Necessity, conditionals and apriority
Hossack, Keith (2022) Necessity, conditionals and apriority. In: Kürbis, Nils and Assadian, B. and Nassim, Jonathan (eds.) Knowledge, Number and Reality Encounters with the Work of Keith Hossack. London, UK: Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781350186439. (In Press)
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Abstract
On Goodman’s truth-conditions, a counterfactual is true if its consequent is inferrible from its antecedent and ‘relevant conditions’. I prove that ‘relevant conditions’ can be defined in such a way that Goodman’s truth-conditions are provably correct. I prove also that Goodman’s truth-conditions entail that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is a priori. I conclude that necessity is apriority.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Keith Hossack |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Jun 2021 10:15 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:10 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/44616 |
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