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Citation for this version:

Citation for the publisher’s version:
Modern Formation, Ethnic Reformation: The Social Sources of the American Nation

The question, 'When is the nation?,' ranks second in importance only to the related query, 'Why is the nation?' in the contemporary social science and humanities literature on nationalism. This issue is confronted by this essay, which considers Anthony Smith's important perennialist-modernist dichotomy through the lens of the American experience. Along the way, it will address the related but independent question of whether nations are 'top-down' artefacts constructed by the modern state, or 'bottom-up' social formations generated by ethnic groups within civil society. The importance of this theoretical question lies not merely with the antiquarian interest in how our world system of nations emerged, but with the more pressing question of why it is persistently re-created, and, for idealists, how it may be superseded.

These theoretical enquiries, as noted above, will come together through consideration of the American case. American nationhood has typically been conceived of as 'modern' in origin, a label which is conventionally held to carry the baggage of state-origins, bourgeois élites, and politico-economic sources of causal primacy.¹ By contrast, this essay will contend that the American nation emerged out of the crucible of both modern and pre-modern processes, with the accent on the former. Hence while some of these formative flows are indeed state-orchestrated and institutional, most are better described as cultural and associational. Moreover, the re-creation of American
nationality after independence often relied upon distinctly 'ethnic' sources. Such processes in turn demonstrate two propositions: first, that the rise of nations is a very real chronological phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process which evolves toward its diachronic 'moment'; and second, that the perennialist vs. modernist distinction\(^2\) - when applied to specific cases - can act as a blunt instrument which fails to correlate with its sister 'ethnic vs. state origins' conception.

Theoretical Departures

There has been a veritable boom in nationalism studies post-1980, but this efflorescence of scholarship has failed to produce a consensual definition over basic terminology like ethnic group and nation. Definitions of the nation range from those which equate it with the state (Giddens' 'bordered power container') to those which define the nation as an extension of ethnicity (Connor's ‘self-aware ethnic group’).\(^3\) While one is obliged by the \textit{zeitgeist} of our times to tip one's scholarly cap to the notion of 'contested concepts,' I consider this state of terminological confusion to be the scholastic equivalent of quicksand. Clearly we need to do a better job of differentiating the nation from the related type concepts of ethnic group and state. To do so, I will step outside the bounds of scholarly convention to declare that social concepts such as these are only marginally less robust in their connections to sensory reality than those of natural science - the difference is not absolute, but one of degree.\(^4\)

I further take the view that all concepts are ontological constructs that 'come into being' at the moment when human beings are struck by a coincidence of sense-
impressions (clustered values of variables) which stand out from a statistically random background. Recurrence of this phenomenon in space-time leads human beings to devise labels for these 'real' phenomena. For instance, when focusing one's camera (or one's eyes), the objects in view become recognisable at some arbitrary threshold point. Yet that does not make the objects any less real - and a rough (though not perfect) consensus will tend to arise among varied observers as to precisely when the object is in focus.

So it is with social phenomena like ethnic groups or nations. If we strip away the presentational distortion demanded by ideology, intellectual fashion, semantics and theoretical tribalism, I believe that a definition of the nation - at the phenomenological level - can be said to exist. Thus the answer to the question, 'When is the nation,' has a more-or-less clear answer. However, such an answer cannot be given by merely listing a host of attributes that define the concept in a synchronic manner. The latter is a necessary shorthand approach, but is too slippery for complex analysis. Rather, concepts are formed at the confluence of certain values of these attributes that appear in diachronic time.

It is worthwhile, however, to consider which attributes are important, and since John Stuart Mill's primal definition, numerous observers, whether theoreticians or politicians, have made their attempt. Perhaps the most useful - in its parsimony and conceptual discrimination from related phenomena - is that recently synthesised by Anthony Smith: 'A named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.' (Smith 1991: 14)
I will now endow this static picture with diachronic motion, hence we shall speak here of a nation as a named human population surpassing specific threshold requirements for:

1. proportion of residents living in a historic territory
2. percentage of the population sharing a particular myth(s) or historical memory(s)
3. degree of shared public culture (in terms of both content and diffusion)
4. degree of economic integration
5. degree and penetration of common rights and duties
6. percentage of population that is collectively self-aware

These requirements would be based upon field research which drew on social surveys, textual analysis, census and industrial statistics. However, in many historical cases, our best approximations can only be gleaned from surviving relics (i.e. newspapers, textbooks, government documents, traveler's notes, diaries, archaeology, genetics). Yet this does not invalidate the above schema - which is a useful theoretical guide for empirical research.

Walker Connor notes that nation-formation is a process, which, while not requiring 100 per cent diffusion of consciousness, does require a degree of mass penetration. However, while Connor is correct to treat nation-formation as processual and diachronic, this neither validates his pessimistic decree that 'there is no formula’ for ascertaining when a nation has definitively emerged, nor concurs with his claim that ‘the point at which a quantitative addition in the number sharing a sense of common
nationhood [triggers] the qualitative transformation into a nation resists arithmetic
definition.¹⁷

Through scholarly agreement on variables and percentages, a perfectly precise
definition is theoretically possible. The threshold requirement for each of the above
criteria would be determined by a consensus of scholarly observers at different places and
times. This intellectual consensus (which can never be total), would ideally distinguish
the precise degree (i.e. 10% must share the collective memory, 25% must share the public
culture) of each attribute that is required. In this manner, theorists could begin to talk to,
rather than past, each other. There is already a very basic consensus over the meaning of
a term like 'nation': no one would argue that we are talking about occupation, for
instance. A tightening of the conceptual net would only bring benefits and could focus
the limited resources of scholars on the relevant questions.

At this point, there is a symbolic issue that presents itself, namely, are scholars
defining the identities of their subject matter? The answer is no, because individuals
identify with particular collective representations. Though they may attach popular labels
like 'nation' or 'region' to them as well, we as scholars must evaluate these in the light of
our more rigorously determined concepts. Thus the decision as to how to systematically
categorise popular representations is irreducibly universal and scholastic. Particular
actors may take them or leave them, and frequently do the latter!

Naturally, these statements are contentious - indeed, they are meant to be. They
are idealistic and run counter to the terminological relativism favoured by many.
Nevertheless, I submit that this kind of method can usefully serve as a beacon toward
which nationalism scholarship can progress in the future. Terminological agreement
would bring the perennialist-modernist debate about the historical origins of nations into sharper relief, because both sides would have to refer to precise degrees of each attribute instead of selecting evidence in *ad hoc* fashion whilst providing idiosyncratic interpretations of the meaning of nationhood. The lack of sociological information regarding the consciousness of pre-modern peasant populations would pose an empirical problem, but not a conceptual one. In consequence, the enquiry into the origins of nations would be transformed from a circular, theoretical exercise into a directed, empirical pursuit. However, since we have yet to arrive at this methodological apogee, existing scholars differ widely on exactly when in history nations emerge.

Walker Connor's seminal article on the subject pinpoints the transition from a consciousness of difference (to others) to a consciousness of similarity (as 'ourselves') as the critical moment, transforming ethnic groups into nations through the growth of self-awareness, often prior to the modern, post-1780 period. Other 'ethno-symbolist' theorists trace the rise of nationhood to the modern period, when new technologies and a new morphology of social relations enabled a denser integration of élites and masses to occur, transforming the previously looser bonds of ethnicity into those of nationhood.

Finally, 'modernist' observers also make the case for the importance of modern integrating mechanisms - industrial capital, a rational and tax-raising bureaucracy, a mass military, public education, and improved mass-communication - in helping to hew nations out of the wreckage of feudal cosmopolitanism. However, whereas ethno-symbolists like Anthony Smith point to a continuity between nations and their pre-modern ethnic antecedents, modernists like Ernest Gellner or Benedict Anderson cleave to the notion that the rise of modern nation-states represents a new break with a
cosmopolitan past, a contingent event which creates national identities from a pre-modern social structure that was at once local and universal in scope. In this conception, economic, political or military sources of social power are primary in the causal chain, with culture and ethnicity serving as second-order derivatives of modernising processes.

Unfortunately, the perennialism-modernism label obscures at least three distinct concepts: a modern vs. perennial chronological axis; a civil society vs. state institutional axis; and an ethnic-cultural-ideological-political-economic variable for the source of social power. Occasionally a statement about leading social actors is also smuggled into the grander modernism-perennialism dichotomy, with modernists placing great store by the role of the bourgeoisie. This would have to constitute a further distinct variable which exhibits only partial correlation with the other three. The American experience of nationhood, which we shall now consider, provides a particularly poignant example of how these variegated strands operate independently.

When was the American Nation?: The Modernist Consensus

Literature on American nationalism has overwhelmingly endorsed the proposition that the United States was a modern creation springing from the Lockean liberal idealism of the Founding Fathers and the politico-economic rebellion of the Whig-oriented colonists.11 Whilst not strictly a materialist thesis, this notion privileges the role of economic and political grievances, as expressed in the tax revolts following from the Stamp Act and Proclamation Acts of 1763 and 1774, symbolized in the popular phrase 'no taxation without representation.'
On this reading, the War of Independence (1776-83) and the political separation of the American state from the British First Empire created the myths, memories, rights and duties, and self-consciousness of the new American nation. Newly created symbols like the American flag, the Constitution, and the architectonic unity of post-1800 Washington, DC helped to define this 'ideal' creation. Subsequent accretions like the Great Seal, the neoclassical architecture of state and federal buildings, and, later, the Statue of Liberty continued to reflect the universalist, Enlightenment-inspired liberal ideals of the Founders.

The idea that the United States was an ideal-typical 'civic' nation which was open to immigration from all corners of the world and represented the ideals of a universal humanity is another recurrent theme in both historical and social science literature. A corollary of this argument is that the American nation emerged *ex nihilo*, built upon a pre-modern *tabula rasa* of disparate British colonies. Thus in the colonial, pre-modern culturescape, empire, colony and locale were the only loci of identity and political activity.

However, while there can be little doubt that political and economic motives were important during the Revolutionary phase, if we examine the diachronic process of American nation formation, it becomes evident that many facets of American nationhood evolved gradually over a period of centuries. The post-independence period certainly introduced a major step-change in the intensity of this evolution, but in terms of nation-formation, it was not the caesura that it is conventionally held to be. Indeed, there is a compelling argument to be made that cultural precursors of an incipient American nation
were already in place by 1776, that they helped to incubate the Revolution, and that the modernist prerequisite of a consolidated American state took place well after 1776.

Before substantiating the contentions advanced above, it is worth revisiting our processual definition of the nation as a named human population surpassing the threshold requirements for:

1. proportion of residents living in a historic territory
2. percentage of the population sharing a particular myth(s) or historical memory(s)
3. degree of shared public culture (in terms of both content and diffusion)
4. degree of economic integration
5. degree and penetration of common rights and duties
6. percentage of population that is collectively self-aware

In the American case, I hold that conditions 1, 3, 4, and 6 were in place prior to modern independence, while condition 5 was not. Whether condition 2 was met prior to 1774-6 is an open question. In other words, in terms of territorial residence, shared culture, economic integration and collective self-awareness, Americans had met the threshold for nation-ness prior to independence. However, lacking a common set of rights and duties, and possessing only a minimal set of shared myths and memories, the American nation could not be held to exist until after 1776.

What this pattern demonstrates is that, with the exception of economic integration, those elements of American nationhood that were in place in the pre-modern period may be considered cultural in nature. Cultural, but not, I would argue, ethnic, for
the latter requires a sense of self-consciousness, myths of shared ancestry and collective memories which were absent at this point since 'American' myths of descent had yet to break with British models. This points to the necessity of discriminating between cultural attributes, which tend to be experienced latently, if at all, and ethnicity, which is far more consciously experienced. Evidence for the above assertions will be considered below.

Anglo-American Cultural Unity in the Pre-Independence Period

Vernacular culture and identity in the colonial United States is an element of the American experience that has been routinely bypassed by many cultural historians who have narrowly focused their attention on the Revolutionary era. However, as several writers remark, the cultural attributes of the colonists were critical for nation-formation. The colonists' relative homogeneity, even compared with many 'old world' states, made it a far simpler matter to construct and maintain a nation than would have been the case had the colonists been as diverse in religious, racial, and linguistic origin as in Mauritius, Hawaii or Fiji, for example.

The American colonists were considerably more culturally homogeneous than is generally believed. Thus if we examine the free settler population in 1776, over 60% were of English ancestry, nearly 80% were British, and 98% were Protestant. Immigration usually made up less than 15-20 per cent of the colonies' white population growth in the period after 1700. It cannot be doubted that Protestantism in the colonies was extremely diverse in sectarian terms, yet it is also clear that what Zelinsky calls 'aberrant creeds' of the theological left and right were extremely over-represented.
American Protestantism (even among 'established' sects like the Episcopalians) was thus more de-centralised, dissenting, and individualistic than in Britain. These 'outsider' denominations collectively nourished, by the 1770s, a 'civil war of religion' against the Anglican ascendancy.

In terms of vernacular culture, the colonial population was principally oriented around a cluster of three related referents: denomination, region, and colony. The three frequently ran together to create 'quasi-ethnic' attachments. For example, American cultural regions were based around distinct core English settler groups (see fig. 1). New England was dominated by East Anglian Puritans, the Middle Atlantic by Quakers from the English Midlands, the Coastal South by southern English Cavaliers and the Appalachian hinterland by Anglo-Scottish Presbyterians, many of whom had migrated via Ulster.

Most of this 'colonial stock' had arrived in the seventeenth century from Britain during distinct waves of settlement, as with the Puritan migrations of 1620–40, reinforcing divergent genealogical and ideological myths of descent. Each brought with them particular cultural patterns, which drifted along increasingly distinct evolutionary tangents due to the geographic stimuli and isolation of the new world atmosphere. This led to marked differences (from Britain) of, for example, dialect, accent and material culture, which helped to reinforce a sense of cultural Otherness among the colonists, most notably in their encounters with mother-country officials, their British officers and emigrants.

Fischer contends that each regional culture assimilated outsiders to its dominant mode of thinking, however, it is worth noting that Fischer's interpretation has been
contested, not least by those who argue that inter-colonial migration had considerably muddied this otherwise simple picture by 1776. We should therefore consider the ways in which processes of integration germinated a sense of pan-regional, pan-colonial 'American' identity. This overarching, trans-colonial identity was as yet cultural, not ethnic, however, and was rarely salient for the colonists in their daily lifeworld.

**Fig. 1 English Origins of American Regional Ethnies in the Colonial Period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Region of Origin</th>
<th>East Anglia</th>
<th>South and West</th>
<th>North Midlands</th>
<th>Borderlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American destination</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Delaware Valley</td>
<td>Backcountry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of Migration</td>
<td>11 years</td>
<td>33 years</td>
<td>40 years</td>
<td>57 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity of migration</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion of migrants</td>
<td>Congregational</td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>Friends (Quaker)</td>
<td>Presbyterian and Anglican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin of immigrant elites</td>
<td>Puritan ministers and magistrates</td>
<td>Royalist younger sons of gentry and aristocracy</td>
<td>Quaker traders, artisans and farmers</td>
<td>Border gentry and statesmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal ranks of immigrants</td>
<td>Yeomanry and artisans</td>
<td>Laborers and servants</td>
<td>Farmers, Artisans and traders</td>
<td>Tenants and cottagers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colonial Integration Processes

In economic and cultural terms, national integration of the states by 1750 was quite marked. Hence the term ‘American,’ claims Paul Varg, gained in significance after the fall of Quebec. Likewise, Richard Merritt has remarked upon the growing frequency in the use of the term ‘American’ in the colonial media from this point [1750] onward. Economic mobility was also playing its role: ‘Intercolonial exchanges...were on the upswing, including numerous migrants, preachers, and artisans, in addition to merchants and their wares.’ Economic integration also sprang from a society that was more expansive, mobile and prosperous than the mother country. Improvements in the organisation of the postal service cut communication times dramatically during the 1750s and 60s, while an expanding road network abetted trends in intercolonial marriage, migration and education. Landmark attempts at political integration - in the form of a proposed Colonial Union at the inter-colonial congress at Albany (1754) - likewise bears mentioning, as does the growing integration of regional political systems.

Wilbur Zelinsky adds that the standardisation of vernacular architecture among farmers throughout the colonies by the mid-eighteenth century indicates the growth of a more trans-colonial, 'national' outlook. In the realm of secular learning, the Enlightenment dampened religious differences among the colonial elite, something symbolised by the success of associations like the American Philosophical Society (1743) or William Smith's American Magazine (1740). Perhaps more significantly, evangelical Protestant revivalism abetted the spread of a common American consciousness. This accords well with the insights of John Armstrong and Adrian Hastings that in the absence
of print and modern communications, organized religion is often the only medium with which a polity can communicate legitimizing myths to the mass of its people. In this manner, religion becomes a crucial conduit for politico-territorial sentiment in the pre-modern era.  

In the American case, a New England, Calvinist sense of religio-communal mission, and a belief in this-worldly millenarianism, helped to give rise to a distinct American sense of exceptionalism. For instance, growing pre-Revolutionary American consciousness was partly attributable to a series of New England-inspired religious revivals known as Great Awakenings (1725-50, 1780-1830). Revivalism's de-centred methods helped to inculcate populist, democratic reflexes, and generate, in Charles Maxson's words, 'a community of feeling.' Indeed, some contend that the First Great Awakening – whose influence stretched from New England to Georgia - was the 'first truly national movement that gave the colonies any sense of common identity....'

Given the role they played as communicators of the American message, it is therefore no accident that leaders of the Great Awakening like Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Bellamy (his associate and student), Samuel Hopkins (founder of New Light' theology in Presbyterianism), Joseph Priestly and Richard Price (the 'Apostle of the American revolution') have been fingered as influential pre-Revolutionary 'proto-nationalists.' They may not have been political revolutionaries, but they were pioneers of a new popular consciousness. Just as important is the fact that the new division between Old and New Lights cut across established ethno-regional boundaries, thereby helping to shatter established cultural frameworks and orient them in a trans-colonial direction.
As Alexis de Tocqueville commented in the 1830's with reference to the Great Awakening and pre-Revolutionary New England providentialism: 'The principles of New England spread at first to the neighboring states; they then passed successively to the more distant ones; and at length they imbued the whole Confederation. They now extend their influence over the whole American world.'

This phenomenon, which American scholars refer to as the 'declension' model of New England influence, flowed from the gradual secularisation in outlook of that theologically-conservative region. New England-led colonial integration, coupled with the colonies' British, liberal-Protestant homogeneity, thereby produced a considerable degree of inter-colonial consciousness.

The Emergence of an 'American' Collective Memory in the Colonial Period

The growing cultural and economic integration of the colonies is not enough to establish the existence of an American nation. It is also important to explain the subjective processes at work in terms of social identity theory. Here, the work of Rogers Smith is vital, for Smith notes that the colonists developed a sense of 'ascriptive', as opposed to civic, distinctiveness during the colonial period. This ethnic distinctiveness was forged through conflict with non-white Africans and native Indians, and Catholic French (to the north and west) and Spanish (to the south and west).

The French and Indian wars, which pitted white Anglo-Protestant colonists against the French-Indian Metis civilization of the trans-Appalachian West activated this identity complex and produced some of the first 'American' collective memories. The defeat of the French, Indians and Spanish, refracted through the glass of New England
providentialism and revivalism, came to be interpreted by the colonists as a sign that they
would be permitted to realise their providential destiny and extend their civilization to the
West. As early as 1745, the capture of Louisbourg, in present-day Nova Scotia, led one
Maryland poet to exclaim: 'They were but Frenchmen still/Their feeble Genius soon gave
Place/To bold New England's hardy Race.'³⁷

None of the above need contravene the notion that settlers thought of themselves
as Imperial Britons (not to be elided with Englishmen). However, a distinct sense of
difference based on vernacular culture, a New World settlement narrative, and peculiar
brand of Protestant faith, provided the prop upon which a sense of 'national'
distinctiveness would grow. When the British Proclamation Acts of 1763 and 1774
agreed, for diplomatic reasons, to halt westward expansion into French-Indian territory, a
sense of outrage was generated against the British 'mother,' which helped to sharpen
previously latent, unarticulated feelings of identity.³⁸

According to Ted Gurr, the dashing of great expectations often is a prelude to
revolution, and in America, the crushing of a New England-inspired consciousness of
Providential destiny, coupled with onerous economic restrictions, led to growing
dissatisfaction.³⁹ Since it was predicted that the fall of French Canada in 1759 would
bring 'a most signal revolution in the civil and religious state of the world,' nothing less
than 'the accomplishment of the scripture prophecy relative to the Millenial State,' would
suffice.⁴⁰ The combination of Britain placating the 'papist' French, coupled with talk of
Anglican bishops coming to America was enough to render American colonists
suspicious of a conspiratorial 'Grand Design' against them.⁴¹ Notice that such a resistance
frame would be much less plausible in the absence of 'proto-American' cultural differentiae based on a distinctive religion and folk culture.

The Duality of ‘British’ Settler Identity

The above should not be interpreted as evidence that an American national identity was operating pre-1776. A sense of latent, criollo cultural identity, based on the common denominators of vernacular culture - dialect, folkways, congregational/revivalistic Protestantism - had developed by 1750 within an élite and upper-middle stratum. Similar processes were underway among Spanish and Portuguese settlers born in the Latin American colonies, particularly among élites who maintained more frequent contact with the mother country and its officials.42

Growing articulation of this new identity, in interaction with the politico-economic grievances and geopolitical trajectory of the Revolution, would ultimately lead the colonists to pass the threshold ‘moment’ for the realisation of nationhood. However, at this juncture, while it is the case that a proper name (‘American’), a shared degree of cultural and economic integration, and a modicum of shared memories were present, it is not sufficient to speak of an American nation. The emergence of a sharper, well-articulated collective memory, as well as the web of rights and duties which bind the general will, had to await the onset of the Revolution.

Are these portrayals those of an expanding 'British' collectivity in the United States or a distinctively 'American' one? The answer to this question is crucial if we are to determine how an 'American' consciousness emerged. We might begin by considering
that settler Loyalists - whether in the pre-1776 United States, in Canada or in Northern Ireland - interpret their ‘British’ identity in a dualistic manner. In other words, they are not metropolitan Britons, but are partly 'native' in identification. Quite often, it is the case that while political loyalty is vested with the imperial British connection, communal identity merely employs British symbolism as a marker of ethno-communal distinction within a new context - much as the Ulster-Protestants do today. However, such a technique does not prevent the Loyalist from distinguishing himself from the 'old country' British - a relationship which comes sharply into relief during voyages to Britain, or in encounters between British immigrants or officials, and native-born colonists.43

This is nowhere better demonstrated than in the conditional, occasionally alienated, nature of the bond between Ulster-Protestants and the British metropole. The two 'British' identities are clearly not one, with territory, dialect, settlement history (i.e. Plantation), local narratives (i.e. Battle of the Boyne) and cultural practices (i.e. Orangeism) demarcating a distinction between the ‘British’ settler loyalist and the mainland Englishman.44

In the American colonies, colonial identities appear to have conformed to the Loyalist pattern of duality. Hence, while much homage was paid to British civilisation, other identities shared the American existential space. Thus the designation ‘American,’ which, as noted, came into increasingly common usage after 1750, was often used interchangeably with ‘Anglo-American’ or ‘British-American.’ Meanwhile, individuals often simultaneously referred to Britain, America and their particular colony as their ‘country.’45 The American identity became particularly pronounced during military campaigns like the Seven Years War in which British officers captained American
troops. The condescension which the officers displayed provided a springboard to ontological maturity. Thus the American performance in battle during the Seven Years' War was contrasted favourably with the campaign of the defeated British general Braddock. Indeed, commentators like Daniel Dulany in 1765 spoke of the debt which Britain owed the 'Americans', but which was repaid only in greater burdens of taxation. For Max Savelle, Dulany represented a current of thought likely shared by most residents of the colonies.46

We may consider settler Loyalism therefore to be a form of liminal, dualistic identity that requires an external catalyst to actualise its national potentialities. Such a catalyst emerged for British Americans with the American Revolution - or rather for the two-thirds of the American population that chose the Patriot side. For American Loyalists, 19,000 of whom fled north to Canada, the old dual identity remained. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the term ‘British American’ remained in popular usage among their English-Canadian descendants, who maintained a dualistic loyalist self-conception until the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the Canadian Orange Order, the world’s largest in 1900, still referred to itself as the Grand Lodge of British America until the late twentieth century.47 Among Ulster-Protestants, Loyalism has retained its force to the present day, though the post-1972 Peace Process has alienated many from the British government, leading to unprecedented assertions of independent Ulster-Protestant 'nationalism.'48

The American Revolution (1776-83), and the subsequent trials of the War of 1812, culminating in the Battle of New Orleans (1815), helped slough off any vestiges of dualism in the new nation's identity. The Revolution created an almost instantaneous set
of myths, symbols and memories which added to the existing base of vernacular culture and collective memory. The heroes of the Revolution, notably George Washington, came to be worshipped as national icons while new representations of the nation as Miss Liberty (akin to the French Marianne or Germany's Germania) and Uncle Sam made their appearance by 1815. The new American constitution, its flag and its anthem were readily adopted by the settler population, which considered itself, in Lipset's words, the 'first new nation.' However, the fact that this euphoria was largely the province of free Anglo-Protestant whites proved to be an important link to the older, 'proto-national' British-American identity. Indeed, this ethnic link was to be affirmed alongside the Enlightenment ideals of the Revolution and subsequently reaffirmed as the nation became consolidated.

The Role of Ethnicity

The Simultaneous Emergence of Ethnie and Nation

At first glance, the title of this essay is misleading, since there is no obvious need to discuss the role of ethnicity when speaking about American national genesis. The logic behind the title of this article lies not, therefore, with pure chronology, but with the process of nation-formation. 'A nation can have its being only at the price of being forever in search of itself,' declares French historian Fernand Braudel. Likewise, Braudel's countryman Ernest Renan insisted upon the need for nations to constantly re-create their legitimacy through a 'daily plebiscite.' The re-creation of nations, therefore,
rather than their mere origin, must be an object of discussion. In this regard, the role of ethnicity has been vital in the recasting and consolidation of an American nation.

In the United States, a distinct 'American' ethnie emerged in synchronous fashion alongside a distinct American national identity. The coincidence of ethnie and nation in the American case is an unusual development since territorial (or primary) ethnicity is often a product of pre-modern developments like tribal confederation, aristocratic incorporation or conquest agglomeration.\(^{52}\) In some nations, notably Mexico, national ethnogenesis occurred after state independence.\(^{53}\) To a large extent, the American case is more similar to that of Mexico than, say, England, since white, Anglo-Protestant Americans' sense of national ethnicity vaulted to a new magnitude only after the 1830s. Yet there is no question that a nascent American ethnie emerged alongside that of the nation after the Revolution.

Many writers are willing to accept that Americans considered themselves to be ideal or purified Britons in ideological terms, bearing the torch of liberal-democratic British civilisation to its logical summit. However, many of those commentators who acknowledge American ideological independence exhibit a curious myopia when it comes to the analogous process of American ethnic fission from the British parent stock.

The Anglo-Saxon Myth of Descent

How did American ethnogenesis occur? The answer, given the intersection of ideology and ethnicity in the subjective sphere, is that American ethnic independence was declared in much the same manner as American ideological independence. The work of Whig
historians, who were so influential for the Revolutionaries, thereby helped to define the genealogy of the new Republic. The idea that the pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxons had known a primitive form of freedom that had its roots in the German forests had emerged in England by the sixteenth century. Some of the more radical variants of the theory held that the Anglo-Saxons carried a desire for freedom in their veins, and had a destiny to realize this impulse. These ideas found a very fertile audience across the Atlantic. Eighteenth century 'Real Whig' historians like James Burgh and Catherine Macaulay stand out in this regard. These interpreters of English history directly influenced the American independence movement. In Reginald Horsman's words,

The various ingredients in the myth of Anglo-Saxon England, clearly delineated in a host of seventeenth and eighteenth-century works, now appear again in American protests: Josiah Quincy Jr., wrote of the popular nature of the Anglo-Saxon militia; Sam Adams stressed the old English freedoms defended in the Magna Carta; Benjamin Franklin stressed the freedom that the Anglo-Saxons enjoyed in emigrating to England; Charles Carroll depicted Saxon liberties torn away by William the Conqueror; Richard Bland argued that the English Constitution and Parliament stemmed from the Anglo-Saxon period....George Washington admired the pro-Saxon history of Catherine Macaulay and she visited him at Mount Vernon after the Revolution.54

Were these prominent Americans merely expressing an abstract ideological exuberance which happened to have an English historical referent? Liah Greenfeld appears to take
this stance, arguing that Americans equated Englishness with Liberalism and no more. Yet such an argument cannot explain the infatuation with the Anglo-Saxons displayed by the statesmen of the new Republic. Explicit in this regard was U.S. president and founding father Thomas Jefferson, who proclaimed to John Adams after drafting the constitution in 1776 that the Americans were 'the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.' Notice that Jefferson has distinguished between the Americans' ideological and genealogical inheritance, both of which he saw as deriving from the Anglo-Saxons. The idea that the Anglo-Saxon English had self-selected themselves through immigration to escape the British (Norman) yoke and bring the torch of freedom to America was a quintessential ethnic myth.

The Anglo-Saxon myth had widespread popularity because it asserted that 'the Normans...had been corrupted by centuries of good living and had become stay-at-homes. It was the Anglo-Saxons who had ventured out to found England's colonies. Therefore, Americans were Anglo-Saxons rather than Normans.' A key source used by Anglo-Saxonists, especially in the late 19th century, was Tacitus' *Germania*. This Roman account of the ancient Teutons would later be used by the most influential and popular nineteenth century American historians to draw parallels between ancient Anglo-Saxon institutions and American ones, like the parallel between Anglo-Saxon tribal councils and the New England town meeting.

As the eminent nineteenth century New England writer Ralph Waldo Emerson later expressed it, Caesar and Tacitus had described the Anglo-Saxons as 'blue-eyed men,
lovers of liberty, yielding more to authority than to command, and respecting the female sex.' Emerson's statements reflect the cumulative result of years of earlier myth-making, the consequence of which was the creation of an Anglo-Saxon descent community that became synonymous with the proper name 'American.'

The Ethnic Factor in the Re-Creation of the American Nation

In the century and a half to come, American 'nativist' ethno-nationalism would be fostered by a plethora of 'patriotic' voluntary associations in civil society, several of which made inroads as political parties or influential factions within the two established parties.57 White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ('WASP') ethnic conceptions of the nation were also embedded, from the 1820s until the 1960s, in school history and literature texts, in popular 'dime' literature and film, and in a gerrymandered electoral system. Anglo-Protestants likewise dominated the upper echelons of education, business and politics, in many cases completely, until the 1960s.58

Thus ethnicity played a recurrent role in the 'rebirth' of the American nation over time. Of course, an important 'civic' - even universalist - discourse also operated, perhaps most strongly in the five decades after the Revolution, the decade after the Civil War, and after the late 1960s. Civic conceptions of the nation as a universal civilisation drawn from all corners of the world challenged Anglo-Saxon exclusivity only after 1900.59 In fact, both the universalist and the ethnic discourse were espoused well into the twentieth century, often by the same individuals, a contradiction reconciled by what Emerson coined 'double-consciousness.'60
Indeed, only in the early twentieth century did a consistent, 'civic' national approach emerge which challenged immigration restriction and Anglo-Protestant hegemony. The re-interpretation of the Statue of Liberty as a beacon for cosmopolitan immigrants took place only in the 1930s, the phrase 'nation of immigrants' did not emerge until the 1940s, and the Anglo-Saxon Protestant-oriented National Origins quota immigration laws were only dismantled in 1965.61

This discussion about the 'ethnicity' of the American nation becomes even more important when we consider that the principal agent of nation-creation (and re-creation) for modernists is the state. Yet the American federal state was relatively weak, in comparison with the individual states, until the twentieth century. The Civil War led to an increase in federal reach, but it was only in the twentieth century, with the state-oriented Progressivism of the New Deal, that the federal state increased its stature as a 'nation-creator.' The constitutionality of federal income taxation (1913) and the growing twentieth century importance of the Presidency vis-à-vis Congress are symbolic of this change, as is the emergence of a national bureaucracy based in Washington. Increasingly, federal standards, spending, executive orders and, after the 1950s, court decisions, came to enhance the 'statist' pillars of American nationality.62 This demonstrates that while a nation's birth may be a chronologically 'modern' development with strong politico-economic overtones, this need not arise from the activities of the state, which, as in the American case, may take centuries to become an important influence on the nation's identity.
Conclusion

I began this article by noting that the question, 'When is the Nation,' can only be answered with reference to the diachronic 'moment' when a measurable social phenomenon surpasses the threshold for 'nation-ness' across all relevant variables. Employing these criteria, the American nation emerged in 1776, after the Declaration of Independence. This should not indicate satisfaction with a modernist interpretation of events. The modernist-perennialist distinction is a conceptual opposition that needs to be unpacked into its constituent components. This is not to say that this distinction, like the 'ethnic-civic' dichotomy, is not useful. It can serve as an ideal-typical package for several related theoretical propositions, but its utility diminishes considerably when applied to actual cases.

The chronologically modern origin of the American nation, for example, tells us little about the relative role of cultural and political forces in nation formation. We have seen, for example, that the American nation emerged at the head of an evolutionary (i.e. 'perennialist') process of cultural integration, but required the revolutionary (i.e. 'modernist') catalyst of politico-economic revolution to burst forth. Growing integration played an important part in moulding a sense of shared cultural identity among the colonists and provided the lineaments of shared consciousness - a fertile soil in which politico-economic grievances could grow. Likewise, 'perennialist' postulates disintegrate as well, since the American nation developed in the modern period out of a dualistic, *pre-ethnic* sense of cultural identity.
Furthermore, the re-creation and consolidation of the nation can often invoke different combinations of these factors. The American case highlights the role of pre-modern cultural resources as well as modern ideological and political forces in the creation of the nation. After independence, 'modern' drivers yielded to 'pre-modern' ethno-nationalist influences, notably between the 1830s and the 1860s, and again from the 1880s to the 1920s. Furthermore, while 'modernist' politico-economic and ideological forces were important prior to the twentieth century, these were largely carried by 'perennialist'-style actors within civil society.

The federal state, meanwhile, only gained an important place in American nation-formation in the decade from 1865, and again in the early twentieth century - notably during Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal administration of 1932-45. The Cold War reinforced the ideological, statist and political sources of nation-formation, though popular culture and economic prosperity increased their significance during the second half of the twentieth century. Dominant-group ethnicity appears to have retreated as a significant taproot of national renewal in two waves, one after the 1920s, the other post-1960s.

Perhaps a useful paradigm which can bring the variegated strands of this argument together is the historicist schema of Arthur Stinchcombe. Stinchcombe contends that social formations like nations originate, to a large degree, from contingent historical 'accidents' of conquest, geography or dynastic acquisition. Once formed, however, the nation becomes a Durkheimian 'social fact,' and comes to possess a 'historicist' causal force all its own. Perhaps Stinchcombe's argument in its purely contingent form holds best for the creation of pre-modern ethnic groups. But even in the
case of the nation, it appears that an 'accidental' confluence of military and political events is significant for nation-formation, though these elements play a considerably smaller role in subsequent national re-formations. This is borne out by the American case, in which the impact of contingent factors markedly diminishes after the Revolution as the nation gathers historicist momentum.

Let us return to where we began. Connor's question, 'When is the nation,' is a valid one, and admits of a definite chronological answer. One should not allow the processual nature of national genesis and the recurrent pattern of national redefinition to obscure this, as many constructivists do. Even so, as the American case demonstrates, the sources of social change which power initial nation formation may not prove significant in subsequent phases of national redefinition. State-created nations frequently resort to ethnic appeals later in their life - as in many parts of post-colonial Africa and Asia.63 On the other hand, many nations which originate on an ethnic basis may gravitate toward political or ideological bases of legitimacy, a pattern particularly noticeable in the 'ethnic to civic' shift of Western societies like the United States since the Second World War.64

Notes


2 First coined by Anthony Smith, the term 'modernist' refers to theorists of nationalism who view nations and nationalism as 'modern' phenomena which emerge only after the French Revolution as societies become integrated through industrialisation, state-bureaucratisation and the development of a mass, literate
culture. 'Perennials,' by contrast, conceive of nations as much older constructs - a form of collective consciousness and socio-political organization that ante-dates the 'modern' period and shows continuities through both pre-modern and modern periods. See, for example, Smith, Anthony, *Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London & New York: Routledge 1998).


7 Connor, 'A Nation is a Nation...' (note 2) p. 158.

8 Ibid. p. 45; Connor, 'Ethnonationalism' (note 2) p. 130.


12 Zelinsky (note 1) pp. 30-33, 101.


16 Van Alstyne (note 14); Pole (note 14).

17 Many states in Europe - notably the Ottoman, Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Czarist - were imperial. Even apparently ‘homogeneous’ France, Britain and Spain had to contend with a degree of entrenched regional or ethnic diversity which was less prevalent within the more fluid, culturally-standardized American colonies. See discussion in Miller, John, *This New Man, The American: The Beginnings of the American People* (New York: McGraw-Hill & Co. 1974) p. 661.


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32 Wood (note 20).


35 Martin (note 25) p. 443; For a counterargument, see Greene (note 24) pp. 55-80.


37 Savelle (note 25) p. 488, emphasis added.


52 Armstrong (note 28); Smith (note 9).


55 Ibid. p. 22, emphasis added.


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60 Goldman (note 56) p. 284; Higham, John, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-
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61 Higham, John, *Send These To Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York: Atheneum
1975) pp. 78-86; Kaufmann (note 58) p. 146.


63 Brown, David *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics* (London &

64 This is the contention of Breton (1988) and Kaufmann (2000), premised upon the liberalisation of
ethnically-based immigration and citizenship policies in North America, Australasia and western Europe.
See Breton, Raymond, 'From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: English Canada and Quebec,' *Ethnic and Racial