



BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online


Palko, Olena (2022) Between Moscow, Warsaw, and the Holy See: the case of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz amidst the early Soviet anti-Catholic campaign. *Revolutionary Russia* 35 (2), pp. 225-246. ISSN 0954-6545.

Downloaded from: <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/47597/>

Usage Guidelines:

Please refer to usage guidelines at <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html>
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.

or alternatively



Between Moscow, Warsaw and the Holy See: The Case of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz Amidst the Early Soviet Anti-Catholic Campaign

Olena Palko

To cite this article: Olena Palko (2022) Between Moscow, Warsaw and the Holy See: The Case of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz Amidst the Early Soviet Anti-Catholic Campaign, *Revolutionary Russia*, 35:2, 225-246, DOI: [10.1080/09546545.2022.2136353](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2136353)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2022.2136353>



© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 30 Nov 2022.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 236



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Olena Palko

Department of History, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland

BETWEEN MOSCOW, WARSAW AND THE HOLY SEE: THE CASE OF FATHER ANDRZEJ FEDUKOWICZ AMIDST THE EARLY SOVIET ANTI-CATHOLIC CAMPAIGN

This article offers a micro-history of Soviet anti-religious actions during the mid-1920s through a reconstruction of the investigation of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz and his forced collaboration with the Soviet secret services. In November 1924, Fedukowicz was forced to sign a letter to Pope Pius XI and a year later committed suicide to avoid the humiliation caused by his actions. This article reveals how elaborate the Soviet secret services' techniques for dealing with uncontrolled religious allegiances had become during the seemingly religiously tolerant NEP era which replaced the overly repressive measures of the Civil War period. It aims to challenge the conventional impression of powerful and effective Soviet secret services. Detailed analysis of the process of fabrication used by the secret services shows how often the rudimentary methods of the secret police could easily threaten the success of the entire operation. In this regard, the limited results the secret services had achieved by relying on individual assets led to toughening of mass repression and a more aggressive anti-religious campaign after 1929.

On 16 November 1924, the major Soviet Ukrainian daily, *Kommunist*, featured a letter addressed to Pope Pius XI from the vicar general for the territory of Volhynia, Andrzej Fedukowicz. In his open letter, Father Andrzej appealed to the Pope to exert his influence on the Polish government, which was forcing Catholic priests in the Soviet Union to engage in espionage on their behalf. At the same time, the priest asserted that there was no persecution of the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union; instead, individual priests were being arrested for their political activities alone. Fedukowicz's letter became the first open denunciation of Poland and its destructive influence on Catholicism in Ukraine signed by a high-ranking Catholic cleric that appeared on the pages of the official Soviet press.¹ It was distributed abroad by the Soviet Telegraph Agency and sparked public outcry in Poland where the actions of the well-regarded Polish Catholic

priest received an overwhelmingly negative response.² Unbeknown to the public the author of the letter had just been released from prison, where, accused of conspiring against the Soviet government and threatened with trial, he was forced to admit his anti-Soviet actions, agree to collaborate with the secret services and sign the before-mentioned denunciation. On 4 March 1925, Father Andrzej, not being able to bear the burden of his repudiation, which made him a cog in the Soviet anti-Polish propaganda machine, committed suicide by self-immolation. His *auto-da-fé* halted the Soviet secret services' far-reaching plans of destabilizing the Church from within, while turning Fedukowicz into a martyr in the eyes of his parish and the whole Church.³

The case of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz offers a rare insight into the inner workings of the Soviet secret services in early 1920s Ukraine. On the one hand, it reveals how elaborate the Soviet secret services' techniques for dealing with uncontrolled religious allegiances had become during a more tolerant NEP (New Economic Policy), the period which came to replace the overly repressive measures of the Civil War. It also traces the process of the fabrication of the secret services' constructs and reveals the human cost of the Soviet propaganda effort. On the other hand, the failure of the State Political Department (GPU) to fully use its newly converted agents challenges the conventional impression of powerful and effective secret services whose half-baked and often rudimentary methods, in reality, could easily go wrong. In this regard, the toughening of repression in the late 1920s can be explained by the limited results that the secret services had achieved by relying on individual assets.

Most scholarship on church-state relations in this period concentrates on examining either the Bolshevik anti-religious practices of the Civil War,⁴ or the Stalinist terror of the 1930s, when religious affiliations made individuals vulnerable during the infamous 'national operations' against Soviet minority populations.⁵ Instead, this article showcases the Soviet anti-religious practices of the post-1923 period that remain largely unexplored in Western historiography.⁶ In doing so, this article pursues two key objectives. First, it aims to shed light on a less examined aspect of Soviet anti-religious policies of the period between 1924 and 1929.⁷ Second, it feeds into the scholarly debate about the nature of the NEP decade, maintaining that it was not simply a 'retreat from the harsh politics of War Communism to liberalism back to harsh authoritarianism under Stalin'.⁸ Instead, it proved to be a 'breathing space' in which the process of building socialism could be successfully accomplished with minimal popular resistance. Although the end goal remained the same, the NEP reflected a change of pace at which those objectives could be most successfully achieved.

When applied to religious affairs, a 'quiet revolution' was underway,⁹ whereby desired structural and institutional changes in religious life could be achieved while the party remained seemingly tolerant of everyday religious practices. Although direct attacks on the clergy were suspended after 1923, the Soviet regime's war against religion continued to be waged on the propaganda front, as well as in the offices of the secret services. While the party opted for maximizing propaganda and minimizing persecution, the present examination of Fedukowicz's case aims to evaluate the effectiveness of those new methods employed by the secret services to break the influence of the Church on the majority of the Soviet population.

In addition, existing scholarship mainly focuses on the Bolshevik treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church, the dominant religious institution in Russia that had enjoyed great privileges during the imperial era,¹⁰ or aims to offer a general overview

of legal and institutional aspects of Soviet religious policies.¹¹ While the fate of the Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet western border zones has received broad scholarly attention in Ukraine and particularly in Poland,¹² Catholicism in the Soviet context in Western scholarship remains understudied.¹³ Until the Soviet Union's collapse, most accounts were written by religious historians and Catholic priests themselves.¹⁴ Meanwhile, new scholarship offers a more nuanced account for the history of Catholicism in the Soviet Union, bringing new lines of enquiry into the research agenda.¹⁵ Nonetheless, two avenues of enquiry remain dominant. The first approach concentrates on repression, examining the Bolsheviks' anti-religious policies, culminating in the destruction of the Catholic Church;¹⁶ whereas the second approach looks at the diplomatic history of the competition between Moscow and the Vatican.¹⁷

This article offers a micro-history of Soviet anti-religious actions during the mid-1920s through a reconstruction of the investigation of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz and his forced collaboration with the Soviet secret services. It utilizes primarily documents generated by the police apparatus, especially the secret services' investigation files, as well as the contemporaneous press.¹⁸ At the same time, thanks to a rich source base, which also includes documents produced by the Polish diplomatic services in response to Soviet actions, the article highlights Warsaw's conflictual and problematic role in ensuring the functioning of the Catholic Church on Soviet territory. While recent studies on the western borderlands have underscored the defining role of the international factor in shaping internal Soviet policies,¹⁹ religious policy included, this article maintains that the Soviet domestic anti-religious campaign also had serious repercussions for Polish-Soviet relations, as well as the Soviet position on the international stage more broadly.

Maintaining faith through wars and revolutions

Andrzej Fedukowicz was born on 7 November 1875 to a Polish-speaking family in the village of Denisovo in Vil'na province in the Russian Empire's northwest region (now Belarus). This administrative unit was formed from the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, seized by the Russian Empire as a result of the second partition of Poland in 1792. By the late nineteenth century, grassroots resistance in the former Polish lands that had previously manifested itself in two Polish risings of 1830–31 and 1863–64, had largely subsided. Decades-long imperial autocratic policies had succeeded in making Poland's former lands an integral part of the empire. Since Polish-language schooling was banned, Andrzej was educated in Russian first in a nearby town of Miory and then in the St Petersburg Private Gymnasium for Boys of the Roman Catholic Church of St Catherine. In 1895, twenty-year-old Fedukowicz commenced his theological studies in the Roman-Catholic seminary in Zhytomyr, the only Catholic religious school in the Ukrainian lands and completed his higher education in the Imperial Roman-Catholic Theological Academy in St Petersburg, where he was ordained a priest in 1902. Thereafter, he returned to Zhytomyr, where he worked as a prefect and a religion teacher in various secondary schools until 1917.

Fedukowicz returned to Ukraine amidst an escalating social and economic crisis that culminated in the revolutionary upheaval of 1905–07. Many of his students took active part in demonstrations and other political activities; some were arrested and persecuted by the authorities. To dissuade them from revolutionary activities,

Fedukowicz took up pastoral duties working with the radicalized youth. He welcomed the Edict on Religious Tolerance signed by Nicholas II on 17 April 1905 that granted freedom of conscience to imperial subjects and removed restrictions on practicing religions other than Russian Orthodoxy.²⁰ It allowed the organization of the Russian Catholic Church and the reopening of closed churches, as well as providing for its other activities, education and charity work among others. Fedukowicz was an active member and later chair of the Zhytomyr Roman-Catholic Charity Organization (*Rzymsko-Katolickie Towarzystwo Dobroczyńności*), founded in 1907 that watched over a Polish library, tradesman's school, nursery, shelters for the elderly and poor, and even a hospital; and a clandestine educational organization, *Oświata*, providing basic education to impoverished children.

In February 1917, Roman Catholics throughout the empire greeted the fall of the monarchy and took an optimistic view of the Provisional Government, hoping that it would finally bring freedom of expression of religious beliefs and ensure religious equality. The expectations for change were also linked to the new leadership in the diocese – in October 1916, pastor of the cathedral parish in Zhytomyr, Ignacy Dub-Dubowski, was appointed Bishop of Lutsk-Zhytomyr Diocese and Apostolic Administrator of the Kamieniec Diocese, and his solemn *ingress* took place in Zhytomyr on 15 February 1917. Fedukowicz's exceptional skills and high regard among the community, especially the Catholic youth, came to the attention of the new Bishop. In April 1917, Fedukowicz, by then a vicar of Zhytomyr cathedral of St Sophia, became a chancellor of the Lutsk-Zhytomyr Diocesan Curia and a vice-dean of Zhytomyr deanery.²¹

As a high church official, Fedukowicz needed to navigate the uncertain political landscape of post-February Russia. Parallel to the Provisional Government, on 4 March 1917 local Ukrainian activists set up the Central *Rada* (Council) that on 7 November 1917 declared the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and its government – the General Secretariat. The Ukrainian government aimed to include Ukraine's diverse national minorities into their state-building initiatives, and even formed separate secretariats for Ukraine's largest minority groups – Russians, Poles, and Jews.²² While the Ukrainian government committed to ensuring national minority rights, their treatment of religious equality was less clear-cut.²³ In this regard, the government's primary task was to challenge Moscow's hegemony in the ecclesiastical realm and achieve de-Russification of the local Orthodox Church.²⁴ Its relations with the Roman Catholic Church were ambiguous. On the one hand, Ukraine's Ministry of Religious Affairs aimed to ensure that there were no obstacles to the Church's religious activities and propaganda. The Catholic Church received state funding, with large amounts provided for the Zhytomyr Roman-Catholic seminary. On the other hand, the ministry strove to supervise the Church's activities to avert any political content that could potentially undermine Ukrainian statehood.²⁵

Ukrainian officials were alert to instances of anti-state propaganda from some Polish Catholic priests in right-bank Ukraine who claimed that these areas were Polish and should become part of the restored Polish state. Even more concern was caused by the fact that new bishops for Ukraine were appointed independently of the Ukrainian government, as in the cases of the Poles, Henryk Przez'dziecki, appointed as bishop for Janów Podlaski, and Piotr Mańkowski for Kamieniec, territories also claimed by the Ukrainian government. In response to these cases, the Minister of Religious Affairs in Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi's government, Vasył'

Zen'kivs'kyi, wrote in confidence to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Doroshenko, highlighting that senior clergy appointments should become 'a matter of state importance', especially since they could have negative impact on the political affiliation of the population in the contested lands.²⁶ Ukraine's declared minimum aim regarding the Roman Catholic Church was to achieve the transfer of the parishes that had previously belonged to the Russian dioceses (Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Tavria eparchies) to the Lutsk-Zhytomyr diocese. The maximum aim, meanwhile, was to reach a concordat with the Holy See and establish a separate Roman Catholic Church for Ukraine.²⁷

In general, Poles expressed little support for the Ukrainian government. Although local Polish leaders welcomed the UNR's minority initiatives, its social and economic reforms were met with objection, the more so since the Central Rada's calls for land socialization could negatively impact numerous Polish landowners.²⁸ The Bolshevik regime that ousted the Ukrainian government from Kyiv on 26 January 1918 – making Zhytomyr the UNR's short-term centre – did not last long either. Poles overwhelmingly welcomed the Polish Army that took over right-bank Ukraine during the Kyiv operation of the Polish-Soviet war.²⁹ When the Polish Army entered Zhytomyr on 26 April 1920, it was warmly received by local Poles and Roman Catholics constituting one third of the city's population of 70,000. Bishop Dub-Dubowski offered a special service at Zhytomyr cathedral for the Polish 'liberators'. For his part, Father Fedukowicz offered his apartment at the bishop's palace to Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who resided there until the Polish Army's retreat on 17 May.³⁰ During that time, Zhytomyr was the seat of the Polish General Staff.

The early Soviet anti-religious practices

On 7 June 1920, the Red Army entered Zhytomyr, re-establishing the Soviet regime that would last for the next seventy years. Soviet religious policies stemmed from Bolshevik ideology that aimed to eliminate all competing loyalties, religious among them. Accordingly, the 1919 *ABC of Communism* maintained that religion and communism were incompatible, 'both theoretically and practically'. Its authors, Nikolai Bukharin and Evgenii Preobrazhenskii, differentiated two aspects of the communist struggle against religion: 'the struggle with the church, as a special organization existing for religious propaganda, materially interested in the maintenance of popular ignorance and religious enslavement' and 'the struggle with the widely diffused and deeply ingrained prejudices of the majority of the working population'.³¹ The second 'struggle' could be waged by the means of anti-religious propaganda, whereas the first required clear legislative procedures that would reduce the ability of organized religions to operate and survive. At this early stage, the Soviet regime did not aim to eradicate religion, however. On the contrary, the Bolsheviks guaranteed freedom of religious belief, a right that would even be inscribed into the Soviet constitution. At the same time, the Church could not enjoy any privileges in the Soviet state, as had been the case for the Russian Orthodox Church, the state church under the tsars.

Soviet anti-religious legislation included several initiatives including the nationalization of monasteries and church lands, the end of state subsidies for churches and

salaries for clergy, and the introduction of state control over education, including inside seminaries. Moreover, the Church lost the right to conduct educational and welfare activities as well as register births, marriages and deaths, thus limiting its function. All such measures became law on 23 January 1918 with the introduction of the Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies, also known as the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church. Through this decree, churches lost the right to own property and the rights of juridical persons, automatically transforming all clerics into *lishentsy* – disenfranchised persons without the right to vote or be elected.³² No less disruptive was fiscal pressure on churches. Once nationalized, church property was transferred to communities, who were then obliged to maintain and pay ever higher taxes for this ‘national property’.

Implementation of this legislation was in hands of a special ‘Liquidation (*likvidatsionnyi*) Department’ formed in May 1921 within the Soviet Ukraine’s Commissariat of Justice. Among its tasks was creating instructions for local authorities on how to conduct observations of religious activities and to inventory and then confiscate all property, capital, valuables, buildings, and land belonging to clerical institutions. In October 1922, the department was transferred to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), enhancing its repressive mechanisms, and providing a direct link to the GPU, to which it passed the results of observations on a regular basis.³³ Another important organ was the Anti-Religious Commission of the Communist Party of Ukraine’s (KP(b)U) Department for Agitation and Propaganda, or *Agitprop*, consisting of high-profile members of the Central Committee (TsK) of the KP(b)U, NKVD and GPU, with the latter’s vice-head acting as chair for its meetings.

Although the Russian Orthodox Church was the Soviet government’s foremost enemy in religious affairs, their anti-religious legislation affected each and every religious community. Arguably, the Catholic Church was no less targeted throughout this period due to its obvious connection to Poland, Russia’s international and ideological rival of the 1920s. The position of the Church became even more precarious during the Polish-Soviet war, when many Catholics sided with the Polish Army, as the example of Zhytomyr’s Catholic community demonstrates. As a result, Soviet authorities saw the Catholic Church as a national, Polish challenge. Mistrust in the party was further exacerbated by the Catholic hierarchy remaining almost exclusively Polish, thus owing religious allegiance to authorities outside Russia.³⁴

Historian of Soviet-Catholic relations, Dennis Dunn maintains that Soviet hostility towards the Catholic Church stemmed from its position as the biggest monolithic Christian Church in the world with an independent leader, thereby posing a challenge, in the Bolsheviks’ view, to an organized international communist movement and future world revolution. Moreover, attacking the Catholic Church inside the Soviet borders could, it was believed, help destabilize rival governments and spread international revolution to the West. The activities of the Catholic Church also posed a serious security concern since Catholics residing in the border zones could potentially cooperate with their co-religionists across the border. No less important were the many Russian nationalists inside the Bolshevik Party who, through anti-Catholic bias, saw the Church as a long-term enemy of the Russian nation, shaping the national identities of Ukrainians and Belarusians and inculcating Western values into the border zones.³⁵

During the first period of Soviet anti-religious action in 1921-23, arrests of Catholic clergy were frequent. Accusations ranged from disobeying the Soviet law on the separation of the state and the church (as in the case of the Catholic priest, Vladimir Ginoff, arrested by the GPU in early 1923 for teaching religion³⁶), to anti-Soviet activity and Polish espionage (the case of the priest, Andrzej Kobierski, arrested in early 1922 in connection with the alleged Polish Military Organization³⁷). The most publicized cases, however, were those linked to opposition to the state requisitioning of church valuables, prompted by the famine in 1921-22.³⁸ When in February 1922 the government ordered all precious metals and stones turned over to the famine relief effort, including sanctified valuables, many priests refused and faced criminal charges. Monsignor Teofil Skalski, Vicar General of the Lutsk-Zhytomyr Diocese on Soviet territory, for instance, was arrested on 2 May 1921 for refusing to hand over church valuables to the authorities. Thanks to the intervention of the Polish consulate, he was released shortly after, but in exchange for a hefty bail.³⁹

The landmark case in this regard was the show trial of Archbishop of Jan Mogilev Cieplak – the only remaining leader of the Latin Rite resident in the Soviet Union – and his Vicar General, Monsignor Constantine Budkiewicz, dean of the clergy in Petrograd.⁴⁰ Cieplak and Budkiewicz were arrested on 13 March 1923, together with fourteen other clerics from Petrograd, and accused of a broad range of anti-Soviet activities including the refusal to turn over church valuables for the famine relief fund. Cieplak and Budkiewicz were sentenced to death, although the Archbishop managed to avoid this through international pressure. Cieplak's repatriation, however, left no representative of the senior clergy on Soviet territory.⁴¹

In this atmosphere, many Catholic priests left for Poland with the retreating Polish Army. Scholars estimate that out of more than 300 Catholic priests active in Ukraine prior to the revolution, only 130 remained by the mid-1920s.⁴² Fedukowicz, however, ignored the risk of persecution for his public support of Poland during the Polish-Soviet war and continued his pastoral duties in Zhytomyr. Apart from pastoral care, he distributed money received from the Polish consulate in Kyiv among destitute Polish teachers in his parish; he harboured remaining Polish soldiers and used his contacts in the Polish diplomatic services to secure their passage to Poland; and he hid Jews from the frequent pogroms of the civil war period.⁴³

During these years, Fedukowicz, to a certain extent, enjoyed the protection guaranteed by the arrangements reached between the Polish and Soviet governments during the peace negotiations in Riga that ended the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. Article 7 of the Treaty of Riga signed by Poland, Russia, and Ukraine on 18 March 1921 stipulated that persons of Polish nationality in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus should enjoy full guarantees of free intellectual development, the use of their national language and the exercise of their religion. The signatories also pledged not to interfere directly or indirectly in questions concerning the organization and work of churches and religious associations within their territory, allowing them the right to employ and acquire the moveable and real property necessary for the practice of their religion, and for the support of the clergy and the upkeep of ecclesiastical institutions.⁴⁴

Nonetheless, these conditions mattered inasmuch as they were 'in conformity with the domestic legislation' of the signatories. And as the Soviet anti-Catholic campaign demonstrated, the Soviets were ready to make use of this stipulation. When faced with the loss of their church buildings and frequent requisitioning, clerics cited their

rights provided by the Riga Treaty's Article 7, but the authorities countered them with Soviet legislation, in particular the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State, claiming that the Roman Catholic Church, like other religious organizations in the Soviet Union, could only operate in accordance with Soviet law.⁴⁵

In the meantime, Fedukowicz continued rising through the Church ranks. As one of the few who remained within Soviet borders, he was now responsible for more parishes and took up additional responsibilities. In 1923, he was named the Cardinal Vicar of the Lutsk-Zhytomyr diocese. He was notified of this appointment in writing by Bishop Dub-Dubowski, who had fled Ukraine in June 1920 and was now based in Lutsk. In the same letter, the Bishop informed Fedukowicz of the high honour he had received from the Polish government, the Order of *Polonia Restituta* (Rebirth of Poland), a state order established on 4 February 1921 to acknowledge outstanding achievements in the fields of education, social work, national defence, and civil service. The following year, he was also decorated with Poland's Cross of Valour (*Krzyż Walecznych*).⁴⁶

The 'religious NEP' and the 'quiet revolution' in church-state relations

The introduction of the NEP led to significant shifts in church-state relations. Faced with almost total social, political, and international isolation, for the Bolsheviks, avoiding an aggressive anti-religious policy could help draw public support towards their project of socialist construction, while also potentially encouraging international recognition and foreign investments. In terms of the Catholic population, a tolerant attitude towards the everyday religious practices of predominantly rural Polish and Ukrainian Catholics in the border regions could help overcome their hostility towards an urban-based and Russian-speaking regime. The promotion of symbolic markers of national identity,⁴⁷ which in the case of Poles entailed Catholic practices, could generate greater trust from the minority populations towards the regime.

Moreover, the liberalization of religious life might also directly impact the USSR's international outlook, especially given the negative publicity it had already provided for the Soviet authorities in the recent past. This was especially the case with Roman Catholics since any discriminative action would immediately catch the attention of Poland, the Holy See, and the wider world. Instead, redefining the state's position on religious practices, and Catholicism in particular, was a prerequisite to a much-coveted rapprochement between Moscow and the Apostolic See.⁴⁸

Nonetheless, as scholars have convincingly shown, the NEP liberalization was only a means of reaching all-embracing objectives, as reflected in the change of tactics employed throughout the decade. Instead of the sweeping repression of Catholic clergy and prohibiting religious practices, the new approach was based on the strategy of de-stabilizing the Church from within, coupled with widespread anti-religious propaganda. According to the TsK KP(b)U Anti-Religious Commission's protocols, new anti-religious methods included the ideological indoctrination (*obrabotka*) of Catholic priests; the organization of 'toilers' demonstrations demanding to stop using Catholic priests for espionage activities in front of the Polish diplomatic services; and popularising the idea of a schism between the Vatican and Polish

episcopate, along with a motion to create an autocephalous Catholic church for the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ The main emphasis, however, was on undermining clergy authority on the calculation that it would eventually break the unity of tight-knit Catholic communities and lead to the desired decline of religious belief. Equally, it would limit the influence Poland enjoyed within Soviet borders.⁵⁰ It was accompanied by a widespread propaganda campaign in the Soviet press, urging Catholic believers to report on priests' anti-Soviet activities, thus helping uncover supposed Polish spies disguised as priests and church activists.⁵¹

That said, when Father Fedukowicz together with another Zhytomyr vicar, Jan Kotwicki, and ten other townsmen were arrested for the first time by Zhytomyr provincial GPU on 4 November 1923, the Soviet secret services did not seek to prosecute him as a representative of the Roman Catholic Church. Instead, the GPU wished to use his high standing in the Church hierarchy and authority among the laity in support of their anti-Catholic and anti-Polish propaganda, thus compromising his influence in Zhytomyr and beyond.

Consequently, Father Andrzej was accused of being a leader of a clandestine subversive organization 'White Eagle' (*Belyi orel*).⁵² The circumstances of his arrest corroborate that the entire affair was the GPU's fabrication, initiated to incriminate Fedukowicz and coerce him into collaboration with the authorities. At the time of his arrest, the GPU confiscated 32,000 Soviet rubles, 10 golden rubles, as well as other valuables, including the bishop's ring from his apartment. Only three issues of Warsaw newspapers and letters from Poland to relatives in Zhytomyr were seized.⁵³

As seen from the interrogation protocols, Fedukowicz refused to answer any questions concerning the 'non-existent' organization White Eagle. Even a confrontation with a provocateur, local teacher Janina Waleszynska,⁵⁴ who pointed to the priest as the organization's leader, did not make him accept the accusation.⁵⁵ Instead, Fedukowicz was eager to clarify the details that could exonerate him. When asked about the money he had been receiving on a regular basis from the Polish consulate in Kyiv, he responded that this was in support of poor Polish teachers in his parish. When presented with a Polish flag – with a depiction of a white eagle – confiscated from his church, the priest clarified that the flag was a gift received from the local activists during the February Revolution; it was used briefly as a banner (*horuhva*), but was left abandoned since the establishment of the Soviet regime.⁵⁶

On 24 December 1923, 'in view of the Catholic festivities', Fedukowicz, after seven weeks of incarceration, was released from Zhytomyr penal colony due to the lack of evidence in his case.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, his release was linked to the fact that Fedukowicz had consented to collaborate with the GPU. In his memoir, his close friend Monsignor Skalski opined that Father Andrzej had agreed to inform the authorities of cases of Polish diplomats encouraging Catholic priests to perform anti-Soviet activities.⁵⁸

Fedukowicz's time in prison, especially those five weeks he spent famished in a solitary cell, affected him.⁵⁹ The priest was physically and morally exhausted. After his release, Bishop Dub-Dubovski addressed Fedukowicz in writing from Lutsk urging the priest to come to Poland to convalesce.⁶⁰ The letter was most probably intercepted by the Soviet secret services as no response followed.

Later on 9 May 1924, priests Fedukowicz, Kotwicki and Józef Ulanicki, along with thirty other Zhytomyr residents – Polish teachers, church clerks, and those

recently repatriated – were once again detained by Zhytomyr GPU.⁶¹ They were incriminated in connection to yet another fabricated illegal organization apparently acting ‘in support of the world bourgeoisie that strives to destroy the Soviet regime’.⁶² As during his previous arrest, the only compromising evidence found in Fedukowicz’s possession were Polish newspapers and his correspondence with Catholic clergy in Poland on matters concerning his parish.⁶³

Fedukowicz’s fate hinged upon his readiness to cooperate with the authorities. On 28 June, a certain GPU officer Karin described at the Anti-Religious Commission’s meeting how the GPU was in possession of a letter written by Fedukowicz to the Pope that could help achieve the Commission’s objectives to undermine Church influence. In this letter, the priest allegedly encouraged Pope Pius XI to intervene in the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine, where the Church had become a tool in Poland’s anti-Soviet campaign. Karin proposed ‘to publish this letter here [in Kharkiv], in Kyiv and Volhynia, and release Fedukowicz’.⁶⁴ Fedukowicz’s case was once again brought to the Commission’s attention on 19 July. At that meeting, the Anti-Religious Commission recognized the value of Fedukowicz’s letter inasmuch as it could help break the unity among the Catholic clergy and laity, initiate the rejection of Polish support, and shift sympathies among the Catholic clergy and Polish communities, thus pushing Ukraine’s clerics to consider the question of autocephaly. They resolved to permit the letter’s publication, following what they called ‘an in-depth examination (*prorabotka*) of the material’.⁶⁵

For their part, the Polish foreign office expressed deep concern about the persecution of Catholic priests of Polish nationality in the Soviet Union, with Polish consular officials closely monitoring each arrest. Nonetheless, there was not much Warsaw could do for Polish-born Catholics accused of spying on their behalf. In these circumstances, any attempt to intervene, either through diplomatic or other channels, would automatically prove the guilt of those detained. With their hands tied, Polish diplomats could only search for influential advocates and seek international support.⁶⁶

This round of arrests was no different. Once news of the arrests reached the Polish consulate, diplomatic officials attempted to locate those detained and provide them with any possible assistance. In late October 1924, as reported to Warsaw, priests Ulanicki and Kotwicki were located ‘deadly ill’ in Zhytomyr prison hospital. Fedukowicz’s whereabouts was unclear.⁶⁷ Later, it emerged that in early October the priest had been transferred to the GPU counter-intelligence department in Kharkiv.⁶⁸ There, following several months of psychological and physical torture by the GPU investigators, Ushakov and Sokolov, Fedukowicz signed a confession in which he admitted conducting espionage on behalf of the ‘imperialist’ Polish government.⁶⁹

The propaganda aspect of the anti-Catholic campaign

Father Fedukowicz was released on 16 November 1924, the same day that his open letter to Pope Pius XI titled ‘Catholic Church in Ukraine – the hotbed of Polish espionage’ (*Katolyts’kyi kostiol v Ukraïni – hnizdo pol’s’koho shpyhunstva*) appeared on the second page of the Kharkiv party newspaper *Kommunist*. The letter, dated from 9 November, went on to outline the poor condition of the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, where Catholic priests were forced to conduct espionage for Poland.

The open letter claimed that the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union was not subjected to persecution, while individual priests were being arrested only in connection to their political activities. In conclusion, Father Andrzej called on the Pope to urge Poland not to meddle in the inner workings of the Catholic Church in Ukraine and to stop using its priests as intelligence agents.⁷⁰

This issue of *Kommunist* also featured an editorial on the wider position of the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, providing context to Fedukowicz's letter. The editors drew readers' attention to the fact that the Catholic Church did not obey the Pope directly, but through Polish mediation. As such, the article continued, Polish bishops, themselves undercover spies, forced Catholic priests in Ukraine to gather intelligence on the Red Army and pass it to the Second Department of the Polish General Staff, the organ responsible for military intelligence and the analysis of foreign military forces. This situation could no longer be tolerated, asserted the editorial. If Roman Catholics wished to pursue their rite, they should help the Soviet authorities uncover such agents of the Polish state, since 'the Soviet government will not allow anyone to cover up espionage with a religious flag'.⁷¹ Fedukowicz's letter was disseminated abroad through the Soviet Telegraph Agency, *Rosta*, and a separate feature on its publication appeared on the pages of the Polish press.⁷²

The publication of the letter sparked consternation among Polish diplomats in Ukraine, especially given their previous history of fruitful collaboration with the priest. To clarify the circumstances of the incident, on 17 November, the day following Fedukowicz's release, an officer of the Polish consulate, Hipolit Zabłocki, met with the priest secretly in Kharkiv.⁷³ During the course of their conversation, Fedukowicz revealed that the letter in question was written in Zhytomyr prison back in May 1923.⁷⁴ Fedukowicz, in his own words, took dictation from the GPU's officer, Ushakov, with little understanding of what was expected of him. Threatened with a trial, Fedukowicz agreed to sign the letter. As he was told, the letter would be sent to the Pope through the diplomatic mail. At the time of his second arrest in Kharkiv in October 1924, Father Andrzej was offered the possibility of writing another letter. In his account, he wished to write a different piece, but somehow its content was exactly the same as the previous one. Fedukowicz intimated that he might have been under hypnosis and unintentionally became 'a traitor of the [Polish] State and the Catholic Church'. This second letter, dated from 9 November, was the one published in the pages of *Kommunist*.

Making use of Zabłocki's visit, Fedukowicz composed an explanatory letter to the head of the Polish consulate general in Kharkiv, Michał Świrski, explaining that he had been forced to plead guilty to the GPU charges to avoid trial, leading eventually to his infamous letter to the Pope. In despair, he concluded:

I don't know how it all came to this; how did it happen that I inscribed a black page into the history of our Nation and became a traitor, Judas, Cain ... God, I have led the Church into disgrace. There is no forgiveness for me. I've been cursed and damned. [...] I am the criminal like the Earth has not yet seen and would not see again.⁷⁵

Świrski needed no convincing that Fedukowicz's letter was orchestrated by the GPU. In his *Aide Memoire* sent to the Eastern Unit of the Political Department of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs on 20 November 1924, the Polish consul provided a detailed account of the Fedukowicz affair, his arrests and the circumstances behind the publication of the letter in question. He feared that the Soviet authorities could take further advantage of the priest, especially given his poor psychological state.⁷⁶ Hence his judgement was to extradite Fedukowicz. To avoid compromising the Polish state, however, Świrski suggested inviting the Vatican to mediate on the matter and that Fedukowicz be sent directly to Rome, bypassing Poland. In addition, the consul urged for a public campaign in the Polish and foreign press to counter Soviet propaganda.⁷⁷ Bishop Dub-Dubowski also made a stand for the priest, suggesting that Fedukowicz could only write what he had done in 'the state of madness', implying that the letter was a fake meant to initiate a new wave of repression against Roman Catholics in Ukraine.⁷⁸

Father Andrzej's *auto-da-fé*

After his return to Zhytomyr, Fedukowicz eschewed his pastoral duties and avoided any contact with colleagues or parishioners.⁷⁹ Following a few months of severe depression, on the morning of 4 March 1925, Father Andrzej climbed the cliff over the Teteriv river outside Zhytomyr, doused himself with petrol and set himself on fire. Aflame, he headed towards the city. On the way, he met some of his parishioners, who immediately rushed to help. Father Andrzej, however, declined their aid explaining that it was his penance for the sins he had committed.⁸⁰ A few hours later he died in the hospital of severe burns.

Fedukowicz's suicide took the GPU by surprise.⁸¹ Needless to say, his sudden death undermined an important act of public denunciation that in the eyes of the secret services would help shift popular opinion against the Catholic Church and, by extension, Poland. There was still more to achieve in Fedukowicz's collaboration and his symbolic suicide nullified the positive results so far. More broadly it exposed the limits of the new GPU methods in dealing with the popular influence of the Catholic Church. Long and meticulous preparations could easily be derailed by unexpected events; and in the case of Fedukowicz's death, could push the popular mood in unwanted directions.

Wishing to regain control of the situation, the authorities interfered in the funeral arrangements – the burial service in Zhytomyr Cathedral was banned; the funeral procession was restricted to the backstreets; and children, youth, and teachers were prevented from attending the ceremony. Even so, some several thousand mourners joined the funeral.⁸² As later maintained by Polish observers, against all expectations, Fedukowicz's letter, which was meant to expose the moral defeat of the Catholic clergy in Ukraine and spread defeatism, only strengthened people's beliefs; the priest's *auto-da-fé* demonstrated the strength of his convictions and turned the cleric into a martyr of the Church in the eyes of local people.⁸³

Although they had failed to fully exploit Fedukowicz in his lifetime, the Soviet authorities sought to make the best of it and use the circumstances of his death to their advantage. In the official press, his suicide was linked to repeated threats, allegedly received by Fedukowicz in connection to his recent letter to the Pope.⁸⁴ Three such letters, according to the GPU, were even found in Fedukowicz's apartment during the search conducted on the day of the funeral. When reporting on the case

to Warsaw, Polish consular officials refuted these allegations, suggesting that the letters were planted during the search. They referred to multiple witnesses present at Fedukowicz's apartment on the day, as well as the priest's flatmate, Father Stanislav Jankewicz, who had confirmed that Fedukowicz had received no recent correspondence.⁸⁵

Notably, the Soviet police did not pursue the case of the alleged threats because of a lack of 'evidence'. Instead, more emphasis was placed on a Union-wide campaign denouncing Poland and the entire Catholic Church for their harsh treatment of Fedukowicz. Kharkiv newspaper *Kommunist* called Fedukowicz 'a victim of the Polish *okhranka* [secret police]' that wished to retaliate against the treacherous priest for his 'treason of the Polish state';⁸⁶ whereas Kyiv's *Proletarskaia pravda* called him 'a victim of Jesuits', implying the cunning and insidious nature of Catholicism.⁸⁷ Information about Fedukowicz's death even reached Moscow. On 12 March 1925, a short notice on the priest's death appeared in the pages of the central newspaper *Pravda*, thus making Fedukowicz's affair a matter of all-Union importance.⁸⁸

To increase momentum, the GPU also arranged the publication of several 'open letters' by collaborators among the clergy, in which certain priests incriminated 'reactionary' Catholic elements within the Church for pushing Fedukowicz to suicide. The first of those letters was signed by the Vicar General and surrogate of the Tiraspol diocese, prelate Józef Kruszynski, who called on Catholic priests not to fall under foreign influence and to cease anti-Soviet agitation.⁸⁹ A similar letter was signed by the chaplain of the Kamienec diocese, Kazimierz Nanowski, which appeared in the pages of the Polish-language Soviet propaganda newspaper *Sierp* on 22 March 1925.⁹⁰ To help present the entire campaign as a spontaneous protest of the 'outraged masses', the clerics' appeals were published alongside numerous letters from the 'Polish public', in which local Poles denounced the negative influence of the Polish state on religious affairs in Ukraine.⁹¹ In addition, a series of anti-Polish protests in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Vinnytsia were organized.⁹²

Certain of success, the GPU rushed to report to the TsK KP(b)U that an important shift in the attitudes among the Polish communities towards the Soviet regime and Catholic Church had finally been achieved. In particular, the secret services highlighted supposed changes in the moods of poorer Poles, who had started expressing negative opinions about rich *kulaks* and the Polish intelligentsia and clergy. This was apparently linked to the emerging wider social stratification of a previously tight-knit Polish community, testifying to the effectiveness of the GPU's chosen methods. The GPU was also quick to inform their superiors about their view that ever more priests expressed support of the idea of a separate vicariate for Ukraine outside of Poland's control.⁹³ Given the present examination of the methods used to extort public endorsement of Soviet policies, these summations were reflective of the secret police's wishful thinking regarding their work among Ukraine's Catholics rather than the extent of their recruitment among the clergy.

The fact that Fedukowicz, a high-ranking cleric decorated by the Polish government for service to Poland and its people, had agreed to collaborate with the authorities and put his name to a compromising document can be seen as a victory for the secret services. The publication of his open letter in the leading Soviet daily had the potential to sow seeds of discord among the close-knit Polish community, and undermine the cleric's authority and call into question his loyalty to the Catholic hierarchy outside the Soviet borders. Undoubtedly, Fedukowicz's reputation was damaged;

the publication of the letter to the Pope turned him into a Church renegade or Soviet collaborator, depending on the observer. Either way, he would not be able to serve his community as before.

Contrary to the secret services' expectations, however, Father Andrzej's self-immolation came to prove the strength of his calling and his allegiance to the Church. Furthermore, his *auto-da-fé* underlined the ineffectiveness of the secret services, which were suddenly forced to improvise to regain control of the situation. Most importantly, his suicide put any future unfolding of the anti-Catholic propaganda campaign on hold, forcing the secret services to cease enforcing their line. Indeed, in this climate, any other public denunciations would not be regarded as genuine, while Fedukowicz's example could set a bad precedent for future converts.

Even so, the GPU managed to turn the loss of an important asset, in highly compromising circumstances, to their moderate advantage. What was initially construed as a localized affair, gained all-Union importance after information about Fedukowicz's death appeared on the pages of Moscow's *Pravda*, and was read across the Soviet Union and worldwide. In this coverage, the Catholic Church was portrayed not only as a tool of Polish espionage on Soviet territory, but as a highly reactionary and bigoted force ready to eliminate any dissent. Moreover, due to the direct link that the Catholic Church in Ukraine had with the Polish government, the coverage was used to incriminate Warsaw in conspiring against the Soviet government and in using Polish-born Catholic priests for their subversive activities.

Fedukowicz's affair also became Poland's failure. First, the loss of a loyal and dedicated cleric weakened the Catholic hierarchy in Ukraine and damaged Polish influence in Soviet territory. Catholic clergy in the border zones were often drawn into the service of preserving a sense of community and withstanding assimilation. This task gained pre-eminence in view of Warsaw's interest in these contested areas, manifested in the ongoing ideological and political rivalry between the Soviet and Polish governments during the interwar period. Nonetheless, the position of the remaining Polish clergy on Soviet territory was so precarious that even when the GPU methods of indoctrination and recruitment failed, priests would suffer from espionage allegations regardless. With very few options available, Warsaw was forced to engage with Soviet anti-Catholic propaganda and exert efforts to debunk their messages, while finding ways to protect their reputation and the survival of the Catholic Church and its clergy.

Most importantly, Fedukowicz's affair demonstrated how conflictual and problematic the position of Poland in the Catholic world had become following the Polish-Soviet war. While Poland tried to defend its responsibility towards Catholics on Soviet territory, regarding the Latin rite as an element of Polishness,⁹⁴ the Holy See wished to improve its dialogue with Moscow and rebuild parts of its hierarchy bypassing Poland.⁹⁵ The aggravation of Polish-Soviet relations made the Vatican take a neutral position and hold back from any direct involvement into the cases of Polish-born Catholic priests in the Soviet Union.⁹⁶

Fedukowicz's affair was also the first public denunciation of the Roman Catholic Church performed by an 'insider', a high-ranking Catholic cleric recruited by Ukraine's GPU.⁹⁷ Although forced to briefly suspend their operations, the GPU were ready to build upon their initial success. During 1925–26, twenty-one priests were recruited, including some senior clerics.⁹⁸ While many of those recruits,

immediately after their release, confessed to their collaboration, which undermined the effort of the secret services,⁹⁹ others played into the hands of the authorities. Such was the case of Father Eugen Perkowicz of Starokonstantyniv deanery, for instance. First arrested in 1921, Perkowicz was recruited by the secret services, renounced his priesthood, and joined the Soviet anti-Catholic propaganda effort. In the period between 1927 and 1930 under the auspices of the GPU and the KP (b)U's Polish Department (*Pol'biuro*), he toured Soviet Ukraine delivering anti-clerical lectures and authored propaganda brochures.¹⁰⁰

Ultimately, Soviet anti-clerical activities of the 1920s, although successful in destroying the Church hierarchy and instilling fear into the laity, failed to extinguish religious belief among the majority of the Soviet population. On the contrary, the tolerant atmosphere provided by the 'religious NEP' resuscitated the religious life within the Soviet borders.¹⁰¹ The religious revival among the Catholics became particularly dangerous in view of a potential war with Poland that the Soviet authorities feared and indeed anticipated after 1927. Failure to take religion under control in these circumstances contributed to the reversal of the official anti-religious policies after 1929, when the Soviet leadership undertook to eliminate religion entirely by promoting militant atheism and unleashing mass repressive actions against believers and their religious leaders.

Notes

1. *Kurjer Polski*, 19 November 1924.
2. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (hereafter AAN, MSZ), sygn. 6770, ark.82.
3. Chaplitskii, Osipova, and Kelley, *Book of Remembrance*.
4. Timasheff, *Religion*; Zatko, *Descent into Darkness*.
5. On the role of religion in Stalin's terror, see Martin, 'The origins'; and Kotljarchuk and Sundström, *Ethnic and Religious Minorities*.
6. Zuger, 'Soviet Catholic Church'; Friz, 'Vsia vlast' prikhodom'; Rubliova, 'Nevidoma dilianka'.
7. Timasheff, *Religion*.
8. Rosenberg, 'Introduction', 3. See also Harris, Douds, and Whitewood, *Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*.
9. This term was proposed by Clark, 'The "Quiet Revolution"'.⁹
10. For an extensive overview of the historiography on the Russian Orthodox Church, see Freeze, 'Confessions in the Soviet Era', esp. 5–19.
11. Bociurkiw, 'Church–State Relations'; Luukkanen, *The Religious Policy*; Timasheff, *Religion*; Marshall, *Aspects of Religion*; Ramet, *Religion*; Boiter, 'Law and Religion'; Simon, *Church, State and Opposition*.
12. Rubliova, 'Vlada i Kostiol'; Dzwonkowski, *Losy duchowieństwa*; Wiśniewski, *Stosunek państwa*; Iwanov, *Pierwszy Narod*.
13. Maillieux, 'Catholics in the Soviet Union'; Maillieux, *The Catholic Church*; Wenger, *Catholiques en Russie*.
14. Zatko, *Descent into Darkness*; Dzwonkowski, *Losy duchowieństwa*; Zuger, *Forgotten*; Chaplitskii, Osipova, and Kelley, *Book of Remembrance*.
15. On new approaches to studying the Church, see Freeze, 'The American Catholic Press'; and Beglov, et al. 'Catholics in the Soviet Union'.

16. Osipova, 'Vozliubiv Boga'; Osipova, *Hide Me within Thy Wounds*; Pospelovsky, *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions*; Peris, *Storming the Heavens*; Rubliova, 'Vlada i Kostiol'.
17. Dunn, 'The Vatican's Ostpolitik'; Stehle, *Eastern Politics*; Lesourd, *Entre Rome et Moscou*; Wenger, *Rome et Moscou 1900-1950*; Tokareva and Iudin, *Rossii i Vatikan*; Tokareva, 'Vatican and Catholics'.
18. Some primary sources for church-state relations can be found in Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union*; Rubliova 'Vlada i Kostiol'; and Panchuk, et al. *Natsional'ni Vidnosyny*.
19. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*; Stone, *Hammer and Rifle*; Samuelson, *Plans for Stalin's War Machine*; Whitewood, 'The International Situation'. On the international factor in unleashing the purges, see Kuroyima, 'Stalin's Great Terror'; and Khlevniuk, 'The Objectives of the Great Terror'.
20. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, 237–8.
21. Hrabovs'kyi, 'Pravda pro smert"', 107. On the early life of Fedukowicz, see Sula, 'Sprawa księdza Andrzeja Fedukowicza'; and Krynicka, 'Ksiądz Andrzej Fedukowicz'.
22. On the activities of the Russian secretary, see Kuzmany, 'Vid impers'koho narodu'.
23. An ambivalent attitude to the Catholic Church was also characteristic of the Ukrainian State of Pavlo Skoropads'kyi from April to November 1918.
24. Bociurkiw, 'The politics of religion'.
25. Ul'ianovskiyi, *Tserkva v Ukraïns'kii Derzhavi*, 201.
26. *ibid*, 205–06.
27. *ibid*, 202–03.
28. Potapenko, 'Ukraïns'ke pytannia'.
29. Rubliova, 'Vlada i kostiol', 32.
30. Skalski, *Terror i Cierpienie*, 231; Krynicka, 'Ksiądz Andrzej Fedukowicz', 224–5.
31. Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism*.
32. *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti*, 372.
33. Rubliova, 'Nevidoma dilianka', 220.
34. *ibid*, 223.
35. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Soviet Russia*, 52–3.
36. Kupczak, *Polacy na Ukrainie*, 268; *Book of Remembrance*, Biography of Father Vladimir Ginoff.
37. Dzwonkowski, *Losy duchowieństwa*, 294; *Book of Remembrance*, Biography of Father Andrzej Kobierski.
38. The Catholic Church presented a special case during the confiscation of valuables. The new codex on canon law of 1917 limited all authority over individual parish churches to the Church hierarchy, making Catholic priests personally liable for any conflicts with authorities. This was contrary to the experiences of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies of January 1918 transferred authority to the lay parishioners of the Orthodox Church. See Freeze, 'A New Source for Russian Religious History', esp. 68–96.
39. Skalski, *Terror i cierpienie*; Rubliova, 'Vlada i kostiol', 424–6.
40. On Cieplak's case, see Zatko, *Descent into Darkness*; Zuger, *Forgotten*.

41. On the papal famine relief of 1922–1924 that provides an important background to Soviet-Catholic relations across 1927, see Tokareva, ‘Edmund Uolsh’; Tokareva, ‘Prikluchenia iezuita v Rossii’; Tokareva, and Beglov, ‘Krestovyi pokhod molitv’.
42. Rubliova, ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 42.
43. Krynicka, ‘Ksiądz Andrzej Fedukowicz’, 225.
44. Treaty of Peace between Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March 18th, 1921, article 7, available at <http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19210318-1.pdf> [last accessed 15 April 2021].
45. Rubliova, ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 37
46. Krynicka, ‘Ksiądz Andrzej Fedukowicz’, 227–8; On how these decorations were used against the priest during his arrests, see Halusevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukraïny (hereafter HDA SBU), spr. P-14807 (1924), ark. 8.
47. Following the list of markers listed in Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*, 13.
48. Becker, ‘Diplomats and Missionaries’; Dunn, ‘The Vatican’s Ostpolitik’; Stehle, *Eastern Politics of the Vatican*.
49. Rubliova, ‘Nevidoma dilianka’, 228
50. See the 1926 GPU report to the TsK KP(b)U about their work among the Catholic clergy and the Polish population; Rubliova ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 108–16.
51. *Bil’shovyk*, 15 July 1924; *Chervonyi Kordon*, 8 May 1924; *Radians’ka Volyn*, 8 January 1925.
52. The transliteration reflects the language of the investigation file of Father Fedukowicz; HDA SBU, spr. 5059-p. The overview of the case, as reported by the Polish consulate in Kyiv to Warsaw, is in AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 107–10.
53. AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 107.
54. Janina Waleszyska was mentioned repeatedly during the interrogation. The first time her name was brought up was on 15 November 1923 (HDA SBU, spr. 5059-p., ark. 129zv), with the first face-to-face encounter occurring during the second arrest on 18 July 1924 (HDA SBU, spr. P-14807, ark. 27-27zv).
55. During his interrogation, Teofil Skalski, a close friend of Fedukowicz and his superior, also rejected the existence of such an organization in Zhytomyr. See his interrogation file in Rubliova, ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 117–19.
56. See the additional statements of Andrzej Fedukowicz on 11 May 1924; HDA SBU, spr. P-14807, ark. 8-10zv.
57. HDA SBU, spr. 5059-p., ark. 133, 134.
58. Skalski, *Terror i Cierpienie*, 137, 274–5, 292; Rubliova, ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 427–8; Krynicka, ‘Ksiądz Andrzej Fedukowicz’, 229.
59. Aide Memoire w sprawie ks. Fedukowicza, 20.XI.1924: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 95-6. This is also in ‘Z archiwaliów MSZ’, 451.
60. Letter of Bishop Dub-Dubowski from 15 March: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 166.
61. Fedukowicz’s investigation file in HDA SBU, spr. P-14807. The Polish report is in AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 90-2.
62. HDA SBU, spr. P-14807, ark. 4.
63. HDA SBU, spr. P-14807, ark. 2; and AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 95–6.
64. The proceedings of the Commission’s meeting from 28 June 1924: Rubliova, ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 89–90.
65. The proceedings of the Commission’s meeting from 19 July 1924: Rubliova, ‘Vlada i kostiol’, 95–6.
66. Winfried, *Diplomats and Missionaries*, 42.
67. The report to Warsaw from 20 October 1924: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 83

68. Ibid.
69. Dzwonkowski, *Losy Duchowieństwa*, 228.
70. *Kommunist*, 16 November 1924. For the Polish translation, see AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 154-6; and 'Z archiwaliów MSZ', 452-5.
71. *Kommunist*, 16 November 1924.
72. *Kurjer Polski*, 19 November 1924. The quote is from a capture in AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 82.
73. Hipolit Zabłocki's report to Michał Swirski from 17 November 1924: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 120-1.
74. Ibid.
75. Fedukowicz's letter to Michał Swirski: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 122 (duplicate on ark. 153).
76. Swirski's Aide Memoria: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 169-71; and 'Z archiwaliów MSZ', 451-2.
77. Swirski's Aide Memoria: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 171; and 'Z archiwaliów MSZ', 452.
78. Krynicka, 'Książdz Andrzej Fedukowicz', 232.
79. Skalski, *Terror i Cierpienie*, 234-5.
80. This depiction of Fedukowicz's last hours is based on the account in *Book of Remembrance*, Biography of Father Andrzej Fedukowicz.
81. The 1926 GPU report to the TsK KP(b)U about their work among the Catholic clergy and the Polish population: Rubliova, 'Vlada i kostiol', 112.
82. Rubliova, 'Autodafe Zhytomyrs'koho ksiondza', 427; Sula, 'Sprawa księdza Andrzeja Fedukowicza', 213-17.
83. From the report of the General Consulate in Kharkiv dated 17 March 1925: 'Z archiwaliów MSZ', 456.
84. *Chervonyi kordon*, 12 March 1925; *Pravda*, 12 March 1925; *Proletarskaia Pravda*, 12 March 1925. See also Rubliova, 'Vlada i kostiol', 102.
85. Raport Konsulatu Generalnego w Charkowie do Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych, 17.III.1925: AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 13-15. Also in 'Z archiwaliów MSZ', 456.
86. *Kommunist*, 7 March 1925.
87. *Proletarskaia Pravda*, 8 March 1925. The quote is from the captures in AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 16-17.
88. *Pravda*, 12 March 1925.
89. *Chervonyi kordon*, 15 March 1925; 22 March 1925.
90. *Sierp*, 22 March 1925. The Polish translation is in AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6770, ark. 39-41.
91. *Radianska Volyn'*, 4 January 1925.
92. 'Z archiwaliów MSZ', 456.
93. The 1926 GPU report to the TsK KP(b)U about their work among the Catholic clergy and the Polish population: Rubliova, 'Vlada i kostiol', 112.
94. Quoted from Pease, 'Poland and the Holy See', 527.
95. Those intentions can be proven by the fact that the Vatican had already undertaken a clandestine reconstruction of the Catholic hierarchy in the Soviet Union under the leadership of the French Jesuit Michel d'Herbigny in 1926. d'Herbigny's mission to the Soviet Union was frequently discussed in Warsaw, where it was linked to a

possible loss of control over the Church in Russia's western borderlands. See Lesourd, *Entre Rome et Moscou*; and Dunn, *Catholic Church and Soviet Russia*, esp. Chapter 5.

96. Winfried, *Diplomats and Missionaries*.
97. Rubliova, 'Nevidoma dilianka', 228; See also the secret report on the situation of the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union in AAN, MSZ, sygn. 10184, ark. 119–20.
98. The 1926 GPU report to the TsK KP(b)U about their work among the Catholic clergy and the Polish population: Rubliova, 'Vlada i kostiol', 113.
99. Rubliova, 'Nevidoma dilianka', 229.
100. Kovalets' (Rubliova), 'Ievhen Perkovych'.
101. On the persistence of religious beliefs among peasantry, see Viola, *Peasant Rebels*; Graziosi, *Great Soviet Peasant War*; and Kul'chyts'kyi, *Narysy Povsiakdennoho Zhyttia*.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This research was funded by the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2017-641).

Notes on contributor

Olena Palko is Assistant Professor at the Department of History, University of Basel. She is the author of *Making Ukraine Soviet: Literature and Culture under Lenin and Stalin* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2021) and co-editor (with Constantin Ardeleanu) of the edited volume *Making Ukraine: Negotiating, Contesting, and Drawing Borders in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (McGill Queen's University Press, 2022). [email:olena.palko@unibas.ch]

References

- Becker, Winfried. "Diplomats and Missionaries: The Role Played by the German Embassies in Moscow and Rome in the Relations between Russia and the Vatican from 1921 to 1929." *The Catholic Historical Review* 92, no. 92 (2006): 25–45.
- Beglov, A. L. "'Krestovyi pokhod molitv' 1930g. i reaktsiia na nego v SSSR." *Elektronnyi nauchno-obrazovatel'nyi zhurnal "Istoriia"* 9, no. 4 (68) (2018). <https://history.jes-su/s207987840002219-9-1> (accessed October 11, 2022).
- Beglov, A. L., G. L. Freeze, E. S. Tokareva, and N. Beliakova. "Catholics in the Soviet Union: New Research and New Sources on Everyday Religious Life (1917–1958)." *The Catholic Historical Review* 106 (2020): 477–89.
- Bociurkiw, Bohdan. "Church–State Relations in the USSR." In *Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power*, edited by Max Haywood, and William C. Fletcher, 71–104. New York: Praeger, 1969.

- . “The Politics of Religion in the Ukraine: The Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1919 (1985).” <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-politics-religion-the-ukraine-the-orthodox-church-and-the-ukrainian-revolution-1917> (accessed September 16, 2021).
- Boiter, Albert. “Law and Religion in the Soviet Union.” *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 35, no. 1 (1987): 97–126.
- Bukharin, N. I., and E. Preobrazhensky. *The ABC of Communism*. 1920. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1920/abc/11.htm> (accessed April 15, 2021).
- Chaplitskii, Bronislav, Irina Osipova, and Geraldine Kelley. *Book of Remembrance: Biographies of Catholic Clergy and Laity Repressed in the Soviet Union (USSR) from 1918–1953*. Indiana: Notre Dame, 2014. <https://biographies.library.nd.edu/> (accessed October 11, 2022).
- Clark, Katerina. “The “Quiet Revolution” in Soviet Intellectual Life.” In *Russia in the Era of NEP*, edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites, 210–230. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991.
- Corley, Felix. *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*. New York: New York University Press, 1996.
- Davies, Robert. *The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–30*. Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Dunn, Dennis J. “The Vatican’s Ostpolitik: Past and Present.” *Journal of International Affairs* 36, no. 2 (1982/83): 247–55.
- . *The Catholic Church and Russia: Popes, Patriarchs, Tsars and Commissars*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004.
- . *The Catholic Church and Soviet Russia, 1917-1939*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
- Dzwonkowski, Roman. *Losy Duchowieństwa Katolickiego w ZSSR 1917–1939: Martyrologium*. Lublin: Prace Wydziału Teologii, 1998.
- Freeze, Gregory. “Confessions in the Soviet Era.” *Russian History* 44, no. 1 (2017): 1–24.
- Freeze, G. L. “A New Source for Russian Religious History: The American Catholic Press, 1917-1924.” *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 63, no. 6 (2019): 65–84.
- Freeze, Gregory L. “The American Catholic Press: Religious NEP, Repression, and Laicization (1925-1939).” *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 64, no. 6 (2020): 121–39.
- Friz, Gregori. ““Vsia vlast’ prikhodam’: vozrozhdenie pravoslavia v 1920-e gody.” *Gosudarstvo, Religii i Tserkov’ v Rossii i za Rubezhom*, no. 3–4 (2012): 86–105.
- Graziosi, Andrea. *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933*. Cambridge Mass: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, 1996.
- Harris, James, Lara Douds, and Peter Whitewood, eds. *The Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution: Illiberal Liberation, 1917-1941*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.
- Hrabovs’kyi, V. B. “Pravda pro smert’ ksiondza Fedukovicha.” In *Reabilitovani Istoriiieu. Zhytomyr’ska oblast’, Kn.7, ch.1*, edited by Iu Hrabovs’kyi, and L. Kopiishenko, 106–110. Zhytomyr: Polissia, 2015.
- Iwanov, Mikolaj. *Pierwszy Narod Ukarany: Polacy w Związku Radzieckim, 1921–1939*. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991.
- Khlevniuk, Oleg. “The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937–1938.” In *Soviet History, 1917–1953: Essays in Honor of R. W. Davies*, edited by J. Cooper, M. Perrie, and E. A. Rees, 83–104. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
- Kotljarchuk, Andrej, and Olle Sundström, eds. *Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Stalin’s Soviet Union: New Dimensions of Research*. Stockholm: Elanders, 2017.
- Kovalets’ (Rubliova), Natalia. “Ievhen Perkovykh: syluet rymy’ko-katolyts’koho sviashchenyka na tli derzhavnoho ateizmu.” *Ukraïns’kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 6 (1996): 101–114.

- Krynicka, Tatiana. "Ksiądz Andrzej Fedukowicz (1875-1925) – proboszcz parafii katedralnej w Zytomierzu na Ukrainie." *Studia Polonijne* 29 (2008): 211–34.
- Kul'chyts'kyi, Stanislav, ed. *Narysy ovsiakdennoho zhyttia radians'koï Ukraïny v dobu Nepu (1921-1929)*. In 2 Vol. Vol 1. Kyiv: Instytut istoriï NAN Ukraïny, 2009.
- Kupczak, Janusz M. *Polacy na Ukrainie w Latach 1921–1939*. Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1994.
- Kuroyima, Hiroaki. "Stalin's Great Terror and International Espionage." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 24, no. 2 (2011): 238–52.
- Kuzmany, Boerries. "Vid impers'koho narodu do natsional'noï menshyny. Ministerstvo velykorus'kykh sprav v Ukraïni, 1917–18 rr." *Ukraina Moderna* 29 (2020): 164–88.
- Lesourd, Paul. *Entre Rome et Moscou, le Jesuite clandestin, Mgr Michel d'Herbigny*. Paris: Lethiel-leux, 1976.
- Luukkanen, Arto. *The Religious Policy of the Stalinist State*. Helsinki: SHS, 1997.
- Mailleux, P. "Catholics in the Soviet Union." In *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967*, edited by Richard H. Marshall, Thomas E. Bird, and Andrew Q. Blane, 359–78. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Marshall, Richard. *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Martin, Terry. "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing." *The Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 4 (1998): 813–861.
- . *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- Osipova, Irina. "Vozliubiv Boga i sleduia za Nim ..." *Goneniia na russkikh katolikov v sssr; po vospominaniiam i pis'mam monakhin-dominikanok Abrikosovskoi obshchiny i materialam sledstvennykh del 1923–1949 gg*. Moscow: Serebrianye Niti, 1999.
- . *Hide Me within Thy Wounds: The Persecution of the Catholic Church in the USSR*. Fargo: Germans from Russia Heritage Collection, 2003.
- Panchuk, Mai. *Natsional'ni vidnosyny v Ukraïni v XX st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*. Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1994.
- Pease, Neal. "Poland and the Holy See, 1918-1939." *Slavic Review* 50, no. 3 (1991): 521–30.
- Peris, Daniel. *Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*. Sobr. 3-e T.XXV: 1905. Sankt-Petersburg, 1908.
- Pospelovskiy, Dimitry. *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
- Potapenko, Maksym. "Ukraïns'ke pytannia v politychnykh proektakh poliakiv Naddnyprianschyny u 1917–1918 rokakh." *Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona* 2 (2012): 146–51.
- Ramet, Sabrina Petra, ed. *Religion in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Rosenberg, William G. "Introduction. NEP Russia and a 'Transitional' Society." In *Russia in the Era of NEP*, edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites, 1–11. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991.
- Rubliova, Natalia. "Nevidoma dilianka 'antyrelihiïnoho frontu': borot'ba vladnykh struktur USSR proty Rym's'ko-Katolyts'koi Tserkvy, 1920-i roky." *Z Arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB*, 1-2 (1998): 218–32.
- . "Autodafe Zhytomyrs'koho Ksiondza." In *Viina i myr*, edited by Larysa Ivshyna, 427–441. Kyiv: Biblioteka hazety Den', 2021.

- Rubliova, Natalia, ed. "Vlada i kostiol v radians'kii Ukraïni, 1919-1937 rr.: Rymo-Katolyts'ka Tserkva pid represyvnym tyskom totalitaryzmu." *Z Arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB* 21, no. 2 (2003).
- Samuelson, Lennart. *Plans for Stalin's War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
- Simon, Gerhard. *Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Skalski, Teofil, ks. *Terror i cierpienie. Kościół katolicki na Ukrainie 1900-1932: Wspomnienia*. Lublin-Rzym-Lwów, 1995.
- Stehle, Hansjakob. *Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917-1979*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981.
- Stone, David. R. *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926–1933*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
- Sula, Dorota. "Sprawa księdza Andrzeja Fedukowicza." *Sprawy Wschodnie*, no. 2-3 (2004): 213–17.
- Timasheff, Nicholas. *Religion in Soviet Russia 1917-1942*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942.
- Tokareva, Evgenia. "Vatican and Catholics in Russia in 1920–1930: Communication Problems." *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, no. 236 (2016): 379–84.
- Tokareva, E. S. "Edmund Uolsh, plany Watikana i Rossiiskaia deistvitel'nost' 1922-1923 gg." *Rossiiskaia Istoriia*, no. 4 (2020): 188–204.
- . "Priekliucheniia Iezuita v Rossii: kak sovetskaia vlast' borolas' s o. Edmundom Uolshom 1922-1923 gg." *Elektronnyi nauchno-obrazovatel'nyi zhurnal "Istoriia"* 12, no. 8 (106) (2021). Last Accessed 11 October 2022. <https://history.jes.su/s207987840016690-8-1>
- Tokareva, Evgenia, and Aleksei Iudin, eds. *Rossia i Vatikan*. Moscow: Nauka, 2007.
- Ul'ianovskiy, Vasyl'. *Tserkva v Ukraïns'kii Derzhavi, 1917-1920 rr. (Doba het'manatu Pavla Skoropads'koho)*. Kyiv: Lybid', 1997.
- Valk, S. ed. *Dekrety Sovetskoï Vlasti. Tom 1: 25 October 1917–16 March 1918*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1957.
- Viola, Lynn. *Peasant Rebels Under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Wenger, Antoine. *Catholiques en Russie d'après Archives du KGB 1920-1960*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1998.
- . *Rome et Moscou 1900-1950*. Paris: Brouwer, 1987.
- Whitewood, Peter. "The International Situation: Fear of Invasion and Growing Authoritarianism." In *The Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution. Illiberal Liberation, 1917-1941*, edited by James R. Harris, Lara Doubs, and Peter Whitewood, 173–186. London: Bloomsbury, 2020.
- Wiśniewski, A. Stosunek Państwa do Kościoła w ZSRR. Wilno: [s.l.]. "Z Archiwaliów MSZ. Po 50 latach kolekcja sovieticów wraca z Waszyngtonu." *Przegląd Wschodni* 2, no. 2 (6) (1992/93) (1938): 435–64.
- Zatko, James. *Descent into Darkness: The Destruction of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia, 1917–1923*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965.
- Zugger, Rev, and Christopher Lawrence. "The Soviet Catholic Church During the New Economic Policy and the Stalinist Terror: Selected Texts Dealing with the Soviet Germans." *Journal of the American Historical Society for the Germans from Russia* 14, no. 1 (1991): 1–13.
- . *The Forgotten: Catholics of the Soviet Empire from Lenin Through Stalin*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2001.