious nationalism of both nation and religion. The significance of religious nationalism in her analysis lies not in movement-based political forces, however, which are often inherently transnational (van der Veer 1994:ix, xii), but in the Durkheimian constitution of religion as national culture (see 2018a:16, 17-8). While van der Veer's perspective was set out initially in the context of British-Indian imperial encounters and their aftermath, lastly, it departs from the Saidian thesis (1978) in capturing religious nationalism as an indigenous reworking of the collective self, which is irreducible to Orientalism or other distortions of a "foreign hand" (1994:20-21).

As civil religion, religious nationalism may feature themes such as 'chosenness by God' or 'rebirth,' and "there is the notion of the coming of a messiah, a leader who is leading his people to the Promised Land" (2015:11). Promised land activism involves religious nationalism as an ideational union of territorialized nationhood and sacred geography (cf.

1994:122). The latter theme is central to this article's discussion of Shiite politics, but in the shape of 'radical religious nationalism' (2015:11-12) contesting the state.

Islamic cases come readily to mind for some of these phenomena - as do religious specifications. Among mainstream (*oṣūlī*) Shiism's key dilemmas is the imposition of clerical authority on a religiosity of "expectation" (*enteẓār*), and many have been its messianic challenges. While messianism remains a social force in the Iranian state, however, its primary vessel, the *Anjoman-e ḥojjatiye* organization, was dissolved in 1983. While ambiguity surrounded Khomeynī's status in the revolutionary era, moreover, its elite have stood firm, once the Islamic state was established, in refuting the imminence of the Mahdī's advent (cf. Maghen 2008:250). Mentions of "promised land" in relation to Khomeynī refer typically not to sacred geography but, metaphorically, his religio-political mission (Menashri 2014). Where invoked in Muslim contexts more broadly (e.g., as *al-waṭan al-mawᶜūd*), the term "promised land" has been thought "evidently copied" from Zionist vocabulary (Sivan 1992:73). An additional point applies to the organization of Yāsir al-Ḥabīb, which is called "Servants of the Mahdī" and whose Jericho is Fadak (see further below). But there is no confusion in their project between the Mahdī and Ḥabīb's leadership for the promised land.

The "construction of territory in nationalist discourse" in van der Veer's rendering of religious nationalism depends significantly on movement in the shape of religious or secular travel, seen as mutually reinforcing, through which conceptions of a larger world emerge (1994 106-108, xii). Thus, the emphasis here and elsewhere in his work is on the transformative qualities of modern migration (e.g., 1995) and of transnational religious movements (e.g., 2002c:95) – adding processual detail to his view of religious nationalism as a radical modern reformation of pre-modern selves (2015:9, 11-12). "In general, the migratory experience can lead to more embracing identifications on the margin of the host

society[,]" it is observed, as among "[t]hose who do not think about themselves as Indians before migration [becoming] Indians in the diaspora" (1995:7). "What can be argued," he illustrates through globetrotting groups such as Tablīghī Jamāᶜat, "is that new possibilities emerge in the transnational element of religion owing to the growth of transnational migration" (2002a:21). It is only in politically defined movements with ambitions for state capture, however, that identitarian clashes in exile might translate into "a religious nationalism [bent] on effecting changes in the migrants' countries of origin" (cf. 1994:130).[1]

These substantiated positions open up interpretive space for researchers of Shiite politics and invite consideration of the conditions under which they apply. The British context, for instance, is crucial for an understanding of how Ḥabīb's operations flourished through a European environment uniquely permissive of politico-religious activism and the exilic concentration of radical Shiites of Shīrāzī orientation. Ḥabīb's incitement of his Western milieu for sectarian politics, moreover, is key to deciphering his activism. But Britain, clearly, neither invented nor endorsed it. The argument from colonial India on indigenous religious nationalism applies too in this British realm of post-migration settlement: its representation focused on a "foreign hand" obscures "consciously chosen political behavior guided by a specific worldview" (van der Veer 1994:20). "Much of the material" that nationalism is seen generally to rework into rival versions, lastly, extends beyond the "proto-nationalist," featuring "ancient understandings of sacred geographies together with sacred histories of particular peoples" (2015:9-10). The Fadakist controversy, however, was also fueled by Ḥabīb's Western resettlement and articulates through "geopolitical overlay." The Khomeynist enemies of the sectarian Shīrāzīs, that is, have helped escalate the scope and redefined the framing of the latter's ideology by associating it with Western political interest.

The following sets out first to examine some key religious conceptions of land in majoritarian Shiism and their inflection points from Islamic tradition at large. The second section charts the legend of the land of Fadak and its significance to Shiite political projects. Ḥabīb's adoption of Fadak as a cause reverts back to the initial irredentist design but borrows a page from modernists in its grand political ambition, couched in the language of religious nationalism. Fadakism reshaped through migration is the focus of the third section. It establishes Ḥabīb's paradoxical quest as it evolved in Britain as a hybrid merging ethnic and clericalist concepts of Shiite statehood. It involves local appeals to "participatory citizenship" and the grooming of secular allies for global sectarian conflict. Extolling European "freedom," it has gradually revealed the contours of a proto-state mission that aims to assert sovereignty along the Gulf. The British-Kuwaiti sheykh emerges thus as another Shiite cleric whose religio-political authority is forged through transnational in-betweenness (See Corboz 2016; cf. Shain 1989).[2] The conclusion finds heuristic value in Fadakism's comparison with Zionism (as does Ḥabīb himself), centered on the question of the role of assimilation – in the shape more of outward pressure in the second and of an elective affinity in the first.

SHIITE TERRITORY

Twelver Shiism more than Sunni Islam has often appeared deterritorialized - because of, among other reasons, clerical cross-border back-and-forth spanning Iranian and Iraqi seminary (*ḥowze*) cities; its geographically dispersed high religious authority (*marjaᶜīyat*); Shīᶜa minorities practicing "emulation" (*taqlīd*) beyond national borders in Sunni-majority countries; its popular piety of regional pilgrimage; and topical aspects of Shīᶜa religiosity. When it comes to territorializations of the faith as in the dyadic concept of *dār al-islām*/*dār*

al-ḥarb, Shiite Sufis have similarly "[shifted] the coordinates of the discourse from the geographical/juridical to the spiritual/metaphysical" (Cancian 2017:297, 295). However, Shiite tradition has also featured definite and sometimes distinct conceptions of territoriality.

While *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* have not been an important duality in Shiite juridical or *ḥadīth* literature, the opposite holds for the kindred distinction of friends and enemies of the "people of the household" (*ahl-e beyt*) - that is, the Shiite Muslims (Cancian 2017:297). It is particular to Shiite Islam, moreover, that its jurists, through al-Mufīd (d.413/1022) following Kulaynī (Arjomand 1984:61-62), established "a third category of territory, *dār al-īmān* (realm of faith), defined by prevailing acceptance of the imāms among its people [….] Greater theoretical importance was given to the opposition between this realm and *dār al-Eslām* than to that between *dār al-Eslām* and *dār al-ḥarb*" (Algar 2011 [1993]).

Sectarian territoriality, in other words, has trumped the solidarities of Islam facing non-Muslim space in these aspects of Shiite tradition. Modern echoes of *dār al-īmān* thinking were heard, for instance, in the argument for the "border of belief [*eᶜteqād*] and religious school [*maẕhab*]" as a foreign policy orientation in post-revolutionary Iran during the presidency of Aḥmadīnezhād.[3] After the revolution of 1978-1979, moreover, *dār al-islām*/*dār al-ḥarb* theory was re-examined in Iran, whereby one reading proposed to equate *dār al-ḥarb* with the countries that "the Islamic state" (i.e., the Islamic Republic) was in actual conflict with (Algar 2011 [1993]) - putting the jurists' state, that is, in the place occupied elsewhere by the benchmark of religious affiliation. The Khomeynist state, furthermore, has presented itself as a transsectarian project, both ecumenical and universalist (e.g., see van den Bos 2018), i.e., seemingly inverting the traditional prevalence in Shiism of sectarian territoriality.

According to the Grand Āyatollāh ᶜAbdollāh Javādī-Āmolī, a pivotal figure in the world of seminary learning as well as in regimist politics and its fundamentalist currents in

Iran, Islam provides clear principles for international relations (2008/1387:1-7). Islamic international relations in his ecumenist perspective, that is, without special provision for the *dār al-īmān*, reflects degrees of amity and enmity relative to Islam in foreign countries, plotted on a scale with four categories: Muslim nations (*mellathā-ye mosalmān*), monotheistic nations (*mellathā-ye towḥīdī*), non-monotheistic nations (*mellathā-ye gheyr-e movaḥḥed*), and colonialist regimes (*nezāmhā-ye esteᶜmārī*) (pp. 7-8ff.). In short, the four-tiered categorization gave an Islamic scale for nearness in foreign relations, specifying anathemas, preferences and requirements - and only implicitly placed the Shiite state on top.

The thread in regimist conceptions of ecumenist rapprochement (*taqrīb*), however, is Shiite leadership, derived from divinely ordained Imamic authority. At its basis lies *pars pro toto* thinking, as seen in Javādī-Āmolī's statement that "[i]f the Muslim community truly adheres to Ahl ul-Bayt […] there will be no discord among the Muslim Ummah [….] According to Quranic verses, all Muslims are obliged to maintain friendly relationships with one another as a result of their love for the Ahl ul-Bayt".[4] Iran's enduring foreign policy doctrine of *omm ol-qorā* or "mother of the cities" reflects the theme: Iran's defense is to be prioritized, because the *umma* depends on it (cf. Nabavi 2009:7). An unguarded statement by the leader of the "rapprochement society" (*majmaᶜ-e taqrīb*), lastly, ventured "that Iran's Shi'is have a legitimate, historical right to exert political and intellectual-religious leadership over Muslims worldwide" (Buchta 2000:51). For all effort at cross-sectarian outreach, then, Iran's de facto alliances have primarily been with Shiite parties (see van den Bos 2018).

The Iranian state created four decades ago was conceived not only as transsectarian but also as a global religious vanguard - that Iranians lived there, and a majority of ethnic Persians, was immaterial to its constitution. State formation in the Islamic Republic, therefore, has seen a paradox: it represented on the one hand a step change in Shiism's

territorialization, while tending simultaneously to devalue the homeland in a revolutionary drive aimed at establishing extramural religious authority. Its officials ventured views of Shiite land in Lebanon, for instance, as part of the Iran-led, transnational Islamist state. December 1982 saw the proclamation at Baalbek of the Islamic Republic of Lebanon.[5] Its draft constitution from 1985 held that "in the absence of the Hidden Imām […] the Virtuous Jurist […] will appoint the chairman of the Lebanese Governance of the Jurist Commission, a local ayatollah" (Sivan 1990:363). Within months of the Ṭāᵓif accord of October 1989, stipulating Lebanese deconfessionalization, Iran's ambassador to Syria "stressed that Iranian officials regard Lebanon, especially the Islamic area of it, as part of the Islamic Republic".[6] Even the reports of martyrs' reburials in Iran from the late 1980s from the Western zones of the war with Iraq, seen credibly as a socialization of the national landscape (e.g., Wellman 2015; cf. Khosronejad 2012), do not imply the bounded hallowing per se of national territory. Transnational views of the Shiite Islamist state have guided Iran long since its "moderation."

The special presidential aid ᶜAlī Yūnesī stated in March 2015 that "our borders are artificial," lauding "greater Iran" (*Īrān-e bozorg*). If that statement left the door open for a secular-nationalist interpretation, the Shiite connotation is unavoidable in his subsequent point that "Iran has become an empire […] and its current capital is Baghdad".[7] Another feature besides persistence, the sectarian affinities in the foreign policy of the Islamist state have been surprisingly unparticular - i.e., ecumenist beyond *oṣūlī* Twelverism. After the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the close advisor to the Supreme Leader ᶜAlī Khāmeneᵓī, Mehdī Ṭāᵓeb, declared that "Syria is Iran's 35th province" (Sadjadpour 2018). In another case of synecdochic reason, during his Friday sermon in July 2011 the chairman of the Guardian Council Āyatollāh Aḥmad Jannatī called for "Bahrain to be 'conquered by Islam and the Muslims'" (Alhasan 2011:613). After the Zaydī Ḥūthīs captured Sana'a in September 2014,

an Iranian member of parliament close to Khāmeneʾī boasted that the city was the fourth Arab capital to fall into Iranian hands.[8] Western academics may dismiss the "Shiite crescent" as an Orientalist trope but it motivated Qāsem Soleymānī (Haghighatnejad 2014), the pivotal figure in Iran's cross-border deployment and among the region's most powerful military operators until his assassination in Baghdad in January 2020.

The transnational projection of Iran as a religious state and of kindred movements such as Ḥizballāh in Lebanon has been marked by the centrality of juristic understandings to their politico-religious identities. Elsewhere, the Shiites' politico-religious identity formation has derived more from perceptions of common land or ancestry – i.e., the religious articulation of ethnic as opposed to civic nationalism. A recent manifestation of the ethnic tendency came to the fore in the aftermath of the Iraq war, with the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq or SCIRI. In 2004, SCIRI led the campaign for the creation of "a separate Shia state in the south" (Isakhan 2015:143), which idea had expanded by the next year to "a nine province, oil-rich 'Shiastan'" (Visser 2008:47). In August 2005, SCIRI's leader ᶜAbdul-ᶜAzīz al-Ḥakīm cited two grounds: the history of oppression they had faced and "the existence of commonalities between the inhabitants of these regions" (Isakhan 2015 144-145). By 2009, his successor ᶜAmmār reiterated "the perception […] in the Southern regions that are involved in a unified culture that [they could] participate in one region" (2015:148). For all vagaries of "unified culture," the sentiment reflected distinct demographic facts: the massive religious conversions in the Centre and the South accompanying the Ottoman undertaking of tribal settlement, which had first made Shiism majoritarian in Iraq (Nakash 1994:443, 449).

There are more pronounced cases still. Louër observed that "[i]n contemporary Bahrain, the name "Bahrani" (pl. Baharna) designates the Arab Shias who consider themselves as the original inhabitants of the country" (cf. Cole 2002:32). Shiites in Saudi

Arabia, in addition, use the label to refer to their co-religionists in the country's Eastern Province (Louër 2008:11). In both countries, "Shias like to point out that, under the name of "Ancient Bahrain" (*al-Bahrain al-qadim*) or Greater Bahrain (*al-Bahrain al-kubra*), present-day Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia used to be one" (2008:12). The area described under the latter label stretched from "Bahrain over the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia toward Kuwait and even Basra in southern Iraq" (Matthiesen 2009). The felt commonality between Bahraini and Saudi Shiites was reinforced by the fact that they spoke the same type of colloquial Arabic, distinguishing them from their Sunni surroundings (Louër 2008:12). During the Arab Spring, the myth of the Ancient or Greater Bahrain made a dramatic entrance into political imaginaries. Saudi protesters in Qatif in the Eastern Province were "chanting 'free Bahrain' and 'one people, not two people' in an apparent reference to the unity of the Bahraini and Saudi (Eastern Province) 'people'" (Matthiesen 2012:637). Bahrani nativism "increasingly made inroads into the protesters' discourse in the Eastern Province" while having become "a key driving force of the uprising in Bahrain" (2012:637). A similar focus of land, but here as sacred geography, has motivated Shiite thought on Fadak.

THE LAND OF FADAK

Fadak was "an ancient small town in the Northern Ḥidj̲āz, near Khaybar" to the North of Medina on the Arabian Peninsula (Veccia Vaglieri:725). Its religious significance lies in the religious narrative of the seventh-century usurpation by the first caliph, Abū Bakr (d.634), and subsequent Sunni leaders, of this peninsular land promised by the Prophet Muḥammad to his daughter Fāṭima (d.632) (Kantz Feder 2014:81). Fadak was inhabited by Jews who had become alarmed at Muḥammad's victorious march on Jewish Khaybar (Veccia Vaglieri:725).

Among the Prophet's commanders was his cousin and son-in-law, ᶜAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d.661), who had led an expedition to Fadak in the preceding year (6/627-8) to quell resistance against the Muslims' advances (see Al-Wāqidī 2013:276; cf. Halm 1991:11; Lalani 2000:5). The siege of Khaybar led to discussion with the Jews of Fadak and the agreement was reached that they "were to remain […] while giving up half their lands and half the produce of the Oasis." Fadak thus "was allocated to Muḥammad" and its revenues spent on needy travelers and "the least rich" members of the Prophet's tribe, the Banū Hāshīm (Veccia Vaglieri:725).

After Muḥammad's death in 632, Fāṭima - at the instigation of her husband, ᶜAlī (Madelung 2006:632) - claimed Fadak as its heiress. Abū Bakr, however, who had prevailed in his designation as successor over ᶜAlī, Moḥammad's protégé, held that the Prophet "had stated that he would have no heirs" and that Fadak should remain "public property used for benevolent purposes" (Veccia Vaglieri:725). The Shiites have found injustice in Fāṭima's treatment by Abū Bakr (but not in the manner in which Fadak was acquired for the Prophet of Islam), countering, for instance, that "Muhammad obtained the land through a peace agreement and therefore it did not constitute booty; it was Muhammad's personal property and he was free to bequeath it" (Kantz Feder 2014:81). After Fāṭima's death, however, aged sixteen or seventeen, ᶜAlī "renounced the claims to Fadak." Under the second Caliph ᶜUmar (d.644) the Jews were expelled from the Northern Ḥijāz, and the Jews of Fadak were given an indemnity (Veccia Vaglieri:725). While ᶜUmar did not credit Fāṭima's claim, he did employ ᶜAlī among Fadak's administrators. Details of the ᶜAlīds' relation with Fadak under ᶜUthmān (d.656) remain obscure (e.g, see p. 726) and ᶜAlī did not see fit to reclaim Fadak during his own caliphate. A Letter in the "Path of Eloquence" cites the Commander of the Faithful thus:

> Verily under the sky we had only Fidak as our personal property but we were deprived of it; it tempted them, they took forcible possession of it and we had to bear the wrench patiently and cheerfully; the best judge is the Lord Almighty. What was I going to do with Fidak or any other worldly possession. I never wanted them for myself. I know that tomorrow my lodging will be my grave.
>
> *Nahj al-Balāgha*, Letter 45 (in *Nahjul Balagha of Hazrat Ali*, 1982, p. 242)

Since the demise of the Shiites' first imām, Fadak has for short periods been in ᶜAlīd hands, facilitated, respectively, by the Umayyad caliph ᶜUmar II (d.720) (Madelung 1989:17); the first ᶜAbbāsid caliph al-Saffāḥ (d.754) (Veccia Vaglieri:726); the seventh ᶜAbbāsid caliph al-Maᵓmūn (d.833), in 826 (Calderini 2008); and, reportedly, the eleventh ᶜAbbāsid caliph al-Muntaṣir (d.862) (Veccia Vaglieri:726). The conflict over Fadak "is recounted in the Sunni hadith collections of Bukhari and Muslim" (Ruffle 2011:25) and became "a major theme of Shiite historiography" (Ende 1997:301). In later times, one meets the theme of "the return of Fadak" in the apocryphal story of the nineteenth-century Isfahani scholar Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir Shaftī. Shaftī had supposedly established friendly relations with the Pasha of Egypt in 1813 and "received the garden (-oasis) Fadak from him and returned it to the *sayyid*s of Medina [i.e.,] the descendants of ᶜAlī and Fāṭima" (1997:300). Ende judges the story of Shaftī "most probably […] pure fiction [and] the reflexion of a wide-spread sentiment among (Shiite and crypto-Shiite) Sayyid families […] that Fadak was-and still is-their inheritance by right." Fadak's usurpation has been a major theme, moreover, "to some extent also for prominent modern Shiite scholars" (1997:301).

As the dispute over Fadak was intertwined with the struggle over the succession of the Prophet and embodied the ᶜAlīds' claim to religio-political legitimacy as the "people of the household" (*ahl-e beyt*), it became an important sectarian marker. But it appears to have only

been in the twentieth century that the dominant mode of Fadak's interpretation emphasizing passive suffering was exchanged for one of revolutionary activism and a belligerent Fāṭima. The transformation is associated with the Iraqi cleric Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (d.1980) and his first work from 1955, *Fadak fī al-Tārīkh* or "Fadak in History" (Kantz Feder 2014:83). Later activist articulations of Shiism such as that of the Iranian ᶜAlī Sharīᶜatī in the 1970s (e.g., in his *Fāṭeme, Fāṭeme ast* or "Fāṭima is Fāṭima") built on Ṣadr's text (2014:81-82). Sharīᶜatī generalized the message of Fadak in writing that "[a]fter her death, [Fāṭima] started a new life in history [….] Everywhere in the history of […] dispossessed masses, [she] is the source of […] justice seeking" (1350/1971). *Fadak fī al-Tārīkh* has similarly been read as an historical transposition: a call to opposition against Iraq's monarchical regime (which lasted until 1958). Tellingly reorienting the focus on the political iniquities of the Iraqi here and now, it "likens Fatima's struggle for the Fadak to 'the echo of nationalization [*taᵓmim*] as we call it nowadays', [asserting] that the 'nationalization of the prophet's inheritance' was unprecedented" (Kantz Feder 2014:96, 89). Neither project rallies around Shiite irredentism.

Fadak is a minor theme only in the discourse of state authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and framed even more strongly in either desectarianized or deterritorialized fashion. In June 2008, the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts Akbar Hāshemī Rafsanjānī visited Fadak, and later reflected thus: "I would like to say that what happened at Fadak can be discussed further without it causing differences. They can result in unity" (Tehran Friday prayers, 27 June 2008). "In view of the fact that you are the first Shi'i scholar to walk in a place where Her Holiness Fatima al-Zahra walked, how do you feel?" a reporter queried Rafsanjānī in Fadak itself. He responded that "[f]irst of all, there is no difference between the Shi'is and the Sunnis" (on Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, 29 July 2008).

For new irredentist conceptions of the heritage of Fadak, the name of the Kuwait-born sheykh Yāsir al-Ḥabīb has recently loomed large. The modern setting for his at times archaic-sounding politico-religious claims includes both the Western trajectory of Shīrāzī Shiism turned against its Khomeynist patrons and the post-imperial era dominated by the norm and reality of territorial (nation-)states. Here surfaces the essential "transformation of religious notions when they are transferred from a […] religious context to the sphere of national politics" (van der Veer & Lehmann 2002:7). In terms of orthopraxy, Ḥabīb presents the anti-thesis of Ṣadrian modernism, but he has shared, paradoxically, in its geopolitical realism, weaponizing Fadak for Shiism's political self-realization beyond the narrow focus on the Oasis proper. Specifically, Fadak provides him with a religious anchor for the homeland of a Shiite nation. His activism towards it depends furthermore on the "triangulation" of "home" and "host" states and audiences through media operations as an adopted refugee in Britain. These operations are undertaken from a territory to the northeast of London named "the Minor Land of Fadak" (*arḍ Fadak al-ṣughrā*). The following section examines the connections in Ḥabīb's world between the minor and the "larger" lands of Fadak.

YĀSIR AL-ḤABĪB

When the young Shiite cleric Yāsir al-Ḥabīb (b.1979) (Linge 2016:7) settled in Britain in 2005, having been "in hiding in London since December 2004" (Wehrey 2014:188), he had already left behind a trail of religio-political conflict in his native Kuwait. His new domicile would soon see the pattern repeated. After the invasion of Iraq in March-May 2003, Ḥabīb had "called for an independent Shiᶜa state" (2014:211), the particulars of which will be investigated below. In November of that year, he was arrested and in January 2004, sentenced

to one year in prison and a fine, convicted, reportedly, of "insulting […] Mohammed's companions, abusing a religious sect and distributing an audiotape without a license" (Amnesty International 2005). The next month, "he was released under an annual pardon announced by the Amir of Kuwait […], but his rearrest was ordered a few days later. The public prosecutor said the release had been an error" (Amnesty [...] 2005). Ḥabīb then went into hiding - moving first to Iraq and then Iran, before seeking asylum in Britain.[9] In May 2004, he was tried in absentia and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.[10] According to unconfirmed information," reported Amnesty, the charges "included seeking to overthrow the state" in addition to "belonging to an organization that seeks to overthrow the state" (idem).

London-based, the fugitive sheykh expanded his anti-Sunni propagation (cf. Linge 2016:10), upping the sectarian ante in September 2010 by calling Muḥammad's wife ᶜĀᵓisha an "enemy of God" (Wehrey 2014:188). As a result, he was stripped of his Kuwaiti citizenship (Linge 2016:7). In October that year, Iran's spiritual leader and head of state ᶜAlī Khāmeneᵓī responded to religio-legal questions with a *fatvā* forbidding the cursing of the "symbols of the Sunni brothers" (*nemādhā-ye barādarān-e ahl-e sonnat*), including ᶜĀᵓisha.[11]

Ḥabīb is a singular presence in the world of Twelver Shiism but emerges from the Shīrāzī tendency of sectarian traditionalists. A self-portrayal mentions that he "used to edit the news for a famous Kuwaiti newspaper at a young age".[12] An Iranian outlet reveals that he contributed to a range of Kuwaiti newspapers, among which *Ṣawt al-Kuwayt*, *Al-Waṭan*, and *Al-Rāᵓy al-ᶜāmm*.[13] The regimist website in question mentions also that in 1996, as a 17-year old, after a meeting with the Grand Āyatollāh Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī (d. 2001), he had travelled to Qom where he was taught by the latter's son (Rezvi & Homazadeh 2014, cited in Linge 2016:7), Sayyid Muḥammad-Riḍā al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī (d. 2008).[14] It was several years later, at 21, that Ḥabīb "first attracted public attention" (Wehrey 2012:146) in

Kuwait. This was in 2000, when he reportedly founded a *hayʾat* or assembly named Khuddām al-Mahdī ("Servants of the Redeemer") and the magazine *Al-Minbar*.[15] In addition, Ḥabīb ranks as a political science graduate from Kuwait University (Al-Ḥantūlī 2010).

Grand Āyatollāh Ṣādiq al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī (b.1942), brother of the late Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī and scion of the family (Azizi 2015), is reportedly "among the few [living] Shiite scholars that [Ḥabīb] approves of" (Rezvi & Homazadeh 2014, cited in Linge 2016:7). Moreover, Ḥabīb is "son-in-law to Sadegh Shirazi's brother, Ayatollah Mojtaba Shirazi" (Azizi 2018). A UK resident like Ḥabīb, Mujtabā al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī is similarly known for verbally attacking the Islamic Republic. This penchant shows in the self-released video 'wherein he ritually curses Khamenei for unveiling and beating Shirazi women' who had 'organized mourning ceremony on the anniversary of Muhammad Shirazi's death' (Szanto Ali-Dib 2012:10). There seem to be no glaring points of theological divergence between Ḥabīb and his Shīrāzī teachers, but the former has taken their sectarian confrontation to a new level, relishing in stepping up the fight with the Sunni other generally and taking it public (cf. Azizi 2018; Linge 2016:7).

Sectarianism marked Ḥabīb's activism in London as it had in Kuwait, but it assumed specific forms in his adoptive country, relating particularly to its framing as participatory citizenship. Citizenship has been among the "traditional symbols of nationhood" (Hogwood & Roberts 2007:239) and informs Western self-understandings in other ways. It "originally emerged in the context of the emergence of free associations in the autonomous European cities," reminds Delanty (1997:300), echoing Deutsch's (1981:77) identification of the "long-lasting autonomy of many smaller groups" as a benchmark of the Western world region. Aspects of citizenship as an analytical category, moreover, show "in the dichotomy of self and other which constitutes the discourse of European identity" (Delanty 1997:286). Here,

the author ventured, in a point that many others have also made (e.g., Said 1991 [1978]:1-2; Kaplan 2016), "Europeanness is constructed in opposition with the non-European, in particular Islam" (1997:298). Shiite (post-)migrants in Europe, then, encounter the idea of citizenship in several of its understandings as a "symbol of the other" (like "justice" or *ᶜadl*, inversely, remains a core symbol of Shiite self, reflected historically in Shiism's designation as the "ᶜAdlīya").[16] Their referencing of "citizenship" in the European West can be expected, therefore, to involve an intense scrutiny of self-other relations – as it has in the case of Ḥabīb.

Some of Ḥabīb's local phrasings were found in *The Shia Newspaper*, published irregularly from the mid-2000s by the "Servants of the Redeemer" or Khuddām al-Mahdī/Khoddam al-Mahdi, who echoed his eponymous Kuwaiti organization (see Al-Ḥantūlī 2010). The Newspaper, freely available online and distributed during religious events, attained notoriety among British Shiites for its abrasive writing - matched stylistically by the prolific use of exclamation marks. It took the fight both to intra-denominational matters (e.g., denouncing Bahrain's "pirates' rule" and Saudi Arabia's "Kingdom of Evil" (no.2) for the repression of Shiites in these countries), and intra-sectarian issues (censuring viewpoints and practices deemed deviant, such as Khāmeneʾī's negative ruling on the permissibility of *muwāsāt* (no.2), "which means imitating and sharing some of [Imām Ḥusayn's] pain," explained Ḥabīb,[17] or Faḍlallāh's alleged wishing of "Allah's pleasure" on the first caliph, Abū Bakr, which implied the late Āyatollāh's apostasy (no.3)). The Newspaper's fourth issue from 2016 exposed Ḥizballāh's kidnapping in Beirut in December of the previous year of a Shiite cleric, Muḥammad-ᶜAlī al-Musawī, who had rejected the Khomeynist regime and supported Ḥabīb's sectarian campaign through regular appearances on his satellite channel – see further below.[18]

But the Shiite Newspaper simultaneously couches its views in terms that speak to the British context, adopting the voice of integrated Shiite selves. The Newspaper holds itself to express "the voice of the British Shia who are seeking to serve their homeland," by which it is meant, Britain. It was service to the "homeland" that apparently motivated its online survey labelled "Is Shi'ism good for Britain?".[19] Moreover, the Newspaper aimed to present "our visions for a better future for our homeland",[20] and from this activist conception of "citizenship as participation" (Delanty 1997:290-91) followed recommendations based on an Islamic vision of the common good. Thus, it reported on a study by the Institute for Public Policy Research that revealed "British Adolescents' behavior Worst in Europe!" due to drugs and alcohol addiction, impacting negatively on society and contributing to the decline of family life. "This makes it obligatory that we ring the alarm bell for reviewing the wrong policies being practiced in our country [….] When shall our Kingdom regain its virtues?"[21]

Fine-tuned to the pluralist sensibilities of the purported homeland, the Newspaper claimed representation of British Shiites aspiring to work "along with […] fellow citizens from different groups and backgrounds." It stated: "We believe in the necessity of presenting […] our beliefs, our culture and the discussion of beliefs and cultures of the others in an atmosphere of […] mutual respect." It was "[i]n addition," i.e., in the afterthought of secondary rank which a secular order reserves for such views, that "from our religious and national responsibility […] we offer our visions for a better future for this dear homeland, believing that it will be better and more wonderful and free from […] problems with its commitment to the noble values of Islam".[22] The "modest proposal," then, was based on the recognition of what Bloemraad and Wright (2014) labelled "demographic multiculturalism." It also suggested, however, that the Newspaper might not perceive socio-political pluralism

as elementary to political order in Britain, reflecting the common self-image in Western Europe (Hogwood & Roberts 2007:38), but rather as an obstacle to the success of its mission.

The point emerges with greater clarity when examining the Newspaper's solutions and their perception of self-other relations in Britain. More than other troubling issues - including, besides restless youths, such phenomena as Darwinism, the impact of secular and feminist media, pornography, and the dangers of chat rooms - the Newspaper identified national threats in relation with Islam. "We believe that the greatest challenge that we face as British citizens, is the terrorism resulting from the falsified Islam that the terrorists have exploited for the achievement of their evil aims".[23] It further emerges from the Newspaper that "the falsified Islam" does not refer only to Salafist appropriations of the religion, but to that of Sunni Islam generally, whose adherents the Newspaper regularly referred to, in reference to the first caliph, as "the Bakri sect": "Those who turned against the Prophet […] after his death are the ones who created this false version which justifies acts of violence and terrorism".[24] Here shows a glimpse of the darker mood, a nationalism of *ressentiment* (see Greenfeld & Eastwood 2005:260) underlying Ḥabīb's crisp language of societal integration.

Newspapers are often seen as a privileged vehicle for nationalism (e.g., Anderson 1983; Bloom 1990) and are intimately bound up with national-democratic self-understanding ("the role of the media in UK politics," typically explains the BBC, under the heading of "Democracy in the UK," "is to inform the public on important issues that affect them").[25] In exhibiting civic virtues, the Shia Newspaper lays claim to national participation in that second understanding, but an alternative nationalism shines through the boundary-crossing operations of its publisher. The Khuddām al-Mahdī Organization has engaged in spectacular activism in Britain and reportedly abroad. In March 2018, for instance, after the arrest in Iran of Ḥusayn Shīrāzī, Ṣādiq's son, a group of Ḥabīb's supporters climbed the balcony of the

Iranian embassy in London and occupied it for several hours, bringing down the flag of the Islamic Republic and planting their own (Azizi 2018). Regarding foreign adventures, "[t]here is evidence that they've also played a role in Iraq's civil war, with Servants of Mahdi's blue flag being flown on the fronts of the military campaign against ISIS" (Azizi 2018).[26] Both of these cases exemplify not civic integration but the pursuit of independent international policy.

A third case of boundary crossing relative to the territorial subordination of British citizenship derives more narrowly from Ḥabīb himself, in his exercise of religious authority. In July 2012, the Iran-based traditionalist Grand Āyatollāh Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Ḥusaynī al-Rūḥānī had issued a fatwa against the Lebanon-based Salafī sheykh ᶜAbd al-Raḥman Dimashqiyya, for opinions deemed blasphemous, declaring that the latter's blood could be shed with impunity. The offence had concerned commentary involving Fāṭima.[27] By then, a war of words had ensued between Naṣrallāh, the Lebanese Ḥizballāh chief, and Ḥabīb, featuring the portrayal of Ḥabīb as a British agent and Naṣrallāh's invoking a code of honour to silence sectarian slanderers.[28] Ḥabīb, however, turned the ethic back on Naṣrallāh, goading him to mobilize forces to punish Dimashqiyya. "[P]ush them and order them to seize this son of adultery whose name is dimasqiya[,]" the subtitles of a video registration say. Failing this course of action, Naṣrallāh could not be considered a man.[29] Ḥabīb joins a substantial list of Shiite clerics who dispense or seek to implement their religious law of life and death across the borders of sovereign states. But none, as far as I am aware, has done so while presenting themselves as eager subjects of a state whose secular Law their legal ideology is anathema to.

Looking back at the institutionalization of Ḥabīb's operations in Britain brings the long game of his political project into focus. The Shia Newspaper, as noted, stems from the mid-2000s. By the time of my interview with him in May 2009, Ḥabīb claimed additional offices in Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and Iran, but legality only in London.[30] The London office, by that

year, contained an assembly space named *ḥusayniyat ash-shuhadāʾ*. "KHODAM AL MAHDI ORGANISATION" was registered as a charity in July 2010 (but associated with the Newspaper, as indicated, then spelled Khoddam Almahdi organization, since several years earlier).[31] The theme of the promised Shiite land had come to the fore by then in Ḥabīb's British enterprises. The Fadak TV satellite channel was founded in June 2010 (cf. Linge 2016:7).[32] It was initiated in the name of Khoddam al-Mahdi Organization and its funds were said to come mostly from Kuwaiti Shiites.[33] By 2017, Fadak TV had become Fadak Media Broadcasts and run into trouble not only for regulator investigations of offensive broadcast content but embezzlement from the company by a former director, amounting to hundreds of thousands of pounds.[34] Khoddam al-Mahdi Organization served another project featuring the theme of promised land: to raise funds for a terrain outside London that was to include a mosque. Another investigation by the Charity Commission followed when it emerged that the eponymous charitable company had been dissolved since April 2012 but funds were still raised in its name.[35] Ḥabīb nevertheless succeeded in his objective to overcome the bounds of Cricklewood. He has operated since June 2013 from an estate in Fulmer, Buckinghamshire containing the Muḥassin mosque, after "the martyr, Al-Muhassin ibn Ali […], the unborn son of Lady Fatima Al-Zahra" – whose miscarriage and subsequent death are attributed by traditional Shiites to ᶜUmar's violent entry of her house, acting on Abū Bakr's behalf in the struggle over the Prophet's succession. The estate was named "the Minor Land of Fadak".[36]

The contours of a proto-state project in Ḥabīb's European activities begin to appear with greater clarity through the Minor Fadak. His activism, as sketched above, was associated with a militia fighting sectarian enemies in Iraq; a newspaper engaged as much in sectarian othering as in communal representation; "foreign policy" militancy breaching Iranian sovereignty in London; and a claim directed towards Beirut to alternative, global Shiite

jurisdiction. The Fulmer estate added a land base to all these elements. Footage of the goings-on at the Minor Fadak include a video clip of some two dozen military-clad devotees involved in a soldiers' drill on the parking lot (with red-tiled houses in the background), for a "Ceremony of the Renewal of the Raising of the Flag of Khuddām al-Mahdī on the Minor Land of Fadak." One of them salutes Ḥabīb with a raised sword. A turbaned cleric is presented with a flag before it is raised. Martial singing accompanies the video registration. It ends with a solemn, manly voice exclaiming preparedness for sacrifice, *labayk yā Mahdī!*[37]

While Britain enabled Ḥabīb's media operations, which domesticated Western political order in their pitch for participatory citizenship, the pivot of their moral geography lay elsewhere. The larger aim of the Khoddam al-Mahdi Organization, it was explained to me in the 2009 interview, was for "a Shiite Arab state in the Gulf".[38] Some of its contours were known by then, as the sheykh had stated after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that it would be "comprising the Eastern Province, Kuwait, Bahrain and Basra" (Wehrey 2014:211). In 2009, furthermore, Ḥabīb "made several speeches exhorting the Shi'a of the Eastern Province to declare their independence and merge with Kuwait and Bahrain as part of a "Greater Bahrain" (Wehrey 2012:146). The area extended to the United Arab Emirates and Oman.[39]

After the establishment of "the Minor Land of Fadak" in 2013, however, different features came to light. The Minor Land in Fulmer was "to pave the way to open the Islamic countries, especially Mecca, the holy city of Madinah, and the Major Land of Fadak," Ḥabīb's website proclaimed in the same year.[40] His territorial project, then, far exceeded the "Greater Bahrain," adding Shiite irredentism of a different kind. The maximum stretch of his religio-political project now vaguely extended to the Islamic world at large while at minimum it included, as its core component, the parts of the Saudi national territory on the Arabian Peninsula that harbored the holy places of the Ḥijāz. Ḥabīb's new articulation connected the

earlier claim to land based on its current or previous inhabitation by Shiites - hitherto unretracted - to one theologically grounded, i.e., to the sacred geography of a promised land.

In other aspects too, the quest for the Greater Bahrain related to but did not begin to exhaust the meaning of Fadakism. By 2009, Ḥabīb had couched the quest for his Shiite state, among other features, in ethnic terms. Unlike the transnational project of the revolutionary Iranian state, Ḥabīb's entity was to be an "Arab" state – a phrasing reminiscent of but far exceeding the bounds of Bahrani nativism, possibly invoking the earliest Islamic polity in Medina (i.e., a city central to Fadakism's geography). Moreover, his project was perceived as religious land reclamation. Shiites had been a majority in Kuwait until 1965, declared Ḥabīb, after which their seventy per cent majority had dwindled to forty per cent: "an invasion" allowed by "Bakrī" government policy.[41] Ḥabīb would seek to invert the sturdy demographic facts on the ground through the conversion of Sunnis to Shiism – peacefully, he specified.[42] The Fadakist project proceeds thus by means of religious exclusion, which was similarly seen to lie at the basis of nationalist state formation in France, Spain, and England (Marx 2003).

A different pillar altogether of the Fadakian state related not to the nature of its inhabitants but the principles of its rule. Whereas Bahraini Shiites over time had become majority-*akhbārī* Twelvers, i.e., against independent legal reasoning and the laity's jurist emulation (Cole 2002:31, 41), Ḥabībian politics is marked by the *oṣūlī* heritage emphasizing clerical authority. The 2009 interview with Ḥabīb dwelled for some time on the repressive nature of the Iranian Islamic Republic, but his objections did not extend to jurists' political power per se. In the Fadakian state, jurists would not rule, as in Iran, but laws would be subject to scrutiny by a Council of *ᶜOlamā* with veto right.[43] The idea fits neatly within the Shīrāzī current. Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī's doctrine of "the government of the religious jurists"

(*ḥukūmat al-fuqahāʾ*), worked out in a 1963 book by his brother, "was reformulated after the Islamic Revolution as 'the council of the jurisprudents'" (*shūrat al-fuqahāʾ*) (Louër 2008:97).

Where in Ḥabīb's world, then, did these opposed political principles, of socio-political pluralism and ethno-religious purification, meet? It was in his view of "the main social gain in Europe," which, he stated, "is Freedom" – currently under threat by restrictions on free speech, in the West as much as elsewhere, driving citizens to extremism.[44] He substantiated his first point with the recent refusal at the UK border (in February 2009) of the Dutch radical politician Geert Wilders, which he rejected. Ḥabīb, who would eagerly incite retribution on Dimashqiyya, withheld judgement of the Dutch MP and maker of the movie *Fitna*, equating Islam and terrorism, which contrasted the alarm of organised Shiite opinion in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. (The *Overkoepelende Shiitische Vereniging*, for example, both rejected "criticism of Islam" and took part in the "Cairo mission" of March 2008, which aimed to prevent "anti-Dutch measures").[45] Ignoring the furor over *Fitna*, he presented Wilders' rebuff as Western self-contradiction, exclaiming that "the Bakris rule Europe".[46]

More than the secular reference to its Western angle suggested, however, Ḥabīb's lauding of "freedom" echoed the centrality of *ḥurrīyat* in the religio-political doctrines of Muḥammad and Sādiq al-Shīrāzī.[47] While not forced out of Iran like they were, he had shared his European refuge with other Shīrāzī Shiites (cf. Louër 2009:14). Just like other forms of Shiism that were side-lined since the revolution in Iran - e.g., that of the Mojāhedīn - the Shīrāzī-ism of the Kuwaiti sheykh had assumed an exilic identity, but of a fundamentalist-clericalist variety. Whether Ḥabīb was as truly high-minded with regard to unbelievers tearing into his religion as the page he took from secular-democratic reasoning or not, the Wilders controversy had involved a higher-order collision for him, affecting the proximate challenge of the Shiite state. Whether or not the sheykh actually believed it to be true that

"the Bakris rule Europe," he stood for a sectarian reform of Shiism that was currently unimaginable in Islamic countries, he explained, its inception conceivable only in the West.[48]

In the case of Kuwait's skewed religious demography, "no-one spoke about it, no-one made any objection about it, because [of] *taqīye*" (pious concealment), declared Ḥabīb. And faced with this plight, he set himself to reform the application of *taqīye*, so that the Shiites would not legitimize cowardice; would defend themselves and - now voicing religious nationalism full throttle – "be a respected people in the world".[49] Correspondingly, Ḥabīb is on record advocating a "national homeland" (*waṭan qawmī*) for the Shiites, noting that "the Jews did the same thing," having "united their words and [petitioned] the British Empire".[50]

(In spite of their radically opposed geopolitics, there is significant commonality in Ḥabīb's and the Khomeynist recasting of *taqīye* to accommodate political activism. Like Ḥabīb, Khomeynī holds *taqīye* impermissible when used as an excuse to refrain from fighting tyrants (Medoff 2015). They both identify a specific duty of courage for religious leaders and privilege *taqīye* as personal as opposed to communal acts (see Mariuma 2014:94 for Khomeynī; Über das Rechtsprechen [...] 2013 for Ḥabīb). But the two perspectives part ways when it comes to sectarianism. Khomeynī's discussion of *taqīye* includes the category of *modārātiye,* which concerns the extension of friendliness to non-Shiites 'for the sake of reducing tensions with […] them' (Medoff 2015). This he held obligatory (*vājeb*) on occasions such as the *ḥajj* (Ḥeydarī 1396/2017-8:126). The constitutional policy of Shiite-Sunni "rapprochement" (*taqrīb*) in the Islamic Republic, more broadly, has been identified as one of its manifestations (Medoff 2015). Ḥabīb, however, has presented praising or paying respect to the "enemies of the *ahl-e beyt*" on the part of religious authorities as an insult to Shiism and an abuse of *taqīye*.[51])

Other Shīrāzīs also deemed to be radicals have proven willing - in their prioritization of irredentist sectarianism - to seek alliances with "unbelievers." Āyatollāh Mujtabā al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī, for example (cf. Azizi 2018), is known among Shiites for advocating that Mecca and Medina should be placed "under the control of the UN [because] the two cities would be better run by kuffar [and] under the conrol of kuffar the shia will have more freedom".[52] Ḥabīb echoes and slightly inflects the line, calling on Shiites to show courage (i.e., invoking the reform of *taqīye* - as elaborated above), to "take back all the Islamic holy sites and have the two holy cities under international supervision." The Fadakian strategy centers explicitly on help from the West: Shiites needed to hire "[W]estern lawyers so that […] legal action [could] be taken with national, European institutions and the United Nations against militant Salafi Wahabi ideology" – which, the sheykh took pains to explain, in English prose, lest his local audience miss a vital point, equated Nazism.[53] Ḥabīb's vantage point has consistently been the promised Shiite oasis in the Gulf, while studying, blending in on the margins of, deriving benefit from and attempting to incite others in the gatekeeping European hostland to attain it.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Fadakism has eagerly delivered on the requirement for religious nationalism to nationalize its ancient materials (van der Veer 2015:9). Whereas the traditional Shiite self-conception is of a "denomination" (*ṭāʾifa*) in Islam (Halm 1991:1-2; 15), for instance, Ḥabīb projects "a […] people in the world." While the legend of Fadak has figured often in irredentist projects since ᶜAlī's demise, no previous cases are apparently known in Shiism of its use for the creation of a state, sectarian or other (congruent with the territorial (nation-)state norm and reality of the

post-imperial era). Citizenship in the land of the Minor Fadak did not imply a "temporary homeland" in Britain but the duty for "British Muslims" to integrate and "defend it if need be".[54] While Muḥammad's Medinan polity was ethnically Arab, the insistence on "an Arab state" after thirteen-plus centuries of Islam's cross-ethnic expansion quite something else - reminiscent rather of the purification discourses associated with nationalist modernity.

The Ḥabībian quest is an obvious taker for religious nationalism but it occupies a particular place with limited generalizability in the typology of Shiite Islamism. Statehood is an end-goal of Fadakism, whereas Ṣadrian politics took up the legacy of Fadak for the state's moral chastisement. While deterritorialized understandings of the state remain significant to the Islamic Republic, Fadakism commits to the sacralization of place across the Arabian Peninsula. The Iranian state remains committed to transsectarian outreach as Ḥabīb provokes, cajoles, offends and spoils for sectarian others to take the bait. While Fadakism has ethno-sectarian markers, the "Major Fadak" is not like the "Greater Bahrain." It speaks of an Arab state but pivots on its Shiite character. Whereas Bahrani nationalism organizes around the territorial image of once contiguous majoritarian habitation, Fadak's significance to Ḥabīb derives essentially from its religious designation. While its differences with the Khomeynist project are by no means minor, the Shīrāzī-ism from which Fadakism stems has emerged in parallel and, for a time, in cooperation with it, and Ḥabīb's, similarly, is a clericalist ideology.

If Fadakism's intra-sectarian comparison renders only limited common ground, cases abound beyond the "Party of ᶜAlī" for the modern politicization of promised land. Smith's study of Arab and Jewish nationalism, for instance, before the crystallization of his ethno-symbolist approach, establishes Zionism as an exchange of "Judaism for Jewry as the unit of solidarity" (1973:42) and Jewry's "new group definition" in the "nation" (1973:36-7). This had followed an "ethnic re-definition of religion" replacing the "religious definition of

ethnicity" (1973:28). It would thus be an error to see Judaism as a national religion reflecting "the 'nation' beneath" (1973:43). But the modernism is revised in Smith's later work, which affirms that "the idea of the nation was well known in pre-modern epochs, and in the ancient world it had its religiously defined counterparts" (1998:168). It was "possible to find examples of social formations […] even in antiquity, that […] approximated to an inclusive definition of the concept of the 'nation', notably among the ancient Jews […]" (1998:190).

Specifics of the approach, then - i.e., the thesis of the secular nature of nationalism in the older work and of ancient religious nationhood in the new - might lead one to dismiss its use as an analytical tool to capture Fadakism, but it offers effective anchors for the thematization of instrumentalized religion, religious reform, and the mirror of the West. Herzl, reminds Smith, "conceded that the return to Zion must be preceded by the return to Judaism" (1973:42). That the former was a "secular apostle of Zionism" is immaterial to the equivalence in Ḥabīb's foregrounding of Fadak to stir up religious nationalism among the Shiites. Rationalizing reform in Judaism had delivered nationalism from the ethnic religion (1973:23, 35) while Ḥabīb posed *taqīye*'s rethinking as key to Shiite self-realization in the Major Fadak. Religious reform in Judaism was rooted in assimilationist pressure and the quest for emancipation (1973:30, 31). The European context in Ḥabīb's case shines through in the pitch for participatory citizenship and his complex articulations of *ḥurrīyat* discourse. There is a further parallel, lastly, in the European "political Zionism [that] often proclaimed itself to be revolutionary in the course of Jewish history[,]" having "developed as a dynamic anti-status-quo force, negating passively awaiting Messianic times and the miraculous ingathering of Jews back into Zion" (Gal 2007:221). Ḥabīb's Servants of the Mahdī have not settled either for quietism, or ventured a defensive concept of their religio-political role, but upped the ante from British soil to remobilize Shiism - offensively - for their vision of Fadak.

It seems difficult to overestimate the impact of Ḥabīb's British base on the nature of his operations, making at first sight for a contradiction with the incisive argument from the Indian setting on the "indigenous" nature of religious nationalism (van der Veer 1994:20). Britain's free broadcasting regime allows for an escalation of scale in Fadakian outreach, for instance, as testified in Linge's report of its local foreign effects. Sectarian polemics in Norway were relatively recent, appearing "as deterritorialized, particularly in digital spaces." There, "European-based polemicists such as […] al-Habib offer sectarian and supranational Islamic identities to young Muslims of various origins, notably by making new sense of pre-modern Sunnite-Shiite polemics" (2016:15). It is unlikely that Ḥabīb would have achieved similar results from Kuwait, which had cracked down on media freedom precisely since the sheykh had begun to escalate his propaganda from Britain (see Wehrey 2012:146).

A second aspect of impact concerns the conceptual dimension, as seen in the length to which the sheykh has gone to couch his message in terms - whether in the presentation of sectarian struggle as participatory citizenship or of Wahhabi Salafism as Nazism - calculated to compel significant political others in the audience to see reason to his cause. Ḥabīb's adoption of dominant tropes from the host society is not limited, however, to strategic communication alone. There is also the commonality in his world between cultural forms in which political self-realization depends on "being allowed to say what needs to be said" - even though it appears as a self-contradictory identification (from the formal defense of Wilders to the expurgation of Dimashqiyya) when looking from the outside in. Thus, it is the "elective" in the "affinity" that reveals what crucially is indigenous to Ḥabīb' exilic project.[55]

Judaism reformed and Zionism surfaced to the background of assimilatory pressure in Europe. But twenty-first century Europe has no "initial agent of change" that enforces citizenship and the sacrifice of ethnocentric particularity on Sanhedrins (see Smith 1973:30).

Systemic pressure to assimilate is thus limited, and the agency of residents less constrained than in the era of Jewish reform, reflecting external demand less than ideological choice. Fadakism embodies very much a law unto its own - as seen in its pursuit of "foreign policy," militia operations, and the attempt to mete out religious punishment across sovereign borders.

Fadakism cannot be equated, moreover, to its adaptive framing in Britain. Its key ingredients gestated elsewhere, discrediting another theory of the "foreign hand" (see van der Veer 1994:20): the attack on Shīrāzī-ism by the Tehrani regime that portrays it as a backward "English Shiism." The selective English patronage of Shiism, it says, was part and parcel of a colonial plot since the days of British India to emasculate the Muslim world.[56] The ethnic component of Fadakism, however (demanding "an Arab state in the Gulf"), is rooted geographically in Bahrani nativism, whose politicization long predates Ḥabīb's flight from Kuwait. Activist intellectuals in Saudi Arabia, for instance, articulated Bahrani nativism for the Eastern province in the early 1990s (Louër 2014 131-132). While the Arab Spring saw Shiite protest challenge Sunni sectarian rule, meanwhile, the British government stood by its traditional allies, the Sunni tribal leaders of the Gulf. The clerical component of Fadakism, too, originated elsewhere: in Karbala and revolutionary Iran. Shīrāzīs having spread to the Gulf "became the main subcontractors of exporting the revolution" but by 1982 were "marginalized in Iran [….], when the Iranian regime began to establish its own network." Their protest against despotism in Iran mixed with religious criticism of Khomeynī and Khāmeneʾī "as the sole leaders of the Shiʻa world" (Louër 2009). Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī's theory of the plural *shūrat al-fuqahāʾ* became the benchmark of their politico-religious schism - but it is equally a doctrine of jurist rule, and of Shiism reoriented towards the state.

Beyond the range of meanings to which its appearances have floatingly attached, Fadakism derives in the core from this recent religious schism within Twelver clericalism in

the Khomeynist vein, involving geopolitical crossings and a corresponding escalation of scale. Here surfaces an additional sense, beyond the foregoing application of the idea in the analysis of Shiite territoriality, in which "the migratory experience can lead to more embracing identifications on the margin of the host society" (van der Veer 1995:7). Ḥabīb's Western presence, that is, presents his Khomeynist detractors with a case lending credence, in their eyes, to the narrative of Western depravity - associated with European expansion and a lust for power that seeks to divide clerics and subdue Islam.[56] More specifically, it provides them with an argument to refocus antagonism in Islam-West relations on the enemy's realm, even while the regional alliances of Ḥabīb's adoptive society have been inimical to his elementary aim - militating, that is, against the Shiite recovery of peninsular land. The radical Europe-based brethren of the anti-Khomeynist Shīrāzīs who once did the Iranians' bidding have thus cut deeper the wound of their revolution and its rejection of Western civilization.

NOTES

[1] Thus, I have interpreted van der Veer's contrasting of Tablīghī Jamāᶜat and Jamāᶜat-i-Islāmī.

[2] The preceding development in the region most obviously relevant to the case of this article concerns Khomeyni's transformative ideological work as an expatriate in Iraq, where he formulated a blueprint of the Shiite-Islamic state (e.g., see Corboz, E. 2015. Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah. *Die Welt des Islams* 55, no. 2), and that of his many Shiite acolytes in the West, particularly in student societies, who helped prepare his return to Iran and would be instrumental in the success of his mission there (e.g., Algar, H. 1987. *Anjoman-e mazhabi*. In *Encyclopaedia Iranica.* ed. Yarshater, 2, London [etc.]: Routledge & Kegan Paul; van den Bos, M. 2012. "'European Islam' in the Iranian Ettehadiyeh," in *Shi'i Islam and Identity: Religion, Politics and Change in the Global Muslim Community*, ed. Ridgeon. London: Routledge).

[3] *Doktrīn-e mahdavīyat; moqaddameʾī bar doktrīn-e maᶜṣūmīn dar sākht-e siyāsat-e khārejī* (speech by Ḥasan ᶜAbbāsī, Head of the Revolutionary Guards-affiliated "Centre for Strategic Studies and Doctrine of Security Without Borders", dated 8 *tīr* 1392/29 June 2013 and available on the presidential website (http://www.ourpresident.ir), accessed 2 June 2015).

[4] 'Ayatollah Javadi Amoli: Adherence to Ahlul Bayt fosters Muslims' unity.' 2016. *ABNA*.

[5] See Kepel, 2002, *Jihad*, 126-127; cf. Deeb, 1988, *Shia Movements*, 292, 297; Hooglund, 1995, *Iranian Views*, 92; Panah, 2007, *Islamic Republic*, 74.

[6] BBC/SWB/ME/0631/A/1, 5 December 1989, cf. Calabrese, 1990, *Damascus Connection*, 189.

[7] *Khabargozārī-ye Mehr*, 9 March 2015/18 *esfand* 1393; Khederi, 2015, *Iraq in Pieces*.

[8] Erdbrink, T. 2014. Populaire generaal symboliseert nieuwe zelfvertrouwen in Iran. *NRC Handelsblad*, 11 December (14).

[9] Interview Sheykh al-Ḥabīb, 1 May 2009.

[10] See AFP, 2010 (20 September), *Kuwait strips Shiite activist of citizenship*.

[11] See http://irandataportal.syr.edu/fatwa-banning-the-insulting-of-aisha-or-any-other-sunni-figures (accessed 6 December 2018).

[12] 'English Researcher interviews Sheikh Yasser al-Habib in the Minor Land of Fadak.' 2014. *Alqatrah* (http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns205, accessed 12 July 2019).

[13] 'Yāser al-Ḥabīb; ākhūnd-e landan-neshīn/dīrūz dar shabake-ye 'fadak,' emrūz dar 'ṣawt al-ᶜitra'.' 1392/2014. *Khabargozārī-ye Tasnīm/Tasnim News*. (https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1392/10/23/248228/ [...], 8 June 2020).

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] E.g., see the glossary in Sobhani, 2011, *Doctrines of Shiᶜi Islam*, 222.

[17] 'Would Imam Hussain (peace be upon him) really want us to punish ourselves for him?!'. 2010. *Alqatrah* (http://www.alqatrah.net/en/an44, accessed 18 January 2019).

[18] https://www.facebook.com/Supporters-of-Sayed-M-Ali-Al-Musawi-450923821783371/; https://www.hra-news.org/letters/a-305/; http://www.fadak.tv/index.php?id=39 [as observed between 21.30 and 22.30] (accessed 19 January 2019).

[19] https://web.archive.org/web/20110202021111/http://shianewspaper.com/ (accessed 29 January 2019).

[20] [Colophon], n.d., *The Shia Newspaper* 7.

[21] British Adolescents' [B]ehaviour Worst in Europe! n.d. *The Shia Newspaper* (2): 31.

---

[22] [Colophon], n.d., *The Shia Newspaper* 7.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Sorry! There is violence but in 'Another Islam', n.d., *The Shia Newspaper* 2.

[25] https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/zwvqtfr/revision/10 (accessed 27 February 2019).

[26] Such is suggested, for instance, by an obituary in the name of the "Iraq branch" of the organization dated 26 May 2018, commemorating two individuals mentioned as its "members" who had been slaughtered by Islamic State in Kirkuk, which circulates on the Internet since 28 May 2018 via the Facebook of Aḥmad al-Mūsawī (accessed on 10 July 2019), who mentions Ḥabīb's al-Muḥassin mosque as his alma mater. Another indication is the English voiceover of Ḥabīb's lecture, Twittered on 26 April 2016 at alhabib_en, stating: "[W]hen the fatwa came from the *marja*ᶜ, the soldiers went from us, as much as we could, we sent them" [1.56.45»] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qa3HXqh_3U, accessed 11 July 2019).

[27] http://selm.ir/5253/ (accessed 28 February 2019).

[28] https://www.shiatv.net/video/3e0e2233801f82486b33 (dated 22 July 2012, accessed 10 July 2019).

[29] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jW6X9x3nUiM [5:16»] (accessed 28 February 2019). An English-language report of the episode on Ḥabīb's website (http://alqatrah.net/en/ns149, dated 1 August 2012, accessed on 28 February 2019) is considerably more moderately phrased.

[30] Presumably the sheykh did not intend to include Iraq in his point on illegality.

[31] https://beta.charitycommission.gov.uk/charity-details/?regid=1137000&subid=0 (accessed 1 April 2019). The Organisation was established, reportedly, in London (Wehrey, 2012, *Politics of Sectarianism in the Gulf*, 146); it is also the case that prior to his emigration, at

the time of his arrest, Ḥabīb had been involved with an eponymous organisation in Kuwait (see Al-Ḥantūlī, 2010, *Yāsir al-Ḥabīb*).

[32] https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/07271856 (accessed 5 March 2019).

[33] «Hezbollah» Kidnaps Their Opposing Religious Cleric: Sayed M. Ali Al-Musawi. n.d. *The Shia Newspaper* (4): 4; Interview Sheykh al-Ḥabīb, 1 May 2009.

[34] *The Independent* reported in June 2013 – evasively, giving readers not a clue of the intensity of the sheykh's discourse - that it had "learned that Sheikh Habib and Fadak TV […] were investigated last year by the communications regulator Ofcom for a televised sermon in which he questioned the sexuality of a Sunni successor to the Prophet Muhammad, Umar Ibn Al Khattab" (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/sunni-vs-shia-in-gerrards-cross-new-mosque-highlights-growing-tensions-among-b—ritish-muslims-8671969.html, accessed 1 April 2019); (fraud) Document 31 March 2017 (http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/CharityWithoutPartB.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1165143&SubsidiaryNumber=0, accessed 5 March 2019).

[35] https://www.sloughobserver.co.uk/news/13437220.charity-watchdog-launches-investigat—ion-into-dissolved-charity-behind-controversial-fulmer-mosque/ (accessed 1 March 2019); https://www.thirdsector.co.uk/charity-commission-opens-statutory-inquiry-whether-dis—solved-charity-raised-spent-funds/governance/article/1289112 (accessed 5 March 2019).

[36] http://www.almuhassin.org/ (accessed 1 March 2019); 'The dream has finally come true! The flag of Khoddam al-Mehdi peace be upon him is hoisted on the Minor Land of Fadak.' 2013. *Alqatrah* (http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns180, accessed 11 February 2019); Buehler, 2014, *"Fatima,"* 186; Kassam and Blomfeld, 2015, *"Remembering Fatima and Zaynab,"* 212.

[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RW04FsvwgMc (accessed 4 April 2019).

[38] Interview Sheykh al-Habib, 1 May 2009.

[39] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0jgkqJ78w-U [0:15-3:26] (accessed 11 July 2019).

[40] *Dream has finally come true!* 2013.

[41] Interview Sheykh al-Habib, 1 May 2009.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] 'The vision of Sheikh al-Habib for the future in regards to the relation between freedom of speech and the freedom of beliefs.' 2015. *Alqatrah* (http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns210, accessed 4 February 2019).

[45] Vellenga and Wiegers, 2013, *Polarization or Bridging?*, 119, 125.

[46] Interview Sheykh al-Habib, 1 May 2009.

[47] E.g., Shirazi. 2001 [2000]. The *Islamic System of Government*. London: Fountain Books (displayed on http://www.english.shirazi.ir/, 29 January 2019), vii; ch. 12; 61.ibid.ibid.ibid.ibid.ibid.

[48] Interview Sheykh al-Habib, 1 May 2009.

[49] Ibid.

[50] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0jgkqJ78w-U [0:15»] (accessed 11 July 2019).

[51] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TnXD0qc0XaI [4.39»] (accessed 9 June 2020).

[52] https://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/234931661-mojtaba-shirazi-speaks-out/ (accessed 5 March 2019).

[53] http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns148 (accessed 3 April 2019).

[54] *English Researcher interviews*. 2014.

[55] This is another case challenging the Saidian narrative that portrays cultural exchange as foreign imposition. Ḥabīb claimed British protection, not long after the ending of Kuwait's Protectorate days in 1961, but *à la carte*. There is similarly a parallel of political convergence, with obvious caveats for contextual difference, in the "Hindu nationalists [who] claim that science is part of India's spiritual heritage, and [who] find support among Britain's theosophists and spiritualists" (van der Veer, 2002b, *Religion in South Asia*, 180).

[56] One of the regimist websites seeking to expose "English Shiism" (FETAN.IR) explained that the spread of *qame-zanī* - a bloodletting ritual associated with the Shīrāzīs - had been a British complot. Aiming to destroy Muslim power, the British had started to work on the Shiites in India because they were at great distance from the *marjaᶜiyat* in Najaf. Abusing their ignorance and great love of Imām Ḥusayn, they had invented and taught them the practice of *shamshīr* and *qame-zanī* to the forehead. The practice then penetrated Iran and Iraq, again through British colonialism (http://www.fetan.ir/home/1628, accessed 6 December 2018).

Literature

AFP. 2010. "Kuwait strips Shiite activist of citizenship." *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, 20 September. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-kuwait-strips-shiite [...] (8 July 2019).

Al-Ḥantūlī, ᶜĀ. 2010. Yāsir al-Ḥabīb: Hādhihī qiṣṣa khurūjī min al-sijn.. wa al-mustaqbal al-tashayyuᶜ. In *Elaph*, 28 November. https://elaph.com/Web/news/2010/11/614420.html (23 February 2019).

Al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad ibn ᶜUmar. 2013. *The life of Muḥammad. Al-Wāqidī's Kitāb al-maghāzī* (trans.) R. Faizer, A. Ismail & A. Tayob. London: Routledge.

Algar, H. 1987. *Anjoman-e mazhabi*. In *Encyclopaedia Iranica.* ed. E. Yarshater, 2, London [etc.]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 80-82.

——. 2011 [1993]. *DĀR AL-ḤARB*. In *Encyclopaedia Iranica.* ed. E. Yarshater, 6, London [etc.]: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 668-69.

Alhasan, H.T. 2011. The Role of Iran in the failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain. *Middle East Journal* 65 (4): 603-17.

Amnesty International. 2005. *Annual Report for Kuwait*. https://web.archive.org/web/20110218151 [...] (accessed 23 February 2019).

Anderson, B.R.O.G. 1983. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.

Arjomand, S.A. 1984. *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam. Religion, political order and societal change in Shiite Iran from the beginning to 1890*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ayatollah Javadi Amoli: Adherence to Ahlul Bayt fosters Muslims' unity. 2016. In *ABNA*, 30 October. https://en.abna24.com/service/grand-ayatollahs/archive/2016/10/30/788755/story.html (28 October 2019).

Azizi, A. 2015. Iran targets 'MI6 Shiites'. In *AL Monitor*, 4 May. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-shia-shirazi-movement-secterian.html (27 September 2016).

——. 2018. What do we Know About the Shia Group that Attacked the Embassy in London? In *IranWire*, 10 March. https://iranwire.com/en/features/5216 (23 February 2019).

Bloemraad, I. & M. Wright 2014. "Utter Failure" or Unity out of Diversity? Debating and Evaluating Policies of Multiculturalism. *International Migration Review* 48 (S1): 292-334.

Bloom, W. 1990. *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"British Adolescents' [B]ehaviour Worst in Europe!". n.d. *The Shia Newspaper* (2): 31.

Buchta, W. 2000. *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic*. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Buehler, A.F. 2014. "Fatima," in *Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God* (eds) C. Fitzpatrick & A.H. Walker. Santa Barbara, CA.: ABC-CLIO, pp. 182-86.

Calabrese, J. 1990. Iran II: The Damascus Connection. *The World Today* 46 (10): 188-90.

Calderini, S. 2008. *Fatima Bint Muhammad*. In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Women in World History*. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 257.

Cancian, A. 2017. "Faith as Territory: *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb* in Modern Shi'i Sufism," in *Dār al-islām/dār al-ḥarb. Territories, People, Identities* (eds) G. Calasso & G. Lancioni. Leiden [etc.]: Brill, pp. 293-312.

Cesari, J. 2018a. Unexpected Convergences. Religious nationalism in Israel and Turkey. *Religions* 9 (334): https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9110334.

——. 2018b. *What is Political Islam?* Boulder: Lynner Rienner.

Cole, J. 2002. "Rival Empires of Trade and Shiᶜism in Eastern Arabia," in *Sacred Space and Holy War. The Politics, Culture and History of Shiᶜite Islam*. London [etc.]: I.B. Tauris, pp. 31-57; 216-21.

"[Colophon]." n.d. *The Shia Newspaper* (2): 7.

Conversi, D. 2002. "Conceptualizing Nationalism: An introduction to Walker Connor's work," in *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism* (ed.) D. Conversi. Routledge advances in international relations and global politics. London: Routledge, pp. 1-23.

Corboz, E. 2015. Khomeini in Najaf: The Religious and Political Leadership of an Exiled Ayatollah. *Die Welt des Islams* 55 (2): 221-48.

——. 2016. *Guardians of Shi'ism. Sacred authority and transnational family networks*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Deeb, M. 1988. Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria. *Third World Quarterly* 10 (2): 683-98.

Delanty, G. 1997. Models of Citizenship. Defining European identity and citizenship. *Citizenship Studies* 1 (3): 285-303.

Deutsch, K.W. 1981. "On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West," in *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures, and Nation Building* (ed.) P. Torkvik. Bergen [etc.]: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 51-93.

The dream has finally come true! The flag of Khoddam al-Mehdi peace be upon him is hoisted on the Minor Land of Fadak. 2013. In *Alqatrah*, 22 June. http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns180 (11 February 2019).

Dressler, M. 2013. *Writing Religion. The making of Turkish Alevi Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ende, W. 1997. The *Nakhāwila*, a Shiite Community in Medina Past and Present. *Die Welt des Islams* 37 (3): 263-348.

English Researcher interviews Sheikh Yasser al-Habib in the Minor Land of Fadak. 2014. In *Alqatrah*, 29 May. http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns205 (12 July 2019).

Erdbrink, T. 2014. "Populaire generaal symboliseert nieuwe zelfvertrouwen in Iran." *NRC Handelsblad*, 11 December (14).

Gal, A. 2007. "Historical Ethno-symbols in the Emergence of the State of Israel," in *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism. History, culture and ethnicity in the formation of nations* (eds) A.S. Leoussi & S. Grosby. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 221-30.

Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.

Greenfeld, L. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Greenfeld, L. & J.R. Eastwood. 2005. "Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," in *The Handbook of Political Sociology. States, civil societies, and globalization* (eds) T. Janoski,

R.R. Alford, A.M. Hicks & M.A. Schwartz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 247-65.

Haghighatnejad, R. 2014. Lebanon's border with Israel is Iran's new defensive line. In *IranWire*, 6 May. https://iranwire.com/en/features/340 (21 February 2019).

Halm, H. 1991. *Shiᶜism*. 2nd. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ḥeydarī, M.M. 1396/2017-8. Taqīye-ye modārātī az negāh-e emām Khomeynī. In *Ḥożūr*. http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/c202_143011/[…] (9 June 2020).

"«Hezbollah» Kidnaps Their Opposing Religious Cleric: Sayed M. Ali Al-Musawi." n.d. *The Shia Newspaper* (4): 4.

Hobsbawm, E.J. & T.O. Ranger (eds) 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hogwood, P. & G.K. Roberts. 2007. *European Politics Today*. 2nd. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hooglund, E. 1995. Iranian Views of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25 (1): 86-95.

Isakhan, B. 2015. "Succeeding and Seceding in Iraq. The Case for a Shiite State," in *Territorial Separatism in Global Politics: Causes, Outcomes and Resolution* (eds) D. Kingsbury & C. Laoutides. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 139-52.

Javādī-Āmolī, ᶜA. 2008/1387. Oṣūl-e ḥākem bar ravābet-e beynolmelal-e neẓām-e eslāmī. *Ḥokūmat-e eslāmī* 13 (2): 5-36.

Kantz Feder, R. 2014. Fatima's Revolutionary Image in *Fadak fi al-Ta'rikh* (1955): The Inception of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's Activism. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41 (1): 79-96.

Kaplan, R.D. 2016. 'How Islam Created Europe.' *The Atlantic*, May 317 (4): 22-23.

Kassam, Z. & B. Blomfield. 2015. "Remembering Fatima and Zaynab: Gender in Perspective," in *The Shi'i World. Pathways in Tradition and Modernity* (eds) F. Daftary, A. Sajoo & S. Jiwa. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 211-28.

Kepel, G. 2002. *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*. London: I.B.Tauris.

Khederi, A. 2015. Iraq in Pieces. Breaking Up to Stay Together. *Foreign Affairs* 94 (6): 33-41.

Khosronejad, P. 2012. "Introduction: Unburied Memories," in *Unburied Memories: The Politics of Bodies of Sacred Defense Martyrs in Iran* (ed.) P. Khosronejad. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1-21.

Lalani, A.R. 2000. *Early Shīᶜī Thought. The doctrines of Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir*. London: I.B.Tauris.

Linge, M. 2016. Sunnite-Shiite Polemics in Norway. *Fleks* 3 (1): 1-18.

Louër, L. 2009. The Limits of Iranian Influence Among Gulf Shiᶜa. *CTC Sentinel* 2 (5): 14-6.

Louër, L. 2008. *Transnational Shia Politics. Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf*. London; Paris: Hurst & Co; Centre d'études et de recherches internationales.

——. 2014. "The State and Sectarian Identities in the Persian Gulf Monarchies," in *Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf* (ed.) L.G. Potter. Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, pp. 117-42.

Madelung, W. 2006. *The Succession to Muḥammad. A study of the early Caliphate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Madelung, W.F. 1989. The *Hāshimiyyāt* of al-Kumayt and Hāshimī Shi'ism. *Studia Islamica* 70: 5-26.

Maghen, Z. 2008. 'Occultation in Perpetuum: Shi'ite Messianism and the Policies of the Islamic Republic.' *Middle East Journal* 62 (2): 232-57.

Mariuma, Y. 2014. Taqiyya as Polemic, Law and Knowledge: Following an Islamic Legal Term through the Worlds of Islamic Scholars, Ethnographers, Polemicists and Military Men. *The Muslim World* 104 (1-2): 89-108.

Marx, A.W. 2003. *Faith in Nation. Exclusionary origins of nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Matthiesen, T. 2009. The Shi'a of Saudi Arabia at a Crossroads. In *Middle East Report*, 6 May. https://merip.org/2009/05/the-shia-of-saudi-arabia-at-a-crossroads/ (26 February 2019).

—— 2012. A "Saudi Spring?": The Shi'a Protest Movement in the Eastern Province 2011-2012. *The Middle East Journal* 66 (4): 628-59.

Medoff, L. 2015. *TAQIYA i. In Shi'ism*. In *Encyclopaedia Iranica.* ed. E. Yarshater, London [etc.]: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Menashri, D. 2014. Iran 35 years after the Islamic revolution - A conversation with David Menashri. In *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 5 February. http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en [...] (26 April 2019).

Nabavi, A. 2009. The Range in Iran's Idealistic Foreign Policy: Ebbs and Tides. *International Politics* 2 (3): http://www.int-politics.com/Articles/No3/ablolamir%20nabavi.pdf.

Nahjul Balagha of Hazrat Ali. 1982. Tehran: Library of Chehel Sotoon Theological School.

Nakash, Y. 1994. The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiᶜism. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (3): 443-63.

Panah, M. 2007. *The Islamic Republic and the World. Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution*. London [etc.]: Pluto Press.

Rezvi, S.R. & H. Homazadeh. 2014. British supported Shia! In *Al-Mogawama*, 17 February. http://almoqawama.org/?lang=en&a=content.q&q=al-habib (23 February 2019).

Ruffle, K. 2011. May You Learn from Their Model: The Exemplary Father-Daughter Relationship of Mohammad and Fatima in South Asian Shiʿism. *Journal of Persianate Studies* 4 (1): 12-29.

Sadjadpour, K. 2018. 'Iran's Real Enemy in Syria.' *The Atlantic*, 16 April. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/iran-syria-israel/558080/ (21 February 2019).

Said, E.W. 1991 [1978]. *Orientalism*. 1st. New York: Pantheon Books.

Shain, Y. 1989. *The Frontier of Loyalty. Political exiles in the age of the nation-state*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.

Sharīᶜatī, ᶜA. 1350/1971. *Fāṭeme, Fāṭeme ast*. [Tehran]: Ḥoseynīye-ye Ershād [accessed via https://fa.shafaqna.com/news/338424, 4 July 2019].

SHĪRĀZĪ - Shirazi, Imam Muhammad. 2001 [2000]. *The Islamic System of Government*. 2nd (trans.) Z. Olyabek. London: Fountain Books.

Sivan, E. 1990. The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back. *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (2/3): 353-64.

Sivan, E. 1992. "The mythologies of religious radicalism: Judaism and Islam," in *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World* (ed.) M. Juergensmeyer. London: Frank Cass, pp. 71-81.

Smith, A.D. 1973. Nationalism and Religion: The Role of Religious Reform in the Genesis of Arab and Jewish Nationalism. *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 18 (35): 23-43.

——. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism. A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*. London: Routledge.

——. 2009. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism. A cultural approach*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Sobhani, J. 2011. *Doctrines of Shiᶜi Islam. A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices* (trans.) R. Shah-Kazemi. London: I.B.Tauris; The Institute of Ismaili Studies.

"Sorry! There is violence but in 'Another Islam'." n.d. *The Shia Newspaper* (4): 2-3.

Szanto Ali-Dib, E. 2012. Following Sayyida Zaynab: Twelver Shi'ism in Contemporary Syria. PhD Thesis: University of Toronto.

Tabātabāʾi, ᶜA. 1360/1981. *Shiᶜa*. Qum: Ansariyan Publications.

Über das Rechtsprechen im Zustand des Zweifels und während dem Praktizieren des Taqiyyah. 2013. In *Alqatrah*, 7 September. http://www.al-qatrah.net/de/al150 (9 June 2020).

van den Bos, M. 2012. "'European Islam' in the Iranian Ettehadiyeh," in *Shi'i Islam and Identity: Religion, Politics and Change in the Global Muslim Community* (ed.) L. Ridgeon. London: Routledge, pp. 64-92.

—— 2018. The Balance of Ecumenism and Sectarianism. Rethinking Religion and Foreign Policy in Iran. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23 (1): 30-53.

van der Veer, P. 1994. *Religious Nationalism. Hindus and Muslims in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

——. 1995. "The Diasporic Imagination," in *Nation and Migration. The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora* (ed.) P. van der Veer. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press.

—— 2002a. Cosmopolitan Options. *Etnográfica* 6 (1): 15-26.

—— 2002b. Religion in South Asia. *Annual review of anthropology* 31 (1): 173-87.

—— 2002c. Transnational Religion. Hindu and Muslim Movements. *Global Networks* 2 (2): 95-109.

—— 2015. Nation, Politics, Religion. *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 1 (1): 7-21.

van der Veer, P. & H. Lehmann (eds) 2002. *Nation and Religion. Perspectives on Europe and Asia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Veccia Vaglieri, L. *Fadak*. In *Encyclopaedia of Islam II.* Leiden: Brill, 725-27.

Vellenga, S. & G. Wiegers 2013. Polarization or Bridging? Responses of Muslim and non-Muslim organizations to criticism of Islam in the Netherlands. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 24 (1): 111-28.

The vision of Sheikh al-Habib for the future in regards to the relation between freedom of speech and the freedom of beliefs. 2015. In *Alqatrah*, 16 July. http://www.alqatrah.net/en/ns210 (4 February 2019).

Visser, R. 2008. "The Two Regions of Southern Iraq," in *An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?* (eds) R. Visser & G. Stansfield. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 27-51.

Wehrey, F.M. 2012. The Politics of Sectarianism in the Gulf. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 2003-2011. PhD Thesis: University of Oxford.

Wehrey, F.M. 2014. *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf. From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wellman, R. 2015. Regenerating the Islamic Republic: Commemorating Martyrs in Provincial Iran. *The Muslim World* 105: 561-81.

Would Imam Hussain (peace be upon him) really want us to punish ourselves for him?! 2010. In *Alqatrah*, 22 August. http://www.alqatrah.net/en/an44 (18 January 2019).

Yāser al-Ḥabīb; ākhūnd-e landan-neshīn/dīrūz dar shabake-ye 'fadak,' emrūz dar 'ṣawt al-ᶜitra'. 1392/2014. In *Khabargozārī-ye Tasnīm/Tasnim News*, 23 *dey*/13 January. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1392/10/23/248228/ [...] (8 June 2020).

Zachariah, B. 1998. Review of van der Veer, P. 1994. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. *Modern Asian Studies* 32 (1): 251-53.