Content Pluralism
Buchanan, R. and Grzankowski, Alex (2020) Content Pluralism. Inquiry , ISSN 0020-174X. (In Press)
![[img]](https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
Buchanan+and+Grzankowski+-+Content+Pluralism.pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript Restricted to Repository staff only Download (210kB) | Request a copy |
Abstract
How fine-grained are the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes? Are the contents of our beliefs individuated solely in terms of the objects, properties, and relations that figure in their truth conditions, or rather in terms of our concepts, or modes of presentation of those objects, properties, and relations? So-called Millians famously maintain the former whereas their Fregean rivals hold the latter. Though much ink was spilled on the question of grain, relatively little was ever achieved by way of consensus. We think the lack of consensus itself cries out for explanation. In this paper, we sketch a pluralist resolution (or, better, a dissolution) of the debate that flows from some extremely minimal commitments regarding the metaphysics of propositions and the attitudinal relations we bear to them. In doing so, we focus on the Act-type conception of propositions of Hanks (2015) and Soames (2010, 2016) and our own (redacted) favored deflationary account, Minimalism.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis, available online at the link above. |
| School: | School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy |
| Depositing User: | Alex Grzankowski |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Jan 2021 07:40 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Jun 2021 10:42 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/41905 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
 |
Edit/View Item |