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    Necessity, conditionals and apriority

    Hossack, Keith (2022) Necessity, conditionals and apriority. In: Kürbis, Nils and Assadian, B. and Nassim, Jonathan (eds.) Knowledge, Number and Reality Encounters with the Work of Keith Hossack. London, UK: Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781350186439. (In Press)

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    Abstract

    On Goodman’s truth-conditions, a counterfactual is true if its consequent is inferrible from its antecedent and ‘relevant conditions’. I prove that ‘relevant conditions’ can be defined in such a way that Goodman’s truth-conditions are provably correct. I prove also that Goodman’s truth-conditions entail that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is a priori. I conclude that necessity is apriority.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Book Section
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Keith Hossack
    Date Deposited: 07 Jun 2021 10:15
    Last Modified: 12 Jun 2021 15:45
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/44616

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