An island of Holy Rus': the crisis in the Russian Orthodox Diaspora in the UK 1991-2009

‘An Island of Holy Rus’: The Crisis in the Russian Orthodox Diaspora in the UK 1991–2009

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Abbreviations

ROC	Russian Orthodox Church
ROCOR	Russian Orthodox Church Abroad
DECR	Department for External Church Relations
OCA	Orthodox Church in America
OCAD	Online Collection of Archival Documents (See Bibliography)
NA	National Archives (See Bibliography)
MFA	(Russian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Transliteration and Convention

I have used the ICAO Passport (2013) version, except where there is a standard alternative already in widespread use, so Dostoevsky rather than Dostoevskii.

When referring to clergy I have generally used their most recent titles throughout the text, except where this would compromise the meaning in the context. Thus, with Father Hilarion Alfeev, Bishop Hilarion Alfeev, Archbishop Hilarion Alfeev and Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev, I have generally used the last title.

Introduction

At Easter 2006, a schism occurred in the Russian Church in the UK when approximately one-third of clergy and parishioners left the Moscow Patriarchate and were received under the omophorion of Constantinople. The tensions that gave rise to the schism were a mixture of ethnic, generational, class, linguistic, theological, cultural and worldview differences. The catalyst was the arrival in the diocese of large numbers of Russophone émigrés following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc (1989) and the Soviet Union (1991). At first a trickle, by the late 1990s it had become a flood, and pre-existing parishioners eventually found themselves greatly outnumbered. Differences in practice and attitudes between the new arrivals and many of those who had grown up under the fifty-year care of Metropolitan Anthony Bloom (1914–2003) seemed irreconcilable. The more liberal or open Orthodoxy being practised in the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Sourozh of the Moscow Patriarchate in London (henceforth 'Sourozh' or 'Sourozh Diocese') did not seem to match that of the post-Soviet Motherland from which the new arrivals had come. Tensions started to rise.

The conflict became polarised, with those who looked to the Moscow Patriarchate for help and guidance (henceforth 'pro-Moscow') set against those who wanted the diocese to continue its trajectory outside Moscow's more conservative influence (henceforth 'anti-Moscow').[1] The diocesan authorities requested, and were sent, bilingual clergy from Moscow to administer to the new arrivals, but this only seemed to deepen, or rather reveal, the crisis. The final weeks before the denouement were extremely tense. Numerous petitions, open letters and the growth of internet polemic

[1] These are the standard terms used throughout this study. The author recognises that this terminology is unsatisfactory, but necessary for the sake of brevity.

escalated the confrontation. Some parishioners of the cathedral related episodes of unruly behaviour including shouting and jeering and there was even the perceived threat of violence in church. In addition, there was the involvement of the Russian Ambassador and numerous reports in the Russian and British media (including on the BBC).[2]

In the end, the then presiding bishop administrator of the diocese, Bishop Basil of Sergievo, wrote to Patriarch Alexis in Moscow asking to be released from the Moscow Patriarchate. Shortly afterwards, he requested to be received under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the British Vicariate (later Deanery) of the Exarchate of the Russian Tradition, a self-governing part of the Russian Church in the Russian diaspora under Constantinople, with a complex jurisdictional history. Moscow rejected Bishop Basil's request, instead forcibly retiring him, and appointing a temporary administrator in his stead. Conflict then broke out between Moscow and Constantinople and a major schism in World Orthodoxy was only narrowly avoided after a year and following intense negotiations. Approximately one-third (the numbers are disputed) of the members of the Sourozh Diocese left the Moscow Patriarchate and with it the cathedral and churches in which they had worshiped in for decades. Three years later, the British High Court decided in favour of the Moscow Patriarchate as the rightful continuation of the Sourozh Diocese, allowing it to retain all the diocesan property, the new British

[2] OCAD at https://www.robertbenedictcollins.co.uk/ . Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Statement from Bishop Basil re Divine Liturgy at the Cathedral on Sunday 14 May 2006, published on his now deleted website www.dioceseinfo.org. 'Bishop Basil wishes to make it clear to everyone that he does not wish there to be any disturbance during or after the Liturgy at the Cathedral of the Dormition and All Saints, London on Sunday 14 May – or thereafter. Nor does he wish for anyone to go to the cathedral who would not normally worship there. He asks that if anyone is the object of aggression, they should not react, except, if necessary, to call the police.'

Vicariate of Bishop Basil having been deemed to have voluntarily left the diocese.

While these events were occurring within the Sourozh Diocese, the two long-estranged parts of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Russian diaspora – the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR) and the Moscow Patriarchate – finally signed, in 2007, a decree of canonical union in Moscow. The events in Sourozh were not unrelated to this development, as this study will analyse.

Though appearing somewhat as an exotic sideshow to the British public, the Sourozh crisis had macrocosmic significance and ramifications. It represented one piece of a puzzle being played out across the global Russian diaspora, everywhere involving the same East–West tensions, claims and counterclaims. Widely reported on the BBC and in the British press, the crisis came at a watershed moment in Anglo-Russian relations, closely followed by the Litvinenko affair. The more cautious relationship with the West under Vladimir Putin, along with the 'consolidation' in the Russian Church, were still relatively recent political phenomena. As the millennium turned, the policies of the Russian State and Church towards the Russian diaspora started to align with a sense of urgency, inspired by neo-Slavophile thought. Both sought to shore up the 'new national idea' against capitulation to 'western permissiveness', after the perceived shame and chaos of the Yeltsin years.

At the same time, the Russian-speaking diaspora in the UK swelled with new, mostly economic migrants from Russia and the Baltic States, changing almost overnight the demographic make-up of the Sourozh Diocese. The diocese had been in many respects the creation of one man, the charismatic bishop Metropolitan Anthony Bloom, and the ethos that had evolved under him was thought to be less 'rigid' and more ecumenical. Above all, there was

an attempt to operate according to the decrees of the Russian Church Sobor of 1917–18, placing greater emphasis on a democratic and localising interpretation of collegiality (*sobornost'*) and increasing the role of women and the laity. Meanwhile the Mother Church (along with the Mother State) seemed to be retreating from such emphases into a more centralising, vertical, conservative, and authoritarian *modus operandi*.

The crisis that developed in the Sourozh Diocese therefore represents the convergence of several developing strands of conflict. As such it is a *climactic* event foreshadowing greater shifts in geopolitics, which offers a contained example in which both the grassroots events themselves and the larger themes and forces that often lay behind them can be studied. The established assessment of the crisis in the western media and academia was (and is) rather black and white. According to this analysis, the Sourozh crisis was just one example of the Erastian and power-hungry Moscow Patriarchate seeking to reign in and control its diaspora parishes. The western media mostly portrayed the Sourozh crisis as that of an aggressive, conservative, statist and nationalist Mother Church attempting to take over (and even destroy) the liberal, indigenous Russian Orthodoxy that had grown up in Britain over the twentieth century. The newly resurgent Russian Church and the Russian State, both influenced by a rise in neo-Slavophile thought and a new conservatism, were keen, it was argued, to centralise and control all aspects of Church life, both in the diaspora and at home. In addition, the State had rediscovered the Church as a soft-power tool to reach and consolidate the diaspora. In the words of Maria Haemmerli, 'As Eastern Orthodox churches were the only institutions that took care of national diasporas, soon the respective states

realised that they could reach these diasporas via the church'.[3] As a result, far-flung parishes in Western capitals were proclaimed to be 'beacons' and 'islands' of Holy Rus. What these new 'windows *in* the West' presented to the world became more important to both Church and state. Anomalous practices which had grown up in the Soviet years came under more scrutiny from the ecclesiastical authorities in the Motherland. From Moscow's perspective, this was merely a correction of divergences which had developed when the diaspora Church was beyond the reach of the Motherland, and a reclamation of rightful ownership.

Partly as a result of subsequent geopolitical developments, there has been an exponential rise in academic interest in the Russian Church and its relation to the Russian State. In addition, various thinktanks and quasi-governmental institutions regularly publish studies of the Russian Church and its relation to Russian foreign policy.[4] The Sourozh crisis has often formed part of these analyses to exemplify the Church's 'neo-Slavophile agenda' and consolidationist policies vis-à-vis the Russian diaspora. Articles by Professor Blitt, Xenia Dennen, and Daniel Payne in the West, and Fr Alexander Shramko and Sergei Chapnin in the Russian-speaking world, have described this narrative in varying degrees.[5] Professor Blitt focused on the geopolitical

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[3] Haemmerli, M., 'Multiple Dimensions of the Integration Process of Eastern Orthodox Communities in Switzerland', Université de Neuchâtel, National Research Programme 58 (March 2011), p.21 http://www.snf.ch/SiteCollectionDocuments/nfp/nfp58/NFP58_Schlussbericht_Hainard.pdf [Accessed 02.05.20]

[4] Cf., for example, Curanovic, A., 'The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation', Russie.Nei., Reports 12, 06.12. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifrirnr12curanovicreligiousdiplomacyjune2012.pdf [Accessed 02.05.20]

5. Payne, D.P., 'Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox Commonwealth', *Nationalities Papers* 35 (2007). Dennen, X., 'Who controls Russian Orthodoxy in Britain?', 18.03.09. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/who-controls-russian-orthodoxy-in-britain/ [Accessed 27.03.20]. Blitt, R.C., 'Russia's Orthodox Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia's Policies Abroad', 33 U. *Pa. J. Int'l L*. 363 (2011). Shramko, A. 'Russkie idut', *Russkii Zhurnal*, (October, 2007). Chapnin, S., 'Kak RPTs demonstriruet tserkovnoe nasledie russkoi emigratsii', 06.16. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/66170. [Accessed 02.05.20]

‘culture wars’ aspect, presenting the crisis as a ‘clash of civilisations’ related to Moscow’s cultural turn to the right. Xenia Dennen, a long-time opponent of the Moscow Patriarchate, focused on the secular power interests of the Russian Church. Fr Alexander Shramko’s more philosophical Russian-language article related events more specifically to developments in Russian messianism.

In addition to renewed academic interest in the Church, there has been an explosion of literature relating to neo-conservative or neo-Slavophile Russian thinkers such as Alexander Dugin. The Church often forms part of these analyses. Writers who were previously little known in the West, such as Konstatin Leontiev and Ivan Ilyin, have been accorded much importance as providers of the intellectual framework for the new Russian Idea. Ultimately, the role of Russian messianism/nationalism has been seen as pivotal in driving the foreign policies of both Church and State.

Such a brief foray into the literature on the crisis cannot do any justice to these and other articles that have analysed the events at Sourozh. I mention them here only to highlight that there is an emphasis in western academia on a single narrative at the exclusion of other nuances. Other studies have analysed events from a more sociological and theological aspect, notably that of Maria Haemmerli of Friboug University in her book *Orthodox Identities in Western Europe*.[6] The author has a deep understanding of Orthodox Church history, theology and praxis, offering an insider’s perspective that is unusual for a western academic. The book analyses the crisis from the broader perspective of diaspora studies, and in terms of ‘Orthodox diasporas’ (which, in

[6] Haemmerli, M. and Mucha, E., ‘Innovation in the Russian Orthodox Church: The Crisis in the Diocese of Sourozh in Britain’ in Haemmerli, M. and Mayer, J.-F. (eds.), *Orthodox Identities in Western Europe: Migration, Settlement and Innovation* (London, 2014)

Haemmerli's view, is a problematic description). Haemmerli focused her study on the tensions between innovation and tradition, concluding, 'when deterritorialised, the Orthodox Church is faced with the need to innovate in order to adapt to a new social and cultural setting' and that this generates the tensions that were seen in Sourozh.[7] She is sceptical about the ultimate success of 'innovation which occurs under the cover of a traditionalist discourse and in the name of staying faithful to the spirit of the living tradition.'[8] It should be said that many articles questioning the narrative of Dennen, Chapnin, Schramko and Blitt emerged from within Church circles, but these voices did not penetrate western academia (and did not intend to do so).

The aim of the present study is an ambitious one. It seeks to act as a corrective to the rather one-sided narrative of the Sourozh crisis prevailing in western academia. This polarised and problematic narrative must be reassessed, and this will entail relating both anti-Moscow and pro-Moscow positions. The polarised view, as it has been repeated in academia, is an over-simplification that fails to answer some basic questions about the crisis, and in presenting a rather bland, black-and-white picture also robs the story of its most compelling aspects. If what is claimed by authors such as Dennen is the whole picture, why was the principal agitator for Moscow not a priest from Russia but instead a lay Ukrainian Jewish convert?[9] If it was an ethnic divide between the English versus the new ex-Soviet Russians, why were there so many English in the Moscow camp, to the extent that the trial and supporting documentation for Moscow was conducted by English lay parishioners? Why

[7] Ibid. p.302
[8] Ibid.
[9] Interviews 2Ea and 2Eb

did many of the English clergy in the provinces not only support Moscow but publicly condemn the treatment of Bishop Hilarion?

There is a real gulf between the way Church historians write about ecclesiastical events, and the approach of western academics, who are resolutely secular and liberal leaning in their methodology and ideology. The secular liberalism of western academia itself constitutes a worldview, and this in turn has a serious impact on historiography, especially for religious and cultural histories. The result of a worldview unconscious of its own hegemonic pretensions is both an 'assumptive cynicism' and certain lacunae, in which divergent views are side-lined or remain unexplored.

In brief, what is meant by such terms as 'assumptive cynicism' and 'unconscious hegemony'? The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1947–) was the first to outline the pervasiveness of 'enlightened cynicism' as the default *modus operandi* – and thus communication – of the so-called 'post-value world' (and especially academia). Regarding the history of religion, this meant, for example, that only *mercenary* motives could be ascribed to historical agents, even if these were unconscious.[10] While it is true, of course, that mercenary motivation is often a factor in religious history, as in any other, it is not the only one. Similarly, in the secular sphere, both pragmatism and idealism jostled for position as the new Russia emerged from the 1990s. Such historiography is displayed most evidently in its assumption of values and mindsets, and a consequent failure to appreciate real motivations. It could be noted that this is an academic blind spot which has affected much recent analysis of Russian Church–State relations by western-based academics, who are not always familiar with the nuances of the theology and history of the

[10] Sloterdijk, P., *Critique of Cynical Reason* (Minn., 1988), p.28

Orthodox Church. As Petr Kasatkin notes in his thesis, 'The fact must be noted that the majority of the present literature concerning the presence of religious persons in world politics today is written by political scientists, sociologists, lawyers and philosophers who are not only "variously acquainted" with the role of the Orthodox Church in the modern world, but who also are not always familiar to the same extent with her canonical arrangements and internal life, history and contemporary problems and achievements."[11] Despite its large and growing importance in world geopolitics, the Orthodox Church remains an obscure and impenetrable entity to many historians. The Washington-based strategist John Stilides noted how this was the case even for someone like himself, born into Greek Orthodox culture. As a result, he made it his mission to promote greater understanding of Orthodoxy and its impact on the world stage.[12]

More controversially, I would also posit that there exists a much older and more subtle thematic and conceptual prejudice in western historiography towards the East as a whole. Some historians more sympathetic towards the East have seen the long shadow of Gibbon as the promoter of this imbalance.[13] For many, concealed disdain is summed up in the word 'Byzantium', and as a result the term has been under much scrutiny in recent times, although alternatives seem unlikely to take hold soon. The word is deeply problematic. Firstly, it is inaccurate, to the extent that no one in the (Eastern) Roman Empire

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[11] Kasatkin, P., *Rol' russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v sovremennikh mirovikh politicheskikh protsesakh states* (Moscow, 2010) (author trans.). Cf. also Osborne, Bishop B.,'Orthodoxy in a United Europe: The Future of our Past: The EU is expanding into Slavic lands' in Sutton, J.& Van Den Bercken., W (Eds) *Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe* (Leuven, 2003).

[12] Cf. Geopolitics, Foreign Policy, and the Orthodox Church. An interview with John Stilides. https://www.ancientfaith.com/podcasts/faithencouragedlive/geopolitics_foreign_policy_and_the_orthodox_church [Accessed 05.01.20]

[13] McGuckin, J.A., 'Orthodoxy and Western Christianity: The Original European Culture War?', in Hotchkiss, V. and Henry, P. (eds.), *Orthodoxy and Western Culture: A Collection of Essays Honouring Jaroslav Pelikan on his Eightieth Birthday* (2005), pp.85–107

would have called themselves by this term, as it was only invented in its current form in the sixteenth century, and in the West.[14] Secondly, the word carries with it a host of negative connotations that are observable in its adjectival equivalent. Such linguistic proclivities cannot but effect historiography in some form. These problems are compounded by the fact that Russian writers and historians themselves often seem to promote the cruel, naïve, despotic and exotic in Russian history, following in the line of Blok's famous poem, *The Scythians*.

A second aim of this study is to critique the established understanding of Russian nationalism as a driver for events in Sourozh. This does not mean that Russian nationalism had no role to play in events, indeed it did. But neo-Slavophile religious nationalism, based on universalism, is subtly different to western conceptions. In addition, Russia's liminal and imperial status was key to how her 'imagined community' was perceived, and this is further explored in this study[15]. It might seem extravagant to propose that such arguments lay at the base of tensions in the Sourozh crisis but I am convinced that East–West dissonance (both misconceptions and truths) played a major role in the development and escalation of the crisis.

To understand the neo-Slavophile rhetoric surrounding the crisis, it is necessary to take into consideration changing attitudes to the role of the Orthodox diaspora with regards to the Motherland. How could it be (as it was claimed) that the diocese was 'freer' from central control when Moscow was under the Soviets than it was at the time of the crisis? How has the Church driven policy towards the diaspora since 1991? Where is the confluence of

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[14] The term was introduced into historiography by Hieronymus Wolf in *Corpus Historiae Byzantinae* (Bayern, 1557).

[15] Cf. Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983, new edn. 2006)

ideas about the 'new national idea' and those about the role of the Church? What role (if any) did the long-hoped-for reunion of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR) with the Moscow Patriarchate play in both neo-Slavophile thinking and the Sourozh crisis? How did centralising forces in both Church and State affect the outcome in Sourozh? Much space is given in this study to dealing with these questions and the ones that arise from them.

Finally, it can be said that the aim of the present study is to take a holistic and dispassionate approach to a rather polemicised subject. It is the author's contention that the crisis was an expression of a coalescence of forces and circumstances whose struggles seemingly resurface again and again in our current volatile and uncertain era: enculturation versus transnationalism, East versus West, conservatism versus liberalism, localism versus centralism, and so on. But to understand both sides in each of these dichotomies, a suspension of disbelief might at times be required. At the risk of controversy, it is necessary to lay aside some of the preconceptions and moral imperatives that are now almost built into western academic discourse if one is fully to understand the *casus belli* of either side. This is especially timely and important at the time of writing (2019), when there is again talk of a 'new Cold War'. The distinction is often made between the post-war divide, which was primarily *ideological* (communism versus capitalism) and the present state of affairs, which, it is claimed, is characterised by a more traditional balance-of-power struggle. Small-scale and peripheral though the events in Sourozh may seem, the language, allegiances and passions aroused show that there was indeed an

ideological element to the conflict, and one that ran very deep and was, perhaps, also very ancient.[16]

A brief word needs to be said about the structure of this study. Chapters 1 and 2 deal first with the history of the crisis and then its place in the broader history of the Orthodox Church. All the undercurrents and themes that surfaced during the events are highlighted throughout these two chapters. An understanding of how things happened and why is essential when moving on to questions concerning East–West dichotomies and Russian nationalism. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse how broader and deeper tensions played out on the ground at the grassroots level. Chapters 5 and 6 represent an in-depth analysis of neo-Slavophile thought as it has affected the policies of the Russian Church and State towards the diaspora, considered by many as a prime driver behind the crisis.

Sources and Methodology

That these events are so recent is both an advantage and a hindrance when writing their history. On the negative side, some might doubt that any meaningful analysis can be conducted when barely a decade has passed, while on the positive, it means there is a vast plethora of information to draw from (something which in itself can become a negative as the researcher encounters feelings of being overwhelmed).

Oral history formed a broad base for this study and a way of checking and countering some of the published material. Interviews were conducted

[16] For the contrary position that the present crisis is not at all ideological, see Khudoley, K., 'Russia and the West: Is a New Cold War Possible?', BASEES lecture, St. Petersburg State University (Cambridge, 2015).

with clergy and laypeople both in the UK and in Russia. Not everyone who was contacted was willing to provide an interview, but a substantial amount of material was collected from fifteen main participants, with several other less important interviews. There was a fairly equal spread across the pro-Moscow and anti-Moscow sides. Most interviews were conducted in person and recorded. Some interviewees preferred not to be recorded and so notes were made. Other interviews were conducted by Skype and one was carried out via email Q&A. Details of the individual interviews and their categorisation can be found in the Bibliography and are available on the author's website listed there.

In addition to oral sources were many collections of online sources. These fall broadly into three categories: internet chat forums and published articles, and blogs. In the first group, the most important were the discussions which took place in Russian on the Russian site www.kuraev.ru. The debate was subsequently transferred to the site www.cirota.ru. Several threads or тема concerned the events unfolding in Sourozh, and to give the reader some idea of the scale of this material, just a single тема [Смута в Сурожской епархии: Тема: #58412] when printed out in A4 reaches over 500 sheets. If one were to print out all this material it would run to many thousands of pages. The online forums have been a hugely important source material for this study, and it might seem unusual that this material has been accorded such an important role. But it is sobering to note that digital resources such as this will provide to future generations the main (and perhaps in some cases the only) sources for the history of our times. The crisis came at a point of rapid growth of the internet and such material provides an almost daily commentary on the events by participants and onlookers from all angles. Details of all the web forums (both English and Russian) can be found in the Bibliography.

Online publications and articles are simply too numerous to mention individually here. All newspapers today exist in online format as do newsletters and even church bulletins. Where possible the website link is given. Occasionally websites have been moved, renamed or deleted along with the material they contained. In this respect I was fortunate to obtain several private archives relating to the crisis. Among these were invaluable printouts of long-deleted sites from *The Times* Online and www.dioceseinfo.org, the website of Bishop Basil Osborne. Details of these personal archives can be found in the Bibliography.

In addition to online and personal archives were traditional archives such as the Bodleian Library, Oxford (papers of Nicholas Gibbes), the Lambeth Palace Archive (including file OC 325, relating to foreign relations), the Alexander Solzhenitsyn House of the Russian Emigration, Moscow (including papers relating to Fr Sophrony), the State Archives of the Russian Federation or GARF (papers relating to Metropolitan Anthony and the Galytsin family, among others), the National Archives at Kew and the Mitrokhin Archives in Cambridge. All such archives are detailed in the Bibliography. Many archives are now digitised and invaluable material can be found in such collections as the Metropolitan Anthony archive www.mitras.ru and the archive of the Orthodox Church in America http://archive.ocl.org/.

Official published reports and statements were also examined. These range from the official Russian Church report of the investigative committee into the crisis to statements by the DECR and the Holy Synod. A small collection of such documents relating to the crisis was also published in Russian in St Petersburg; it was rather selective in its approach.[17] Most such documents are

[17] *Khronika Sourozhskoi Smuty* (Saint Petersburg, 2006)

available online and where possible an actual weblink is provided. The most important sites are those of the Moscow Patriarchate, the DECR and the World Russian People's Council (all site details can be found in the Bibliography). In relation to the 2009 property trial, which took place after the actual crisis and provided its final conclusion, the author was very fortunate to receive from the British High Court a recording of the entire three-day trial. Finally, it should be said that the literature surrounding Sourozh, such as the articles mentioned above by Prof Blitt et al, also provides a source. In analysing such recent events, the analysis itself becomes a part of the historiography.

Chapter 1: The Sourozh Crisis

The vast population shifts that occurred in Europe in the first half of the last century and continued in smaller waves of migration up to the present day resulted in sprawling, interconnected and sometimes mutually hostile diasporas the world over. Perhaps none of these shifts was so cumulatively expansive and complex as the series of migrations from Russia following the Revolution (1917), the Soviet and Allied victory (1945) and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and then the Soviet Union (1989–91). The very geographical size of Russia meant that after 1917 émigrés spilled out across a wide swathe of the world: in the Far East they created huge, thriving diasporas in such places as Harbin in China; many departed to the UK from the Russian north following the collapse of the British Expeditionary Force; and great numbers also fled into eastern Europe (especially Serbia) and Constantinople following the final collapse of the White forces in Crimea. To these émigré communities were added refugees following World War II, and finally, and most notably for this study, the huge influx of ethnic Russian economic migrants from the CIS and eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of its satellite states.

The size of this diaspora is difficult to define with any certainty, with figures ranging from twenty to thirty million ethnic Russians living beyond the borders of the present Russian State. This is second only in size to the Chinese Diaspora.[1] In the UK alone, estimates of the Russian population range from about 35,000 to 300,000, and evaluations of the size of each wave of migration have been wildly disparate. The UN International Organisation for Migration

[1] Ryazantsev, S.V., 'The Modern Russian-Speaking Communities in the World: Formation, Assimilation and Adaptation in Host Societies', *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing*, Vol. 6, No. 3, S.4 (Rome, May 2015)

mapping exercise of 2007 noted that the 2001 census put the number of Russian citizens in the UK at 15,644, but that by December 2006, unofficial estimates put the figure at 300,000 with 100,000 of those arriving within the previous two years (i.e. during the finale of the Sourozh crisis).[2]

The story of the Russian Church in the diaspora does not represent one monolithic institution concerned only with the spiritual care of a scattered flock. Instead, all the vicissitudes that had existed before the Revolution were exacerbated by the new climate in which the Church now found herself. This experience was similar to that of other diaspora churches, with Khachig Tololyan writing of the Armenian Church that its role in the Armenian diaspora became, '... the arena in which the disputes and conflicts of Armenian life were to be fought out'.[3] The Armenian Church was, like the Russian Church, to experience the pressures and influences of a supremely *national* Church that now found herself competing in the religious marketplace of the West.

Differences of opinion arose within the diaspora Church as to how to deal with its new predicament. Those exiled intellectuals who had returned to the Church under the influence of the Slavophile movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often at odds with more conservative strands within the Church. Splits also occurred over the relationship between the diaspora Church and the Church in the Soviet Union. But the experience of all the national Orthodox churches with flocks spread beyond the Orthodox heartlands was far more complex than the pre-existing internal tensions between conservatives and liberals. This was particularly true for the Russian Church, for multiple reasons that are analysed in this study.

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[2] IOM International Mapping Organisation, Mapping Exercise: Russia (London, July 2007)
[3] Toloyan, Khachig, 'The Role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Diaspora', *Armenian Review*, Vol. 41, Nos. 1–161 (Spring 1988), pp. 55–68

Churches that had previously been national and in many respects ethnic institutions, associated above all with a people's history, culture and national struggle, now found themselves attracting converts among the population of the host country. Moreover, they and their children were subject to all the influences of modern secular life in countries where their national Church appeared insular and parochial. Such jurisdictions were often subject to senescence as they struggled to maintain a 'home from home' in a foreign land. In this environment the Russian Church above all others rose to the challenge of this new 'applied universalism' of diaspora life – a concept with which Slavophiles had been struggling with for decades. This was in part because the route home was blocked for Russian Christians in a way that it largely was not for members of other Orthodox diasporas, and in part also because of the Russian Church's more developed sense of a multi-ethnic, universal mission. The development of the Sourozh Diocese under Metropolitan Anthony Bloom should be seen in this light.[4]

Anthony Bloom: A Controversial Figure

Related to the composer Alexander Scriabin on his mother's side, Metropolitan Anthony was born into the Russian intelligentsia in 1914. He was brought up in Paris, where he qualified as a surgeon at the University of Paris. His dramatic conversion from convinced atheism to Orthodoxy whilst reading the gospels in

[4] The term 'Orthodox diasporas' is as controversial for secular as for Church historians, as it can be seen to imply that there are 'Orthodox lands' and 'Non-Orthodox lands'. By contrast, one does not speak of a 'Catholic diaspora'. Nevertheless, the description has been retained in this study for the sake of brevity. Cf. Haemmerli, M., 'Orthodox diaspora? A Sociological and Theological Problematisation of a Stock Phrase', *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 10(2–3) (2010), pp.97–115 and Thorbjørnsrud, B., 'The Problem of the Orthodox Diaspora: The Orthodox Church between Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Universality', *Numen* 62 (2015) p.644

his teens affected the whole of his subsequent mission. It could be said that from this moment, his interpretation of Christianity was that of a faith that must be *lived* through a personal meeting of man with God. He was drawn to the religious life and was secretly tonsured a monk in occupied Paris in 1943, taking the name of Anthony. Despite having little knowledge of English (but fluent in Russian, German and French), he was sent in 1948 to care for the parish of the Moscow Patriarchate in London, with its shared church on Buckingham Palace Road.

Over the next half-century, Metropolitan Anthony was to become one of the best-known Orthodox bishops in the world, inspiring hagiographic adulation in some as much as suspicion in others. There is already a vast literature about Metropolitan Anthony, which increases year on year. Conferences devoted to his work take place internationally and several charities and archival foundations have been set up in his name. Metropolitan Anthony is not the subject of this thesis, and studies of the man and his teaching can be found elsewhere, but it is useful to say here a few words about him, especially regarding the widely divergent assessments of him.

Most accounts of his life and work were written by his spiritual children and many of these consider him to be a saint. On the other side, criticism ranges from scandalous accusations concerning his moral integrity to accusations of heresy and milder critiques of his manner. Until the appearance of the recent work by Avril Pyman, the main account of his life was a book by Gillian Crow with the enigmatic title *This Holy Man.*[5] Although penned by a disciple of Metropolitan Anthony, Gillian Crow's book is not a hagiography and

[5] Crow, G., *This Holy Man: Impressions of Metropolitan Anthony* (London, 2005) and Pyman, A., *Metropolitan Anthony of Sourozh: A Life* (London, 2016)

speaks rather openly of his shortcomings. She describes what she refers to as his 'darker side' and how he was not afraid to isolate and discard people. Perhaps more importantly for this study, she also describes his inability to deal with difficult situations and confrontation, locating its cause in the innate shyness that would lead him to 'act despotically' or lapse into silence.[6] Several interviewees spoke of a kind of personality cult that had developed around Metropolitan Anthony.[7] For them, the poverty and simplicity displayed by the bishop contained its own ostentation.[8] For another, the 'exoticism' that surrounded him was a result of 'his good looks and exotic and exaggerated Russian-Parisian accent'.[9] Also, and importantly for this study, is the emphasis placed by several people (and not only by those opposed to him) on his supposed need to be the centre of attention.[10] Fr Andrei Kordochkin, a priest who was present in the diocese at the time of the troubles, wrote on the tenth anniversary of Metropolitan Anthony's death in 2013, 'It was hard for Archbishop Anthony to live alongside other gifted people … in the sky of Sourozh only the one sun could shine'.[11] According to another interviewee, there was a 'London-Oxford-Sourozh group'.[12] Many provincial parishes rarely, and sometimes never at all, received a visit from their diocesan bishop, and this was to create problems later.[13]

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[6] Crow, p.198ff and p.224

[7] 'Kommentaria: Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vsgliad iznutri', *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, Nos. 1–2 (278–279) Ian. 2004. Also Interview 1C

[8] Interview 2Ea

[9] Orthodoxengland.org.uk, Phillips, Fr. A., 'The Situation of English Orthodoxy and a Vision for the Future of Russian Orthodoxy in Europe' 24.07.15, http://www.events.orthodoxengland.org.uk/the-situation-of-english-orthodoxy-and-a-vision-for-the-future-of-russian-orthodoxy-in-europe/ [Accessed 24.03.20]

[10] Interview 2Ea

[11] Kordochkin, A., 'Nastoiatel' Madridskogo prikhoda RPTs o. Andrei Kordochkin o Surozhskoi Smute' (02.06.13). https://d-st75.livejournal.com/506036.html [Accessed 24.03.20]

[12] Orthodoxengland.org.uk, Phillips, Fr.A., 'Sourozh: Russian traditions without the Russian Orthodox Faith' http://www.orthodoxengland.org.uk/sourozh1.htm [Accessed 24.03.20]

[13] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Letter from a Provincial Parishioner, posted 05.06

The conflict surrounding the person of Metropolitan Anthony did not finish with his death, but in some respects intensified. One memoir stated, 'For the West he was a welcome figure, but he was a polarising figure in the Russian Emigration and in Russia itself. In general, he was more supported by the laity and married, parish (white) clergy, whilst monastics were more opposed to him'.[14] It was indeed true that Metropolitan Anthony had over the years become distanced from several figures, most notably from Father Sophrony Sakharov, whose monastery in Essex had moved in 1965 from the Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction to Constantinople.[15] The many who were devoted to him were opposed by a less vocal number who were uneasy with his direction,[16] and these diverging opinions are still visible today. The patristic scholar Metropolitan Kallistos, known for discretion in matters of Church politics, nevertheless made statements to the effect that Metropolitan Anthony had, 'allowed certain people (particularly women) to become dependent upon him in a rather unhealthy way'.[17]

After his death, there was much talk among the anti-Moscow group about 'preserving the legacy' of Metropolitan Anthony. For the anti-Moscow group, this meant the preservation of the 'open and sincere' form of Orthodoxy based on love that had been preached by Metropolitan Anthony. To others, however, the 'legacy of Metropolitan Anthony' had many negative connotations. A blogger wrote that 'all the talk about the legacy of Metropolitan Anthony' was 'exactly how sects are born'.[18]

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[14] Tugarinov, E.S (ed), *Mitropolit Antonii Syrozhskii: Biografia v svidetel'svakh sovremenikov* (Moscow, 2015), pp.166–7

[15] Cf. Papers relating to Sophrony Sakharov in the Dom Russkogo Zarubezh'ia Imeni Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna, Moscow. Cf. Interview 1F

[16] Cf. Metropolitan Mark of Germany's memoir of Metropolitan Anthony in Tugarinov, *Mitropolit Antonii Syrozhskii*, op.cit. p.166ff

[17] Ibid., p.135

[18] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2163204, 01.07.06 [Accessed 09.05.20]

What exactly the legacy of Metropolitan Anthony comprises is complicated by the fact that his statements, if not contradictory, often left open questions – for instance, his sometimes-ambiguous remarks concerning the ordination of women.[19] Similarly, he made no public pronouncements about leaving the Moscow Patriarchate and many apparently loyalist comments exist, yet several private conversations in which he stated an opposite view have been reported publicly. Radio Radonezh wrote that faithfulness to the so-called 'Sourozh tradition' and the legacy of Metropolitan Anthony meant bearing witness to the truth of Christianity in a secular society and not 'gradually accommodating the Church to the liberal spirit of the century, in which the main problem of Church life is the question of whether a lesbian can be a bishop'.[20] Within Russia, Metropolitan Anthony remains a popular figure and his books can be found in most Church bookshops. For many of the grassroots faithful in Russia he is considered a counterweight to the perceived politicisation of the official Church – a cause of unease for many Orthodox – and a reminder of the simple Evangelical commands of love and mercy.

[19] Cf. 'Metropolitan Anthony Bloom – Men and women in the Church' http://otelders.org/theology-and-spirituality/metropolitan-anthony-bloom-men-women-church/ [Accessed 09.05.20]
[20] 'O vernosti "surozhskoi traditsii"', Radio Radonezh, 16.05.06. Available at cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2082349, 24.05.06 [Accessed 09.05.20]

Building Tensions (1991–2002)

When Metropolitan Anthony arrived in the UK, there existed two separate and mutually wary jurisdictions of the Russian Church: the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR). A more detailed analysis of their relative histories is given in the following chapter; suffice it to say at this stage that the Moscow parish in London tended to represent those in the liberal intelligentsia who had returned to the Church, while ROCOR attracted White Russian émigrés and post-war refugees fleeing the Red Army.

The euphoria of victory in post-war Britain was accompanied by a strong pro-Soviet feeling, which was to quickly descend into the hostility of the Cold War. This affected the Church as any other diaspora organisation, and the Moscow parish became still further depleted of parishioners. Realising that the diocese would eventually die out if it continued to maintain a strict ethnic policy in accommodating only elderly Russian émigrés, Metropolitan Anthony increasingly saw his role as that of an 'Orthodox witness to the West'.[21] He was media friendly (he was often on the BBC), good-looking, multilingual, learned and able to communicate in a contemporary way that showed he understood people's real day-to-day problems. He could speak with equal ease about his arrest by the Gestapo while he served in the French Resistance as about the pastoral problems facing Christians in the West. Under his care, the diocese started to attract indigenous converts. By the late 1980s, the converts outnumbered the Russian émigrés and their descendants by a ratio of about 4:1,[22] and many of the Russians had themselves been swayed by the new ethos that developed under Metropolitan Anthony. And what was that ethos? A

[21] Tugarinov, *Mitropolit Antonii Syrozhskii*, op.cit. p.155
[22] Collins, R., 'Demographics and the Russian Orthodox Church in London', Chapter 11 in *The Desecularisation of the City* (London, 2019)

picture will develop as the study progresses, but it is useful to summarise here several key points.

In essence, there was a relaxation of the emphasis on maintaining tradition and Church rules in favour of what was felt to be the simplicity and 'spirit of love' of the early Christian Church. Metropolitan Anthony himself focused on two aspects of the Christian message: the personal encounter (meeting) with God and love of one's neighbour. Under Metropolitan Anthony, the Sourozh Diocese was to take its guiding principles from its interpretation of the decrees of the all-Russian Sobor of 1917–18. The influence of the Great Sobor on the ecclesiology of Sourozh will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5. Here it is sufficient to say that Metropolitan Anthony and his entourage sought to enact many of the decrees of the Sobor which of necessity remained dormant in the Soviet Union. The Sobor laid emphasis on a 'horizontal' ecclesiology, increasing the role of the laity, women and the white clergy. In practical terms this was developed into the administrative Sourozh Diocesan Statutes (1979), a document many years in gestation.[23] Tolerated by Moscow, if never formally ratified, the statutes gave greater powers to the local clergy and parishioners of the diocese in the election of their bishop and in the day-to-day running of affairs. There was also a greater emphasis on *sobornost'* as a decentralising tendency that devolved powers to all the members of the parish and diocese and to the elected diocesan and parish assemblies and councils. Most importantly, the Sourozh Statutes were not considered by its authors to be a dry legalistic document, but were described as, 'a framework in which we

[23] The ecclesiological influence of the Sobor of 1917–18 on Sourozh and the development of the new diocesan Sourozh Statutes is discussed in Chapter 5. The Sourozh Statutes can be found in OCAD. Official Documents. Statutes of the Diocese of Surouzh (Metropolitan Anthony).

can create life, a life which may not as yet be perfect, for it must follow the course of its own, natural, free development'.[24]

Another key aspect of Sourozh Diocese as it developed under Metropolitan Anthony was its openness and ecumenism. This was in contrast to the national-ethnic policy of most other Orthodox churches in the diaspora, some of which would actually turn away curious enquirers if they did not belong ethnically or at least linguistically to their Church.[25] Through the Society of St Alban and St Sergius in Oxford, the diocese formed strong links with the Anglicans and was involved with other inter-Christian dialogue. With regards to the daily life of the diocese, rules concerning dress (such as the obligation for women to wear headscarves in church), fasting and other practices were relaxed. In the liturgy, there was a downplaying of the formal majestic ceremony of episcopal services and, most important of all, the vernacular was introduced into certain parts. The requirement of confession before every communion was also abrogated. All of this was not unaccompanied by controversy both within and without the diocese. Several years before the crisis, Metropolitan Antony conceded, 'Here in London a certain group (not very large) reproaches me for "betraying Russian Orthodoxy" and accuses me of "building up a church that is not Russian"'.[26]

Over time, the collapse of the Soviet Union was to alter radically the ethos created under Metropolitan Anthony, as new migrants flocked into the West, and communication opened with the Church inside Russia. The changes in the parish and diocese occurred so gradually that even by 1999, a parishioner gave an account of a diocese that was little changed from its

[24] Report to the Diocesan Conference at Effingham on the Meeting of the Diocesan Assembly, 27.05.79
[25] Bartholomew, Patriarch, 'Has Christ been divided?', *The Messenger*, 08.11.08
[26] 'Iz lichnoy besedy s mitropolitom Antoniem 8 iiunia 2000', *Russkaia Mysl'*, 20–26 (July, 2000)

earlier incarnation.[27] He described the diocese from the perspective of a recent Russian émigré and posited it as a counterweight to the increasingly 'nationalistic' and 'inward-looking' Church inside Russia. He lauded Metropolitan Anthony's bravery in downplaying the ethnic and 'folk cultural' link of Orthodoxy and instead emphasising its universality, 'In order to proclaim the very universality of Orthodoxy, its openness to all peoples and cultures, it was necessary to weaken or at least downplay the established and much-cherished link between Russian Orthodox tradition and Russian culture, and this was made one of the most creative operating principles in the Diocese of Sourozh.'[28]

Perhaps more controversially, one might add that in the 1990s, the Church inside Russia was only just emerging from its long dark night and as such there were neither the resources nor the appetite to consolidate diaspora parishes. The Church instead struggled to enchurch vast numbers of people on its own soil. Moreover, Yeltsin's government, although very quickly allowing the Church to reclaim property and annulling anti-religious discrimination, was not aligned with it in the same way that it gradually became under Putin. In addition, the Church at home was facing a plethora of new and unforeseen battles, as large numbers of foreign missionaries entered the country along with all the unbridled temptations and chaos of modern free-market capitalism. It also had to deal with internal struggles and schisms as ROCOR attempted to set up a parallel Church within the country, and previously hidden differences between liberals and conservatives started to emerge. All of this meant that the 1990s were in effect the calm before the storm in

[27] Filonenko, A., 'The ROC in Twentieth Century Britain: Laity and Openness to the World', *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999)
[28] Ibid., p.63

Sourozh, but the world described by the Sourozh parishioner above was rapidly coming to an end.

The collapse of communism brought greater ease of communication between the gradually recovering Mother Church and the diaspora. As ethnic Russians started to pour into long-isolated parishes in the far abroad, the Mother Church started to show renewed interest in these communities. Seeking something familiar in the foreign capital, the first port of call for many of the new Russian arrivals in London was the cathedral of the Moscow Patriarchate in Knightsbridge. As the 1990s progressed it became apparent that the large demographic shifts in the diocese were creating tensions between recent Russian migrants and many in the existing communities. At the millennium, Metropolitan Anthony stated in an interview, 'I have a very clear or rather gloomy feeling that as we enter the third millennium we are entering some obscure and complex and, in a certain sense, unwelcome period.'[29] These were prescient words indeed.

The Hilarion Affair (2002)

The spark that was to cause the underlying tensions in the diocese to flare up was the short but intense residency therein of bishop Hilarion Alfeyev from the Department of External Church Relations (DECR) in Moscow. Many of the themes and conflicting interests of this thesis are encapsulated in the persona of Bishop (now Metropolitan) Hilarion Alfeyev. Described by some hardliners in Russia as *mitropolit zapadnik*, he was nevertheless felt by the anti-Moscow group to be a conservative. Thus, to liberals he was a traditionalist, and to

[29] *Russkaia Mysl'*, op. cit.

conservatives a dangerous liberal.[30] The head of the DECR was and is seen by secular Western academics and the media as the epitome of the new 'Russian International' in its desire to counter Western liberal secularism. But Metropolitan Hilarion is also one of Russia's most famous contemporary composers, whose music is performed in the great concert houses of the world, as well as a master of several ancient languages who completed his PhD in ancient Syriac patrology at Oxford in a record two years. He is an intellectual whose addresses are delivered in fluent Russian, Lithuanian, German, French, English and Greek, and whose books and articles run into the hundreds, yet the conservative wing of the Russian Church is wary of him. In truth, the polarisation surrounding Metropolitan Hilarion is more revealing of the times than of the man himself.

Bishop Hilarion's presence in the Sourozh Diocese was as a result of a direct request from Metropolitan Anthony, who was keenly aware of his own age and frailty.[31] He knew that after his death the diocese would be left with two bishops, one of whom, the Anglo-American Bishop Basil Osborne (whom many expected to be his successor) did not speak Russian, while the other, the Russian Bishop Anatoly, was seventy-two and nearing the end of his active tenure. Metropolitan Anthony felt the diocese needed a young and energetic Russian bishop/priest who could minister to the new arrivals. He requested one of the most talented men in the Russian Church, a man who had also been his protégé and spiritual son: the then Father Hilarion Alfeev. Prior to his

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[30] E.g. inform-religi.ru, 'Pravoslavnii narod idet 100-tysiachnym krestnym khodom, mitr. Ilarion brataetsia s katolikami', http://inform-relig.ru/news/detail.php?month=06&year=2015&ID=10753&sphrase_id=14772283& [Accessed 09.05.20]. Also 'Interv'iu ep. Ilariona (Alfeeva) ofitsial'nomu saitu kievo-pecherskoi lavry', 21.09.03 http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/meetings/239/ [Accessed 09.05.20]

[31] OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Two Statements of Metropolitan Anthony. 'Father Hilarion … has been appointed at my request to our Diocese as a young suffragan bishop'. Also, Letter from Metropolitan Anthony asking Moscow to send M.H. to the diocese, patriarcha.ru, 20.11.00. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html [Accessed 09.05.20]. Also Interview 2Ea.

arrival in the UK, Father Hilarion was consecrated to the episcopate and there is some disagreement at whose behest this was done.[32] Bishop Basil Osborne, Metropolitan Anthony's second-in-command in the diocese, attended the consecration in Moscow on 14 January 2002.[33] During his consecration address, the Patriarch spoke at length about the difficulties and challenges of being an 'Orthodox witness in the West' and of the need to focus particularly on the trials and tribulations of the new Russian immigrants.[34] The language used by the Patriarch was filled with allusions to the 'Russian World', but also strangely echoed the (in)famous words of Metropolitan Sergius Stragorodsky in his 'submission' to the Soviet State:[35] 'But give especial attention to those countless children of our Church who have found themselves in a strange land and for whom the Church remains almost the sole connection which unites them to the Motherland. Be for them a Pastor and a Father, Governor and Teacher, *let their joys be your joys and their sorrows be your sorrows*.'[36]

Bishop Hilarion's 130 days in Sourozh were to reveal all the hidden tensions in the diocese.[37] The young bishop set out on a tour of all the far-flung parishes of Britain and Ireland. Along the way he met with, and listened to the

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[32] OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Dean, T. and Adrian, Dr S., Reply to Prot P. Scorer's Letter in Response to the Petition to Metropolitan Anthony, 22.01 03

[33] Cf. also the email of Bishop Basil to diocesan clergy in Jan 2002, revealing his discontent at the consecration of Bishop Hilarion on his return to the UK. 'However, they did not want to send him to England as a simple priest, as he is one of their most suitable bishop candidates. As a result, he was sent here as a vicar bishop of Metropolitan Anthony with the condition that from time to time they would give him certain assignments'. Online Archive: old.hilarion.ru. old.ilarion.ru 05.05.2019 http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 25.04.18]

[34] The full texts of both long speeches by the Patriarch and the newly ordained bishop are available in the Mospat Archive, 'Svyateishii Patriarkh Aleksiy II sovershil khirotoniu arkhimandrita Ilariona vo episkopa Kerchenskogo', 11.02.02, https://mospat.ru/archive/2002/02/nr201141/ [Accessed 25.04.18]

[35] 'The Soviet Union … whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and our failures are our failures', 'deklaratisa 1927', pravenc.ru, 'DEKLARATSIYA' 1927 g. https://www.pravenc.ru/text/171618.html [Accessed 14.09.20]

[36] Op.cit. (author's emphasis)

[37] Alfeev , Metropolitan H., Appeal from Metropolitan Hilation to the Diocese, Jan-02. Online Archive: old.hilarion.ru http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.0./2019]. Also, Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Surozhskaia Smuta', 20.08.02. http://hrampm.org/userfiles/library/autors/%5Balfeev_ilarion%5Dsurozhskaya_smuta.pdf [Accessed 05.0.19]

grievances of, all parties, but especially attended (as the Patriarch had instructed him) to the newly arrived Russians. By the anti-Moscow side, he was criticised for visiting the Russian embassy and was labelled an 'auditor' and 'an agent of Moscow', who had come to 'reclaim the Diocese for the Russian State'.[38] Even one of the most active and influential lay-members of the pro-Moscow group related how 'it was obvious' that Metropolitan Hilarion was in 'constant contact with Moscow', which had given him clear instructions 'to sort out the Diocese'.[39]

The Department for External Church Relations (DECR) was a constant target of the anti-Moscow parishioners, and often the focus of theories of western academics in their studies of the 'Russian World'. Following the victory in 1945, the Soviet regime had realised the potential of the Church as a key influencer on the international stage. Metropolitan Nikodim of Petrograd was sent to London in June of that year, and the DECR was set up the following year with the Metropolitan Nikodim as its head. It is now one of the most influential synodal departments and acts in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation. It has been responsible for key documents such as the Social Concept of the ROC (2002) which laid out the post-communist Church's position on important social issues, along with its relationship to the state.[40] Anti-Moscow commentators have consistently drawn attention to the Soviet origins of the DECR,[41] but despite its portrayal as an arch-conservative think-tank, the DECR has a reputation within the Russian

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[38] The oft-repeated words 'auditor from Moscow' were from the well-known Sourozh priest Sergei Gakkel, apparently from a phone conversation with Bishop Hilarion. Cf. 'Interviu ep. Ilariona Alfeeva ofitsial'nomu saitu Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry', 21.09.03. http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/meetings/239/ op. cit.
[39] Interview 2Eb
[40] 'The Basis of the Social Concept of the ROC', mospat.ru. https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/ On the DECR, cf. Curanovic, A., 'The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation', Report IFRI Centre (Brussels, June 2012), p.13, and Leustean, L., *Eastern Christianity and the Cold War 1945–91* (London, 2011)
[41] Struve, N., Interview with Vladimir Volynskii, portal-credo.ru, *Lenta Novostei*, 21.06.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=545 [Accessed 09.05.20]

Church for ecumenism, innovation and rapprochement, especially with the Roman Catholic Church.

While Bishop Hilarion was touring the country, Bishop Basil Osborne convened a meeting of the diocesan clergy to discuss the crisis with a view to 'getting rid of this new bishop'.[42] Events took a grimly farcical turn when Bishop Hilarion himself turned up at the meeting, having been informed about it by one of the attendees. The conflict was now out in the open. After the meeting proved a failure for Bishop Basil, he turned to the diocesan council which was largely (if not wholly) controlled by the anti-Moscow faction. The council issued a statement which was read in Bishop Hilarion's presence after the Sunday liturgy in the London cathedral. It was heavily critical of the Bishop Hilarion, alleging that he had stoked up tensions in the diocese and had come as an 'auditor' from Moscow to bring the diocese back into line. For many, this event was a new low in the crisis. A commentator wrote that the sight of the newly arrived bishop standing silently while accusations were read out was 'reminiscent of the Soviet show trials'.[43]

Metropolitan Anthony's position in the affair appears to have been ambiguous. On the one hand he did, at least passively, acquiesce in the accusations against his protégé, while at other times he resolutely defended Moscow. He often spoke of the loyalty of the Diocese of Korsun (the Moscow Patriarchate's tiny diocese in mainland Europe) to the Moscow Patriarchate in Soviet times. He also spoke about the concept of control, a term used so often by the anti-Moscow group: 'Many were then frightened at the thought that through the Church, the Soviet government could seize emigration: not

[42] Jillions, Fr J., 'Bishop Hilarion (Alfeyev) in England 2002', http://www.ocanews.org/news/Jillions11.7.08.html [Accessed 02.04.18] and Interview 1A

[43] Lambouras, M., Letter to Metropolitan Anthony, 06.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240. [Accessed 09.05.18]

materially, but spiritually'.[44] But he went on to describe how this did not deter them in their loyalty to the suffering Mother Church.

The pro-Moscow group responded to Bishop Hilarion's difficulties with an increasing number of petitions and open letters addressed to Moscow and to the clergy of the diocese. They also started to circulate more literature on the internet and in printed form. Bishop Hilarion himself, in his later account of the crisis, bore witness to the fact that the turmoil was about much more than him, being directed at the Russian State and Church 'which has supposedly taken the wrong course in emphasising episcopal power, which supposedly Russifies foreign dioceses and which supposedly seeks, via the DECR to "seize" the Sourozh diocese (as if this diocese is somehow unrelated to the Russian Church), and together with the diocese the whole Russian Diaspora in the West'.[45] Many of those interviewed for this study (from both the pro- and anti-Moscow groups) confirmed that Bishop Hilarion had been the catalyst that exposed underlying tensions created by Russian immigration,[46] and also that there did exist (for good or for ill) a desire of the Mother Church to 'reign in', or rather 'consolidate', its diaspora parishes.[47] Thus, it is the subtle differences between 'seizure' versus 'consolidation' that colour the analysis of the crisis depending on one's viewpoint. This thesis is an attempt to unpick those differences, as well as the misunderstandings that often accompany such analysis.

On 17 July 2002, Bishop Hilarion was finally transferred from the diocese to be the Russian Church's representative to the EU in Brussels. The crisis

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[44] Conversation with Parishioners in the Cathedral, 28.11.02. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=151' [Accessed 09.05.20]
[45] Alfeev, Metropolitan Hilarion., 'Otvet na zaiavlenie eparkhal'nogo soveta surozhskoi smuti', 09.97.02 (author trans.). Available at cirota.ru, *Tema*: #14548, 15.08.02.
[46] Interview 1C
[47] Interview 1B

continued following his departure. In August 2002, Metropolitan Anthony and Bishop Hilarion exchanged intense open letters about their understanding of the events, which were published in the Russian newspaper supplement *NG Religii*. [48] There have been questions over Metropolitan Anthony's authorship of this letter, but at any rate he did not publicly disavow it.[49] The letter was personally critical of Bishop Hilarion, accusing him of financial greed and of sowing division as a deliberate move to enable a DECR takeover of the diocese.[50] Metropolitan Hilarion's lengthy response largely laid the blame for the problems at the feet of a small group of anti-Moscow parishioners and clergy centred around Bishop Basil and the diocesan council.[51] He countered the 'KGB auditor' accusations with similar insinuations of his own, alleging that, from the moment of his arrival he had felt 'under surveillance'. He added that he felt as if all his conversations were 'overheard', recorded and commented upon, stating that it felt like being 'inside a totalitarian sect with very strict rules'. Metropolitan Hilarion stressed in several pronouncements that for him at least the crisis was not an ethnic one, and his supporters were equally divided between English and Russians.[52] A particular assessment of the sojourn of Bishop Hilarion is worth quoting at length. The interviewee was an active member of the pro-Moscow party, and later a member of the parish council. Interestingly, he laid emphasis on the developing structures in the diocese as partly responsible for events:

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[48] *NG Religii* No. 6, 21.08.2002

[49] One interviewee stated, 'Metropolitan Anthony's letter is genuine. More than that, I myself heard, with my own quickly reddening ears, Metropolitan Anthony saying: "when you arrived, you came to me for confession, and said: '...and I have POWER'" (the words quoted in the letter were introduced simply: 'you told me'). What? Break the secrecy of confession? In order to hit the man you've kept asking to join the diocese for years?' Interview 2Eb

[50] Ibid.

[51] An abridged version of Metropolitan Hilarion's text was published in *NG Religii*, 21.08.02. http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2002-08-21/4_ilarion.html?print=Y [Accessed 28.04.18]

[52] Credo.ru, 'Interv'iu s episkopom Venskim i Avstriiskim Ilarionom, 'Bog porugaem ne byvaet'. https://credo.press/66398/ [Accessed 30.03.20]

> Metropolitan Anthony was reported saying in 2002, at the height of the crisis over Bishop Hilarion: 'had I been fifteen years younger, I would have fought for him'. The leadership of the parish and diocese was predominantly Russian-speaking in 1950s and 60s, and overwhelmingly English-speaking in the 1990s. He managed to persuade the former to accept people very different from themselves (many times I heard him mentioning this with pride), but his job was relatively easy, as there were few, if any, administrative structures. By the 1990s there was a number of these, with people making decisions in the name of their bishop, so having a young Oxford-educated, but Moscow-trained bishop with his own ideas was threatening the established order. To my mind even a fifteen-years younger Metropolitan Anthony would have failed.[53]

The petitions, internet blogs and open letters increasingly generated by the pro-Moscow group[54] were often perceived by the anti-Moscow group as 'bad form' and unsuited to church life.[55] It is known that Metropolitan Anthony did not welcome this form of activism.[56] What was less reported by the mainstream media was that the anti-Moscow parishioners also indulged in it to a lesser degree. An interviewee recalled how people would hand out leaflets calling on women 'not to wear headscarves' in church.[57] The discontent of the

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[53] Interview 2Ea

[54] These petition letters are convincing evidence of the great volume of grassroots support for the pro-Moscow faction. Cf. Letter to Patriarch Alexei from the Parishioners of Sourozh. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 28.04.18]. This petition in support of M.H., after the statement from the Ambon, gathered 279 signatures – a large proportion of the London cathedral churchgoers. Cf. Letter to Patriarch Alexei from the Parishioners of Sourozh. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 First petition (in support of M.H., after the statement from the Ambon). Cf. also Letter to Metropolitan Kirill (DECR), Petition in Support of M.H. from the Parishioners of SS Peter and Paul, Dublin. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [All accessed 28.04.18]

[55] OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Scorer, Prot. P., Open Letter to Adrian Dean

[56] Petrov, S., cirota.ru, *Tema:* #53307, *Soobshchenie:* #1908908, 'Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za rubezhom', 03.07.06. http://www.cirota.ru/forum/view.php?subj=53307&order=desc&pg=10 [Accessed 05.05.19]

[57] Interview 2D

pro-Moscow parishioners stemmed in part from their perception of exclusion from many of the administrative organs of power in the diocese (such as the diocesan and parish councils).[58] The vocal role of the laity in the pro-Moscow campaign was criticised by the anti-Moscow group, which was paradoxical considering the latter's promotion of the laity in other arenas. An open letter from the pro-Moscow group laid out the reasons for the use of petitions and noted the long historical tradition in the Church of the laity affirming or protesting (even rioting) against the hierarchy, concluding, 'This popularism is still (thanks be to God) with us. We, the people, want our Church. Many of the laity now feel shut out of their own Church'.[59] It could be noted that the use of petitions and direct appeals from the laity to the Patriarch has a peculiarly Russian history. When Vera Shevzov wrote her study of Orthodoxy on the eve of the Revolution, she used hundreds of similar letters as a principal source.[60]

Interregnum

On 8 December 2002, Fr John Marks from the Devon parish published his 'Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient Working of the Sourozh Diocese'. The document collated a series of statements by parishioners and clergy against the Moscow Patriarchate,[61] and contained accusations of Russification, politicisation, nationalism, xenophobia and even anti-Semitism. It

[58] http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/parish council minutes, 15.01.03 [Accessed 06.05.19]: 'we are not represented on the governing bodies – we have 2/3rds of parishioners but only 5 of 17 seats on parish council.' And also, Sarni, M. and Peregudov, M., 'Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vzgliad iznutry', *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, Nos. 1–2 (278–9), 15.01.04. http://www.tserkov.info/numbers/commentary/?ID=828 [Accessed 28.03.20]: 'Of the 14 members of the parish council in London there are only three Russians, one Georgian and an English woman with Russian roots.'

[59] OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Thomas, Dr S. and Dean, A., Open Letter, Reply to Prot P. Scorer's Letter 22.01.03, Ibid.

[60] Shevzov, V., *Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution* (Oxford, 2004), p.8

[61] OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks, Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient Working of the Sourozh Diocese

was published on the portal Orthodox Christian Laity, and despite several requests for it to be removed, the website refused to take it down.[62] Despite all these upheavals, Metropolitan Anthony remained committed to the ethos of the diocese as non-ethnic and open to all. One of his last interviews shed a light on why he remained so committed to the path of indigenous Orthodoxy.[63] The parish had grown incrementally and very slowly, with decades of labour and commitment. To see this life's work start to crumble at the end of his long life must have been a hard and tragic cross to bear.

On 4 August 2003, Metropolitan Anthony died. He had overseen the London parish for over fifty years, and many could not imagine how parish life would continue without him. It seems that with Metropolitan Anthony's death there was a brief lull in conflict, at least on the surface. In the words of the Commission of Inquiry which was sent by Moscow at the end of the crisis, 'Witnesses call the period between July 2002 and December 2005 relatively calm. All the witnesses noted that Metropolitan Anthony's funeral was an extremely significant event for the Diocese, which spiritually united all its members.'[64] However, it seems there was also at that time an attempt by the supporters of Moscow to create a separate stavropegic parish 'out of despair from being heard', it was claimed.[65] After Metropolitan Anthony's death Moscow would not confirm Bishop Basil as the new ruling bishop. Instead, he was named 'temporary administrator' of diocese, pending the appointment of a new bishop. This situation disempowered the anti-Moscow group who had proposed Bishop Basil's appointment through the diocesan council. It also gave

[62] OCL Archive. Letters to Editor, 19.12.02
[63] Interview with Metropolitan Anthony, *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, No. 23 (Dec, 2002)
[64] The Commission of Enquiry into the Sourozh Crisis, published in full in English: http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=documents&div=90 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[65] Letter of Metropolitan Kirill to Sourozh Parishioners, 01.01.04. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/care/?ID=2 [Accessed 07.04.20]

hope to the pro-Moscow parishioners who increasingly gathered around Bishop Anatoly and the parish in Manchester. Yet in 2005, Bishop Basil was still writing positively about the new arrivals from abroad and the changes in the parish, stating that, 'attendance on a Sunday has probably quadrupled' and that '[the diocese] has been strengthened by the influx of new immigrants'.[66]

The Road to Schism (2005–2006)

In 2005, Father Andre Teterin arrived in the diocese from Russia with the intention of providing pastoral care to the new Russophone parishioners. As with other incoming Russian clergy before him, his sojourn was at the request of the diocese, as he was known to be multilingual and intellectual.[67] On 3 December 2005, he gave a talk in the cathedral to the Russian Christian Movement.[68] This was to be the catalyst of the final denouement.

The talk was given in Russian and Fr Andrei later admitted that, because of this, he perhaps spoke 'more freely' than normal. The Russian Christian Movement had ecumenical connections and was suspicious in the eyes of conservatives, not least for the absence of the word 'Orthodox' in its name. Fr Andrei would have been aware of his audience and he took the opportunity to criticise various practices in the diocese and the perceived exaggerated focus on Metropolitan Anthony. He followed the talk up with a letter to a Russian

[66] Osborne, Bishop B., 'Twenty Five Years and One Hundred Issues', *Sourozh Journal*, Issue 100, 05.05
[67] Letter from Bishop Basil to Metropolitan Kirill (DECR), requesting Fr Andre Teterin be sent to the diocese as an 'ideal candidate', 22.12.03. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html [Accessed 05.05.19]
[68] Teterin, A., '"Sobornost'": konferentsia 'Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia v Velikobritanii"' (tekst raspechaten s audiopici), 03.12.05. http://sourozh.tserkov.info/sobornost/?ID=7 [Accessed 26.03.20]

website which, if anything, was even more critical, attacking the way the services were performed.[69]

Bishop Basil responded by imposing a ban on Fr Andrei and forbade him even to enter the cathedral until he had repented. In response, Fr Andrei wrote to the Patriarch and the Russian Ambassador in London, while his supporters organised petitions and open letters.[70] On 26 December, Fr Andrei made a short visit to Moscow to meet with the DECR; he came back (in the words of Bishop Basil in his interview with the BBC) 'in high spirits'.[71] He agreed to apologise if he would then be reinstated. There followed another campaign of letters and petitions from his supporters among the pro-Moscow group.[72] At the Sunday liturgy on 1 January 2006, Fr Andrei was finally back in the cathedral. Bishop Basil announced the lifting of the ban and cries of 'We've won!' were heard in Russian coming from the congregation.[73] Fr Andrei thanked his supporters from the microphone.

After this episode, several of the anti-Moscow clergy wrote an open letter to Bishop Basil stating, 'we are outraged by his [Fr Andre's] attempt to involve the Russian Ambassador who, as the representative of a foreign power has no jurisdiction in this country.'[74] In addition, some people in the Russian Christian Movement in Great Britain also issued an open letter attacking Fr

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[69] https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/print [Accessed 26.03.20]. Cf. Collection of letters and texts relating to the events around Fr Andre Teterin: http://yakov.works/spravki/5_russia_ukaz/21_ru_bio/Teterin.htm [Accessed 26.03.20]

[70] 'Pis'mo prikhozhan sobora v sviazi s otstranieniem prot. Andreia Teterina ot sluzhenia', Open Letter with 209 signatures, 13.12.05. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sobornost/?ID=12 [Accessed 07.04.20]

[71] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Transcript of Bishop Basil interview on the BBC, 'Vera i Vek'

[72] Open Letter with 200 signatures Cirota.ru. *Tema:* #53307, *Soobshchenie:* #1875888, 'Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za rubezhom', 20.02.06., [Accessed 05.05.19]

[73] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Bishop Basil Osborne, Open Letter to the Members of the Diocese of Sourozh, 16.05.06

[74] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Letter from the Deans of the Diocese of Sourozh to Bishop Basil of Sergievo, 01.01.06. Two Letters from the Clergy of Sourozh Diocese to Bishop Basil of Sergievo.

Andre's speech.[75] The letter criticised Fr Andre's 'Soviet mentality' ('the desire for the authoritarian control of everyone and everything') and claimed that he misunderstood the term *sobornost'*, which they stated was much wider and more philosophical than he had assumed.[76] The letter also noted that Fr Andrei's written statement to the parish council was full of 'false accusations in the Spirit of the Soviet Era' and that his speech represented in effect 'a call to schism'. It claimed, 'The very vocabulary … suggests that its author relies on the intervention of non-church authorities'[77]. It also pointed out that he had called on the Russian Ambassador to intervene with the leadership of Sourozh and to 'unite the diaspora'. Fr Andre's use of politicised language was also critiqued, citing his description of Sourozh as an 'island of Russianness in the capitalist world'.

At the end of the crisis in June 2006, Fr Andrei penned a long open letter about the events, in which he stated that he was 'getting ready to leave for Russia. With joy and thanksgiving to God!' He went on to criticise the diocese in strong language, speaking of 'the transformation of Surozh from the school of Christian love, and one of the centres of the Orthodox preaching, into a totalitarian sect with a personality cult, a ban on freedom of speech, cultivated by a consciousness of imaginary exceptionalism.' He concluded that, 'With difficulty and mistakes, the Russian Church is rising from slumber and moving forward – but Sourozh is rotting'.[78]

Tensions between Fr Andrei Teterin and Bishop Basil continued, and in March Bishop Basil excluded six pro-Moscow members from the parish council.

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[75] 'Otkrytoe pis'mo Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia v Velikobritanii'. http://www.religare.ru/2_25805_1_21.html 07/02/2006 [Accessed 28.09.19]
[76] For a longer analysis of how *sobornost'* related to the ecclesiological debate in Sourozh, see Chapter 5.
[77] Otkrytoe pis'mo' op.cit.
[78] Op. cit. http://yakov.works/spravki/5_russia_ukaz/21_ru_bio/Teterin.htm [Accessed 17.09.20].Cf also Interview 1A, "[the Deanery] is like a little sect."

This last action was extremely controversial and far from relieving the tension only served to increase it. Throughout Great Lent 2006 (6 March–23 April), many petitions and open letters were organised by the pro-Moscow group, now calling themselves the 'Laity Initiative'. There were even strikes, as pro-Moscow parishioners declared 'a withdrawal of labour' during Holy Week.[79] In any case, many of the most pro-Moscow parishioners had already ceased to worship in the cathedral, instead preferring to travel to the stavropegic parish in Manchester where Bishop Anatoly served.[80] The question of loyalty to the Motherland was raised in many open letters, one such addressed to Bishop Basil complained that some of the Russian-speakers themselves 'were not very loyal to the country in which they were born and raised'.[81] For Bishop Basil, a parting of the ways now seemed inevitable. He did not believe that there could be any reconciliation while Moscow was supposedly undermining him.

On 24 April 2006, Bishop Basil wrote to the Patriarch asking to be allowed to move the Sourozh Diocese from under the omophorion of Moscow to that of Constantinople (to be under the Parisian Exarchate of the Russian Tradition).[82] He set out his reasons for coming to his decision, noting the huge demographic shifts in the diocese and claiming that the situation was now 'unbearable'. He complained that the DECR had interfered in the diocese, supporting those elements who were seeking to undermine his authority.[83] He

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[79] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Two Letters from Bishop Basil of Sergievo, Open Letter, 01.05.06

[80] Interview 2Eb

[81] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1995088, 13.04.06. Not all the open letters were from the pro-Moscow side. E.g. OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Two Letters from the Clergy of Sourozh Diocese to Bishop Basil of Sergievo, 06.02.06. The letter was signed by six presbyters. 'Firstly we are deeply concerned at the conduct of Archpriest Andrey Teterin in the London cathedral parish during the past two months in that he publicly showed his disrespect for you, the Administrator of the Diocese.',

[82] The Parisian Exarchate of the Russian Tradition had a complex history and at the time of the Sourozh crisis was under the omophorion of Constantinople. Its relationship to Sourozh is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

[83] Mospat.ru, 'On the situation in the Sourozh diocese Information by the Communication Service of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations', 15.05.06 https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2006/05/31304/ [Accessed 30.04.20]

described the non-ethnic policy pursued by Metropolitan Anthony, which he claimed was being eroded with direct help from Moscow through financial control and control of liturgical language, and he noted that these problems were 'structural and endemic' within the Moscow Patriarchate.

On 2 May, Bishop Basil wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarchate asking for the diocese to be received into its jurisdiction. He did this without being given permission from Moscow. On 5 May, the Patriarch of Moscow wrote to Bishop Basil refusing his request, claiming, with some justification, that the move would result in further splits within the Orthodox diaspora. He addressed Bishop Basil's implied accusations of Russian nationalism, stating, 'The history of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in America, as well as our experience of participation in pan-Orthodox discussion of the problem of the diaspora, are clear witness to the absence in our Church of any selfish ambitions or nationalist prejudice'.[84]

The Patriarch invited Bishop Basil to Moscow for talks. However, when he heard of the letter to Constantinople, and of Bishop Basil's refusal to attend a meeting in Moscow, he forcibly retired him as the Administrator of Sourozh. Archbishop Innokenty of Korsun was appointed as temporary administrator in his place and hastily despatched to the diocese along with a Commission of Inquiry whose job it would be to get to the bottom of what had occurred in the troublesome provincial diocese.[85]

Bishop Basil then issued backdated 'letters of release' from Moscow to all the clergy of the diocese. The British media at this time started to pay

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[84] Ibid.

[85] The diocesan council initially refused to accept the decision of the Patriarch to retire Bishop Basil: 'We find it impossible to accept, as contrary to the Statue of the Diocese of Sourozh the decision of the Patriarch on the removal of Bishop Basil …'. Declaration of Members of the Diocesan Council, quoted in Open Letter of Fr Raphael Armour. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=43754, [Accessed 11.06.20]

attention to the crisis.[86] Bishop Basil appeared in a long interview on BBC Radio 4 and issued an open letter in which he set out his case as to why he had acted as he had.[87] He wrote that it was clear that 'the agenda of the Moscow Patriarchate is to make Sourozh conform to their idea of a "normal" diocese outside Russia. That is, one which is under the direct control of the DECR'.[88] He described his difficulties in working with the elderly Russian bishop Anatoly and Father Andrey Teterin, who had 'launched a public attack' on him and 'on the Diocese itself'.[89] He alleged that Fr Andrey was being secretly encouraged and backed by Moscow, and also discussed the pro-Moscow group, the Laity Initiative and its connections with the Russian State in the form of the Russian Ambassador. He complained that, 'a campaign was now being waged on the internet in Russian' by his opponents and that such people were receiving direct support and encouragement from Moscow. He went on to explain his actions, 'The reason, then, that I decided to act was that I could see myself being gradually worn down by the pressure of the opposition, which was supported by Archbishop Anatoly from within the Diocese and the DECR without. At the same time morale among those whom Metropolitan Anthony had brought into Orthodoxy and the Russian Church was plummeting day by day. The longer I waited, the less would be the chance of successfully releasing the followers of Metropolitan Anthony's vision from the grip of a Patriarchate that seemed determined to "bring them under control" and thereby stifle their

[86] Cf. Petre, J., *The Telegraph*, 30.05.06. Mimo, C., *The Independent*, 18.05.06. Walters, P., *Church Times*, 26.05.06. Interview 1C.
[87] OCAD, Selection of Documents uploaded to the Kuraev Forum, Open Letter from Bishop Basil to the Members of the Diocese of Sourozh, 16.05.06. Cirota.ru, *Tema:* #58558, *Soobshchenie:* #2070221, 18.05.06.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid. Cf. OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org Docs. Transcript of Recording of Talk by Archbishop Anatoly in the London Cathedral, 11.12.05. Cf. also OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Two Letters from the Clergy of the Diocese of Sourozh to Bishop Basil of Sergievo. Archpriests John Lee, Benedict Ramsden, Alexander Fostiropoulos, also 'Pis'mo v podderzhku Arkhiepiskopa Kerchenskogo Anatolia', 10.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=34, [Accessed 07.04.20]. Cf. also OCAD. Untitled document of the Commission and the Conference, 07.06.06

life and activity'.[90] Finally, Bishop Basil explained the need for secrecy stating that if 'word had got out' about his intentions he would have been immediately and forcibly retired.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate asked Bishop Basil to 'reapply' for admission, changing the justification for this move to that of Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon, which he duly did.[91] After a meeting of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, on 8 June 2006 he and his new jurisdiction were accepted into the Ecumenical Patriarchate as part of the of the Parisian Exarchate (Russian Tradition).[92] The crisis thus entered its final stage in which it broadened out into world Orthodoxy and in the process very nearly resulted in a major schism between Constantinople and Moscow. In response to Constantinople's acceptance of Bishop Basil, Moscow again issued a summons for him to appear before the Holy Synod of the Russian Church to account for his actions, and when he did not comply, he was suspended and banned from serving. The ban of course had little practical effect as Bishop Basil was no longer within the Russian Church. The ecclesiastical and jurisdictional wrangling between Moscow and Constantinople was only settled finally in Geneva almost a year later, in March 2007, and the property battle was only concluded (in favour of Moscow) in April 2009, this last date marking the end of the crisis.

While this power struggle was in progress at the top of the Church, the events in the cathedral caused some upheaval and confusion in the provinces. Some parishes opted to vote on whether to leave Moscow with Bishop Basil or not, while others went with the decision of their priest. As many of these

[90] Open letter from Bishop Basil, 26.05.06, op. cit.
[91] Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of Canon 28.
[92] Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of the Exarchate.

parishes were small, close-knit communities, the schism was particularly unsettling. Initially, eighteen parishes went to the Exarchate (about two-thirds of the total), although some later returned to Moscow.[93] In terms of bodies, however, the slant was probably in the opposite direction, as new arrivals so outnumbered the 'old guard' within the London cathedral, by far the biggest parish in the diocese.

A final twist at the time of writing (2019) was the dissolution of the Russian Exarchate itself (and with it the Deanery founded by Bishop Basil) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As a result of this decision, the majority of Exarchate parishes again returned to the Moscow Patriarchate, thus closing the circle after a long series of splits.[94] Subsequent also to these events was the momentous schism between Moscow and Constantinople in late 2018 following Constantinople's unilateral recognition of separatist elements in Ukraine.

[93] News statement, 27.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=168 [Accessed 07.04.20]
[94] Provost, Y., Orthodoxie.com, 'Communiqué de l'Archevêché suite à l'Assemblée générale du 23 février 2019' https://orthodoxie.com/communique-de-larcheveche-suite-a-lassemblee-generale-du-23-fevrier/ [Accessed 21.03.19]

The Commission of Inquiry

The Moscow-organised Commission of Enquiry into the crisis was composed of clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR). The work of the commission took place in two sessions, one held in Oxford in late May and the other in mid June 2006. During these sessions, the commission gathered oral evidence along with written submissions to be considered alongside all the legal and official documentation. The commission did its best to encourage input from the anti-Moscow faction, but from the start the composition of the commission's panel was seen as biased in favour of Moscow.[95] Despite numerous invitations to attend, Bishop Basil refused to meet with the commission and advised his supporters to likewise boycott it. A long statement appeared on his (since deleted) website conceding the 'very high level of competence' of the commission's members but singling out particularly members of the DECR as people who 'might not be impartial in examining complaints against their own employer.'[96]

Bishop Basil was further 'puzzled' by the appointment of Archbishop Mark of Berlin, overseer of the ROCOR jurisdictions in western Europe. He was concerned that discussions surrounding the imminent reunion of ROCOR and Moscow would influence the commission's findings. Perhaps he was also concerned that ROCOR's conservatism would be a negative influence on the investigation. Bishop Basil praised the choice of Bishop Innokenty of Korsun (the Moscow Patriarchate diocese in western Europe), but also singled out for criticism Father Mikhail Dudko.[97] The statement concluded that the

[95] Interview 1A, 'The Russians tend to know what the answer is before they start'
[96] OCAD. Untitled document of the Commission and the Conference, 07.06.06
[97] Ibid. [Fr Mikhail Dudko was the son of Fr Dmitry Dudko, a famous Russian dissident priest who later aligned with Russian nationalists. Bishop Basil was aware of Fr Mikhail's conservative lineage. Fr Dmitry is the subject

commission was 'a missed opportunity' to 'hear the voice of the people',[98] but in late May the commission began its work, making it clear that this would proceed with or without the participation of Bishop Basil and his followers.[99]

The commission's first session was timed to coincide with the diocesan conference scheduled for 26–29 May 2006. The commission had been hoping to use the diocesan conference to gather testimonies from the anti-Moscow group, but the conference was boycotted by Bishop Basil and most of his supporters. Some anti-Moscow parishioners (including some of the speakers) did attend, while refusing to take part in the inquiry. From all accounts the atmosphere was extremely tense, with those in the anti-Moscow group who did speak making emotional pleas to the conference to support Bishop Basil. Some asked robust questions of Archbishop Innokenty, querying why the hierarchy had supported the pro-Moscow group in 'their lack of proper discipline, their violence and their lies'.[100] The answer was always the same – pleas for 'love and unity' – but it was far too late in the day for such general appeals to have any effect.[101]

Bishop Innokenty had the unenviable role of mediator. Interestingly, the previous year he had published an article in the journal *Sourozh* in which he had praised the multi-ethnic character of the Russian Church, concluding, 'Thus one cannot say that the Russian Church ignores the birth of local Orthodoxy and is characterised, as one can hear from time to time, by a new ecclesiology founded on national and ethnic principles'.[102] Most of those interviewed for

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of a recent book in English, *The Last Man in Russia: And the Struggle to Save a Dying Nation* by Oliver Bullough (London, 2013). Such realignments of allegiances have been a common theme in recent Russian history.]

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Sourozh Conference. Innokentii Korsun.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Innokenty of Korsun, Bishop, 'The Unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe', *Sourozh Journal*, Issue 102, 11.05

this study suggested he did as good a job as was possible, with one stating, 'He was just what was needed, he was a born diplomat!'.[103] Soon after the conference, the Diocesan Assembly and a group of lay supporters wrote a letter to the Patriarch that stated bluntly that they did not recognise the commission and that 'even if it were legitimate, its findings can have no real validity'.[104] The letter claimed that such a body could not be independent. It also noted the disregard of the Diocesan Statutes and the lack of leadership after the death of Metropolitan Anthony, stating that the diocese had in effect 'been abandoned'.[105] The authors of the letter admitted that the commission had invited their input ('implored us even') but that the offer had been rejected because of a refusal to answer basic questions. The letter went on to describe what was perceived as the commission's rather chaotic *modus operandi*, with 'no real understanding of the role of Chairman'.[106]

As participation in the commission from the anti-Moscow group faded away completely, several long 'testimonies' were posted on Bishop Basil's website by laymen who had no confidence in the commission's neutrality.

The commission's report was published on 9 September 2006.[107] The basic findings were as follows:

- The crisis was the result of a long build-up of tension in the diocese and not a purely recent development.
- Metropolitan Hilarion's sojourn in the diocese was a catalyst for the surfacing of discontent.

[103] Interview 1A
[104] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Letter from Parishioners to Patriarch, 30.05.06
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] OCAD. The Report of the Commission of Enquiry

- There was no evidence of any desire on the part of Metropolitan Anthony at any time to move the diocese out of the Moscow Patriarchate, but there was evidence that Bishop Basil and his supporters were preparing for this eventuality in 2002.
- Critical events, according to the commission, 'concerned only the Cathedral in London. There was no tension in other parishes of the Diocese'.
- The ban imposed by Bishop Basil on Fr Andrei Teterin was 'excessive' and 'uncanonical'.
- The DECR did not support one side over the other in the crisis.
- There was no evidence to support Bishop Basil's claims, expressed in his open letter of 16 May 2006, that it was Moscow's intention to 'Russify' the diocese and to seize control of it in line with a Russian nationalist agenda.
- There were many canonical irregularities in the way Bishop Basil had issued backdated and uninvited 'letters of dismissal' to only some of the Sourozh clergy.
- The timing of Bishop Basil's decision to take Sourozh Diocese out of the control of the Moscow Patriarchate could be linked to the changing demographics of the parish council, where recent, pro-Moscow migrants would soon outnumber the anti-Moscow group.
- The commission categorically denied the accusations of Russian nationalism on the part of the pro-Moscow faction, citing the testimony of numerous witnesses.

The Commission conceded that its findings were necessarily incomplete as a result of the refusal of Bishop Basil and his close entourage to take part in the investigation.

The Property Trial (June 2009)

The great unresolved issue of the schism was the property of the diocese and the battle over this dragged on into 2009. On 5 June 2009, three years after the schism, the case finally went to the High Court for a three-day trial. On the one side were representatives of Bishop Basil's Vicariate (the British part of the Parisian Exarchate under Constantinople) and on the other, representatives of the Sourozh Diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate. Although Bishop Basil and his supporters had vacated the cathedral following the schism, they still claimed to be its rightful owners, and on 23 June 2007 the diocesan assembly of the Vicariate (later Deanery) passed a resolution to this effect. The Vicariate then sought a decision from the Charity Commission, but the matter remained unresolved. The pro-Moscow claimants then mounted a legal challenge which, as we shall see, succeeded on the basis that the Sourozh Diocese still existed and continued to worship in the cathedral. Bishop Basil and his supporters were deemed to have voluntarily left it and therefore had no claim to pass resolutions concerning the trust deeds.

Property had played a central role in the crisis, and indeed there was much at stake. The value of the parish property alone, excluding the cathedral itself, was put at £2.8 million, while the value of the diocesan property was estimated at up to another million.[108] Ten years on, these valuations have increased fourfold. The London cathedral had been bought from the Anglican Church by the diocese in 1978 without any funds from Moscow, the money being raised from local parishioners and from Orthodox of all jurisdictions in the diaspora.

[108] Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 11

The case of the claimants (pro-Moscow) was to rest heavily upon the interpretation of a technicality in the trust deeds, i.e. whether there could be said to have been any real 'doubt' as to the 'continuation and identity of the diocese and parish of Sourozh' following the schism of 2006. The Russian cathedral in London had a long pre-history as an embassy church and the original parish (as it was, prior to any splits) had been founded in 1919. Following the Russian Revolution there were struggles between various émigré factions and the new Soviet Union as to the ownership of diaspora real estate. This is explored in the following chapter but explains the reason why many diaspora parishes were keen to regularise their status at that time. It was assumed that church governance and jurisdictional matters remained under Church (canon) law, whilst the legal institution of the parish was principally 'to regulate in financial matters'.[109]

In the 1920s, the Russian Church in the diaspora experienced multiple schisms between the Moscow Patriarchate, the Synodal Church (later ROCOR) and the Parisian Exarchate, which was also called the Evlogian Exarchate after its founder, Evlogy Giorgievsky (1868–1946).[110] It is the Evlogian parish that concerns us here. Throughout its history the Evlogian Exarchate moved several times between Moscow and Constantinople, and this is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. At the time that the original parish trust deed was approved on 20 July 1944, the parish was under the jurisdiction of Constantinople. On 4 October 1946, the parish voted unanimously to move back to the Moscow Patriarchate.[111] No one doubted the legality of this move,

[109] NA. RG8/292.26
[110] The history of these early schisms is related in the following chapter.
[111] Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 23

although Bishop Basil noted during the crisis that it had been against the Church canons.

On 13 May 2002, at the height of the Hilarion affair, an attempt was made by members of the diocesan council to modify the cathedral's property trust deed, to enable 'property to be removed from the control of the parish council and handed over to the exclusive competence of unelected members of the committee of Trustees of the Parish'.[112] Metropolitan Hilarion wrote in his memoirs:

> The ownership document was reissued so that the board of trustees ceased to be accountable to the parish council and could independently make all decisions regarding the use and sale of church property. Thus, the board of trustees, which consists exclusively of the British and friends of Fr. Alexander Fostiropoulos [one of the main opponents of the Moscow Patriarchate], prepared the ground for all real estate to be left to them in case of transfer to another jurisdiction.[113]

There had been several rumours of attempts to make changes to the property protocols of the diocese, and open letters had been written concerning this.[114]

In fact, all such attempts were unsuccessful, but they highlighted the long-term goals (or fears) of the anti-Moscow group. Following the schism in 2006, a vote was taken by the acting diocesan assembly (of the Vicariate) stating that it was the sole legitimate successor of the Diocese of Metropolitan Anthony (Sourozh).[115] It was unanimously passed. Attempts to convene full

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[112] Cf. Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 2, 24.04.09: 11:00–12:00. 'It was an attempt by Bishop Basil or those associated with Bishop Basil to give greater power to the trustees.'
[113] Alfeev, Metropolitan H. Statement, 08.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 06.05.19]
[114] OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Letters to the Editor, Update from Adrian and Tanya Dean, 25.01.03. Also, interview 1C
[115] Court 56 Trial Recording Trial, Day 2, 24.04.09: 14:00

quorum meetings of the parish council and diocesan assembly were repeatedly postponed and it was not until May 2007, almost a year after Bishop Basil had broken with Moscow, that the diocesan assembly (as constituted on 2 May 2006) finally convened a meeting that took place on 23 June.[116] This meeting passed a resolution which stated, 'For the purposes of the said Trust Deed, the Episcopal Vicariate of Orthodox Parishes of Russian Tradition in Great Britain and Ireland is the successor to the Diocese of Sourozh'.[117] It was this action which ultimately provoked the legal challenge from the pro-Moscow supporters who continued to worship in the London cathedral.

In April 2008, the case went before the Attorney General. The defendants (the Vicariate under Bishop Basil) indicated that they would rely on the decision of the Attorney General to support their position, but the opinion expressed by the Attorney General on viewing the resolution and the deeds was in favour of the claimants (the Moscow Patriarchate). When the matter came to court the following year, the defendants described the Attorney General as 'siding with one side against the other' and stated that the case 'risked compromising the role of the Attorney-General in the protection of charities'. They claimed that such a decision was prejudicial, especially where 'one party [ie Moscow] *has limitless means*'.[118]

The claimants focused their attention firstly on the legality of the meeting of the diocesan assembly that had passed the resolution and secondly, and more importantly, on the legality of the resolution itself (even if the meeting which passed it had been validly convened). The necessity of calling such a meeting rested on Clause 4 of the parish trust deed, which called

[116] News statement, 20.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=170 [Accessed 07.04.20]
[117] Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 7
[118] Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 115

for resolution in the event of the creation of a 'doubt' as to the continuity and/or identity of the parish or diocese.[119] The wording was as follows, 'all subsequent occasions upon which any doubt shall or may arise relating to the continuity of the life of the Parish **and** the identity or the body community or congregation which shall be entitled to the benefit of this deed'.[120]

When the matter came before the High Court in April 2009, the judge agreed to hear the claimant's evidence relating to Clause 4 of the trust deed on the understanding that if this 'should be in his favour on the questions of construction there would be no need to go into that further evidence resulting in saving in time and costs'.[121] This meant in effect that all, or most, of the evidence relating to the build-up to the schism was relegated to a secondary role. The purpose of the trial was to decide whether in fact a 'doubt' had arisen as to the continuity and/or identity of the parish and diocese, and, if not, then the resolution of the diocesan council (as convened by the Vicariate) would be deemed invalid.

This put the defendants in a very awkward position because many times, and even in their witness statements, they had conceded that the parish and the diocese of Sourozh still existed at the cathedral. In fact, it was plain for all to see that a large and flourishing parish of 'Russian Orthodox Christians' (in the words of the trust deed) continued to exist at the cathedral and in other buildings. The defendants then focused on whether there was a doubt in the 'identity' of the parish, in an effort to broaden the remit of the trial, but this was also largely unsuccessful. The claimants repeatedly countered to the judge that, 'if a construction approach is adopted', then 'there was no reason to be

[119] Throughout the trial the reference was constantly to both the parish and diocesan trust deeds, but the two were almost identical.
[120] Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 41
[121] Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 93

concerned with what has been happening between 2001 and 2006 and questions of theology and to what if anything the Russian State has been doing …'.[122] The claimants proposed that the idea that 'the niceties of theology' (can women wear headscarves?) can create a doubt as to the identity of the congregation resulted in 'all sorts of problems' in the creation of legal precedent, and this was indeed a route which the judge was not inclined to go down.[123]

The judge had seen witness statements about the build-up to the schism and was sympathetic to the plight of Bishop Basil's supporters. He did allow, and even encouraged, the defendants to put their case to him, even though the claimants refused to cross-examine or engage with this process, deeming it irrelevant. At this point the hearings did broaden out into the wider issues of Russian nationalism and the related topics discussed in this study. The defendants claimed they had been 'constructively dismissed' by the pro-Moscow 'cuckoos'.[124] There had been, it was stated, a Russian 'invasion' into the parish and moreover, Clause 4 of the original trust deed had been drawn up precisely with such a problem in mind.[125] The defendants claimed that there had always been unease about the possibility of 'a Moscow takeover' and that the reference to doubt arising in the identity of the parish had been deliberately inserted in anticipation of such an event.[126] The defendants concluded, in language now familiar to the reader, 'The reasons for the dispute are because there were campaigns which were in favour of the will of the what

[122] Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 10:00–11:00
[123] Ibid.
[124] Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00
[125] Ibid.
[126] Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 15:00–16:00. Defendants: '[Clause 4] is obviously drafted with a view to expecting trouble. It is not a very ordinary clause to find in a parish deed. And trouble is exactly what this unfortunate parish has suffered …[it] must refer to "the very type of trouble" which was to be expected. Metropolitan Anthony for a long time was able to maintain autonomy of development from Moscow.'

the Moscow Patriarchate was intent upon, namely the expansion of its canonical territory in western Europe … This is part of a movement that is going on all over western Europe. And there are huge divisions which are building up. It is not a one-off. It is part of a pattern of assertion of power.'[127] Such wider issues were deemed relevant enough for the claimants to feel the need to counter them on day three of the trial. They pointed to the repeated occasions when Moscow had acquiesced to the wishes of the diocese (for instance, in the appointments of clerics from Russia) and concluded that there was 'a complete lack of any evidence that there has been anything along the lines of the slightly paranoiac suggestions that Moscow is trying to extend its tentacles over the diocese and parish here. There wasn't any evidence and there isn't any evidence that this was a take-over by Moscow and indeed the contrary is the case.'[128]

In the end, such arguments were academic as the judge decided that there was in fact no doubt as to the continuation of the parish and diocese and hence no reason to trigger the meetings and resolutions. In his own words, 'they are at each other's throats, but the parish is still definable.'[129] Whether or not this can be considered a fair decision rests to some extent on one's affiliation in the debate. What is without doubt is that the Bishop Basil's supporters did not put forward a particularly compelling case. Firstly, it was clear that they had delayed the convention of meetings to pass the resolutions which should have been taken immediately after the schism. Secondly, there was the confused appeal/response to the Charity Commission and the Attorney General. Thirdly, they do not seem to have foreseen the claimants'

[127] Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00
[128] Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 10:00–11:00
[129] Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00

reliance on the construction argument [the continuity or not of the parish/diocese] and so did not adequately prepare for it.

In the context of a much-formalised legal argument (the arising of a doubt), the arguments concerning Russian nationalism were rejected. The judge concluded that the parish worshipping within the diocesan cathedral in London in 2007 was *the same* as the parish that had been there in 2005 (or in 1944). The supporters of Bishop Basil had in fact left this parish and jurisdiction to create another one. It is possible that, in today's more polarised geopolitical world, the judge might have arrived at a different decision. It is hard to know, but what is interesting is the subtext of the defendants' response. It was presumed that Russian nationalism and the consequent interference from the Motherland was so great as to actually 'destroy' the existing parish and to create something completely new with little or no identity to that which had been there previously. It was a precarious argument as, in order to win, the implication would have been that there was doubt as to whether those who continued to worship in the cathedral were 'Russian Orthodox Christians' [as defined in the deeds]. Moreover, it was suggested that such events were happening all over the world, not just in the UK. This was largely the argument of those who viewed such events as the outcome of the rise of a neo-Slavophile (nationalist) imperative in the Russian Church and State and its movement into the diaspora. This argument will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6.

It might be presumed that the conclusion of the property trial would have put an end to the whole affair. The pro-Moscow side had won in the sense that they retained the legal continuity with and the property of the Sourozh of old. But the crisis left a bitter taste and regrets that rumble on to

this day. Hardliners might have crowed at the demise of Bishop Basil and his subsequent laicization,[130] but not everyone was triumphant in victory. 'They would do anything to get those people back,' as a priest on the Moscow side said in an interview.[131] When Fr Mikhail Dudko of Sourozh spoke at the Moscow Congress of Compatriots in 2009, he still emphasised the missionary aspect of the diocese along the lines of Metropolitan Anthony, saying, 'The Russian Church is not only a national Church, but a missionary Church, which is why the range of its activities abroad is very wide'.[132] But the truth was that both jurisdictions were now less diverse, and the fact that nationalism remained a regular theme of official Sourozh publications shows some unease with the situation. An issue of the diocesan journal from 2009 contained an article entitled 'Orthodoxy and Ethnicity' which related the following interesting story concerning Fr Sophrony:

> I might mention what Father Sophrony used to say about nationalism in the Church, which divides people, as when people say, 'Oh, you are a different nationality. What are you doing here? This is our church.' Father Sophrony could never become reconciled to such statements. Once he was told by a priest, 'It's impossible to overcome nationalism in our church', and the thought came into Father Sophrony's mind at that moment, 'Then salvation is impossible'. In his talks, Father Sophrony said, 'You must know that if you are a nationalist, you believe in

[130] Soon after the trial, Bishop Basil decided to marry and was laicised. The Vicariate was subsequently transformed into a Deanery.
[131] Interview 1D
[132] 'V ramkakh III Vsemirnogo kongressa sootechestvennikov sostoyalos' zasedaniye sektsii «Rol' Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi i drugikh traditsionnykh konfessiy v ukreplenii yedinogo dukhovnogo prostranstva Russkogo mira», 02.12.09. https://mospat.ru/ru/2009/12/02/news9603/ [Accessed 17.04.20]

> superiority over others, and then you are in darkness and Christ is not with you.[133]

The preceding narrative represents a very concise account of a highly complex crisis, with events often happening on a daily basis. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account but to serve as a foundation for further exploration into the causes of the tensions. For those unfamiliar with the history of the Russian Church in the last century, these events now need to be set in context, because at least part of the explanation for the tensions lies within that story. This will be covered in the next chapter.

[133] Sakharov, Hieromonk N., 'Orthodoxy and Ethnicity', *Sourozh*, No. 105, 2009. Another interesting article in the same journal proposed that nationalism also affected the British convert and was not solely a Russian phenomenon, relating it to the proposals to establish an insular 'British Orthodox Church' reflected that. Cf. Papavassiliou, Archimandrite V., 'For the Healing of the Nations', *Sourozh*, No. 105, 2009.

Chapter 2: The Sourozh Crisis in Context

The Jurisdictional Genesis of Sourozh

To understand fully the complexities involved in the Sourozh crisis, it is necessary to be aware of the genesis of the diocese. This entails a detour into the jurisdictional fragmentation of the Russian Church following the Revolution. It is a story that has been told elsewhere, so the emphasis here is upon the peculiarities of the English situation, and on how Church history fed into neo-Slavophile thought.

The various strands of the Russian Idea were explored most creatively in the various jurisdictional branches of the Church outside the Soviet Union. Religious philosophers from the Evlogian jurisdiction (Skobtsova, Berdiaev, Kartashev) explored the Russian Idea with an intense focus on the meaning of the diaspora situation.[1] In the more conservative Synodal (ROCOR) jurisdiction, the Russian Idea was central to the *Weltanschauung* of the Church, which represented history as a titanic struggle between East and West / Good and Evil (Ilyin). This attitude hardened in the post-war years, although at the same time softening to some extent towards the USA. In the Moscow Patriarchate both abroad and, later, at home there was a concentration on the 'Russian character' as seminal, in the lineage of Dostoevsky. A grasp of the jurisdictional framework, and its causes and passions, is therefore central to understanding both the crisis itself and the theories concerning it.

[1] It is a peculiarity of Russian messianism, or Russian philosophy in general, to use multiple terms whose meanings often bleed into each other. Neo-Slavophiles often use such terms as the Russian Idea (popularised by Berdiaev), the Russian World, Holy Rus and others, all with subtle differences of emphasis. This is explored more deeply in Chapters 5 and 6.

The post-Revolutionary Russian diaspora was not created by one monolithic White emigration, but rather represented all the turmoil of the pre-revolutionary period. As a result of the ideological ruthlessness of the Bolsheviks, the range of refugees was broad, from left-wing SRs through liberal Kadets to hard-line monarchists. The splits that occurred in the Church outside Russia reflected the demographic of their congregations.[2] Many of the liberal religious intelligentsia gravitated to Paris and London, while the Synodal Church was initially based in Karlovac in Serbia. The Evlogian jurisdiction from which Sourozh emerged was rather different in style to both the Synodal (and later ROCOR) jurisdiction and the Moscow Patriarchate.

It is necessary to explain how the famous ethos of Sourozh emerged and that it was not the solely the creation of Fr Anthony Bloom. In 1921, Metropolitan Evlogy (Giorgievsky) had been appointed by Patriarch Tikhon as temporary administrator for the Church in Western Europe.[3] He fulfilled this role as part of the reformed synod of Russian bishops who had gathered in Karlovac in Serbia following the White defeat in the Civil War. Patriarch Tikhon died in 1925 and a sobor to elect his replacement was not possible in the new Soviet State. After this time, Metropolitan Evlogy's relationship with the Karlovac Synod, which had become rather strained, became openly hostile. Metropolitan Evlogy favoured a policy of conciliation towards the Church in the Motherland, aiming to maintain links wherever possible. The Karlovac Synod, however, which was dominated by monarchists, started to condemn those who attempted what they considered to be appeasement with the Bolsheviks.

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[2] Cf. Tsypin, Prot. V., *Istoria russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi: sinodal'nyi i noveishii period (1700–2005)* (Moscow, 2012), p.749ff

[3] Cf. Ukaz No. 423, 26.03.1921,

After Patriarch Tikhon's death in 1925, the Church was governed by a series of *locum tenens.* When these were imprisoned, so-called 'acting' *locum tenens* took their place. In March 1927, Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) of Nizhny Novgorod emerged from prison and controversially 'assumued leadership' of the Church.[4] As he was only the acting *locum tenens* (the position being occupied by the imprisoned Metropolitan Peter of Krutitsy), the assumption of control was doubly questionable. Moreover, a cloud hung over Metropolitan Sergius in the eyes of the (Synodal) Church Abroad and many of the faithful due to his (albeit brief) participation in the schismatic Living Church (the doomed attempt by the left in the Church to create a 'Red Church' acceptable to the Soviets).[5] Nevertheless, in March 1927, and with the permission of the secular authorities, he organised a synod of hand-chosen hierarchs over which he presided.

The schism finally came when, on 29 July 1927, he issued his now (in)famous decree declaring the Church's support for the new Soviet State.[6] More divisively, Sergius's declaration was followed by a new oath that required all parishes within the Motherland and abroad to swear allegiance to the Soviet State. Close to one-third of the remaining bishops within the Soviet Union issued condemnations or failed to support Metropolitan Sergius in other ways. On 5 September 1927, the Bishops' Council of the Church Abroad (Karlovac) resolved to cease administrative contact with the Moscow Church. So began the seventy-year struggle between what was to become the Russian

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[4] On Sergius's 'assumption' of power and subsequent actions, Cf. Regelson, L., *Tragedia Russkoi Tserkvi*, (Moscow 1977, 2017 ed) pp. 46ff. Regelson's thesis is that many of the problems of the Moscow Patriarchate today are a result of Sergius's secularist approach – the division of the 'mystical' from the 'worldly' direction of the Church.

[5] The Living Church schism is discussed briefly in Chapter 6.

[6] The document contained the famous lines advising the faithful that the 'joys and sorrows' of the new Soviet State should also be their own. An in-depth discussion of the document can be found here: pravenc.ru, 'Deklaratisa' 1927, http://www.pravenc.ru/text/171618.html [Accessed 15.05.20]

Church Abroad (ROCOR) and the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (ROC – MP).

Émigré parishes the world over were now thrown into turmoil and London was no exception. An open letter of appeal from those opposing Metropolitan Evlogy shows how tense the situation had become by 1926 in the London parish, which was on the brink of division.[7] The document is interesting for multiple reasons. Firstly, allusion was made to the intense and difficult situation between political factions which up until then the parish had been able to contain: 'In spite of the differences of opinion in political and other relations, we were peaceful and united, joined together by our Orthodox parish'.[8] Secondly, the style of accusations was eerily similar to those seen eighty years later during the Sourozh crisis. The appeal claimed that supporters of Metropolitan Evlogy were bent on dividing the parish, utilising such methods as refusing to donate to the parish collections. Thirdly, criticism was levelled at the 'disrespectful and malevolent' behaviour of Metropolitan Evlogy's supporters towards the synodal clergy. Fourthly, the letter accused a small and determined group of seizing control of power and dividing the parish: 'And now, some parishioners – all in all 11 people … have seized the cathedral, divided the parish, changed the property rights … and dictates to us with all the power at their disposal".[9] Finally, the letter showed the underlying influence of the control of assets as a major driver of tensions. Like the appeals of 2006, the letter was signed by ten members of the parish council, who called on all parishioners to reject the temptation of *smuta i raskol* instigated by a small group of activists.

[7] NA. RG8/292.26 'Obrashchenie k' prikhozhanam' russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v' London'
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.

In 1927, the parishes under the care of Metropolitan Evlogy in Western Europe decided to remain with Moscow and to accept the so-called 'Sergian Compromise'. As a result there were further splits in the diaspora. Although Metropolitan Evlogy painstakingly altered the wording of the oath to be acceptable to both parties, it was still unacceptable to some in his jurisdiction. In London, Fr Basil Timofeev left the Evlogian Diocese for the Synodal (Karlovac) Church. Following his decision to remain under Moscow (and Sergius), Metropolitan Evlogy was ejected from the Synod of the Church Abroad. In 1924, a similar jurisdictional crisis had occurred in the USA, where Archbishop Platon (Rozhdestvensky) declared the autocephaly of the North American Diocese, also later splitting with both Moscow and ROCOR. Metropolitan Evlogy's ejection by the Synodal Church was the culmination of a struggle that had continued throughout the 1920s and which is recounted in detail in his memoirs.[10]

Metropolitan Evlogy's continued tenure under Moscow was itself short-lived because in 1930 tensions flared once again. On 15 February 1930, an article appeared in the Soviet press purporting to be an interview with Metropolitan Sergius and the synod over which he presided.[11] In answer to the question, 'Is it true that there is persecution of religion in the USSR, in whatever form it might appear?', Metropolitan Sergius replied, 'There is not and never has been persecution of religion in the USSR'.[12] In answer to a question about the huge numbers of churches that had been closed, the archbishop was supposed to have replied that this was because the people no longer wanted them open. We now know that the interview was a fake and in

[10] Evlogy, Mitropolit G., *Put' moei zhizni.* https://predanie.ru/evlogiy-geogievskiy-mitropolit/book/74547-put-moey-zhizni/
[11] Omolenko.com, 'Interviu s mitropolitom Sergiem Stragorodskim i ego Sinodom', 15.02.30, http://omolenko.com/otstuplenie/stragorod1.htm [Accessed 16.05.20]
[12] Ibid.

fact a concoction by Stalin, Molotov and Yaroslavsky, but Sergius did not publicly contradict it.[13] The publication of this supposed interview, occurring as it did in the most tragic years (with the exception perhaps of the Great Terror) of the Russian Church, plunged the Evlogian churches into further chaos. Metropolitan Evlogy vividly describes in his memoires how priests who continued to name Archbishop Sergius in the liturgy suffered abuse, threats and even physical violence, the laity accusing them of being 'commissars' and 'cowards'.[14] Despite widespread awareness that Sergius had been under impossible pressure to reach some kind of concordat with the Soviet State, the opinion of many was that he had not had enough faith in the ultimate 'indestructibility of the Church' and that he should have 'gone to Golgotha' along with all the other faithful who rejected the Bolsheviks. Metropolitan Evlogy himself stopped naming Sergius in the liturgy for fear of causing a riot.[15]

In Great Lent of 1930, a huge ecumenical demonstration of sympathy for the Russian Church culminated in a pan-denominational event in St Paul's cathedral in London. Metropolitan Evlogy presided at this and was subsequently ejected from the Moscow Patriarchate by Metropolitan Sergius. However, he did not return to the Karlovac Synod, but instead sought canonicity with World Orthodoxy by coming under the omophorion of Constantinople, who were ever ready to recognise autocephalous jurisdictions in the West. This was a hugely important decision and in many ways the root of the 2006 Sourozh crisis. When Metropolitan Evlogy left Moscow for Constantinople in 1930, he carried with him most of his parishes, including

[13]Cf. Kurliandskii, I., 'Kak Stalin, Yaroslavskii i Molotov v 1930 godu napisali "interviu" Mitropolita Sergiia', 15.03.13, http://www.pravmir.ru/kak-stalin-yaroslavskij-i-molotov-v-1930-godu-napisali-intervyu-mitropolita-sergiya/ An analysis by an expert of the handwriting of Stalin and other Politburo members, in which Stalin's personal and careful amends can be traced. [Accessed 16.05.20]
[14] Op. cit. Evlogy, Mitropolit G., *Put' moei zhizni*
[15] Ibid

London. Thus in London, from 1930 onwards, many archival records refer to the two parishes by the names Evlogian (rather than Patriarchal) and Synodal (or Anastassian, after Metropolitan Anastassy Gribanovsky, then head of the Synodal Church, or émigré Church). Rather unusually, the two communities in London agreed to share the cathedral for use on alternate Sundays. This arrangement was to last until the mid-1950s.

Not all Metropolitan Evlogy's parishes in Western Europe decided to follow him to Constantinople in 1931. Some joined to Karlovac (later ROCOR), and a tiny group remained loyal to the (as they saw it) suffering Church in Moscow. The newly created Diocese of Korsun (which is the name of the Moscow Patriarchate Diocese of Western Europe to this day) was small in size – Metropolitan Anthony subsequently recalled it consisting of only about 80 individuals spread across the whole of western Europe – but included some highly respected and influential figures, the most prominent being the talented philosopher and theologian Vladimir Lossky. As with Metropolitan Evlogy's exarchate, the group was centred in Paris but remained virtually penniless. About his decision to join neither ROCOR nor the Evlogian Exarchate, Metropolitan Anthony wrote, 'we had no illusions whatsoever, we knew that Moscow was captive and did not have the freedom to speak or to do what it wanted, but under those limited and harsh conditions, beyond what we could know, it was true to the faith'.[16] Metropolitan Benjamin, who had been General Chaplain to the White Forces, also left the Evlogian Exarchate in order to remain with Moscow. When questioned about the paradox of a 'White Russian supporting a Red Church', the archbishop replied, 'Firstly, the Church is not red! Then, even if my mother became a prostitute, I would not renounce

[16] Metropolitan Anthony, interview, December 1999. The Foundation of the Three Holy Hierarchs. http://iconeorthodoxe.free.fr/en/textes/fondation_en04.html [Accessed 16.05.20]

her – and the Russian Church did not become a prostitute, she became a martyr!'[17]

These complex jurisdictional shifts are important because they foreshadow the events in Sourozh in 2006 and reveal the longer-term forces at work. Metropolitan Evlogy's decision to go under the omophorion of Constantinople in 1931 was regarded as 'high treason' by the Karlovac Synod. It was deemed to be especially serious considering the long-standing rivalry of the 'Second Rome' (Constantinople) with the 'Third Rome' (Moscow) and Constantinople's brief but notorious support of the Living Church schism against Patriarch Tikhon. Metropolitan Evlogy was declared by some bishops 'to have left the Russian Church' to the point of almost going into schism and leaving World Orthodoxy.[18] A similar sense of betrayal was felt in 2006, but at that time the accusations of denying the Motherland came from *pro*-Moscow supporters.

Over time, Metropolitan Evlogy himself came to represent the liberal, democratic, intellectual wing of the Church in opposition to the peasant, aristocratic and monarchist wing (which later became ROCOR). These two aspects of the Russian Church had been on a collision course even prior to 1917 and the subsequent mass emigration.[19] In the diaspora, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Evlogy, with its centre on the Rue Daru in Paris, developed a reputation for mystical religious philosophy (rather than strict theology) and attracted famous names in this field: Nicholas Berdiaev, Sergei Bul'gakov, John Meyendorff and Alexander Schmemann. The Evlogian Exarchate was ecumenist, fostering relations especially with the Anglican Church through

[17] Ibid. The story was also related by Metropolitan Antony in Glenny, M. & Stone, N., *The Other Russia* (London, 1990), p.188
[18] Evlogy, *Put*', op. cit., Chapter 23.
[19] Cf. Shevzov, V., *Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution* (Oxford, 2004), pp.51–3

Nicholas Zernov and the Society of St Alban and St Sergius in Oxford. This institution came to be viewed with suspicion by the Synodal Church (ROCOR), which at various times sought to exercise control over it. In the 1930s, Fr Sergei Bul'gakov's new theology of Sophiology was condemned as heresy by the Karlovac Synod, a decision that was subsequently confirmed by other Orthodox Church jurisdictions. The struggle between the Rue Daru (as it came to be called) and the Karlovac Synod was not only one of theology but encompassed deep cultural and political allegiances.[20]

At the end of his long life, Metropolitan Evlogy addressed accusations that he had drifted towards liberalism from a previous position of conservative Russian nationalism. His answer was that the paramount commitment of his life was towards 'the *freedom* of the Church' against all political and worldly concordats.[21] Had he been alive to witness the Sourozh crisis of 2006, one wonders whether he would have accepted the accusations of the anti-Moscow group that it was precisely the freedom of the Church from worldly interests (the Russian State) that was in jeopardy.

[20] For Metropolitan Evlogy, the essence of the problem was that he felt the Synod to have acquired an aura of self-importance and authority beyond its remit. It was, in his opinion, simply a temporary institution necessitated by tragic circumstances. He felt that the real authority of the Motherland had never been abrogated, yet the Synod had proclaimed itself *the only* Russian Church authority in the diaspora. A key moment was when the Synod voted on whether to recognise the tenure of Metropolitan Peter of Krutitsy as *locum tenens* – Metropolitan Evlogy's response was, '*they* can recognise *us* but *we* can't recognise *them*!'. He wrote later in his memoirs, 'The Hierarchical Council [of the Synod] had dug a deep and impassable pit between us, for it illegally appropriated supreme authority in the Russian Church, capable of modifying *and even repealing* canonical directives of Patriarch Tikhon, and in this way creating our unfortunate church schism.' Evlogy, *Put'*, op. cit.
[21] Ibid.

The Cold War and the Diaspora Church

At the outbreak of World War II, there were (as there still are) three Church jurisdictions of Russian origin in Europe: the Synodal Church, which had broken from Moscow in 1926 at the time of the proclamation of Metropolitan Sergius and later became the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR); the Exarchate of Metropolitan Evlogy, which had broken from Moscow in 1930 and was under Constantinople; and the tiny Diocese of Korsun, the European branch of the Moscow Church. World War II and the Soviet victory complicated the situation in the diaspora Church still further. Many ethnic Russians now found themselves trapped in the West and unable, or unwilling, to return home. Among these were thousands of captured Soviet soldiers and citizens who had been sent to work as slave labour in Germany and now faced an uncertain future upon returning to the Soviet homeland, even though many had fought bravely in the Red Army. There were also those who had fought alongside the Axis Powers for ideological reasons (Cossacks and members of Vlasov's Free Russian Army) and who had a deep hatred of the Soviet state, as well as the many refugees who had simply fled before the advancing Red Army, such as ethnic Russians who had settled in Yugoslavia and the Baltic States, and now were refugees for a second time.[22]

In 1945, in the euphoria of the imminent Soviet victory, Metropolitan Evlogy decided to return the Exarchate to the newly established Patriarchate of Moscow, but this return was short-lived and the great majority of parishes

[22] Cf. Harwood, J., 'Orthodoxy in Britain 50 Years Ago', *ROCOR Studies* (18 April 2010): 'Many Russian Orthodox, however, were not of the old emigration but had come to Britain in the wave of upheavals in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. These actually outnumbered the old émigrés, though they were in decline in the 1960s as many moved to the Americas, and most lived in the industrial Midlands and North rather than in London. Almost all of this group adhered to the Russian Church Abroad (whose clergy in Germany had often helped them to come to Britain) or to the already-mentioned Polish Orthodox Church. They were largely of peasant origin and a surprisingly large number came from the Kiev region.'

voted to return to Constantinople after his death in 1946. The London parish, however, decided to remain with Moscow, and this was how the Russian Church in the UK became split between the Moscow Patriarchal Church and ROCOR. What is important for the purposes of this study is that the London parish, though with Moscow by the time of the young Fr Anthony Bloom's arrival, had emerged from the Evlogian Exarchate. As such, its roots and core were quite different to those of the Synodal Church or even the 'mother Diocese' of Korsun which had remained with Moscow in 1931. This is why such seemingly distant events were so important to the crisis of 2006. An interviewee stated in forthright terms:

'The ultimate historical roots of the Sourozh schism lay in the Diaspora schism between the minority of Russophobic, liberal, politicized elements in the Diaspora (in Europe called Evlogians and based in Paris) and the majority of the Diaspora in ROCOR. This schism took place in London in the 1920s, as elsewhere in Europe. (Though the roots of this schism lay in turn in the liberalism, modernism and fringe Orthodoxy of pro-Revolutionary intellectuals and aristocrats in Saint Petersburg before the Revolution. It was these individuals who emigrated to Paris after 1917). After 1945 the London Evlogians returned to the Patriarchate, but mainly without enthusiasm.'[23]

It was to the 'Evlogian' Exarchate (intellectual, liberal, open) that Bishop Basil claimed he had in fact *returned* in 2006.

It was not for the first time that ROCOR and Moscow were sharing a church, as this had also been the case during Metropolitan Evlogy's brief tenure under Moscow from 1927 to 1930, but 1945 was not the 1920s. Over the next fifty years, the animosity between the Moscow Patriarchate and

[23] Interview 1C.

ROCOR would reach fever pitch, although an actual canonical schism between the two churches was narrowly avoided.

The Synodal Church, having given open support to the Axis war effort and helped with the renovation of parishes in the territories occupied by the Germans, suffered a massive blow with the Axis defeat. In addition, wishing to show support for the Soviet war effort, the Anglican Church softened its attitude towards the Soviet Union and embarked on a propaganda mission on behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate. Copies of *The Truth About Religion in Russia*, a book published by the Moscow Patriarchate in English in 1944, were circulated in vast numbers to the Anglican Church and exchange visits were organised.[24] All of this boded ill for the Synodal Church, in the words of Daniela Kalkandjieva, 'After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the emigres lost control over the debate on Moscow's canonical jurisdiction and authority'.[25] As a result of the Moscow Patriarchate's propaganda drive following the 1945 victory, twenty-one Russian hierarchs and 285 parishes abroad were 'reunited' with the Motherland Church. Daniela Kalkandjieva goes as far as to write, 'The Soviet victory in the war called into question the future of the Karlovci-Synod'.[26]

The saviour of the Synodal Church proved to be the influx of virulently anti-Soviet refugees from Russia and Ukraine. In Bavaria alone there were, 'about twenty prelates, hundreds of priests and nearly a million laymen'.[27] From huge refugee camps, such as Fischbek near Hamburg, these people spread out to Britain, the USA and Australia, carrying with them the deep

[24] Kalkandjieva, D., *The Russian Orthodox Church 1917–1948: From Decline to Resurrection* (London, 2015), p.162ff.
[25] Ibid., p.3
[26] Ibid., p.241
[27] Ibid., p.241

hatred of communism and the Soviet State that was to become the hallmark of ROCOR in the world of the Cold War[28]. The Synodal Church was renamed as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR) and at the same time ROCOR's anti-Western rhetoric was softened, becoming pro-American as well as anti-communist.[29]

Moscow delegates to the World Council of Churches and other bodies consistently supported Soviet foreign policies and the so-called 'peace movement'. An attempt by the Moscow Patriarchate to extend this control into the diaspora parishes was less successful, however, with Lucian Leustean concluding, 'Moscow sought to dominate the Russian Diaspora; its delegation led by Metropolitan Nikolai went to London in June, to Paris in August, and the US in September 1945, failing however to bring these communities under its control. Soviet interest in employing the Church in its foreign policy was evident through the fact that the church Department of Foreign Affairs which was established in 1946 had the largest headcount of all the Patriarchate's departments'.[30] The paradoxical point was often made during the Sourozh crisis that the grip of the 'long arm of the Soviet (Russian) State' was weaker under the communists than it became after 1991. One priest noted that Sourozh was even further removed from Soviet Moscow's control than other diaspora parishes, due to its insular location.[31]

The church at Buckingham Palace Gate to which Father Anthony Bloom was sent in 1948 was at that time operating a rota system shared between the Synodal Church and the Moscow Patriarchate. As the Cold War deepened, this

[28] Cf. Tsypin, Prot. V., *Istoria russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi: sinodal'nyi i noveishii period (1700–2005)* (Moscow, 2012), p.772
[29] Tsypin, Prot. V., ibid., p.782
[30] Leustean, l., *Eastern Christianity and the Cold War* (London, 2011), p.3.
[31] Interview 1C.

situation became highly anomalous, but the unusual arrangement continued until 1956 when the church was forcibly requisitioned by the British state and demolished to make way for an extension to Victoria coach station. The ensuing debates are recorded in detail in the archives of Lambeth Palace and offer a fascinating insight into politico-religious allegiances in the post-war Russian diaspora and the important role of the Anglican Church in the negotiations. The documents attest to the role of the Anglican hierarchy in the transfer of the large and desirable church in Ennismore Gardens not to ROCOR, to whom it had originally been promised, but instead to the Moscow Patriarchate. A 21 Sept 1954 letter from one of the negotiators of the deal, Fr Waddham, states:

> One of the difficulties of the situation is that the church which would have suited their parish very well [Ennismore Gardens] has apparently been offered to the Anastasy group [ROCOR]. It will therefore look to the outside world as though the good church is being offered to the Anastasy group by the Church of England whereas the representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate in London are being banished to the City where no one lives. This may have rather unfortunate consequences especially since we are in good ecclesiastical relations with the Patriarchate of Moscow, and the Anastasy group have no ecclesiastical status which is recognisable as canonical. What has happened in fact is that the better church has been offered to the non-conformists while the official church is offered something very inferior.[32]

[32] Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325 / 1 (1948–56) Council of Foreign Relations. Article 19, Letter from Fr Waddham to Hodgins 21.09.54. The letter added, 'the arrangements at present proposal, if pressed might leave a very unfortunate taste in the mouths of these Russians and might have a deleterious effect on the relations of the CfE with the Russian Orthodox Church.'

The Anglicans decided to resolve the issue by offering the church at Ennismore Gardens to *both* jurisdictions with the proviso that they share the church on alternate Sundays. The offer failed to take into account the depth of mistrust that now existed between the two sides. A letter from the Synod to the Archbishop of Canterbury on 11 February 1956 stated, 'the difference between the two parties is much deeper now than it was before World War II'.[33] Metropolitan Anthony recalled, 'I remember I once asked him [the priest of ROCOR] personally, "What do you think of me?" He replied, "Since you are an honest man, I'll give you a straight answer. If I wanted to be polite, I would say, "You are not a priest." But I will give you a straight answer: "If you are under Moscow, *you are a priest of Satan!*"'[34]

After a spirited public debate, the ROCOR parish decided to give up any claim to the church at Ennismore Gardens and therefore was left without any church in which to worship. Metropolitan Nikodem, head of the ROCOR parish in London, wrote to the Anglican Church authorities, 'the fact remains that it is impossible to ask refugees who even in this country have been subject to a campaign of threats and intimidation by agents of the Soviet Government, to share a church which owes allegiance to the Patriarch of Moscow.'[35]

Conversely, those in Father Anthony Bloom's Moscow parish did not at all see themselves as 'KGB agents' but as expressing solidarity with the suffering Church in the Motherland. The Church Warden, Dr V. Korenchevsky, wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury, **'**We are in this jurisdiction not only for

[33] Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325 / 1 ibid.
[34] Glenny, M. and Stone, N., *The Other Russia* (London, 1990), p.189
[35] Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325. Letter from Nikodem to Hodgins, 29.03.56. Cf. also Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325. Letter from Nikodem to Hodgins, 01.03.56. This letter outlines the disappointment felt by ROCOR at being 'gazumped' by Anthony Bloom. 'You told me that the CfE has no desire to go into our differences, but unfortunately, in spite of this, they exist; perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that these differences are so important that they have divided, and may well devastate the whole world; so they cannot be brushed aside as trivialities.'

canonical reasons. The Patriarch's Church in the USSR represents the only resisting power to the anti-God Soviet government. This peaceful but unbreakable resistance to the Soviet government is a miracle'.[36] It was this stance that came to dominate the trajectory of the Sourozh Diocese as it developed under Metropolitan Anthony, who did not shrink in his criticisms of religious persecution in the USSR. His support of the dissident movement and his relationship with the anti-Soviet Keston College were also well-known. Because of this, Metropolitan Anthony became a hero within the Soviet Union to many in the Church, especially within the Orthodox dissident-intellectual movement. A commentator, writing at the time of the crisis, stated, 'It is not surprising that the few intellectuals who came to the Church under the conditions of the Soviet stagnation were grouped around Sourozh, as around their church ideal, and every visit of Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom) to Russia became a triumph of "Surozhskoy spirituality"'.[37]

As the Cold War progressed and the Moscow Patriarchate increasingly became (or was viewed by ROCOR as) a soft-power arm of the Soviet State abroad, the opposition of the hierarchy of ROCOR became ever more intransigent.[38] At the same time, the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) started to gradually lose its Russianness, due to enculturation and indigenous conversions. As a result, many ethnic Russians left for ROCOR, further adding to the jurisdiction's reputation as 'a Russian ghetto'.[39] To the charges of complicity with the Soviets (Sergianism), ROCOR added accusations of liberalism, modernism and especially ecumenism, reaching an apogee of

[36] Lambeth Palace Archives. Letter from Dr V. Korenchevsky (Church Warden of MP) to Archbishop of Canterbury), 29.06.56
[37] Maliutin, A., 'Surozh ostaetsia sobornym', 09.06.06. https://credo.press/67626/ [Accessed 03.03.20]
[38] Cf. Psarev, A., 'Looking Toward Unity: How the Russian Church Abroad Viewed the Patriarchate of Moscow, 1927–2007', *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 52: 1–4 (2007)
[39] Tsypin, Prot. V., ibid., p778

traditionalist and anti-communist opposition to Moscow under the leadership of Metropolitan Philaret Voznesensky (1964–85). Under his tenure ROCOR broke off relations with almost any Orthodox jurisdiction that recognised the Moscow Patriarchate.[40]

Over time, this policy led ROCOR into the canonical backwaters as almost all of World Orthodoxy was to come to friendly relations with Moscow. By the time of Metropolitan Philaret's death and Mikhail Gorbachev's election as General Secretary of the Communist Party, ROCOR was dangerously isolated.[41] This aspect of the 2007 reunion between Moscow and ROCOR is often overlooked; as the historian Fr Mitrofanov put it, the union was not only with the Moscow Patriarchate but 'with the whole Orthodox world'.[42] By 2007, ROCOR retained amicable links with only the Jerusalem Patriarchate, the Sinai Monastery and a fragile link with the Serbian Church. It was in this environment that Metropolitan Philaret penned his three famous 'Sorrowful Epistles' in condemnation of Moscow ('Sergianism'), Ecumenism and liberalising trends.[43] To some in ROCOR, the joining to 'world Orthodoxy' was not an attractive prospect. It meant not only joining with Metropolitan

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[40] Cf. Balashov, Fr N., 'Five Years of the Reunified Russian Church', 17.05.12. 'In the past there had been years when it seemed impossible to imagine that we would ever be fully reconciled with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, such was the level of polemics, mutual accusations, and intolerance.' http://www.pravmir.com/five-years-of-the-reunified-russian-church-reflections-of-fr-nikolai-balashov/ [Accessed 03.03.20]. Cf, also Interview 1F

[41] Cf. Kallistos., Metropolitan., Interview, 28.07.10: 'I saw that the Russian Church in Exile was becoming increasingly cut off from worldwide Orthodoxy, and that troubled me.' https://journeytoorthodoxy.com/2010/07/strange-yet-familiar-my-journey-part-3/ [Accessed 27.03.20]

[42] Cf. Mitrofanov, Prot. G., *Tragedia Rossii: zapretnye temy istorii xx veka* (SP, 2009)

[43] It would be an interesting thesis to trace the change in language that ROCOR and the émigré church in general used in relation to the Motherland. Less and less was the focus on 'Sergianism', and more and more on liberalising tendencies and theological errors in the Orthodox World in general, which were perceived to have 'infected' the Moscow Patriarchate. As we shall see, this became important because of the developments in the Sourozh Diocese under Metropolitan Anthony and for ROCOR's relationship with that diocese after the 2007 union.

Anthony's Sourozh, but in the words of one priest, the problem was that 'joining with Moscow meant joining the whole caboodle.'[44]

ROCOR and Moscow: uniting the two Russias

A particular event remained at the epicentre of the post-1991 drive for continuity with Russia's past and consolidation of the Russian World – and that was the reunification of the two estranged parts of the Russian Church. In Chapters 5 and 6 we analyse the reasons for this imperative, but as the ROCOR–Moscow union is such an important feature of the backdrop to the Sourozh crisis, it is necessary to explore the event in some detail here.

There can be no doubt that the union was as deeply important to the Russian regime as to the Church.[45] To secular western academics, the event might appear as a footnote in post-Soviet history, yet it was marked with huge coverage in the national media. During an interview at the time on Russian TV, the then Father Tikhon Shevkunov noted:

> And of course it is a great social event: the consolidation of the people, the consolidation of the country. The very possibility that we in the present (probably not the best years for Russia), can not only ruin and divide but also unite and create our country, including our people scattered about the globe – this is undoubtedly not only a religious but a social and public event.'[46]

[44] Interview 2G
[45] Cf. Shumilo, V., 'Putin uskoryayet tempy po prisoyedineniyu RPTSZ 'MP' *Tserkovnykh Vedomostei*, 23 (2005)
[46]Narochnitskaia, N., 'Ob'edineniye tserkvei — ob"yedinenie naroda' (author trans.). Interview reprinted in Narochnitskaia, N., *Russkii Mir*., (SP, 2007)

His co-panellist, the neo-Slavophile Russian diplomat Natalia Narochnitskaia, added, 'the reunification of the nation in such a "hypostasis of the spirit" [ипостаси духа] is the most important thing and can, perhaps, help the consolidation of the national community around the State. It means the strengthening of the State.'[47] Negotiations between ROCOR and Moscow were unfolding at the same time as the Sourozh crisis and in the same interview, Fr Tikhon claimed that Bishop Basil's announcement of his departure to Constantinople was deliberately timed to disrupt these negotiations.[48] Both sides claimed that the Sourozh crisis was actually a 'sub-plot' of the greater relationship between Moscow and the Russian diaspora (ROCOR).

The union of ROCOR with the Moscow Patriarchate is a truly vast topic and one that is still awaiting a thorough and dispassionate analysis. More than any other event, the Act of Canonical Union was seen by the Putin regime as the means by which the trauma of the Revolution would be healed – the 'two Russias' would finally be reunited and for the State, above all, continuity with the pre-revolutionary past would be affirmed. At least, such was the hope. But how could the two Russias, which had gone to war with each other on two occasions in a most bitter brother-against-brother struggle, ever be united? For the state, with its secular agenda, the unification of the Church jurisdictions provided a key to the re-establishment of the national consciousness, but in order to achieve this, the huge barrier erected through seventy years of enmity would have to be dismantled and for many in the Russian Church Abroad this was a step too far.

[47]Ibid, p.78 (author trans.). Similarly, Patriarch Kirill spoke how in 2007, 'Everyone felt a great upsurge, a hope for the unity of the Russian World', *Tserkov i Vremia*, No. 4 (49) (2009)
[48] Ibid. Narochnitskaia. Cf. Interview 1C

The paradoxes thrown by the union into daily life of the diaspora can be illustrated with just one example out of thousands. In 2015, an issue of *Vestnik,* the church magazine of the German ROCOR diocese, marked seventy years since the Soviet victory.[49] On the cover was a picture of the memorial service at Linz to mark the anniversary of the massacre of Cossacks, who were handed over to the Soviets at the end of the war in one of the darker pages of British history.[50] The Cossacks had fought on the Axis side in a misguided effort to liberate their homeland from the atheistic state that they abhorred. Like the annual service in New York to commemorate General Vlasov and his Russian Liberation Army, this occasion could be described as a traditional ROCOR event, attended by monarchists, Cossacks and émigré and local Bavarian nobility and veterans. Inside the magazine was an article on the Cossack memorial service. A few pages further on was another article about a different memorial event, this one marking the seventieth anniversary of the *Soviet* victory in the World War II. The latter event was similarly marked by a procession and a speech by Archbishop Mark.

During World War II, the Synodal Church (ROCOR), then based in Serbia, proclaimed support for Hitler's invasion of 22 June 1941. In Soviet Russia, Archbishop (soon to become Patriarch) Sergei was one of the first public figures to issue a call to arms to repel the invader from the Motherland, doing so on the very day of the invasion, whereas Stalin, reeling from Hitler's betrayal of the Nazi-Soviet pact, would take several weeks to issue his proclamation. The two sides of the Russian Church were then in a real sense at

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[49] *Vestnik Germanskoi eparkhii Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi za granitsei*, 03.15

[50] The tragedy was described in detail in Count Tolstoy's *The Victims of Yalta* (London, 1977), which led to a famous libel case between Lord Aldington and Count Tolstoy. The trial itself was the subject of a book by David Mitchell, *The Cost of a Reputation: Aldington Versus Tolstoy: The Causes, Course and Consequences of the Notorious Libel* (London, 1997).

war with one another. Thus, the reunion of ROCOR and Moscow was for some a highly controversial occasion, accompanied as much by despair in those who rejected it as by triumph in those who supported it. The ex-KGB officer and anti-Moscow historian Konstantin Preobrazhensky wrote that the union signified nothing less than 'the export of Putin's "vertical power" beyond the borders of Russia, spreading it to the Russian Diaspora.'[51] He added that Putin would thus receive, 'bastions of Russian political influence in all the main cities of the world' and that such churches would become recruiting grounds for the FSB abroad.[52] The motivation of the regime in seeking to reunite the two Russias differs widely depending upon one's convictions. For Vladimir Ilyin, writing in the anti-Moscow ROCOR journal *Vernost'*, the reburial of the White general Denikin in Moscow, the desired union of the Church and 'the surge of interest in the Russian Diaspora' simply confirmed 'the fact that the present government is desperately searching for legitimacy'.[53] For Vladimir Ilyin, the greatest attempt to found a united Russia came with the sixtieth anniversary celebrations of Victory Day, and he pointed out that this could only be a victory for those who considered the Soviet State to be their Fatherland, noting that Denikin and Ivan Ilyin had been reburied while Stalin and Lenin remain in Red Square.

In 2006, Fr Grigoriev, a professor at the ROCOR Jordanville monastery, levelled an attack on the union that ended with the following words:

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[51] Preobrazhenskii, K., *KGB v russkoi emigratsii*, op. cit. (author trans.). Cf. Shramko, A., 'Russkie idut' *Russkii Zhurnal* (2007). Preobrazhenskii makes claims for the 'reclamation' of diaspora parishes such as Sourozh, 'The very existence in other countries of a certain circle of people who are in some sense "devoted" and interested in being connected to the motherland opens up considerable possibilities to influence these countries and counteract them. It is understood that the new field of Russian Statehood is being constructed no longer based on the communist international, but *that the sole suitable means for the formation of foreign agents is Orthodoxy connected with Russian tradition.*' (author trans and emphasis.)

[52] Preobrazhenskii, K., *KGB v russkoi emigratsii*, op. cit. (author trans.)

[53] Cf. Vladimir Ilyin in *Vernost'*, No. 20 (2005) (author trans.). The reburial of Denikin is discussed in Chapter 5.

> That is why now, more than ever, they need to acquire the ROCOR by hook or by crook, not only to silence 'the witness that got away' but to reinforce the illusion of direct and legitimate historical continuity of the modern day 'Russian Federation' with traditional pre-revolutionary Russia that ROCOR represents to them. This new self-image and vision of the Soviet government has naturally been extended to its Moscow Patriarchate department. Once the Patriarchate acquires the ROCOR, all questions of its legitimacy as the Russian Orthodox Church and the heir to Patriarch Tikhon will finally be put to rest.[54]

The writer Dimitri Gontscharov compared this 'whitewash of history' to the Soviet cleansing of history,[55] while another commentator, writing again in *Vernost'*, stated, 'We also cannot see unification with a church in a state which still keeps the emblems, signs, names, customs, melodies, statues, legal norms, etc., of the accursed communist past. These manifestations … are openly allowed and accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate.'[56]

The 1990s were characterised by a polarised war of words between ROCOR and Moscow, a time when the Moscow Patriarchate started its policy (if it can be described as such) of seeking to reclaim all property abroad that had previously belonged to the Tsarist state. Two of the most notorious cases occurred in Palestine, often a focal point of inter-jurisdictional strife, in which ROCOR nuns barricaded themselves inside their monastery. As Moscow grew

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[54] Grigoriev, Fr. N., 'ROCA/MP History', 25.10.2006, http://rocorhistory.blogspot.co.uk/2009/03/rocamp-history-by-fr-nikita-grigoriev.html [Accessed 27.03.20]

[55] Gontsharov, D., *Vernost'*, No. 16 (2005). The situation was extremely polarised, and this in itself became problematic. For Archpriest Nicholas Dalinkiewicz, who wrote a thoughtful rejoinder to Fr Grigoriev, it was too easy to portray the historical situation as black and white and he saw that as a temptation to be avoided. Dalinkiewicz, Archpriest N., *Response to: Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, The Beacon of Light (Revised) by Fr Nikita Grigoriev*, 10.01.07, available at saintjonah.org http://www.saintjonah.org/articles/beacon_response.htm [Accessed 27.03.20]

[56] *Vernost',* No. 14 (2005)

in status as *the* Russian Church, both at home and in the diaspora, ROCOR was sinking into marginalisation for the second time. But the disputes between ROCOR and Moscow in the diaspora were small compared to those that occurred as a result of ROCOR's opening of a 'parallel Church' on Russian soil.[57] In 1990, the Free Russian Orthodox Church was founded with the following announcement from ROCOR's Synod, 'The free Russian Orthodox parishes have opened due to the absolutely paralyzed, unrepentant state of the hierarchy and clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate, who have fallen away from pure Orthodoxy through the acceptance of the declaration by Metropolitan Sergius (who usurped the power of the Church in Russia) in 1927 of loyalty to the militantly atheistic communist Soviet power."[58] An exploration of the schisms that occurred within Russia and in the diaspora on the road to the 2007 union are beyond the remit of this study. But the significance of that event and its relation to the Diocese of Sourozh were of prime importance[59]

Similar fears and motivations were at work in Sourozh in 2006, and of particular importance was the perceived role of the Russian state, especially as one of the key accusations against Moscow had always been of Sergianism. Broadly, the accusations made by ROCOR anti-unionists against Moscow fell into three categories: Sergianism and overly close Church–State [Erastian] relations; ecumenism and modernist, liberal practices; and of the canonisation

[57] Statement of the ROCOR Synod, 03.2000: 'We did not try to actively open parishes and foist ourselves on them from abroad, but merely "accepted" those Russian people who learned more about the history of the Church and its life and yearned for ecclesiastical communion with us.'

[58] 'Polozhenie o prikhodakh Svobodnoi Rossiyskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, priniatoye Arkhiereiskim Soborom Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi Zagranitsei 15 maia 1990 goda', *Pravoslavnaia Rus'.* 1990, No. 12, pp.1-2.

[59] An important schism appeared at the turn of the millennium when the aged and frail ROCOR primate Metropolitan Vitaly declared that the Moscow Patriarchate was 'a pseudo-patriarchate with a pseudo-patriarch at its head …The Moscow Patriarchate has lost Apostolic Succession, which is to say, it has lost the Grace of Christ. We have not the slightest intention of taking part in a Bishops' council, or Sobor, jointly with the Moscow Patriarchate.' Metropolitan Vitaly, 'Letter to a Priest', *Vertograd-Inform*, No. 1 (November 1998), p.17 (English edition)

of the New Martyrs – in particular the Royal Martys and the Josephite martyrs.[60]

Of these three areas, the one where Moscow's policy had most visibly altered was regarding the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia, especially the Royal Martyrs. The Moscow Patriarchate started the slow process of the canonisation of the New Martyrs in 1992 and even eventually included several of those bishops and clergy who had been repressed by the 'Sergian' Church.[61] To the wary in ROCOR, this was a cynical exploitation of Russian nationalism, and it was also the easiest of ROCOR's three accusations to counter.

ROCOR's accusation of ecumenism and liberalism was directed not only at Moscow, but more widely at World Orthodoxy, the Patriarchate of Constantinople being far more liberal in attitude than Moscow.[62] During the 1990s, a repositioning of Moscow with regard to the liberal-ecumenical currents within Orthodoxy meant that many of ROCOR's denunciations started to ring hollow. In 1970s and 1980s, many dissident Orthodox intellectuals had expressed liberal and ecumenical tendencies, much as had their counterparts at the turn of the century, but this was always going to be, by its very nature, a fringe movement based mostly in the intelligentsia of Moscow and St Petersburg. As Russia started again to turn away from the West, so too did the Church and a new conservatism, critical of the World Council of Churches and reform, spread through the rank and file of the Church. By the end of the

[60] Josephites became a generic term for all those who resisted Metropolitan Sergius in the Soviet Union. Initially large in number, they were heavily repressed and persecuted to extinction. Cf. Shkarovsky, M., 'The Russian Orthodox Church versus the State: The Josephite Movement, 1927–1940', *Slavic Review* (Boston), Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp.365–84

[61] Kostriukov, A.A., *Lektsii po istorii Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–2008* (Moscow, 2018), p.340. Cf. also Interview 2G. Some in ROCOR actually criticised the speed with which the canonisations took place.

[62] Interview 2G

1990s, the Moscow Patriarchate was one of the most conservative jurisdictions within World Orthodoxy, bar ROCOR itself.

It was the accusation of Sergianism that Moscow found (and finds) most difficult to counter, partly because a total rejection of the 'Sergian compromise' would mean attacking the very foundation on which the current Moscow Patriarchate is based. Militants within ROCOR wanted the incumbent Patriarchate itself abolished as a fake creation of Stalin and several collaborationist bishops. Instead, they argued, there should be a general Church Sobor which would be tasked with the election of a new patriarch, untainted by KGB affiliation. For these hardliners in ROCOR, nothing less than a complete rupture with the past of the Soviet Church would do, and it became obvious that a schism in ROCOR was inevitable.

When the union was finally concluded in 2007, two small but historically important communities in the UK left ROCOR, and with it World (Canonical) Orthodoxy. These were the Convent of the Annunciation in Willesden and the monastery of St Edmund the Martyr in Brookwood, Surrey.[63] A paradox of the two schisms that occurred in quick succession (in 2006 and 2007) in the Moscow and then ROCOR parishes in Britain was that often the same accusations were levelled, but for very different reasons. For example, ROCOR priests sometimes quoted dissidents with contacts in Keston College, such as Fr Gleb Yakunin, who they considered to represent the opposite, liberal end of the Church. For the Sourozh-based anti-Moscow group, Moscow – with its public stand against LGBT – was to the right of World Orthodoxy; and yet for the anti-unionists in ROCOR, Moscow was steeped in ecumenism and liberalism. Both sides were united in their dislike of the Putin regime, but again

[63] Cf. Interview 2G

for different reasons. The position of the anti-unionists in ROCOR was clear: the Putin regime was simply the successor to the communist regime and its new conversion to the Church was a politically convenient façade. The archpriest Mikhail Ardov, writing in the conservative ROCOR journal *Nasha Strana*, criticised the presence of Putin on the ambon at the concelebration between the two primates. In his view, a layman – even the Tsar – would never normally have assumed such a position and he wrote, 'The presence of Putin was glaring proof that the Lubyanka had finally defeated the last bastion of Orthodoxy – ROCOR.'[64] Meanwhile, the anti-Moscow liberals abhorred Putin's conservatism and heavy critique of Western liberal values.

Fig 1.[65]

The role of Putin was extremely important to the anti-Moscow faction in ROCOR, who viewed the whole unification process as a project driven by the KGB, or rather, its successor the FSB. Similar accusations were levelled or implied during the Sourozh crisis by Moscow's critics both within and without the Church. Even those who accepted that the KGB may have changed in terms

[64] Ardov, M., 'Putin na podpisanii akta: znak torzhestva Lub'ianki', *Nasha Strana*, No. 2822 (June 2007) (author trans.)

[65] Fig 1.The Reunion of ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_Alexey_and_Laurus.jpg. Attribution: Kremlin.ru [Accessed 16.05.20]

of its ideology (from communism to Russian nationalism) still regarded the organisation as essentially anti-Church. The monthly *The Shepherd* magazine, published by the Brookwood monastery, carried many articles critical of Putin whom they saw as 'one of the prime movers in the whole process'.[66] ROCOR, in their opinion, was being wooed by 'a misguided Russian nationalism' which 'seemed to have played such a major part in the whole process'.[67] The liberal press within Russia also noted the importance that Putin placed on the union, becoming ever more personally involved in driving it forward.[68] It noted the many meetings that Putin held in the USA with ROCOR hierarchs and stated that these, 'showed that Vladimir Putin was in fact the initiator of the process in 2003 and continues to control it. In stimulating the Church authorities to search for a compromise, Putin is literally being reborn in the eyes of Orthodox émigrés in the West as the image of the Gosudar – Protector of Orthodoxy'.[69] A ROCOR priest-monk who later left ROCOR stated in interview that it was, 'quite incredible how much time and energy he did spend on it [the Union], he must have been quite worried about the witness of ROCOR.'[70]

It was the issue of Russian patriotism, which Putin had captured so well, that the anti-unionists found so difficult to counter. In August 2000, the Moscow Patriarchate finally canonised the Royal Martyrs along with hundreds of other victims of the Bolsheviks. Icons of the Royal Martyrs started immediately to appear across Russia and Ukraine in a new outburst of Slavic nationalism – and the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate abroad were no exception. The devotion to the murdered Tsar and his family had once been one of the defining differences between ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate

[66] *The Shepherd*, July 2007
[67] Ibid.
[68] *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 'ob'edinitel' russkogo pravoslavia', 16.09.05 (author trans.)
[69] Ibid.
[70] Interview 2G

parishes, but that difference had disappeared almost overnight. For all the messiness of its history, for all its compromises and failures, the Moscow Patriarchate could claim at least to have lived and suffered with the Russian people under the communist yoke. It was hard for ROCOR to counter this. How could small, émigré ROCOR claim to be 'more Russian' than the vast and reviving Moscow Patriarchate Church within Russia itself? The explosion of Church building and renovation occurring in Russia was on an epic and seemingly miraculous scale. For tiny ROCOR to dismiss all this seemed mistaken to many, and in the end the purist position of the anti-unionists started to look increasingly like navel-gazing.

What did the union and the build-up to it mean for Sourozh? Of course, it meant that the two jurisdictions could now concelebrate and work together more constructively. But relations between the two jurisdictions had not always been easy, as was displayed by ROCOR's refusal to share the church at Ennismore gardens in the 1950s. For some in ROCOR, Sourozh was still viewed with suspicion.[71] The worldview expressed in Metropolitan Philaret's *Sorrowful Epistles* was diametrically opposed to the ethos developed under Metropolitan Anthony in London at the same time. How could the two dioceses come together, even after the fall of communism? An open letter from Archimandrite Alexis in the Brookwood monastery near London expressed concern not so much with the Moscow Patriarchate as with *Sourozh.* It is an important document that is worth quoting at length:

> There are a number of points which perhaps pertain only to the situation in Britain. Joining with Moscow, with or without autonomy, *would put us in full communion with the Sourozh Diocese*, which in many ways is

[71] Interview 2G, 'There is still animosity between Sourozh and ROCOR in the UK, but it doesn't seem to be based on anything theological'

> completely different from other eparchies of the Patriarchate. It is to all intents and purposes the creation of the late Metropolitan Antony Bloom and thus reflects many of his eccentricities. Its character is essentially *Evlogian* rather than Muscovite; there is a strong anti-monastic bias among the majority of its clergy and people; feminism in various shades is prominent among its intellectuals and Met. Antony even came close to endorsing the acceptance of women priests … and in general it reflects the most 'liberal' trends within 'Orthodoxy' … *even if all other things were equal as regards the Patriarchate as a whole, one would not want to be in full communion with Sourozh.* Visiting clergy from Russia (MP) have often told us that they see it as something like the 'Living Church.[72]

In the end, the story of the 2007 union appears to be one of small groups attempting to hold back the wheel of history. The statement made by Archbishop Mark of Berlin (ROCOR) in 2004 is important in showing how those in the diaspora had misunderstood the reality of the situation in Russia:

> The Russian people has made its choice. It has recognized the present Russian Orthodox Church in Russia (Moscow Patriarchate) and its hierarchy. We must take account of this in spite of possible objections from members of the Church Abroad. At the beginning of the 1990s we still could not see the processes that were happening in Russia as the people there saw them. Life in Russia went by a different path from how the émigrés presented it …[73]

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[72] Letter of Archimandrite Alexis to Metropolitan Laurus and all faithful children of ROCOR, December 2003. http://rocorrefugees.blogspot.co.uk/2010_03_01_archive.html [Accessed 16.05.20]

[73] Archbishop Mark interview, 26.01.04. Author trans. http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/Novosti-2003/vlmark_2004.html [Accessed 16.05.20]

These words of Archbishop Mark were foreshadowed in an open letter written by Solzhenitsyn to ROCOR in 1974. He wrote, 'The supplanting of the real Russian nation with an image of a catacomb church is not what we need today. We must not do as I have noticed in some of your publications: we must neither ignore, nor avoid through closed-mindedness the resurgent and strengthening Orthodoxy in our country. Our task today is much more complicated, more complex, but also more joyous than mere solidarity with come secret, sinless – but also bodiless – catacomb church"[74]. The ROCOR leadership of the late eighties and early nineties had believed that as soon as communism was overthrown, the Russian people would reject the compromised Moscow Patriarchate and flock to their jurisdiction, which had preserved its 'crystalline purity'.[75] In hindsight, this looks like an error of judgement not dissimilar to that made by other dissidents and émigrés. Likewise, Solzhenitsyn had enthusiastically expected Russians to reject Western capitalism as well as communism and return to Russia's core spiritual values (Orthodoxy, simplicity, the commune, and so on). They had both become trapped in a romanticised view of the country they so loved, and as a result had drifted out of touch with the day-to-day hopes and fears of the Russian people.

[74] Solzhenitsyn, A., Open Letter to the Third Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad 1974, ROCOR Studies Archive. https://www.rocorstudies.org/2012/12/12/letter-to-the-third-council-of-the-russian-orthodox-church-abroad/ .To counter this, cf. Nun Tatiana, 'Bestelesny li bezgreshnye katakomby: zapadnye publikatsii o pravoslavnom podpol'e v SSSR', Lesna Convent Archive https://www.monasterelesna.org/dokumenty-i-stati/katakomb-cerkov/katakomby/ [Accessed 16.05.20]
[75] Tsypin, Prot. V., op. cit., p.785ff.

The Question of Property

Sourozh was just one diaspora diocese of the Church that had experienced arguments over property after the Revolution. The anti-Moscow parishioners pointed to many examples in which Moscow had sought to 'reclaim' foreign parishes at the expense of local wishes. As this was a key accusation from anti-Moscow groups, it is necessary to understand its genesis in more detail. The question of Church property, and its restitution and rightful ownership, has been a painful and complex one both within Russia and abroad. In Russia, the various post-communist regimes have facilitated the handing back of churches as well as, more controversially, land and non-church urban properties.[76] In most cases, in Russia and abroad, it is the Russian State that facilitates ownership of property by handing it over to the Church for lifelong use for free. However, because the most recent (2007) law ('On Transferring the Property in Federal Ownership to the Church Institutions', a development of laws of 2002 and 1990) leaves much decision making at the federal level, this can mean there is in practice a great discrepancy in outcomes.[77] In addition, the State can (and by law should) hand over land use for free for the construction of new churches.

This legal situation has created problems between the Church and the civil and secular authorities in Russia, the most recent notable case being the demolition involved in the construction of the huge church of the new martyrs in the grounds of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow. Such matters became a continual source of tension in Russia (and have even been the subject of films

[76] Köllner, T., 'On the Restitution of Property and the Making of "Authentic" Landscapes in Contemporary Russia', *Europe Asia Studies* (June 2018)
[77] Cf. multiple authors, International Conference on Research Paradigms Transformation in Social Sciences Property and Land Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church and State in Russia, Conference Paper (2018) Available at https://www.futureacademy.org.uk/

and books) because, since regaining its freedom, the Church has been involved in a massive building and restoration programme. Since 1989, the number of churches has quadrupled from 9,700 to almost 40,000 – a quite staggering increase. The Church has been criticised even from within for pouring vast sums into ever more grandiose constructions at the expense of social projects.[78] Such debates are not new: similar criticisms were made in the late nineteenth century, when the Church was involved in an even bigger expansion.[79] For the purposes of this study, it is significant only to note that the property battles in the far abroad were not exclusive to the diaspora, but represented a core imperative of the Russian Church as she attempted to regain property believed to be rightfully hers and to expand her presence on the Russian landscape and beyond.

Unlike most Orthodox churches, the ROC has a large number of parishes beyond the borders of the current Russian Federation, particularly in Ukraine. Even today, perhaps as much as half of its property is located abroad. This is of course a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire and its successor the Soviet Union, and it is also a result of the huge waves of emigration across the globe. All of this makes the cross-border property concerns of the Church paramount.[80]

Leaving aside the question of Church property in the near abroad, which is beyond the remit of this study, in general the history of Russian property in the diaspora was complicated from 1917 by the sudden collapse of the Provisional Government, the ceasefire, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the subsequent German defeat in the war. The German government recognised

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[78] Burgess, J.P., *Holy Rus: The Rebirth of Orthodoxy in the New Russia* (Yale, 2017), pp.187–9
[79] Shevzov, V., op.cit., p.70
[80] Sidorov, D., 'Playing Chess with Churches: Russian Orthodoxy as Re(li)gion', *Historical Geography*, Vol. 28 (2000), p.229

the Soviet government *de facto* in the armistice of December 1917 and soon after *de jure* in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Great Britain declared her recognition *de facto* in the Anglo-Russian trade agreement of 16 March 1921; Italy did so in a commercial treaty of 7 February 1924. The United States recognised the USSR *de jure* only in 1933. In Britain, the 1923 general election produced a hung parliament followed by the formation of the UK's first Labour (minority) government, led by Ramsay MacDonald. He granted Moscow formal diplomatic recognition almost immediately upon coming to office on 1 February 1924.[81] The 'year of recognitions',[82] 1924, was a huge blow to the White cause in the diaspora.[83] In practical terms, it meant that the White opposition had to vacate property, such as embassies, and hand it over to the new Soviet owners. This created great unease for the émigrés who retained their Tsarist-era churches. It was the threat of expropriation by the Soviets that, among other reasons, had moved the London congregation in forming a proper parish (using the Parish statutes adopted by the Council of 1917-18) in 1919 - although the funds came from the Omsk government of Gen. Kolchak up to its collapse.[84] In Paris, by contrast, the pre-revolutionary embassy church was viewed by the Soviets as part of state property abroad, and as a result they laid claim to it. Fortunately for the émigrés they were able to keep hold of it after judicial proceedings, but the Russophile author Stephen Graham described how a 24-hour watch was necessary to prevent Soviet agents from storming the building.[85]

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[81] Wilson, G.G., 'British Recognition de Facto and de Jure of the U.S.S.R', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan 1934), pp.99–101
[82] Carr, E.H., *Interregnum*, (London, 1954), pp.243–53
[83] Kudriakova, E.B., *Rossiskaia Emigratsiia v Velikobritanii v Period mezhdu Dvumia Voinami* (Moscow, 1995) pp.12–13
[84] Interview 2Ea
[85] Graham, S., *Russia in Division* (London, 1925), pp.14–15, cf. also Ross, N., *Saint-Alexandre-Nevski: Centre spirituel de l'emigration russe 1918–1939* (Paris, 2005), p.217ff.

In London, the Labour government instituted legal proceedings against the White Russian chargé d'affairs E.V. Sablin, demanding that Chesham House, the Russian embassy building, be handed over to the Soviets.[86] The period from the Bolshevik coup to diplomatic recognition of the Soviets had been one of uncertainty in the British Russian diaspora, with the government oscillating between dealing with Litvinov (the Bolshevik representative, the so-called 'people's plenipotentiary'), and with Sablin. As recognitions came through, the Bolsheviks tried to take over the assets of the Whites, in London as in all other diaspora communities. This is important because in the long view of diaspora–Motherland relations, the Bolshevik seizures of the 1920s are seen by some as no different to those of more recent times.

But where did this leave Russian Church property abroad? The answer is not straightforward, for two reasons. Firstly, although in 1924 no part of the Russian Church in the diaspora had formally split with Moscow, it soon would (1927). Secondly, pre-Revolutionary property ownership was itself complex, with some real estate owned directly by the State, some by the Church and some privately owned. The cathedral in Paris again provides a useful example. The Tsar had given 200,000 francs for its construction, the Holy Synod 200,000 francs, and 600,000 francs were collected popularly. In this case, the émigrés later claimed that none of these donations had been 'state money'; the reality, however, was that even at the time of Alexander III, when the church was built, the Tsar's private finances and the state budget were closely intertwined.[87]

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[86] Zakharov, Vasilii, *No Snow on Their Boots: The First Russian Emigration to Britain* (London, 2004), p.133ff.
[87] Graham, S., *Russia in Division* (London, 1925), p.216

These factors came to prominence once again as the Moscow Patriarchate sought to 'reclaim' its property in the far abroad post-1991. In most cases, this involved legal disputes with either ROCOR or the Evlogian Exarchate parishes under Constantinople, or a mixture of these, as well as battles with the local secular powers. In the British case, there was no Tsarist-era church in continued ownership and use by any party, so a property dispute with ROCOR could be avoided. In addition, the capital had two cathedrals: one for the Church Abroad (in Chiswick) and one for Moscow (in Knightsbridge), which Moscow fought to retain and won, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In a sense, this was the second occasion in which Moscow had fought for the use of the Ennismore Gardens church (and won), the first being the previously described post-war wrangling with the Church of England.

The property reclamations were used by the anti-Moscow group as examples to illustrate a *policy* (if such existed) of Russian state revanchism, in which Moscow infiltrated local parishes and agitated for union with her. Property concerns were thus linked to accusations of Russian nationalist geopolitics, as Sebastian Rimestad noted, 'All these projects make the Patriarchate of Moscow appear intent on achieving dominance in the capitals of Western Europe. The intimate link between Russian ethnicity and the Orthodox faith also seems to confirm the fear that Moscow influence means Russification.'[88] The argument, put forward by academics such as Struve and Blitt, is that property reclamation is part of the Moscow Patriarchate's deliberate worldwide policy to increase her global presence while at the same time diminishing the relevance of rival jurisdictions.[89]

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[88] Rimestad, S., 'The Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe: One or Many?', *Religion, State and Society*, 43:3 (October, 2015), pp.228–243

[89] Cf. Blitt, 'Russia's Orthodox Foreign Policy..'op.cit, pp.415ff

Each property battle represents a unique case, of course, but overall Moscow's great investment of time, effort, and money in fighting these is without doubt. In very many instances, Moscow came out the winner (as in Sourozh), but where that was not possible, a new – and even grander – church was sometimes constructed in the same city, to the chagrin of their opponents. In Paris, the beautiful Tsarist-era cathedral on the Rue Daru had been under the Exarchate since the 1930s, while Moscow for many years worshipped in a small suburban church. Moscow never tried to claim ownership of the cathedral, but instead built a new and massive complex not far from the Eifel Tower. There seems to have been particular animosity in Paris because of the importance of the city in the history of the diaspora. In 2011, as plans for the new cathedral were being unveiled, the academic Nikitra Struve attacked Moscow's plans in an interview in the Russian press, stating; 'The state funded a new cathedral in Paris … and the state coveted the cathedral in Nice. In pre-revolutionary Russia, the Church could only dream of freeing the Synod from state control. However, in exile, particularly here in France, it was beyond the reach of any state control'.[90] He went on to accuse the Moscow Patriarchate of Erastianism and the now familiar accusation of having 'a Soviet mentality'. Patriarch Kirill made overtures to the Parisian Exarchate, but they were not reciprocated and instead, the doors of the Rue Daru cathedral were closed to him.

There were long-lasting property wrangles between the Exarchate and Moscow in the south and west of France. The dispute in Nice had started in a similar way to that in Sourozh, although with the parties in opposing roles as the church at the time was not under the jurisdiction of Moscow. As in

[90] Struve, N., '"Khristianstvo - ne vlast" RPTs beret Parizh. Chto dumavut ob etom nastuplenii russkikh emigrantov? Beseda Ol'gi Allenovoi', *Ogonok*, No 29 (25.07.11) p. 13

Sourozh, demographic changes in the parish after 1991 meant that recent émigrés came to outnumber the descendants of the old White aristocracy. Many of the new arrivals desired full reunion with the Church in Russia, although this was disputed by existing Exarchate clergy who claimed that 'flying pickets' of 'new Russians' from neighbouring regions, even Spain, had been brought in to 'pack the parish council' during voting.[91] Similarly again to Sourozh, a key parish council member claimed that the 'takeover' was 'part of a broader effort to consolidate the authority and legitimacy of the present Russian state, an effort close to the heart of President Vladimir V. Putin'.[92] The Patriarchate of Constantinople also issued a statement saying that Russia, 'was trying to open yet another Embassy [ie the church takeover] in France'.[93] When the French courts finally decided in favour of Moscow in 2011, there was a further wrangle about handing over the keys.[94] The matter was not finally settled until 2013, when the order was enforced by the French Court of Appeal.

The Nice church had previously been the property of the Tsarist state, making the decision relatively straightforward. In Biarritz the case was less clear, owing to disputed pre-revolutionary ownership. It is interesting that Moscow seemed in public statements to lay claim to the church as the rightful owner, arguing, 'For it should not be forgotten that the Russian church in Biarritz was torn away from the Moscow Patriarchate *only temporarily*, when, following in the steps of Metropolitan Evlogy, it stopped its subordination to

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[91] Tagliabue, J., A Cathedral Resists the Label 'Property of Russia', *New York Times*, (09.01.08)
[92] Ibid.
[93] Interfax-religion.ru, 'Konstantinopol'skii patriarkhat obviniaet rossiyskie vlasti i biznes v popytke zakhvata khrama v Nitstse', 15.02.06, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=9547 [Accessed 31.10.18]
[94] Pravmir.ru, 'Mitropolit Ilarion: vopros o peredache khrama v Nitstse nuzhno reshat' s pomoshch'iu peregovorov', 09.09.11, https://www.pravmir.ru/mitropolit-ilarion-vopros-o-peredache-xrama-v-nicce-nuzhno-reshat-s-pomoshhyu-peregovorov/ [Accessed 31.10.18]

the Russian Church in 1931'.[95] Had this argument prevailed in court, it would have called into question *all* the property rights of the Parisian Exarchate. The French courts eventually overturned a decision to move the church to Moscow and the church was handed back to the Exarchate. Supporters of Moscow then founded their own parish in the town under the omophorion of Moscow's European Diocese of Korsun. The Exarchate complained about this venture but there was essentially nothing they could do to stop it.[96]

The Exarchate was not alone in coming into conflict with Moscow over properties in the far aboard. ROCOR was also in possession of many pre-revolutionary churches and other properties, and the period leading up to the 2007 union saw several disputes, with the deepest crises taking place in Palestine. The battles between Moscow and ROCOR in Palestine are interesting because many of the claims made mirrored those of the Sourozh crisis. There were two flashpoints: in 1997 at the convent in Hebron and in 2000 at the Metochion of St John the Baptist in Jericho. Several embarrassing incidents were used as justifications by the Palestinian government for the transfers to Moscow. Patriarch Alexei and his entourage were refused entry to several holy sites under the care of ROCOR, which then led to claims about the similar treatment experienced by Russian pilgrims to these monasteries on the grounds (as in Sourozh) that they were not Russians but people with 'a Soviet mentality' - 'new Russians'.[97] These claims were vigorously denied by Sister Anastasia Stephanopoulos, a ROCOR nun in Jerusalem, who claimed that

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[95] Mospat.ru, 'On the Situation Around the Russian Church in Biarriz Statement of the Communication Service of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations', 16.02.06, https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2006/02/29686/ [Accessed 31.10.18]

[96] Mospat.ru, 'Constantinopolitan Exarchate leaders in Western Europe are against services celebrated by a Russian Orthodox priest in Biarritz', 03.03.06, https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2006/03/30604/ [Accessed 11.11.18]

[97] Schmemann, S., 'Arafat Enters Into a New Fray, Over a Russian Church', *New York Times*, 11.07.97 and Rubinstein, D., 'A Russian Church's Via Dolorosa', *Haaretz,* 23.12.2004

thousands of pilgrims from the new Russia passed through their sites every year. Sister Anastasia was to find herself at the epicentre of another crisis a few years later, when she barricaded herself into her convent in Jericho to avoid its transfer to Moscow. As she was the sister of one Bill Clinton's chief advisers, the story made international news.[98]

At the time of these crises, the 'new Cold War' was in its infancy, but the statements of Russian commentators were forthright. The head of the (refounded) Imperial Palestine Society stated, 'The Holy Land has always been important for the Russian Orthodox people. We want to try to recover as much as possible of our properties, and especially to resume our school activities. If before we helped just the Orthodox, now we want to help all the Christians in the Holy Land and the Middle East and the entire population.'[99] ROCOR would have found this imperative of Moscow's difficult to resist, even without the secular support of Moscow given by the Palestinian Authority. In 2000, the ROCOR Synod issued a statement that 'these latter days have witnessed a new wave of forcible seizures by the Moscow Patriarchate of churches and monasteries from ROCOR in various countries – or attempts to seize them – with the help of the secular authorities (foreign and Russian), whenever such is possible – in Italy, Israel, Germany, Denmark, Canada.'[100] Nevertheless, some forces within ROCOR continued to pursue a line of dialogue with Moscow in Palestine, though this was heavily criticised by some.[101] Thus, the accusations against Moscow from ROCOR were similar again to the anti-Moscow voices in Sourozh. The implication was that the main objective was a mercenary

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[98] Religionnews.com, 'West Bank Monastery Dispute Centers on Russian Revolution Split', 21.03.00, https://religionnews.com/2000/03/21/news-feature-west-bank-monastery-dispute-centers-on-russian-revolution-spli/, [Accessed 11.11.18]
[99] Speech by Sergei Stepashin, President of the Imperial Russian Orrthodox Palestine Society. http://en.lpj.org/2014/09/05/the-imperial-russian-orthodox-palestine-society/ [Accessed 11.11.18]
[100] Statement of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR, *Russkii Vestnik,* Nos. 3–4 (2000)
[101] 'Jericho, a second Gorny by consent?', *Church News,* Vol. 12, No.3 (85) (March 2000), p.6

property grab by Moscow. A ROCOR priest noted how there was an ukaz put out before the union which proclaimed that 'all properties should belong to the Synod', he noted that this was probably an attempt at 'gathering in' real estate in preparation for the final act. The ROCOR monastery in Willesden, which he served, had a clause in the trust deed stating that they should not be in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, which prevented any transfer.[102]

ROCOR's union with Moscow in 2007 resulted in some communities breaking off and forming small 'True Orthodox' groups in Palestine and elsewhere. Bishop Agafangel, of one such splinter group, wrote of the crises in Palestine, 'The government in the Moscow Kremlin, under the guise of the "Russian World," carried out a political seizure of the property of the Russian Church Abroad'[103] – similar language to that used against Moscow in Sourozh and elsewhere. As in the UK, the post-union situation saw ROCOR and Moscow working closely together in Palestine, with a huge investment of materials and personnel from the Motherland. As in Russia, so also in the UK and Palestine: the emphasis was on bricks and mortar, renovation, and new construction – a public display of the power of Russia's resurgent Church.

Constantinople versus Moscow

We will examine the universalist impulse of the Russian Church in chapters 5 and 6, but the ROC was not the only Church with such pretensions. Constantinople's universalist claims were of a different nature to Moscow's, but the resulting competitive relationship between the two sees has dominated Orthodox ecclesiology for well over two hundred years, or more.

[102] Interview 2G
[103] Mitropolit Agafangel, 'RPTsZ: Prikhody v Svyatoi Zemle', 05.12.15. http://internetsobor.org/index.php/novosti/rptsz/rptsz-prikhody-v-svyatoj-zemle [Accessed 11.11.18]

The Constantinople/Moscow disputes of the 1990s and 2000s (Estonia 1996 and Sourozh 2006) now appear as the precursors of the much bigger Ukrainian crisis of 2018 and ongoing. In many respects, the battlelines drawn in Ukraine, Surozh and Estonia were similar, with churches having become entangled as arenas of the global culture wars. Although each crisis and each property battle were unique, with their own ethnic-linguistic and historical issues, the hidden tensions were often the same or similar. Thus, some commentators placed the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow at the epicentre of the crisis, claiming that this was the real cause and driver of the events.[104] Both jurisdictions could be said to be the victims of what might be called 'the globalisation of polarity'. In this schema, to be 'for Constantinople', implied to be for progressive, western, liberal Orthodoxy, while to be 'for Moscow' implied the opposite. In Sourozh, as in Estonia and other areas, churches divided along such lines.

Both sides looked deep into history to bolster their claims and Bishop Basil and others made frequent reference to both the early ecumenical councils and the Church Fathers. As a result, some knowledge of the history of this rivalry is essential if one is to understand the crisis in broader terms. For the past five hundred years, Moscow's claims to dominance in World Orthodoxy have been countered by Constantinople's ancient claims as 'first among equals', viewed by the sceptical as an ongoing attempt to construct a kind of Eastern Papacy – a claim virulently rejected by Constantinople.[105] The radical reduction in actual jurisdictional territory of Constantinople over the last century has been accompanied by claims (which remain disputed by other

[104] Mozhegov, V., 'Tri glubyny odnogo raskola', Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostei, 19.07.06. https://www.apn.ru/publications/article10050.htm [Accessed 16.05.20]
[105] Chryssavgis, J., *Bartholomew: Apostle and Visionary* (Nashville, 2016), pp.146–7

jurisdictions) to be the leader of the whole Orthodox Church, with the unique ability to grant autocephaly and call councils, and with an authority that traverses jurisdictional boundaries: 'As Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew occupies the First Throne of the worldwide Orthodox Christian Church … Transcending national and ethnic borders, the Ecumenical Patriarch is spiritual leader to 300 million Orthodox Christians worldwide.'[106]

Much of Constantinople's claims to primacy derives from Canon 3 of the Second Ecumenical Council (Constantinople 381): 'Because it is new Rome, the bishop of Constantinople is to enjoy the privileges of honour after the bishop of Rome.'[107] They derive also from Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 (an insertion that was rejected by the Pope of the time, Leo I), which sought to elevate the see of Constantinople to second only to Rome because of her imperial status: 'reasonably judging that the city which is honoured by the imperial power and senate and enjoying privileges equalling older imperial Rome, should also be elevated to her level in ecclesiastical affairs and take second place after her.'[108] In the words of Archdeacon John Chryssavgis, the worldwide promoter of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, both these canons, 'cast the die for Constantinople to inherit by default the role of leadership after the Schism of 1054'.[109]

No Orthodox jurisdictions, even today, cast doubt on the primacy of Rome in terms of status and importance, though not of jurisdiction, in the first

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[106] Patriarchate.org, 'Bartholomew: Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch', https://www.patriarchate.org/-/e-a-th-panagiotes-o-oikoumenikos-patriarches-k-k-bartholomaios [Accessed 16.05.20]
[107] Canon 3, 1st Council of Constantinople. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum02.htm [Accessed 16.05.20]
[108] Council of Chalcedon – 451 A.D, https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum04.htm [Accessed 16.05.20]
[109] Chryssavgis, op.cit. p.148

millennium.[110] The (albeit controversial) Ravenna Document of 2007, issued as a joint statement between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, stated plainly that, 'the bishop of Rome was therefore the protos among the patriarchs'.[111] From the Orthodox side, the Ravenna Document was largely the work of Constantinople and sought to subtly elevate that see above all others, which was controversial for many national churches. During discussions at draft stage, a Russian delegation headed by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev objected to the implication in Section 39 that an Orthodox Ecumenical Council would be represented by those churches 'in communion with the See of Constantinople'.[112] In practical terms, at time of writing (2019), this would put the Russian Church outside the Orthodox Communion.

The ecclesiological path taken by Constantinople has been heavily connected to the collapse of the Greek world in the Levant over the last century. It is difficult today to appreciate fully the seismic shifts in populations that occurred throughout the Ottoman Empire (and indeed Europe as a whole, especially in the east) in the aftermath of the First World War. The census of 1885 shows that Constantinople (as it was still largely called at the time) was then a majority Christian town. Even after the World War II, the population of the city had a significant Greek Christian minority, which was only finally lost in the emigration following the 1955 anti-Christian pogroms. The Greek Christian population of the city is now just some two thousand in comparison to some fifteen million Muslims. This dramatic change, which happened within living memory, has had a traumatic impact on the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an

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[110] Alfeev, Mitropolit I., *Besedy* (Moscow, 2012), p.102

[111] The Ravenna Document, 13.10.07. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/ch_orthodox_docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20071013_documento-ravenna_en.html [Accessed 16.05.20]

[112] The Russian delegation did not sign the final Ravenna Document as they left the proceedings due to the presence there of the new Estonian (Constantinopolitan) delegation.

institution. As its own direct territory (or rather subjects) has decreased, it has sought out new lands across the globe to maintain its status and fragile base in Istanbul. On 1 March 1922, Constantinople made formal her claims to the whole Orthodox diaspora, claiming jurisdiction over all lands not included in the previous boundaries of the Roman Empire and Slavic lands.[113] Over the following century, this led to independent recognitions worldwide of autocephaly. In the words of Serge Keleher, 'The largest groups of Orthodox Christians under the direct jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch are however the Greek Orthodox of the diaspora: in Western Europe, North and South America, and Australia. These include several million faithful. The Patriarchate of Constantinople is therefore very careful to retain and assert its rights with regard to the diaspora.'[114] After the loss of most of her Greek subjects, Constantinople recognised breakaway autocephalic churches in Finland (1923), Russia (Living Church, 1924), Estonia (1923), Poland (1924) and western Europe (Parisian Exarchate, 1931).[115] The Russian Church could do little to counter these recognitions as they came during years of intense government persecution.[116] The most recent, and by far the most controversial recognition of all – Ukraine (2018) – came at a time when the Russian Church was not so weak, with dramatic results.

Constantinople has based most of her claims as the dispenser of autocephaly on a controversial interpretation of Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon. The canon allowed for the Patriarchate's jurisdiction over 'the barbarians' on the fringes of the Eastern Empire ('the bishops of these dioceses

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[113] Tsypin., Prot. V., *Istoria russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi: sinodal'nyi i noveishii period (1700–2005)* (Moscow, 2012), p.755

[114] Keleher, S., 'Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century: Moscow versus Constantinople', *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1997)

[115] Pap. Archimandrite G., *The Messenger*, 09.02.09

[116] Cf., Livtsov V., 'Istoriia vzaimodestviia Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi s ekumenicheskim dvizheniem: konets XIX - nachalo XXI v'., Thesis, MGU, 2013.

who work among non-Greeks, are to be ordained by the aforesaid most holy see of the most holy church in Constantinople').[117] It was precisely this canon that Constantinople required Bishop Basil Osborne to mention in his transfer request that he was asked to rewrite.[118] Moscow responded to Bishop Basil's letter with a lengthy refutation of Constantinople's 'papal pretensions' and misinterpretations of the canons: 'A concept that the authority of the throne of Constantinople is extended to all territories that are not part of one or other Local Church is a new and unrecognised, by the Plenitude of the Orthodox Church, interpretation of the canon'.[119] Moreover, Moscow focused on the misuse (as they saw it) of Canon 28. Patriarch Alexei wrote in a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch, 'there is no doubt that this refers not to provinces but to peoples' and went on to state that the title *primus inter pares* had been given only because Constantinople was the imperial city, second only to Rome. He concluded that the Byzantine empire was no more and so there was no justification for 'constant recourse to this canon'.[120]

Much has been written for and against the Constantinopolitan interpretation of Canon 28. One of the most thoughtful recent papers, by Archimandrite Grigory (2009), noted that part of the problem is that such an interpretation ultimately ignores the previous jurisdiction of the Roman Patriarch (the Pope) over the Western lands.[121] The disputes concerning jurisdiction in the Orthodox Church look set to become only more labyrinthine,

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[117] Council of Chalcedon…', op. cit.
[118] Cf. Bishop Basil of Amphipolis, 'The Vision of Chalcedon Canon 28', ancientfaith.com. https://www.ancientfaith.com/specials/st._vladimirs_seminary_summer_conference_2009/bis [Accessed 04.01.19]
[119] Mospat.ru, 'The Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the decision of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on receiving Bishop Basil (Osborne) into its jurisdiction', 19.07.06, https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2006/07/32306/ [Accessed 04.01.19]
[120] Patriarch Alexei, Letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch, 18.03.02, available at orthodoxytoday.org, http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles-2009/Alexis-A-Letter-To-The-Ecumenical-Patriarch-Concerning-The-Situation-Of-The-Diaspora.php, [Accessed 04.01.19]
[121] *The Messenger*, 09.02.09, op.cit.

especially if one considers the rather unusual 'gentleman's agreement' for non-proselytization between the Catholic and Orthodox lands – no Orthodox jurisdiction is likely to install an Orthodox 'Roman Patriarchate' or even Metropolitan at any time in the near future.

For Bishop Basil, the role of Rome was the key to understanding the role of Constantinople in Western Europe (and hence the diocese of Sourozh). Whilst he did propose that Constantinople had a certain authority over the Orthodox in the UK and elsewhere, this was only as *locum tenens* in lieu of the re-establishment of the Roman Patriarchate (the Papacy). It is interesting that Bishop Basil did not claim that it was the mention of 'the barbarian lands' in Canon 28 which gave Constantinople rights over Western Europe, but only her pre-eminence in the *taxis* following the Great Schism. Perhaps this was why he was reluctant to use Canon 28 in his first appeal to Patriarch Bartholomew. Bishop Basil proposed that, 'From a missionary point of view the world has been divided between the four [ancient] patriarchates' namely Rome (West), Constantinople (North), Antioch (East) and Alexandria (South).[122] These reflected the four corners of the globe and the four points of the compass. They included both the 'known' and 'unknown' world. Speaking of the situation in the UK, he said, 'it is unreal for an Orthodox to pretend that the Patriarchate of Rome does not exist.' Thus, it can be said that although Bishop Basil was seen by some supporters of Moscow to be a 'stooge' of Constantinople, in fact his elevation of that see contained huge caveats and limitations.

[122] 'The Vision of Chalcedon Canon 28', Bishop Basil Osborne, https://www.ancientfaith.com/specials/st._vladimirs_seminary_summer_conference_2009/bis [Accessed 02.12.20]. Bishop Basil considered the position of the Jerusalem Patriarchate as anomalous as its borders were contained within the Empire.

These canonical claims of Constantinople to primacy have been explored in depth elsewhere, but her more recent ideological-theological universalism has been less discussed. The claims of Constantinople are different both canonically *and* ideologically-theologically to those of the Russian Church, which are rather hinted at and based more on the universalist (imperial) history of Russia. It is the contention of this study that there has developed a subtle but important difference between the universalism of these two jurisdictions and that these now represent opposing poles in the so-called culture wars as they are played out between East and West. Patriarch Kirill has often noted Russia's ability to build bridges between cultures and religions, with an emphasis on the traditional or conservative values that they share in common. But what is not questioned is Orthodoxy as the repository of absolute truth. Any hint of religious or interfaith syncretism is far from the Russian Church of today; Russian Orthodoxy is a 'totalising' Christianity in much the same way as Catholicism is or was, prior to Vatican II at least.

It is controversial to mention it but much evidence is now available that the Ecumenical Patriarchate came under the internationalist and syncretistic-universalist influence of Freemasonry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[123] For conservatives in Orthodoxy, the ecumenical movement pioneered by Constantinople in the last century was a direct result of this influence. The goal of this current was not, it is claimed, Christian unity so much as a universal union of all the world's major faiths. While the Ecumenical Patriarchate would shy away from stating this overtly, it is difficult to avoid seeing syncretistic-universalist tendencies in many of the

[123] Cf Zissis, Hieromonk Seraphim, 'Some preliminary notes on the influence of Freemasonry on early Greek Ecumenism', https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/influence-freemasonry-early-greek-ecumenism [Accessed 04.01.19]

patriarchate's official pronouncements. In addition, Patriarch Bartholomew has at times stated that the 'God of Muslims and Christians' is 'the same God'; 'Of course God is but one, independently of the name we give him: Allah or Yahweh and so on. God is one; and we are his children'.[124] In 2016 he caused further scandal to conservatives in Orthodoxy by appearing in an interfaith video with Pope Francis and representatives of Muslim and Buddhist religions.[125]

This is a universalism very different from Patriarch Kirill's 'brotherhood of peoples' in the Russian World. It was not by chance that Russia's universalism survived – and indeed flourished – during the Soviet epoch. At that time, communism was the new totalising state religion that *could* be violently imposed on all nationalities and religions in a way that Orthodoxy could not. Indeed, as late as the mid 1980s, Professor Norman Stone 'confessed' that he was still teaching his students that the Soviet Union had 'solved the nationality problem',[126] just a couple of years before ethnic conflicts would break out across the fringes of the Soviet Union. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be stated that Patriarch Kirill's call to 'brotherhood and unity' is profoundly *secular*. The emphasis is on 'traditional peoples' of the world uniting with Russia in a *global anti-globalist* resistance to exactly those syncretistic policies and universal values that Constantinople promotes. Some in the Church who oppose *both* Constantinople's and Moscow's universalisms posit that they are on the way to proposing a kind of universal Christian culture, or rather a culture*less* Christianity. In the words of J. Buciora, 'because national identity and culture belong to a specific people, the cosmopolitan idea

[124] 'Charlie Rose Interview with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew', 17.04.10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sf9GZIvvEDk [Accessed 04.01.19]
[125] 'This innovative "video of the Pope" is causing a sensation', 06.01.16, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vI0tiN88ldE [Accessed 04.01.19]
[126] Stone, N., *The Atlantic and its Enemies* (London, 2010), p.571

of culture, or universal "Christian culture" is not an option'.[127] Thus one cannot (or should not) speak of 'Orthodox culture'.

The idealistic universalism of Constantinople also stands accused – just as that of the Russian Church is – of concealing Hellenisation and nationalist self-aggrandisement. Constantinople has sought to limit the number of non-Greek monks on Mount Athos to 10 percent or less, in order to try to stem a Slavic ascendency in this vital part of World Orthodoxy, and has also pursued a policy of reigning in diaspora parishes previously granted autonomy or even autocephaly.[128] Of particular relevance to this study, the Parisian Exarchate to which Bishop Basil Osborne and his followers moved in 2006 was disbanded by Constantinople in 2018, with the requirement that its parishes move under the local Greek (Constantinopolitan) diaspora jurisdictions. As a result, most of the jurisdiction moved back to Moscow. 'Hellenisation' has also been given as one of the reasons for the rapid break-up of the new Ukrainian jurisdiction founded on the tomos of Constantinople in 2018. When the architect of Ukrainian autocephaly himself, Philaret Denisenko, went into schism following the jurisdiction's first council, he complained that it was not autocephaly but rather a 'Greek take-over'; the Council had been convened 'by Greeks', the statute was written 'by Greeks' and the diaspora parishes of the new jurisdiction were to be 'under the Greeks'.[129] But to view this as a question of pure Hellenisation is to misunderstand the complex tensions that surround the Ecumenical Patriarchate even within the Hellenic world itself.

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[127] Buciora, J., 'Ecclesiology and National Identity in Orthodox Christianity', Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe (International Conference) (2003), pp.27–42

[128] Orthochristian.com, 'Patriarchate of Constantinople to Limit the Influx of Non-Greeks to Mount Athos', 04.03.14, https://orthochristian.com/69025.html [Accessed 04.01.19]

[129] Euromaidanpress.com, 'Honeymoon over for Orthodox Church of Ukraine', 06.07.19, http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/07/06/honeymoon-over-for-orthodox-church-of-ukraine-as-its-creator-goes-into-schism/ [Accessed 22.09.20]

The issue is that many conservatives in the Greek Church resist Constantinople on the grounds of its liberal-ecumenical stance rather than territorial claims – although the two can occasionally coincide. The Greek Church is home to some of the most conservative voices in World Orthodoxy, such as Metropolitan Seraphim of Pireus. In addition, Mount Athos itself has been at the epicentre of resistance to the liberal-ecumenical policies of Constantinople. There *is* support for Constantinople on the peninsula, but opposition is more apparent and vocal. In one of Putin's several visits to the largely Greek Mount Athos, he was given the unusual honour of standing in the 'place of the Emperor', while the Greek prime minister's proposed visit was cancelled, and black flags were hung from the monasteries stating 'Keep the Antichrists off the Holy Mountain'. Esphigmenou monastery, which took a defiant stand against Constantinople, was excommunicated in 2002. At various times since, the Greek government and Constantinople have attempted to take back the monastery. At the latest attempt, the monks threw Molotov cocktails at the police and representatives of Constantinople, for which they received long prison sentences in absentia, as the monastery remained in the hands of the rebellious monks.

Thus it can be said that the Moscow and Constantinople jurisdictions represent two very different universalist approaches. Russia does not claim jurisdictional territory over the earth but only within her existing canonical borders, even if the Russian diaspora is a global phenomenon. However, she does represent a universalist aspiration of Orthodoxy for the whole world, which will be explored in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In contrast to Russia, Constantinople's territorial base is weak, even precarious, and she could in a sense be said to be at the mercy of various much stronger forces: the Turkish government, the USA, Russia and so on. Several memos leaked in 2009 from

the US consulate in Istanbul spoke of Constantinople's 'vulnerability' and anxiety in the face of the Moscow Patriarchate's power and rise in the Orthodox world, even expressing the concern, 'that Russia would like nothing more than to see the Ecumenical Patriarchate based in the "third Rome" of Moscow'.[130]

This weakness or vulnerability of Constantinople is viewed by her supporters as a source of credibility today, in contrast to what might be considered archaic visions of temporal power. Bishop Basil emphasised that it was Constantinople, alone among the ancient patriarchates, who had shown humility in granting autocephaly in her 'region'.[131] In this regard, he noted the direct jurisdictional claims of the Patriarchate of Alexandria over the African continent. As Constantinople has lost (or ceded) territory it is interesting that she has sought to reinvent the term 'symphonia', originally coined by Justinian to denote the relationship between the secular and spiritual empires. As we shall see, the term is much used by the Russian Church today to denote the relationship between the State and the Church, but Constantinople is seeking to give it a new meaning, broadening it out from Orthodoxy to all religions and even non-religious moral codes, such as universal human rights.[132] In these roles, both jurisdictions are sought after as 'soft-power' tools in the struggle between East and West and today's culture wars. Russian clergy often accuse Constantinople of being a tool of the declared enemies of Orthodoxy: the CIA, the EU, the promoters of a secularist-liberal western agenda. Likewise,

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[130] Wikileaks.org, Ecumenical Patriarchate Decries Russian Orthodox Interference' 02.07.09., https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ISTANBUL243_a.html [Accessed 04.01.19]
[131] 'The Vision of Chalcedon…' Op.cit.
[132] Cf. Plested, M., 'Teaching the world to sing in perfect symphonia', *The Times*, 26.11.05
. Patriarch Bartholomew, 'The Role of Religion in a Changing Europe'Speech at the London School of Ecomonics for the London Hellenic Society , 03.11.05, patriarchate.org, https://www.patriarchate.org/homilies-of-ecumenical-patriarch-bartholomew/-/asset_publisher/1kOYHp8ZkEOU/content/the-role-of-religion-in-a-changing-europe [Accessed 04.01.19]

Constantinople clergy refer to the Russian Church's Erastian tendencies and proximity to a corrupt regime. As secular societies started to polarise into traditionalist versus progressive camps, the Orthodox Church proved no different. The troubles in Sourozh, manifested both in the minutiae of praxis, and in the ecclesiastical geopolitics of Constantinople versus Moscow, were a representation of this conflict. All of the above discussion should be borne in mind when considering Bishop Basil's decision to move under Constantinople.

Throughout the twentieth century, there had been friction between Moscow and Constantinople.[133] With the breakup of the Soviet Union, two new canonical problems emerged simultaneously: new independent states appeared in the previous jurisdictional territory of autocephalous national churches (usually Russia, but not always); and a vast influx of Orthodox migrants into non-Orthodox lands (the so-called Orthodox diaspora), of which Constantinople considered herself the spiritual administrator. The first major flashpoint came in Estonia in 1996, when Constantinople unilaterally recognised a small, largely indigenous breakaway movement of the Estonian Autonomous Church. Moscow regarded this as an aggressive incursion into her canonical territory, but a letter of Patriarch Batholomew was also revealing. Turning the tables, he accused Moscow of, 'trespassing in countries under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (ie. the so-called "diaspora") – namely, Estonia, Hungary and elsewhere'.[134]

The battleground between Moscow and Constantinople in the Orthodox diaspora (i.e. the entire world outside Russia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe) is still something relatively new in the *longue durée* of Church

[133] Cf. Fajfer, L. and Rimestad, S., 'The Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow in a Global Age: A Comparison', *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 10:2–3 (2010), pp.211–227
[134] Letter of Patriarch Bartholomew, 24.02.96, available at: http://www.orthodoxa.org/GB/estonia/documentsEOC/reponseAlexis.htm [Accessed 04.01.19]

history. In the Sourozh crisis, Constantinople claimed that the UK, as part of this diaspora, formed part of her vast area of jurisdiction: 'What had not gone unnoticed was how much attention was being paid [by Moscow] to the Russian Diaspora, who lived in lands that comprised the canonical privilege of the Ecumenical Patriarchate".[135] Although the Moscow/Constantinople struggle was relatively new, Bishop Basil located such jurisdictional rivalry at the very epicentre of Christianity and even the Old Testament.[136] In the new globalised world, tensions between Constantinople and the rest of the ancient hierarchies seem only set to increase.

There appears little doubt that Metropolitan Anthony himself would never have taken a unilateral decision to move under Constantinople. In 2001, he wrote a letter to Moscow asking for the appointment of the then Father Hilarion Alfeev to the diocese, stating that, 'His appointment would allow us to seize a new victory over the pretensions of Constantinople to hegemony in World Orthodoxy'.[137] As the crisis surrounding Bishop Hilarion developed, Metropolitan Anthony stated at a parish council meeting, '[what has been said] is a deep insult to all my beliefs and feelings. Namely that, in the event of discrepancies between ourselves and the DECR that I would take our Diocese out from the Moscow Patriarchate to one of the other Churches. I have never thought about it and in addition I will say that the thought is so unacceptable for me that I would rather leave than allow it to happen'.[138]

At the same time (April 2002) in Moscow, Patriarch Alexei, doubtless inspired by the contemporaneous wrangling in London, chose to pen what was

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[135] Chryssavgis, op.cit.
[136] 'The Vision of Chalcedon…' Op.cit
[137] Letter from Metropolitan Anthony to the Patriarch of Moscow, 19.03.01 (author trans.). http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html [Accessed 04.01.19]
[138] Parish Council Minutes, 06.11.02 (author trans.). http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html [Accessed 04.01.19]

at that time the longest and most strident statement against Constantinople's diaspora policies. This letter was later published in full in the journal *Sourozh* on 1 February 2005, the very eve of the final crisis. It was a point-by-point critique of Constantinople's universalist claims. He started with Canon 28 of Chalcedon and a long discussion about its phrase *en tois barbarikois* ('among the barbarians'). Patriarch Alexei managed a convincing deconstruction of Constantinople's arguments on this point, concluding that the council fathers could never have intended that Constantinople would, by extension, have jurisdiction over the then-unknown Australia and North and South America and – even more contentiously – the lands previously under the Western Patriarchate (Rome): 'As regards Orthodox jurisdiction in the canonical territories that belonged to the Church of Rome before the schism of 1054, no authoritative pan-Orthodox decision has ever been taken'.[139] In particular, Patriarch Alexei emphasised the recency of Constantinople's claims, linking them to the universalist-expansionism of Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios IV in the 1920s who, 'developed the theory of the subordination of the whole Orthodox diaspora to Constantinople'.[140] Patriarch Alexei then went on to claim the 'provisional' character of the Russian Exarchate and indeed of ROCOR as *temporary* historical accommodations as a result of the Revolution. He concluded: 'We continue to be saddened to see that the legitimate and natural desire to bring together again our own people, who live dispersed for historical and political reasons, is the object of such harsh and unjust attacks on the part of the primate of a Church that has experienced a similar tragedy.'[141] In effect, the two rather different universalisms of Russia and Constantinople had come

[139] Patriarch Alexis of Moscow, 'A Letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch Concerning the Situation of the Diaspora and All Russia', *Sourozh Journa*l, 02.01.05
[140] Letter ibid.
[141] Letter ibid.

into conflict in lands over which neither had jurisdictional control. Russia and other Orthodox heartlands have claimed that they are not seeking jurisdictional territory, but only jurisdiction over *souls*. Such a policy is extremely contentious as it potentially allows Russia to build Russian churches wherever there are Russians, even in other Orthodox lands.

The earliest concrete signs that the ground was being laid for a move of jurisdiction in Sourozh was the attempt to alter the charitable trust deeds, conducted in camera by members of the diocesan council. Bishop Hilarion publicised this in his account of the crisis, stating that such an attempt, 'prepared the ground for all real estate to be left in case of transfer to another jurisdiction'.[142] When the move was finally announced by Bishop Basil in 2006, it immediately produced a storm of debate 'for and against' Constantinople. Part of the focus was on the familiar canonical disputes, but of more interest to this study were the ideological arguments. An article published on the Russian portal Credo.ru was typical of the prevailing pro-Moscow view. Sourozh was portrayed as just a pawn in the much bigger conflict between Constantinople (the West) and the Moscow Patriarchate (the Slavic East). The actions of Constantinople were simply the sensible actions of any combatant – create facts on the ground and argue later: 'Actually, exactly this has happened. The Ecumenical Patriarchate strives at once for victories and then immediately writes these in as the "legal precedent", having thus established herself as the highest legal judge of World Orthodoxy'.[143] In fact, Bishop Basil himself used this argument of appealing to the 'higher court' of Constantinople for resolution to the conflict.[144] Another article, by Vladimir Mozhegov, put

[142] Online Archive of Metropolitan Hilarion, 08.02 (author trans.). http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 04.01.18]
[143] Grigori, I., 'Global'noe Protivostoianie', portal-credo.ru, 14.06.06 (author trans.). http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=44208 [Accessed 04.01.19]
[144] OCAD. Letter of Bishop Basil, 15.05.06

forward the theory that all such 'clash of civilisations' rhetoric was 'a spiritual temptation' encouraged by Constantinople (the West) to polarise the situation against Russia.[145] The author neglected to account for the fact that *both* sides indulged in such rhetoric, which invoked Huntingon and the culture wars. The anxiety of pro-Moscow parishioners at the thought that they might be moved under their arch-rival Constantinople appears deep and genuine. Archbishop Innokenty of Korsun referred to the decision of Archbishop Evlogy to leave Moscow in the 1930s and go to Constantinople. He related how Metropolitan Benjamin (Fedchenkov) had 'fasted and prayed for forty days to see what decision to make', and in the end he had stayed with Moscow and founded the diocese of Korsun.[146]

The theory that Constantinople had by some means instigated the whole crisis in order to extract jurisdictional benefit seems unlikely. Despite all the hyperbole, there was little evidence of direct agitation by Constantinople (or indeed by Moscow) prior to 2006. It was true, as we have seen, that the diocese was born out of, and to some degree characterised by, the Evlogian Exarchate that had existed previously under Constantinople, but it was also true that Metropolitan Anthony was deeply loyal to the Russian Church and had no such feelings towards Constantinople. Bishop Basil would have been aware that Constantinople would welcome his request to transfer the diocese, and after the death of Metropolitan Anthony, the main obstacle to this was removed. Perhaps more important than the events themselves were the geopolitical interpretations of the events. Despite a war of words, communion between Moscow and Constantinople was maintained and the dispute was

[145] Mozhegov, V., 'Tri glubyny odnogo raskola', Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostei, 19.07.06. https://www.apn.ru/publications/article10050.htm [Accessed 04.01.19]
[146] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie:* #2075235, 20.05.06. 'Slovo arkhiepiskopa Korsunskogo Innokentia, vremenno upravliaushchego Surozhskoy yeparkhiei, posle liturgii', 14.05.06

eventually resolved, but for the Moscow Patriarchate it was simply another aggression in a campaign against her jurisdictional unity that had started with Constantinople's (albeit short-lived) recognition of the Renovationists in the 1920s. For Constantinople's supporters, she was fulfilling her role of recognising the aspirations of small, indigenous Orthodox communities against the wishes of powerful national churches.

This is not the place to begin analysing the Ukrainian schism of 2018 in detail, other than to point to certain ideological trends that were at the base of these geopolitical frictions and which this thesis has sought to uncover. Official and semi-official pro-Moscow statements consistently attacked Constantinople for 'liberalism', being captive financially and ideologically to the USA (and NATO) and promoting moral and dogmatic relativism. It is notable that pro-Moscow voices have sought to draw Metropolitan Epiphanius of the newly founded Ukrainian jurisdiction under Constantinople into the culture wars. Any statements by anti-Moscow clerics which might seem to support western values, LGBT and cultural relativism would be unpopular in socially conservative Ukraine.[147] On the other hand, anti-Moscow believers, and some Orthodox hierarchs from other jurisdictions, criticise Moscow for rigid traditionalism, being politically and financially captive to the Russian regime and promoting Russian nationalism, xenophobia and homophobia. These ideological divisions run right through the Orthodox Church as they do through the Catholic Church. To put it concisely, but rather controversially: it is not so much the case that the various diaspora schisms were the result of geopolitical tensions (e.g. Russian revanchism), but rather that the geopolitical tensions

[147] Cf. 'Eksklyuziv. Polnaia versiia razgovora Yepifaniia s prankerami', 22.12.2018, https://news-front.info/2018/12/22/eksklyuziv-polnaya-versiya-razgovora-epifaniya-s-prankerami/ [Accessed 30.11.19]

themselves were the result of ideological divergence reflected on the national and religious level.

How was and is this rivalry to be viewed by the rest of the Orthodox world? It seems that universalist and primacy claims made by *any* jurisdiction cause anxiety because of the path taken over history by the Papacy. The Western Church's slide into universalist absolutism is seen in the East as a lesson in 'mistaken hubris'. Thus, while many jurisdictions might align themselves with either Moscow or Constantinople out of necessity, they are unlikely to fully support the pretensions of a New or Third Rome to being master of the Orthodox World. It must be remembered that many of these churches (re)gained their independence from both Russia and Constantinople only comparatively recently. Bulgaria regained autocephaly from Constantinople in 1945 after a long struggle against Hellenisation, only to find herself within Moscow's 'sphere of influence' during the Cold War. Thus, it can be understood that satellite jurisdictions in the diaspora, far from the defined canonical territories of either Moscow or Constantinople, can be wary of the ascendancy of either. G.P. Fedotov, writing in 1928, noted how one aspect of Russia's universalism was that Russians themselves remained ignorant of other Orthodox churches and their cultures and traditions, which were generally much more ancient than her own. This is a problem for the Russian Church today as she seeks to make allies in her struggle with Constantinople. Romanians, Bulgarians and Georgians are all familiar with Russification in church and secular affairs and have no desire to encourage it.[148]

It should be said that the drive for autocephaly (if such it can be called) is also a comparatively recent phenomenon, connected with the emergence of

[148] Fedotov, G.P., 'Natsional'noe i vselenskoe', *Vestnik R.S.KH.D.*, No. 6, 1928 g. in *O Rossii i russkoi filosofskoi kul'ture: filosofy russkogo posleoktiabr'skogo zarubezh'ia* (Moscow, 1990), pp.441–62

European nationalism – the newly formed countries needed their own state church as part of the 'national package'. This Erastian tendency had filtered through from the West by indirect as well as direct means, such as the (uncanonical) foundation of the new Church of Greece in 1830 under the tutelage of the new state's German king. Because of this, the language of many of these more recent autocephalous jurisdictions is different from that of Russia or Constantinople. The Hellenic rhetoric from the Greek Church is more ethnic than universal; Archbishop Christodoulous, for example, did not shrink from talk of the 'survival of the Greek race' and Orthodoxy as an essential component of that.[149]

The geopolitical rivalry between the two sees has taken place not only in terms of jurisdictional conflict and the global Culture Wars, but also at the level of *political* pre-eminence. An example of this was the much-vaunted 2016 meeting in Cuba between Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. Despite objections from hardliners in the Russian Church, the meeting was a propaganda coup for the Moscow Patriarchate. Not only did the Pope travel into the Russian sphere of influence to meet the Patriarch, but Moscow appeared to all the world as the most important leader in World Orthodoxy (which her supporters would argue she is). Whatever will be the outcome of this long-standing rivalry, it shows no sign of abating soon. It might be suggested that Constantinople is playing the long game. Present unpopularity in the Orthodox world versus popularity in the western secular world will eventually bear fruit as local Orthodox churches take root and western liberal values also start to take hold even in Orthodox lands.

[149] Makrides, V., *Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece: The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics* (London, 2016), p.32

Chapter 3 Enculturation and Preservation: Macrocosmic Themes

The roots of the Sourozh crisis were connected to both ancient and more recent developments and divergences between East and West. References to 'the Russian soul' and *sobornost'* opposing western 'individualism' implied deep dichotomies with long theological genealogies. Moreover, such pronouncements pointed to the fact that, for many, the absolute dichotomy of East and West was a self-evident article of faith.[1] The following two chapters will analyse how these undercurrents played out in the day-to-day life of the diocese. It may seem rather ambitious to locate the feelings of distrust and anxiety that emerged during the crisis to the shift from the immanent theology of the Eastern Fathers to the analytic, solution-driven theology of scholasticism, but the roots of the divisions between the East and West worldviews go back many centuries. Christos Yannaras located all the problems that increasingly torment the modern world in 'the theological differences that once provoked the "Schism" dividing Christendom in two. Today's individualism and absolute utilitarianism appear to have theological origins.'[2]

Theme 1: Culture Clash

The Sourozh troubles have been variously described as a political, generational, ethnic and class conflict. Before we analyse the various claims to each argument in detail, it is pertinent to view them all under the umbrella term 'culture clash'. One of the Information Sheets published by Bishop Basil during the crisis stated openly, 'This is not a question of personalities but a

[1] Plested, M., 'Dispatches from Russia', *First Thing*s (Jan. 2018)
[2] Yannaras*, Orthodoxy and the West*, op.cit., p.ix

clash of cultures'.[3] While the 'locals' (and it is necessary to be careful delineating the faction along these lines) experienced the behaviour of the new arrivals as 'rude' and 'arrogant',[4] the new arrivals spoke repeatedly of British 'coldness' and the condescending aloofness of the locals.[5] Certainly, there was much in the practices of the new arrivals that seemed at odds to the anglicised norms of Sourozh. These included; talking in church, clapping and exclaiming in parish meetings, pushing and other tactile behaviour, and a general 'lack of manners'. One commentator noted that the problems were exacerbated by the fact that the English would speak 'coolly and calmly' about an issue, whereas a Russian would 'rip his shirt'.[6] This divergence in social comportment had even been noticeable to the first-wave émigrés, many of whom were from the nobility. The Zernovs, who had such an influence on the development of Orthodoxy in Britain after the revolution, noted how, 'The English were inclined to tolerance and not inclined to extremes'.[7] In defence of the new arrivals, Fr Mikhail Dudko, who had been sent to Sourozh in order to investigate the troubles, spoke of, 'This crowd of thirsting, bewildered and discouraged people who wanted someone to talk to – and then this quiet and reverent prayer at the altar, it was a terrible contrast … these were Russian people who came to a Russian Orthodox Church and found themselves unwelcome there.'[8]

Because these differences resonated with deep cultural dichotomies, they touched the minutiae of daily church life. A cathedral parishioner

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[3] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Information Sheet, 01.05.06
[4] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2076407, 21.05.06
[5] Leonidov, Dr I., Statement, 23.05.2006. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=1 [Accessed 28.03.20]
[6] Mamford, E., 'Sourozhskaia Eparkhia: naemnik ili pastir'?', 07.09.06. https://pravoslavie.ru/4694.html [Accessed 30.03.20]
[7] Kaznina, O.A., *Russkie v Anglii* (Moscow, 1997), p.83
[8] Interview with Fr Mikhail Dudko, Radio Radonezh, 03.08.06. http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=radio&div=356 [Accessed 20.01.20]

mentioned how, in the 'rarefied atmosphere' of Sourozh, taunts were received for such 'Russian superstitions' as the blessing of Easter cakes and eggs.[9] Another wrote that the locals seemed not to grasp the childlike faith of the Russians, which involved prostrations, kissing the hands of priests and other tactile practices. He stated, 'It was exactly by such means, that Christianity had helped Russia survive countless trials – which means that it is related to the very essence being Russian'.[10] He went on to compare the meeting of the Russians and English to the meeting of Indians and colonisers in the New World, stating that the Russians were not 'dumb Indians' whose simple faith and loyalty could be bought with 'firewater'.[11]

The meeting of East and West in everyday social praxis was indeed fraught with conflict and misunderstanding. An English parishioner inferred that the problems on the ground in Sourozh were endemic and went right to the top of the Church: 'It seems to me that with the best will in the world it would be extremely difficult for the Moscow Patriarchate to understand the West and the diverse cultures included in the term "Western" because of lack of sustained contact and a totally different background and experience.'[12] Likewise, Bishop Basil complained about the noise and agitation which had accompanied the new arrivals, upsetting the peace that had previously reigned in the cathedral.[13]

In Sourozh, the emotional directness of Russians came as a shock to parishioners. In turn, the mannered and labyrinthine social mores of the English middle classes seemed to the Russians not only incomprehensible but

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[9] Raba, M.B., Statement, 20.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=4 [Accessed 28.03.20]
[10] Kabakov, V., 'Otdelenie, a ne razvod', 20.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=36 [Accessed 02.01.20]
[11] Ibid.
[12] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Statements of Parishioners
[13] Interview with Basil Osborne, BBC, *Vera i Vek*, 19.05.06

also designed to 'hold the other at arm's length' in a manipulative way.[14] Many of the new arrivals found the behaviour of the locals to be cold and snobbish. Others thought the new arrivals were winning the battle because they were not afraid to be rude and persistent.[15] An interesting account from a new arrival stated, 'after some years of Orthodox experience, I was quite stunned by Sourozh. Because Sourozh is cold, freezing cold … colder and less accommodating than any other parish I had seen before'.[16] The author noted that he had converted to Orthodoxy while at university in the US, having previously experimented with Buddhism, and was far from being a 'Russian nationalist'. For many of the new arrivals, the shy, academic persona of Bishop Basil was perceived as 'coldness' and superiority.[17]

The seemingly defensive and aggressive behaviour of Russians can quickly give way to jovial and candid friendship once all-important trust has been gained.[18] Anyone relatively familiar with Russian culture will recognise this immediately. For the English especially, this open directness can be unnerving, especially when something critical is being transmitted. The tone of the open letters to the Patriarch came as a surprise to the indigenous parishioners – they were at turns pleading and complaining, swearing 'undying

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[14] Cf. Badmaeva, S.V. and Timofeeva, E.K., 'Vlianie rossiiskogo mentalityta na stil' rossiiskogo menedzhmenta', *Psikhologicheskaia nauka i obrazovanie*, No. 5 (2010). 'Relations between people are informal and the concept of friendship is valued very highly. Russian candidness: personal questions never cease to amaze foreigners. For Russians, it is quite normal to relate intimate personal details to complete strangers on a train. Worldly formal conversations are foreign to them and little understood.' (author trans.)

[15] Baumov, A., *Russkii Newsweek*, *Prikhod po-angliskii*, 22.06.06. http://www.religare.ru/2_30732.html [Accessed 20.01.20] Quotes from parishioners: 'It's unpleasant for an Englishman to get involved in something ugly. If someone behaves in an ugly way, the Englishman will not argue and scream, he just frowns, holds his nose, says, "Oh my God, what is this?" and goes away. And so, we are losing control, step by step.' And 'if the "activists" immediately got repulsed in their own style, things wouldn't have come to the current crisis.' (author trans.)

[16] Leonidov, Dr I., Statement, 23.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=1 [Accessed 28.03.20]

[17] Cf. Interv'iu s Nikolaem Kul'manom, Surozhskie nestroenia: vzgliad iznutri, 05.09.06. http://www.pravoslavie.ru/4693.html [Accessed 20.01.20]

[18] Cf., Cross, A., *A People Passing Rude: British Responses to Russian Culture* (2013), and Rathmayr, R., 'Intercultural aspects of new Russian politeness', *WU Online Papers in International Business Communication*, Series One: Intercultural Communication and Language Learning (2008). Also Kelly, C., *Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin*, (Oxford, 2001)

loyalty' to the Motherland combined with impassioned hyperbole.[19] On the other side, one priest spoke of, the 'Anglican-style clique/club which the rulers of the 'Sourozh Diocese' by the early 2000s largely were'.[20] Even the English themselves realised that there was an unhealthy tendency to 'keep everything under wraps' in the hope that 'somehow the troubles would blow away'.[21] Trying to muddle through, instead of facing the crisis head on, prolonged the pain and meant that divisions grew deeper and trust weakened.

Theme 2: Becoming Russian, Becoming Western

A pro-Moscow parishioner wrote of Bishop Basil that 'he does not understand the Russian Soul' and that perhaps 'he should simply go and read Dostoevsky, and then he will understand that we are very complicated people and that he cannot be our leader'.[22] The comment implied that the anti-Moscow parishioners were all *non*-Russians, which in fact was not the case, many being descendants of the White emigration. Such accusations were, therefore, doubly offensive to such people. In his study of the Russian Soul, Dale Pesmen narrates how this concept was crystallised in the nineteenth century by the Slavophile intelligentsia rather than the peasantry. The Russian Soul was conceptualised in contrast to western 'precision'. It was expressed by 'strong feelings, the inexpressible, the unlimited, the hyperbolic, the spontaneous, the unpredictable, the immeasurable and the unmannered'.[23] This is the 'Natasha's dance' that was said to be at the heart of every Russian – aristocrat or peasant,

[19] Cf. Chisholm, Y., *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, 25.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=14 [Accessed 20.01.20]
[20] Interview 1C
[21] Interview 1A
[22] 'Interv'iu s Nikolaem Kul'manom', op.cit.
[23] Pesmen, D., *Russia and Soul: An Exploration*, (Cornell, 2000) p.16

sophisticated western émigré or forest dweller. It is a leitmotif in Russian culture even today; one example is the scene of Glasha's dance in Klimov's wartime epic *Come and See*, which united multiple Russian mythologies: nature, spontaneity, naivety, passion, authenticity. It was one thing to point to this absence in a westerner, but for a Russian it could be deeply hurtful.

Interestingly for Sourozh, Pesmen concludes, 'Indifference or coldness are the greatest offences as well as the prime signs of dusha affliction or *loss*, more so than rudeness, anger or even brutality, which still show that a person is interested, partial, cares'.[24] Patriarch Kirill has made much use of this terminology, and his borrowing of the term *passionarnost'* from the Soviet Slavophile Lev Gumilev should also be mentioned in this context. The Patriarch Christianised the term that Gumilev had used to emphasise the passionate nature of the Russian people, and which expressed itself in self-sacrifice, openness and anarchy of spirit, speaking of Russia's 'ancient, Christian passion' (*drevniaia khristianskaia passionarnost'*). Rephrasing Gumilev, he continued, 'the higher the *passionarnost'*, the higher the civilisation, when *passionarnost'* goes out of human life, then a civilisation and a people will die'.[25]

The pro-Moscow new arrivals sometimes objected with the claim that the old White émigré supporters of Bishop Basil could only claim connection to a distant and idealised Motherland, in which many of them had never even set foot. A blogger wrote that, 'Of course they loved Russia', but that this was a 'fairy-tale Russia with golden domes and fantastic towers'.[26] The anti-Moscow parishioners argued that the New Russians (and their English supporters) could

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[24] Ibid. p.272

[25] Kirill, Patriarkh, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie*, (Moscow, 2009) pp.392–3

[26] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2167220, 03.07.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. This accusation was untrue for many of the old white émigrés, several of whom were involved with charitable work within the new Russian Federation, such as the St Gregory's Foundation. http://stgregorysfoundation.org.uk/. Cf. also Kudriakova, E.B., *Rossiskaia Emigratsiia v Velikobritanii v Period mezhdu Dvumia Voinami* (Moscow, 1995), p.5

claim little continuity with pre-revolutionary Russia and so had no great claim to be arbiters of true Russianness. This standoff was important as it led to a belief in a deep culture gap between the two groups, with one side claiming the other had become 'westernised', and the other that their opponents had been 'sovietised'.[27]

So it was that both sides stood to accuse the other of lack of Russianness. The pro-Moscow new arrivals accused the old émigrés of nostalgia and an inability to love the newly resurgent Russian Church that was emerging from the catacombs. A deacon, who came from an émigré intellectual background,[28] felt deeply hurt at accusations from pro-Moscow supporters that his criticisms of the Russian Church were founded on a lack of patriotism. He replied that his family had fought against Bolshevism for three generations, that his wife's father had died as a new martyr and that it was not for others to teach him how to love the Motherland. He wrote that love 'sometimes obliges us to criticise the dark side that we also love'.[29]

The arguments were further complicated by the deep association of Orthodoxy with 'nationality' in Russian history. It has been argued that Russian nationality is a relatively new phenomenon, rather akin to the emergence of Italian nationality following the Risorgimento in the nineteenth century. Nicolai Petro noted in his study on Russian democracy that, 'As late as the early twentieth century a peasant —and the vast majority of Russians were peasants then – would speak of himself not as a "Russian" but as "Orthodox" (pravoslavnyi). Russian was his language; Orthodoxy was his identity.'[30] It

[27] Interview 2A. The interviewee was a long-standing member of the pre-war Russian émigré community. She viewed the new arrivals as very 'other' in terms of their supposed Russianness – as sovietised rather than Russian. The notion of a Soviet mentality is discussed in the following chapter. Cf. also interview 2G. The interviewee relates stories of white émigrés who do not wish to return, 'for fear of being disappointed.'
[28] His grandfather was the eminent émigré Orthodox philosopher Simeon Frank.
[29] *Tema:* #58412, *Soobshchenie:* #2167405, 04.07.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]
[30] Petro, N., *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture* (Harvard, 1995)

follows, then, that a non-Orthodox Russian is an oxymoron, but also that someone who becomes Russian Orthodox can, and perhaps should, also *become Russian.*[31] As Anna Pechurina noted in her study of the British Russian diaspora, 'Thus, it can be observed that Orthodoxy is considered to be one of the main identifying markers of Russian-ness. In other words, those who speak Russian and feel comfortable in the church might be regarded as Russians.'[32] This 'becoming Russian' goes beyond the religious sphere. A person can be deemed to have become Russian through exhibiting a love for Russian culture combined with the Russian character-traits mentioned in this study: passion over reason, community over individualism and so on.

Less attention has been given to such people in the Sourozh crisis – English converts whose love of Russia had made them honorary Russians. Their presence further complicates the us/them ethnic narrative. Such people were by no means small in number or simply inactive fellow-travellers – they were the husbands and wives of Russian activists.[33] When the crisis reached the British High Court in 2009, the representation was carried out by two English parishioners. Metropolitan Hilarion later himself wrote of the 'myth' that the reason for the conflict was the English/Russian divide, noting how many letters to the Patriarch supporting his cause were from the English.[34] For the anti-Moscow group, these people were also to some extent motivated by misplaced Slavophilia. An article in the Russian daily *Trud* about the crisis

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[31] Cf. Verkhovsky, A., 'Kirill's Doctrine and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodoxy', Tolstaya, K., (ed.) *Orthodox Paradoxes Heterogeneities and Complexities in Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy* (Leiden, 2014) p.73. 'If Orthodox people denotes both ethnic and political nationality, then everyone who belongs to the ROC should be considered Russian.'

[32] Pechurina, A., 'Creating a Home from Home: Russian Communities in the UK', PhD Thesis (Manchester, 2010), p.96

[33] Cf. Chabakuri, Statement, 26.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=3 [Accessed 28.03.20] and Raba Bozhia Maria, Statement, 20.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=4 [Accessed 28.03.20]

[34] Cf. Hilarion, A., 'Surozhskaya Smuta' (2003), http://hrampm.org/userfiles/library/autors/%5Balfeev_ilarion%5Dsurozhskaya_smuta.pdf [Accessed 28.03.20]

stated, 'Russian Orthodoxy in England has become attractive for people of many nationalities. And not only thanks to the gifted personality of Metropolitan Anthony, but moreover thanks to Russian Orthodoxy itself and its incomparable spirit. And not only in England. The *стремление верить по-русски* is now popular.'[35] The Sourozh priest Maksim Nikolskii wrote in his memoirs on Sourozh, 'Some of the English try to learn Russian in order to be able to pronounce the prayers in Church Slavonic and to understand the Church services … some of those who convert to Orthodoxy take this decision so seriously that they change their name from English to Russian and prefer to attend Slavonic services to English ones. Such is this strange phenomenon!'.[36] This was all rather counter to the ethos of Metropolitan Anthony, who stressed that 'Orthodoxy was more important than Russianness'.[37]

The anti-Moscow parishioners tended to raise the issue of 'Russianness' in narrower terms than the multinational, universal concept promoted by neo-Slavophiles.[38] This was countered by one parishioner who wrote that part of the problem was that the anti-Moscow supporters of Bishop Basil imagined that the Russians were a single unit like the Jews or the Kazaks, and that in fact the Russians were only able 'to unite at Kulikovo Field'.[39] These two conflicting ideas of Russianness offer insight into the roots of the crisis. For the pro-Moscow group, an indigenous English convert who loved Russia, was learning Russian, supported Moscow and followed the traditions of the Church was more 'Russian' than a pure Russian émigré (even a first-generation one) who had become westernised and criticised the Motherland from afar. This latter

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[35] Konovalov, V., 'Surozhskii Paradoks', *Trud*, 27.06.06 (author trans.)
[36] Cf. Tugarinov, E., *Mitropolit Antonii Surozhskii*, op.cit. , p.192. Cf. 'A Collection of Anonymised Letters to Metropolitan Hilarion from Parishioners and Clergy of Sourozh', 06.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 28.03.20]
[37] Cf. Maidanovich, E., 'O Surozhskoi eparkhii', *Foma*, No. 3 (17) (2003)
[38] Cf. Chapter 5
[39] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2076496, 21.05.06 [Accessed 28.03.20]

group, caricatured as 'rootless cosmopolitans', was a key target for criticism from the pro-Moscow group. The situation, however, was complex[40]. An article by Seraphim Rebinder that appeared in *Sourozh* magazine in August 2005, just before the final crisis, is worth quoting at length:

> Attitudes to Russia and the Russian Church, however, differ enormously not only amongst local converts to Orthodoxy but also among descendants of the Russian emigration. Some feel themselves to be Russian, or very close to Russia; others think that on the whole it is better not to have too much to do with Russians because of what they see as the Russian tendency to messianism or imperialism. Moreover, many descendants of émigrés are highly critical of the Russian Church, or rather, of the Moscow Patriarchate. They consider that although holiness is of course to be found within the Russian Church, the Moscow Patriarchate – as one representative of that persuasion put it – is 'a sick organism'; what is more it seeks to be close to the State and to serve the State's interests; and it is riddled with clericalism and extreme traditionalism.[41]

The émigrés who were considered by the pro-Moscow group to have lost their Russianness were, firstly, the descendants of the White Emigration who were usually either aristocratic or from the intelligentsia, and, secondly, recently arrived liberal-minded Muscovites or ex-Soviet intelligentsia. Both groups were already far from the *narod* in term of culture and upbringing well before 1917. Such people were typified in the early parishioners of Sourozh. The Zernovs in

[40] For more on cosmopolitanism versus localism, see Chapter 6.
[41] Rebinder, S., 'The Proposed Metropolia: Can it Heal the Divisions of the Russian Diaspora?', *Sourozh*, No. 10, 08.05

Oxford and the writer Iulia de Beausobre were in this lineage. The latter provides an interesting case. She was an aristocrat who had 'converted' to Orthodoxy in the Gulag (she had of course been baptised Orthodox as a child) where she had been repeatedly tortured by the NKVD. She survived, and on her escape from Soviet Russia, she was to write some insightful texts on Orthodoxy as well as some of the first Gulag memoirs to be published in English.[42] In England she developed a more 'contemporary' understanding of Orthodox practice than perhaps she might have had she remained in the USSR. She came to England in the 1920s and became an active layperson in the Russian church in London.[43] Asked about the use of icons in prayer, Iulia described them as 'aids to prayer for beginners',[44] a response that would horrify the average churchgoer in Russia, both then and now.

Those new arrivals who had 'lost Russianness' were critiqued by one pro-Moscow parishioner, who wrote, 'The situation is complicated by the fact that they welcome only those Russian-speakers who are either unchurched or who are not aware of, or feel no loyalty towards, the Mother Church. Such people often feel hostility towards the Russian Orthodox Church and towards Russians. An occasional characteristic of theirs is a spirit of dissent and cosmopolitanism.'[45] In the polarised situation that developed, such parishioners came to support actions deemed deeply offensive by the pro-Moscow group, such as the NATO bombing of Orthodox Serbia, or at least they supported Bishop Basil's refusal to read the Patriarch's condemnation of it.[46]

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[42] Iulia de Beausobre (1893–1977). Cf. de Beausobre, I., *The Woman Who Could Not Die* (London, 1938)
[43] Cf. Babington Smith, C., *Iulia de Beausobre: A Russian Christian in the West* (London, 1983)
[44] Ibid., p.121
[45] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1907853, 07.03.06, 'Otkrytoe Pis'mo' [Accessed 05.05.19]
[46] Cf. Cirota.ru *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1907853, 07.03.06, 'Otkrytoe Pis'mo', 23.02.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]

Once accusations had been made, people had no choice but to fall into separate camps, and arguments from both sides appeared disingenuous. For example, one priest pointed out that if the treatment of Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev had taken place in Russia, it would have raised a cry of disapproval from liberal anti-Moscow parishioners.[47] It was a perceptive comment that remained unanswered. Likewise, the DECR might have appealed to the generous spirit of Russian universalism, but they were resolute in excluding liberal-leaning Orthodox and those warier of the Moscow Patriarchate from such 'universalism'. An open letter to the Patriarch ended typically, 'We are not afraid of anything – we have an Orthodox country and an Orthodox president, and we want to keep our connections to our own roots!'.[48]

Theme 3: Russification and Russophobia

The treatment of the new arrivals was considered by some to be close to discrimination.[49] But the pro-Moscow parishioners fought back, and in a way that was perceived by the anti-Moscow side as aggressive. Perhaps the most frequent accusation levelled at the pro-Moscow camp was their desire to Russify the diocese and eject from it the English converts and their anglicised émigré confreres.[50] There were allusions to the new arrivals as 'cuckoos' who had forced out the rightful owners.[51] From all the evidence available it does seem that Metropolitan Anthony, though a lifelong devoted son of the Moscow Patriarchate and Russian Church *within* Russia, towards the end of his

[47] Jillions, Fr J., 'Bishop Hilario', op.cit.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Cf. Blagon.ru, 'Kommenartii diakona Andreia Kuraeva k sobitiam Surozhskoi eparkhii' (author trans.). http://blagogon.ru/articles/156/ [Accessed 05.05.20]
[50]Cf. Hirst, M., *The Tablet*, 26.05.06
[51] *Khronika surozhskoi smuty,* pis'mo, op. cit. 20.06.06. Also, Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00

life started to criticise what he perceived to be Moscow's 'heavy hand'.[52] However, many of the supporters of Moscow, including Metropolitan Hilarion himself, claimed that Archbishop Anatoly, who had been sent to Sourozh from Russia in 1990 with a similar mission to that of Metropolitan Hilarion, had also been discriminated against by virtue of a tacit Russophobia among the leaders of the diocese.[53] When the diocesan council expressed gratitude to Archbishop Anatoly in a public pronouncement during Metropolitan Hilarion's tenure, he wrote that 'it sounded more like offence and mockery, than a sincere expression of love and sympathy. When Vladyka Anatoly came to England he was offered the same cold welcome as me, if not worse'.[54]

The charges of Russification were laid out in the document that was read out from the altar in the presence of Bishop Hilarion: 'Bishop Hilarion … established contact almost exclusively with members of the Russian community, encouraging in them the impression that he was "their" bishop who would support "their" interests in the Diocese, *which should become a purely Russian national Diocese*'.[55] Metropolitan Hilarion countered that he had been sent to Sourozh with the specific direction of helping with the much-needed mission to his compatriots. At the inaugural address after his consecration in Moscow, his mission in Britain had been described by Patriarch Alexei as being, 'in the field of "enchurching" and in the preservation of "Russianness" in belief, language and devotion to the Motherland'.[56] A

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[52] Cf. OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Thomas, Dr S. and Dean, A., Open Letter, 22.01.03

[53] There were many charges, the main ones being that he received a fraction of the wages of other English hierarchs and had to live in a damp basement and walk the long distance to the cathedral (though in his seventies) as he could not afford to take public transport. All these claims were repeated frequently during the troubles. Cf. Alfeev, H., 'Sourozhskaia Smuta', 2003, op. cit. [Accessed 05.05.20]

[54] Ibid.

[55] 'Otkrytoe pis'mo mitropolita antoniia surozhskogo episkopu ilarionu alfeevu', *NG Religii*, No.6, 21.08.2002. (author trans. and emphasis).]

[56] Mospat.ru, 'Sviateishii Patriarkh Aleksii II sovershil khirotoniiu arkhimandrita Ilariona vo episkopa Kerchenskogo', 11.02.02, https://mospat.ru/archive/2002/02/nr201141/ [Accessed 25.04.18]

statement made by Metropolitan Hilarion in June 2002 seemed to imply that this fear of Russification was at least partly located in paranoia: 'whenever I mentioned Russians, these people accused me of trying to Russify the diocese. As soon as I gave a hint about the need to bring new priests to the diocese, including those speaking in Russian, they immediately spread the rumour that I was going to expel all British priests and replace them with Russians.'[57]

The greatest driver of Russification was simply the huge demographic shifts in the diocese.[58] After Bishop Hilarion's arrival, there was an attempt to make parishes more welcoming for newly arrived immigrants with the introduction of English classes and Russian cultural events. Some parish members resented this drive as veiled Russification.[59] Pro-Moscow supporters, however, were quick to point out that the 'ethnic jibes' they suffered at the hands of the supporters of Bishop Basil would not have been tolerated if they had been black or Asian. 'In order to understand the absurdity of such statements it is sufficient to change the word *Russian* into *blacks*. Can you imagine what would happen to any bishop of a western country who dared to say, I do not want to pray in a church with these black migrants, with Arabs or with Africans etc? The politically correct media would tear him to shreds, but of course it's ok to speak like this about Russians!'.[60] This perceived double-standard in dealing with Russians was, it was claimed, based on a Russophobic slant which permeated all the way down from the western media into the life of the parish, repeating cultural clichés and enforcing negative stereotypes.[61]

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[57] Statement of Metropolitan Hilarion, 06.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[58] Cf. Collins, R., 'Demographics and the Russian Orthodox Church in London' in Goodhew, D. and Cooper, A.P. (eds.), *The Desecularisation of the City* (London, 2019)
[59] Cf. OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Marks J., 'Compilation of Presbyters' Suggestions for the Diocese of Sourozh', op. cit.
[60] Blagon.ru, 'Kommentarii diakona Andreia Kuraeva k sobytiiam v Surozhskoi yeparkhii', http://blagogon.ru/articles/156/ [Accessed 25.04.18]
[61] OCAD. Thomas, Dr S. and Dean, A., op. cit. Also, Tsygankov, A., 'Psikhologicheskoe vospriatie velikikh derzhav v mire. Istoki rusofobii', *Vestnik RUDN*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2018), pp.186–96

A parishioner (herself Russian) wrote of the community being 'under attack' from the huge wave of 'neophytes' from Russia, people who militated for a Russian exclusivity 'in the most disgusting ways, physically pushing the local people, insulting them to their face, not to speak of pouring hatred and lies over our community in print and on the Internet'.[62] Even pro-Moscow parishioners conceded that some of the new arrivals constituted 'a very motley and complex crowd' (*ochen' raznosherstnaia i ochen' slozhnaia publika*).[63] The testimonies of the new arrivals themselves were also emotive. Another parishioner wrote with sarcasm of the rejection by the locals of the 'bare-faced girls' and 'young men with heavy-gold crosses who do not understand Florenskii or Berdiaev', and warned the anti-Moscow activists to remember their ancestors 'who had died in the Kuban and in the cellars of the Chekists'.[64]

The position of Bishop Basil in this area is not easy to define. His route to Orthodoxy had been ethnically varied (Greek and Syraic as well as Russian). His Russian was poor. He seems to have become more ambivalent towards Moscow as time went by. Accusations of Russophobia made against him were vigorously denied by the anti-Moscow parishioners.[65] Alexander Shramko pointed out that Bishop Basil had '*suddenly* became scandalous' to the Russian Church after his 'betrayal', in much the same way as the Church had '*suddenly* discovered' multiple irregularities relating to Metropolitan Filaret Denisenko following his falling fall from grace (i.e. that he had a wife and other

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[62] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. 'From a Russian Sourozh parishioner of 45 years' standing'
[63] 'Surozhskie nestroenia: vzgliad isnutry', op.cit, 05.09.06.[Accessed 27.03.20]
[64] Krivoshein, N. 'Kliriki i miryane o situatsii v yeparkhii', 25.05.06, http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=17 [Accessed 27.03.20]
[65] Cf. Teterin, A., Letter to Prot. Peter Scorer, 2006. 'Bishop Basil, who, judging by his words and deeds is increasingly "Russian hating"'. http://yakov.works/spravki/5_russia_ukaz/21_ru_bio/Teterin.htm [Accessed 26.03.20] Also Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2082349, 24.05.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. The author of this post published two documents, one from Radio Radonezh and the other from an open letter to the Commission of Inquiry. Cf. also Scorer, Prot. P., interview with Natalia Golytsina, Radio Svoboda, 13.06.06. https://www.svoboda.org/a/160895.html [Accessed 20.01.20]. For Fr Andrei Teterin's understanding of the situation, cf. *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1997523, 14.04.02 [Accessed 20.01.20].

scandals).[66] A statement from pro-Moscow parishioners broadened the supposed Russophobia out from Sourozh: 'The main target is the great and holy and especially revered Russian Church … The impression is given that the leadership of the Sourozh Diocese and the London cathedral have made it their goal to force the new arrivals here to forget that they are Russian and that their Church is Russian Orthodox.'[67]

When the crisis finally came to a head, this issue produced deep emotions on both sides. After Bishop Basil's announcement in church in May 2006 about leaving the Moscow Patriarchate, several bloggers reported cries from the congregation: 'Russians! Remember that you are Russians!' and 'We will not give up our church to foreigners!'.[68] According to several reports, a long-serving member of the parish who had smuggled bibles into the Soviet Union, and for this received an award from the Patriarch, was verbally abused, spat at in the face and told 'this is no longer your place'.[69] The same blogger reported that the English were told they were there only 'as guests' of the Russians.[70] All these claims were disputed by the pro-Moscow bloggers as pure fantasy.[71]

Although the majority of the accusations of extreme behaviour were made by the anti-Moscow group, they were certainly not restricted to that side. An English pro-Moscow blogger, for example, wrote that some of Bishop

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[66] Shramko, A., 'Tserkov bez territorii: o nedavnikh sobytiakh v Surozhskoi eparkhii', portal-credo.ru, *Lenta novostei*, 12.06.06

[67] Prikhozhane Londonskogo sobora, 'Gliadia iz Londona', 04.06. https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/ [Accessed 20.01.20]

[68] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2239930, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Cf. also 'Otkrytoe pis'mo Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia v Velikobritanii', 07.02.06. http://www.religare.ru/2_25805_1_21.html [Accessed 28.09.19]. This interesting letter, a riposte to Fr Andre Teterin by the Russian Christian Movement, reflected many of the thematic issues of this thesis: the accusations of Soviet-style agitprop, the influence of the Russian State, the objective of control of the diaspora. It also critiqued the accusation that the anti-Moscow group were determined to make 'Russians forget they are Russians'.

[69] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2240007, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]

[70] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2240317, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Cf. also Kirillova, I., 'Mnenie', portal-credo.ru, 2006. https://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=584 [Accessed 20.01.20]

[71] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2240057, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]

Basil's supporters 'took disrespect to another level' during the diocesan conference that immediately followed the schism, shouting at Archbishop Innokenty, interrupting his speech, making gestures at him and calling him a KGB spy. For this parishioner, this behaviour was a great insult 'to all those who have suffered under communism and held their faith'.[72] Such events are disputed, but whether they really took place as described or not, the point here is that relations between the two sides were at such a low ebb that people felt they *could* have been true.

Jeering, pushing, spitting; this may seem a surprising description of a modern church congregation in Britain. But such animosity is observable elsewhere in the Orthodox Church when jurisdictions and denominations collide. Physical battles involving both clergy and laity in the shared sites in the Holy Land are still an occasional problem, and the tense situation in Ukraine, where Latin Catholic, Uniate and various Orthodox jurisdictions overlap, often erupts into violence, some of it serious.

Reports of events such as those described above, coupled with the large numbers of the new arrivals, encouraged the anti-Moscow group in their fears of being 'swamped' and 'invaded'. A blogger calling themselves 'A Worried Orthodox Christian' wrote, 'The new Russians invaded the London Parish by sheer numbers, easily outnumbering the "older" parishioners by 50 to 1, and possibly double or even triple that. Suddenly the "older" parishioners realised they had been pushed aside and even pushed out.'[73] Alexander Shramko wrote that that the Russification of Sourozh was inevitable and was happening across the diaspora through people who, though far from the Church at home, were drawn to it now they were abroad as a 'national club'.[74] He went on to make

[72] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 16.06.06
[73] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 03.06.06
[74] Shramko, A., 'Russkie idut', *Tsarkva*, 24.11.07. https://churchby.info/rus/164 [Accessed 19.05.20]

the link between nationality and Orthodoxy, stating that for these people, 'the uncomplicated logic is developed, Russian means Orthodox and so if its "more Russian" so it must be "more Orthodox"'.[75] An article on portal-credo.ru also emphasised that the neophytes in Sourozh were not generally churchgoers in the Motherland, but only sought out the church abroad as a familiar cultural support, stating, 'And here one must speak clearly – they are precisely drawn to the *Russian* Church and not to Orthodoxy.'[76] The poet Boris Kolymagin, commenting on the crisis from within Russia wrote of, 'this new wave of Sadducees who see in the Church only a combination of ritualistic services and a cultural-nostalgic centre for "connection to the Motherland"'.[77]

Whether or not there was a deliberate policy of Russification of the diaspora by Moscow is difficult to ascertain. What is important is that this was felt to be the case by the anti-Moscow parishioners. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, local events were coupled with strong rhetoric from the centres of power of Church and state, and while the term 'Russification' was itself avoided, there was much parallel terminology. 'Russification' is an emotive word with associations with late-Imperial Russian policy in the Baltic States and Ukraine, and the even more violent actions of the Soviet state in these areas. The aim in both cases was to supress local cultures deemed potentially harmful to the unity of the empire. Russification, especially under the Soviets, would result in millions of victims, and so for some in Sourozh, Russification had connotations of powerlessness in the face of an innumerable foe. In turn, those accused of Russification in Sourozh also felt outnumbered and on the defensive in a foreign land.

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[75] Shramko, A., ibid. (author trans.)
[76] Cf. portal-credo.ru, 'Mezhdunarodnaia Tserkov' dlia russkikh'. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=204 11.04.2003 [Accessed 20.01.20]
[77] Kolymagin, B., 'Saddukei na marshe', 05.06.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=fresh&id=483 [Accessed 08.02.20]

Theme 4: Conspiracy Theories

On 19 June 2006, a blogger called An Orthodox Christian wrote on *The Times* Online site, 'Something exceptional happened on the website of the Diocese of Sourozh; since the middle of May 2006 when Archbishop Innokenty was appointed temporary administrator – *A Russian flag suddenly appeared on its home page!* What is it telling us?'. To which the response came, posted by webarchdeacon, 'It is telling you that you are starting to read your Diocesan webpage in English. If you like to start reading in Russian, there will be a British flag proudly appearing next to the diocese name. Maybe it is a conspiracy too, and the "Hand of Moscow" trying secretly support British cricket team to get to you this way?'.[78] It is an amusing anecdote but had a serious aspect, from the outset, the crisis was – on both sides – rife with conspiracy theories. The paranoia seemed to mushroom in the new and unregulated online environment where much of the debate was conducted. An interviewee remarked, 'I had better to study the intricacies of group hysteria if I wanted to understand this crisis'.[79]

The behavioural psychologist Peter Kreko emphasised the role of conspiracy theories in simplifying chaotic and inconsistent events in times of crisis: 'conspiracy theories are cognitive, as they aim to provide the group and its members with an often satisfactory and comfortable explanation of the social and political world, its events and mechanisms … They help to dissolve contradictions, inconsistencies and dissonances, and they give simple deductive explanations to a broad range of complex phenomena.'[80] He also emphasised their importance in the creation and maintenance of group

[78] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 19.06.06
[79] Interview 1Ha
[80] Kreko, P., 'Conspiracy Theory as Collective Motivate Cognition' in Bilewicz, M., Cichocka, A. and Soral, W. (eds.), *The Psychology of Conspiracy* (London, 2015), p.65

identity, in the way they '[strengthen] group boundaries, provide an outlet to hostility and increase collective self-esteem, detect the threats against the in-group and help interpret the past in a way that fits the group's interests … and help manage the level of in-group anxiety when some unexpected events (crises, tragedies) occur.'[81]

The presumption of behavioural psychology that all conspiracy theories are unfounded does not leave room for the possibility that some conspiracy theories may actually be true, at least to some degree. It is always difficult to sift out the justifiable fears and truths of conspiracy theories from paranoia and inflation. In Sourozh, accusations often went a long way back in time, making verification difficult. Sometimes the conspiratorial accusations of the two sides were remarkably similar (even identical) and heavily laden with the profound suspicions with which the opponents viewed each other. The pro-Moscow group were 'KGB spies' bent on the destruction of the diocese; the anti-Moscow group were 'a Masonic clique' who had been plotting for years to remove themselves from Moscow's grasp.[82] Both sides focused on the supposedly mercenary interests of the other group. The pro-Moscow group spoke about the attempt to keep hold of (or seize, depending one's viewpoint) the highly valuable property following the schism. They also cast doubt on the sale of Pushkin House, insinuating shady dealings, and the intention to deprive Russians of a cultural centre.[83] The anti-Moscow group emphasised the 'fiscal greed' of Moscow in the reclamation of property abroad, stating that behind this plan lay the ever-present hand of the Russian State.

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[81] Ibid.
[82] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #53307, *Soobshenie* #1907853, 03.07.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[83] Shimov, I., 'Pushkinskii klub v Londone', 13.12.04. https://www.svoboda.org/a/24185701.html [Accessed 24.03.20]

Conspiracy theories of the anti-Moscow group

The main conspiracy theory of the anti-Moscow group was that the crisis was an artificial creation of a small group of activists working in conjunction with the DECR and the Russian State. The intention was to create a schism in order to purge the diocese of undesirable elements.[84] This theory was reiterated in the contested open letter of Metropolitan Anthony that identified the DECR as the instigator of the crisis and claimed that Metropolitan Hilarion deliberately avoided contact with the diocesan management:

> For you, they became enemies when in fact they are the preservers of the structure of our Diocese, who defend us from the DECR management, which many Russians do not trust because of the complex relations which existed and perhaps still exist between the Church and the State. Evidently, through you the DECR wants to manage the entire Russian Diaspora.[85]

Agreeing with this theory, one parishioner wrote on a Russian forum that, 'The troubles were deliberately organised, with support from the outside and this became the real reason for the impossibility of solving the existing problems and disagreements'.[86] In an earlier post, the same parishioner had been still clearer in writing that the pro-Moscow group were not at all interested in solving the crisis, but only in the creation of more problems and the further development of the troubles.[87] He suggested that the pro-Moscow group had panicked, thinking that the troubles might be 'on the brink of being solved' with the formation of new parishes specifically targeted at the new arrivals. This had led Moscow to invent still more schemes for causing disturbances.[88]

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[84] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2226599, 01.08.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[85] 'Otkrytoe pis'mo Mitropolita Antonia Surozhskogo…' *NG Religii*, No. 6, 21.08.02, op.cit. (author trans.).
[86] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2280662, 25.08.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 05.05.19]
[87] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2226599, 01.08.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 05.05.19]
[88] Ibid. cirota.ru

Hand in hand with these theories went personal accusations that people were 'fulfilling orders' from 'above' (presumably the DECR or the Russian State) and that people were not who they said they were.[89] Lists of names and 'key players' were published by both sides, but especially by the anti-Moscow group.[90] The online debates themselves came under suspicion, one blogger writing that, 'I'm afraid that the discussion on the forum has again become an organised campaign like an "artillery barrage" preceding the arrival into the Sourozh diocese of Fr Mikhail Dudko before Easter as the "auditor" from the DECR.'[91] The anti-Moscow group often used such militaristic descriptions with an obvious nod towards the Cold War and the KGB. A parishioner spoke of 'the divisive activity of the "militant Russians" who follow the traditional techniques of Soviet propaganda professionals by encouraging the creation of enclaves of direct patriarchal rule.'[92]

Finally, there were insinuations of Russian mafia involvement in the crisis. London had become the second home of wealthy Russian businessmen, who were able to make donations to church funds well beyond the means of any of the locals. Vladimir Potanin was one donor and Roman Abramovich's children were baptised in the cathedral.[93] Oleg Deripaska's donation of a million pounds to the Manchester church (a small local parish) was portrayed in the British media as a kind of stealth takeover by the Russians, in light of the fact that the parish had supposedly changed jurisdictions following the donation.[94] Although this switch of jurisdictions turned out to have been mistakenly reported, nevertheless it does seem that towards the end of the

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[89] E.g. cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2164250, 02.07.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[90] Cf. Kobelev, V., 'Kto stoit za statei dvukh surozhian: russkaia partia v Surozhskoi eparkhii'. https://credo.press/36695/ [Accessed 08.02.20]
[91] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2082068, 23.05.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[92] OCAD..'From a Russian Sourozh Parishioner …', op. cit.
[93] Konovalov, V., Article, *Trud*, No. 186, 12.10.07
[94] Vallely, P., *The Independent*, 11.02.09

crisis, the Manchester parish did become the centre of pro-Moscow resistance to Bishop Basil in the UK.[95] This attention to and fear of the new wealth was reflected in Bishop Basil's letter to the Moscow Patriarch dated 1 May 2006.[96] He also claimed on the BBC that the crisis was a 'premeditated plan' of Moscow's to ensure that the Diocese be 'under their strict control'.[97]

Conspiracy theories of the pro-Moscow group

The pro-Moscow group also claimed that the schism had been prepared in advance and in fact long before the events of 2006. A ROCOR priest wrote that Bishop Basil had mentioned switching jurisdictions as early as 1982.[98] The principal conspiracy theory of the pro-Moscow group was that the crisis was an artificial creation of a small but powerful clique centred around Bishop Basil, who would do anything to preserve their power and interests.[99] Bishop Basil's removal of the pro-Moscow supporters from the parish council was perceived as an attempt to amend the Trust deeds to ensure control of the property following any schism.[100] A priest who remained in Sourozh commented, 'It makes you wonder whether they were planning what happened when Metropolitan Anthony was called to his reward…the idea was that Basil would take over.'[101]

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[95] Kirillova, I., 'Mnenie', portal-credo.ru, 2006. https://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=584 [Accessed 19.01.19]

[96] OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Bishop Basil Osborne, Open Letter, 01.05.06

[97] Bishop Basil, BBC interview, op. cit.

[98] 'In 1982 the then Fr Basil Osborne, whom I had first met when he was a young deacon in 1972, told me that the clear intention of the ruling clique of liberal academics in Sourozh (mainly convert clergy) was to "go over to the Greeks" as soon as Metr Antony was dead.' Interview 1C. Cf cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2280530, 25.08.06. 'The schism with the Moscow Patriarchate was prepared long ago and the decision about the move to the Patriarchate of Constantinople in any case would have been taken regardless of the development of events'. (author trans.)

[99] Interview 1A, 'I think MA was manipulated, he was very old and ill.' And interview 1C

[100] Cf. Chapter 2 on property disputes

[101] Interview 1A

A parishioner related in an interview how, as a relative neophyte to Sourozh at the time and as an Englishman, he was swept up in this air of intrigue while attending meetings in key parishioners' houses.[102] Later he wrote publicly, 'Why was a pressure group of English and Old Russian parishioners formed? What was the purpose of these meetings? Was the purpose of the meetings to discuss how to manipulate parishioners?'.[103]

Pro-Moscow supporters stated that many of the supposed complaints were actually false flag inventions. They said they had never demanded that the liturgy be only in Slavonic and that this was part of a conspiracy to discredit them, citing Fr Andrei Teterin's offer to hold services in English.[104] The pro-Moscow group also published lists of names of supposed conspirators and their roles, and Metropolitan Hilarion himself wrote that in his view the crisis was a result of the activities of four or five people whose names he gave.[105] In the blogs and unofficial media, the insinuation was made that Bishop Basil was a freemason, and this was repeated several times during interviews.[106]

One cause for the generation of conspiracy theories on the pro-Moscow side was a feeling of exclusion from the centres of diocesan power.[107] There was increasing frustration about remaining unrepresented on all the decision-making bodies. Parishioners claimed they were not allowed to speak at parish meetings and that the labyrinthine web of English allegiances and social mores served to obfuscate and exclude Moscow's supporters. A feeling of exclusion from the traditional channels of expressing grievances led to an increase in petitions, open letters and blogs. One such open letter to the Patriarch dated

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[102] Interview 2D, 'I used to go to the house meetings of 30 -40 people who would talk about how they could control the church.'
[103] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 16.06.06
[104] cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2077328, 21.05.06 [Accessed 19.01.19]
[105] Cf. Alfeev, Hilarion, 'Surozhskaia Smuta', op.cit.
[106] Interview 2Ea
[107] *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, No. 1–2 (Jan 2004), pp.278–9

12 January 2003 complained that over 90 percent of the parish council seats were still 'English-speaking' and ended, 'We are tired of all kinds of secrecy at all levels of Church governance, craftily termed "confidentiality"'.[108] It was not only ethnic Russians who had these feelings. An English priest, who could be described as perhaps the most 'neutral' in the crisis, complained about the opacity of some of the diocesan council's activities.[109] He noted how meetings had been called without his invitation, as well as inaccuracies in the reporting of events.

It seems that both sides were convinced of their own conspiracy theories (one pro-Moscow supporter wrote that 'only a blind person couldn't see what was really going on in the diocese"[110]) and this was partly because there was an element of truth in both sets of accusations. For example, it was true that both groups had a small but motivated group of activists and a much larger group of less committed fellow travellers. Both sides did appeal to higher powers beyond the borders of the UK (Constantinople and Moscow) and used their connections with the media and establishment as best they could.

Another reason why the conspiracy theories arose and seemed so credible was perhaps the problem with communication between the two sides. Firstly, of course there was the language barrier, and added to this was Bishop Basil's reluctance or inability to communicate effectively what was happening. A parishioner wrote that the 'arbitrariness' of Bishop Basil was hard not to notice and that meetings called to discuss the situation were then cancelled

[108] 'Pis'mo prikhozhan Londonskogo sobora sviateishemu patriarkhu Moskovskomu i vseia Rusi Aleksiu', 15.01.03. Reprinted in *Khronika Suruzhskoi Smuty* (SP, 2007)
[109] Armour, Fr R., 'O deklaratsii chlenov Eparkhal'nogo soveta', 01.02.02. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=22 [Accessed 24.03.20]
[110] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2077328, 21.05.06 [Accessed 24.03.20]

without notice.[111] Another wrote that he never really addressed what was going on, apart from in his two-minute statement after the liturgy about transferring the diocese to Constantinople.[112]

Theme 5: The Media

Most reports of the crisis that appeared in the British media took a negative view of the new immigrants and the supporters of Moscow. The crisis provided an opportunity for the media to discuss the Russian Church and most of the articles (even those in scholarly publications) included many sweeping generalisations and clichés. An article in the liberal Catholic weekly *The Tablet* is a typical example: 'since the fall of Communism, the prevailing mood in the Orthodox Church in Russia has been increasingly inward-looking and exclusivist. It has attracted large numbers of new zealots, who often have no background in Orthodoxy, but are motivated by patriotism, a hankering after order and ritual, and conservative social and political values.'[113]

The media battle was not confined to the UK but quickly broadened out into Europe, the USA and Russia. The European media compared Sourozh with often-similar experiences in Russian parishes in France, Switzerland, Germany and Italy. A long article by Dr Gerd Stricker, critical of Moscow and entitled 'Moscow's Heavy Hand', appeared in the Swiss academic journal *Religion und Gesellshaft in Ost und West.* It listed the now-familiar accusations of a 'Moscow takeover' and suggested that Moscow had instigated the crisis for political gain.[114] The article described a similar situation in Vienna, in which the

[111] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2281542, 26.08.06 [Accessed 13.05.20]
[112] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2164989, 04.07.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 13.05.20]
[113] Hirst, M., 'Mutiny Against Moscow', *The Tablet*, 27.05.06
[114] *G2W*, 20.10.02, p.23ff.

newly appointed bishop Paul Pomianov had promoted 'post-Soviet crudeness' (*unkultur*) and 'tensions between old and new Russians'.[115] It ended by describing the DECR as the catalyst for this Russification.[116]

In France, where the diaspora battles were particularly bitter owing to the large number of Tsarist-era churches and parishes, Professor Nikita Struve became one of the leading spokesmen for the anti-Moscow campaign. His several articles on the crisis criticised Moscow's 'authoritarianism and clericalism' and lack of sympathy in dealing with the diocese's 'unique path'.[117]

In Russia, some liberal papers, such as *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, came down on the side of Bishop Basil, but they were the rarity. The intellectual Deacon Kuraev, who had one of the most popular blogs in Russia, expressed pleasure that the Moscow Patriarchate had acted decisively and firmly with Bishop Basil.[118] The crisis was seen more in terms of a power struggle in World Orthodoxy between Moscow and Constantinople, rather than as one between liberals and traditionalists at the local level. But however sceptical many clerics in the Russian Church may have felt about Metropolitan Anthony, overt criticism was muted owing to his fame and popularity.

The Sourozh crisis, which took place in 2002–2007, emerged at roughly the same time as the exponential growth of the internet was beginning, although it is important to remember that internet usage in 2002–2003 was far below that of the present (2020) level and prior to the explosion of the smartphone. The International Organisation for Migration Mapping exercise for Russians in Britain (2007) stated that 'More than 60% of respondents use

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[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Struve, N., Interview with Vladimir Volynskii, portal-credo.ru, *Lenta Novostei*, 21.06.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=545 [Accessed 09.05.20]
[118] Kuraev, D.A., 'Kommentarii Kuraeva' op. cit. Cf. the comments of Fr Mikhail Dudko, who was sent to the diocese as part of the Commission of Inquiry, to the effect that the treatment of Bishop Basil Osborne had been 'extremely soft'. Interview with Fr Mikhail Dudko. https://credo.press/70073/ [Accessed 20.01.20]

the Internet on a regular basis'.[119] However, the new medium was already by far the most active channel for receiving (and posting) updates. Reports also appeared in the established English and Russian daily papers, and there were several interviews and updates about the crisis on the radio in both the UK and Russia, including on the BBC. The story was at its most raw as it appeared in the unregulated online blog war, which is described below and provides an example of how the new technology impacted events. Sometimes the old and new technologies coincided, with one of the principal battlegrounds being the comments pages of online articles written by *The Times* newspaper's religious correspondent Ruth Gledhill.

Only those who were bilingual could post on both Russian and English sites and this excluded a large proportion of the indigenous parishioners, regardless of their allegiance. Sometimes there were issues about incorrect 'translations' being used to further the end of one side or the other. Metropolitan Hilarion posted a message correcting the translation of a speech he had made to the parish, writing, 'I was not appointed here as the successor of Vladyka Anthony, but as his vicar *to assist* him in administering the diocese'. He notes, 'Subsequently, these words, recorded on a tape recorder, were translated into English in such a way that it turned out that I came "*to manage* the diocese'.[120] Many documents were translated from English for the main Russian Orthodox news blogs, such as portalcredo.ru and the Kuraev forum (subsequently cirota.ru), but there was less translation from Russian to English. Indeed, it could be suggested that communicating in Russian provided some 'cover' for the Russian-speaking, pro-Moscow supporters, who often spoke 'more freely' when on Russian-language media than in the English language.

[119] IOM Mapping Exercise, p.14. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/russia/iom_russia.pdf
[120] Alfeev, Metropolitan H., Statement. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.05.19]

An example is the interviews and articles by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev after the crisis in 2002, which he complained were translated unofficially and not removed.[121]

At the eye of the storm were the diocesan websites sourozh.org and dioceseinfo.org. The second website only appeared after the forced resignation of Bishop Basil, because on 15 May 2006 he found he could no longer edit sourozh.org. The new website was speedily set up and provided the main platform for announcements from Bishop Basil and his flock.[122]
The old Sourozh site continued with official pronouncements from the Patriarchate and the investigative commission, as well as updates and comments from parishioners. What might be termed an information war then developed between the two websites, with the preferred medium being personal anecdotes and open letters, mixed in with practical information for the parish.[123]

English-language media

Prot. Peter Scorer mentioned in an interview in Russia that there was less interest in the Sourozh story in the UK, even though events took place there.[124] This was mainly the result of the very small number of Russians (or other) Orthodox living in the UK, but it also highlighted the secularisation of British society that had taken place since the war – religious stories of any kind were considered rather un-newsworthy.[125] Nevertheless, the story did reach the BBC

[121] OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Doc 7, Posted in Letters to the Editor, 28.12.02
[122] News statement, 29.05.06. https://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=209353 [Accessed 07.04.20]
[123] 'Raba Bozhiia Mariia (v Surozhskoy yeparkhii s 1995 g.)', 20.05.06, http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=4 [Accessed 20.01.20]
[124] Interview with Prot. Peter Scorer, 08.10.07. 'Protodiakon Petr Skorer: So vremenem iskrennie posledovateli mitropolita Antoniia v Velikobritanii i vo vsei Yevrope soberutsia vmeste', 08.10.07, http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?id=16322&s=5&ss=2 [Accessed 20.01.20]
[125] Cf., Secularism.org, 'Survey: UK is one of the least religious countries in the world', 13.04.15 http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2015/04/survey--uk-is-one-of-the-least-religious-countries-in-the-world

and all the major broadsheets, and the stance was generally critical of Moscow.

The old dissident platforms such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the BBC Russian Service, and more recent channels such as Open Democracy published much about the crisis. As might be expected, this coverage was generally critical of Moscow. The anti-Moscow group had the advantage of long-standing connections with the BBC through Metropolitan Anthony and Fr Sergei Gakkel, who had both broadcast on the BBC's airwaves, along with parishioners who had worked there. As with other British media outlets, the BBC's stance on the crisis was generally anti-Moscow.

Soon after his forced resignation, Bishop Basil was interviewed on BBC radio. His interviewer was antagonistic towards Moscow in a rather open way.[126] The tone of the following examples was typical the questions posed:

- 'Why would Moscow be so interested in dividing the parishioners and the priests that had existed there for so many years, thus really undermining the life of the diocese? Why would they be interested in that?'
- 'This Father Andrei Teterin and sort of group of people … started writing and being rebellious, what happened?'
- 'He [Father Andrei Teterin] wouldn't dare do it in Russia?'
- 'Was he [Father Andrei Teterin] sent to you from the Moscow Patriarchate with this behaviour in mind? [To this question Bishop Basil

[Accessed 20.01.20]. Ruth Gledhill, who did report extensively on the crisis for *The Times*, was the last full-time religious correspondent for a national newspaper in the UK. Now there are none.

[126] The interviewer had made no secret of her personal stance, writing on the website opendemocracy.com, 'It's about time the world was told the true story about the way the Sourozh Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church in UK was butchered by the Moscow Patriarchate, and the way the priceless Russian Service of the World Service was destroyed.' Sumovitch, I., 'BBC Russian Service: farewell to old friends', 31.01.11 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/irina-shumovitch/bbc-russian-service-farewell-to-old-friends [Accessed 28.09.19]

was forced to admit that Fr Andrei had in fact been personally chosen and invited by himself.]

Even on Russian portals, there were interviews in a similar vein. When Prot. Peter Scorer was interviewed for the Russian website portalcredo.ru, the interviewer asked him, 'Perhaps the DECR also fanned the flames of discontent in the diocese?'.[127] The pro-Moscow supporters could do nothing about the support given to their opponents by the BBC save likewise complain about it on Russian media channels. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev wrote that Fr Sergei Gakkel, 'has for many years whilst working at the BBC in his programs systematically poured mud upon the hierarchy of the Russian Church, reproducing the slander and lies spread by the Western media'.[128]

The broadsheets were more neutral, but a generally anti-Moscow perspective can be identified here too.[129] Ruth Gledhill's articles in *The Times* attempted to be even-handed and to give the opposing view, while at the same time employing language that sometimes undermined this neutral stance. For example, an article of 17 May 2006 wrote that, 'The Moscow Patriarchate has set up a commission to look into *what it is calling* "a crisis" in the Russian Orthodox Church in Britain.'[130] It is a minor point, but such nuances cast doubt on the purported impartiality of much of the British media. The language of all channels in the UK was heavily laden with such euphemisms and innuendos. The Russian channels were more direct in their partisanship, perhaps reflecting the cultural differences previously discussed.

There was one other UK online source for information during the crisis and this was the blog of Fr Andrew Phillips, a parish priest in East Anglia, in the

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[127] Intervieu: Protodiakon Petr, 19.06.2006. http://portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=news&id=44347 [Accessed 28.09.19]
[128]Cf. Alfeev, H., 'Surozhskaya Smuta', 2003, op.cit. (author trans.).
[129] Mimo, C., *The Independent*, 18.05.06, and Petre, J., *The Telegraph*, 30.05.06
[130] Gledhill, R., *The Times*, 17.05.06 (author's emphasis)

jurisdiction of ROCOR. He had the benefit not only of having known many of the protagonists personally, but also of being fluent in Russian and several other languages, having studied Russian at Oxford where he had met Bishop Basil and others of the British Orthodox intelligentsia. He had also lived in Moscow and Paris, so was acquainted with the day-to-day Church life in these places. It should be said that Fr Andrew did not at all hide his opinion of the anti-Moscow supporters of Bishop Basil. By way of example, a typical title of one of his essays was, 'Sourozh: Russian traditions without the Russian Orthodox Faith'. Fr Andrew saw the anti-Moscow faction as a small group of intellectual converts and descendants of White émigrés, who had gathered around Metropolitan Anthony. Having previously controlled the diocese, they had been shocked and dismayed when the 'real Church' arrived en masse on the doorstep of their churches. In his view, their religion was not Orthodoxy, but rather a mixture of High Church Anglicanism mixed with French phenomenology.

The academic and religious press responded to the crisis with several articles that were generally hostile to Moscow, such as those of Xenia Dennon (previously mentioned) and Phillip Walters.[131] When the court case took place in 2009, several years after the crisis, the story resurfaced. It has continued to reappear from time to time, usually because of external events affecting Anglo-Russian relations. For example, when the BBC closed the Russian Service of the World Service in 2011, an article by Irina Shumovitch appeared on the website opendemocracy.net. This article took perhaps the strongest of all stances against Moscow, beginning:

[131] E.g. Phillip Walters http://www.faithineurope.org.uk/power.pdf. [Accessed 28.09.19]

> In 2006 London's Russian Orthodox Cathedral was controversially taken over by Moscow Church authorities. The affair was typical of a wider strategy of infiltrating, appropriating, and/or destroying Russian cultural property abroad. Unfortunately, last week's cuts to another Kremlin target — the BBC's Russian Service — send out a message that the saboteurs have won yet again.[132]

It is interesting to note how this article immediately called forth another comment war on the internet, showing that the matter was far from dead.

Russian-language media

The internet media war in Russia was particularly intense and involved many clergy. In Russia, bloggers seem at first to have moved between websites, before each settling down at one site. This started to polarise the angle and debate of each website. The website portalcredo.ru (often shortened to credo.ru) did not have an open chatroom as at other sites, but instead published material collected from across the internet and elsewhere. It came under fire from pro-Moscow supporters for its supposed partisanship. Prot. Peter Scorer, however, who was interviewed by the website maintained that the reason why people complained was because it simply 'tried to give both sides' of the story and that 'some people didn't like that'.[133] He stated in the same interview that there was much interest in the story in Russia.[134] Largely, this was because of the great fame of Metropolitan Anthony in World Orthodoxy, but also because of the bitterness of the struggle and the near

[132] Shumovich, I., BBC Russian Service, 'Farewell to Old Friends', 31.01.11. op.cit.
[133] Interview with Prot. Peter Scorer, 19.02.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=44347 [Accessed 20.01.20]
[134] Ibid.

schism between Moscow and Constantinople that occurred as a result. Certainly, similar crises in Paris, Nice, Budapest and other cities did not call forth nearly the same degree of interest. In Russian Orthodox teaching manuals, the Sourozh crisis often appears as the example *par excellence* of enculturation versus newcomers.[135] Even the sensationalist Moscow tabloid *Moskovskii Komosomolets* published articles on the crisis, linking it to Boris Berezovsky and other expat Russian oligarchs, whose lives fascinate the tabloid readership in Russia.[136]

The liberal Orthodox site portal-credo.ru came under criticism from other bloggers both within Russia and without. A regular blogger spoke of portalcredo.ru as 'a group of maniacs who hate the Russian Orthodox Church' and who 'should be the subject of attention of Russian special services'.[137] Another commentator noted that it was 'simply not possible not to notice that they breathe malice towards Orthodoxy in general'.[138] Another wrote that 'on credo.ru is a lot of dirt'.[139] Such comments typify the heightened passions in Russia and the variance with the British debate. While it was true that portal-credo.ru published many articles critical of Moscow, such as the long article, 'An international church for Russians'[140], they also published articles such as the much-reprinted and strongly pro-Moscow open letter, 'Sourozh: a view from the inside'[141], in addition to articles from the official MP organ and pro-Moscow journal *Tserkovnii Vestnik*.[142]

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[135] E.g. Koslov, Prot. M., *Klir i Mir: kniga o zhizni sovremennogo prikhoda* (Moscow, 2010), p.343
[136] Bychkov, S., 'Pravoslavnye ushli po-angliiski: A mitropolit Gundiaev deistvuet po-berezovski', *Moskovskii Komosomolets*, 20.06.06
[137] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2115888, 08.06.06 [Accessed 04.02.20]
[138] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2134249, 17.06.06 [Accessed 04.02.20]
[139] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2134249, 17.06.06 [Accessed 04.02.20]
[140] 'Mezhdunarodnaia Tserkov' dlia russkikh', http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=204 [Accessed 04.02.20]
[141] Sourozh: Vzgliad iznutry', http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=17638 [Accessed 04.02.20]
[142] E.g. the article from *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, 24.05.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=monitor&id=8324

Some bloggers in Russia recognized the problems caused by their distance from the events in Sourozh and noted that it was 'almost impossible' to work out who was in the right, as both sides seemed to have grounds. But such even-handed comments were in the minority.[143] Russian chatrooms and comments pages were also used by participants in the crisis, which resulted in online communities developing an expectation of news from those on the scene. There were frequent requests to bloggers in London to 'tell us more news!'. One blogger, who passionately opposed Moscow, and was a frequent visitor to several blogs, stated that it was 'practically impossible' to understand this situation 'from the outside', and that in order to understand what was happening, 'it is necessary to live here and to live long enough to understand what is going on'.[144]

The Russian media were concerned less with the specifics of the Sourozh crisis than its impact on the reunification of the two parts of the Russian Church: the Moscow Patriarchate and the Church Abroad (ROCOR). This was a historical event of great importance to Russia, and the two issues, interconnected as they were, were often discussed together.

Similarly, the later stages of the crisis (or rather the post-crisis developments) caught the attention of the secular Russian media to a far greater extent. A long article in the *Moscow Evening News* on the 16 June 2006 led with photos of Bishop Basil, the Patriarch of Moscow and the Ecumenical Patriarch and the words, 'The most powerful Orthodox patriarchs in the world – Moscow and Constantinople – for the last 15 years, balanced on the brink of war'.[145]

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[143] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2067225, 16.05.06 [Accessed 08.02.20]
[144] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2282504, 26.08.06 [Accessed 08.02.20]
[145] *Moskovskie Novosti*, 16.06.06

The official ITAR-TASS News Agency published a great many documents and updates on the development of the crisis. As might be expected from a state broadcasting company, the agency was rarely critical of the pro-Moscow group in Sourozh. Personalities whose comments were reported on the site included the Patriarch, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev and Protodeacon Vsevolod Chaplin in Moscow. The latter's comments sometimes went to the heart of the matter, stating for example on 31 May that the Church 'will not be the Church unless she is able to combine different languages, cultures and private opinions'.[146] He ended laconically that, 'The Church would have died long ago if she had been transformed into a club for people who are nice to each other'.[147]

The anti-Moscow Russian speakers criticised the media portal clustered around the Moscow radio station Radonezh. An article by Mikhail Pozdniaev entitled 'Sourozh Destroyed', which appeared in the newspaper *Novaya Izvestia*, came out strongly against the Moscow Patriarchate and complained about the 'spirit of Radonezh' that now reigned in the Church.[148] The phrase was borrowed from an article by Prot. Peter Scorer, which stated 'They not only don't need Metropolitan Anthony in Russia, from the point of view of the authorities he is actually dangerous. Soon his books will disappear from shops; his works will be forgotten, and in England, in London, the "Spirit of Radonezh" will reign'.[149] The interview with Prot. Peter Scorer was only one of several such critical of Moscow.[150]

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[146] 'Protoierei Chaplin o konflikte Surozhskoi eparkjii', 31.05.06 https://www.newsru.com/religy/31may2006/chapline.html [Accessed 08.02.20]
[147] Ibid.
[148] Pozdiaev, M., 'Surozh razrushen', *Novaya Izvestia*, 19.06.06
[149] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2167405, 04.07.06 [Accessed 08.02.20]
[150] Cf. Kolymagin, B., 'Saddukei na marshe', 05.06.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=fresh&id=483 [Accessed 08.02.20]

An interesting insight into the crisis was provided by Yuly Dubov, who was interviewed by the opposition paper *Ezhenedel'niy Zhurnal*. Dubov was a close business associate of Boris Berezovsky and had made London his home, where he wrote Russian bestsellers about oligarchs. One might have expected him to take a dim view of Moscow's role in the affair, but instead he viewed the events as a simple human power struggle between individuals, writing 'I'm inclined to think that what happened was the consequence of a thoughtless struggle for who will be top in the house – "We're more numerous" say the "New Russians", "and that means we will impose our will". "But we were here first!" reply the "Old Russians"'.[151]

The Muscovite intellectual/academic press was largely against Moscow in the crisis – a classic example of this being the previously mentioned long article in the *Russian Journal* by Alexander Shramko entitled 'The Russians are Coming! Are the Fears of Western Orthodox Justified?'.[152] The article tied the events into the new search for Russian identity after the collapse of communism, locating it in the newly resurgent drive of neo-Slavophile internationalism. The article went on to criticise the conservative and traditionalist Orthodoxy of the Church in Russia while praising the liberal Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony, open to modernity and pluralism.

The interest did not disappear after the events themselves had receded from the newspapers. On 26 September 2006, Nikolai Bobrinsky published an article in the journal *My v Rossii i zarubezh'e* entitled 'Sourozh after Sourozh: Impressions of an Outside Observer', in which he visited the cathedral on a trip from Moscow, noting that everything was much the same as it had been

[151] Dubov, Iu., 'V raskole vinovaty vse, i vladika Vasilii ne iskluchenie', 16.07.06, *Ezhehedel'nyi Zhurnal,* 16.06.06 (author trans.). http://www.ej.ru/vision/entry/4062/ [Accessed 20.01.20]
[152] Shramko, A., 'Russkie idut', *Russkii Zhurnal*, 25.10.07, op.cit.

before, but that there was a certain 'upset and disquiet' due to the fact that the schism had 'divided close friends' and 'destroyed life' in the parish.[153]

Analysis of the Media

In conclusion, it can be said that the reports in the Russian secular media reflected positions in Russian society at large and that religious media channels reflected divisions in the Church. In this respect, the debate in the Russian media was more diverse than that in the West which, as we have seen, presented a more unified anti-Moscow approach to the crisis. The reports that emerged in the Russian media also reflected the 'media savviness' and available resources of their authors. For example, in the religious media there were many articles taking an anti-Moscow and pro-Bishop Basil stance, because support for the latter came from the small but active group of liberal-leaning Russian Orthodox intellectuals. The members of this Moscow-based group saw themselves as the spiritual children of Metropolitan Anthony and similar figures in Russia, such as Frs Alexander Men, Alexander Ogorodnikov and the Biblical scholar Fr Giorgy Kochetkov.[154] The Moscow church of SS Kosmas and Damien is the spiritual centre of this group,[155] which has been at odds with the conservative tendency in the Church ever since the 1990s in much the same way as the Sourozh parish of Metropolitan Anthony came into conflict with Moscow. The new arrivals in Sourozh who complained that the practices there were alien to those they knew in Russia need only have gone to the church of SS Kosmas and Damien to witness, in a Russian parish;

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[153] *My v Rossii i zarubezh'e*, No. 4 (2006)

[154] Dudarev, A., 'Smena Tserkovnoi Normy?', http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/personalities/6435/ [Accessed 20.01.20]

[155] The church of SS Kosmas and Damien is also known as the artists and writers' church and was where the spiritual mission of Fr Alexander Men was continued by his disciples. Cf. Burke, D., 'The Russian Orthodox Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian', *Anglican and Episcopal History*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 401–407

experiments with the vernacular, a much greater emphasis on the role of women and the laity, along with ecumenical activity and a very developed program of social outreach. Several key figures in this parish were the spiritual children of Metropolitan Anthony and seminars on his legacy still take place there regularly.

A study of this group of Muscovite Orthodox intellectuals would be a thesis of itself. Some moved to the mainstream, conservative Church, but many drifted away from religion altogether or, like the dissident Fr Gleb Yakunin, left canonical Orthodoxy to join schismatic groups. Nevertheless, at the time of the crisis and even today they are still a force to be reckoned with in terms of their social activity and media presence. As many were writers, their media output was greatly disproportionate to their numbers and it would be easy, if evaluating the crisis on the evidence of the Russian media alone, to assume that much of the Church was against Moscow's actions. In fact, it is probably fair to say that the great majority of churchgoers in Russia were either unaware of the crisis, and, if they had been aware, would have supported Moscow against Bishop Basil.

The intellectual-liberal Orthodox in Russia took such an interest in the story because they themselves felt threatened by the Patriarchate. Although the parish of SS Cosmas and Damien has support from the head of the DECR, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev,[156] Fr Kotechtkov has been withdrawn from his parish and forbidden to teach. Other Orthodox intellectuals, sometimes critical of the official Church, such as the famous Deacon Kuraev, have been in constant trouble with the Patriarchate. There have been attacks on – even

[156] Cf., Metroplitan Hilarion's 2012 sermon at the church of SS Kosmas and Damien in which he praised it as 'a model parish'. 'Mitropolit Ilarion sovershil bogosluzhenie v stolichnom khrame sviatykh Kosmy i Damiana v Shubine', 07.04.12, http://www.hilarion.ru/temple/mitropolit-ilarion-sovershil-bogosluzhenie-v-stolichnom-khrame-svyatykh-kosmy-i-damiana-v-shubine.html [Accessed 20.01.20]

murders – of such figures, most notably that in 2013 of Fr Pavel Adelheim, a Gulag survivor who had written a book critical of verticality in Church governance.[157] In addition, there has been a low-intensity campaign against Orthodox intellectuals throughout the clergy and grassroots. On 5 May 1998, an (in)famous book burning took place in Ekaterinburg at the instigation of the local bishop. Works by Alexander Schmemann, John Meyendorff, Nikolai Afanasiev and Alexander Men were confiscated from teaching establishments and publicly burned as liberal and heretical texts. Most mainstream churches will contain multiple religious pamphlets deploring modernism, liberalism, ecumenism, modern dress, intellectualism, westernism, feminism and homosexuality. All of this has led to the Orthodox intelligentsia in Russia feeling embattled, and their coverage of the Sourozh crisis offered an opportunity to express those fears.

Finally, sometimes the press organs themselves attempted to affect the crisis through a careful editing of events. An example was the publication of the two pivotal open letters of Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev in the Russian newspaper supplement *NG Religii*. Metropolitan Hilarion's words speak for themselves:

> The editors of the newspaper *NG-Religii* received an open letter from Vladyka Anthony. The newspaper employees did not show me this letter, but they reported that they were preparing material on the conflict in the Diocese of Sourozh and that they already had material sent by the diocese, and asked if I would like to state my point of view on the situation. I provided them with material which they published with abbreviations. But in parallel, they printed a letter from Vladyka

[157] Krotov, Ia.,'Ubiystvo pskovskogo sviashchennika Pavla Adel'geima - sluchaynost' ili zakonomernost'?'10.08.13, https://www.svoboda.org/a/25067480.html [Accessed 20.01.20]

> Anthony, with which I was not acquainted. It looked like Vladyka Anthony had written in answer to my material. In fact, neither he saw my text, nor I his. The dialogue was, if you like, 'staged'. But the result was the way journalists wanted to see it.[158]

As is often the case, journalism on both sides was interested in promoting the polarised drama and conflict of the events, rather than exploring the nuances of similarity and difference.

[158] Online Archive Caves Monastery Kiev. http://pml.org.ua. Interview with Metropolitan Hilarion, 02.20.02 (author trans.). 'Interv'iu episkopa Podol'skogo Ilariona (Alfeyeva),predstavitelia RPTS pri Yevrosoiuze ofitsial'nomu saitu Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry', http://pml.org.ua/userfiles/library/autors/%5Balfeev_ilarion%5Dintervyu_episkopa_podolskogo_ilariona_%28alfeeva%29%2C_predstavitelya_rpts_pri_evrosoyuze_ofitsialnomu_sajtu_kievo-pecherskoj_lavry.pdf [Accessed 06.05.19]

Chapter 4 Enculturation and Preservation: Praxis and Devotion

Differences between the two sides in Sourozh were perceivable in 'ingrained' behaviour and devotional habits. These themselves were sometimes related to background, education, and class. Some of these tensions already existed within Russia but were heightened by the diaspora situation. The insecurities of émigré life can accentuate and entrench customs and beliefs which are taken for granted in the Motherland.[1]

Theme 1: Social Class

In addition to divisions along ethno-linguistic and political (traditionalist versus liberal) lines, there were perceived differences of social class in Sourozh. However, participants in the crisis tended to refer to class only obliquely, as reference to it was uncomfortable for both parties.[2] While it was true that Metropolitan Anthony had been a great missionary to the English, it was also undeniable that many converts came (in the words of a Sourozh priest) 'from a very particular class from the British Establishment'.[3] Converts were often Oxbridge-educated High Church Anglicans or Anglo-Catholics.[4] These people mixed easily with the first wave of post-Revolutionary émigrés, but they were less attuned in behaviour and attitudes to the Russians arriving from the mid-1990s.[5] A Russian parishioner wrote in the comments page of *The Times* Online, 'Bishop Basil and his supporters have always wanted their "British Church" free from things Russian and "foreign". Unfortunately, this group has

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[1] By comparison, several studies of Muslim and Hindu diaspora communities have noted how émigré life can emphasise conservative practices (such as Sharia law and the caste system) as communities resist the cultural pressures of their new homeland. Cf. Banerjee, Dr. C.,'Identities, Diasporas, Cosmopolitanisms, and the Possibility of Global Humanities', *Contours Journal*, Issue 4: Summer 2014 and Gopal, P., 'Dominating the diaspora' , *Himal.com*, Apr 01, 2010

[2] Interview 2D

[3] Interview 1D and Interview 2Ea

[4] Interview 1A and 1C

[5] The close connections between the Anglican Church and the Russian Church over the previous seventy years had also laid the ground for this rapprochement. Cf. Kaznina, O.A., *Russkie v Anglii* (Moscow, 1997), pp.79ff

always had the support of the Russians who came here escaping the Revolution and who have always looked down on their "uneducated and peasant" compatriots who have come here during the past ten years'.[6] A ROCOR priest, who closely followed the crisis in his blog, wrote more plainly: 'The snobs of Kensington and Oxford did not want to mix with Russian "peasants" (or English or Serbian or Greek "peasants" for that matter). The same was true of some of the children and grandchildren of the old émigrés, who had aristocratic attitudes, even though they had largely lost their Russian language and culture … It was in so many ways an aristocratic mafia.'[7]

Differences were also identified concerning the educational backgrounds and interests of the various groups of émigrés. G.A. Bordyugov's and A. Kasaev's study of the Russian diaspora 1986–2000 pointed out that whereas the Church had been the absolute common denominator of the first wave of émigrés, the overwhelming majority of new émigrés (post the Soviet collapse) ignored the Church as well as cultural centres such as London's Pushkin House in favour of Russian discotheques and restaurants.[8] Having left Russia voluntarily and with no immediate desire to return, they were less interested in preserving Russian culture and more in economic betterment.[9]

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[6] OCAD. Times Online.

[7] Phillips, Fr A. 'On the Recent Troubled History of the Russian Church in London', http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/londonl.htm [Accessed 20.01.20]

[8] Bordiugov, G.A. and Kasaev, A.Ch., *Russkii Mir i Rossia: Formirovanie Novogo Tipa Otnoshenie* (Moscow, 2014), p.68. Also Bocharova., Z.S., *Fenomen zarubezhnoi rossii 1920-x g*. (Moscow, 2014), pp.243ff. Also Byford, A., 'The Last Soviet Generation in Britain' in Ferandez, J. (ed.), *Diasporas: Critical and Inter-Disciplinary Perspectives*: 'The Orthodox Church is no doubt an important focus of "community" for some migrants, but it is by no means capable of acting as a pillar of this "diaspora" as a whole. The establishment of a more stably funded, formally independent, Russian cultural centre (Pushkin House on Bloomsbury Square in London) is so far proving to be a success, but it is often perceived as somewhat elitist, while its size cannot compare with the state-funded cultural centres of other developed nations.'

[9] Cf. Lazarashvili, V., 'At Home in Limbo: Understanding the Role of the Community of Russian Christian Orthodox Church in Amsterdam in Psychosocial Well-being of its Members with a History of Migration', Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2006. The author remarks on the 'cultural bereavement' of the first two waves of émigrés, which distinguished them from the third.

This point was somewhat contradicted by the 2007 United Nations International Organisation for Migration (IOM) mapping exercise on Russians in the UK, which stated, 'most Russians arriving in this country are well-educated and speak at least a little English. As a rule, they have no problems integrating into British society and participating fully in their domestic, social and economic environment'.[10] Perhaps more surprisingly, the IOM mapping report also concluded, 'The role of the Church, and the place of national holidays and celebrations were one of the recurrent subjects for discussion. The Church was commonly referred to as the centre of communal activity and the focal point for Russian society in the UK. The Church appears to be the first thing that comes to mind if people are asked to nominate the "first meeting place"'.[11] Such a statement seems to run counter to the secular zeitgeist of the West and also points to why the Russian State, as well as Church, would be so interested in diaspora parishes. Perhaps a reason for the contradictions above is to be gleaned from a survey of the Russian Jewish diaspora in Brighton Beach. The study concluded that the way that immigrants identified themselves was heavily dependent upon the surrounding culture and so 'diasporas do not necessarily emphasize the most cherished elements in their identity repertoires'. Rather, they select those aspects of their culture which will prove most useful in their new environment.[12]

A longstanding Sourozh parishioner singled out wilful departure from the Motherland as one of the main differences between the waves of emigration, distinguishing the earlier, forced 'exiles' from subsequent

[10] IOM Mapping Exercise, p.27
[11] IOM mapping exercise, p.27
[12] Laitin, D.D., 'The De-cosmopolitanization of the Russian Diaspora: A View from Brooklyn in the "Far Abroad"', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studie*s, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 5–35

economic migrants.[13] Statements from the Patriarchate and the Russian State sometimes bemoaned the fact that many of the most recent migrants were already losing their culture and their language, whereas third-generation émigrés often kept better ties to their roots.[14] The first émigrés were driven by the pain of nostalgia to preserve the culture of the land that remained forever closed to them.[15] But as the generations passed, even these people started to lose their Russian language and heritage. For von Schlippe, this was not to be too much mourned; enculturation was inevitable in order 'to avoid the permanent pain and burden of living in two separate worlds'.[16] Nothing could be further from the language of Patriarch Kirill and his 'Russian World'.

The shifts in social status of individual migrants, as well as of their Church, had traumatic as well as more positive effects on their lives in the Orthodox diasporas.[17] This was especially true of the post-war émigrés, many of whom had left behind fortunes and personal status. Such people often found the Church anew in their exile, but it was very different from the Church they had known in pre-revolutionary Russia. Great names of the Tsarist court – Sheremetev, Golytsin and others – now found themselves in humble surroundings, working as parish priests and taxi drivers.[18] Many looked back to the tradition of the Russian Church to uncover meaning in their new lives, far from the trappings of wealth and power.[19] Diaspora theologians rediscovered

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[13] von Schlippe, I., 'The Crisis of Exile', *Sourozh* magazine. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/history/?ID=18 [Accessed 30.03.20]
[14] Kirill, Patriarch, 'Vystupleniye Svyateyshego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseya Rusi Kirilla na Vsemirnom kongresse sootechestvennikov', 01.12.09. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/955171.html [Accessed 20.01.20]
[15] Interview 2G
[16] Cf, von Schlippe, I., 'The Crisis of Exile', op. cit., p.99ff [Accessed 30.03.20]
[17] Cf.Haemmerli, M., 'Orthodox Migrations to Western Europe: The Painful Transition from the Glory of National Church to the Meekness of Religious Minority', *G2W* (Sept 2014)
[18] For Fr Giorgy Cheremeteff see: 'Reliogioznie deiateli russkogo zarubezhia' http://zarubezhje.narod.ru/tya/sh_042.htm and 'Graf Giorgy Alexandrovich Sheremetev' http://www.pravoslavie.ru/113783.html [Accessed 30.03.20]
[19] Cf. Gorodetskaia, N., *The Humiliated Christ in Russian Thought* (London, 1938)

the works of Archmandrite Feodor (Alexander Buhkarev), who had emphasised the material poverty and humility of the Church. In the words of Paul Valliere, '[for Bukharev] it is better for a church to be "weak but faithful" than outwardly grand but lacking in "active faith."' [20] This is a frequent criticism of today's Moscow Patriarchate, where clergy can arrive at meetings in fleets of chauffeur-driven limousines, and wealth-related scandals regularly appear in the Russian media.

The stoic readjustment to fate of these émigrés was one of their most notable qualities, and has been described by several writers, perhaps most movingly by Solzhenitsyn.[21] But such readjustments of status also affected those who arrived in later migratory waves. Often this was experienced as a diminishing not so much of personal *s*ocial standing, as in the status of their religion. As Haemmerli has pointed out, the transformation from worshipping in the national, state Church to an obscure denomination in the diaspora cannot but influence church life on the personal and social level.[22] While the White émigrés were forever grateful to their host countries for taking them in, the post-communist migrants had to readjust to the minority status of their Church, having arrived from lands where the Church was resurgent and powerful. For them, this new status evoked resentment and a defensive attitude towards their ethnic identity.[23]

The post-1991 economic émigrés were not entirely made up of the urban working classes. That they had arrived at the doors of the cathedral at Ennismore Gardens at all meant they had been self-selected from the 250–

[20] Valliere, P., *Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key* (Edinburgh, 2000), p.90
[21] Solzhenytsin, A., *Gulag Archipelago II*, (London, 1974) p.48
[22] Haemmerli, M., 'Orthodox Migrations to Western Europe', op.cit.
[23] Lebedeva, N.M., *Novaia Russkaia Diaspora* (Moscow, 1995), p.289

300,000 new Russian-speaking arrivals in Britain.[24] Many of them were graduates of MGU and other prestigious universities, as several were keen to point out in their testimonies.[25] The attitudes of young people and those in higher education in Russia still differ from those of their peers in the West. Irina Papkova noted that a survey of MGU students showed that 67 percent thought that 'sects' were harmful to Russia and 72 percent thought of 'Orthodoxy as the basis of Russian state and cultural traditions'.[26] By contrast, a British Social Attitudes survey of young adults aged 18–24 in the UK showed that just 3 percent identified as 'Anglican'.[27]

In the eyes of many of the previous émigrés, they were not so much *Russian* émigrés as 'sovietised people' or, worse, 'new Russians'.[28] Both terms had condescending class implications.[29] The sociology of class in Russia is complex, relating to the pre-revolutionary situation as well as the development of social class in the Soviet Union. In theory, the communist state had striven for a classless society – the 'unbreakable union of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia' enshrined in the Soviet Constitution.[30] In practice, however, there was an intricate system of social stratification, which was polarised between the nomenklatura and the military and economic bureaucracy at the

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[24] Cf. Byford, A., 'The Last Soviet Generation in Britain' in Ferandez, J. (ed), *Diasporas: Critical and Inter-Disciplinary Perspectives* (Oxford, 2009)

[25] E.g. Statement of Sourozh parishioner 25.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=14 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Also 'Kliriki i miriaane o situatsii v yeparkhii' 26.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=3 [Accessed 20.01.20]

[26] Papkova, I., 'Orthodox Religiosity among the Elite University Students in Russia and its Relationship to their Political Views', *Religion in Eastern Europe* 2 (May 2008)

[27] BSA Report 34 (2017)

[28] The idea of a 'Soviet mentality' is analysed later in the chapter.

[29] One interviewee noted how dress and language overlapped in this confrontation, 'The only Russian spoken by Metropolitan Anthony during some Sunday services was the announcement after the liturgy in Russian only not to wear stilettos in church.' Interview 2Eb

[30] Glava 3, stat'ia 19: http://constitution.garant.ru/history/ussr-rsfsr/1977/red_1977/5478732/ [Accessed 20.01.20]

top, and wage-labourers and farmworkers at the bottom.[31] Such a class system revolved mainly around renumeration and job security, but also to some degree around education, as the nomenklatura had access to the best schools for their children. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in the nomenklatura were able to retain their elite status through their control of the dismantling process of the Soviet system.[32] The concept of 'New Russians' that was born in the early 1990s caricatured such people as both rich and vulgar. The Church inside Russia was also affected by these changes.

The same accusations that surfaced in Sourozh were (and still are to some extent) to be found in Russia herself. Tobias Kollner and Detelina Tocheva researched the sometimes-strained relationships which can occur between those churches said to be built 'with gold' (postroena na zolote) – i.e. donations from businessmen – and those built 'with tears' (postroena na slezkakh) – i.e. painstakingly renovated by volunteers.[33] In Sourozh, the question of money reared its head in various ways. Firstly, an issue arose when parishioners asked to be paid for their labour, when previously all the cleaning and other chores had been carried out by volunteers.[34] Secondly, the new diocese became home to some very rich parishioners who were able to make substantial donations for renovation and even rebuilding, as in the case of Oleg Deripaska's donation to the Manchester parish. For the anti-Moscow

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[31] Zaslavskoi, T.I., *Sotsietal'naia transformatsia rossiskogo obshchestva. Deyatel'no-strukturnaia kontseptsia* (Moscow, 2002), p.96ff

[32] Cf. Pastukhov V.B., 'Ot nomenklatury k burzhuazii: novyye russkiye', *Polis: Politicheskiye issledovaniya*, No. 2, (1993)

33 Cf. Köllner, T., 'Built with Gold or Tears? Moral Discourses on Church Construction and the Role of Entrepreneurial Donations' in Zigon, J. (ed.), *Multiple Moralities and Religions in Post-Soviet Russia* (New York, 2011). Also, Tocheva, D., 'The Economy of the Temples of God in the Turmoil of Changing Russia', *European Journal of Sociology* (April 2014), pp.1–24 and Kollner, T., 'Pravoslavie nravstvennost' i raschet' http://www.colta.ru/articles/raznoglasiya/11654 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Cf. also Nikula, J. and Chernysh, M. (eds.), *Social Class in the Russian Society: Studies in the Social Classes and Social Change of Contemporary Russia* (Saarbrücken, 2010)

[34] 'In recent years, with numbers growing, the people doing the work were still the same old group, because the new Russian members wanted payment for it.' High Court Case No: HC07C03107, Section 56/21.

parishioners, both examples were thought to be at the cost of holistic, independent parish life.[35]

In reality, the new diocese was made up of rich and poor, educated and non-educated. This was undoubtedly so even if the overwhelming feeling of the locals was that the new arrivals came from the 'lower echelons' of society. The usually anti-Moscow journalist Sergei Chapnin noted that there were problems in Sourozh caused by a flood of neophytes into the diocese, but compared it to the situation in Russia in the early 1990s when parishes had worked to welcome the surge of new converts.[36] At that time the reputation of the Church in Russia was extremely high. This was because it was one of the very few institutions which maintained a living connection with Russia's deep cultural history. But it was also because she still held a certain moral integrity, despite the stories of 'collaborationist' bishops. Practically every village in Russia contained a ruined or dilapidated church. In towns, the plunder and destruction were even more obvious, so the suffering of the Russian Church was on display as a constant visual witness for all to see. The curious and unchurched masses poured into such decrepit buildings, often to be met by congregations of babushkas and elderly priests. The comparison with the 1990s became a refrain of the Sourozh crisis and of other similar later episodes. The Patriarch himself wrote that, in the 1990s, 'priests came face to face with a huge quantity of unchurched people, whose knowledge of religion was either rudimentary or zero.' He used the example to highlight the need to overcome the 'ghetto mentality' of the Church which was driving the curious away.[37]

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[35] Vallely, P., *The Independent*, 11.02.09
[36] Chapnin, S.,'Kto po zabotitsia o russkoi pastve?', *Tserkovny Vestnik*, May 2006 (author trans.)
[37] Kirill, Patriarch, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie* (Moscow, 2009), p.85

The situation was further complicated by the fact that class distinctions cut through ethnic and linguistic parameters, although one priest conceded that, 'a lot of people in the lower-skilled jobs are of course Russian-speaking'.[38] An English convert to Orthodoxy critiqued the anti-Moscow group on *The Times* Online with the words, 'Do we want a Middle-Class ghetto?'.[39] Social class was the subtext of many accusations on both sides. One English parishioner wrote disparagingly about the 'sumo-like girth' of ethnic Russian priests who spent their time at 'vodka-laced feasts'.[40] Very often the words 'club' and 'intelligentsia' were used to denote social class, just as was the term 'new Russians'. A pro-Moscow parishioner wrote to Bishop Basil, 'what you are doing now is constructing a Church which is a club for intellectuals and old émigrés'.[41] Another parishioner commented on gazeta.ru about the 'snobbish looks' which the followers of Metropolitan Anthony gave to the 'simple and rustic' people.[42]

Some of the tensions surrounding social class had existed long before even the revolutionary period. Far from disappearing because of the 'classless' Soviet epoch, they had in fact been accentuated. While the royal family have been rehabilitated in Russia and the reputation of the last Romanovs is high, the same is not true, in general, for the aristocracy, at least as regards Orthodox believers. Many Orthodox still blame the aristocracy and the intelligentsia for the westernisation of the country which, it is supposed, led ultimately to the Bolshevik coup. This mixed attitude mirrors that of the rural peasantry in the lead-up to the revolutionary period. It is also reflected in Putin's popularity in contemporary Russia compared to that of state officials,

[38] Interview 1A
[39] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 16.06.06
[40] OCAD. *The Times* Online, J. Karras
[41] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 02.07.06
[42] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #58412, *Soobshchenie* #2081975, 23.05.06 [Accessed 01.05.20]

particularly regional governors. Perhaps it is true to say that for 'ordinary Russians' suspicions of the aristocracy persist, and it was with the descendants of these people that such Russians came into contact in Sourozh.

The intelligentsia has had an even more problematic role in Russia, particularly within the Church. Public appreciation of the intelligentsia increased in the late Soviet epoch but has since decreased and not recovered.[43] It could be argued that the position of the intelligentsia in Russia had always been unstable, caught as they were between the autocracy and the peasantry, and subsequently between the party nomenklatura and the Soviet people. Neither their affiliation to Western liberalism nor to Orthodoxy was able to bring them the acceptance of the regime, the narod or the Church.[44] On the one hand, there were grassroots condemnations of 'rootless cosmopolitans', but on the other hand the Patriarch and the DECR frequently name-dropped Berdiaev, Kartashev and others. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev himself represented the lineage of artistic-intellectual Orthodoxy stretching back to Khomiakov and Kireevsky. As regards the Sourozh crisis itself, the efforts of Moscow to retain this strand of Orthodoxy can be seen in the open letters of the Patriarch and in their readiness to send some of their highest-achieving clergy to the diocese. Despite what might be claimed by certain hardliners, the mainstream hierarchy of the Church did not want to jettison the artistic-intellectual Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony. On the contrary, there was and is a desire in the Church to claim well-known figures in the arts and sciences to bolster the Church's intellectual prowess and to counter accusations of being a morbid and backward-looking institution. Such an

[43] Typical of the Church's recent attitudes towards the intelligentsia is Karelin, Arch. R., *Tserkov' i intelligentsia* (Saratov, 2009). Cf. also English, R., op. cit., and for a grassroots take on the question, *Mozhno li otdelit' tserkov ot zhizni?* (Danilovskii monastir, Moscow, 2002), p.22

[44] Sabirov, V. Sh., *Russkaia ideia spasenia* (Saint Petersburg, 1995), p.77ff

impulse can be perceived in the frequent mention by Metropolitan Hilarion of figures such as Arvo Part and John Tavener, the two most famous Orthodox composers of recent times, and both diaspora converts of the artistic-intellectual lineage.

In Russia today, the literary-intellectual current is manifest within the major Orthodox teaching academies, such as the St Tikhon Orthodox University. But even conservatives who critique these institutions and their theologians are also often ready to name and praise Orthodox stars in the arts and sciences when they arise. The conundrum for the Church is that while it proclaims a desire to cast its cultural net wider, at the same time a very narrow and insular view of the arts and education in general predominates among actual regular churchgoers. In the words of Mikhail Suslov, the Church 'wants to lower the entry barrier for cultural production to be considered as religious in order to claim that all Russian culture is essentially Orthodox, but by so doing, the Church has to admit that the best accomplishments of Russian culture gravitate away from religion'.[45] In short, a view of Russian culture which excludes Tolstoy (and even Pushkin for some ultra-conservatives) is only ever going to be acceptable to a tiny fraction of Russians. For those trying to broaden the Church's appeal, the Orthodox intellectuals of the Russian diaspora provide a way to extend the cultural remit beyond books by Tikhon Shevkhunov and Church music. Nevertheless, the small band of regular churchgoers both in Russia and in the diaspora remains in a kind of cultural ghetto in which actual Orthodox culture (Church music, icon paintings, religious literature) dominates at the exclusion of almost everything else, and

[45] Suslov, M., 'The Russian Orthodox Church in Search of the Cultural Canon', *Transcultural Studies* Vol. 12, Issue 1 (Nov 2016). Cf. also Simons, G., *The Russian Orthodox Church and Its Role in Cultural Production* (London, 2005)

attempts to broaden this out are met with resistance and accusations of neo-renovationism. In fact, as with other 'rigid' practices mentioned in this study, this is a relatively recent phenomenon. Even the devout family of the last Tsar liked to read Tolstoy together, collect contemporary European art and listen to western composers. This newfound rigidity towards the arts is in some sense a corollary problem of the caricaturising and polarisation discussed in this study.

Theme 2: Mentalities

Accusations of a new 'Soviet mentality' were directed at the new arrivals in Sourozh, with allusions made to the KGB and militaristic behaviour. A Sourozh blogger spoke of this Soviet mentality as the 'authoritarian desire to control everyone and everything', continuing, 'In Russia many parishioners like rigour combined with specific instructions for different occasions and frequently give up personal "freedom"'.[46] The expression 'Soviet mentality' presumes that this mentality (or mentalité to expand the term into its historiographical sense) is different from the previous mentality of the people of the Russian Empire and posits it against something else – something 'better and more refined'. It implies a mentality that is totalitarian, closed (fixed), ruthless and so on.[47] Yet how much is such a notion a historiographical invention? *Can* a mentality indeed be transformed in just a few generations? Or does this Soviet mentality owe much (if not all) to some pre-revolutionary mentalities?[48] It is easy to use a term like 'Soviet mentality' while assuming that everyone has a similar idea

[46] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1902718, Parfenov, Fr P., 'Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za rubezhom', 04.03.2006. http://www.cirota.ru/forum/view.php?subj=53307&order=desc&pg=10 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[47] Cf. Badmaeva, S.V., and Tmofeeva, E.K., 'Vlianie "rossiiskogo mentalitéta" na stil' rossiiskogo mendzhmenta', *Psikhologicheskaia nauka i obrazovanie*, No. 5 (2010)
[48] Vilkov, A., *Mentalityt krest'ianstva i rossiiskii politicheskii protsess*, PhD Thesis, Saratov (1998)

of what it means, and while this may be true, a historical deconstruction of the term into its parts is less easy. A careful analysis of the term reveals that it reaches to the very heart of Russia's post-communist dilemmas, referring to issues of continuity, class, guilt, power, and empire.

Those who could not accept the idea of continuity between Russia and the Soviet Union came from both the left and the right of the diaspora, and both sides spoke of a new Soviet mentality that had little to do with the Russia of old. But did Soviet Russia really sever all connection with the pre-revolutionary past? There is no doubt that this was at least the intention of the founders of the regime. As with other attempts at the creation of Marxist utopias in the last century, the aspiration was nothing less than a complete break with the old world and a transformation of human nature itself. Yet, even with the death and repression of millions of people, it seems that such attempts were doomed to failure. David L. Hoffmann in his study of Stalinist values concluded, 'The majority of the population learned to live within the system without accepting its collective values'.[49] It is true that many of the social mores of Soviet life came to ape those of traditional cultures, with prohibitions on abortion, same-sex unions and a strong promotion of the family and sobriety, but Hoffmann is also sceptical of attempts to marry Soviet and pre-revolutionary values stating, 'To describe Stalinism as a return to traditional Russian ways is to mischaracterise it in a fundamental way'.[50] Yet despite such a failure to engineer new humans, the brutal efforts of the regime to destroy the old Russian ways were not without success. For those who intimately knew the Russia of old, it seemed at the time that they had succeeded. From the liberal-intellectual side, this belief was exemplified in the

[49] Hoffmann, D.L., *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity* (Cornell, 2003), p.187ff
[50] Ibid.

work of Nabokov, for whom, in the words of Henry Grosshans, there was 'an historical rupture brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution. [Nabokov's] Russia is no relation to the present-day Soviet Union, and for him the clock of native Russian culture does not strike in our time.'[51] Instead there was a new 'Soviet man' who had broken with Russia and now lived in a banal vacuum. Russia had vanished and could not be reborn, living on only in the minds of a few wandering émigrés.

For those further to the right of Nabokov, true Russianness, which they agreed had been replaced by a Soviet mentality, was not preserved in the world of the émigré intelligentsia. For these people, the authentic Russian mentality was to be found only in ROCOR (and those groups that subsequently broke from it) and in the so-called 'Catacomb Church'. An interviewee, a priest-monk who had left ROCOR following the Union, quoted a conversation with an old woman in Russia who had said, '"It will take our people about two generations to get back to being human"'. The priest continued, 'It's true of the people in the Church too, they have been schooled in a way which is different from other Orthodox confessions.'[52]

The idea of a new Soviet mentality, born in the last century and still driving the Russian Church and society today, is common also for liberal thinkers. An essay by Petr Meshcherinov in 2012 castigated the Church for transforming Soviet patterns of thinking into Orthodox ones.[53] He painted a bleak picture of contemporary Russia as consumerist, amoral, corrupt, secular and irreligious, but also accompanied by a kind of, 'forced Soviet asceticism

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[51] Grosshans, H., 'Vladimir Nabokov and the Dream of Old Russia', *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1966), pp. 401–40

[52] Interview 2G

[53] Meshcherinov, P., 'Sovremennoe Tserkovnoe soznanie i svetskie ideologemy iz kommunisticheskogo proshlogo' in Malashenko and Filatova (eds.), *Pravvoslavnaia Tserkov' pri novom patriarkhe* (Moscow, 2012), pp.121–40

[and by the] unbridled development of all the supressed Soviet complexes'.[54] For Meshcherinov, the Church was at the epicentre of this conundrum, and along with Nabokov, he proposed that there had been a complete break with the past. 'If we assume a certain presence of "Holy Russia" in pre-revolutionary times, then it is absolutely obvious that this "Holy Russia" was destroyed in the Soviet period so much so that not a trace of it remains in any apparent or hidden form.'[55] In its place the new Soviet mentality mimicked real Orthodox values. Thus, *sobornost'* had become collectivism, humility had become civic passivity, and obedience had become strictness and uniformity in the 'fight for Orthodoxy', and so on. Other commentators have stressed that, for some, the Soviet mentality is not at all a negative concept. According to Alexander Shramko, such elements within the Church reject 'all that is not Soviet' as untrue, leading to a defiant stand against all other Orthodox jurisdictions.[56]

If we are to use and take seriously concepts such as 'Soviet mentality', they should be located within the broader stream of historiography. The history of mentalities has largely focused on pre-industrial belief systems in a consensual sense, for example, on the worldview of the medieval peasantry in the Mediterranean. The early Annales School historians, particularly Braudel, were interested in constructing mentalities as 'closed ideologies', over broader and deeper consensual cultural *ways* of thinking. But according to Peter Burke, 'there is no reason why a mentality should not be imputed to a social class or other group rather than to a whole society'.[57] Taking that one stage further, is there any reason why the history of mentalities should not form part of our

[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Shramko, A., 'Tserkov' bez territorii', 09.06.2006. https://churchby.info/bel/54/ [Accessed 01.04.20]
[57] Burke, P., 'Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of mentalities', *History of European Ideas*, 7:5, pp.439–451 (1986)

historical method for very recent and even contemporary events, especially when the clash of cultures is involved? Thus, when we use the term 'Soviet mentality', we might consider its journey from the pre-modern peasant mentality of the mass of the Russian population up to and beyond 1917 to its use in describing contemporary Russians in a negative way.

Some historians have suggested that while mentalities may seem to change over time, what is really happening is a replacement of one system by another, while emotional and subconscious paradigms remain the same. In the sense of the Russian (Slavic) peasantry it could work in broad terms like this: the schemata of the evil-outsider threat at the village-commune level in pre-industrial Russia became the internal-enemy threat (parasite, kulak, rootless cosmopolitan, etc) of the Soviet era, and finally the foreigner threat in the post-communist era. In this way, Oksana Morgunova has traced Russia's long tradition of 'othering' (ours – *nashi* – versus the rest) even in contemporary émigré discourse.[58]

Another mentality of the Russian peasantry, which was even more essential to their *weltanschauung*, was mutual assistance (self-regulation) through the commune (*obshchina*), specifically through the communal holding and redistribution of land.[59] As will be touched on in this study, this was seen by the Slavophiles as the tangible location of *sobornost'* – almost as a way of life, hence its immense importance to Russians even today. Up to the very eve of collectivisation, over 95 percent of peasant land was held in commune (and over 85 percent of the Russian population up to collectivisation were

[58] Morgunova, O,, 'Europeans, not Westerners: How the Dilemma "Russia vs. the West" is Represented in Russian Language Open Access Migrants' Forums', *Ab Imperio* (January 2006), p.392
[59] Confino, M., 'Russian Customary Law and the Study of Peasant Mentalités', *The Russian Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan 1985), pp.35-43

peasants). The proposed reforms of Stolypin and even of the Bolsheviks had failed. The communal redistribution of land – the *chernyi peredel* – had become so deeply embedded in the life of the peasantry that it could only be changed by complete annihilation – collectivisation – of their way of life and culture. It is fashionable today for historians to paint a very bleak picture of Russian peasant life, but while it was certainly brutal and unfair in many respects, the truth probably lies somewhere between the dark depictions of Gorky and the golden age presented by the Russian Church today. To modern historians, the essential, striking feature of peasant life was its communality. Land was redistributed according to need (and often against self-interest) by village elders and the commune as a whole. This practice alone created and sustained a communal integration mentality far beyond the comprehension of today's post-industrial West.

In addition, the commune was also integrated by marriage, Church feasts, communal agricultural labour in accordance with the extreme Russian seasons, the production of foodstuffs and many other practices, not to mention serfdom, which for centuries tied the Russian peasantry to their locality. The Soviet mindset/mentality was superimposed onto this system but did not take its place. Thus, many of the cultural collisions mentioned in this study, from pushing and shoving in church to communal petitions, can be traced back ultimately to a pre-revolutionary past – perhaps even a pre-modern past, because up to the eve of Revolution many parts of Russia *were* pre-modern. When the anti-Moscow group spoke of a 'Soviet mentality' were they in fact talking about a 'Russian peasant mentality'? When Meshcherinov, as above, critiques the wariness and chauvinism of today's Russian churchgoers as 'Soviet', is he in fact critiquing the Russian peasantry's antipathy to the outsider? This is interesting because many of those using the

term ‘Soviet mentality’ in a derogatory sense were themselves Russians, though either the descendants of the White emigration or the intelligentsia, or both. Thus, the huge divide between a vast peasant mass beneath a tiny westernised elite, which had imperilled Tsarist society for centuries, could (in a rather crude way) be said to have resurfaced within some parishes of the Russian Church in the diaspora.

Before we look at the term through the longue durée, what was meant (or rather *intended*) by it in ideological/historical terms? The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism unveiled at the Party Congress in 1961 focused heavily on mutual interdependence and support in its twelve ‘laws’. That being said, the very first rule was ‘Loyalty to Communism, and love of the socialist Motherland’. In Soviet lore, it was the Party that was infallible in the sense that it was self-correcting in a way not dissimilar to the Orthodox understanding of the indefectibility of the Church. So, while individual heresies might arise (be they Bukharinism or Uniatism), their downfall resided in their supposed rejection by the masses as well as by the infallible authority of the Party (or the Church). In Soviet terms, the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism had been laid out by Lenin in an unquestionable way. This black-and-white mindset was one of the most important accusations against the Soviet mentality. The ideal party member was at base a ruthless revolutionary who would not shrink from denouncing his own family (hence the cult of Pavlik Morozov) if they revealed counter-revolutionary leanings. In the march towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, there was no room for softer and more nebulous, intellectual interpretations of life and history. Similarly, when applied to Orthodox believers, Soviet mentality implies an intransigent and end-orientated mindset in which there is no room for *ekonomia*, debate or compromise. By its nature, such a mindset is anti-intellectual, but when the anti-Moscow group used the

term, they wanted also to exclude from it the pre-revolutionary peasantry who they considered to have had a much more flexible mindset than the Soviet Orthodox who had come to the Church in the later years of communism.

Another implied term of Soviet mentality is the notion of suspicion, or 'friend or foe'. The Soviet Moral Code also delineated a world of friends and enemies. Stalinism sought to elevate paranoiac suspicion to one of the chief virtues of a good communist. In addition to what the party was trying to do, the impact of Russian-Soviet history itself in the last century should also be considered. From 1900 to the 1960s, citizens of the Russian and Soviet empires endured an almost seamless march of traumatic upheavals: The Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), the 1905 Revolutions (1905–6), World War I (1914–17), the Revolution and Civil War (1917–22), Collectivisation (1929–33), the Great Terror (1937), World War II (1941–5), internal resistance wars in the Baltic and Ukraine (1944–mid-1950s), the Doctor's Plot (1952–3), Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign (1958–64). Each of these events was accompanied, in greater and lesser quantities, by physical hardship, mass repressions, famine, executions and other forms of death. Also common to all was the psychological trauma of social instability, fear, and polarising campaigns about 'the enemy within'.

How societies cope with such collective traumas has been the subject of much analysis, but it seems that even one such cataclysmic event can have deep and reverberating consequences, let alone the series of national tragedies that Russia experienced in the last century. Studies of how Cambodia has adapted to the legacy of the Khmer Rouge have noted the paradigm of 'demonisation followed by amnesia' as the nation struggles to move on and

memory fades.[60] Other studies of similar events have singled out the 'search for meaning' as one of the key drivers of the post-traumatic mindset.[61] Both the search for meaning and demonisation/amnesia impulses can solidify into simplistic paradigms and dichotomies as people attempt to make sense of seemingly mindless suffering. Archpriest Vladimir Fedorov linked a blame/demonisation impulse to a flight from culpability: 'Regrettably, in Russia it is still common to think that all negative changes are insinuated into our society by some foreign "enemies." The psychology and ideology of hunting for somebody else to blame … means the inability to practise self-examination and repentance is a fundamental obstacle for missionary strategy.'[62] Thus, in the Russian/Soviet case, the implication is that the Soviet mentality was a coping mechanism in response to collective traumatic events, which were not only multiple but sustained and even normalised. The ensuing defensive-aggressive mentality was thus a mindset in which external threats were located and subdued before they could unearth bitter memories.[63]

The Jesuit priest Ignacio Martin-Baro developed his theories of collective mental health during the brutal civil war in El Salvador, through which he lived (and died).[64] Most importantly for this study, he proposed five behavioural changes which resulted from the experience of war and other collective traumas:

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[60] Chandler, D., 'Cambodia Deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 99:2-3, 355-369 (2008)

[61] Hirschberger, G., 'Collective Trauma and the Social Construction of Meaning', *Frontiers in Psychology,* (10 August 2018). Cf. Igor Shafarevich's statement in *From Under the Rubble* (London, 1974): 'It is hard to believe that any country has ever suffered such a multitude of catastrophes as has been unleashed on Russia during the last half century. Surely, they cannot have been senseless and in vain? Involuntarily one looks for some purpose in them.'

[62] Fedorov, Archpriest V., *Winds of Change: An Orthodox Point of View* (World Council of Churches, 2010)

[63] Interview 2D

[64] Martin-Baro, I., 'Political Violence and War as Causes of Psychosocial Trauma in El Salvador', *International Journal of Mental Health*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Mental Health Aspects of Political Repression and Violence (II) (Spring 1989), pp.3–20

1. selective inattention and a clinging to prejudices
2. absolutism, idealization, and ideological rigidity
3. evasive scepticism
4. paranoid defensiveness
5. hatred and the desire for revenge

He suggested that 'people living under continual fear often become desensitized to violence, increasingly rigid and conservative in their beliefs, paranoid, and obsessed with revenge. Pent-up anger, combined with the frequent rumours that helped reinforce paranoid fears … can strike innocent scapegoats just as easily as actual perpetrators (including attacks on "witches," "heretics", or anyone else perceived as an outsider).'[65]

Other daily experiences of Soviet life that were less traumatic but also, by their relentlessness, affected the people in various ways were collected by Dmitry Mikhayev under the term 'humiliation'.[66] These included shortages and low wages which forced people to steal from their workplaces, accept bribes as standard and cheat to secure accommodation, education etc. He proposed Soviet society as bitter struggle for survival that institutionalised suspicion, resentment, fear, and anger. The result was an ever-present fear of anarchy (*proizvol*) and the construction of a complex network of in-groups engaged in a constant low-level war.

How was this Soviet mentality transformed as the new Russia emerged from communism? An interesting analysis of survey data in the study of Y. Levada compared changes in attitudes in the Soviet Union and Russia between

[65] Vitelli, R., 'When the Trauma Doesn't End: How Can People Learn to Live with Chronic Traumatic stress?', *Psychology Today* (29.05.2013)
[66] Mikheyev, D., 'The Soviet Mentality', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Dec 1987), pp.491–523

the pivotal five years 1989 and 1994.[67] In relation to the concept of fear, he observed little essential change in the top ten parameters. By 1994, fear of war had gone down from second place to seventh, but fear of the arbitrariness of the authorities [*proizvol vlastei*] had risen from seventh to fifth place, and fear of return to mass repressions had gone from nowhere to sixth place. In relation to the question 'What do Russian people lack?', 1989 saw a peak in self-criticism, with rude manners, laziness and lack of education being highlighted by survey respondents, but according to Levada's analysis, this period of self-criticism was very short-lived:

> And then it passed, as society came under the blows of state and political collapse. There is no desire to engage in self-criticism right now. Although we have not gone through the phase of serious self-criticism and self-repentance and will suffer because of this for a long time. Now we have entered the phase when people like to boast, and in the most primitive way to brag and assert themselves. It worries me when most people repeat that we have 'always had great achievements', great 'soul', 'the greatest culture in the world' and that we are ready to teach everyone … excuse me, it is a kind of complex.[68]

Such a description could almost have been lifted from an anti-Moscow open letter or blog in the Sourozh crisis. One pro-Moscow Sourozh priest stated plainly, 'The Russians have never known anything else. They've had this great gap of eighty years when everyone was absolutely dreadful to each other. Now they've all come into the Church not knowing any other sort of behaviour'.[69]

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[67] Levada, Y, 'Chelovek sovetskii: piat' let spustia 1989–1994 (predvaritel'nye itogi sravnitel'nogo issledovania). http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/517/678/1219/034_levada.pdf [Accessed 27.05.20]
[68] Ibid.
[69] Interview 1A

The place of the Church in the notion of Soviet mentality represents a further permutation of the post-communist malaise. Soviet culture was atheist and secular, so an accusation of 'Soviet mentality' implied that faith was not religious but a political, secular ideology'.[70] Accusations of having a Soviet mentality were most often made by those opposed to the Moscow Patriarchate, either from the left (Bishop Basil's group) or the right (ROCOR). For both groups, the phrase was a useful tool denoting the negative connotations of all the themes discussed in this study: rigidity, the cult of power, corruption, hypocrisy, cronyism, secularism, Russification.

How far these 'symptoms' (if present at all) were a result of recent historical events as opposed to the longue durée is beyond the scope of this study and may be an impossible question to answer. But an awareness of the existence of this debate is useful to our understanding of events. The author's opinion is that the concept of a Soviet mentality refers to a period that is of too short a duration. The great majority of studies of mentalities in the cultural-historical sense conclude that it is a concept of the longue durée. Brutal and destructive though the Soviet epoch was to pre-existing socio-cultural structures, far more important to the mentality of the Russian people, even today, were the long years of peasant Russia, the weather, geography, the autocracy and the Church. A detailed and perceptive thesis by Galina Tsigvintseva into the Russian mentality concluded, 'The worldview of Russians is still characterised by antimony and utopia … irrationalism and fatalism accompany the Russian on his life's path'.[71]

[70] Interview 2G ' the new Russian mentality which has been formed by the state'
[71] Tsigvintseva, G., *Osobennosti formirovania i funktionirovania mentalitéta russkogo naroda*, (Perm' 2005) (author trans.)

Finally, it should be said that not all the connotations of Soviet mentality were or are considered negative by Russians past and present. With the rise of Putin, the Soviet epoch was increasingly seen as a positive, even a golden age of camaraderie and security, in which a basic Christian morality prevailed. Putin has compared such things as the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism to the Sermon on the Mount or the Ten Commandments. Such a mixing of the Soviet and Christian was at the very heart of the problem for those who critiqued the Moscow Patriarchate both from within and without.

Theme 3: Behaviour and Dress

"There was an abundance of pious gesticulations, bowing and crossing, kissing the icons, prostrating and touching the ground with the forehead (sometimes with an audible thump), and bowing and crossing again and again, and by men, young and old, as well as by women ... there were a good many poor in and about the church, and beggars at the doors, to whom those passing in and out gave kopecks freely." [72]

– William Palmer (1840)

The English Slavophile William Palmer's lively description of a church service in Russia in the nineteenth century is little different from those of today. Especially on the big feasts, or even on a normal Sunday in a big city, there can be a huge crush of people all pushing in one direction or another. It can seem rather alien to western churchgoers, as it was to Palmer, who are habituated to sitting in silence or singing hymns. In addition, the norms of Church behaviour and dress in Russia or Greece today can be quite different to those

[72] Quoted in Wheeler, R., *Between East and West: The Anglican career of William Palmer of Magdalen 1811–1849*, PhD Thesis, Durham Univ (2003), p.103

that can be observed in diaspora parishes that have made concessions to modern life in the West. For diaspora worshipers some of this might even appear shocking, and this is what happened in Sourozh. There were frequent complaints of pushing and shoving in church, and of members of the congregation chatting loudly.[73] The noise and hubbub were particularly at odds with the ethos that had developed under Metropolitan Anthony, who encouraged prayerful silence in church. As early as 1994, he was compelled to admonish parishioners in a statement which is worth quoting at length:

> Our church was a place where people could find quiet and silence; not only the silence of people who would not talk, but the deep silence of souls that were standing face to face with God. In the last year this has changed, and many people have told us – not only the old members of the congregation, but people coming from Russia have told us how disappointed they were at the change that had occurred here in the last couple of years. People come into the church, and instead of standing by the door and realizing where they are – being there like the publican who felt he was unworthy of entering the realm of God – they enter, buy candles and begin to walk about irrespective of the moment of the Liturgy. So, I not only make an appeal – I tell you with all the conviction and all the authority vested in me, that this is inadmissible.[74]

The practices lamented by Metropolitan Anthony have been critiqued as representing a consumerist attitude to religion: laypeople arriving late, just in time for communion, an obsession with *my* confession, *my* communion, pushing ahead to light *your* candle, lighting candles between the cherubic

[73] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org, 'From a Russian Sourozh parishioner …', op. cit.
[74] Metropolitan Anthony, Archpastoral Admonition, 06.11.1994, Newsletter 279, Dec 1994. http://masarchive.org/Sites/texts/1994-11-06-1-E-E-S-EM04-082SilenceAtTheChurch.html [Accessed 08.05.20]

hymn and the anaphora, and so on.[75] To the anti-Moscow groups, these practices were another legacy of Soviet life, where forceful behaviour was necessary for survival. But a further aspect was noted in a paper by the Sourozh diocesan council member Irina von Schilppe.[76] For the new arrivals, the function of the church as a social club was especially important. The noticeboards were filled with advertisements and appeals for work, lodging, language courses, etc. In her article, von Schlippe noted that such a function is a part of church life, and that this should be admitted and provided for, in order that it did not then need to bleed into worship and other areas. Nevertheless, the diaspora situation did not account for all the confrontation in this area. Whether the behaviours on either side were a result of enculturation or sovietisation, a difference of emphasis was perceived: the one side appearing disrespectful and the other aloof and cold.

One of the first differences that was obvious to the new arrivals concerned dress; some women did not cover their heads and wore jeans.[77] In a well-known incident in the cathedral, someone had scolded a woman attired in such a manner. Metropolitan Anthony had then preached a sermon consisting of just a few sentences, commanding whoever had done this, 'to pray for her and her child to the end of their days!'[78] An article in *The Independent* newspaper stated that the new Russians were 'demanding the compulsory wearing of headscarves for women', something which was vigorously denied

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[75] Cf. Shevshnikov, Fr S., 'O potrebitel'stve v Tserkvi" Pravoslavie i mir', www.pravmir.ru, 03.01.10 and Yannaras, C., 'The Historical and Social Dimensions of the Church's Ethos', Chapter 11 of *The Freedom of Morality* (Crestwood, NY 1984), pp.195–229.
[76] von Schlippe, I., 'The Crisis of Exile', op. cit.
[77] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs. Comments on the Current Situation. Bishop Basil does not insist that women wear headscarves in church, and he permits them to wear trousers. Cf. also 'Tserkovnaia bor'ba v "Londongrade', BBC Russia.com, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/press/newsid_5028000/5028644.stm ,30.05.06. [Accessed 05.05.20]
[78] Serbian Orthodox Church Eastern America, 'For whom must I pray?' https://www.easterndiocese.org/news_180704_1 [Accessed 05.05.20]

by many in the pro-Moscow camp.[79] One parishioner claimed that these 'pretended fears' were all part of a choreographed campaign by Bishop Basil and the anti-Moscow group.[80] There were even counteraccusations from the pro-Moscow supporters that in fact it was the anti-Moscow group that was being prescriptive in dress. An English pro-Moscow parishioner wrote, 'A senior member of the laity has claimed that women look like Muslims in their head wear: how offensive is this statement? How cruel is this statement? … I hope you pray for your bigotry!'.[81] To the charge that western secular dress was 'disrespectful' and 'against the canons of the Church', the anti-Moscow group replied that one's spiritual state was more important than the cultural trappings of Orthodoxy. They noted that it would be better for the new arrivals to maintain a respectful silence and especially not to 'run about lighting candles' during and after the cherubic hymn, as was mentioned in several testimonies.[82]

What is so interesting are the claims again made by both sides of authenticity and continuity with pre-revolutionary practices. An interviewee described the conservatism currently displayed in the Russian Church within Russia as a 'novelty', emphasising that these practices were not at all prevalent in the pre-revolutionary Church.[83] Such a view presupposes that local Church practice did not (and could not) have survived the communist onslaught of seventy years. The new Church practice in Russia, had, as with so much else, to be reinvented after 1991. Sergei Filatov put this theory succinctly, 'Orthodoxy, not as an ideological doctrine, but as a real creed, is a new faith for most

[79] Cf. Milmo, C., 'Russian community faces schism as Patriarch Alexis sacks London bishop', *The Independent,* 19.05.2006
[80] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2074581, 19.05.2006 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[81] OCAD. *The Times* Online, 16.06.2006
[82] Interview 2A
[83] Interviews 2A and 1D

Russian citizens'.[84] This is a highly disputed point and one which may never be fully answered. It would require massive fieldwork on the ground in Russia, and the time for gathering such data has probably already passed.

To what extent were Russian Church practices within Russia simply a continuation of the pre-revolutionary customs? And were the practices in the diaspora simply a continuation of those in the pre-revolutionary Church or did diaspora practice change over time? This is a fascinating subject and could be extended beyond religion into all aspects of daily life. Did the seventy years of communism represent a complete rupture from the past? Or (as the neo-Slavophiles maintain) did the years of repression incubate and sustain traditional practices against the pressures of modern life in the West?

As regards the Church, the answer to these questions presupposes that the pre-revolutionary Church was itself cohesive in practice and behaviour. This was far from the case. The theory has been proposed that the schism that occurred in the diaspora Church in 1926 would have happened even without the Bolshevik Revolution, as the struggle between modernisers and traditionalists in the Great Sobor of 1917–18 eventually resulted in schism.[85] Yet in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when people were free to travel back and forth for the first time in seventy years, it appeared that Church custom in the Motherland had become stricter than was even the case in the ROCOR parishes – the most conservative part of the diaspora Church.[86] A report from a ROCOR parishioner who experienced both situations was similar in tone to many other testimonies: 'Somehow I never felt at home in the churches there [in Russia], because the minute you walked in … I don't think

[84] Filatov, S., 'Orthodoxy in Russia: Post-atheist Faith', *Studies in World Christianity*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2008), p.189
[85] Cf. Vorontsova, I.V., 'Dvizhenie za tserkovnuiu reform v Rossii nachala XX v. i Pomestnyi Sobor 1917–18', *Istoricheskii Zhurnal: nauchnye issledovania*. No. 4 (2017), pp.105–20
[86] Interview 2G

this is a particularly Russian trait, whether the Church Abroad was more tolerant, but you didn't have anyone leaping at you saying "Why aren't you wearing a headscarf?!" and "Why are you standing here?!" and "Why have you crossed yourself there?!" You think, "Maybe I should just go away and not get in the way of everybody who prays."'[87]

One theory accounting for this development was suggested by a Moscow Sourozh parishioner: 'they [post-Soviet Russians] often don't know what the tradition is'.[88] According to this argument, communist persecution was *so* great and *so* destructive that Church custom was lost and there was a complete rupture with the past. After 1991, the resurgent Church reinvented custom along more severe lines in accordance with the conservative shift in the ROC as a whole. Anti-Moscow groups argued that this was the result of the sovietisation of all aspects of life discussed earlier in this chapter, which created a cult of power and a more rigid and legalistic Orthodoxy. One Church historian wrote that, 'the disappearance of babushkas ironically made the worldview within the Church more Soviet-like. Babushkas were raised in a peasant environment in which Soviet cultural symbols and practices penetrated very slowly'.[89]

Another suggested cause of rupture was that most parishioners in Russia post the millennium were not from families who kept the faith underground through the 'babushka lineage'. They were instead recent converts, drawn to

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[87] Kozhevnikova, A. 'Invariably the "Russianness," is Going to Dissipate With Every Congregation' rocorstudies.org, http://www.rocorstudies.org/interviews/2014/08/17/invariably-the-russianness-is-going-to-dissipate-with-every-congregation/. [Accessed 09.03.20]

[88] Interview 2A

[89] Cf. Mitrokhin, N., 'The Russian Orthodox Church in Contemporary Russia: Structural Problems and Contradictory Relations with the Government, 2000-2008. *Social Research*, vol. 76, no. 1, 2009, pp. 289–320 Cf. also, Ethan-Davey, Al., 'Russkaia Natsional'naia ideia v kontseptsii A.C. Panarina'. *Politeks*. Vypusk -2, 2005. The 'Romantic Orthodoxy' of men such as Likhachev and Panarin opposed the attempt to manage Russia (Church or society) with 'legalism'. Perhaps they would also have opposed new rigidity of the Russian Church in the twenty-first century?

the Church for a multitude of reasons. Such people, it is proposed, demonstrated the zealotry of neophytes, with an obsessive attention to right belief, right worship (*pravoslavie*) and right practice. A field study of Russians in the UK noted that this was now a phenomenon even within the diaspora. The following description is interesting for this study and worth quoting at length:

> This specific, 'open' attitude to religion expressed by the elderly people was noted by one participant who represents the later Russian generation. As he said, the older people who were born and brought up with the church are not so rigid about rules; at the same time, those who became religious after the ending of the Soviet Union are very strict and inflexible about their beliefs and judge others severely: 'For those who have grown up in an Orthodox culture, who believe naturally, these things are natural and simple. But the people who became believers just recently want to follow everything to the utmost and over the top and sometimes you cannot say a word against it. People from the older generation can make a joke and say something like "oh if we sing like today we are not getting to heaven". They can joke. But if I said something like that my wife would accuse me of blasphemy.'[90]

Like the barbarian Franks of the Carolingian era, the post-Soviet neophytes became 'more Roman than the Romans' as an overcompensation and a cover for this anxiety. They reinstated customs that had in fact never been the norm in the pre-revolutionary Church: compulsory headscarves for women, very

[90] Pechurina, A., 'Creating a Home from Home: Russian Communities in the UK', PhD Thesis, Manchester (2010), p.93

rigid interpretation of the fasting rules for the laity, non-attendance at any non-Orthodox services, and so on.[91]

The problem with this theory lies in the abundance of evidence for the widespread use of *most* of these practices (although not all) before the revolution, and also in its total dismissal of the role of the 'babushka lineage'. Although there were indeed very few families who remained Orthodox in private, some people did continue to attend services wherever possible, and it was from these small seeds that the post-communist Church would emerge. Is it to be supposed that these people also lost the practice and customs of their ancestors? This seems unlikely.

A second theory (proposed by supporters of Moscow) stated that it was the customs of the *diaspora* Church that had altered over time through a process of enculturation and through demographic change within the parishes. A comparison of studies of custom in the pre-revolutionary Church, such as that of Vera Shevzov, with current Church practices suggests that in the most important aspects – services, confession and the great fasts – the Church in Russia today is probably closer to the pre-revolutionary Church than the diaspora Churches.[92] In post-Soviet Russia, many Orthodox women adopted a demure style of dress, a kind of 'Orthodox uniform' that can also be seen as a liberation from the all-pervasive oversexualisation of women's fashion in Russia. Nadieszda Kisenko, who has researched this subject in some detail, states:

[91] With regards to headscarves Cf. Interview 2A: 'Headscarves. This is a modern (post-Soviet) practice and was never current when I was in Morocco. Headscarves is a peasant Russian practice not related to religion but practical. It has been adopted by the strict Orthodox as a "badge".'

[92] Cf. *Shevzov, V., Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution* (London, 2004) p.73ff

> The most striking form of rechurching, however, is a concern with women's dress and appearance. This is something new in Russian Orthodoxy. Before the revolutions of 1917, women and men attended services either in the clothing they normally wore or in their Sunday best; both were 'decent'. Believers considered it a sin to attend church in their work clothes. Women wore long dresses or skirts and covered their heads when they went to church, as they did any time they went out in public. Men wore trousers and long-sleeved shirts and removed their hats. In the Soviet period, church attendance itself prompted more concerns than the non-existent issue of how to dress for it. In the past twenty years, however, given the long rupture with previous tradition, changes in fashion, and the highly sexualized clothing worn by Russian women at the office, notions of what constitutes proper dress for church attendance (or, indeed, for living as a 'true' Orthodox Christian) now vary widely.[93]

Kisenko goes on to describe the 'Orthodox uniform' of the devout woman, 'not only is the head covered but so are the elbows and the knees, the skirt (never trousers) falls nearly to the floor, no makeup, nothing too tight, eyes are downcast, and shoes are flat'.[94] The author likens this to the dress of Hassidic Jews, but perhaps it has more in common with that of extreme Evangelical sects, such as the Plymouth Brethren. Historically, this new 'Orthodox uniform' seeks to emulate and connect to the Russian past in a way still preserved among Old Believers; for women, forearms are never shown, the shirt is buttoned tight up to the neck, the head is always covered, female hair is never

[93] Kizenko, N., 'Women in Contemporary Russia: A Thematic Cluster: Feminized Patriarchy? Orthodoxy and Gender in Post-Soviet Russia', *Signs*, Vol. 38, No.3 (2013), pp.595–621
[94] Ibid.

cut.[95] The concern with women's dress reveals an anxiety over broken connections to the past and an aspiration to authenticity. This became a leitmotif of the Russian Church in general and of the Sourozh crisis in particular.

As a side note, it is relevant to mention that Russia was the birthplace of many conservative religious dress styles, which sought to reify appearance at a particular point in time. The best-known examples of this tendency are the Russian Old Believers, whose dress was locked down in the seventeenth century, and the Hassidic Jews from the Pale of Settlement, whose dress was influenced by the Polish nobility and is little changed since the eighteenth century. Perhaps there is also, in this emphasis on headscarves, plainness, no make-up, something of a desire to reify female dress in the demure styles of *Soviet* epoch, in reaction to contemporary oversexualisation?

Theme 4: Language

The debate over language, which has been constant in World Orthodoxy for at least the last century and shows no signs of abating, centres around two basic questions. Firstly, whether the churches in the diaspora should move from using their national languages to that of the host country, both in services and in ancillary communications. Secondly, whether the mother churches should move from using archaic forms of liturgical language to the contemporary vernacular. Both questions concerned Sourozh, the first directly and the second indirectly, as an important driver of the ideology of the first. The point was made in several statements that, because the Church Slavonic used in the

[95] Scheffel, D., *In the Shadow of Antichrist: The Old Believers of Alberta* (Univ. of Toronto, 1991), pp.186–7

liturgy was in any case incomprehensible to many new ethnic Russian worshippers, moving to English would make the texts more accessible to them also.[96]

The Russian Church, of all the diaspora Orthodox churches (with the exception perhaps of the Antiochian Orthodox Church), has been the most open with regards to the introduction of local tongues. In Greek churches, for example, it is common not to hear even one word of contemporary Greek in the liturgy, let alone English. This has been blamed as one of the reasons why the Greek Church in the diaspora has been haemorrhaging young people from its congregations.[97] Connected to this situation is the ethnic segregation of Greek parishes in the diaspora as places where the curious indigenous enquirer has not traditionally been over-welcome, although this situation has been changing in recent years. The Russian Church in the diaspora, by way of contrast, has been more welcoming to converts, if not actually embracing missionary work. A Sourozh priest noted that some Russian parishes 'have nothing to do with the local people, but I feel ours does and that's because of the language' [use of English]. He continued that because of the Greeks insistence on Greek 'they have lost generations of people.'[98] The parish minutes of the Moscow church in London show that there were not infrequent demands for more English in the liturgy. Even in the nineteenth century, the priest of the Russian Embassy church in London requested the Holy Synod to

[96] Interview 2A

[97] The proposed introduction of modern Greek into services in place of Koine Greek mirrors the Church Slavonic versus Russian debate. In 2002, the Greek Synod banned experimentation with modern Greek, even in the Gospel readings. Cf. https://zenit.org/articles/orthodox-church-bans-modern-greek-in-liturgy/ [Accessed 07.03.20] and https://www.johnsanidopoulos.com/2010/04/greek-synod-condemns-liturgy-in-modern.html [Acessed 07.03.20]. Cf. also Roudometof, V., 'Transnationalism and Globalization: The Greek Orthodox Diaspora between Orthodox Universalism and Transnational Nationalism', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 2000), pp.361–97

[98] Interview 1A

allow him to serve the liturgy occasionally in English.[99] To my knowledge, Metropolitan Anthony never used contemporary Russian in the liturgy (apart from the readings, perhaps) but he did introduce English and the parish celebrates in both Church Slavonic and English to this day. Some of the new arrivals from Russia disliked this increasing use of English, seeing it as an encroachment into what should be a 'Russian church'. Others, such as the biblical scholar Anna Schmaina-Velikanova, accepted it even though they could not understand it, on the assumption that they would have to learn English in any case if they wanted to live in the UK.[100]

The introduction of English into the services became a flashpoint for various reasons. The possibility of the gradual abandonment of Church Slavonic was painful for many parishioners because of its deep spiritual significance as a sacred language. The move to (any) vernacular also had associations with modernism and renovationism. But perhaps first and foremost, the change was a perceived focal point of the ethnic struggle. Petitions were sent to Moscow demanding that parishioners need 'to pray in their own language'.[101] Slavonic, of course, is nobody's mother tongue today, but the new arrivals expected the warmth of the half-understood familiar rather than the coldness of the half-understood alien.

The question of language went beyond the liturgy into that of the language used in meetings, lectures and notices.[102] The great majority of the

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[99] Cf Tugarinov., Y.S., *Mitropolit Antoniy Surozhskiy. Biografiya v faktorakh sovremennikov*, (Moscow, 2015) p.141ff

[100] Interview with Anna Shmaina-Velikanova, portal-credo.ru. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=541 [Accessed 07.03.20]

[101] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #53307, *Soobshchenie* #1995088, 13.04.06 'Otkytoe Pis'mo prikhozhan londonskogo soboroa episkopu vasiliiu (osbornu)'

[102] Osborne, Bishop B., 'Twenty-Five Years and One Hundred Issues', *Sourozh Journal*, Issue No. 100, May 2005

English converts spoke little Russian.[103] It might have been expected that people joining the Russian Orthodox Church would have an interest in all things Slavonic – including language – but Metropolitan Anthony's open-door policy meant this was not necessarily the case. (By contrast, English converts to the Greek Church, such as Fr Ephraim Lash, Philip Sherrard and Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, appear in the main to have been Hellenists.) As Russian gradually reverted to being the lingua franca in the cathedral, the English started to feel isolated, especially those with no Russian and no Russian marital connections.[104] A letter, which was posted on Bishop Basil's website at the time of the crisis, is worth quoting at length as it encapsulates so many of these grievances:

> My experiences have included attending a Liturgy in the Cathedral at which the first half hour was entirely in Slavonic (how much more was Slavonic I don't know as I left); attending a meeting in a room where the walls were pasted with many posters and notices which I did not understand; a service where words to communally sung prayers were handed out to Russians with no similar papers for the English; a Liturgy which was entirely in English having Slavonic parts added to it when nobody in the parish was Russian; a conference in the Diocese held entirely in Russian; a report on the work of the Diocese which appeared to consist wholly of events and meetings with dignitaries from Russia and previous Russian states and almost nothing about establishing links within the UK; learning that a priest is likely to include Slavonic prayers in a Liturgy on the basis of there being one or two Russians in the

[103] Cf. Arefev, A.L., 'Russkii iazyk na rubezhe XX–XXI vekov', Dissertation, Ministerstvo obrazovania i nauki RF.(Moscow, 2012), p.269

[104] Dioceseinfo.org, Comment from Alexandra Milton, parishioner of the diocese, 19.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=205 [Accessed 07.04.20].

> congregation when there are a dozen English who will not understand; the realisation that after over 40 years of Sourozh in the UK our Cathedral still does not have one service in English, amongst various other events.[105]

Seen from the Russian side, such changes seemed inevitable as they mirrored the demographic shifts taking place. An open letter to the Patriarch complained that, 'Bishop Basil tries to convince everyone that the cathedral is "international" and that there shouldn't be services in Slavonic. Even though we Russians are 85 percent!'.[106] The relationship of the older Russian émigrés to the language question was complex, with probably the majority favouring some measure of English in the services. But there was also a subtle difference between the Russian spoken by the older émigrés and that of the new arrivals. Metropolitan Anthony himself related the story of a Russian woman who, after having gone to confession in the cathedral, questioned the priest; 'Father, can I say something to you?' – 'Yes of course'– 'Your advice is excellent, but your grammar is terrible'.[107]

It is interesting to compare Sourozh to the ROCOR parishes in the UK. ROCOR ('the Church of aristocrats and peasants'[108]) had placed constancy to liturgical tradition at the absolute centre of Church life and for this reason, the main ROCOR cathedrals and churches in general maintained Slavonic as the language of services. Often the priests conducting these services were locals who simply had to learn Slavonic to serve. The question of liturgical language is

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[105] Dioceseinfo.org, Letter from a provincial parishioner, 19.05.2006. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=206 [Accessed 07.04.20]
[106] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #53307, *Soobshchenie* #1907853, 'Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za rubezhom', 03.07.06. http://www.cirota.ru/forum/view.php?subj=53307&order=desc&pg=10 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[107] Interview with Metropolitan Anthony, *Moskovskiy tserkovnyy vestnik*: *Sobornyi listok*, *Londonskogo kafedral'nogo sobora,* No. 372, 2003. http://zarubezhje.narod.ru/texts/anthony_sourozh01.htm [Accessed 07.03.20]
[108] Interview 1D.

a sensitive one because of the multi-jurisdictional character of the Orthodox diaspora. The individual ethnic churches do not want to lose their identity with a wholesale adoption of the local language, and yet the halfway house of multilingual services also seems unsatisfactory. It is known that Metropolitan Anthony strongly disliked the mixing of different languages in one service, although he did acquiesce to it.[109] It seems that this situation will settle down only with time.

It should also be noted that pressure for retention of Slavonic in the liturgy did not just come from Russophone parishioners. Some who had no understanding of either Russian or Slavonic preferred Slavonic as a sacred language untainted by the modern world. A parishioner stated in interview; 'Both the English and Russian laity were against the translation of the liturgy into English (or Russian). The laity always want to be "transported" – they do not want demystification; they do not want to understand the liturgy'.[110] Such statements moved the linguistic question onto the theological battleground fought over by traditionalists and modernisers, the argument expanding beyond the ethnic one of Russian versus English into that of the sacred (Slavonic) versus the profane (the vernacular).

I would propose that the arguments concerning the maintenance of Slavonic *within* the Motherland were pivotal in its abandonment/retention in the diaspora. The usage of contemporary Russian in the Russian Church has a somewhat complicated and painful history. As far back as the early nineteenth century, usage of the vernacular in sacred texts has been associated with modernism, syncretism and freemasonry. The Bible Society of Alexander I, which sought and succeeded in some measure in making the Bible available in

[109] Cf Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015), p.140. op.cit.
[110] Interview 2A

contemporary Russian for the masses, was viewed with suspicion by the majority of clergy and did not survive his reign.[111] Subsequently, the vernacular came to be associated with renovationism, but the subject was also discussed at the All-Russian Sobor of 1917–18.[112] In 1905, as part of the pre-conciliar commission process, Russian bishops were canvassed about the use of Slavonic; twenty-eight out of forty-eight bishops made critical comments about the incomprehensibility of Slavonic.[113] At the same time, there were calls for a 'New Slavonic' translation of texts, updating archaisms and making the texts more accessible. Brian Bennet, in his study of the subject, concludes that, 'The basic idea (of the reformers) is that the Church was on the way to Russifying the liturgy if only it had been allowed to fulfil its mandate'.[114] Indeed, one of the *doklads* of the conciliar subsections did allow for the partial introduction of Russian in certain readings, albeit only with episcopal permission.[115]

The debate about Slavonic versus Russian was intense in Russia in the 1990s when the question was reopened after the collapse of communism. For traditionalists, according to Bennet's study, 'Slavonic is intelligible to people who attend church on a regular basis; it is only the neophyte intelligentsia who do not understand it and constitute a vocal minority advocating for change'.[116]

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[111] Cf. Hosking, G., *Russia: People and Empire* (Harvard, 1998), pp.140ff. Also Batalden, S., 'Printing the Bible in the Reign of Alexander I: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Imperial Russian Bible Society' in Hosking, G. (ed.), *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine* (London, 1990) and Zacek, J.C., 'The Russian Bible Society and the Russian Orthodox Church, *Church History*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec 1966), pp.411-37, and Zacek, J.C., 'The Russian Bible Society and the Catholic Church', *Canadian Slavic Studies*, Vol. 1 (1971)

[112] Cf. Kravetskii A., 'Problema bogosluzhebnogo iazyka na Sobore 1917–1918 godov i v posleduiushchie desiatiletia', *Zh.M.P ,* No.2 (1994), pp.68–86. On the liturgical reforms of the Living Church, including usage of contemporary Russian cf. Solovev, I., 'Obnovlencheskii raskol i liturgicheskie reformy', *Tserkovny Vestnik*, No. 12 (385) 27.06.08. Also, Bennet, B., *Religion and Language in Post-Soviet Russia* (London, 2011), p.69: 'Russian is "simply and unequivocally" associated with Renovationism'. Cf. also the seven liturgical reforms as they were proposed by the Sobor of the Living Church itself, *Pravoslavnaia Obnovlencheskaia Gazeta*, 'Zhivaia Tserkov'' No. 10 (1922), pp.17–18

[113] Bennet, op. cit., p.68

[114] Ibid., p.76

[115] Ibid., pp.68ff

[116] Ibid., p.73

Traditionalists and Slavists, such as Dmitry Likhachev, argued strongly for Slavonic as a sacred language not dissimilar to Latin in the West or Ancient Hebrew in Judaism ('Jesus spoke in Aramaic but prayed in Hebrew'). They maintained that Church services were not about imparting information, which was a Protestant concept, and defended Slavonic against the 'philistinism' (Likhachev) and corruption of everyday Russian.[117] They also pointed out that everything in church was different from the everyday: clothes, buildings, behaviour and that language formed part of difference. Likhachev also made the point that Church Slavonic had in any case never been a vernacular idiom as that is understood today.[118]

Moreover, and of especial importance for this study, Slavonic is deeply connected to the concept of the 'Russian World' and pan-Slavism. Saints Cyril and Methodius Day (24 May) is now a national holiday in Russia, when Slavonic is celebrated across the land. A typical modern panegyric referenced the memory of Khomiakov and Kireevsky and called on believers to defend the 'universal and priceless jewel' of the Slavonic language against the 'wicked attempts' to tamper with it.[119] Even small suggested changes to the status quo have brought forth a passionate response from those who see them as the 'first step … on the road to renovationism'.[120] Church Slavonic has been described as 'the Soul of the Russian people, Defender of her national roots and the living witness of her history'.[121] Language is thus seen as a

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[117] Likhachev, D.S., 'Russkii iazyk v bogoslovskoi mysli', (1998) http://www.golubinski.ru/ecclesia/liturgika35.htm [Accessed 08.02.20]
[118] Petrukhina, E.V., 'O pol'ze tserkovnoslavianskogo iazyka kak iazyka bogosluzhenia dlia sovormenogo russkogo iazyka', *Slovo*, (Dec, 2011)
[119] 'Slavyanskii yazyk kak natsional'no svyashchennii' drevglas.ru. http://www.drevglas.ru/troick.html [Accessed 20.01.20]
[120] Pravdoliubov, Prot. S., 'Radi mira tserkovnogo proekt o tserkovnoslavianskom iazyke sleduet sniat' s rassmotrenia', bogoslov.ru, 22.08.2011. https://bogoslov.ru/article/1902908. Also cf. Firsov, S.L., *Vlast' i ogon' :Tserkov' i sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1918 – nachalo 1940-x gg*, (Moscow, 2014), pp.238.ff
[121] Pravdoliubov, op. cit.

battleground in the new Cold War and the 'clash of civilisations'. Those opposed to the vernacular point to the small changes that preceded the watershed of the Second Vatican Council and the quick descent into folk masses and other vulgarisations that followed the Catholic Church's abandonment of Latin.

As a result, promoters of contemporary Russian in Church services are regarded with suspicion by many of the faithful in Russia today; a recent poll on whether the Church should translate parts of the liturgy into contemporary Russian polled only 18 percent in favour.[122] This is far from being a niche debate; the 2011 Inter-Council document on Church Slavonic received 1,198 online reviews, while a document on the organization of social work in the Russian Church received 8 reviews.[123] In recent times, the derogatory term 'new renovationsists' has been applied to priests who have sought to introduce the vernacular, such as Fathers Giorgy Kochetkov and Alexander Borisov, the former a liturgical scholar and the latter a priest of the liberal-leaning Moscow parish of SS Kosmas and Damian.

The 'new renovationists' of post-Soviet Russia also sought (tentatively it must be said) to introduce some of the other reforms of the Living Church into the liturgy.[124] The liturgist Fr Georgy Kochetkov started to use contemporary Russian in his Moscow parish church in the 1990s, attracting a large congregation of intellectuals. Later he was moved to a smaller church and then banned from serving publicly altogether. Along with his use of contemporary

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[122] 'Sredi zhitelei Rossii net yedinogo mneniia o predpochtitel'nom yazyke pravoslavnogo bogosluzheniia' 23.09.11, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1630066.html [Accessed 01.03.20]
[123] Velikanov, P., 'Opyt internet-obsuzhdenia dokumentov Mezhsobornogo prisutstvia', 29.01.2012. https://www.pravmir.ru/opyt-internet-obsuzhdeniya-dokumentov-mezhsobornogo-prisutstviya-video/ [Accessed 01.03.20]
[124] Ivanov, S.N., 'Khronologia obnovlencheskogo "perevorota" v Russkoi Tserkvi po novym arkhivnim dokumentam', *Vestnik PSTGU* 3 (58) (2014), pp.24–60

Russian came a host of other practices which the Church considered to be modernist. The usage of contemporary Russian has also sometimes been accompanied by a proposed, or actual 'cleansing' of the liturgy of historically 'difficult' passages. The removal of these in modern translations has been seen as an attempt to rewrite sacred texts to satisfy modern political correctness.[125]

The abandonment of Slavonic for the vernacular in the diaspora was often a case of simple necessity, rather than a result of the theological differences mentioned above, as it is difficult (though not impossible) for clergy to serve in a language they do not understand. Nevertheless, it was also true that those parishes and jurisdictions that were quick to abandon Slavonic often introduced other modernising or ecumenical practices. Slavonic (and other archaic languages) doubtless served as a cultural barrier to the incremental pressures from western society. Once English became the liturgical language, parishes immediately became more attractive to indigenous converts, which in turn opened them to wider societal influences.

Theme 5: Devotional Practice

Church services

At least some of the liturgical practices that developed in the Sourozh diocese were seen by the pro-Moscow group as verging on neo-renovationism. An article by some 'parishioners of the cathedral' stated, 'Sourozh priests simply do not know the liturgical statutes and the correct procedures for holding liturgical services'.[126] They complained that services were shortened and

[125] E.g. Fr Innokenty Pavlov of the Moscow Theological Academy proposed excising perceived anti-Semitic passages from the Good Friday prayers. Likewise, the contemporary Catholic Church has removed references to 'the perfidious Jews' from the same services.
[126] Prikhozhane Londonskogo sobora, 'Gliadia iz Londona', April 2006. http://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/ [Accessed 20.01.20]

'gutted' to the extent that any true Russian theological student would be 'in despair'.[127] Metropolitan Anthony was well known for his dislike for what he regarded as needless 'pomp and ceremony' in liturgical practice, and in this he differed from the custom of the Mother Church, as evidenced, for example, in the episcopal liturgies of Metropolitan Hilarion.[128]

As with all the flashpoints in the crisis, the battle of words over ceremonial practice at Sourozh contained behind it a wealth of historical and political conflicts. In recent times, the Church within and without Russia has been criticised for what is perceived as indulgence in the 'trappings of splendour' over, for example, social and educational projects. Church construction and renovation – the so-called 'gilding of the cupolas' – has become a matter of some controversy in Russia, not only between the Church and those opposed to it, but also within the Church.[129] Likewise, the majesty and formalism of (especially episcopal) celebrations of the liturgy has its supporters and detractors. So it was also in Sourozh, the pro-Moscow camp supporting the resurgent Church's desire to inspire and impress with grand celebrations after years of ghettoization, and the anti-Moscow camp including those who preferred simple, less ostentatious services. Metropolitan Anthony only celebrated a full episcopal service once a year, on the feast of All Saints. He told Metropolitan Kallistos, 'I'm not against ceremony if it possesses spiritual meaning but I can't see the point of rigid formality'.[130] After the departure of the anti-Moscow group following the schism, the ritual in the

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[127] Ibid.

[128] Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015), op. cit., p.144

[129] Most recently there has been controversy surrounding the 'forty times forty' project of the Moscow Patriarchate to build 200 new churches in the Moscow suburbs. E.g. 'Bozh'ia volia
V Moskve stroiat sotni khramov, nesmotrya na gnev zhiteley. Komu eto vygodno?', 15.08.19, https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/08/15/church/ [Accessed 20.01.20]

[130] Cf. Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015), p.144, op.cit.

London cathedral became more formal and choreographed. An interviewee commented that because of this change, 'If I were a parishioner in London I probably wouldn't go to the cathedral'.[131] He saw such 'composed' services as artificial and off-putting.

On the other hand, one English priest (who remained with Moscow) pointed to the fact that although Metropolitan Anthony's episcopal liturgies were very modest, he himself was actually far more 'the centre of attention' than in a standard episcopal liturgy, where 'the spotlight was diffused' among all the deacons, servers and splendour.[132] Criticisms can be made of both positions; what's interesting here are the subtexts. On the surface, to a western audience the situation can look clear cut: the sincere, simple Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony's Sourozh rejected the 'grandiose posturing' of the resurgent mother Church and this was reflected most tellingly in the way they both chose to celebrate the liturgy. Yet the anti-Moscow group perhaps failed to understand that after seventy years of intensive persecution, the Russian Church was at last relishing her moment of freedom and this was reflected in a desire not to hide the liturgy away in a secret house church, but to present the most magnificent and public displays imaginable.

For the pro-Moscow parishioners, the standardisation of liturgical practice with that of the Mother Church was natural and simply a restoration of order. One parishioner commented, 'When Bishop Basil gave his blessing to read the hours before vespers, for many of the old parishioners it was taken as "Russian revanchism" and they demanded that he shorten it'.[133] In contrast,

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[131] Interview 1D
[132] Interview 1Ha
[133] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #58412, *Soobshchenie* #216746, 04.07.06 [Accessed 28.03.20]. Cf. also Sarni, M. and Peregudov, M., 'Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vzgliad iznutry', *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, Nos. 1–2 (Jan, 2004), pp. 278–9. http://www.tserkov.info/numbers/commentary/?ID=828 [Accessed 28.03.20]

the ROCOR priest Fr Andrew Phillips wrote, 'There was no danger at all of Russification – the danger was "Orthodoxification" that is being forced to abandon the "comfortable" Anglican practices [e.g. shorter services] which Metr Antony's converts were used to'.[134] One of the great differences in liturgical practice dividing Orthodoxy from Roman Catholicism and Protestantism is length of services. Following the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, Church services and attendant practices in the West became greatly shortened. The Tridentine Mass, which became the universal liturgy for most of the western Roman Catholic Church from the Council of Trent (1545–63) up to the liturgical reforms post Vatican II (1970), greatly standardised and shortened existing liturgical practices, making universal the use of the Roman Rite.[135] The Protestants of course went much further in their drive towards simplification of services. In the Catholic Church it became possible to say a 'low' Mass (liturgy) in about forty-five minutes. The standard Orthodox liturgy will last approximately twice that, but this does not include the hours and post-liturgical prayers and other practices. In addition, the evening services are often much longer, Vespers and Matins frequently being combined. These practices are very ancient and reflect Orthodoxy's much greater connection with monasticism, or rather the lack of divide between monastic and lay liturgical practice. Monasticism is central to all Orthodox jurisdictions in a way that has disappeared in the West. Indeed, it is impossible for an Orthodox jurisdiction to continue without a healthy monastic current because the episcopacy is drawn from the celibate monastic (black) clergy. Even the fasting rules, which seem very prescriptive for westerners new

[134] Phillips, Fr Andrew, 'On the Recent Troubled History of the Russian Church in London' (2008) http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/londonl.htm [Accessed 08.02.20]

[135] The Eastern Catholic (Uniate) Churches continued with their liturgies, as did some religious orders and other communities with liturgies dating back over 200 years prior to the Council, such as the Carthusians.

to Orthodoxy (well over half the year is a mostly vegan fast), are based on the monastic rule and there does not exist a separate one for the laity. All of this means that shortening of services and simplification of ritual is viewed by traditional Orthodox as a secularisation and westernisation (the two are largely synonymous) of liturgical practice.

There was one confrontation in Sourozh that was particularly painful to indigenous converts to Orthodoxy and this related to the prayers offered for the non-Orthodox. During the Orthodox liturgy, the faithful write the names of their loved ones, living and departed, on slips of paper to be read out by the clergy before the liturgy. According to the strict interpretation, prayers for the non-Orthodox or *inoslavie* (heterodox) cannot be offered during the liturgy proper. In Russia, some churches have signs which inform people, 'The unbaptized, people of other faiths, unbelievers and suicides are not commemorated in the church'.[136] The practice of praying for non-Orthodox had grown up in the diocese as a natural process of enculturation due to the large number of people whose families remained outside the Orthodox Church.[137] This practice was deemed to be transgressive for some in the pro-Moscow clergy, as it broke with Church tradition and encouraged a nebulous idea of the Church's boundaries. Theologically, practices relating to the heterodox are sensitive, owing to the rigid interpretation of the dogma of the impossibility of salvation outside the Church (*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*). To the anti-Moscow parishioners, not being able to pray for their deceased loved ones as they had always done seemed particularly cruel.

[136] Luehrmann, S., 'The Politics of Prayer Books: Delegated intercession, names, and community boundaries in the Russian Orthodox Church', *Journal of Religious and Political Practice*, 2:1, 6–22 (2016), p.14
[137] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org, Comments on the Current Situation, op. cit. '[Bishop Basil] does not forbid parishioners to include the names of non-Orthodox on the prayer slips they send into the sanctuary at the beginning of the Divine Liturgy'.

The growth of the ecumenist movement in the last century gave rise to a conservative counter-revolution in the Orthodox Church.[138] This resulted in a more rigid and defined belief about the boundaries of the Church; who is inside and who is outside, and what services and prayers can be offered for them (if at all). Different jurisdictions within World Orthodoxy have likewise aligned themselves broadly with either the liberal (Ecumenical Patriarchate, OCA) or the conservative (Russia, Georgia) tendencies. This additional ideological complication has been added to the multiple ethnic struggles that increasingly plague the Orthodox Church. For example, the 2018 schism between Moscow and Constantinople ostensibly concerned ecclesiology and power, but the new Ukrainian jurisdiction founded by Constantinople has felt pressure to align itself with those liberal and ecumenist movements in the Church that Moscow opposes.

Confession and communion

A gradual relaxation of mandatory confession before communion had grown up in Sourozh as part of the general enculturation of the diocese.[139] The long queues for confession that the new arrivals were now forming before and during services thus represented a novelty for many indigenous converts. Regular face-to-face confession with a priest had never become established even in the highest Anglican traditions. Many priests relate that confession is particularly difficult for Protestant converts to Orthodoxy or even to traditional Catholicism (where the sacrament is administered through the anonymity of

[138] Baranov, S., 'An Analysis of the Basic Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church's Attitude Towards Heterodoxy', Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies, Cambridge, UK [No date]. https://www.academia.edu/25589076

[139] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs, Comments on the Current Situation, op. cit. '[Bishop Basil] does not insist on a one-to-one correlation between confession and the receiving of communion.'

the confessional).[140] For the pro-Moscow group and traditionalists in the Russian Church, regular communion without confession verged on scandalous, and they argued that a practice should not be abandoned simply because it was more challenging in our modern age.[141] For the anti-Moscow group, however, mandatory confession before communion was an archaism that interfered with man's personal repentance before God. For some, it represented an obsession with a literal letter-of-the-law observance, which was also in danger of promoting 'the illusion of purity'. In any case, it was suggested, the practice had often been abandoned in other local Orthodox churches such as the Greek.[142] In an open letter, Fr Andrei Teterin countered these arguments: 'There is the steadily enforced idea of the "unnecessary and old-fashioned" sacrament of penance and related confession (especially before communion). When … I spoke about this, one of our West-European fellow clergymen jumped up and cried, "With these words you are throwing a stone at Metropolitan Anthony!"'.[143] In opposition to Fr Andrei, Bishop Basil posted a website notice stating that confession was not deemed to have a direct correlation with receiving communion.[144]

Within World Orthodoxy, over the course of the last century, there has been a movement towards increasing regular communion by the laity. The desire was to increase the spiritual life of workers and peasants to counter the ever-greater threats and temptations of modernity. In the Russian Church in the diaspora, there was criticism of the pre-revolutionary practice of

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[140] Phillips, Fr Andrew, 'On Becoming and Remaining an Orthodox Christian: A Talk given at the Orthodox Pilgrimage to Felixstowe in August 2001, http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/brorthoc.htm [Accessed 03.02.20]
[141] Cf. Maksimov, Fr. Giorgy, 'Neobkhodimia li ispoved pered prichastiem?', 06.11.18, http://www.pravoslavie.ru/117000.html [Accessed 03.02.20]
[142] On the jurisdictional divergence, Cf. Pastoral Committee of the Pan-Orthodox Assembly of Bishops with Churches in Great Britain and Ireland, Report on the work: January - June 2011 http://dioceseofsourozh.squarespace.com/pastoral-committee-2011/ [Accessed 03.03.2020]
[143] Quoted in 'Gladia iz Londona'. Op.cit. https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/print [Accessed 20.01.20]
[144] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs, Comments on the Current Situation, op. cit.

infrequent communion, which often took place only on the great feasts or even just once a year in accordance with the State law. However, as Vera Shevzov has shown, this infrequency belies the actual depth of religious feeling: 'It is important, therefore, not necessarily to equate the perceived importance of the Eucharist with the frequency of its reception. Many believers partook of the Eucharist relatively rarely not because they considered it unimportant or insignificant but precisely because of the sense of awe and holiness with which it was associated'.[145]

Accompanying the drive for regular communion was an emphasis on correct preparation. In post-Soviet Russia, this has come to include not only confession but sometimes stringent fasting rules, along with lengthy preparatory prayers. As a result, the practice of regular (weekly) communion is starting to decrease in Russia. Nadieszda Kizenko in her study concluded that, 'Confession in Russia today has much in common with pre-revolutionary practice. People are still expected to fast before going to confession and communion; they still often schedule those sacraments for the four seasonal fasting periods of the year. The Orthodox Church still publishes large-circulation guides to train penitents to confess properly'.[146] Regular communion without confession is now a rarity in the Russian Church within Russia, and in the diaspora Church it is not uncommon to see notices stating, 'Anyone approaching the altar MUST go to confession at the vigil service on Saturday or if this is not possible, on Sunday morning'.

A word should be said here about the practice of *general* confession as it was practiced by Metropolitan Anthony. The concept of general confession, by which a parishioner may 'privately confess before God' and consider him or

[145] Shevzov, *Russian Orthodoxy*, op. cit., p.77
[146] Cf. also Kizenko, N., 'Women in Contemporary Russia', op.cit.

herself to be absolved with a general absolution before the liturgy, does not as a rule exist in the Orthodox Church. Such a practice was piloted, albeit in a very different context, at the end of the nineteenth century by St John of ~~Krondstadt~~Kronstadt, who in practice simply could not hear the confessions of all the tens of thousands of souls who beat a path to his door. Before the main liturgy, the church would be filled with people weeping and crying out their sins one to another, before St John would read out a general absolution.[147] The Sobor of 1917–18 also discussed the issue of general confession and made some provision for it in specific circumstances (such as for soldiers before battle) and requiring certain actions (such as the reading out of questions about the most serious sins lying on the conscience of the penitents).[148] Using St John's example, some diaspora parishes started to introduce the practice of general confession, but of a different kind to that of St John. For Metropolitan Anthony, the practice was usually accompanied by a lengthy conversation with a group of people, and absolution was not simply read out to the assembled congregation while they privately confessed their sins in silence.[149] Nevertheless, the practice seeped into many communities in the Sourozh diocese, especially where there was a high level of indigenous converts. In some parishes, one-to-one confession with a priest became almost a rarity, and regular communion the norm. For the newly arrived Russians, this practice seemed close to what was done in Anglican services and far removed from the Orthodoxy they knew.

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[147] Cf., Grisbrooke, W.J., *The Spiritual Counsels of Father John of Kronstadt* (New York, 1967), pp. xxiiiff. Also, Kizenko, N.*, A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People* (Pennsylvania State Univ. 2000), pp.64ff

[148] Kravetskii, A., 'Problema bogosluzhebnogo iazyka na Sobore 1917–1918 godov i v posleduiushchie desiatiletia, *Zh.M.P*, No.2 (1994), pp.68–86

[149] For a description cf. Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015),p.158ff. op.cit. Also, Surozhskii, A., *Nabliudaete kak vy slushaete* (Moscow, 2004), pp.515ff

At Sourozh there was also less emphasis on the stringent rules around fasting, which owing to their complexity can become a virtual obsession among devout Orthodox. An open letter complained that the custom of fasting on Saturdays in preparation for communion on Sunday was considered to be 'outdated'.[150] The problem lay in the cumulative effect of all these seemingly minor divergences. The more easy-going attitudes to dress, confession and fasting, the shortening of services and introduction of the vernacular – all pointed to an Orthodoxy that was somewhat easier to practice than that of the Church in the Motherland. For the anti-Moscow group, it was not about an easing of restrictions to make the Church more acceptable, but a re-emphasis on the things that were really important (and in fact more difficult), such as alms-giving and love of one's enemies. But the pro-Moscow group pointed to the fact that the relaxation of rules and jettisoning of tradition in other denominations (notably the Catholic Church) had led to neither a renewed spirituality, nor a resurgence in Church attendance. In fact, it represented a capitulation of the Church before the secular world, with a resultant haemorrhaging of the faithful.

Icons

On (Old Calendar~~Orthodox~~) Christmas Eve 2006, an icon of St Nicholas was moved from the centre of the London cathedral into the cathedral kitchen area. The icon had an interesting history, having belonged to Russian troops during the Russo-Japanese war who kept it with them when they were saved by the British Navy. It even had bullet holes as testimony to its provenance and had recently been restored at some expense. The moving of the icon may not

[150] Sarni, M. and Peregudov, M., 'Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vzgliad iznutry', *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, Nos. 1–2 (Jan, 2004), pp.278–9. Kommentarii. http://www.tserkov.info/numbers/commentary/?ID=828 [Accessed 28.03.20]

have been a deliberate act to humiliate the pro-Moscow group, but it was perceived as such.[151] Even if the icon had been moved thoughtlessly, this perhaps even more shows the depth of the cultural divide. Western audiences should understand the intense devotion to St Nicholas that is one of the hallmarks of Russian spirituality. There is probably not a major city in Russia without a church dedicated to this saint. Every year on the saint's feast days, Bari in Italy (where the relics have been held since 1087) is inundated with Russian pilgrims. The grandest of all Russian *krestny khod*, from Kirov to Velikoretskoe, is in honour of St Nicholas. Every year over 100,000 pilgrims walk for days and nights behind the icon of St Nicholas, each with their special requests and petitions to the saint. The removal of the icon of St Nicholas to the pantry is mentioned several times in the letters and witness statements of the pro-Moscow group. It was seen almost as a declaration of war and elicited an open petition to the Patriarch. One parishioner wrote that, 'This action really characterises the present relations towards the Russian spiritual legacy which is taking shape in our church – that is, latent Russophobia!'.[152] The incident also illustrates the great importance of icons in the Orthodox Church and that events surrounding them can be of national importance.

The previously mentioned attitude of the White émigré Iulia de Beausobre to icons – 'aids to prayer for beginners' – was at variance with the devotion of the new arrivals. Western converts, often steeped in the transcendence of God, can feel very uncomfortable with the practices associated with icons and relics in the East and especially in Russia: kissing and touching icons, full prostrations (repeatedly kneeling and bowing one's head to

[151] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #53307, *Soobshchenie* #1995088, 'Otkytoe Pis'mo prikhozhan londonskogo sobora episkopu vasiliiu (osbornu)', 13.04.06 [Accessed 05/05/19]
[152] Ibid.

the floor) before icons, the blessing of food, of water, full immersion in holy springs and wells, and so on. These practices have all but disappeared from the West, even in Catholic countries, where they were also once common. Icons of course are perceived as 'windows on the Divine' and objects of beautiful transcendence, but less as sacred objects in themselves, which in their very essence can elicit miracles.

This difference in perspective goes to the heart of the East–West divide: the West's so-called 'banishment of God' from daily life to the heavens, resulting in a dichotomous way of thinking.[153] And to the East's (especially Russia's) ability to mix the sacred with the material, the imminent with the transcendent, in the incarnational and cosmological aspect of the universe.[154] Charles Lock, in his study of Bakhtin, noted how western dichotomies found themselves collapsed in Orthodoxy as a result of the theology of Christ's incarnation: 'The Neoplatonic divisions and dichotomies – matter/spirit, body/mind, time/eternity, *form/image, figure/ground*, etc. (in each pair the privilege belonging to the immaterial and transcendent) – are perpetuated within the Western Church. Eastern Christianity, surrounded by Neoplatonism, found those dichotomies to have been challenged and possibly invalidated by the Incarnation'.[155]

Icons hold such immense significance not only because of their provenance and history (though this is indeed a major factor) but also because of their miracle-working qualities: icons weep and produce myrrh, icons are miraculously renewed, icons are lost and miraculously reappear, icons travel

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[153] Cf. Yannaras, C., 'Orthodoxy and the West: A paper read at the Inter-Orthodox Conference in Brookline, Mass., in September 1970' , *Eastern Churches Review* 111, No. 3 (1971)
[154] Cf. Steenberg, M.C., *Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption* (Leide, 2008), pp.138ff
[155] Lock, C., 'Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology', *Journal of Literature & Theology* Vol. 5, No 1. (March 1991)

miraculously from place to place, icons have a life of their own and are definitely not just the symbolic devotional devices that westerners often taken them for.[156] Icons have still more animate qualities in that they 'pay visits' and 'meet' people and other icons. Because of this, icons have an important role to play in the national consciousness, hence the outrage at the removal of the icon of St Nicholas and the suggestion of Russophobia. An event illustrating the huge importance that an icon can play in national life was the return visit of the Kursk-root icon to back to Kursk in 2009. The occasion was especially relevant to this study as it represented the meeting of the two separated parts of the Russian Church (the two Russias), as the icon had long been the symbol of the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR), residing as it did in the ROCOR Jordanville Monastery in New York. Close on half a million people turned out to welcome the icon back to Kursk.

The Kazan icon of the Theotokos is perhaps the most 'politicised' of all Russian icons, being associated with both the liberation from the Tartar-yoke and the defence against Poland in the Time of Troubles. A copy of the icon was even processed through the streets during the siege of Leningrad. With these stories in mind, one should note the appearance of the reigning (derzhava) icon of the Theotokos in the Sourozh diocese at the end of the crisis in 2006, the icon having been sent from Moscow to the London cathedral. This icon had long been an important symbol for Russian monarchists and nationalists due to its interesting history. It had been discovered by a peasant woman after its location had been revealed to her in a dream on the day of the Tsar's abdication in 1917. In addition to its history, the icon depicted the Theotokos

[156] One of the factors in the canonisation of the Romanovs was a series of myrrh-streaming icons of the Holy Royal Martyrs. As is often the case with such events, several were simply cheap paper copies of existing icons rather than originals, cf. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=66492 [Accessed 02.08.20]

in the Imperial crown and holding the sceptre and orb and cross (globus cruciger), the symbols of regal authority. For all these reasons, the appearance of the icon in Sourozh at this time was seen by some as the *coup de grâce* by the victorious Moscow party.[157]

[157] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OLicrYAJWrnBlRqQ-n6peWk9k1FkmHpSKf1lR6pyMLM/preview [Accessed 24.09.18]

Chapter 5 Sourozh and the Russian World: Church and State

Interest in the concept of the Russian World grew after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with both pro- and anti-Moscow sides in Sourozh referring to it as creating the momentum behind events.[1] The term is a typically broad and amorphous neo-Slavophile concept, encompassing both universalist aspirations and a nationalist (exceptionalist) ideology.[2] The concept defined Russia as a meta-territorial entity, and placed a concomitant focus on the Russian diaspora. The collapse of the Soviet Union – the Russian Empire in its final form – created almost overnight the fourth-largest diaspora in the world, as ten million ethnic Russians found themselves outside the borders of the Russian Federation. As a result, the power and influence of the Russian Church increased. Not only were the Church's borders not contiguous with those of the newly reduced Russian State, spilling out into Ukraine, the Baltic States, and elsewhere, but in addition the Church possessed a vast worldwide network of dioceses and parishes. Such parishes were often in the centres of western cities and in possession of prime real estate and symbolic prestige. The British diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate (Sourozh) was thus inescapably connected to the renewed interest in the Russian World.

Sergei Chapnin, previously the editor of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, linked the Sourozh crisis to the Kremlin's foreign policy and 'the strategic objectives of the Patriarch towards the diaspora'. He connected it to an increased tendency towards vertical power within the Moscow Patriarchate and concluded, 'The life of the Diocese of Sourozh is now organized the very

[1] Interview 1B

[2] Cf. Laruelle, M., 'The Russian World: Russia's Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination', Centre on Global Interests, May 2015. http://globalinterests.org/2015/05/26/the-russian-world-russias-soft-power-and-geopolitical-imagination/ Laruelle focuses on the non-ethnic character of the new Russian World project and views it a global 'meta-project'.

same way as the church in Russia. Dioceses and parishes are just cells of Putin's "Russian world". Organized uniformly, they are conveniently arranged for centralized management from Moscow. The Cathedral in London is now just one of these cells. The new Bishop of Sourozh invited the Patriarch to personally make sure this is so. No more rebels, no more dissent'. [3] To be able to assess this critique, it is necessary to grasp the multiple viewpoints and overlapping concepts associated with the idea of the Russian World and assess how they affected events in Sourozh.

The language surrounding the new Russian World doctrine mixed political and religious concepts. The World Russian People's Council, founded in 1993 and headed by the Patriarch, became the foremost promoter of the idea of the Russian World. Delegates were drawn from the political, business, cultural and religious life of Russia, both at home and in the diaspora. Putin and Lavrov were frequent attendees. The themes of the annual gatherings, which took place in the new Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, ranged from the Orthodox mission to and conservation of the Russian people through to health and environmental issues.

The Sourozh Diocese was affected by these developments in various ways. Firstly, the remote management of the Soviet years was replaced by an increased interest in and control by the Mother Church. The growing interdependence of the Russian Church and State (the 'new symphonia') meant that the State had a greater stake in Moscow's diaspora parishes. The talk increasingly concerned the 'consolidation of the Russian diaspora' and the Church's role in that. The funding power of the State was far greater than that

[3] Chapnin, S., 'Kak RPTs demonstriruet tserkovnoe nasledie russkoi emigratsii', June 2016. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/66170 [Accessed 02.05.2020]

of the Church and, in the words of Bishop Basil, 'money is also expected to bring with it control'[4].

Secondly, the neo-Slavophile ideology that lay behind the concept of the Russian World promoted a hierarchical centralising of Church governance. This mirrored the new vertical power and sovereign democracy promoted by the State. These changes were at odds with the ethos of the Sourozh Diocese and, in particular, the Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh that had been formulated by Metropolitan Anthony and his entourage with an emphasis on devolving power to the white clergy and laity.

Thirdly, the diaspora assumed greater importance due its role as a soft-power tool in the culture wars between Russia and the West. Foreign parishes of the Russian Church, and especially those with the fame and pedigree of Sourozh, were posited as 'islands of Holy Rus' which were to shine as beacons of Christian tradition in the ever more secularised West.

Fourthly, the influence of Russian World rhetoric and neo-Slavophile thought was often perceived as a form of Russian ethnic nationalism and so, for the anti-Moscow group in Sourozh, the Russian World became synonymous with aggressive ethnic Russification. In fact, the genealogy of the Russian World ideology was more complicated, being associated with Russian universalism as well as exceptionalism.

Finally, the Russian World concept developed due to the tensions within globalisation, between transnationalism (glocalism) and enculturation (cosmopolitanism). These more recent phenomena possessed a longer genesis within the Orthodox Church in terms of the relation between jurisdictional

[4] OCAD. Letter of Bishop Basil to the Moscow Patriarch, 01.05.06

space and territory. For some, the Sourozh crisis was a representation of a new transnational ecclesiology, in which jurisdictional territory collapsed under the pressures of the new interconnected world.

The Russian World: An Erastian or Symphonic Ideal?

The growth of the concept of the Russian World affected the Russian Church and State in different but complementary ways. For some sceptics, it represented a deepening intrusion of the secular state into the life of the Church. Paradoxically, this was deemed by some to be more invasive and insidious than the power that the Soviet State had held over the Church. To such critics, the 1980s and early 1990s appear as a brief period of comparative freedom for the Church. The crisis in Sourozh, on the other hand, was represented as a watershed in the steady march of state control, an episode in a time of transition when the various affiliations within the Church were jostling for the upper hand. In terms of Church–State relations, the position of Metropolitan Anthony and the Sourozh Diocese was somewhere between that of the official Moscow Patriarchate and the dissident movement. Although connections between dissident diaspora organisations, such as the Keston Institute, and Metropolitan Anthony were not strong, supporters of both were largely drawn from the same intellectual wing of the Church. On his visits to the Soviet Union, Metropolitan Anthony became especially beloved of the Muscovite Orthodox intelligentsia who sought to free the Church from its centuries-long subjugation to the Russian State (Tsarist or Soviet).

Considering this, it was all the more paradoxical that the catalyst of the crisis was Bishop Hilarion Alfeev, a man steeped in the dissident milieu. A few years prior to his arrival in Sourozh, the then Father Hilarion Alfeev had vividly

described life within the blossoming Church in Russia in the 1980s and early 1990s. He noted how at that time it was the younger generation who flocked to the Church while the elderly stayed away.[5] For a few brief years, the Church seemed to be moving away from the Erastian tendency to which it later returned. Writing at the millennium, he noted that 'Many of those who now actively come out in the name of the Church under the banner of patriotism or nationalism and who speak about the "rebirth of Russia" and "spiritual values" were at that time leaders in the Komsomol or party officials who held the Church at bay through the barrel of a gun'.[6] As the Church moved from the periphery to the mainstream, from Soviet samizdat to state Church, it lost a great deal of the attraction it once held for the young (and not only the young). Many students who might once have been found discussing Berdiaev and Florovsky and printing liturgical texts were soon joining anti-Putin groups.[7] A Sourozh parishioner summed this up with a comment on Bishop Basil's website, 'many Russians I know are searching for depth and real worship in their Church and do not desire a Church that is just an extension of Russian state power or the propagator of an aggrandizing national myth'.[8]

The 'golden age' of the Church in the late 1980s was distinguished by its sense of community and authenticity. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev recalled his time as a priest at the church St Ekaterina on the Ordynka in Moscow: 'we lived soul-to-soul, and there were no conflicts or disagreements of any kind'.[9] In those years, intellectual dissidents and conservative patriots co-existed more or less amicably, united against their common enemy – the atheist State.[10] The

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[5] Alfeev, I., *Pravoslavnoe bogoslovie na rubezhe epoch. Stati, doklady* (Moscow, 1999) (author trans.)
[6] Ibid., Alfeev, I., *Pravoslavnoe bogoslovie*
[7] Papkova, I., Interview, Budapest, 01.05.10
[8] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs. Statements from Sourozh Parishioners
[9] Alfeev, Mitropolit I., *Besedy* (Moscow, 2012), p.55
[10] Cf. Ermoliuk, A.V., *Vzaimootnoshenia RPTs s gosudarstvom i intelligentsiei v 1988–2000 g*', Thesis, Cheliabinsk, 2007

reputation of Metropolitan Anthony and the Sourozh Diocese was high both within and without Russia. Again, in the words of Metropolitan Ilarion Alfeev:

> The atmosphere in the Church then was very different from the present: there was a sense of community, solidarity, people supported each other. At that time priests were not divided into 'right' and 'left' or into 'liberal' and 'conservative', they didn't accuse each other of 'not being Orthodox' ... I think that many of those who came to the Church at that time would agree that the atmosphere in the Church was then lighter, warmer and cleaner. In those years hardly anyone would have thought to search for some kind of 'deviation from Orthodoxy' in the works of Metropolitan Anthony, he was simply read and loved.' [11]

As the common threat of Soviet repression was finally lifted from the Church, the truce between the various factions also started to fall away. In the end, the victorious faction was neither the liberals nor the ultra-conservatives, both of which were far too numerically small, but more the 'institutionalists' and the rank-and-file churchgoers.[12] But the experience of the Church in the nineties was seminal, both within the Motherland and beyond. The Church now found herself as just one Christian denomination among many, as the Catholic Church started to re-open churches en masse and western evangelicals, often with robust financial support from the USA, built impressive missionary outposts in the New Russia.[13]

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[11] Ibid., Alfeev, I., *Pravoslavnoe bogoslovie* (author trans.)

[12] Cf. Della Cava, R., 'Reviving Orthodoxy in Russia. An Overview of the Factions in the Russian Orthodox Church, *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July–Sept. 1997), pp. 387–413

[13] Caridi, C., 'Ideology or Isolationism? Russian Identity and its influence on Orthodox–Catholic Relations: Part 1, Orthodoxy and Russian Identity', *Religion in Eastern Europe*, XXVII, 1 (Feb. 2007). Also, Sebentsov, A.E., 'Religion in the System of State Power', *Russian Social Science Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 2012), pp. 32–42

The hope and expectation of the Sourozh liberals quickly turned into disappointment and finally despair as the Church in Russia turned her back on the open Orthodoxy of men such as Metropolitan Anthony. Instead, as the unstable nineties progressed, believers turned once again to the anti-western and messianic rhetoric of neo-Slavophiles.[14] The arrival of new, more conservative émigrés in the Diocese of Sourozh was thus compounded by the rise of national-Slavophile thinking in the Russian Church and State. If Metropolitan Hilarion was right, the surge in Russian immigrants in Sourozh that occurred from the mid-1990s onwards was more likely to be made up of those who saw the Russian Church as an extension of the State and who had previously 'held the Church at bay through the barrel of a gun'. If so, conflicts between the new arrivals and the existing parishioners, many of whom had been supporters of the dissident movement, might seem to have been inevitable. The backing of the State created a feeling of powerlessness in those who opposed Moscow, as one parishioner put it succinctly: 'The writing is on the wall for the diocese, as we have known it. As soon as the Metropolitan dies, the Patriarchate will install a hierarch, with presbyters and deacons, and financial backing. All that we have worked for will be swallowed up!'.[15]

In the 2000s, as Putin took the helm, the Russian World became the central, overarching political concept with which Church and State approached the diaspora in both the near and far abroad.[16] The new Russian State was interested in the Church as a provider of continuity through Russia's turbulent

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[14] At the end of the millennium, Robert English wrote that, 'The resurgence of a Russian national "neo-Slavophile" current should come as no surprise. As I have frequently emphasized, the "neo-Westernizing" politico-philosophical current was always in a minority – even among Soviet intellectuals, much less educated society more broadly, and certainly among the general public … The wonder perhaps, is why Russian opinion and Russian policies have not turned more sharply anti-Western'. History was to prove him right. English, R., *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the end of the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2000), p.235

[15] OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks, op. cit.

[16] Cf. Putin, V., 'Pis'mennoe interv'iu Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina', *Russkaia Mysl'*, 24.11.06

history and also because of her prestige and global reach. The Church was interested in the State because of the financial and legal backing it could provide, but also because it provided a certain patriotic legitimacy through Russian-Soviet history. These aspirations were exemplified in the rebirth of the idea of Moscow as the 'Third Rome', a political-religious concept that posits Moscow as both the spiritual and temporal successor to Constantinople and Rome. The promotion of Moscow as the Third Rome as a tool of wartime propaganda by Stalin and Eisenstein has been well documented.[17] But as one study noted, what is more unusual 'is that the same ideas have continued to develop in a "peaceful" post-war Soviet era'.[18] As recently as November 2014, a conference in Moscow dedicated to the Third Rome theory drew many of the major neo-Slavophile thinkers: Prof Alexander Dugin, Natalia Narochnitskaya and Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov.[19] Kirill Frolov, president of the Union of Orthodox EU Citizens, stated in 2006 (the year of the Sourozh crisis), 'Moscow the Third Rome is not a historical archaism, but a contemporary political task for Russia'.[20] Similarly, an article by E. Lashchenova published in the official journal of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expanded on the political dimensions, speaking of how, 'Orthodoxy and the Byzantine traditions of Russia's state order predetermined its mission in the world; this mission liberated Russia from national egotism' and how consequently Russia was 'called upon to head the Orthodox-Slavic civilization'.[21] This melding of the contemporary Russian State with the Church was highly problematic for anti-

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[17] Halperin, C.J., 'Le metteur en scène athée et le tsar orthodoxe : Ivan le Terrible de Sergei Eisenstein', *Revue des études slaves*, LXXXVIII-3 (2017), pp. 515–26

[18] Blyumin and Rudntzky, 'The concept of "Moscow the Third Rome" in the Art of Stalin's Time', Summer 2013, CES 650

[19] Shevkunov, Arkhimandrit T., '*S Bozh'ei pomoshch'iu vozmozhno vse: o vere i otechestv'e*, Texts of the Third Rome conference papers, 11.11.2014 (Moscow, 2015), pp.102–33

[20] http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5337000/5337122.stm (author trans.) [Accessed 08.10.19]

[21] Lashchenova, E., 'National Archetypes of Russia's Foreign Policy', *Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations*, Issue 2 (2013), p.112

Moscow voices in Sourozh.[22] For Bishop Basil, it was represented by the fact that pro-Moscow parishioners and clergy had turned to the Russian Ambassador for assistance.[23] The anti-Moscow clergy and parishioners viewed it as an unholy alliance of the spiritual and secular powers, working together for purely mercenary interests. It was the undercurrent of many of the accusations and tensions in Sourozh, from the militaristic allusions levelled at priests who had come from Moscow to accusations of a Soviet cult of power.[24]

The anti-Moscow element in Sourozh was not the only part of the diaspora Church in the UK that was uneasy about the new symphonia of Church and State. Archimandrite Alexis of the ROCOR monastery in Brookwood wrote an open letter in 2003 in which he listed multiple concerns with the Moscow Patriarchate, stating 'According to many commentators, the present socio-political situation in Russia is even more deleterious than it was under the Soviets, and it appears that the Church is deeply involved in many aspects of what seems to be a "Gangster State" in a way that is less excusable than its subservience to the Soviets, which after all was a totalitarian tyranny'.[25] This pattern of both the left (Sourozh) and the right (ROCOR) of the Church criticising the centre (Moscow) was a leitmotif of the Sourozh crisis. Perhaps no issue united these two poles as much as the question of Erastian or Sergian tendencies in the Moscow Patriarchate. Both liberal and conservative elements perceived that the Church was in danger of being transformed into secular cultural institution.

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[22] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #58412, *Soobshenie* #2088395, 26.05.06 [Accessed 26.05.20]
[23] OCAD. An Open Letter from Bishop Basil to the Members of the Diocese of Sourozh, 16.05.06
[24] OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient Working of the Sourozh Diocese, 08.12.02
[25] Letter of Archimandrite Alexis, 05.12.03. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=15914 [Accessed 19.07.20]

A particular manifestation of this was deemed to be the promotion of the idea of non-proselytism, or the notion that there were 'Orthodox lands' and 'Catholic lands' over which a pragmatic inter-religious détente reigned. In the new Russian World, parishes were to concentrate on their own kind. This was the antithesis of the ethos of Metropolitan Anthony, who, as we have seen, did not have this luxury in the immigrant-poor years of the Cold War. While Sourozh had not been overtly missionary as a diocese, the fact remained that Metropolitan Anthony's frequent appearances in the British media and at top universities amounted to a missionary appeal. As head of the DECR, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev was at pains to condemn Orthodox proselytism in the West.[26] He stated emphatically, 'Our parishes in the west do not ~~n't~~ have any proselytising purpose and they are not ~~en't~~ there to convert Anglicans and Catholics to Orthodoxy. Of course, individual cases of conversion to Orthodoxy take place, just as there are examples of conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism on our own "canonical territory", but we do not have a proselytising strategy in relation to the west and we are not trying to convert England or France to Orthodoxy'.[27] The supposition behind this was that personal belief was less important than place of birth and ethnicity. An interesting article that appeared on portal-credo.ru soon after the Hilarion affair, entitled 'Sourozh tears', perceived in the troubles an unlikely 'liberal-conservative synthesis'.[28] The author proposed that this was a means by which to reconcile the two *secularist* tendencies in the Church: 'extreme nationalism

[26] Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Printsip "kanonicheskoi territorii" v pravoslavnoi traditsii', Budapest Catholic University, 10.02.05. Also, Kirill, Patriarch, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie* (Moscow, 2009), p.185

[27] 'Interviu Ep. Ilariona Alfeeva', 21.09.03, http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/meetings/239/[Accessed 02.04.20]. It should also be noted there are at least some academic voices that propose that the ROC's recent expansionism into Western Europe is in retaliation to Catholic proselytism in Russia. Cf. Rousselet, K., 'L'Église orthodoxe russe et le territoire', *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, Vol. 1 *La Russie: Géographie des Territoires* (2007), pp.63–85

[28] 'Surozhskie slezy', portal-credo.ru, 07.08.02. http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=39 [Accessed 20.05.20]

and extreme ecumenical liberalism'. He concluded, 'At the heart of this "synthesis" is a banal materialism, the servant of which is religion … as a cultural add-on. If religion is determined by birth and cultural identity, then such a religion is "programmed" genetically, laid down culturally, and Divine Revelation in it is only a beautiful literary trope'. It was a simple argument, but a convincing one.

Thus, the Church's involvement with the Russian World concept has been critiqued from both right and left. An interesting interview with Archimandrite Savva from Belarus attacked the Patriarch's talk of 'the Russian World' as 'essentially a form of idolatry … This is the main nerve of the "Russian world": the hidden disbelief in God, whom Russia has overshadowed as an object of faith'.[29] He went on to criticise the notion of any such 'worlds', be they Greek, Russian, or other. A priest-monk of from ROCOR in the UK stated that such 'Russian nationalism' was one of the reasons why he eventually left the jurisdiction, singling out worship of the Russian state as a secularist project.[30] Metropolitan Anthony had likewise promoted a non-ethnic Orthodoxy in which 'there was neither Jew nor Greek'.[31] Many of the converts under his jurisdiction felt little or no connection to Russia, and thus the concept of the Russian World meant almost nothing to them.[32]

The Church's decision to promote the doctrine of the Russian World was grounded in her long subservience to the state. Nevertheless, the Church sought distinction as the centre and arbiter of Russianness within that concept.

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[29] Mazhuko, Archimandrite Savva Mazhuko, 'Neskol'ko voprosov o "Russkom mire"'. Interview *Kievskaia Rus'*, 24.06.14. http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/churchlife/5345/ [Accessed 20.05.20]. There are echoes here of the words of Dostoevsky's Shatov in *The Devils*: '"Do you believe in God?" "I believe *in Russia* … I believe in her Orthodoxy … I believe in the body of Christ … I believe that the new advent will take place in Russia … I believe …" Shatov muttered frantically.'

[30] Interview 2G

[31] Cf., Interview 2D on the multi-ethnic nature of the ROC in general in the UK

[32] OCAD. Statements from Sourozh parishioners. Letter from a provincial parishioner.

Some of the more perceptive western commentators, such as Luke March and Marlene Laruelle, emphasised this tension. Luke March stated, 'the most fundamental break from Tsarist "official nationality" is that the view of nationality proffered is profoundly *secular*. Russian Orthodoxy is not part of the contemporary triad'.[33] He described the 'new national idea' (i.e. of the State) as essentially non-ideological and pragmatic, a nostalgic conservatism in which a kind of Russian *sonderweg* is vaguely implied. Likewise, Marlene Laruelle portrayed Putin's role as that of 'an arbitrator among different stakeholders, as well as between different ideological factions.' [34] A bland avoidance of anything that might be utilised by extremists was exemplified in the new words given to the old Soviet National Anthem. Whereas the previous lyrics had been supremely ideological (and emotive for that), the new version spoke in a rather banal way only of Russia's 'forests and fields' and 'brotherly friendship of peoples'. It was notable, too, that restoration of the pre-revolutionary anthem, *Bozhe Tsaria Khrani*, with its Orthodox monarchist lyrics was not seriously considered.

It might be said that the anti-Moscow groups in both ROCOR and Sourozh saw themselves as opposing this secularist or Sergian tendency in the Moscow Patriarchate. They felt themselves to be tapping into a rich seam of Russian spirituality that ran from the possessors and non-possessors and Old Believer schisms through to the Josephite and Catacomb Church of Soviet times.[35] It is a history of unequal struggle in which the state has more often

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[33] March, L. 'Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the new "Russian Idea"', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64:3 (April 2012), pp.401–25. 'This quasi-ideology sees Russia as part of European geography and culture, although politically and historically distinct. Its "nationalism" is moderate in terms of its emphasis on modernisation not anti-modernism, Europe not Eurasia, secularism not the Third Rome and pragmatism not ideological conflict. Officially, the emphasis is on a civic nationalism with an emphasis on Russian citizenship in a multinational state rather than on ethnic or cultural heritage.'

[34] Laruelle, M., 'In search of Putin's philosopher: Why Ivan Ilyin is not Putin's Ideological Guru', Intersection Project EU, 03.03.17

[35] Cf. Fletcher, W., *The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917–1971* (London, 1971)

held the reins of power. This is despite the supposed clericalisation of Russian society feared by some today within Russia and much publicised in the West. John D. Basil noted, 'The authority of the federal government may well be the final arbiter on this issue. It has not yet supported any one point of view, contrary to the hasty and often hyperbolic conclusions drawn by some Western media outlets'.[36] Likewise, John Burgess has suggested that the influence of the Church in Russia is often greatly overestimated by western academics, framing Russia much as any modern, secular society in which Orthodox Christianity is just 'one subculture among many'.[37] This does seem to be born out in the oft-repeated statistic that over 70 percent of Russians identify themselves as 'Orthodox', but only between 2 and 5 percent regularly attend services.[38] Orthodoxy's cultural importance to Russians is high, but actual religious participation is low.

The reasons for the post-communist interdependence of Church and State in Russia are more nuanced than Chapnin, Blitt, Dennon et al propose. Nowhere is the Sloterdijkian cynical paradigm more prevalent than in debates concerning Church–State relations.[39] Mercenary interests of power and fiscal gain are presumed to be *the* prime motivating factors. This was certainly the feeling among the anti-Moscow group in Sourozh, and it was (and is) prevalent within the Russian Church and society at large. But it is not the whole story, because ideologies seldom seduce purely for reasons of material gain. The recent history of both Church and State in Russia would probably be very

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[36] Basil, J.D., 'Problems of State and Church in the Russian Federation: Three Points of View', *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 211–235. For an opposing view, cf. Blitt, R.C., 'How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia: A Guide in Progress', *BYU Law Review*, Issue 3, Article 2 (2008)
[37] Burgess, J.P., 'Orthodox Resurgence: Civil Religion in Russia', *Religion in Eastern Europe*, XXIX, 2 (May 2009) Cf. also Sokolov, M., 'Novye pravye intelektualy v sovremennoi Rossii', *Ab Imperio*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2006), pp. 321–54
[38] *East-West Ministry Report*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1997
[39] Cf. Sloterdijk, P., *Critique*, op.cit.

different were it not for the major shift of neo-Slavophile ideas from the periphery to the centres of power from the late 1970s onwards. Particularly important was the rebranding of the security services (FSB) from a Marxist to a conservative-nationalist ideology.[40] Interestingly, even the reborn Communist Party of Zuganov jettisoned its seminal opposition to the Russian Church, which it now considered a respected pillar of the Russian State.[41]

This process had begun a long time before, as the writings of Soviet-era Slavophiles such as Gumilev and Shafarevich became more widespread. Gorbachev's reforms simply expedited the process. The Church historian Pospielovsky vividly described how this transition affected the intimate life of the elites: 'There is also the nomenklatura, the KGB and the party nationalism. These also understand that the old ideology needs renovation … I am familiar with young Christian converts, some ten years my junior [i.e. born between 1955 and 1960], who are sons of generals. You enter their flats. The corridors are hung with portraits of Marshal Zhukov and all sorts of official diplomas. Then you go into the son's room. There is an icon in the corner and portraits of Nicholas II and Konstantin Leontyev'.[42] In 2001, the Patriarch blessed a

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[40] Cf. Nedostup, A., 'Russkaia ideia i pravoslavie', in *Russkii Mir: o nashei natsional'noi idee* (Moscow, 2014)

[41] Medvedev, R., *Post-Soviet Russia: A Journey Through the Yeltsin Era* (Columbia, 2000), pp.249–51. Cf. also Tolz, V., *Russia: Inventing the Nation* (London, 2001), p.122: 'Gorbachev's reforms galvanized the debate over Russia's attitude towards the West. The clear Westernizing aim of Gorbachev's policies provoked strong opposition on the part of many Communist Party officials, who rejected Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in favour of a Stalinist amalgam of Leninism and the glorification of pre-revolutionary Russia. At the same time, a number of neo-Slavophiles of the 1960s and 1970s decided to join forces with the communists and set up a united electoral bloc for the 1990 election to the Russian parliament. Such formerly uncompromising anti-communists as the mathematician Igor Shafarevich no longer opposed alliance with communists. The communists, in their turn, now accepted the Slavophile tradition as important to the Russian national consciousness. Both camps were united by the rejection of the West as a suitable model for Russia.'

[42] Pospielovsky, D., 'Russian Nationalism and the Orthodox Revival', *Religion in Communist Lands*, 15:3 (1987), pp.291–309. Cf. also Laruelle, M., 'Inside and Around the Kremlin's Black Box: The New Nationalist Thinktanks in Russia', Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm Paper (Oct. 2009), p.68. Marlene Laruelle has noted how this obsessiveness around the Russian national idea permeates all levels of Russian society in a way that it does not in the West (at least perhaps until recent crises in Europe). She describes how even in the pro-Western opposition, 'the Other Russia', Kasparov rubs shoulders with Limonov, but also how the new Russian nationalism is moving away from its traditional literary and theological bases into the world of economics and political science – 'a modernised messianism for the future'.

renovated church in the centre of the Lubyanka complex, which had been restored with FSB donations.

The quest for continuity in Russian history manifested itself in Church and State in different though overlapping ways. A key event was the reburial of the remains of the White general Anton Denikin in the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow on 3 October 2005, just before the final episode of the Sourozh crisis. The event was attended by Putin, the Patriarch and numerous neo-Slavophile luminaries, such as the film director Nikita Mikhalkhov. It provoked anger and despair from the old guard in ROCOR, and from the western media, strangely united against their common enemy. The ex-KGB spy and ROCOR parishioner Konstantin Preobrazhensky wrote of this incident in his book, *KGB v Russkoi Emigratsii*, 'And soon general Denikin will be reburied under the red flag! And Putin will not deny himself the pleasure of playing the Bolshevik party anthem over his grave, as the current Stalinist Russian national anthem was originally called. So, the diminutive red-haired boy from a poor working-class family will at last be able to fully quench his class hatred'.[43] Both political and Church voices increasingly glorified the stability, security and sacrifice of Soviet times, even linking it to Christian morality. This was not for always mercenary gain, but rather in a sense necessitated by Russia's disjointed history. This was the bogeyman for both conservative ROCOR and the liberal Exarchate [in the UK the Vicariate and later Deanery]. An active pro-Moscow parishioner noted that long after the end of the crisis, he attended a funeral at which all sides were again present: 'The funeral service gathered together the two parts who split in 2006 - there was about 1 1/2 dozen people from Holborn [the Deanery]. There was less enmity this time round, and I was greeted in the choir with

[43] Preobrazhensky, K., *KGB v russkoi emigratsii* (2006), p. 86ff

smiles. The Exarchate crowd is just the same as some of the ROCOR crowd in 1970s and 80s - they were full of loathing for the 'Red Church' – and these now hate the 'Moscow church'.[44]

A new breed of conservative students and intellectuals, pro-Soviet and pro-Church, thus arose in Russia in the 1990s.[45] This meant that the liberal-minded, dissident intellectuals represented by Sourozh and the Parisian Exarchate were no longer the only Russian Orthodox intelligentsia. As we have seen, veiled criticisms of the education and class of the newcomers to Sourozh were fiercely countered by pro-Moscow parishioners who laid out their MGU credentials. The new Orthodox intelligentsia was largely composed of the younger Soviet elite described by Pospielovsky. They were also joined by some of the older generation dissidents, such as Solzhenitsyn, who stated that Putin 'was helping Russians to rediscover who they were' after the Yeltsin years.[46] Solzhenitsyn was only one example of those dissidents whose innate anti-westernism forced them to rethink the Soviet era. This divide was not necessarily defined along the lines of diaspora (liberal dissident)–Motherland (conservative patriot). The subtle shift was typified by the Paris-based poet Yuri Kublanovkskii. Once a dissident and anti-regime liberal figure, he became a devout Orthodox patriot who published critiques of pro-western intellectuals inside Russia.[47] The development of a pro-regime, pro-patriarchate Orthodox intelligentsia further marginalised the Sourozh ethos. Whatever might have been said about the Putin regime, it was not the atheistic communism that had

[44] Interview 2Eb
[45] Cf. Sorchak, V., 'Messianstvo kak sotsiokul'turnyi I ideologicheskii fenomen Rossii', Thesis (Moscow, 2013)
[46] 'US embassy cables: Solzhenitsyn praises Putin', 04.04.08, *The Guardian,* http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/148516 [Accessed 25.05.20]
[47] Kublanovskii, Y., 'The liberal intelligentsia does not understand the country we're living in', *Kultura Gazeta*, 01.10.14; and Kublanovskii, Y., 'The present responsibility of the intelligentsia', Interview, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, No. 6610

persecuted the Church almost to extinction. Therefore, the continued hostility towards it of Sourozh dissident intellectuals *and* ROCOR hardliners assumed the appearance of a Cold War recidivism.

The reclamation of the Soviet epoch as a positive model became~~was~~ a hallmark of the Russian World as the use of this concept by Church and State developed. Patriarch Kirill himself devoted a whole book to the concept of the Russian World[48]. It was a book in which the Church's relationship to the State (both Tsarist and Soviet) loomed large. It was this concordat with the past that more than anything else angered the anti-Sergian tendencies in Sourozh and ROCOR. Pragmatists and pro-Moscow Slavophiles argued that the Church–State symphonia was necessary for the 'consolidation' of the Russian people, both at home and abroad – and this became the new byword of the Russian World. Andy Byford noted that, 'During 2007–2009 the main stated objective of "compatriot" mobilisation in Britain was the so-called "consolidation and unification" of the Russian Diaspora in the UK'.[49] This *applied* neo-Slavophile ideology had been a constant theme of both Church and State since the millennium.[50]

Such a policy could not but have an effect on Church life in the diaspora, especially for an anomalous diocese such as Sourozh. It meant stronger ties to the Mother Church, more episcopal visits and an increased flow of information and clergy between Moscow and the diaspora, along with a centralisation of decision-making (verticality) and an emphasis on the preservation of Russian

[48] Kirill, Patriarch, *Sem' slov o russkom mire* (Moscow, 2015)
[49]Byford, A., 'The Russian Diaspora in International Relations: Compatriots in Britain', *Europe-Asia Studies* 64:4 (01.03.12), p.727
[50] Cf. 'Policy Concept of the Russian Federation', Point 1:j 'to consolidate the Russian-speaking Diaspora', Point 45:f 'to further the consolidation of compatriots living abroad so as to enable them to better realise their rights in the countries of residence, and to facilitate the preservation of the Russian diaspora's identity and its ties with the historical homeland'

culture.[51] It signalled greater uniformity between parishes and dioceses and meant a retreat from local variations that had grown up organically via enculturation. It also meant a steady Russification of the liturgy and Church communications. For the anti-Moscow parishioners, these changes were experienced mostly as negative. But for the pro-Moscow parishioners, it meant the rectification of what were seen as unorthodox practices, while the closer ties to the Mother Church were to be welcomed after years of separation.

The 2000s saw the apogee of the impetus towards consolidation within and without the Church.[52] Putin became president, and at the same time the rise in crude oil prices and sensible economic policies in Russia were at last creating a little stability and middle-income wealth. The plethora of Russian Diaspora organisations that had been founded in the nineties started to gain a new impetus (and funding) for their mission to consolidate and export the Russian World beyond the Motherland.[53] Although the concept of the Russian World had appeared in the nineteenth century as analogous to the term Slavic world, when it was reborn in the early 1990s its boundaries were more tightly linked to the Russophone world and the talk was more of compatriots abroad.[54] The Church gradually took up the idea and added to it the notion of Russia as a civilisation, broadening it out from its ethno-linguistic base. Whereas the promotion of Russia as an empire was politically taboo in a contemporary context, the idea of Russia as a civilisation – a conceptual

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[51] Kirill, Patriarch, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie* (Moscow, 2009), p.187

[52] Cf. Suslov, M., '"Russian World": Russia's Policy towards its Diaspora', *Notes de l'ifri. Russie. Nei*. *Visions* 103. Russia/NIS Centre

[53] Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Mitropolit Ilarion otvetil na voprosy saita "Pomniu Rossiu"', 12.02.12. https://mospat.ru/ru/2012/02/17/news58335/ [Accessed 25.05.20]

[54] Cf. Zevelev, I., 'The Russian World in Moscow's Strategy', 22.08.16. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy [Accessed 16.04.18] and Fokina, K. 'Voprosu o russkom mire', Orlovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet. Thesis, 2014.

euphemism for empire – was not.[55] In the words of Kirill Govorun, 'the concept of "civilisation" became the key in the construction of the "Russian World".[56]

The idea of Russia as a civilisation fed into the global 'clash of civilisations' rhetoric of the post-communist world. The events in Sourozh from 1990 to 2009 should be situated during these currents, which affected the tone and manner of the debates whatever the conscious intentions of the participants. An essential difference in approach to Church–State relations lay at the heart of the pro- and anti-Moscow positions, in Sourozh as in the wider Church. For those opposed to Moscow, the new symphonia signified a secularisation and banalisation of religion into a merely cultural and political entity. The alternative they promoted (such as the Sourozh of Metropolitan Anthony) was non-ethnic and pan-Orthodox, with no direct connection or funding from any state. Metropolitan Anthony had been resolute in refusing funding from the Russian State, Soviet and post-Soviet. When the cathedral was purchased from the Anglicans in the 1970s, for example, all the money was raised by donations. The supporters of Moscow countered that the close relationship of Church and State was pivotal in the history of Orthodoxy in general and signified the sacralisation of the state rather than the secularisation of the Church. If Orthodoxy was a totalising belief system, then the state could not be said to lie outside its remit. Particularly with regards to Russia, they looked back into Russian history, and at renewed concepts such as the Third Rome, to find political imperatives for the Church.

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[55] Kirill, Patriarch: Rossia – eto strana-tsivilizatsia. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3334815.html [Accessed 11.01.9]. And Kirill, Patriarch, 'Russkii Mir: osobaia tsivilizatsia, kotoruiu neobkhodimo sberech'. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3730705.html [Accessed 11.01.19]

[56] Govorun, K., 'Interpretiruia "russkii mir"', *Russkii Zhurnal* (2014) http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Interpretiruya-russkij-mir [Accessed 25.05.20]

The Russian World: Vertical Power and *Sobornost'*

The long view of the history of the Russian Church might see the Sourozh crisis as a manifestation of tensions that had existed since earliest times. It is true that the tendency to centralisation and clericalisation of power and authority in the Church was much older than the devolvement of power to the local level and the laity. Sometimes dormant, sometimes explosive, the struggles between the Church and State ran deep and were reflected in both the Nikonian and possessors versus non-possessors episodes.[57] In Sourozh, Metropolitan Anthony and his entourage aspired to a much greater involvement of the white clergy, laity and women in the decision making and daily life of the diocese. Yet, in the view of many in Sourozh, the post-communist Russian Church seemed to be moving in the opposite direction, with power being ever more concentrated in the Patriarchate and its organs – the Synod and the DECR.

A pivotal event for Metropolitan Anthony and his disciples was the Sobor of 1917–18, which was cited as a counterweight to the increasingly vertical tendency in the Church. Irina von Schlippe, a member of the Diocesan Council and also the anti-Moscow camp, wrote, 'One essential feature of our life in Sourozh is that we are continuing the stream of renewal of the Russian Orthodox Church which came from within the country at the beginning of the 20th century and culminated in the Sobor of 1917'.[58] The Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh were an attempt to implement some of the decisions of the Sobor in the context of the existing diaspora situation.[59] Moreover,

[57] Cf. Kostiuk, K., 'Formirovanie i evoliutsia "bogoslovia vlasti" v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XIV–XVI vv, *Gosudarstvo, religia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom*, No. 3 (2014), p.42ff
[58] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org. 'Some purely personal thoughts on the situation in the Diocese of Sourozh', 2006
[59] Cf. Bloom, Metropolitan A., Letter on the need for statues for the Diocese of Sourozh, in Report to the Diocesan Conference at Effingham, on the Meeting of the Diocesan Assembly, 27.05.79

Metropolitan Anthony could claim (although to my knowledge he did not) that the original post-revolutionary London parish had been founded on the ustav of the 1917–18 Sobor.[60] Bishop Basil was to regularly refer to these statutes in his dealings with the Patriarchate and as confirmation of his rights in the eyes of his supporters.[61] The statutes emphasised the role of the diocese in the election of its own bishop. This was a very democratic process, in which nominees could be put forward if they had the support of just fifteen parishioners.[62] The statutes also confirmed the roles of the elected diocesan and parish councils, the two bodies that were to play such a vital role in the troubles. But the battle over ecclesiology went much further than the statutes and control of the diocesan and parish councils, to the very heart of the debate over the role of the Church in the modern world. Was the Church to capitulate before the secular democratic zeitgeist or entrench itself as a reactionary and conservative vertical power, mirroring the secular trajectory of the contemporary Russian State?

As one priest in Sourozh commented, 'The fullness of Orthodoxy is found at the *local* level. This is what I experienced when I first encountered the Church. Therefore, my loyalty is first to the Parish, second to the Diocese, and third to the Patriarch – whoever he may be'.[63] In response to this remark, a parishioner replied in a Russian-language chat-room that it was a 'truly divisive' approach to Church discipline in which a parish priest could consider himself of greater importance than the bishop or the patriarch. Punning upon the priest's name (John Marks), the parishioner called this a 'Marxist'

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[60] NA. RG8/292.26, op. cit.
[61] *Tserkovnyi Vestnik*, Nos. 1–2 (Jan. 2004), pp.278–9
[62] OCAD. Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh, Article II: 5–7. Details the procedure for the election of the bishop based on nominees: 'Nominations must be signed by fifteen individuals on the Diocesan Electoral Roll, of whom at least three must be presbyters and 6 lay members of the Assembly.
[63] OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks, op. cit.

ecclesiology (‘марксистская’ экклесиология).[64] On the other hand, the contrary tendency, towards the centralising of Church power, was suspicious in the eyes of the anti-Moscow group because it seemed to relate to secular authoritarianism at a time when Putin was talking of ‘vertical power’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ and making showy displays of power. Likewise, the Church began to emphasise patriarchal pre-eminence along with rich ceremonial.

The arguments of Church and State were not dissimilar. The post-Cold War world demanded strong, central governance if the Russian World was not to descend into chaos. For the Church, with its vast diaspora, the idea was even more compelling. The extension of control beyond its canonical borders and the consolidation of previously disparate groups necessitated a strengthening of vertical power. But, as the above blogger expressed, other aspects of this debate were more ideologically driven. Democratisation of ecclesiology was seen by some in the Russian Church as a secular western import, opposed to all things Eastern, Orthodox and even Christian. Promoters of democratisation countered that it was ~~is~~ in fact the autocratic, centralising ecclesiology that was a western import, and secular in the sense that it aped~~s~~ worldly power and the centralised Caesaropapism of the Catholic Church.[65] In order to grasp how these opposing views operated in the Sourozh crisis, it is necessary to understand the key role of the Sobor of 1917–18, on which the Sourozh Statutes – and the whole Sourozh ethos – were based. The Sobor was frequently mentioned during the crisis by the anti-Moscow supporters, who considered themselves to be implementing its decrees. In February 2003,

[64] Cirota.ru. *Tema*: #58412, *Soobshchenie*: #2164989, 02.07.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 25.05.20]
[65] Tsygankov, A., ‘Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia's Foreign Policy; “Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by Habit”’, *Europe-Asia Studies* 64:4, pp.695–713

Bishop Basil issued a statement concerning the importance of the Sobor of 1917–18 to the diocese of Sourozh:

> It seems absolutely clear to me that the only way forward is to follow the path shown us by Metropolitan Anthony, and to combine loyalty to the Patriarchate with internal autonomy. If we do not do this, the 'fault lines' that exist elsewhere in the Russian diaspora will appear here as well and the Diocese will split up. This does not have to take place. The past 40 years have shown that it is quite possible to maintain local autonomy within the Patriarchate. We have demonstrated this very clearly here in Britain. If we become truly aware of what we must do if we are to stay together, we can achieve this, in spite of the fact that even today, nearly twelve years after the fall of communism, it has not yet been possible to implement the decisions of the 1917–18 Sobor in Russia.[66]

In the decades preceding the February Revolution, the Church had been debating structural reforms with some passion, culminating in the Great Sobor of 1917–18. It began in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Provisional Government in August 1917 and ended in September 1918 with the onset of the Bolshevik Red Terror. Although cut short, the proceedings of the Sobor itself (leaving aside those of the long preparatory process) were vast and are still not fully published even today. The Novospassky monastery in Moscow is nearing completion of a thirty-four-volume series of protocols and documents. Each volume is well over a thousand pages and the project has been a Herculean undertaking.[67] In broad terms, it can be said that the Sobor gave

[66] OCAD. Statement by Bishop Basil of Sergievo at the London Cathedral, 16.02.03

[67] Cf. http://sobor1917.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/sobor_2016_01.pdf. The decrees of the Sobor were recently translated into English as appendices in the first full-length study of the Sobor in English: Destivelle, H O.P. *The Moscow Council 1917–1918* (Notre Dame, 2014)

voice to the more liberalising or democratising tendencies within Church governance. As the Sobor ended in the Bolshevik coup and a wholesale onslaught on the Church, opinion in the diaspora Church concerning the legitimacy of its proposals ~~and even its very existence~~ was divided.[68] Conservative critics claimed that the Church had been under pressure to be seen to act in line with the revolutionary zeitgeist.[69] The legacy of the Sobor was complicated by the attack unleashed on the Church by the new Soviet State – a persecution almost without parallel in Church history.[70] This meant that the Church inside the Soviet Union was in no position to enact the decrees of the Sobor as they had been intended. Two outcomes relating to Church administration, however, were to prove pivotal for both the Church in the Motherland and the diaspora. The first was the election of the first patriarch since the time of Peter the Great, which gave the Church a steady hand in terrible times in the person of Patriarch (later Saint) Tikhon of Moscow. This election enabled a certain loosening of rigid Church administrative structures, as Tikhon quickly realised that there would be times when local jurisdictions

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[68] To counter the accusations that the Sobor had been compromised, it should be said that the preparations for the Sobor had begun over twelve years earlier and still highlighted the same areas of reform. The Tsar himself had given his backing to the Sobor and was known to be in favour of some of the reforms. Nevertheless, today many in the Russian Church consider the Sobor to have been modernist and even heretical. Cf. Vasilik., Protodiakon Vladimir, 'Sobor predstavlyal sobori dostatochno slozhnoie iavleniie' http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2017/05/05/sobor_predstavlyal_soboj_dostatochno_slozhnoe_yavlenie/ 'It was attended by various elements, including revolutionary and radical ones, at times proposing completely unsustainable things that might simply destroy the Church. For example, a married episcopate and the complete Russification and reforming of worship was seriously proposed. The most ardent modernist projects that could destroy our Church were advanced' [Accessed 25.05.20]

[69] Cf. Pavlov, D.B., *Otechestvennaia i zarubezhnaia istoriografia gosudarstvenno-tserkovnykh otnoshenii 1917–1922 gg* (Moscow, 2011), p.3ff, and Shevzov, V., op.cit., p.47

[70] The destruction of the Church in Russia is still a neglected subject in Western academia. Cf. Lupinin, N., 'The Russian Orthodox Church' in *Eastern Christianity and the Cold War*, op. cit., p.20: **'**The intensity of the attack on the ROC and on religion is entirely unprecedented in the annals of the world and the history of the Church … Curiously most (Western) textbooks on the history of the Soviet Union barely mention this phenomenon nor do many more specialised studies on government policies or on specific Soviet leaders. This strange omission unfortunately indicates a mix of ignorance, thematic prejudice and imbalanced historical analysis and needs scholarly emendation'. Also Bouteneff, V., *Father Arseny 1893–1973* (London, 2001) p.vi: 'From 1917 to 1991 – 600 bishops, 40,000 priests, 120,000 monks and nuns were killed. Many died in the harsh conditions of labour camps, others were shot or buried alive.' A good concise history of the persecution is still Vladimir Rusak's *Sviditel'stvo obvinenia* (Vols. I–III, Jordanville, 1986).

and even parishes would become cut off from the existing hierarchal lines of command. Secondly, the Sobor highlighted and placed greater emphasis on the roles of the laity and women in the Church. This gave renewed energy to parishes and allowed the Church to survive even through the darkest years of collectivisation and Stalinism when the Church hierarchy and clergy were almost completely destroyed. During this time, it was largely lay women who kept the Church alive underground. The words of Mikhail Shkarovskii are worth quoting for their vivid description of how the Church survived her Soviet nightmare:

> The fact that the Church in this period was able to survive was due in some respects to the special significance of the fruits of the Sobor of 1917–1918, because of the revival of parish life and an increase of the role of women. Paying no heed to mortal danger, parishioners everywhere resisted the closure of churches. And the overwhelming majority of people in the parish councils in the 1930s were women. They demonstrated an amazing fearlessness and resilience in self-sacrificing service to the Church. It was these women who went into exile to support and save the lives of their priests, they gave shelter to the persecuted and guaranteed the underground life of Church services. Many ascetics [подвижницы] appeared, not as monastics, but living like monastics, so hundreds of such 'monasteries in the world' appeared. All of this allowed the Church not only to survive but to be reborn as soon as external circumstances changed.[71]

The example of the bravery of such women under the totalitarian regimes of the last century was often referenced by Metropolitan Anthony with a view to

[71] Cf. Shkarovskii, M.V., 'Vlianie Vserossiiskogo Pomestnogo Sobora 1917–1918 gg. v sovetskuiu epokhu', *Tserkov' i Vremia,* 4 (25), 2003. 164-188 (author trans.)

inspiring a rethink of attitudes within the Church. In the diaspora, the loosening of administrative structures 'in times of need' helped the Higher Church Administration (which was to become ROCOR, the Russian Church Abroad) to gain independence. All this considered, it might be thought that the Sobor would be held in high esteem in post-Soviet Russia and that the Church would be desirous to enact freely its decrees, so long delayed. But this is not the case at all and the reasons for this are complex.

Firstly, the Church in the diaspora was free to discuss the decrees of the Sobor and many of the theologians who had drafted its proposals now found themselves in Paris and Berlin.[72] The Paris School that developed under the guidance of such figures as Fr Sergei Bulgakov was viewed with suspicion by the Church Abroad and the monarchist wing of the Church. The Paris School was to publish much about the Sobor and reforms to Church administration and emphasised *sobornost'* over hierarchal power. The school later came under the Exarchate of the Russian Tradition and the omophorion of Constantinople, and although it included some of the most famous names in twentieth-century Russian theology (Schmemann, Afanasiev, Bulgakov) they were in the liberal and ecumenist tradition from which the post-Soviet Church has now moved away. Although Metropolitan Anthony was under the Moscow Patriarchate, his influences and background were very much of the Paris School.

Secondly, and this is something that is often overlooked by western commentators, all liberalising tendencies in the Russian Church are viewed with suspicion in relation to the history of renovationism. The derogatory term 'neo-renovationists' was sometimes used by hardliners to describe the

[72] On the influence of the Sobor on the theology of the Russian Diaspora cf. Destivel', I. '*Reaktsia bogoslovov russkoi emigratsii na sobor 1917–1918 g.*', Thesis

'liberals' of Sourozh.[73] In fact, the proposals of the r~~R~~enovationist movement were largely rejected by the Sobor of 1917–18, which took a much more sober line on reforms, but any talk of increasing the role of the laity, and similar initiatives, often stands accused of neo-renovationism.[74] The Renovationist schism of 1922–44 was extremely important to the subsequent trajectory of the Russian Church. The movement had its genesis in several reformist streams that fed into the preparations for the 1917–18 Sobor, with extremist elements seeing the Revolution as an opportunity to realise radical changes in the Church.[75] The result was the emergence of the Living Church, an attempt by liberals in the Church, supported by the Bolsheviks, to introduce revolutionary reforms into Church governance, pastoral theology and the liturgy. As the Bolsheviks had intended, the movement was highly divisive and caused a schism throughout the country between those who supported Patriarch Tikhon's condemnation of the movement and the followers of Fr Alexander Vvedenensky, who led the Living Church until its final demise in the 1940s. While some White clergy and bishops initially supported the new movement, the laity largely rejected the reformers, seeing them as 'stooges' of the atheist state[76]. The leaders of the Living Church proposed, among other reforms, elimination of 'pagan' accretions into the Liturgy, a return to the simpler style of worship of the early church, permanent opening of the royal doors during services, and translation of certain parts of the liturgy into contemporary

[73] Cf. 'The Sourozh Schism and the Last Christians', 15.05.06. http://www.orthodoxengland.org.uk/sourozh2.htm [Accessed 05.05.18]
[74] On the renovationists and the Sobor, cf. Firsov, S.L., *Vlast' i ogon': Tserkov' i sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1918 – nachalo 1940-x gg*. (Moscow, 2014), pp.224 and 238ff.
[75] Cf. Golovushkin, D.A., 'Fenomen obnovlenchestva v russkom pravoslavii pervoy poloviny XX veka', Thesis. VAK.RF. 2020.
[76] Ivanov, S.N., 'Khronologia obnovlencheskogo "perevorota" v Russkoi Tserkvi po novym arkhivnim dokumentam', *Vestnik Pravoslavnogo Sviato-Tikhonovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta* 3 (58) (2014), pp.24–60,

Russian.[77] The Renovationists are remembered in the Russian Church today as traitors by laity and clergy alike, seen as having sought favour and signed agreements with the very persecutors who forced their fellow priests to submit to the bullet and the Gulag. In one incident, Vvedensky was called to give evidence against his own mentor, Metropolitan Veniamin of Petrograd. During his statement he was nearly killed by a rock thrown by a peasant woman.[78] Daniel Payne, in his brief analysis of the Sourozh crisis, noted that resisting the spectre of renovationism was high on the agenda of the Russian Church, 'not only is the issue regarding the Diocese of Sourozh and the Western Exarchate in Paris associated with the spread of Russian nationalism, it also pertains to the issue of spiritual security with the ROC attempting to consolidate its own influence against that of renovationism and secularism'.[79]

Later Church persecutions under Khrushchev in the early 1960s again tried to create schisms in the Church at the parish level by demanding an increased role for the laity and in particular for parish lay representatives to act as a counterweight to the clergy.[80] As a result of these Soviet State interventions, initiatives for democratisation and lay involvement in Church

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[77] For a broad outline of the liturgical and linguistic reforms of the Renovationists, cf. Solov'iev, Iierei Il'ia 'Obnovlencheskiy raskol i liturgicheskiye reformi', *TSV* № 12 (385) June 2008/27 July 2008 g.

[78] Cf. Firsov, S.L.*, Vlast' i ogon': Tserkov' i sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1918 – nachalo 1940-x gg*. (Moscow, 2014), p.217ff

[79] Payne, D., 'Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?', *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp.712–27

[80] Cf. Shkarovskii, M.V., 'Vlianie Vserossiiskogo Pomestnogo Sobora 1917–1918 gg. v sovetskuiu epokhu' *Tserkov' i Vremia*, 4 (25), 2003, pp. 164-188. In relation to the Khrushchev persecutions: 'The "Reform" [ie Khrushchev's reform] largely attempted to destroy traditional Church governance, whilst her juridical organisation was subdivided. Priests were separated from the parish life and had to be appointed by the community under contract for "the fulfilment of religious needs". The clergy were not allowed to attend meetings of the elected church council in which the authorities possessed the legal right to challenge appointees and gradually install its own people. In fact, the leaders of parish life became these "elders", often completely unchurched and even unbelieving people of morally dubious character. Without their agreement the priest or bishop was not able to conduct any work or even to sack the cleaner from the church. The legal status of the bishops and Patriarch was not stipulated anywhere as if they didn't exist and possessed no lawful form of communication with parish life.' (Author trans.)

administration are today met with opposition in Russia, which has increasingly returned to a vertical power structure.

The arguments that were debated during the Sobor of 1917–18 (and many years previous to it) continued on in the diaspora. Some of the more liberal-leaning jurisdictions, such as the future OCA in America, the Parisian Exarchate and the Diocese of Sourozh in London, decided to implement some of the decisions of the Sobor independently. In the broadest of terms, this was done through a greater emphasis (or, it might be argued by their opponents, misunderstanding) on the concept of *sobornost'* as permeating all aspects of Church life, especially ecclesiology.

This is not the place for an in-depth analysis one of the most complex terms in Russian theology, but a few words need to be said about *sobornost'* as a concept. Both sides in the conflict claimed to have a better grasp on the real meaning of *sobornost'*. The critique of the pro-Moscow parishioners was that Bishop Basil and his entourage represented it as a dry 'collegiality' or 'democratisation', and this was displayed in their 'coldness'. A pro-Moscow parishioner complained that Bishop Basil did 'not understand what *sobornost'* is. But *sobornost'* is a very important concept! A very important business! *Sobornost'* is when we are all together. But he failed to understand this!'[81] But for those opposed to Moscow, *sobornost'* was a key weapon to use in their arguments against vertical episcopal power.

Sobornost' is usually translated into English as 'conciliarity' or 'collegiality', but such definitions fail to capture the full meaning of the term. It

[81] 'Surozhskoe nestroenia: vzgliad iznutry' pravoslavie.ru, op.cit.. http://www.pravoslavie.ru/4693.html [Accessed 26.05.20]

has ancient roots which go back to a pre-modern – perhaps even pre-Christian – worldview, as G.V. Stel'mashuk points out:

> The term *sobornost'* is understood as a complete set of psychological attitudes and existing practices of Church life and of unwritten rules for the conduct of the laity. *Sobornost'* is a certain mentality, permeating all levels of society in the pre-industrial era and a characteristic of all Russian Orthodox people. The principles of *sobornost'* as a special worldview go back into the mists of time. They appear in parallel with the emergence of the territorial community in the pre-State period of history. The self-governance of the city and likewise of the village were so constructed on the principle of *sobornost*.[82]

The philosopher Ivan Ilyin, in his study of Hegel, attempted at points to define this concept phenomenologically: 'the singular is permeated by the Universal and included in it; the Universal grasps the individual and constitutes its inner substantial nature. In such an immediate identity they constitute a single "grasping" or "genus"'.[83] It was this diversity in the unity of the collective that characterised the first Slavophiles' countering of the atomisation of western European industrialised society with the ideal of the Russian *narod* and the peasant commune.[84] Indeed, Khomiakov himself is often regarded as the coiner of the noun *sobornost'*.[85] Furthermore, the adjectival variant *sobornaia* had been chosen for the translation into Slavonic of 'universal' in the Nicene Creed (Εἰς μίαν, Ἁγίαν, **Καθολικὴν** καὶ Ἀποστολικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν / Et unam,

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[82] Stel'mashuk G.V., i Nikolaeva, O V. *Sobornost' kak vazhneishaia cherta russkogo pravoslavia v kontekste perspektiv ego razvitia*, vypusk 3: Sbornik materialov konf. SP Fil. Obsh. (St Petersburg, 2005) Intro.
[83] Ilyin, I., *The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity: Volume One: The Doctrine of God* (Illinois, 2010), p.109
[84] Cf. Gorelov, A.A, 'A.S.Khomiakov: uchenie o sobornosti i russkaia obshchina', *Znanie, Ponimanie, Umenie*, No. 2 (2017), MGU
[85] A discussion of the etymology of the word *sobornost'* in relation to Khomiakov's writings can be found in Shevzov, V., op. cit., pp.30–35

sanctam, **catholicam** et apostolicam Ecclesiam / Во едину святую, **соборную** и Апостольскую Церковь / And in One, holy, **Catholic** and Apostolic Church), when there are other words that would have equally sufficed. This choice seems to encapsulate the opposing worldviews of the individualist West versus the collectivism of the East. The nineteenth century Slavophile Konstantin Aksakov used the metaphor of a choir to depict *sobornost'*, describing a unity in which each individual becomes ever more part of the group, yet ever more themselves.[86] This idea was developed with great insight in the twentieth century by the literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in his concepts of polyphony and dialogism, both of which emerge from Slavic *sobornost'*.[87]

From this short description it can be seen that *sobornost'* is not only a pivotal Orthodox concept, but a peculiarly *Russian* one as well. For this reason, issues around its (mis)appropriation were extremely sensitive. I would here like to posit a link between the debates around *sobornost'* and the seminal work on nationalism by Benedict Anderson and subsequent studies.[88] Anderson's concept of the imagined (national) community was resolutely modern and secular and in some respects defined against the *ancien regime*, so it might appear mischievous to apply it to the religious sphere. There are two reasons why this may be fruitful. Firstly, in the Russian case, the emergence of nationalism (if such it can be called) was – and is – still very connected to the Church ('Russian was his language, Orthodoxy his identity'[89]). Secondly, while Anderson's conception of the pre-modern religious-cosmological worldview as 'hierarchical and centripetal' seems to hold true in its essence when applied to

[86] Aksakov, K., 'O sovremennom cheloveke' IIff. (Saint Petersburg, 1876)
[87] Cf., Esaulov, I.A., 'Polifonia i sobornost'', The Seventh International Bakhtin Conference, Book 1 (Moscow, 1995)
[88] Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities:* op. cit. (1983, 2006)
[89] Petro, N., *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* op.cit.

Western Europe, it is less applicable to the Orthodox East.[90] One of Anderson's key ideas about the 'imagined community' of the nation is that of the horizontal: 'Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived *as a deep, horizontal comradeship.*'[91] Western academics steeped in the history of the Western Empire and especially the emergence of the Papacy should take account of the subtle distinction between that and the *sobornost'*-driven ecclesiology (and subsequent social structures) of the Orthodox East, especially Russia. Anderson's 'deep horizontal comradeship' does seem to go part of the way to providing an adequate description or translation of *sobornost'*. As the Sourozh parishioner wrote, Bishop Basil did not understand that *sobornost'* 'is when we are all together'. This is not to propose Russian *sobornost'* as analogous to modern nationalism, but rather to utilise Anderson's imagined community as a useful concept in the national or rather hyper-national manifestation of the Russian Church.

In what ways did the re-emphasis on *sobornost'* at the Sobor of 1917 play out in practical terms in Church administration? In particular, the Sobor emphasised the independence of each diocese and proposed that dioceses should elect their own bishops from a list of candidates compiled by local clergy and confirmed by the Synod. These elective principles for the diocesan clergy coupled with the formation of proposed elected diocesan and parish councils were rather revolutionary and the debate on this issue was more heated than on any other. As Vitali Petrenko writes: 'Another breakthrough was represented by the adoption of the "Temporary Statute of the Parish". It

[90] 'The fundamental conceptions about "social groups" were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal', Anderson, ibid., p.15
[91] Ibid., p.50

conferred “extraordinary powers’ on the parish, including the right to elect local clergy and enabled the parishioners to organise the Church-parish councils and to exercise control over the Church's affairs on the local level. The course was set to organise ecclesiastical life in line with the ideals of Khomiakov's principle of sobornost', which would limit the “vertical” hierarchical authority of the black clergy, bringing and re-enforcing the principle of power-sharing on to a horizontal level which would involve a greater participation of the white clergy and laity in the ecclesiastical life of the Russian Orthodox Church’.[92] As noted, this was a pivotal instruction of the Sourozh Statutes.[93] The process was covered in detail in sections 4–8 with much emphasis on an explanation of the transparent electoral procedure. In the new Sourozh Statues introduced in 2010, there was practically no mention of this procedure.[94] The diocesan election was to become a specific matter of contention after the death of Metropolitan Anthony.

The anti-Moscow group consistently made the connection between Putin’s *vertikal’ vlasti* and the increasingly hierarchical tendencies in the Russian Church. The words of a statement of the diocesan council on 16 June 2002 stated that the Russian Church ‘heavily traumatised by the violence and cruelty of more than 70 years of communism, is now trying to regain her national character and it seems is in need of a display of hierarchical power as opposed to communal authority’.[95] The anti-Moscow group saw in the Moscow Patriarchate’s tendency towards hierarchal or vertical power the legacy of a ‘Soviet cult of power’.[96] A parishioner wrote that the Russians of the first wave

[92] Petrenko, V., ‘The Development of the Concept of Authority Within the Russian Orthodox Church’, PhD Thesis, Durham, 2005
[93] OCAD. The Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh (Metropolitan Anthony version), Sections 4–8
[94] OCAD. The Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh (Metropolitan Anthony version)
[95] *Khronika Surozhskoi Smuty*, op. cit.
[96] Cf. Kostiuk, K., ‘Formirovanie i evoliutsia “bogoslovia vlasti” v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XIV – XVI vv' in *Gosudarstvo, religia, tserkov’ v Rossii I za rubezhom*, № 3 (32) 2014. Also Wallace L.D., ‘Alexander Men and

and the English converts were 'sickened by the cult of power and strength, they feel in the face of the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate. They [ie the English and old émigrés] have never been Soviet citizens, it is alien and strange'.[97] Irina von Schlippe linked the cult of power directly to the secular vertical power structure writing, 'The State autocratic manner of governing, more pronounced at the moment than of late, is affecting the Church as well'.[98] One parishioner wrote that it was 'ultimately a question of the Moscow hierarchy exerting power simply because it has power and wishes to be seen to exert it whatever the consequences'.[99] This is an interesting and sometimes overlooked point, but beyond the remit of this study. The display of power plays a different role in Russia compared to the rest of Europe (including Eastern Europe). Even in ecclesiastical matters, ostentation and public shows of power do not necessarily have negative connotations; on the contrary, modesty and compromise can be seen as weaknesses.

In practical terms, the power dynamic did draw the Church and the State together and Metropolitan Hilarion made no secret of his close contact with the Russian Foreign Ministry. He viewed such activity as completely benign: 'First of all, our important partner in the business of the support of our compatriots [in the diaspora] is the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs … The DECR has become more focused on its work with foreign countries – in fact it has become analogous to the secular Ministry of Foreign Affairs'.[100] Similarly, Lavrov has spoken about the importance of collaboration between the Church

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Russian Orthodoxy: The Conflict between Freedom and Power', *Religion in Eastern Europe* XXIX, 4 (November 2009). Both articles take the concept of the cult of power much further back into Russia's past, the first relating it to the theology developed especially under Tsar Ivan Grozny, and the second into Russia's pagan past. For the notion of a Soviet mentality, see Chapter 4.

[97] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #58412, *Soobshenie* #2088395, 26.05.06 [Accessed 26.05.20]

[98] Von Schlippe, op. cit.

[99] OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs. An Open Letter and a Personal Observation

[100] Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Mitropolit Ilarion otvetil na voprosy saita "Pomniu Rossiu"', 12.02.12. https://mospat.ru/ru/2012/02/17/news58335/ [Accessed 26.05.20]

and embassies working together to consolidate the Russian World.[101] Yet seen from the anti-Moscow side, the involvement of the Russian Ambassador in the Sourozh case was highly disconcerting, let alone the new emphasis on secular emblems and holidays of the Russian State.[102] A by-product of this new centralisation of power was a concentration on *actual* power and the trappings of power; hence the reclamation of property at home and abroad, the usage of black limousines by the higher clergy, previously associated with the party nomenklatura, etc. Some commentators on the Sourozh crisis linked this tendency to the legacy of years of Soviet infiltration, in which the Moscow Patriarchate was the soft-power arm of the Soviet State abroad.[103] A Moscow priest wrote in relation to the Sourozh crisis that, '"Sergianism" in the post-Soviet conditions is a rigid "vertical" of Church-administrative authority, spliced with corrupt secular power, exploiting the "symbolic capital" of the national spiritual tradition in order to transform it into physical capital, used for personal earthly purposes. Any attempt at *sobornost'*, even the most pitiful … undermines such a "vertical" and its monopoly on "symbolic capital" and is therefore doomed to forceful eradication'.[104] Proponents of this view had multiple examples to cite as evidence. One of the most notorious concerned the priest Fr Sergei Taratukhin, who was tried and sentenced by an

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[101] Cf. Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference After Tenth Meeting of Working Group on MFA-Russian Orthodox Church Interaction, Moscow, 20.11.07. http://www.mid.ru/en/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/356698 [Accessed 16/04/18]

[102] Although it should be pointed out that meetings with the Russian Ambassador were also conducted by Bishop Basil. Cf. Letter from Bishop Basil to Patriarch Aleksei, 03.03.06. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html

[103] Zherebiatiev, M., 'Lenta novostei: I beglii episkop Vasilii', portal-credo.ru, 24.06.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=45528 [Accessed: 05.05.19] 'The announcement of Bishop Basil as a foreign ''runaway bishop'' was announced on NTV, the State Broadcasting channel ''in true Soviet style'' … 'Without a doubt, the ROC MP in the 2000s has taken upon itself the role as the ideological and spiritual guide of Russian foreign policy.' (author trans.)

[104] Maliutin, A., 'Surozh ostaetsia sobornym', 09.06.06. https://credo.press/67626/ [Accessed 15.08.18] (author trans.)

ecclesiastical court after referring to Khodorkovsky as a political prisoner.[105] This event happened at the same time as the Sourozh crisis, and to the anti-Moscow group represented the lengths that the Church would go to in its concordat with the State.[106]

This was the damning critique of the Church represented in the Russian art-house film *Leviathan* in which Church and State work together to exploit honest people for mercenary gain. An English commentator on the Sourozh crisis noted this view as a subtext of anti-Moscow opposition: 'Vladyka Vasily [favoured] the preservation of the "style" of administration of the diocese, setting him in opposition to the situation in Russia, where, as it seems to him, the church hierarchy is absolutely despotic and completely corrupt'.[107] Another blogger was glad that the conflict was not an ethnic one but 'one of a different understanding of ecclesiology'.[108]

The greatest practical concern for the anti-Moscow camp relating to these differences over ecclesiology was the succession within the diocese. People were aware that in 1996 there had been a schism in the Russian Church in Estonia, when the local candidate for the diocesan bishop had been rejected by Moscow.[109] Similarly, people knew that following Metropolitan Anthony's death, Bishop Basil had only been confirmed as the administrator of the diocese and not (yet) the ruling diocesan bishop, despite his selection by the diocesan council. Moscow countered that the diocesan council was a small and self-interested body concerned with maintaining independence from Moscow

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[105] Korobov, P*., Kommersant',* No. 51, 24.03.06, p.7
[106] Cf. Maliutin, op.cit.
[107] Thomas, Dr S. 'What is canonically wrong with what Bishop Basil Osborne & the Patriarch of Constantinople have done with the Diocese of Sourozh?', 07.2002. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[108] Cirota.ru, *Tema* #58412, *Soobshenie* #2307454, 05.09.06 [Accessed 26.05.20]
[109] Cf. Crow, G. *This Holy Man,* op.cit., p.220ff

at all costs, and that it did not represent the great mass of parishioners. In any case the actual right of a diocese to choose its own bishop over and above the wishes of the central Church administration had not been agreed even in the Sobor of 1917.[110] On the other hand, it might be said that the diocesan council with its anti-Moscow majority might propose Bishop Basil's name, but he would probably have lost a *full* election, in accordance with the Sourozh Statutes, due to the demographic shifts in the diocese and the commitment of the pro-Moscow parishioners.

The anti-Moscow group presented the democracy and *sobornost'* of Sourozh as opposing the autocracy and verticality of Moscow. This was an over-simplification. Recently, the Metropolitan of Nizhny Novgorod was asked to make the distinction between the increasingly used terms *tserkovnaia vertikal'* versus *sobornost'*. [111] He replied that the straightforward transference of secular terminology into ecclesiastical affairs was problematic for the Church, as it had never been a democratic organisation. In fact, how could it have been, formed as it was hundreds of years before the emergence of such concepts? He concluded, 'To compare the Church with the secular state, a political party or a commercial organisation, even in the level of terminology, when such concepts as вертикаль власти or демократическое устройство become completely acceptable, means that we don't understand her nature and we don't possess a vital sense of belonging to her blessed life … For people outside the Church this is completely incomprehensible, they measure everything by worldly standards and are trying to force this position on others.'[112] This position was confirmed by one of the most 'open' and liberal

[110] Cf. Destivelle, op. cit.
[111] 'Interviu mitropolita Nizhegorodskogo i Arzamasskogo Georgi', 13.04.16 http://www.pravoslavie.ru/92418.html [Accessed 25.01.20] (author trans.)
[112] Ibid.

modern Russian theologians, Fr Alexander Schmemann. In his article 'The Church is Hierarchal', Schmemann wrote, 'When in the "clergy-laity controversy" the terms "government", "administration", "controlling authority" are used, are all those who use them aware that when applied to the Church, they must of necessity mean something different from what they mean in a purely secular context? The Church is not a secular society and, therefore, all definitions and descriptions of its life and functioning to be adequate must necessarily be transposed and adjusted to its nature'.[113] Schmemann went on to critique the understanding of *sobornost'* as a synonym for the political term 'democracy'. Anti-Moscow communications in Sourozh frequently used this term and its derivatives, a custom that was derided by their opponents.

What was also problematic in the Sourozh crisis was the transference of the term *vertikal* into ecclesiology. This also contained within it the notion of the worldly entering the Church in the form of an aping of the new autocracy of the regime. This was – and is – a common accusation made against the Church within Russia and without.[114] Simply put, the argument states that as power became centralised in the state, this was mirrored in the Church in a symbiotic process, as the Church sought to 'keep up' with the state. This simplistic view of Church–State relations in Russia was criticised even by anti-Moscow analysts such as the academics Veera Laine and Iiris Saarelainen, who suggested, 'The interests of Church and state are not always fully congruent. The Church is not merely the Kremlin's puppet; it functions as its own,

[113] Schmemann, A., 'The Church is Hierarchal: An Answer to Ralph Montgomery Arkush, Esq', *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1959), pp. 36-41. Author's emphasis.
[114] E.g. Patriarkh Kirill, 'I vertikal vlasti', 28.01.2010 http://inosmi.ru/russia/20100128/157843524.html [Accessed 013.16.17]

sometimes internally divided entity'.[115] Nevertheless, it was felt by the anti-Moscow group that Moscow was compelled to make an example of Sourozh lest other dioceses follow her lead in invoking the proposals of the 1917–18 Sobor and deciding to elect their own bishops, or secede from Moscow's sphere of power in other ways. Pro-Moscow supporters countered that it was the anti-Moscow group who had misunderstood the true meaning of *sobornost'*. For the pro-Moscow group, *sobornost'* was in many ways the *opposite* of democracy ('one person, one vote') as it was not based on individualism, but on the collective. Such arguments had raged during the Sobor of 1917–18. Vera Shevzov writes, 'The debates in the Sobor over the concept of sobornost' were some of the most lively. For Bishop Efrem of Selengina the debate concerned two opposing worldviews; the democratic and the theocratic. He rejected what he saw as an attempt to bring protestant democratisation to the Church under the banner of sobornost'.[116]

The Sourozh crisis represented a continuation of the battle of worldviews mentioned by Bishop Efrem. Both sides argued over the significance, or rather, the true meaning of the Sobor, but here the position of the pro-Moscow group was on shakier ground. It is difficult to view the Sobor as devoid of reformist and liberalising tendencies. The very make-up of the Sobor, with its majority of lay participants, had itself been revolutionary.[117] It was paradoxical for Sourozh that Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev was himself situated at the more liberal end of the debate and himself often promoted a horizontal emphasis in church governance, stressing a multicentred view of the structure of the Church: 'The Church historically appeared and developed

[115] Saarelainen, I. and Laine, V., 'Spirituality as a Political Instrument: The Church, the Kremlin and the Creation of the Russian World', 98 FIIA Working Paper (Sept. 2017). Cf. Interview 1C
[116] Shevzov, V., op. cit., p.51
[117] Cf. Destivelle, op. cit.

under conditions of pluralism, and by its internal structure and nature it is not and cannot be a totalitarian organization with the unification of all and everything'.[118] Regarding the perspective of the laity, it is worth noting that an academic study by Christopher Marsh found that churchgoing Orthodox Christians were 'somewhat more favourably inclined toward democracy than are other Russians'. He concluded that, 'religious belief and practice have virtually no impact on democratic values, suggesting that Orthodoxy may not be the obstacle to democracy that some have made it out to be'.[119]

A further arena in which the horizontal–vertical tension was played out should be mentioned in brief. There was a difference in the practical application of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in small provincial parishes compared to its realisation in the big London cathedral. In both cases there were divisions between the two sides, but the London cathedral was a special case because metropolitan cathedrals are by their nature 'glocalised' (to use the term coined by Roudometoff[120]), with peripatetic and often multi-ethnic mass congregations. There is a gulf between the daily life and atmosphere in a big cathedral compared to that of a church in a small town or a village. Yannaras wrote an extensive critique of urban cathedrals, which for him promoted atomisation in place of *sobornost'* and dilettantish consumerism in place of eucharistic synaxis: '[A cathedral] contains thousands of people, often tens of thousands, and there is no personal communion or sense of being a body.'[121] The inclination towards vertical power was greater in such a situation, where

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[118] Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Rol' svetskikh i khristianskikh tsennostei v sovremennon mul'tikul'turnom obshestve', 02.06.14. https://mospat.ru/ru/2014/06/04/news103601/ [Accessed 013.16.17] :

[119] Marsh, C., 'Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy', *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 13, Issue 3 (Summer 2005), pp.449–62

[120] Roudometof, V., 'Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization', *Current Sociology*, Vol. 53 (1) (Jan. 2005), pp.113–35. Cf. Chapter 6 of this study.

[121] Yannaras, C., *The Historical and Social Dimensions of the Church's Ethos*, Chapter 11 of *The Freedom of Morality* (Crestwood, 1984), pp.195–229

multiple groups and individuals vied for precedence. In this sense, the comment posted by John Marks (‘my loyalty is first to the parish …’) becomes more understandable. The ideals of *sobornost’* were more realisable in smaller, local settings.

Chapter 6 Sourozh and the Russian World: A Global Mandate

The Russian World was by its nature a diaspora concept. It posited that Russians in the Motherland and in the near abroad and far abroad were linked together spiritually, culturally and (in terms of the Church) jurisdictionally. After 1991, there was impetus towards consolidation, in other words pulling the parishes and dioceses of the far abroad, such as Sourozh, into a cohesive whole.[1] The problem was that the multiple jurisdictions of the Russian Church in the far abroad were not cohesive, but rather represented the various strands of the diaspora's history over the twentieth century. The ethos of Sourozh was different from that of ROCOR, which was different again from that of the Parisian Exarchate.

The creation of the Russian diaspora affected the concept of the Russian World concept both ideologically and practically. Firstly, after 1917, it was increasingly seen by the White émigrés as a providential event, scattering Russian Christians ~~to~~ across the world. Secondly, in its applied realisation of the ideals of Russian universalism, it created a sense of a global mission for the Russian Church and people.[2] And when, after 1991, yet another wave of emigration developed the diaspora further in the near and far abroad, the idea of the diaspora's spiritual significance became central to the new Russian World concept. At the same time, the secularisation and liberalisation of western society was increasingly being resisted by Russia's promotion of traditional values. This shone a new light on parishes in the far abroad, such as Sourozh, which the Church and State now sought to use as soft-power tools in

[1] Interview 1B. Cf. Innokenty of Korsun, Bishop, 'The Unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe', *Sourozh Journal*, Issue 102, 11.05

[2] Shchedrovskii, P., 'Russkii mir i transnational'noe russkoe', *Russkii Zhurnal*, 02.02.00 http://old.russ.ru/politics/meta/20000302_schedr.html

the new culture wars.[3] This meant that both sides in Sourozh were to claim victim status. Anti-Moscow parishioners resented what they saw as the promotion of conservative traditional values by the new regime. The pro-Moscow side felt themselves at odds with western liberal values as understood by Bishop Basil and his supporters.[4] This is a rather simplistic dichotomy, but it was important in ~~at~~ Sourozh. In this chapter, we will examine the development of the missionary idea in the Russian diaspora, as well as the effect of the new 'culture wars' on diaspora parishes in the West, such as Sourozh. To do this, it is necessary first to understand the gestation of the diaspora ideology within the Russian World concept.

The Significance of the Diaspora

The years immediately following 1917 saw an outpouring of books and articles on the meaning and destiny of Russia as émigrés struggled to come to terms with the cataclysmic events. In Paris, Berdiaev, Kartashev, Bunin, Bulgakov and others wrote extensively on the meaning of the new Orthodox diaspora, while in Oxford, the Zernovs explored the ecumenical significance of the diaspora, forging links with the Anglicans and other Christians. They founded the Society of St Alban and St Sergius, an organisation with close links to the Parisian Exarchate and the Sourozh of Metropolitan Anthony. The society invited many of the famous diaspora thinkers mentioned above to speak in Oxford, London

[3] Cf. March, L., 'Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the new "Russian Idea", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64:3 (April 2012), pp.401–25. Cf. p.419: 'Russia is moving from defensive reaction to Western initiatives to a more assertive position that at least potentially might act as an alternative "value centre" to Western liberal democracy.' Also Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Rol' svetskikh I khristianskikh tsennostei v sovremennon mul'tikul'turnom obshestve', 04.06.14. https://mospat.ru/ru/2014/06/04/news103601/ [Accessed 24.05.20]

[4] Cf. Branford, B., 'Bitter rift in UK Orthodox Church', 13.05.06. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4764833.stm [Accessed 24.05.20]. Also Walters, P., 'The Power Struggle in Orthodoxy', *Church Times*, 26.05.06

and at the various Sourozh conferences. The abiding meaning of the emigration for all factions was one of divine providence.[5] Berdiaev's 1925 essay 'On the Spiritual Tasks of the Russian Emigration' is worth quoting at length for its codification of many of the hopes and fears that surfaced in the Sourozh crisis and are still involved in the Russian World concept to this day – the historical world mission of the Russian people, the fear of enculturation and dissipation, the threats of modernism and secularism:

> It is not by chance that Russian Orthodox people have been brought into physical contact with the Western world, with the Christian West. Orthodoxy has a universal significance and it cannot continue to settle into a nationally-restrictive and isolated condition, it ought to become a spiritual force, active in the world. Russians, remaining faithful to the faith of their fathers, are compelled to live amidst a foreign world, or a world godless and irreligious, or a world that is Christian, but confessing a different Christianity … By the will of God's Providence we have been sent forth into a community with the Western spiritual world, and we ought to strive to get to know it and enter into brotherly relations with it, associating with it in the name of the struggle against anti-Christian forces. But there can also be the bad in this relationship. Russians can gradually lose the uniqueness of their own spiritual type, they can be torn away from their own national-religious roots, can dissolve away into Western life, having adapted, entering into compromise.[6]

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[5] In his book *Missia russkoi emigratsii* (Moscow, 1994), the neo-Slavophile Mikhail Nazarov distinguished three functions of the Russian diaspora. Firstly, that of preserver of the pre-revolutionary national consciousness; secondly, that of spiritual aid to the suffering motherland; and thirdly, 'Creative: the understanding of the tragic experience of the revolution in universal terms … The discovery of the new Russian Idea as the Orthodox synthesis of the universal man'. Nazarov, M., *Missia russkoi emigratsii*, tom 1, 'raznie missii'

[6] Berdiaev, N., 'On the Spiritual Tasks of the Russian Emigration' http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1925_302.html [Accessed 10.01.18]

While Berdiaev may be considered to be at the liberal end of neo-Slavophilism, his thoughts were echoed by all, including the renowned ROCOR bishop, St John of Shanghai, who likewise issued a grave warning. If the Russian diaspora did not live up to its responsibility, it would 'remain in banishment, persecuted by everyone, until gradually it will degenerate and disappear from the face of the earth'.[7] Perhaps it is a mistake to ascribe too much import to these impassioned appeals. For the life of the average White émigré was a desperate struggle for survival and most were less concerned with messianism than in finding work and lodgings. The Sourozh parishioner Irina von Schlippe, a member of the diocesan council at the time of the crisis, deflated some of this rhetoric in her article 'The Crisis of Exile', stating that, 'Russians brought Orthodoxy to the whole world *without meaning to*, not as missionaries, but simply by settling there, making a church, worshipping in it and opening their Church to their environment'.[8] In 2006, in the midst of the Surozh troubles, Bishop Basil Osborne appeared on the BBC and spoke about the legacy of Berdiaev, and of émigré figures such as Alexander Shmemann and John Meyendorff.[9] This provoked the ire of one the pro-Moscow parishioners, who wrote in a letter to the Patriarch, 'It is interesting that Bishop Basil in his BBC interview did not also add the philosopher Ivan Ilyin to these thinkers? Probably that is because he is too Orthodox and not liberal enough. Ivan Ilyin wrote, "Wherever we are scattered, we Russian émigrés must remember that other peoples do not know us and do not understand us, and that they fear Russia, do not empathise with her and in fact are happy only with her

[7] 'Report to the All-Diaspora Sobor, 1938' http://orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/meaning_diaspora.aspx [Accessed 10.01.18]
[8] Cf. von Schlippe, I., 'Krizis izgnania: poiski sotsial'nikh i dukhovnikh reshenii v emigratsii', 28.05.2006 http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/history/?ID=18 [Accessed 30.03.20]. Author's emphasis.
[9] Interviu u episkopa Vasiliia (Osborna) religioznoi programme russkoi sluzhby Bi-Bi-Si "Vera i vek". 23.05.06, http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=7&id=6440 [Accessed 10.01.18]

weakening. It is not a new phenomenon'".[10] Ilyin was often caricatured as the eminence grise behind the new Russian Idea as it was portrayed in the western media and academic press.[11] Such caricatures did little justice to his complex philosophy.[12] Ilyin's supposed influence on the post-communist regime has also been rejected by some western academics, such as Andrei Tsygankov, who noted that Ilyin did not even make the top ten important thinkers of a survey of Russian international relations students.[13] In addition, Marlene Laruelle noted that Putin had only cited Ilyin five times and that these were 'rather bland' quotations.[14] Nevertheless, it was true that the anti-Moscow analysts tended to emphasise the liberal Paris School thinkers, while conservatives quoted Ilyin and Leontiev. The diaspora was significant to both left and right, but with differing emphases.

In broader terms, some have traced a messianic imperative through the very notion of 'scattering', of diaspora and of exile. Marc Spindler noted in his study that 'in the sense of being disseminated throughout the world, all Christians can be considered as a missionary diaspora as far as all in each place dare to bear witness to the Gospel. Dissemination is somehow synonymous with mission'.[15] For believers, the concept has Biblical foundations in the

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[10] Statement of Parishioner, 25.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=14 [Accessed 10.01.18]
[11] E.g. Snyder, T., *The Road to Unfreedom* (New York, 2018)
[12] Ilyin was a polymath, exiled along with Berdiaev and others by Lenin on the famous 'philosopher's ship'. He was analysed by Freud, studied with Husserl, and had to flee from the Nazis to Switzerland, where he died. Cf. Ljynggren, M., 'Freud's Unknown Russian Patient' in *Poetry and Psychiatry: Essays on Early Twentieth-Century Russian Symbolist Culture* (2014). He repeatedly stressed his opposition to nationalism of the ethnolinguistic model and he particularly singled out his dislike of beliefs that placed peoples into hierarchies, stating 'the true patriot is simply unable to hate or scorn other peoples'. See Kutuzov, B.P., *Russkaia istoria s pozitsii staroobriadchestva* (Moscow, 2013), pp.103–108. Ilyin's magnum opus, *The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity* (Ill, 2010) has recently been translated into English by Philip T. Grier in two volumes: http://www.nupress.northwestern.edu/content/philosophy-hegel-doctrine-concreteness-god-and-humanity
13 Tsygankov, A., 'In the Shadow of Nikolai Danilevsky: Universalism, Particularism, and Russian Geopolitical Theory', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 69, Issue 4 (2017)
14 Laruelle, M., 'In search of Putin's philosopher: Why Ivan Ilyin is not Putin's Ideological Guru', Intersection Project EU, 03.03.17
[15] Spindler, M., 'The Impossible Quest for a General Theory of the Diaspora', *Exchange* 21.1 (1998), p.3

scattering of the apostles and the exile and wandering of the Israelites. All of this means that the Russian diaspora – its formation, existence and meaning – has increasingly fascinated the Russian Church and this preoccupation shows no sign of abating.

At the time of the Sourozh crisis, the view of the formation of the diaspora as a messianic event predominated in many of the pronouncements coming from the Patriarchate and the DECR. To take just one example, the then Metropolitan Kirill stated that 'The values which the Russian Orthodox Church holds more and more represent a worldwide witness. It is exactly upon this witness that the sole spiritual justification of our worldwide scattering rests, from the Revolution down to our times'.[16] But this Slavophile-nationalist view of the diaspora was not the only one. Metropolitan Anthony also saw the diaspora in messianic terms, but in a different way from both ROCOR and Moscow. For him, although the Russian emigration *was* providential, it was not linked to the manifest destiny of the Russian people. Instead, he saw it as a God-given opportunity for Russians to rediscover the non-ethnic Christianity of the early Church, in which there was 'neither Jew nor Greek'.[17] Some anti-Moscow parishioners suggested that the neo-Slavophile view of the Russian diaspora was dangerously close to the heresy of ethnophyletism.[18] Indeed, the jurisdictional consequence of promoting the Russian diaspora as a providential imperative of the Russian people was that Church governance should remain within the Russian Church, wherever it might be found.

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[16] Kirill, Mitropolit, 'Doklad na Arkhiereiskom Sobore RPTs', 24.06.08 g. http://sobor.patriarchia.ru/db/text/427253.html [Accessed 10.04.20].
[17] Beliakova, E.V., 'Kanonichskie osnovy ustava surozhskoi eparkhii' in various authors, *Dukhovnoe nasledie Mitropolita Antonia Surozhskogo: materialy pervoi mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii 28–30 sentiabria 2007g.* (Moscow, 2008), pp.84–5
[18] OCAD. Statements of Sourozh Parishioners. A. Milton

Before the early modern period, the very notion of a national church was virtually non-existent. Instead, jurisdictions were delineated in terms of territory (usually cities) rather than ethnos (hence the Pauline epistles to the Church of Corinth and others).[19] With the rise of European nationalism in the nineteenth century, the newly founded Orthodox states in the Balkans started to demand their own national churches along the lines of the western national churches. The issue came to head with the Bulgarians' unilateral declaration of autocephaly in 1872. What made this episode so contentious was that the Bulgarian Church claimed administration over all ethnic Bulgarians, wherever they were – and this included territory administered by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Thus, a transnational, ethnic jurisdiction was proposed which was not territorial as such and not even national in the sense of ~~that~~ having borders contiguous with those of any existing state. The 1872 Synod condemned this as 'an event without precedent' in Church history.[20] In reality, inter-ethnic strife had been the plague of Eastern Christianity from the time of the first universal councils. The earliest splits in the Church were ostensibly dogmatic, but essentially communities divided along ethnic lines. This problem is still unresolved to the present, and in fact has only grown, to the extent that, Fr Alexander Schmemann spoke of a gradual 'disintegration of universal consciousness' within Orthodoxy and its replacement instead by 'national consciousness'.[21]

These tendencies of the Russian Church prompted the Greek-Catholic academic Fr Jarolav Buciora to write, 'One of the more unusual concepts of

[19] Cf. Getcha, Fr J., 'Can One Justify the Notion of a 'National Church' from an Orthodox Point of View?' *Sourozh*, Issue 83, 05.01

[20] Payne, D.P., 'Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox Commonwealth', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 35, No. 5 (Nov. 2007) and Getcha, Fr J., ibid.

[21] Meerson, M., 'The Orthodox Church in America' in Ramet, P., *Eastern Christianity and Politics* (Durham, North Carolina, 1988), p.116

pan-Slavism is put forward by Bishop Hilarion Alfeyev. He describes the Moscow Patriarchate as "trans-national", and this term has become an international slogan under which (it is claimed) the Moscow Patriarchate is attempting to create a new concept of transnational political influence in the context of its ecclesiological realm'.[22] Bishop Innokenty, soon before he took over the interim administration of the Sourozh diocese following Bishop Basil's departure, wrote an article in journal *Sourozh* ~~Journal~~ that was critical of the position of Buciora above. He related examples in which the ROC had embraced enculturation and concluded, 'Thus one cannot say that the Russian Church ignores the birth of local Orthodoxy and is characterised, as one can hear from time to time, by a new ecclesiology founded on national and ethnic principles'.[23] Nevertheless, transnational ecclesiology is often celebrated by Moscow, rather than being denied. Olga Tserpitskaia stated in her study of Russian foreign missions stated, 'Having also acquired the numerous Orthodox diaspora in the Far Abroad, *the Russian Church herself became truly transnational*. As a consequence, on the international stage she pursues not only her own interests, but she also represents her interests to those states who enter into her canonical territory in those areas allowed by the Church statutes'.[24] A visual representation of this policy can be seen in the 2013 film *The Second Baptism of Rus*,[25] presented by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev. The film narrates the story of the rebirth of the Russian Church at the end of the Soviet period and into the twenty-first century. It contains a long and famous interview with Vladimir Putin and concludes with a view of the globe with rays

[22] Buciora, J., 'The Canonical Territory of the Moscow Patriarchate'. http://www.orthodox-christian-comment.co.uk/canonical_territory_of_the_moscow_patriarchate.htm [Accessed 20.01.20]
[23] Innokenty of Korsun, Bishop, 'The Unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe', *Sourozh Journal*, Issue 102, 11.05
[24] Tserpitskaia, O., 'Missii i predstavitel'stva v sisteme zarubezhnikh uchrezhdenii RPTs', *Nauchno-analiticheskii Zhurnal Obozrevatel'*, Vypusk 4, St Petersburg, 2011, p.42 (author trans.). Author's emphasis.
[25] http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1107643 [Accessed 01.05.20]

of light coming first from Moscow, then from the Slavic world and finally from parishes and dioceses of Moscow spreading out over the whole earth. In some respects, the scene is not dissimilar to depictions of the spread of world revolution over the globe from Moscow via the Communist International. Such a Russocentric position was at odds with those on the ground in Sourozh, who wanted to loosen the ethnic connection to Russia and instead to promote an indigenous Orthodoxy.[26]

The position of Moscow's western parishes was further complicated by another development, also regarded as providential. At a time of rapid secularisation in the West, the ROC had experienced a surprising rebirth at home.[27] For neo-Slavophiles, this gave to the Church a world-historical task as the 'keeper' of the spiritual realm and the 'witholder' (*katehon*) of the apocalypse. The outcome of this position was that it was seen as natural and in fact *incumbent* upon the Russian Church to reach out beyond its geographical or canonical borders and to place more emphasis on the Russian Church parishes in the West. In 2009, the Patriarch stated, 'We need to clearly understand the uniqueness of the Russian way of life and to reproduce it not only in those countries with a dominant Russian culture, *but to bear witness to it far beyond their borders, especially in the conditions of the spiritual and moral crisis of contemporary human civilisation*'.[28] While other churches in the West existed 'under an information blockade, under a very hard diktat from

[26] OCAD. Statements of Sourozh Parishioners. K. Greenhead

[27] Much has been written both for and against the rebirth of the ROC after the collapse of communism. Even accepting the low figures for actual regular church attendance, the statistics remain surprising, especially those relating to the number of Russian monasteries which increased from just twenty in 1988 to 972 at the end of 2019. In 1988, there were 8,500 parishes, and at the end of 2019 over 40,000. This at a time when monasticism in the West is rapidly disappearing. https://sinfo-mp.ru/statisticheskaya-informaciya [Accessed 12.01.20]

[28] Kirill, Patriarch, 'Russkii mir: puti ukreplenia i razvitia', *Tserkov' i Vremia*, No. 4 (2009). Author trans and emphasis.

secular society',[29] to use the words of Metropolitan Hilarion, the Russian Church, it was argued, was under no such pressure. Thus, parishes abroad received relatively high levels of funding from the Mother Church and Russian State for renovation and cultural centres. But the aim, it seems, was not so much to attract new western converts (at least in the first instance) as to maintain the resilience and Orthodoxy of the diaspora in a hostile environment, while at the same time also acting as 'beacons' of Russia's new ideological struggle against the West.[30]

This position resulted in some success for the Russian Church, with new networks being forged with traditionalists and conservatives in the West. The World Congress of Families chief Larry Jacobs went as far as to state that, 'Russia is the hope for the world right now'.[31] The idea was that Russian parishes would promote a positive view of Russia to all those opponents of liberalism and secularism, who were invited, in Professor Blitt's words, to 'join us'.[32] Parishes such as Sourozh were to become Russia's new 'windows in the West'.[33] In 2009, the third Russian Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad was dedicated to the question of the consolidation of the diaspora. In his keynote speech, Patriarch Kirill stated that the Church's western parishes were 'little

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[29] Hilarion, A.,Metropolitan., *Tserkov i Mir* (Moscow, 2014) author trans
[30] Cf. Vasilenko, K., 'Vozvrashchenie Tret'ego Rima', *Vremia Novostii*, No. 229, 14.12.01 http://www.vremya.ru/2001/229/4/17563.html [Accessed 02.04.20]
[31] Stroop, C., 'A Right-Wing International? Russian Social Conservatism, the World Congress of Families, and the Global Culture Wars in Historical Context', 16.02.16. https://www.politicalresearch.org
[32] Cf. Blitt, Professor C., 'Russia's "Orthodox" Foreign Policy', op. cit., p 431.Cf. also, from *The Journal of the MP*, cited in Petrenko, V., 'The Development of the Concept of Authority' op.cit., p. 205: 'Moscow is a beacon, a beacon not only for us Orthodox, but also for those seeking true, unclouded civil, national and religious freedom. Moscow is a beacon for all of toiling humanity, for all who seek religious and social truth.' Cf. also Verkhovsky, A., '"Kirill's Doctrine" and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodox Christianity' in Tolstaya, K. (ed.) *Orthodox Parodoxes* (Leiden, 2014), p.75. 'It must be noted that this is a very broad target group. It can include people who consider themselves neither Russian nor Orthodox, but who share wholly or in part, the ideas of Russia's greatness as a nation, the key role of the Church in its history, the ''clash of civilisations'' in the modern world, the evils of ''liberal'' innovations, and the values of tradition etc.'
[33] Cf. Poloskova, T., 'Iskushenie "Diasporal'noi" Polemikoi', *Zagranitsa,* 28.02.11. http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_german_nikolaewich/2016.shtml [Accessed 25.05.20]

islands of historic Rus abroad' and 'the natural concentration of spiritual and cultural life of our compatriots'.[34] The island metaphor was mentioned both at the highest level and by parishioners in Sourozh, with an anti-Moscow participant writing of the 'Russian party' as 'people, who, living continually or for the most part in London, all the same feel a living connection to Russia (or with Russian Church life), and they desire that Sourozh, whilst retaining a minimal level of its own character, is nevertheless an island of "Russianness" and of "Russian Church life" in England'.[35] It should be noted that island imagery has a long history in Russian folklore that is intimately connected to Orthodoxy and Russia's liminal landscape of forests and lakes. From the mystical island of Kitezh to the fortified island monasteries of the Russian north, the concept of the island as an ark or bastion of the sacred in a hostile environment has deep cultural reverberations. Whether conscious or not, the repeated use of island imagery to denote foreign parishes connected with this narrative.

The idea of a kind of union of resistance or new Holy Alliance to combat western liberal humanism affected inter-Church dialogue just as it affected inter-state relations.[36] As with the Holy Alliance of Tsar Alexander, the new imperative under Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev and the DECR was controversial

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[34] Kirill., Patriarch, 'Vystuplenie Sviateishego Patriarkha Moskkovskogo i vseia Rusi Kirill na Vse mirnom kongresse sootchestvenikov', 01.12.09 (author trans.). http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/955171.html [Accessed 29.12.18]. Cf. also Tserpitskaia, O., *Missii i predstavitel'stva v sisteme zarubezhnikh uchrezhdenii RPTs,* op. cit. 'The diaspora, for instance, in certain cases can be an influence on the political life of the country of arrival and facilitate the creation of a certain image of their country in the eyes of the local population, which is why the Russian authorities today pay so much attention to the support of the diaspora.' (author trans.) Also, Kirill, Patriarkh, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie* (Moscow, 2009), p.187 and Alfeev, Mitropolit I., *Tserkov' otkryta dlia kazhdogo* (Minsk, 2011), p.32

[35] Kobelev, V., 'Kto stoit za statei dvukh surozhlian?: russkaia partia v Surozhskoi eparkhii', 30.01.04 (author trans.). https://credo.press/36695/ [Accessed 25.05.20]

[36] Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'Mitropolit Ilarion otvetil na voprosy saita "Pomniu Rossiu"', 12.02.12. https://mospat.ru/ru/2012/02/17/news58335/ 'We are looking for traditional allies ... to promote Christian values in the world.' Cf. also, Curanovic, A., 'The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation', Report IFRI Centre, Brussels, 06.12 https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifrirnr12curanovicreligiousdiplomacyjune2012.pdf

for some in the Russian Church who saw him (paradoxically from the perspective of liberals, who saw him as a hardliner) as a liberal ecumenist. In particular, Metropolitan Hilarion reached out to the Catholic Church in its embattled state in western Europe and the US.[37] He emphasised both churches' common ground in defending Christian heritage and morality, stating 'the collaboration between Catholics and Orthodox acquires a special meaning in the business of defending Christian morals. We do not have Eucharistic communion, we are divided by dogmatic questions, we have a different ecclesiology, but we have the same views on all the general moral questions'.[38]

All of this was conducted in the language of the geopolitical 'clash of civilisations' which became ever more the lingua franca of the times. Kravchuk and Bremer noted the often-unsung influence of Huntingdon's article in Russia, stating that it was the Church that developed this paradigm in the media.[39] At a dinner at the Anglican Nikean club in London in 2010, Metropolitan Hilarion stated: 'All current versions of Christianity can be very conditionally divided into two major groups – traditional and liberal. The abyss that exists today divides not so much the Orthodox from the Catholics or the Catholics from the Protestants as it does the "traditionalists" from the "liberals".'[40] [41] In Sourozh,

[37] Alfeev, Mitropolit I., *Besedy*, op. cit. p.144 and pp.312–13
[38] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3667639.html (author trans.) [Accessed 24.05.20]. Cf. also Alfeev, Metropolitan H., *Tserkov i Mir* (Moscow, 2014), and Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 'European Christianity and the Challenge of Militant Secularism' *Ecumenical Review*.57:82, 2005, and Alfeev, I., *Tserkov' otkryta dlia kazhdogo* (Minsk, 2011), p.12
[39] Cf. Kravchuk, A. & Bremer, T., (Eds.) *Churches in the Ukrainian Crisis* (London, 2017)
[40] Full text of speech, 'Metropolitan Hilarion Address to the Annual Nicean Club Dinner' 09.09.10, https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=9399 [Accessed 16.04.18]
[41] Cf also. Mezhuev, B., 'Russkii mir prikhodit v Evropu', *Izvestia*, 17.04.14

liberal anti-Moscow parishioners were pitched against more traditionalist pro-Moscow ones; it was in so many ways a battle of worldviews.[42]

It should also be noted that the clash of civilisations was seen by some pro-Moscow analysts of the Sourozh crisis to be a 'trap' or a 'temptation' set by the opposition. Vladimir Mozhegov promoted this idea as he viewed the polemical language invoked by the Sourozh crisis as a western attack on Russian universalism.[43] Anti-Moscow parishioners in Sourozh also rejected the 'culture wars' narrative as far too simplistic, as did anti-Moscow conservatives in ROCOR. For both, the idea of Russia's mission to the West was another piece of grandstanding, which also misunderstood the West. Professor Makrides described this recent manifestation of Russian thought as 'a kind of quasi-messianic, salvation syndrome aimed at helping the West to overcome its numerous deadlocks and impasses'.[44] He noted that the West today 'neither wants to be saved nor needs such self-declared saviours. It acknowledges its own limitation, mistakes, and weaknesses, expresses a strong self-critique and is ready to learn from others. Today, we no longer hear only the voice of a triumphalistic West, as in previous periods, but also a self-critical awareness of enduring problems and challenges lying ahead.'[45] Likewise, the Lesna Convent in France (which had previously been one of the most revered ROCOR institutions in the world, but had left ROCOR after the union) repeatedly attacked the idea of a holy war between East and West. They pointed to the million people who had marched in France against same-sex marriage as

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[42] Scorer, D.P., Interview on Radio Free Europe, 'Teper, kogda Tserkov' osvobodilas', ona dobrovol'no stala rabom gosudarstvo', : https://www.svoboda.org/a/160895.html, 'So the tension that arises is not between the Russians and the English but between different worldviews'
[43] Mozhegov, V., 'Tri glubyny odnogo raskola', Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostei, 19.07.06 https://www.apn.ru/publications/article10050.htm [Accessed 16.04.18]
[44] Makrides, V.N., '"The Barbarian West": A Form of Orthodox Christian Anti-Western Critique' in Krawchuk A., Bremer, T. (eds.), *Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness* (London, 2014)
[45] Makrides, ibid.

opposed to abortion rates in Russia, which were among the highest in the world.[46]

Perhaps unfortunately for Sourozh, the anti-Huntingdon narrative (if such it can be called) was in the minority because both the western and Russian media preferred to concentrate on Russia's 'cultural conservatism' versus the West's 'egalitarianism'.[47] It is indeed true that so divisive have been the culture wars taking place across the world over the last twenty-five years that even some of Russia's traditional enemies have started to align with her, at least in some cultural spheres, as societies have become polarised at all levels.[48] On his visit to Poland in 2012, the Patriarch again spoke about a 'union of all traditional religious cultures' and how Poland and Russia face the same onslaught against their similar moral and religious positions.[49] Such statements have drawn support for Russia from the right in Church and state in Poland, Hungary, Austria, Italy and elsewhere. At the same time, as Alicja Curanovic has noted, the statements from the Moscow Patriarchate have gradually moved from a traditional East versus West paradigm to the battle between 'globalized transnational secular elites and societies attached to traditional values all over the world … it is no longer the West vs. the non-West, but secular liberals vs. adherents of traditional values. The dividing line thus cuts through civilizations and adds an anti-establishment dimension to Russia's

[46] Lesna Convent, 'Sovremenye Rossia, Ukraina i Zapad: dukhovnyi smysl segodniashnikh konfliktov'. http://www.monasterelesna.org/dokumenty-i-stati/teksty-i-stati/sovremennye-rossija-ukraina-i-zapad/ [Accessed 16.04.18]
[47] Cf. Rar, A., *Rossia-Zapad: kto kogo?*, *Glava XI: konflikt tsennostei* (Moscow, 2016), p.267ff
[48] Cf. Petro, N., Russia's Orthodox Soft Power, Carnegie Council, 23.03.15
[49] Both Poland and Hungary have been under pressure from the European Parliament because of their positions on LGBT and immigration. Cf. News, European Parliament, ' Parliament strongly condemns ''LGBTI-free zones'' in Poland', 18.12.19, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20191212IPR68923/parliament-strongly-condemns-lgbti-free-zones-in-poland [Accessed 20.05.20]

moral leadership'.[50] For Curanovic, such a position was consciously not a national-ethnic one.

After the ending of Bishop Innokenty's temporary administration in November 2006, Archbishop Elisey was confirmed as the new Archbishop of Sourozh. He spoke at a conference on globalisation in London in 2013 and strongly critiqued its utopianism and secularist morality, naming the familiar touchstones of LGBT and bioethics.[51] The conference was an opportunity to showcase Russia's resistance to the globalist narrative in the heart of a western capital. As one cannot envisage either Bishop Basil or Metropolitan Anthony delivering such an address, it was a concrete example of the soft-power leverage of the ROC abroad and the success of Moscow's policy. The culture wars meant that transnational locations of all kinds became involved in the new ideological struggle. Western embassies in Russia flew the rainbow flag of the LGBT movement, while ROC parishes in the West presented a united display of traditional values.

Andrei Tsygankov has distinguished between two of the West's 'phobias' about Russia: fear of geographical expansionism and of the threat posed by Russia to western values. It is interesting to consider why the West has become so fixated on an economically and demographically weak Russia. Perhaps some of the reason lies in the ideological threat that Russia seeks to promote, and which the West anxiously views as a potentially destabilising force.[52] That Russia poses a geographically expansionist threat to Europe at the

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[50] Curanovic, A., Russia's Mission in the World, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 66, Issue 4 (2019), p.6
[51] Zapesotsky, A., 'Ethnos. Norms and Values in the Era of Globalisation', Rossotrudnichestvo, London, 14.10.13. https://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/27 [Accessed 24.05.20]
[52] Tsygankov, A., 'Nauchnye Shkoly: Psikhologicheskoe vospriatie velikikh derzhav v mire. Istoki rusofobii. Interviu s professorum mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii I politicheskikh nauk universiteta Can Frantsisko Andreem Pavlovichem Tsigankovym'. *Vestnik: RUDN. Seria: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2018), pp.186–96

present time seems unlikely. On the other hand, a huge spotlight is turned by the West's media and governments on Russia's position re: traditional values, LGBT rights and so on. In doing so, the western media paradoxically also draws attention to Russia's role in the global culture wars that the Russian Church and State wish to promote.[53]

Universalism and Exceptionalism

The new concept of the Russian World had both universalist and exceptionalist aspects, with long antecedents in Slavophile thought. The two tendencies had a symbiotic and non-exclusive relationship.[54] The anti-Moscow group in Sourozh emphasised the nationalist and xenophobic ideology of Moscow, claiming that talk of universalism was a fig-leaf for Russification. Supporters of Moscow claimed that such an assessment was based on an incorrect and western understanding of Russian nationalism. They looked back into Russia's multi-ethnic and imperial past to distinguish Russia's universalism from the nationalisms of modern Europe.

In Britain, in particular, a small number of highly educated literary and religious Russophiles had adhered in whole or in part to the idea of Russia's universal mission. This was important for the development of Russian Orthodoxy in Britain, and of the Sourozh Diocese itself. Of the several outstanding personalities who were drawn to Russia and her Church in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, two names especially stand out: William Palmer (1811–1879) and William John Birkbeck (1859–1916). Both

[53] Cf. also Mezhuev, B., 'Russkiy mir prikhodit v Evropu', *Izvestia*, 17.04.14. https://iz.ru/news/569452
[54] Dmitry Likhachev noted this ambivalent nature of Russian universalism: 'How paradoxical it is that such bright universalism can give rise to dark shadows …'. Likhachev. D., *Izbrannie trudy po russkoi I mirovoi kul'ture* (St Petersburg, 2015), p.57ff

men became fluent in Russian and Slavonic, translating many liturgical and historical texts. Palmer's six-volume history of the Nikonian schism is still the most comprehensive history on the subject in English to this day.[55] Birkbeck's Russophilia has been labelled 'a virtual obsession' by one author, painting as he did a bucolic picture of devout Russian peasants on the eve of the Revolution.[56] Birkbeck was a firm believer in Russia's (or rather the Russian people's) universal spiritual destiny and in the renewal of world Christianity. Other such fellow-travellers included the writer Maurice Baring (1874–1945), who expounded on some of the truisms of Russian messianism in his book *The Russian People* (1911), writing at length about 'the Russian soul' and describing ~~expounding on~~ the centrality of Orthodoxy in the lives of the common people. The traveller and spiritual seeker Stephen Graham (1884–1975) also fell under the spell of the ideal of Russia as an agrarian counterweight to modernity.[57]

While a liberal-leaning, literary-philosophical Orthodoxy was inspired under the auspices of the SS Alban and Sergius Society of the Zernovs in Oxford, Russophiles such as Fr Nicholas Gibbes, tutor to the last Tsarevich and a devoted supporter of the monarchy, had a more conservative emphasis. These differing strands of Russophilia can be traced in Britain right up to and through the Surozh crisis and were both important in the formation of the Sourozh ethos. Fr Nicholas Gibbes especially seemed able to combine a conservative Orthodoxy with a non-ethnic and missionary outlook. He envisaged his Oxford Orthodox society as one that would attract people 'regardless of racial origin or nationality' and thus carry Orthodoxy 'to the chief intellectual and cultural centre of the British Empire [Oxford]'.[58] More recently,

[55] Palmer, W., *The Patriarch and the* Tsar, Vols. I–VI (London, 1871–6)
[56] Hughes, M., 'The English Slavophile: W. J. Birkbeck and Russia', *The Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 82, No. 3 (July 2004), pp.680–706
[57] Hughes, M., *Beyond Holy Russia: The Life and Times of Stephen Graham* (London, 2014)
[58] Private Papers of Nicholas Gibbes, Bodleian Library. Letter to Prof de Smitt, 04.07.49

characters as diverse as the art critic John Innes Stuart (1940–2003) and Father Andrew Phillips (1956–) were to fall in love with Russia while still at school, learn the language and join the Russian Orthodox Church. John Innes Stuart was a flamboyant biker who wrote books on punk rock and was a parishioner at Sourozh, while Father Andrew was an ROCOR priest who wrote critically of the diocese.[59] The diverse mix of British converts and Slavophiles was one of the unique qualities of Russian Orthodoxy in Britain, and especially of the Sourozh Diocese.

The concept of Russian universalism was also important to ethnic Russians in Sourozh. Some located it in Russia's multi-ethnic imperial and Soviet past, with a parishioner stating, 'In the course of these years I saw that the Russians were not opposed to the arrival of the English, but even on the contrary, that they were a bit kinder and more patient to the English. Russians are used to living amongst people of different nationalities and over the last 85 years in Russia, children from their schooldays have been inspired about the brotherhood of all peoples'.[60] Along with the multi-ethnic concept of Russia came an expansive definition of 'Russianness' itself, promoted by Church and State alike after 1991. In the Putin years, the emphasis on universalism increased, and as early as 2001 he stated, 'The concept of the Russian World long ago ceased to be constricted by the geographical borders of Russia and even by Russian ethnicity'.[61] Putin was concerned about the post-Soviet

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[59] 'John Innes Stuart 1940-2003', http://russianartconsultancy.com/John_Innes.html and 'Biography', http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/biog.htm [Accessed 16.01.18]

[60] *Khronika Surozhskoi Smuty*, op. cit. 'Nik O. Moi lichnyi opit'

[61] Putin, V., 'Vystuplenie na otkrytii Kongressa sootechestvennikov', 11.10.01 (author trans.). http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21359 [Accessed 16.01.18]
Cf. Fokina, A.V., 'K voprosu o russkom mire' op. cit. and Batanova, O.N. *Russkyi Mir i problemy ego formirovania.* R.A.G.S. (Moskva 2009): 'The Russian World … is a global cultural-civilisational phenomenon in which Russia plays the role of the Mother-state for the Russian emigration, uniting people who, in spite of their nationality, consider themselves Russians, as the carriers of Russian culture and language, with a spiritual connection to Russia and are not indifferent to her dealings and her fate.' (author trans.) Also, Nazarova, G.F.

independence movements that had been constantly bubbling up during the nineties as regions sought autonomy and even independence. When he said that the Russian World was not constricted by Russia's geographical borders, he was probably talking about the near abroad, but for the Church, this concept really did mean the whole world.[62] Thus, parishes in the far abroad, such as Sourozh, became the focus of a new universalist aspiration for the Church.

In 2004, the then Metropolitan Kirill of the DECR gave an address at the 8th World Russian People's Congress. The theme of the event was 'Russia and the Orthodox World'. Metropolitan Kirill covered most of the major themes of neo-Slavophile thought, mentioning by name many of the early and the diaspora Slavophiles – I. Kireevsky, A. Khomiakov, V. Solovev, N. Danilevskii, Leontiev, Fr Sergei Bulgakov, S. Frank, Florensky and Berdiaev – and laying emphasis on Russia's non-ethnic, even multi-faith *world* mission:

> But for Russia, for the Russian world, this is not an ethnic concept. The Russian World includes within it all peoples, those who belong to other religions but who share the same values in their social life together with the Russian people. It was precisely Russia, who aware of herself as Orthodox was yet able to support different cultures in unity. For centuries Russia developed the mechanism of co-existence of different

and Fokina, A.V., 'Russkii mir: obnovlenie podkhodov k konseptsii. Uchenye zapiski', Orlovskogo Gos Uni, No. 6 (69) (2015)

[62] Igor Zevelev noted that, while the focus on a kind of 'limitless and "universal" Russia' was useful when emerging from the Soviet Empire, these attempts 'have been in constant conflict with particular aspirations of neighbouring peoples who largely did not want to become "universal", seeing Russification behind such universalism and seeing it as a threat to their existence'. Zevelev, I., 'Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy', Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, 12.12.16, pp.4–5, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-national-identity-and-foreign-policy

cultures and religions who accepted one system of social values whilst preserving their religious identity.[63]

This Russian universalism became the driver for what might be called the global mission of the Russian Church, compelling the Church's renewed interest in, and consolidation of, the diaspora parishes. The Patriarch referred to a 'blossoming chain of foreign parishes and foundations', noting that not only were the Soviets not interested in contact with their émigrés but even supressed these contacts.[64]

Only the Russian Church, it was argued, with her multi-ethnic parishes throughout the world, could overcome the abiding ethnicity problem of Orthodoxy. But were these emotional declamations about universalism and the brotherhood of peoples simply a cover for an exceptionalist Russian *sonderweg*? For an anti-Moscow think-tank such as the Cicero Foundation, the idea of a global mission for the Russian Church was not a benevolent, but a cynical Erastian project: 'The goal of the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate is much more ambitious: it is about founding a truly global church under the aegis of Moscow – where Moscow means both the Kremlin and the patriarchate'.[65] Moreover, we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, intense controversy surrounded Moscow's policy of consolidation of the diaspora – as seen in the reaction to the move to Russian as the lingua franca in the London cathedral. Russia's soft-power networks have focused on the promotion of Russian as a global language. New diaspora organisations, such as Russkiy Mir

[63] Kirill, Mitropolit, 'Doklad mitropolita Smolenskogo i Kaliningradskogo Kirilla na VIII VRNS', 03-15.02.04, https://vrns.ru/documents/61/1222 [Accessed 29.12.18] (author trans). Cf. also, Kirill, Patriarkh, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie* (Moscow, 2009), pp.187–8: 'Russian culture it is not a religious conception. Within it are Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and other confessions … It is essentially the aggregate of certain values and historical experiences, which inform the personal and everyday life of a people, who include themselves within it.'
[64] Kirill, Patriarkh, *Zhizn' i mirosozertsanie* (Moscow, 2009), p.394
[65] van Herpen, M., *Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy,*(London, 2016), p.157

and Rossotrudnichestvo, emphasised the importance of Russian, and the Church also had a role to play.[66] This was a wise and necessary initiative by those seeking to preserve the Russian World in whatever sense. All the major languages of the world are engaged in similar battles against the global hegemony of English.[67] The ROC with its expanse of diaspora parishes provided a ready-made Russophone network in the far abroad.[68] Many such parishes, including Sourozh, started to run Russian-language courses, along with courses on Russian culture and history.

Alexander Verkhovsky has pointed out that the Church's interpretation of the Russian World represented a far softer and more inclusive nationalism than pure Russian ethnic nationalism: 'what we have here is an extremely inclusive model of ethno-cultural nationalism; Russian culture is defined as involvement in Orthodox Christianity. This is probably the most inclusive existing model of Russian nationalism'.[69] Indeed, proponents of the new Russian World, from Patriarch Kirill to the intellectuals of the Izborskii Club, have been at pains to distinguish their doctrines from those of the narrower European nationalisms that emerged following the Napoleonic period.[70] In this, they agree with some Western historians such as Geoffrey Hoskings who paradoxically regarded the weakness of a *Russian* nationalism of the European model as being the cause of Russia's burdensome post-imperial malaise.[71] Some Sourozh commentators might have referred to Moscow's policies as

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[66] Saunders, R.A., 'The Geopolitics of Russophonia: The Problems and Prospects of Post-Soviet "Global Russian"', *Globality Studies* 40 (14.07.14)
[67] Cf. Phillipson, R., 'The lingua nullius of global hegemony' in *The politics of multilingualism: linguistic governance, globalisation and Europeanisation* (Geneva, 2014)
[68] Gorham, M., 'Virtual Rusophonia: Language Policy as "Soft Power" in the New Media Age', *Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media*, No. 5 (2011), pp.23–48
[69] Verkhovsky, A., '"Kirill's Doctrine" and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodox Christianity' in Tolstaya., K. *Orthodox Parodoxes* op.cit., p.73
[70] Cf. also Ilyin, I., *Belaia ideia* (1926). For Ilyin, true 'nationalism' was a religious sentiment not a secular one. It was not about a people, or even land.
[71] Cf. Hosking, G. Russia*: People and Empire: 1552–1917* (London, 1998) Introduction, pp.xix.ff.

xenophobic and even antisemitic, but Russian 'fascism' along European lines (racialist and anti-Christian) is a relatively new phenomenon.[72] Anastasia Mitrofana's study of fringe Orthodox far-right movements noted the demotion of 'universalism' as a leitmotif for these groups: 'This loss of Orthodox universalism naturally leads to the rejection of the traditional idea of Russia's universal mission to save the whole of humankind. Many extreme Orthodox fundamentalists have openly converted to the *nationalist* position, abandoning the idea of Russia as the Third Rome that preoccupied Russian Orthodox political thought of the last four centuries. Denying the Third Rome concept appears to be a significant step for fundamentalists'.[73] As a result, figures considered by the West to be extreme nationalists and even fascists have rejected ethnic Russian nationalism. Metropolitan Ioann Snychev of St Petersburg, a pivotal figure of the neo-Slavophile right, stated that the Russian World 'includes anyone who recognizes that to take part in serving the Russian people has a divinely established aspect to it, anyone who identifies himself with the Russian people in the spirit, goal and meaning of their existence, regardless of their national origins.'[74]

Likewise, John D. Basil noted the impact on the ROC of parishes such Sourozh, situated in the far abroad. Such movements signified the transformation of canonical territory into ecclesiological space, guiding the

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[72] OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks. Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient Working of the Sourozh Diocese, 08.12.02

[73] Mitrofanova, A., *Politicisation of Russian Orthodoxy*, (Stuttgart, 2005) p 74. This tension exists not just in Orthodoxy but is also very strong in many countries such as France, where the Catholic Front National and L'Action Francaise is scorned by New-Right intellectuals like De Benoist. Marlene Laruelle has noted that 'Dugin never concealed his disdain for the monarchist nostalgia and politicized Orthodoxy embodied by Rodina leaders such as Rogozin and Narochnitskaya'. Lauruelle, M. 'Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?', Occasional Paper 294, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 28.06.01. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP294.pdf. Cf. also Sudo, J., 'Russian Nationalist Orthodox Theology: A New Trend in the Political Life of Russia', *Political Theology* 6.1 (2005), pp. 67–86

[74] Dushenov, K. (ed.), *Pastyr' Dobryi., Venok na mogilu mitropolita Ioanna. Dlia menia zhizn' – Khristos, i smert' – priobretenie'* (Moscow, 2011) (author trans.)

Church away from territory and ethnos and back into a universalist imperative.[75] The Belarussian priest Fr Alexandr Shramko, writing about the Sourozh crisis from abroad, suggested that even the notion of canonical territory was starting to collapse under pressure from globalisation. More important than physical location for Shramko were ideas of communal space, such as on the internet, that brought liberal or conservative groups closer to each other.[76] He posited that the Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony was much closer to many in Russia than the conservative-political Orthodoxy available at home.[77] Thus, the transnational ecclesiology associated with the ethnophyletism discussed earlier was further developed by the technological revolution. If such an ecclesiology was not to be constrained by territorial borders or ethnicity, then the jurisdictional boundaries were extremely flexible. In fact, the ROC has recently started to set up parishes even in lands under other Orthodox jurisdictions, such as in Turkey and Africa. These decisions have caused some consternation.

The call to disparate and even non-Christian peoples to find unity in the Russian World had been a hallmark of Slavophile thought from the time of Dostoevsky, who promoted the idea of the Russian as the 'universal man'.[78] After 1991, officials in both Church and State started to talk of the *peoples* of the Russian World and to emphasise its inherent diversity. The expansive definition of Russianness also allowed the Church to protect the interests of Russians in the diaspora while combatting accusations of ethnic nationalism.

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[75] Basil, J.D., 'Problems of Church and State in the Russian Federation, Three Points of View', *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2009)

[76] Transnationalism and localism are discussed in the final section of this study

[77] Shramko, A. 'Tserkov' bez territorii, 09.06.06. http://churchby.info/rus/54

[78] Dostoevsky, F.M., 'Ob'iasnitel'noe slovo po povodu pechataemoi nizhe rechi o Pushkine'. *Dnevnik Pisatelia III, 1880. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* 26 (Leningrad 1984), p.129ff. Cf. also Laruelle, M., 'The "Russian World": Russia's Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination', CGI (May 2015)

This was especially important for inter-Orthodox relations. Gradirovsky, one of the framers of the Russian World concept in the nineties, had specifically deconstructed the notion of ethnic diaspora politics: 'So, if we accept the thesis that the identification of Russia on an *ethnic* basis is evil, then we must recognize that ethnic diaspora politics is a continuation, the realization of this evil'.[79] But a problem arises: if the definition of the Russian World is so vast, what then is it? And how can such an amorphous notion be meaningful? As we have analysed in chapter 3, one implication was that non-ethnic Russians could 'become Russian' and that ethnic Russians could 'lose Russianness'. Taken to extremes, the loss of Russianness was viewed as an act of betrayal (*predatel'stvo*), a more loaded term to Russians, perhaps, than it is in the West. This implied that although the concept of the Russian World was nebulous, one of its defining boundaries was not. The question of betrayal of the Motherland surfaced from time to time in the Sourozh crisis and was a latent theme of many of the open letters.[80] Gradirovsky himself, although he proposed a very extensive definition of the Russian World, also singled out those who were traitors to it. He laid particular emphasis on those Russians who had become westernised, living abroad, who said, 'Become civilised at last! Become like everyone else! Stop being yourself!'[81]

The new concept of the Russian World was proposed as non-ethnic and even multi-confessional.[82] In the political sphere, it posited a multipolar world

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[79] Gradirovsky, S., 'Rossia I postsovietskie gosudarstva: iskushenie diasporal'noi politiki', 06.02.11. http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_german_nikolaewich/5002.shtml [Accessed 20.05.20]

[80] E.g. Parishioners of Sourozh. Open Letter, 'Blagodatnyi Ogon' Gliadia iz Londona', 01.04.02. https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/print [Accessed 20.05.20] and Cirota.ru,' Otkrytoe pis'mo', *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1995088, 13.04.06, [Accessed 20.05.20]

[81] Gradirovsky, ibid.

[82] The director of the organisation Russkiy Mir stated, 'When our fund was established, a lot of people asked - why russkiy and not rossiskiy? How to define Russianness? Genes, passport, belief? Obviously, the Russian World is not confined by the borders of the Russian state – this concept is not geographical, religious or ethnic.' Nikonov, V., 'Filosofy, politologi I antropologi ishchut sposoby ob'edineniua Russkogo mira', 19.03.10. http://fedpress.ru/28/polit/society/id_176409.html [Accessed 20.05.20]

order in place of presumed Western cultural and economic hegemony.[83] Multipolarity had a long history as a political concept in Russia, being perhaps particularly suited to sprawling land empires with multiple ethnicities.[84] Any multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state must have recourse to a supra-national mission (in however broad terms) in order to build a cohesive society.[85] The new Russian World was distinctly neo-traditionalist, anti-globalist and promoted Russia as the central locus of that multipolar resistance. But it was not so universalist as to accede benignly to the loss of an important western diocese such as Sourozh to Constantinople and the sphere of western influence. Nor were pro-Moscow individuals so universalist as to welcome the perceived western liberal values of Bishop Basil and his supporters.

For anti-Moscow parishioners and analysts, the universalist concept of the Russian World was a cover for a baser Russian ethnic nationalism. This accusation also had deep roots in the history of Slavophile thought. Dostoevsky may have emphasised an expansive idea of Russian culture, but he was also prone to bouts of extreme anti-westernism and xenophobic nationalism, as noted by Soloviev and others.[86] A key concept in this regard was the promotion of Russia as the 'New Israel', a messianic theory almost as old as that of the

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[83] Cf. Mezhuev, B., 'Amerikanskii fundamentalizm i russkaia konservativnaia revoliutsia', *Logos* 1 (36), 2003. Also, Silvius, R., 'The Russian State, Eurasianism, and Civilisations in the Contemporary Global Political Economy', *Journal of Global Faultlines*, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (April 2014), pp. 44–69. Also Chebankova, E., 'Contemporary Russian conservatism', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 32:1 (2016), pp. 28-54. Also, Papkova, I. and Gorenbur, D. 'The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Politics', *Russian Politics and Law*, Vol. 49, No. 1, (Jan.–Feb.) 2011, pp. 3–7

[84] Cf. Chebankova, E. 'Russia's Multipolar World Order', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 33, Issue 3 (2017)

[85] Cf. Tsygankov, A., 'Finding a Civilisational Idea: "West", "Eurasia", and "Euro-East" in Russia's Foreign Policy', *Geopolitics*, 12 (2007), pp.375-399. Cf. also Nikolayevna, O., 'Russkiy mir i problemy yego formirovaniya', Ros. akad. gos. sluzhby pri Prezidente RF (Moscow, 2009)

[86] Cf. Soloviev, V.S., 'Russkii natsional'nii ideal', *Novosti i Birzhevaia gazeta*, Nos. 23, 26 (Jan 1891), and *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii* (1891), Gl. *Idoly i idealy*. In Soloviev's time, the Russian Church was divided over the question of nationalism, which was still a relatively new ideology with connotations of revolution, making it suspicious to many conservatives in the Church. Cf. Ivanov., A and Chamakin, A., 'Pravoslanoe dukhovenstvo i russkii natsionalizm v nachale XXv', *Voprosy Istorii* 9 (2018), pp.153–66

Third Rome. In 1888, in a speech on the 900-year anniversary of the baptism of Rus, Archbishop Nikanor proclaimed, 'Who is this new Israel in our days? Between the many other heterodox peoples, it is the Orthodox Christian Russian people. We are the new Israel! We are the chosen people. We are the seed of God on earth!'.[87] Moving quickly on from this statement of ethnic nationalism, he continued, 'What is more, warm sympathy is conveyed to us from other countries by fellow Orthodox, by members of our race living beyond the boundaries of the fatherland, and even by countries that are not connected to us by the confessional faith'.[88] Although this emphasis on Russia as the New Israel was a hallmark of Russian Orthodox nationalists leading up to the Revolution, it became less prevalent afterwards.[89] Perhaps this was because of its innate ethnic connotations. But some academics, such as Jennifer Wasmuth, still place importance on the analogy and do not see a contradiction: 'Furthermore, the ROC necessarily stresses its universal and supranational structure because it is truly a multinational church. Its members include Karelians, Komi, Mordovians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Chuvash, Yakuts, Armenians, Tatars and Buryats … In practical terms the idea of Russia as the "New Israel" has been far more important than the idea of Moscow as the "Third Rome".'[90]

A final messianic concept that was gathering adherents in the ROC at the time of the Sourozh crisis was the idea of Russia as the 'witholder' (*katehon*) of the apocalypse.[91] This was an anti-universalist and divisive concept that

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[87] Brovkovich, Arkhiepiskop N., *Besedy i poucheniia* (Odessa, 1884) Available at: https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Nikanor_Brovkovich/besedy-i-pouchenija/#0_2 [Accessed 12.04.20]
[88] Ibid.
[89] On Russia as the New Israel, cf. also Shevzov, V., op. cit., p.67
[90] Wasmuth, J., 'Russian Orthodoxy between State and Nation' in Krawchuk, A., and Bremer, T. (eds.), *Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness Values, Self-Reflection* (London, 2014), p.20
[91] The concept of the *katehon* ("the one who restrains") is developed from 2 Thessalonians 2:6–7. Shnirel'man, V., 'Antikhrist, katekhon i russkaia revoliutsia', *Gosudarsvo, Religia, Tserkov'*, Nos. 1–2 (37) (2019). Also Engstrom, M., 'Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy', *Contemporary Security*

borrowed much from the conservative German theorist Carl Schmitt, positing 'us' against 'them'.[92] It was more prevalent at the fringes of Church, but its basic tenets were present in a more subdued way in all areas of Church discourse. It was ~~is~~ interesting how statements of Romantic Orthodox universalism made during the Sourozh crisis could suddenly move to combative and polarised language, sometimes within the same communication.[93] Such schizophrenic utterances were entwined with the neo-Slavophile view of Russia as essentially antinomic. Lurching from katehonic eschatology to eirenic universalism. Neo-Slavophile philosophers promoted contradiction and antimony as intrinsic characteristics of existence and the desire for 'resolution' an impossible human malady, doomed to failure. The philosopher V. N Makrides thus describes the attitude of the East in general, 'The abolition of all contradictions is considered by them [Neo Orthodox philosophers such as Christos Yannaras] to be a Western neurosis, which has led to an uncritical social optimism, to the creation of 'great mythologies' and finally to their tragic fall. On the contrary, the Orthodox East has always been more moderate and from the very beginning recognised the inherent contradictions in all things and situations'[94]. Pavel Florensky, who in his magnum opus, *The Pillar and the Ground of Truth* wrestled with the antimonies and paradoxes of the theodicy, not in order to impose a false resolution on them, but in order to show that ultimate truth is essentially antinomic, a

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Policy (2014), pp.356–79. The concept of Russia as 'the world's "shield" against the apocalyptic forces of chaos.' There is also the Church's notion of "Atomic Orthodoxy" in which Russia's development as a nuclear power is providential and holy (the A bomb was created at Sarov). Cf. Neigebauer, Z., 'Korni rossiskogo "atomnogo pravoslavia": geopolitika i novyi irratsionalizm', *Diskurs* (Aug 2019)

[92] Cf. Kurylo, B., 'Russia and Carl Schmitt: The Hybridity of Resistance in the Globalised World', *Palgrave Commun 2*, 16096 (2016), and Auer, S. 'Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis and the Return of Geopolitics', *International Affairs* 91:5 (2015), pp.953–68

[93] E.g. Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #53307 *Soobshchenie*: #1907853, *Otkrytoe Pis'mo*, 07.03.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]

[94] Makrides., V and Uffelman., D 'Studying Orthodox Anti-Westernism: the Need for a Comparative Research Agenda' in Sutton, J & Bercken, W., (eds), *Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe* p.100 (London, 2003)

theory which has been seized upon with interest by today's logicians[95]. Thus, benevolent universalism and narrow exceptionalism walk together in the Russian World concept and were typified in Dostoevsky above all. Bakhtin in his study on Dostoevsky noted how he possessed an 'extraordinary artistic capacity for seeing…many ambiguous, complex…things where others saw only one, hearing two contending voices in every one, hearing in every expression the readiness to go over to the contrary.'[96] For the supporters of Moscow, the universalist and the exceptionalist imperatives implied in the Russian World could both be true.

Transnationalism versus Enculturation

The Sourozh crisis came to a climax at a time when massive technological change was reshaping diaspora communication and integration. Traditional theories of enculturation and ghettoisation were starting to break down in the wake of globalisation. Even in 2000, Petr Shchedrovsky noted that the borders were collapsing 'between the external and internal market. Between the population living "inside" the country and in the diaspora'.[97] In 2009, Oksana Morgunova wrote an article about the British Russian diaspora that highlighted the predominance of a transnational *approach* (if not mindset), in which modern technology coupled with ease of travel meant that émigré life no longer equated to abandonment of the Motherland. Instead, it was possible for émigrés to still 'incorporate the native country into their life plans.' She stated that 'migration movements have reached such a level of intensity that a

[95] Cf., Rojek., P, 'Pavel Florensky's Theory of Religious Antinomies'. *Log. Univers*. 13 (2019), 515–540
[96] Bakhtin., M. *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*., p.277
[97] Shchedrovskii, P., 'Russkii mir i transnational'noe russkoe', *Russkii Zhurnal*, 02.00

continuous link is somehow formed, with those living abroad permanently involved in the life of both countries'.[98] This was an important change and a new phenomenon at the time of the Sourozh crisis. The daily flow of information between Russia and the UK seemed to undermine both Bishop Basil (it was outside his control and remit, practically and linguistically) and the enculturation that had become a symbol of the diocese. It seemed as if émigrés did not have to really commit to the Sourozh ethos, because Russia was 'only a click away'. In the words of Bishop Basil, many of those opposing him appeared to be people who 'have hardly left home'.[99]

More recently, commentators on this phenomenon have pitted cosmopolitanism (globalism) against transnationalism (localism).[100] Roudometof and others have pointed out that transnationalism does not necessarily lead to greater cosmopolitanism and have introduced the concepts of *transnational localism* and *glocalism*. As a result, the dichotomy does not necessarily relate to location (émigrés versus indigenous), but rather concerns mindset. Previously, 'cosmopolitans' were conjectured to be represented by the middle and upper-class diaspora intelligentsia, while 'locals' were the uneducated working class. The ideological implications of cosmopolitanism versus localism were laid out by Roudometof: 'Living in a transnational world, individuals can adopt an open, encompassing attitude or a closed, defensive posture. In the first case, individuals are labelled cosmopolitans; in the second case, they are labelled locals'.[101] This paradigm is somewhat contentious. While analysts of cosmopolitanism are generally in favour of the concept as

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[98] Morganova, O., 'Den' segodniashnii: britanskie russkie ili russkie britantsy?', *Russkoe Prisutstvie v Britanii* (London, 2009), p.37ff

[99] Interview with Bishop Basil, BBC Radio 4 *Sunday*, 21.05.06

[100] Cf. Hannerz, U., 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture', Lechner., F & Boli, J., (Eds) *The Globalization Reader* (New Jersey, 2014)

[101] Roudometof, V., 'Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization', *Current Sociology*, Vol. 53 (1) (January 2005), pp.113–35

denoting a vague system of values – ~~pro-openness~~pro-openness, rights based and opposed to any form of nationalism – the term 'localism' is more problematic. In Sourozh, however, all the 'positive' connotations of cosmopolitanism and localism were 'negatives' to the other side. This again highlights the importance, for Sourozh and other similar disputes, of worldview over ethnicity, local origin or class. In Sourozh, there was an additional overtone. Some pro-Moscow parishioners complained about the 'spirit of cosmopolitanism' among certain of the anti-Moscow Russians, evidently seeing no positive implications: 'They welcome only those Russian speakers who have no churching, or feel no loyalty to their mother Church. Such people often feel hostility towards the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russians. They are sometimes characterized by the spirit of dissent and cosmopolitanism'.[102] Some western academics might not pick up on the distinctly Soviet reference here: cosmopolitanism was a signifier for certain recalcitrant bourgeois tendencies and was even a crime during the Stalin years. It was often put together with the term 'rootless' – 'rootless cosmopolitanism' and *tuneiardstvo* (parasitism).[103] In such an understanding, the oft-mentioned openness of cosmopolitanism becomes a negative rootlessness, i.e. a disparagement, a betrayal, even a denial of the existence of one's own culture, resulting in an artificial syncretism or a relativistic dilettantism.

Sourozh presented a further deconstruction of the local-cosmopolitan paradigm in relation to the notion of openness, with cosmopolitans characterised as more open to different cultures than locals.[104] Yet, as we have seen, it was often the newly-arrived pro-Moscow parishioners who accused

[102] Cirota.ru, *Tema*: #53307, *Soobshchenie*: #1907853, *Otkrytoe Pis'mo*, 07.03.06 [Accessed 05.05.19]
[103] In the late Stalin period, the phrase also developed anti-Semitic overtones though the Sourozh accusations are unlikely to relate to this.
[104] Cf. Phillips, T., 'Imagined Communities and Self-Identity: An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis', *Sociology*, Vol. 36, Issue 3 (August 2002), pp.597–617

the cosmopolitans of erecting barriers and even latent racism. The accusation was that the anti-Moscow cosmopolitans were willing and able to welcome their own (or those very similar), but that the 'other' (in this case Sovietised Russians) represented a threat to the in-group.

Church parishes of all kinds in the West started to present a challenge to the cosmopolitan–local paradigm. On the one hand, many urban parishes were increasingly multi-ethnic, but were often at-odds with the dominant culture surrounding them. Catholic parishes frequently contained more Polish, Indian and African transnationals than indigenous English. Moreover, the incomers were often characterised by a less open, more conservative mindset. In this sense, the crisis in Sourozh was part of broader tendencies in western Christianity and the migratory movement of peoples. The situation was further complicated in Orthodoxy by an ambivalent attitude towards western converts. Whether they liked it or not, western Orthodox converts were the products of the globalising forces many of them deplored. Globalisation, in its shrinking of both time and space, resulted in an increased pluralism of cultural encounters. This peeled away previous local and community methods of social control to reveal a potentially dizzying choice – not least in the religious marketplace. This sometimes resulted in an anti-convert mentality in the Orthodox diaspora. Conversion to Orthodoxy was seen as a sign of a suspiciously pluralistic attitude to religion, and of not following the faith of one's fathers ('you are English, you should be an Anglican, like your queen!' was a common supposition). A Sourozh parishioner wrote, 'Converts have not always been readily encouraged. Too often the various national groups simply cannot see why anyone from a different ethnic and cultural background should

want to join them'.[105] Such an attitude could be directed at converts regardless of any liberal versus traditionalist tensions. Ultimately, the suspicion of western converts as having betrayed their own national religion in order to become Orthodox was a form of ethnophyletism and a secularist approach to religion.

On the ground, such attitudes could translate into two types of anti-convert mentality. From the nationalist side, there was the 'betrayal of the fathers' mentioned above, and there was also the suspicion that converts would prove to be the advance guard of liberalism and modernism. However traditionalist converts might appear, they could rarely be trusted to have completely made the journey over into Orthodoxy. Instead they forever carried with them a residue of their western cradle. Blog articles about such matters run into the hundreds.[106] The thesis of Victor Livtsov on the ecumenist movement concluded specifically in relation to the UK, 'The ecumenical activity initiated by the Russian Orthodox Church was supported by representatives of the West European Exarchate [joined by Bishop Basil Osborne], who had ties to the Anglican-Orthodox Commonwealth of SS. Alban and Sergius. However, the community and exarchate became more and more western due to the transition to Orthodoxy of representatives of other confessions'.[107] If ~~such a situation~~ ethnic-only Orthodoxy continues indefinitely the position of all Orthodox jurisdictions in the West is precarious. Even those diasporas whose ethnic-religious link is very strong, such as the Armenians, have found it difficult to embed regular church attendance in the young. Neither is complete

[105] Lambouras, M., 'Some Reflections on the Question of Nationalism and Orthodoxy', *Sourozh* No. 105, 2009
[106] E.g. Phillips., Fr Andrew, othodoxengland.org, 'On the Failure of Anglican Converts to Produce an Orthodox Culture' 26.04.14. http://www.events.orthodoxengland.org.uk/on-the-failure-of-anglican-converts-to-produce-an-orthodox-culture/ [Accessed 05.05.19]
[107] Livtsov, V., 'Anatol'evich, *Istoria vzaimodestvia Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi s ekumenicheskim dvizheniem: konets XIX – nachalo XXI* v', Dissertatsia po VAK RF, 2013.

ghettoization and the prevention of intermarriage possible or desirable, as it is for some Hassidic and Muslim groups. As the ethnic link starts to weaken, and migrants move on or return home, it seems that only the birth of local western Orthodox jurisdictions will ultimately work, both practically and canonically. But this also seems to be far off and is the subject of another study.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the Sourozh crisis began in terms of established narratives, looking in particular at the cultural dichotomies of East and West. These old-world, sometimes rather caricatured interpretations of events were used as justifications at the time of the crisis and certainly held true for many. The failure of either side to understand the other had deep cultural-theological roots. The differences were heightened by the diaspora setting, which represented a type of 'extreme borderland' situation. That Russia as a nation and Russians in general felt and feel threatened by the West is observable in many spheres, whether or not it is true in reality. As Luke March put it, 'I certainly agree that if there is a "Russia problem", then there is a "West problem" too. Western policies have certainly created an environment where the Russian elite can readily portray the nation as isolated, victimised, and threatened, even if this an impression which the Kremlin milks opportunistically.'[1]

For the post-1991 Russian émigrés, there were two paths: gradual assimilation to the local culture or 'fiercely clinging to one's own'. Because of the perceived antagonism towards Russia in the West, assimilation carries heightened connotations of rejection of the Motherland – and some diaspora Russians have embraced this. On the other hand, 'fiercely clinging' involves a far less critical attitude to the Russian State than might have been the case at home. The Church of course, was and perhaps will always be, at the epicentre of questions concerning Russian culture, even for relatively secular people. Moreover, this 'clinging to one's own' in the Russian context was and is often ill-understood by western analysts and others. The clashes between Russia and

[1] March, L. 'Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the new "Russian Idea"', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64:3, April 2012, pp 401–25

the West, from the Battle on the Ice (1242) to Borodino (1812) and the Siege of Leningrad (1941–4) are deeply embedded in the worldview of Russians from an early age, whilst consciousness of equivalent foundation histories is diminishing in western countries. Such events, along with clashes in the spiritual domain, such as the Union of Brest (1590), are still seen (rightly, in some ways) as aggressive *cultural* wars of expansion, even extermination. Perhaps this is why it was the pro-Moscow side that made greater reference to the East–West dichotomy; it was part of their internal narrative in way that was not true of the anti-Moscow parishioners.

In addition to the hyper-reality of being 'an island of Holy Rus' adrift in the urban West, the actual cultural-philosophical divergence between the two sides was real and ancient in origins. Again, it was the pro-Moscow side that made the most appeals to these differences. This was a result of both the diaspora situation and the embattled feelings arising in response to the seemingly inevitable creeping dominance of western technology, culture and values. A sense of embattled retreat is a mark of many diaspora communities and Sourozh was no different, with the preservation of language and customs being a major concern. A priest who remained with Moscow stated his concerns that as a result of the events of 2006, the diocese 'was in danger of becoming like a Russian chaplaincy…and the Church can't really be the Church if it is a chaplaincy. It becomes as irrelevant as those Anglican parishes in the South of Spain with their Matins and sherry on a Sunday, but it isn't really the Church.'[2]

Language, especially, provided both an obstacle to assimilation as well as an opportunity for cultural preservation, heightening in-group cohesion and out-group exclusion. This was the backdrop that set the scene in which events

[2] Interview 1A

that might appear relatively obscure to an outsider could have great importance. Relations between the two sides were made all the worse when such concerns were played down by one side or the other. The pro-Moscow reaction to the perceived threat could appear impassioned and strange to the anti-Moscow locals, the severity of the former's reaction being increased by the sense of existential threat described above, and also by fundamental behavioural differences.

The overriding explanation from western academia for the Sourozh crisis (and for other similar events in the west[3]) was one of renewed Russian nationalism along with a confrontation between two diverging worldviews. On the one hand were the western diaspora parishes that had become encultured with western liberal values; on the other was the Moscow Patriarchate, which was on an opposite trajectory with its conservative, Slavophile-nationalist, centralising drive. These two poles of World Orthodoxy were reflected in the positions of Constantinople and Moscow, embedding an ancient rivalry with contemporary geopolitical implications. Such an explanation holds true in its overall assessment of the situation, but the problem with such oversimplifications is that they entrench polemic and in so doing close down the potential avenues of reconciliation, or at least understanding. The importance of this point is reflected in the large amount of space given in this study to an analysis of the Slavophile-nationalist drive. It was certainly true that this imperative, coupled with Slavophile historiography, resulted in a rebirth of Russian universalism and the formation of the concept of the Russian World in which more emphasis was put on the diaspora parishes in the world's great capitals. This development occurred at the same time as the rise of the so-called culture wars between a West that was rapidly secularising and

[3] Cf. Chapter 2. The Property Battle in Context.

rejecting its Christian past and a Russia that (in public at least) was positioning itself as the 'withholder' (*katehon*) of such forces. This gave birth within Russia to a heady mix of both Russian exceptionalism and universalism, which were two sides of the same doctrine. Perhaps this drive towards Russian universalism was, and is, related to anxiety about the much more successful spread of *Western* universalism, the culture wars thus representing a battle between the two. Danilevskii had recognised this in the nineteenth century when he proposed a Slavic universalism in opposition to the Western kind, which even then was spreading over the globe with great rapidity. This is why the secular and ecclesiastical leadership in Russia were, and are, at pains to stress a broad and rather vague 'union of traditionalist peoples'. Paradoxically, multipolarity is proposed as a universalism in itself.[4]

Few Western commentators have really understood what this means. This has been partly the result of blind spots that can appear in any discourse where there is a hegemonic tendency. As noted, one of the by-products of recent western historiography is the prevalence of a certain Sloterdijkian cynicism that elevates pragmatic-mercenary motivations to the exclusion of others. This is especially problematic in questions relating to religion and Russia. While some neo-Slavophile thought may be grandstanding and a fig-leaf for Russification and old-world nationalism, much of it is more subtle and certainly sincere. This was reflected in Sourozh, and in other similar crises, by the support of multiple fellow-travellers, who can be seen as a manifestation of the ideas promoted in the speeches of Patriarch Kirill. Moreover, Sourozh was only one small part of a global pattern in which communities and individuals were no longer divided along national, geographic or even ethnic

[4] Cf. Tsygankov, A., 'In the Shadow of Nikolai Danilevsky: Universalism, Particularism, and Russian Geopolitical Theory', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 69, Issue 4 (June, 2017)

lines, but by the culture wars. As this polemic has gathered pace, so the concept of the Russian World has grown broader and broader, to include almost any community fighting to preserve tradition against globalism.

All sides in the culture wars have been unashamed in their use of caricature, simplification and polemic. Sourozh was not the usual battleground for such tensions, as both sides could be considered as conservatives by wider society, but this only shows how far the delineation of such groups had come even by that time. The crisis was an early manifestation of the power of the internet to increase tribal allegiances, as participants confirmed and entrenched their positions in the echo-chambers of the blogosphere. It could be countered that the stakes in religious conflicts are usually extremely high, which partly explains the passions and polemic they arouse. This was noted by the judge in the 2009 trial when the pro-Moscow barrister tried to downplay the significance of certain events. But the conflicts in Sourozh do not appear to have been primarily of a doctrinal or theological nature, although the stress-points often revealed themselves as accusations of 'not being Orthodox'. In effect, they were based more on openness or resistance to the zeitgeist – to globalisation's breaking down of difference, and its syncretic imperative in moral values, culture, religion. Fear of this powerful and pervasive force helped to embed defiance in the pro-Moscow group.

For this reason, older explanations of East versus West and Russian nationalism do not hold true for all events in Sourozh. The crisis came at a transitional time in geopolitics. The influx of economic migrants (rather than exiles), plus the exponential growth of the internet at the time, meant that the nature of diaspora life was changing from the old émigré and cosmopolitan diaspora way of being to a new transnationalism.[5] New arrivals were able to

[5] Cf. Chapter 6

continue in constant contact with the Motherland, and an increase in media battles and conspiracy theories online also reflected these changes. The ability of every participant in the crisis to broadcast their theories daily was novel at the time and, as has since become commonplace, led to overheated and polarised debates that were the result but also the cause of the troubles.

The rise of the neo-Slavophiles cannot be laid entirely at the door of the culture wars, renewed East–West tensions and the polarised resistance to/embracing of globalisation. Russia's internal dialogue also had a huge role to play in her renewed interest in the diaspora. After the Revolution, diaspora intellectuals, from Ilyin to Berdiaev, continued to obsess over Russia's destiny in the light of the Bolshevik victory and these thinkers would provide the foundation of much neo-Slavophile thought after 1991. The post-war period saw the rebirth of neo-Slavophile thought within the Soviet Union, with writers such as Solzhenitsyn and Shafarovich being the forebears of later neo-Slavophile intellectuals such as Dugin. Russian intellectual, political and religious life is still immersed in questions of Russia's place in the world and her relationship with the West. Each year sees a plethora of new books and articles on these themes. This is a phenomenon not to be found in any other European nation. The 1990s were the heyday of such debate, as multiple voices within Russia jostled for power, but by the 2000s one main narrative was emerging: a policy of continuity that sought to reconnect with and consolidate Russia's history, geography and place in the world.

The influence of the rise of Putin on the debate both within and without the Church is certain, though difficult to assess. The drive of the young president to re-establish Russia as a world power and to unite the country internally had far-reaching implications for the Russian Church and her diaspora. Both cultural westernisation and extreme nationalism were rejected

(at least internally) and continuity with Russia's past was elevated to paramount importance. The president, an avid reader of history, poured much energy into the reunification of the estranged parts of the Russian Church.[6] To many he was the king-maker of a process that would have seemed a minor sideshow to Yeltsin. Similarly, the DECR formed a close relationship with the MFA, firstly under the yet-to-be Patriarch Kirill and subsequently under Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev, striving to consolidate Russian parishes abroad as 'beacons' and 'islands' of Holy Rus.

The language used by the president and the Church was not the language of old-fashioned ethnic nationalism for which it was sometimes mistaken. Instead, a heady new universalism promoted the Russian Church as the global guardian of Orthodoxy. With other Orthodox Churches in the West increasingly under pressure from secularism, the Russian Church argued that she alone had the secure base and global reach to provide the inspiration for the whole Orthodox (and not only Orthodox) world. Russia's multi-ethnic and multilingual parishes across the globe were spread over several jurisdictions and represented both an opportunity and a threat to the Patriarchate. As all these jurisdictions are now again part of the Mother Church, Moscow's policy can be said to have been a resounding success. ROCOR and Moscow reunited in 2007 and the Exarchate in 2019; there were small departures in both cases as a result of the unions. One notable casualty of the 2019 union was the parishes of the English Deanery, which had left Sourozh in 2006 with Bishop Basil. For many, the events described in this study were simply too fresh to contemplate a reunion.

[6] 'Putin ob'iasnil, pochemu liuubit chitat' knigi po istorii', 01.01.18 https://rueconomics.ru/299332-putin-obyasnil-pochemu-lyubit-chitat-knigi-po-istorii [Accessed 04.12.20]

These undoubted successes of the Moscow Patriarchate were critiqued by a small minority of intellectuals within the Church and by the majority of academics external to the Church. They were deemed to have been possible only with the suppression of democratic voices within the Church and the promotion of vertical episcopal power, mirroring developments in the State. The new symphonia of the Russian Church and State was viewed as a cynical marriage between the spiritual and temporal powers, in which the real power lay with the State. This was a dangerous game for the Church to play, according to the critics, who cited Russia's turbulent history in support of their views. One commentator noted that Russians 'had a long history of turning on their Church', and that, for the State, the Church was simply another weapon in her soft-power arsenal.[7] But as far as the diaspora was concerned, the benefits certainly did not all go one way. Much of the money that poured into diaspora Church projects, such as the new cathedral in Paris, came from the State. In addition, the Church was at the forefront of the new battle for hearts and minds beyond Russia's borders, and this new mission to the West was important to the Russian Church's prestige and self-image as a global church. The Russian Church is a major player in a loose worldwide coalition of Christians opposing the liberal-secular imperative in many western (and non-western) countries. Just one example is the role of the Russian Church in the World Congress of Families, a large Evangelical-founded US organisation with strong links to Russia.

It should be noted that criticism came not only from the liberal intelligentsia. The right within the Russian Church (especially ROCOR) attacked both the new symphonia and the Church's entry into the global culture wars. Such voices regarded Putin's motives as at best cynical and criticised the

[7] Interview with Irina Papkova, Budapest, 01.05.10. www.rocorstudies.org

liberalism of certain sectors of the Moscow Patriarchate, particularly the Sourozh Diocese. They regarded the Russian Church's focus on the culture wars as a diversion from Russia's own burdensome issues of corruption, poverty and inequality, marriage breakdown, abortion rates, alcoholism and so on. These competing communities illustrate how the Church has been unable to escape the divisions increasingly encountered in public life over the world.

That the Russian Church came to think of herself increasingly in global rather than purely geographic terms was the result of a coalition of forces ranging from the philosophical (Slavophile universalism), the theological (Third Rome) and the providential (the diaspora), through the geographical-political (the burden of Empire) to the globalised geopolitical (the culture wars). While the Russian Church was propelled to a global mission, Constantinople increasingly claimed jurisdiction over the entire Orthodox diaspora, and the stage was set for further confrontations. In addition, the Russian Church increasingly represented traditional Orthodoxy as opposed to the liberal Orthodoxy of Constantinople. The liberal Orthodox may have criticised Moscow's assertive policies in the diaspora, but they were popular with many parishioners as the Church won property battles in Nice, Budapest, Rome, London and other cities.

Since the Sourozh crisis of 2006, the tensions between Constantinople and Moscow have broken out into a schism that has been compared to the Great Schism of 1054 between the Latin West and the Greek East. The Church crisis in Ukraine has split World Orthodoxy, but not simply along ethnic or geopolitical lines. These divisions exist on the surface, but allegiances akin to those of the Sorouzh crisis run far deeper. Orthodox clergy have supported either Constantinople against Moscow or vice versa, regardless of their jurisdictions; traditionalists referring to the troubles as 'the pruning of the

vine', and liberals framing them as a refusal of zealots to face the real problems of the modern world. Wherever tensions have flared up in World Orthodoxy since 1991, the undercurrents have been the same, as the pressure to align with either conservative Moscow or liberal Constantinople increases.

In a broader sense, the experience of the Russian Church in the diaspora was not unique. Events similar to those at Sourozh occurred in the Armenian diaspora after 1991. There were major differences of course, but the appearance there of new parishioners with, it was claimed, a 'Soviet mentality' is particularly analogous.[8] The notion of a conflict of mentalities is an interesting, though probably ultimately inconclusive, line of enquiry. It relates to the idea that communism was able, within the lifespan of an individual, to reform the ways of thinking of an entire people. The fact that such a theory has not been restricted to the Russian situation implies the existence of common differences of social comportment. Such a situation was probably related more to previously existing praxis within, for example, social class, which the Revolution heightened, rather than to a complete rupture with the past.

The crisis in Sourozh is interesting precisely because it showed the symbiotic relationship between so many micro and macrocosmic forces. The stage was small, but the themes were large. Geopolitical tensions presented as ideological divergence were both a cause and a result of the minutiae of dissonance at the parish and individual level. This was partly because of the way individual lives were increasingly and inescapably connected to the pressures of world-historical forces. Whether they liked it or not, in an age of hyperbolic and omnipresent media saturation, parishioners were increasingly at the centre of macrocosmic struggles between various forces and it became

[8] Petrosyan., L., 'The Armenian Apostolic Church in Contemporary Times (1991-2011): Political Changes In Armenia and Social Challenges of the Last Three Catholicoi of Etchmiadzin. Part I: Vazgen I and Garegin I' *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*, vol. 24 (2015):81-111

less and less easy to remain neutral. This in turn led to a battle of worldviews being played out at the parish level, often sublimated into conflicts about praxis rather than expressed as overt ideological confrontation.[9] The disputes over dress, confession, icons etc were thus semiotic confrontations in which a small act or gesture could carry behind it the whole weight of history. It is interesting how, after the events, official channels in the Russian Church sought to downplay this aspect of the crisis, often stressing that there was *not* a difference in worldview or ecclesiology,[10] while unofficial pro-Moscow channels continued to vocalise against 'the westernised Sourozh liberals'.

But how much influence could neo-Slavophile thought really have had on the minutia of events? The answer, it seems to me, is that the rhetoric was both symptomatic and causal. Thus, the diaspora was both the subject and the instigator of new Slavophile thought. The Sourozh crisis, and similar events, revealed the growing power of Orthodox diasporas to influence the politics of their Motherlands. A commentator at the time went so far as to state that, 'today's Orthodox consciousness tends to be held captive by the needs and requirements of the Orthodox diasporas'.[11] This is a growing trend in the world, as transnationalism becomes a global phenomenon. In western Europe alone there are perhaps some eight million Russophones, most of whom consider themselves, at least nominally, Orthodox.[12] Such transnationalism is seen by some as a backward move in Orthodoxy in general. A priest noted that the Sourozh crisis was itself partly to blame for this, with the result that other jurisdictions became more wary of local converts. He stated that, 'what happened [In Sourozh in 2006] has set the possibility of any union of

[9] Cf. Scorer, Deacon P., Interview by Natalia Golytsina, *Radio Svoboda*, 13.06.06
[10] Lipich, O., Interviu Mitropolita Kirilla, *RIA Novosti*, 14.10.06
[11] Kishkovsky, Fr L., 'UK Diocesan Crisis Tests Church's Mission to All', *The Orthodox Church News Magazine*, Vol. 42, Nos. 5–6
[12] Koksharov, N.V., 'Kul'tura russkogo zarubezh'ia', *Credo New*, No. 2 (2007), pp.48–59

Orthodoxy in Britain back 50 years…Everyone will look and say "you can't trust these Brits, they've got no real attachment to the Church."'[13] The implication being that as soon as things happened which you didn't like, that you could pack up and move jurisdiction.

In addition, even in the 2000s, it became impossible for diasporas to escape the tendency to fall into camps: modernist versus traditionalist, globalist (cosmopolitan) versus transnational (localist), conservative versus liberal, East versus West. The geopolitical theories of Huntingdon and others seemed to reinforce these dichotomies and provide them with a world-historical narrative. The new arrivals into the Sourozh parish also reflected a concrete manifestation of these ideas. These arguments were in many ways grounded in the tensions of our era: tradition versus the jettisoning of tradition; anxiety and defence against globalisation versus the welcoming of the new world; the rise of the secular versus the reaction to it; fear of cultural syncretism versus its acceptance. Such instinctual predilections are deeply ingrained and have little to do with rational thought, being based more on experiences and inclinations rooted early in life. This is partly why it is impossible to break down the Sourozh crisis on purely class, ethnic or even theological lines.

The battle of worldviews, polarisation between East and West, enculturation versus transnationalism: all these took place against a backdrop of deep, emotional homesickness (*toska po rodine*) which was a factor for émigrés on both sides. Towards the end of his life, Fr Sergei Bulgakov, the diaspora theologian, equally beloved and scorned by 'liberals' and 'conservatives', wrote a brief essay about the long shadow that Russia had cast

[13] Interview 1A

over his life, concluding: 'The older I get, the more my life experience expands and deepens, the clearer the meaning of my homeland becomes for me. There I was not only born, but germinated as a seed, in my very being, so that all my later, broken and complex life, is only a series of shoots from this root. Everything, which is mine comes from there. And dying, I will return – to the same place, the same gate – of birth and death.'[14]

Despite the war of words between the Moscow Patriarchate and the various diaspora jurisdictions that had departed from her orbit, the thirst for the Motherland, both real and romanticised, was immensely powerful. This was seen after World War II, when many parishes in the Exarchate (including Surouzh) and even ROCOR parishes and monasteries decided to return to Moscow. It was also a major driver in the ROCOR–Moscow Union in 2007, and again in 2019, when most of the Exarchate parishes decided to return home as well. Despite all the protestations that the new Russia had broken connection with the Russia of old, that Soviet Russia had buried the Russia of Tchaikovsky and Levitan under an industrial heap, and that the brash post-Soviet Russia was a rude imposter, for many of the émigrés, old and new, their rowan tree was never very far from view. Even in an age of globalised communications, nostalgia remains the deepest layer of all.

Each house is strange, each altar bare.
And I don't care. It doesn't matter.
But if, beside the autumn road, I see
a rowan tree …[15]

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[14] Bulgakov, S., 'Moia Rodina' (1939) author trans.
[15] Tsvetaeva, M. (trans. Paul Schmitt), *Toska po Rodine*
Всяк дом мне чужд, всяк храм мне пуст,
И все — равно, и все — едино.
Но если по дороге — куст
Встает, особенно — рябина …

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Key Interviews:

A letter/number system was used whereby 1 denoted clergy and 2 laypeople.

1A. Interviewee was an English priest who remained in Sourozh. Interview was conducted in person and recorded. Consent by form signed.

1B. Interviewee was an American-born priest who was in Sourozh at the time of the crisis. Interview conducted by Skype and recorded. Consent by email.

1C. Interviewee was priest of ROCOR based in UK. Interview was conducted by email Q&A. Consent by email.

1D. Interviewee was an English priest who remained in the Moscow Patriarchate. Interview conducted in person. With notes. Consent form.

1E. Interviewee was a Russian Metropolitan Bishop of the Russian Church. Interview (Audience) was conducted in person in Moscow, notes taken.

1F. Interviewee was a Metropolitan Bishop of the Greek Church living in the UK. Interview conducted in person and notes taken. Consent by form signed.

1G. Interviewee was a priest of the Russian Church in Moscow. Interview conducted in person and notes taken.

1Ha and 1Hb. Interviewee was a Russian-English priest based at the cathedral at the time of the crisis. Interview was conducted in person and notes taken. Consent by form signed.

2A. Interviewee was a descent of white émigrés, active on the Diocesan Council. Interview conducted in person with notes. Consent form.

2D. Interviewee was an English lay parishioner active at the time of the crisis. Interview conducted by Skype and recorded. Consent by form signed.

2Ea and 2Eb Interviewee was a Ukrainian layman active in the cathedral at the time of the crisis. Interviews conducted in person and recorded (also notes taken). Consent by Form signed.

2F. Interviewee was a Russian layman and ex lieutenant colonel of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and a parishioner of ROCOR living now in the USA. Interview was conducted via Skype and recorded. Consent by email.

2G. Interview with an English priest-monk who left ROCOR following the Union. Consent form signed.

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