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Internal Variations in Sikh Hostland National Identity:

Dimensions of Sikh Britishness

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Birkbeck, University of London

Declaration

I confirm this is my own work

Gurbachan Singh Jandu

May 2022

Abstract

In this study, I show that Sikhs in England are increasingly identifying as English over British. Even though British remains the choice of the majority, younger Sikhs are now more likely to identify as English. Whilst true of other minority ethnic groups, this is especially characteristic of Sikhs, suggesting that decentralised nationalism is gaining over centralised nationalism.

British national identity research must account for newer developments. For example, British identity no longer depends solely on the state but also on personal and localised experiences. Thus, peer-to-peer influence helps explain complexity in British national identity today – the very existence of which challenges classical theories of nationalism. Furthermore, an important backdrop is created by Britain's fast-changing ethnic profile, caused by mass migration and the legacy or mild persistence of higher natural growth among Britain's ethnic minorities.

Whilst much research exists on majority group national identity, minority ethnic groups remain under-researched. I address this omission for one group, Sikhs in England and Wales.

Using Kaufmann's (2017) notion of complex nationalism, I present research on the Britishness of three Sikh generations. Data is obtained through a mix of methods, using a custom survey of 100 Sikhs and 100 white Britons. To augment this, I use existing national surveys and the 2001 and 2011 censuses. I also interview 25 Sikhs.

I show that age is the key variable shaping Sikhs' British identities. Older Sikhs' Britishness is associated with state nationalism whilst younger Sikhs are more influenced by localised and personalised 'everyday' forms of Britishness. Hence their greater sense of English and other regional national identities. Whilst not unique to Sikhs, this trend to youthful Englishness is highly developed among them.

This confirms Kaufmann's (2017) theory that national identity can emerge from sub-state associational processes that are capable of reconfiguring national identity in liberal consumer societies following long periods of peacetime.

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Guide to Transcripts

The following system has been applied with regards to the interview data. All direct quotes from subjects are indented and in smaller font size. If cited as part of a paragraph within the thesis writing, they are denoted by opening and closing quotation marks as follows “...”.

“(...)” denotes where the text has been only partially used from the whole sentence or statement.

Where non-English terms, phrases and words have been used, these have been translated for understanding and are indicated by the brackets [...].

The initials GJ indicate the interviewer and author of this thesis. All other names and initials denote the interviewee’s (anonymous) name for the interview. All interviews are given a date of interview and residential location of the subject. An example is given below:

GJ: Okay, thanks. Going back to yourself, you said you were Welsh, rather than British or any other national identity. Why did you not choose British?

Mark: I’m a proud Welshman, that’s why! Plus, British is just English, isn’t it?

Mark, aged 49, Birmingham, May 2018

List of Abbreviations

EU - European Union

EEC - European Economic Community

UK - United Kingdom

US/USA - United States of America

BSR - British Sikh Report

BES - British Election Study

EMBES - Ethnic Minorities British Election Study

BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation

ONS - Office for National Statistics

ONS LS - Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Survey

NHS - National Health Service

BSNIS - British Sikh National Identity Study

BAME/BME - Black and Minority Ethnic

UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party

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Lastly, thank you to my wife Sarah whose untiring support of my research for over a decade has been the foundation for the completion of this thesis.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my daughter Maya Awst Jandu whose arrival at its very start ensured its completion.

Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction: British Identity and Sikhs in Context

National identity remains an important way for people to describe themselves in liberal societies (Fukuyama, 2018). This is despite the notion that national identity, both in its political relevance and social acceptance, would recede due to factors such as globalisation, cosmopolitanism, international migration, the lessened role of the state, and a lengthy period of peace. Reflecting on the last three decades alone, I find that national identity has not just remained, but has, in fact, increased as a mainstream topic of cultural politics, even for recently settled migrant communities. For instance, in the two major territories of Europe and the USA the phenomenon has resulted in the success of several political parties with ethno-nationalist policies centred on protecting social, geographical, and economic aspects of their nation-states from ‘outsiders’ or non-citizens.

Against this background, in my thesis, entitled “Internal Variations in Sikh Hostland National Identity: Dimensions of Sikh Britishness”, I present findings to show that British Sikhs are firstly, very attached to their Britishness and secondly, this national identity is not uniform across the community. Instead, I posit that the content of Sikh Britishness is better understood as having variations that are most strongly moderated by age, most notably between British- and English-identifying Sikhs – with the latter a younger group. This change in Sikh British national identity is of note for two reasons. First, the community is a fairly recently-settled one and second, Englishness has been previously thought to be associated with white English ethno-nationalism.

As a statement of this thesis’s originality, I note the following. The research contributes to the fields of nationalism studies, Sikh studies, and British and English national identity studies. Further innovation is derived from the triangulated mixed-methodology

employed. In particular is the use of symbols to gauge the degree of sentiment towards national icons, behaviours, and characteristics. These substantive conceptual innovations have allowed for the collection of new and unprecedented empirical data. Finally, the analysis of the gathered information using close mathematical testing has produced significant and worthwhile findings on the existence and character of hitherto unresearched Englishness amongst Sikhs in England.

My objectives in researching this include understanding the current literature, exploring the content of Sikhs' Britishness, and, finally, contextualising the findings by comparing them to analogous patterns for white Britons. This leads me to test my hypothesis against a range of qualitative and quantitative evidence. The results reveal a generational process, in which younger Sikhs are more likely to self-identify as English compared to older Sikhs. I also find important differences between the content of white Britons' and Sikhs' British national identities. This contributes to the literature on how national identity varies *within* nations, whether by age, ethnicity, region, class, ideology, gender or other social locations.

My study, therefore, addresses a gap in the existing literature: hostland Sikh nationalism in Britain. In locating the research within existing scholarship, I note that it does not cover Punjab-based national identity politics, herein classified as Sikh homeland nationalism. I also do not focus on Sikh religiosity and Indian Sikh identity, both of which are already well served. All these are therefore beyond the scope of my research on Sikh British national identity.

An important difference between homeland and British Sikh communities gives rise to the niche this study fills. For the Indian Sikhs, homeland identity politics are about the struggle against subjugation and the survival of the community as a native religious minority. On the other hand, Sikh hostland identity politics arise due to the community's

settling-in process. The focus here is on belonging, social acceptance, and class mobility for a recently-settled migrant ethno-religious group. Within the British Sikh community, I concentrate on national identity; this is in order to address a gap in Sikh studies on non-religious Sikh identity in Britain. In doing so, I add British Sikhs to the list of cases researched by those interested in studies of minority constructions of nationhood in the West. There has, by contrast, already been significant work on Indian Sikhs and their struggle for Sikh sovereignty in Punjab.

The importance of this study's topic is rooted in the changes to British national identity for nearly every citizen post-war, much of which is under-researched. Alongside this are the contemporary effects that national identity has on national cohesion and unity, both in everyday life and in times of emergency. For minority ethnic groups in particular there is very little understanding of the effect this changing national identity has on their everyday lives and long-term prospects. As they comprise an ever-larger proportion of citizens, what being British means to them is bound to affect their attachment and commitment to Britain. This in turn will affect majority ethnic groups too. Thus, this study may help inform our understanding of ethnic and race relations, as well as assisting in the empirical task of testing theories of nationalism.

Structure of the Chapter

I follow this opening section by providing background to British national identity and, more specifically, to the genesis of Sikhs and their British national identity. This leads onto the research questions which themselves derive from the gap identified in the brief review of the literature that follows. Next, I establish my objectives and describe my methodology. For clarity, I then outline the concepts I have adapted for use here and indicate the scope and limitations of this research. This sets out my argument, against which I present my

main findings. Lastly, I detail the relevance and importance of the research findings before outlining the structure of the thesis and concluding this introductory chapter.

I begin with a background to British national identity to show the nature of the wider nationalism that Sikhs operate in.

The Dimensions of British National Identity

Away from headline political events, national identity has continued to operate without political attention, especially at grassroots level. Its resilience lies in its power to make people feel psychological attachment to important aspects of society including healthy relationships with fellow citizens, a chosen way of life or simply the beauty and physicality of the place where they were born or where they live now. This is seldom reported as frequently as the political developments described earlier, hence it has drawn less research interest. For example, this national identity is embedded into some peoples' behaviour in subtle ways such as accents or mannerisms, thereby making them distinct to others (Khor, 2015). However, for others regional accents are simply taken for granted and not thought of as important markers of identity. Despite this, a citizen's national identity can become very salient, such as when among foreigners, or when mass migration changes the national ethnic mix (Kaufmann, 2018).

Englishness is one such national identity which, due to its long history and conflation with Britishness, has become a 'hidden' national identity, often neglected by the state due to its vernacular character. Another reason for its lack of prominence is that its social acceptance has been affected by radical-right white British groups and state ideas of civic British, rather than English, national identity. For example, unlike other British regions, there are no English-only government institutions.

However, the situation has significantly changed for Englishness since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. For example, even minority ethnic citizens from recently migrated communities now assertively identify with English national identity. Another major step change has been that many citizens are now actively seeking and stating what Englishness is – rather than what it is not. It is no longer as unnoticed as it once was. This is forecast to become more widespread partly due to state-driven changes such as devolution and Brexit and partly due to growing personalised and localised nationalism. Some evidence for this comes from the many Sikhs who call themselves English without pause. As such, away from major geopolitical events and for personal reasons, I find that English national identity gives many people a powerful sense of who they are, including groups who have been less commonly thought of as English.

One obvious gauge of this is the personal attachment a citizen has to English national symbols and practices. This includes landscapes such as the South Downs, childhood memories of local dialects, relationships with people on the street where they grew up, regional food celebrations such as cheese rolling competitions in Gloucester, or ethnic characteristics such as Cornish Geese Dance clothing. All this remains embedded in the psyche, but the social (English) identity is the one many perform (Khor, 2015).

Furthermore, this process of developing a national identity is the same for all the four-nation regions. For example, if a Scot migrates to England, the émigré may still find it “profoundly difficult to think of herself as an Englishwoman” (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2015, p. 6). For this reason, I find it unsurprising that Sikhs who were born and brought up in England, to parents with the same direct connections to England, may find it hard to think of themselves as anything other than English, even though their parents – and majority peers - may hesitate to do so.

The above shows that British identity today has a complicated and unsettled nature. Even though factors such as nation, religion, ethnicity, social class, and political party support all continue to play important roles, there are now important nuances. This is fairly straightforward to understand given large-scale migration from the Commonwealth and more recently from the EU, which, along with natural growth, has rapidly changed Britain's ethnic composition. Whilst this is a national phenomenon, it is clearest in cities and college towns. Here, some interesting patterns have begun to emerge. For example, 'British only' identity is declining in England and Wales. Religious identity is declining among the white British but is vibrant amongst minority ethnic groups such as Sikhs.¹

As part of the reason for the foregoing, historical British identity is itself in decline. This is partly due to a lack of contemporary unifying factors such as those present at its formation. As it was then overlaid atop English, Welsh, Irish and Scottish identity, elites used binding events such as opposition to Catholicism, war with France and empire building to reinforce the strength of Britishness (Kumar, 2003). The relevance of these aspects has long since declined, meaning that Britishness and its component national identities are now being contested by elites and non-elites alike. National identity is no longer the domain of the ruling classes and is less dependent on international conflicts and ideologies, such as war and religion. For example, Bunting (2007) found that interest in Welshness was not based on pre-Christian Welshness but on pop-culture interest in Welsh language music and the Welsh language curriculum set by the Welsh assembly.

A seismic event in contemporary national identity politics that reflects the above well was the result of the referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union that took place in June 2016. The result was a 52 - 48 victory for those who wished to leave the EU.

¹ Much of this commentary is derived from my analyses of the 2001 and 2011 censuses.

With regard to Sikhs, the subject of this thesis, it is interesting that the British Sikh Report 2017 survey found that only half of its respondents voted to remain in the EU. When tabulated against specific nationality, English-identified Sikhs were more likely to vote to leave the EU than Sikhs who identified as British. Even more interesting was that, in the same survey, a majority of (British) Sikhs who sympathised with creating a Sikh sovereign state in India (Khalistan) also voted to exit the EU. This I assess as the strong desire for nationalistic Sikhs to have a distinct territory. In fact, hostland national identity features strongly in many diaspora Sikh groups. In Kenya, one of the most venerated national independence fighters is Sikh – Makhan Singh.

So, British identity and British nationhood are undergoing changes. One change that stands out is the way that Britishness is formed and maintained. Whilst state-ascribed citizenship remains a central theme of a Briton's identity, other elements of national identification are growing in prominence. For example, everyday experience can strongly shape what Britishness means. This is the central idea underpinning this study. That away from the state – which retains its relevance - significant parts of British nationhood can be formed, developed and maintained in sub-state networks; almost spontaneously.

Kaufmann (2017) recognises this in his identification of the emergent and spontaneous aspects of nationalism. This helps explain why populist movements such as the English Defence League or the Mod counterculture movement could promote versions of national identity without strategic orchestration.

It may also explain why state attempts at defining Britishness rarely exhaust people's 'national imaginaries' (Radcliffe, 2004). There is too much variation, much of which is almost always in flux. Woods and Debs (2013) stress that the construction of nationhood is a dialectic, not one-way, process, wherein "ordinary people often resist, or are indifferent to, the efforts of cultural and political elites to impose or provoke particular nationalisms"

(pp. 2–3). Like these authors, I take culture seriously as an independent force, and one whose structures can be discerned through systematic analysis, such as this research.

Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008) refer to this as everyday nationhood and it is indicated by, amongst other aspects, the choices people make about the symbols of nationhood that they are sentimental about and are therefore attached to. Due to this, I include symbols such as royalty, food and landscape in my study as tests for the content of Britishness. These everyday symbols prove especially important for more vernacular, regional nationalities in Britain, such as Englishness. As Kaufmann states, “[N]ations inculcate an emotional attachment to myths and symbols much more than locales do.” (2018, p. 172).

Indeed, English national identity is a focus of my study because a majority of British Sikhs are English either through long-term settlement or, as with a large proportion (57 per cent in 2011), being born here. Importantly, a vast majority of them are forecast to be born in England within two generations. So, whilst many Sikhs may be British citizens, there is a possibility they may feel English more than British – even though they may not openly state it.

Beyond England, regional identity has gained momentum as a powerful force in contemporary British society. This can be seen in the post-referendum campaign for Scottish independence (Deacon and Sandry, 2007), the devolution process in Northern Ireland (Hepburn and McLoughlin, 2011), and the mandatory primary school-level Welsh language campaign in Wales (Mourby, 2001). In England, there has been a populist rise of English identity as reflected in the nativist politics of far-right movements such as the English Defence League who rail against Islam, or parties like UKIP who campaign against the influence of the EU.

Table 1 shows the prevalence of the main regional nationalities in Britain during the last census. In England, as in Wales and Scotland, regional national identities strongly prevailed in 2011.

Table 1

Regional British Identities in England, Scotland and Wales

National Identity	Persons in Category	Regional Population	Percentage of Population per National Identity in Region
British Only	11,134,274	63,182,178 (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)	18%
English Only	32,472,725	53,012,456 (England Only)	61%
English and British	4,867,862	53,012,456 (England Only)	9%
Welsh Only	2,053,419	3,063,456 (Wales Only)	67%
Welsh and British	274,547	3,063,456 (Wales Only)	9%
Scottish Only	3,741,089	5,295,403 (Scotland Only)	71%
Scottish and British	1,052,171	5,295,403 (Scotland Only)	20%

Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016).

(N=63,182,178).

Table 1 illustrates that English identity (both on its own and in combination) was the most common response (in number of persons) to the 2011 census question on national identity in England. Furthermore, British identity was only chosen by a minority of “White British” respondents, whether selected on its own, or in combination with another choice. This

regional trend was evident in all three nations, with identities in Wales and Scotland being somewhat more focused on small-nation over British identity than is true in England.

As introduced earlier, one explanation for the rise of English national identification is the increasing diversity of Britain through non-white British immigration from Europe and beyond as well as the increase of minority ethnic groups through higher birth rates and larger family sizes. This has meant that white Britons are no longer the majority in cities such as London and Leicester. In this situation, where the majority groups are in decline, it is understandable if some choose to self-identify not as British but as English. An example is the East London borough of Barking and Dagenham, where the proportion of “White British” declined from 81 per cent to 49 per cent between the censuses of 2001 and 2011.

Ethnic Group	2011	Percentage of Total	2001	Percentage of Total	Change in Persons	Percentage Change	As Part of Total Change
White British	45,134,686	80.49%	42,747,136	86.99%	2,387,550	5.59%	34.42%
White Other	2,485,942	4.43%	1,308,110	2.66%	1,177,832	90.04%	16.98%
Total white	47,620,628	84.92%	44,055,246	89.65%	3,565,382	8.09%	51.40%
Mixed	1,224,400	2.18%	643,373	1.27%	581,027	85.22%	8.38%
Asian	3,820,390	7.51%	2,248,289	4.37%	1,572,101	85.31%	22.66%
Black	1,864,890	3.33%	1,132,508	2.19%	732,382	63.65%	10.56%
Total Population	56,075,912	100.00%	49,138,831	100.00%	6,937,081	7.75%	100.00%

As national context, Table 2 shows the dramatic changes in ethnic mix in England and Wales since 2001.

Table 2

Population Changes within Ethnic Categories in England and Wales: 2001 to 2011

Sources: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016); Office for National Statistics (2011): 2001 Census aggregate data UK Data Service (Edition: May 2011). (N=56,075,912).

From this table and other data from the two censuses, two trends relevant to my study are evident. Firstly, non-British white, or “White Other”, a group that includes European migrant workers, had grown significantly by 2011, in fact by more than 90 per cent. Secondly, white (British and other) had decreased from 89.65 to 84.92 per cent in a decade. Of importance to my study, the category of “Asian” (including Sikhs) accounted for 7.51 per cent of the population of England and Wales in 2011 – up from 4.37 per cent in 2001.²

Despite this national picture, the use of English identity over British amongst recently settled groups such as Sikhs is still a surprise. Since the 1950s Sikhs have used British citizenship as a path to social acceptance and economic welfare. So, if they are now moving away from a citizenship-based British identity then this is a distinctly new phase. Hence, I consider the emergence of Sikh regional national identity to be an important development for the study of national identity. Non-whites identifying as English can offer a unique window into our grasp of the wider processes of national identification. Furthermore, as these processes have both social and practical significance in British society, such as aiding or hindering intra-community cohesion, understanding them better holds civic significance.

² I acknowledge that in the “White British” census category, even a small rise can amount to a large change in number of persons. Likewise, a large increase in the percentage of Asians may still only amount to a small increase in persons.

In summary, by researching the dimensions of national identity of one group in multi-national and culturally-diverse Britain, I add to the study of ‘nations of nations’ (Bratberg and Haugevik, 2009). The relevance of these dimensions lies in them being not just a phenomenon in ‘troublesome’ areas such as the Basque region in Spain but a vibrant and mainstream topic in all British nations.

Next, I give historical background to Sikhs in Britain today. This provides chronological context to the contemporary questions I ask in this thesis. By doing this, I also show what aspects of a Sikh’s identity are out of scope in my thesis on Sikh Britishness. These include Sikhism and secular Punjabi heritage culture. I start with the origins and features of Sikhs.

Origins and Distinguishing Features of Sikhs

Sikhs originated as an ethno-religious group in India, and Punjab particularly. As adherents of the religion of Sikhism, the group came into being with the first guru, Guru Nanak (b. 1469). Some thirty years later, he is said to have travelled extensively and gained a wide following by espousing a spiritual way of life. This eventually became known in the West as Sikhism. The word *Sikhi* is the Punjabi term for Sikhism and can be translated as ‘to learn’. Over the next two centuries both the religion and group waxed and waned with ten gurus that headed the movement. A final drive by the tenth guru, Guru Gobind, founded a strict religious order called *Khalsa* in 1699. The last guru also left a ‘living’ guru in the form of the Sikhs’ holy book, the *Guru Granth Sahib* that replaced the divine human leadership of Sikhs. The central tenets of the religion are applied through the three practices of: praying, sharing, and honest work as well as the avoidance of the following five vices: lust, anger, greed, materialism, and egocentricity (McLeod, 1989).

The Sikh religion is monotheistic and is considered to have come about as a reformist response to the 15th century ideologies of Hinduism and Islam then dominant in India.

Currently, this relatively young religion has over 25 million adherents with the majority, 20 million, in India (Shani, 2008). This makes it the fifth largest in the world. There are substantial Sikh groups overseas in the UK, North America, The Middle East, and Africa. While it is essentially humanitarian, it forms an important part of the group's identity politics due to its role in establishing the group's distinctiveness globally. Hence, from the foregoing, it is straightforward to see why the connection between Sikhs and Sikhism remains the most popular theme in extant literature. This includes their distinctive places of worship called *Gurdwaras* that were the subject of my 2012 postgraduate dissertation.

In the UK, the group has long been considered to have distinctive features that set them apart from many other religious groups, in similar fashion to Orthodox Jews for example. This includes unshorn hair and turbans amongst males and covered heads for females. Contemporarily however, this is not as popular in the community as it once was. Newer generations are less likely to present themselves in the same manner as their predecessors. Shorn hair, Western dress and non-Punjabi mores in food, language and religion increasingly likely amongst Sikhs born overseas. Internally, the global religious group or *Panth* is split into sects set against ideological disagreements of Sikhism (Takhar, 2005). Despite the founding principle of caste-rejection, there are also castes loosely based on Hinduism's vocational categorisation in the community or *Qaum*(Ballard, 2000).

Sikhs in Britain: When, From Where, and Why?

The first recorded Sikh in Britain is Prince Duleep Singh who set foot on English soil as a Victorian subject of the British Empire in the middle of the 19th century. Since then, there have been only one or two mass migration waves of Sikhs, with the most significant settlements beginning in the 1960s. From 1960 to 1961, the number of Sikhs in the UK increased from 5,900 to 23,750 (Singh and Tatla, 2006). A lesser wave is connected to the

Sikhs who sought refuge from Uganda in early 1970s and Afghanistan beginning in the late 1990s. In the census of 2011, only 5 per cent of Sikhs were born in Africa, the Middle East and Asia accounted for 38 per cent. A large majority of 57 per cent were British-born; with most being English-born. The latter statistic plays a decisive role in Sikh Britishness.

Historically, the main reason for Sikhs being choosing to migrate to Britain has been because they were subjects of the British Empire. As such they had easier access to the 'motherland'. However, their settlement story has not been straightforward, with racially-skewed landmark legislation being passed by both major political parties from 1962 onwards. Despite this, Anglo-Sikh heritage is widely celebrated today. For example, Prince Charles unveiled a permanent statue of Prince Duleep in Thetford in 1999 paid for by the Maharaja Duleep Singh Centenary Trust. Singh and Tatla (2006) call this an "enduring symbol of Sikhs' British attachment" (p. 45).

Residence and Other Socio-Economic Settings

Sikhs in Britain have originated from a relatively small area of India and today live in very specific areas in Britain, a phenomenon that is linked to their chain migration patterns. Migration has occurred mainly for the push factor of the loss of agrarian livelihoods in Punjab and the pull factor of an acute post-war need for labour in the UK's manufacturing and industrial sectors. This partially explains their current residential locations of West London and West Midlands where heavy manufacturing using commodities such as rubber and metal historically took place. Today they are seen as a well-settled, productive community that has adapted to British life whilst at the same time maintaining their heritage's cultural mores.

Following the census of 2001, several important aspects of Sikh lives in Britain become available as the enumeration contained religious group categorisation for the first time. So,

we know that a majority (57 per cent) are UK-born and identify as British with an ethnicity of Indian whilst living in major cities and college towns. The group has above average levels of income, education, and youth. They are internally demarcated along cultural lines that include religion and secular factors such as language, food preferences, and traditional dress. Younger and British-born Sikhs more likely to be influenced by Western culture through acquired cultural and social capital. Mainstream political ideological differences are less common within the community when compared to national statistics on aspects such as Brexit voting patterns.

All of these historical aspects give a clear signal why various types of nationalism are present in the community. Sikh homeland nationalism in the form of diaspora nationalism based on religious politics in India is prominent among earlier generations of Sikhs. Despite most of these older Sikhs being British citizens, many still practice a non-citizenship-based nationalism such as Sikh Indian nationalism. This deterritorialised nationalism distinguishes them from the younger Sikhs who, due to the strong connection to Britain and weaker links to India, are less likely to display diaspora in favour of more nativist behaviour. In addition, this differentiation also gives the community distinct intra-group cultural features, including national identity. This underpins my research presented herewith and I cover it in more detail next.

The Dimensions of Sikh British National Identity

Having established the background to the broader topic and connected it to current developments in British society, I next detail the aims, research questions, objectives, findings, and relevance of this thesis on Sikh British national identity.

This thesis aims to build on and develop current scholarship which suggests that Sikhs in Britain are simply British in their national identity, i.e., Bhambra (2021); Jivraj (2013);

Singh and Tatla (2006); Singh, J. (2010; 2012), and Jaspal (2013). Labelling Sikhs as British is so common that they are regularly held up as a 'model' British community, for example by Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013, since they integrate well, contribute financially, and yet retain their separate identity (Katwa, 2013).

The main outcome of my research is the finding that post-war Sikh British national identity in England and Wales is not singular. It has deep variations which are characterised by three aspects. Firstly, Sikhs are better understood as being more than just British in their expressed national identity. Secondly, a growing number are identifying as English rather than British. Lastly, Sikh national identity is most strongly moderated by age so that younger Sikhs are more likely to identify as English rather than British. Thus, Sikh British national identity is now not 'British Only', a situation brought about by the advent of complex, ground-up nationalism as opposed to a uniform top-down state nationalism.

For example, the now elaborate identity of Sikhs is characterised by a number of the following dimensions. Sikhs may identify with Britain and/or one of the four countries of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In addition, they may identify with a region within those countries such as the English Midlands, Cornwall or London. Apart from these territorial connections, Sikhs may also self-identify with discrete symbolic aspects of each identity, such as historical or contemporary Britishness. Finally, any number of combinations of these dimensions can also make up an individual Sikh's national identity.


So, for instance, Sikhs in Scotland are more likely to consider themselves Scottish over British, whereas older Sikhs in England are more likely to call themselves British over English. They are, of course, all state-granted citizens of the UK but I find that this may or

may not predict their lived and expressed nationhood, including its name. Furthermore, this is a different situation to that of Sikhs just a generation ago.

Up to now, little research has been done on Sikh national identity in the UK. The assumption has been that they identify as British, based either on data from the census category or their behaviour, including how they identify nationally when overseas – for example in India. However, this is an oversimplified view, as there are also many Sikhs who identified as “English” (on its own) in my self-administered Sikh national identity survey. This is shown in Figure 1. Note that here the question was “What do you consider to be your national identity?” with the answers requiring just one choice from “Northern Irish”; “Welsh”; “Scottish”; “English”; “British”; “Other (please specify)”.

Figure 1

Single British Nationalities of Respondents in Study Sikh Survey



Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

This may indicate some important developments for nationalities and minorities in more liberal consumer societies. For example, it may signal the porousness of English identity to non-white ethnic groups. Furthermore, it indicates that English identity is currently maintained mainly from the ground-up, perhaps due partly to the lack of England-only institutions driving a regional nationality. Thus, another outcome of my findings is that the growth of both Englishness and decentralised nationalism is ripe for newer research.

Turning back to Sikhs, it is thus less surprising that an English Sikh is very different to a Scottish Sikh, or that a Sikh from London differs from one from the English Midlands. They are now harder and harder to frame as a British community across nationalities. This complicated nature of Sikh Britishness means that one can encounter Sikhs in England who self-identify themselves in various ways including: British, English, British-English, Sikh English or Sikh-English-Londoner. In Wales, however, Sikhs show a proclivity for using country-level national identity over British, just as in Scotland. This is partly due to country-specific identity being much stronger in these two nations than in England.

Research Questions on Sikh Britishness

Against this background, the research questions are two-fold. Firstly, do variations in Sikh Britishness exist? If so, what are the strongest moderators of these variations – especially Englishness? In seeking to answer these questions, I also add to the same information on white British groups since I use them for comparison.

The idea of Sikhs being British is derived mainly from national data answers to a single question on national identity that was introduced in the 2011 census. Due to the limited reply options available, and the lack of research before this census, the perception exists

today that Sikhs are simply British.³ Other highly specific surveys all indicate a more complicated scenario of Sikh British identity. These include community ones like the British Sikh Report or specialist national ones such as the Citizenship Survey and the British Election Study, including its specialist branch the Ethnic Minorities British Election Study (EMBES). However, due to the lack of research using this data as highlighted in my literature review, the phenomenon remains sparsely covered. I partly correct this situation by conducting two custom-designed surveys. For this reason, my research questions will address this gap in our present knowledge.

Current Knowledge on Sikh British National Identity

In the chapter following this introduction, I present a full analysis of the literature in which I note that, in addition to Sikhs, there is inadequate work on the national identity of minority ethnic groups in general. Despite this dearth of case studies, significant theoretical work exists within nationalism studies that I use as lenses to analyse variations in Sikh hostland national identity. This chosen field is that of vertical nationalism and includes one that is most relevant to my thesis, that is the role of complexity in national identity (Kaufmann, 2017).

This is not to say that Sikhs are not a well-researched group. There is significant knowledge on other aspects of the community, especially the theological, scriptural, and

³The 2011 national identity question was a self-determined assessment of one's own identity and included six tick box responses – one for each of the four parts of the UK (English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish), one for British, and one for 'Other'. Where a person ticked 'Other' they were asked to write in the name of the country. People were asked to tick all options that they felt applied to them. This means that in results relating to national identity people may be classified with a single national identity or a combination of identities.

historical. This focuses on Sikhism as a five-hundred-year-old religious order. Most other literature on Britain's Sikhs, such as sociological or anthropological research, is written mainly by adherent Sikhs reflecting on their history and culture. For instance, work on British Sikh identity mostly reflects on community heritage aspects such as Sikh religiosity or Punjabi culture. Despite this, an unanticipated discovery is that much of this communitarian literature is driven by internal politics and its aim is to challenge various minority statuses inherent in the community. These include caste, gender, sect or even other South Asian religions. Due to this, my study will add knowledge to the less-researched area of Sikh British national identity.

In summary, there is some general literature on national identity amongst the various ethnic groups in Britain. However, given the rapid developments in issues of national identity politics, I find it incommensurate as it fails to reflect the changing national and theoretical context. Whilst there has been a better response for the majority white British groups, this can still benefit from enrichment. On minority ethnic groups, there is a fair amount of work on Muslims as Britons but much of this is based on religiosity. There is virtually no work that focuses solely on the Britishness of Sikhs in England and Wales.

Researching Sikh Britishness: The Objectives

In trying to test complexity in Sikh Britishness, my research has the following objectives. The first is to understand the current field of research on Sikhs, to which end the qualitative and quantitative studies available on Sikh national identity in Britain are reviewed. Here I show that there is only limited popular and peer-reviewed research available, with a particularly severe paucity of interview and survey data on Sikh Britishness. Hence, I conclude my review of the academic literature and statistical data available by establishing the lacuna which this thesis contributes to filling.

My next objective is to use existing data to flesh out a contextual understanding of Sikh Britishness, against which this study's contribution will stand out. To do so, I use the national censuses of 2001 and 2011, the ONS LS (a 1 percent sample of individual census records linked over time, open to researchers), British Sikh Reports, the Citizenship Survey and the British Election Study – including its specialist branch the Ethnic Minorities British Election Study (EMBES). This provides the evidence to show that the notion of Sikhs being simply British is derived mainly from these general datasets and, furthermore, that no in-depth research on Sikh Britishness has taken place.

Having established this gap in the existing research, my next objective is to obtain useful and representative qualitative and quantitative data that can be tested using both wide field research and standard statistical tests. Here mixed-methods data gathering proves useful as I am a participating community member with good access to interview subjects. Through these methods, I gather core data by conducting 25 interviews with British Sikh citizens and collecting survey data from 100 British Sikhs across 50 questions.

In the main, most of this information is about the pattern of Sikh attachment to symbols of Britishness, the test for which elicits affective attachments towards particular symbols within the national myth-symbol corpus as conceived by Kaufmann (2018). As can be imagined, 100 hours of interviews and observation as well as 100 replies to 50 questions creates a large volume of statistical and narrative information. Here the decision is made to report the qualitative and quantitative data jointly rather than separately, thereby enabling me to triangulate findings both in the field and via the survey questionnaire.

The next objective is to identify any patterns or themes in the data. These point me towards general types of Sikh Britishness. For example, and recalling that it is symbols of Britishness I utilise, I assess that traditional or historical Britishness can be measured by

attachment to symbols such as royalty or the BBC. On the other hand, liberal-cosmopolitan ‘anti-nationalism’ or the rejection of national identity could be linked to a low score across all symbols.

All this is revealed through three main statistical tests, namely, cluster analysis for factors (themes), regression analysis for the significance of individual variables, and simple cross-tabulations to illustrate dominant types of Sikh British national identity. To increase the representative nature of the Sikh data, I present the qualitative interview data together with the survey results to substantiate their mathematical importance. Indeed, the interviews are structured around the symbolic data with many interviewees having already completed the survey.

Through such qualitative and quantitative analyses, I arrive at several variables that predict the content of a Sikh’s Britishness. One such analysis probes differences in symbolic attachment by age, place of birth, social grade or class, education, profession and residential postcode. From these, regression tests ascertain that age is the strongest factor as I find that younger Sikhs are more likely to self-identify as English whilst older Sikhs are much more likely to consider themselves as British. No other variable holds such statistical prominence as age. The choice of symbols also differs with age with older Sikhs more attached to traditional British symbols like the monarchy.

All of this is supported by the interview data which reveals differences within the Sikh community in the symbolic makeup of their British identity, most notably between young and old. However, such differences do not exist between young and old white Britons. Moreover, the large Brexit-driven differences of identity within the white British population are not reflected within the Sikh population.

In pursuing and meeting these objectives, the outcome of the research was that I confirmed the hypothesis that Sikh national identity fits a complex and ground-up rather than top-down interpretation of national identity construction.

Methodology, Reflexivity and Data Collection Integrity

As to methodology, I collected data using a mixed methods strategy of interviews, survey data, and participant observation. I did so for two main reasons. First, there was an acute need to generate specialist statistical data owing to the very limited data available on Sikh British national identity. Secondly, due to this lack of research I needed two types of datasets to act as cross-checks.

Hence, the core of my results data is drawn from a self-generated survey posing 50 questions to 100 Sikhs. In the survey a rating for various symbols of Britishness was requested, this allowed me to gauge the 'sentimental value' of a particular symbol for each Sikh's Britishness. These ratings were scored numerically from 0 to 100 and cumulatively they generated a vast amount of data to assess for evidence and significance. Simplification was thus needed for insight. Here, cross-tabulations and cluster testing unveiled patterns and themes in Sikh Britishness whilst regression analysis allowed me to see what factor was strongest in predicting variation in Sikh Britishness between individuals. Through all this, I find age to be the dominant variable in predicting differences in the weight accorded to different symbolic elements in the British identity of Sikhs in England and Wales.

The qualitative research included semi-structured interviews with 25 subjects and over 100 hours of participant observation. Most of this was done in conjunction with, rather than independent of, the quantitative data. For example, of the 25 interviewees, 14 had already taken part in the survey. So, it was possible to follow up their statistical answers with open-ended discussions for further insight. In this way, mixed research methods

helped create candid and detailed data on a community that can be reticent about participating in research on identity. Bhambra (2021) uses a grounded theory approach for similar reasons in her very recent research.

Theories and Concepts in Sikh Britishness

Having alluded to complex and simple nationalism, it is worthwhile clarifying their use and importance in my study. I do this alongside discussing the broader field of nationalism theories that underpin both my conceptual approach to Sikh Britishness and the analysis of the findings. In the main, I classify these theories much like Ozkirimli (2010) does: classic and contemporary. Classic theories provide a good explanation for vertically driven nationalism, for example in the form of elite-diffused, centre to periphery nationalism. Theories such as ethnosymbolism, ethno-traditionalism or modernism form an important way for me to show why some Sikhs, such as older ones or foreign-born ones, gravitate to symbols of historical or traditional Britishness such as the queen or the NHS. However, this finding is replete throughout the nationalism theory literature and is, thus, not the hoped-for originality in this study.

That novelty is derived in explaining the behaviour of Sikhs who are sentiment about contemporary symbols of Britishness such as ethnic citizen mix, hopefulness about the British nation, and popular culture. These symbols are erstwhile associated with the White British majority groups such as the White English. I find that the best fit theories for explaining this relatively new phenomenon are horizontal theories, otherwise called ground-up, decentralised, or nationalism from below theories. In the literature these concepts are variously termed as personal nationalism, everyday nationalism, banal nationalism, multivocality theory, and popular nationalism. All these form important theoretical underpinnings to this study. With this latter set of concepts guiding the

research I show that for younger Sikhs, identity is a malleable form of self-identification rather than something immutable.

Sikh Britishness and Sikh Englishness: Complexity and Nationalism as a Key Theory

Amongst the now-burgeoning theories in this sub-field, one stands out for its usefulness in successfully predicting and explaining Sikh Britishness. This is the notion of complexity and nationalism by Kaufmann (2017) who shows that the modernist-ethnosymbolist (or constructivist-perennialist) theoretical axis is cross-cut by a vertical (top-down) vs. horizontal (bottom-up) dimension. When compared to the maturity of vertical theories, horizontal ones remain much less developed. As context, the latter theories were honed at a much less peaceful time when migration was virtually negligible. Thus, horizontal theories, with their focus on the masses rather than the elite, could only have come into prominence during a time like the present where peacetime and migration is the norm in Western liberal consumerist nation states, such Britain.

Using Kaufmann's (2017) paper "Complexity and Nationalism" as a starting point, I theorise that a uniform approach to the nationalism of Sikhs in Britain is the perception that they are monolithically British in their national identity. By this I mean not only are they holders of British citizenship, but that when they or others are asked what their nationality is, they are very likely to say British. In contrast, under complex nationalism the same group would reply in various ways to the same question. So, for instance there are English Sikhs, Londoner Sikhs, British Sikhs, Scottish Sikhs, Welsh Sikhs, and Sikhs with no expressed national identity. Or it may be that British is an outer layer to 'small-nation' identities but with lower salience. The latter will determine if identity categories are hybrids such as when hyphenated in English-Sikh or 'unitary' such as English Sikh.

Complexity theory explains much of the above as Sikh British national identity has developed from being simply British to developing complex variations. The most popular of these is English national identity which has been formed without any orchestration or coercion. Hence, it is not vertical (top-down) nationalism but instead, I suggest that it is an example of horizontal (ground-up) nationalism.

Furthermore, it is one that has been achieved through specific aspects of complexity that Kaufmann (2017) identifies as: emergence (from below), feedback loops (between peers and social constructs), and distributed knowledge (i.e., variation by region, age and individual). Aside from theory, this spontaneous sub-state national identity development amongst Sikhs makes sense for more applied reasons. These are the non-elite rise of Englishness, the decline of Britishness and finally the desire for Sikh social mobility in a region (England) which a vast majority of them call home. It is, as Kaufmann (2017) suggests, the “wisdom of crowds” within Complexity Adaptive Systems theory (p. 6).

Further evidence of the usefulness of complexity theory in testing Sikh Britishness comes from the way it helps differentiate between the national identity seen in older and younger Sikhs. For the former, I find that a vertical, elite-diffused model predicts firstly, the symbols that they are sentimental about and secondly, that they are very likely to call themselves British. Younger Sikhs on the other hand develop national identity away from a centralised source and are thus more likely to identify as English given that it is a strongly vernacular national identity.

By taking an example from the field research and tying it into Kaufmann’s aspects of complexity theory I next show my strong empirical reasons for using this theory. A Sikh hailing from a Sikh-majority area such as Hounslow, West London gains entry to Bath University to pursue undergraduate studies. At Bath, they join the university rugby team,

an aspect that is logical given the immense popularity and highly-developed culture of the sport in Western England. At one of the derby matches between English and Welsh club sides, they are exposed to the palpable ‘collective effervescence’ displayed by players and supporters alike. As the Sikh socialises, lives, and studies with like-minded rugby fans, they become further connected to this different and powerful pop-cultural element. I view this as the emergence of nationalism for the Sikh in question – regional Englishness via pop-cultural sports in this case. Over the next few years at Bath, the Sikh builds and deepens their personal and social networks that act as feedback loops that transform the Sikh’s identity. This includes their national identity which was most likely British initially.

Given the length of time they spend at Bath, they reach a point where the culture from the Sikh-majority area is in the ascendancy, as is the national identity many Sikhs express in those areas – British. The Sikh now considers themselves English as it better represents their current lifestyle, and aspired-for social mobility amongst like-minded peers. The final aspect of Kaufmann’s (2017) notion, that of distributed knowledge comes about as the Sikh passes on their experiences to other Sikhs especially family members.

In this way, entire Sikh cohorts undergo national identity changes, making the sum of Sikh Englishness a phenomenon larger than its individual Sikh parts. And we see evidence of this in the rise of the following metrics amongst predominantly younger Sikhs: mixed ethnicity marriages and households, broader residential and profession choices, non-Sikh naming practices, and extensive ethnic category changes between the ONS censuses of 2001 and 2011. Thus, the complexity concept works well in showing that age is a strong moderator of variations of Sikh Britishness.

Other reasons for its appeal in my study are due to its contemporary nature in successfully addressing nationalism in a Western, liberal nation state during a long period of peacetime

and migration. However, I acknowledge that its novel use here can be seen as a possible drawback given that there are no other empirical nationalism case studies that have utilised it as I do here. Despite this, its ability to address the changing internal national identity patterns of recent migrant groups who are erstwhile non-Western and that can be considered illiberal offers a justifiable critique of ethno-traditionalism. This outweighs the risks of precedence in examining national identity in Sikhs in Britain.

All the same this, I remain mindful that more classic nationalism theories such as ethnic and civic nationalism as well as both ethnosymbolist and modernist forms of elite-led nationalism remain very relevant in my research. For example, they play a major part in assessing why a large proportion of older Sikhs still self-identify as British, or in understanding the challenges younger Sikhs face in calling themselves English whilst being non-whites. I also remain aware that complexity theory does not adequately cover the emergence of sub-groups that challenge the individualism espoused by an un-orchestrated change such as Sikh Englishness. It may be that Complex Adaptive Theory's recent use in social sciences trails behind its success in the natural sciences. However, its place alongside other horizontal theories and its challenge to vertical theories gives it primacy in my analysis.

Thus, in applying both schools of nationalism theory to Sikhs in Britain certain conclusions become apparent about the importance of age in Sikh Britishness. Firstly, it is, as Singh and Tatla (2006) reported, that the older immigrant generation used state-driven nationalism in the form of citizenship to 'sustain' themselves during a survival phase when they were under pressure. In addition, they used it to distinguish between themselves as Sikhs 'abroad' not 'home'. This is captured in the two Punjabi phrases of *desi* and *pardesi*, herein roughly translated as 'of the land' and 'away from the land' (Kim, 2012). These two phrases are also symbolic of an individual being old-fashioned and progressive,

respectively. For example, in India there is a desirability of *pardesi* partly ascribed to its access to British citizenship. Developing this idea further, *pardesi* is now characterised by Englishness in Sikh youth with their aims of social mobility, albeit with a less centralised nuance. As casual observation, I note that older Sikhs often use the word *angrezi* or English to describe younger Sikhs.

Therefore, fast forwarding two generations on and the community's relationship to national identity has moved into a less materialist, more psychological phase. In this phase, citizenship no longer revolves around serving as a badge of security, as before. It is also no longer a differentiator to peers, partly as today's young Sikhs are mostly all British citizens. More importantly, most of their peers are now no longer other Sikhs or South Asian émigrés but instead are from the majority white British groups. In this new network, British national identity does not have a strong psychological draw. Englishness, with its more localised connectivity, is seen as more pertinent in everyday life, such as in the performance of the England rugby team. It is thus perceived as more attractive. In some English-identifying Sikhs, the lack of emphasis on Englishness by the state has given them a 'cause' to support, thereby giving them opportunities to form ideological links with other like-minded people in order to enhance belonging.

This is a powerful draw for younger Sikhs as there is no 'large cause' as there was with older Sikhs – such as a world war or physiological wellbeing. Instead, theirs is a small cause multiplied over thousands of Sikhs who are in the same situation, that is, in close contact with white British majorities. What occurs is that small changes produce an effect larger than the sum of its parts, this results in complexity: a variety of perceptions of Britishness, differing between individuals and subgroups, with little deliberate coordination from an institution.

Given that the change between the immigrant generation and the current one is inherently tied to age, age emerges as the strongest moderator of a Sikh's Britishness.⁴ Other variables conceptualised as significant include: education, profession, residential postcode, place of birth, socio-economic class, political attitude, gender and religiosity.

Terms and Scope of Study

Whilst there is no major use of technical terms in this study, it helps to clarify the use of certain words and phrases. First is the separation of 'British' and 'Britishness' in this study. The first is used to describe the judicial or legal status of someone – their citizenship as issued by the UK state. This is British citizenship devoid of any social or personal elements, simply reflecting that an individual has met the criteria for state citizenship. This is akin to what McCrone and Bechhofer (2015) describe as a "badge" or a synonym of citizenship (p. 7). It may or may not reflect how that person describes their nationhood.

For that I use the second term, Britishness. Here the morpheme added to Kenya, Europe, British, English, Scottish or Welsh creates the suffix '-ness'. This is used to describe the sentiment, feeling, attachment or any such ongoing psychological process of being a British citizen. Hence, Britishness is associated with behaviour and responses to people, ideas, symbols, practices and events associated with the nation-state of the UK (Wright and Gamble, 2009).

It is the sense of being a Briton and, as a term, has roots that go as far back as 1870 (Ward, 2004). In this work, I use it chiefly to describe psychological attachment to British

⁴ There has only been one major wave of Sikh migrants, that in the 1960s. More recent migrants, from Afghanistan, for instance, have arrived in small numbers only. As such, most younger Sikhs are children or grandchildren of settler Sikhs.

symbols. I survey a sample of these for 100 Sikh and 100 white British citizens. The symbols encompass landscape, such as the white cliffs of Dover filling one respondent with a sense of homecoming, to the BBC, with another respondent responding to familiar voices on BBC radio stations. As an alternative measure of Britishness, in 2018 the BBC, in conjunction with YouGov, ran a similar survey on Englishness. This found that humour, tradition and good manners are the characteristics most associated with being English.⁵

Given the long history and importance of both terms (British and Britishness) in this study, it is worthwhile noting that these are not fixed in meaning. They have undergone significant 'dimensional' changes since the Acts of Union of 1706 and 1707. Just in modern times alone, these include the territorial, such as the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922, and the psychological, such as the amplification of nationhood during the Second World War. Following the end of this war, the mass migration to Britain by Afro-Caribbeans and South Asians has added a multi-ethnic facet.

More recently, there has been a decline in the central role of the state and the increased regionalisation of British identity into Englishness, Welshness, Irishness and Scottishness. Of these, Englishness holds significance in this study as most Sikhs in Britain live in England. As such, the discussions around Englishness, rather than Britishness, could be of most value in understanding the future of Sikh British national identity.

An important part of this identity, for my research, are the symbols of Englishness and Britishness, the separation of which is not easy. I therefore focus on the British category and ask whether the BBC, National Health Service or the British Army elicit a stronger

⁵ Sources: Smith, M. (2018). Young people are less proud of being English than their elders. London: YouGov.

sense of national sentiment from a Sikh living in England. I also compare more widely, asking, for instance, about whether the England football team or white cliffs of Dover contribute more to a person's sense of British identity. My research suggests that, for younger Sikhs at least, English symbols hold more sentimentality than official British ones.

It is important to clarify exactly what I mean by symbols of national identity, especially as they form the critical data-gathering strategy. In trying to understand the content of national identity, I utilise popular and personal representations of British nationhood such as royalty, food, music and landscape. This fits with Kaufmann's (2018) schema, designed to elicit affective attachments towards particular symbols within the national myth-symbol corpus. The importance of symbols is that they form an individual's collective representation of nationhood, selected to construct their own version of nationalism as Cohen (1996) describes. This continues the theme of using horizontal, rather than vertical, nationalism to guide this research. In speaking of the attachments that make up their Britishness, an interviewee or survey respondent reveals the degree to which a symbol is 'consumed' by them. The combination of symbols and the rating for each by subjects then gives rise to a quantitative assessment of the shape of their Britishness, including its "particularistic cultural and social meaning" (Khor, 2015, p. 26). Thus, the measured rating for each symbol represents its 'concreteness' (Abizadeh, 2004).

Two other groups of terms that deserve clarification are race and ethnicity, as well as civic and ethnic national identity. Starting with the latter first, I use classic distinctions in which ethnic national identity is based on the "principle of descent; the nation is a marriage of blood and soil." (Wright, Citrin and Wand, 2012). Drawing a comparison with Germany and Japan, where single ethnic groups are strongly associated with national identity, Englishness in Britain has a strong ethnic association with whiteness (Leddy-Owen, 2014).

Conversely, the boundaries of the civic nation, exemplified by France and the United States, are permeable; in principle, anyone can belong provided they accept certain fundamental values and institutions. Civic nations thus are often characterized as voluntarist and inclusive where citizenship is accorded based on *jus soli* principles (Wright, Citrin and Wand, 2012). Given its roots in eighteenth century four-nation history, Britishness has long had civic notions (Kumar, 2010). Thus, Sikhs easily fall into this civic category with the majority (mostly older) ones continuing to self-identify as British due to its avoidance of ethnic stipulation.

However, despite this distinction, I find that an increasing number of Sikhs are challenging the white ethnic 'baseline' of certain parts of Britishness. Whilst this is especially the case with Englishness, it is present in Welshness and Scottishness too. Therefore, there is a clear possibility that these distinctions may not be as rigid as once formulated. For example, many whites in the study did not conflate Englishness with whiteness but rather with other symbolic elements. As further evidence, younger Sikhs took part in national 'rituals' erstwhile associated with English whites, such as following the England rugby team. Thus, younger Sikhs who 'consume' English nationhood identify as English more than British.

Moving onto the use of ethnicity as opposed to race when describing groups in British society, the easy answer is that the national census is set up to count the population in this way. However, there is more to this distinction here. I argue that white British is not strictly an ethnic designation. Instead, as it encompasses several unique ethnic groups such as the Cornish, Scottish or Welsh, it is actually pan-ethnic rather than ethnic. It is also not racial, as the term white can be used to encompass white Europeans. Sikhs, a mostly non-white group, are also uniquely identified in the census due to their religious doctrine. This sets them apart from white British groups, thus providing easy data

categorisations. For these reasons, these two terms, British Sikh and white British, are more usefully utilised as ethno-national census identities in this study. An aspect that is reflected in my use of first letter capitalisation when referring to the census category “White British” rather than white British citizens more generally.

For the foregoing reasons (ethnicity over race), I find that younger Sikhs have more ‘cultural convergence’ with white British groups than older Sikhs. I take this to constitute a form of popular nationhood, as it is connected to behaviour or cultural, social and psychological characteristics rather than legal or political status, or even a racial type.

I have detailed all this because there is strong connection between Sikhs’ age, and whether they experienced an ethnic or racial type of Britishness. For example, it was racially-motivated legislation that became a barrier for early Sikh settlers – now older Sikhs - becoming citizens (Mattausch, 1998). Thus, once this was obtained, these Sikhs tended to view citizenship as central to their national identification as they considered it less racially-based and more inclusive compared to English. Now, however, younger Sikhs are more likely than older Sikhs to choose Englishness since their origin, behaviour and sense of belonging fits this bottom-up national identity. Many do not feel that Englishness is a racial category. Moreover, there is a good reason for them to desire inclusion in Englishness. For them, as Barth (1969) suggests, ethnic groups are made up of ‘operators’ whose aim is social mobility and success. In line with this, the younger Sikhs’ need for efficacy drives their national identity politics.

Recalling that a large majority of Sikhs live in England and that most of them are English-born, the concept of English as cultural nationhood rather than Englishness as racial-ethnic is more useful in assessing why Englishness is rising among Sikhs. Thus, their British national identity is becoming less simple and more complicated by moving toward

a more personalised and localised identity. For example, part of the attraction for younger Sikhs to follow the England rugby team is because of its middle-class associations when compared to football. They are playing out Weber's concept (in Roth and Wittich, 2013) of identity deriving from similarity of habits, practices, and memory-making.

Simply put, the traditional or historical idea of ethnic and civic British national identity, including English national identity and its ethnic and racial component, is challenged by variations in Sikh Britishness. This is best seen in younger Sikhs who assay the notion that Englishness is ethno-racially constructed. This fits into Cohen's (1996) idea that for groups like Sikhs, belonging is a constant problem and thus aligning with Englishness solves some of these issues.

Locating the Research in Metatheory

This research arises from the researcher's interest in his own community's identity and place in British society. Hence, the position of the author with regard to the nature of his knowledge of the subject matter is a balance between subjectivism and objectivism. The experience of researching peers and members of a 'virtual' community of Sikhs and Britons is part of the author's own Sikhness and Britishness. It is thus reflexive to some degree. In order to counter this, two methodological strategies have been adopted. The first has been to seek out an expert supervisor on nationalism with no 'natural' ties to the community. Second, a mixed-methods study with both 'personal' and 'impersonal' ways of collecting data was used to cross-check findings.

Furthermore, this stance towards knowledge determines the theoretical framework used to analyse these findings. That is, nationalism theories specifically focusing on decentralised national identity. This is because early field research evidenced uncoordinated and strong peer-to-peer horizontal linkages among Sikhs. These are much like the spontaneous

behaviour of a flock of birds or the instinctive pedestrian traffic patterns described by Kaufmann (2017). Therefore, the most apt theories to assess the data are decentralised nationalism theories as they attend exactly to the above. Notwithstanding this perspective, I would note that classic nationalism theories can still explain the lower likelihood of sub-national Britishness in older Sikhs.

Overall, my closeness to the subject matter and decade-long participant observation as a community researcher, alongside my objective research methodology, underlies my research process. This includes my initial research proposal entitled *The 'British Only' box and London's Sikh Youth*, subsequent research questions, data collection, and, finally, the analysis and conclusions. For this reason, I assert that the design and motivation of this study combines subjectivism and objectivism, as Crotty (1998) states "...to talk about the construction of meaning is to talk about the construction of a meaningful reality". As a Sikh, evidencing new dimensions of national identity forms my meaningful reality due to my personal connection to the community. Thus, the nature of my knowledge goes beyond the relationship between me being a dispassionate "knower or would-be knower and what can be known" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

In addition to deepening our understanding of the place of Sikhs in British society, my choice of studying national identity over other identities is kindled by a curiosity about how people develop their attachment to nationhood and nations. It is not founded solely on an academic interest in ideological nationalism. I desire to know what comfort and usefulness everyday Britishness provides Sikhs in their daily 'lived' lives.

The Main Findings

I find that age is key in predicting variation in Sikh Britishness. Even though British remains the majority identity among Sikhs, this is changing. In the interviews, I show that

younger Sikhs are more likely to self-identify as English whilst older Sikhs are most likely to call themselves British. In the symbolic analysis, older Sikhs are very likely to associate themselves with traditional forms of Britishness consisting of the royal family, NHS, BBC, trade union banners and the National Trust. Younger Sikhs on the other hand are more likely to be sentimental about regional English accents, rugby, the mix of people living in Britain and punk-rock music.

For thoroughness, several other variables were examined and found to be of lesser or no significance in moderating a Sikh person's construction of British identity. These include class, education, country of birth, profession, gender, religious identity, and area of residence. In a secondary finding, age-related variation in Britishness is unique to Sikhs when compared to the majority white British ethnic group as the latter showed much less age-based variation in national identification. This indicates that first, the higher prevalence of English over British identity among younger Sikhs is not part of a society-wide phenomenon and second, variation in white British peoples' form of national identity is much less likely to be a correlate of age.

Why Age is the Key Moderator Among Sikhs

The hypothesis here is that Sikhs have a complicated British national identity moderated strongly by age. This is based on two conjoined developments in the community, namely that most younger Sikhs are British-born and that an overwhelming majority of those are English-born. Due to this, most younger Sikhs have had a longer and deeper experience of the English nationhood formation process as they are British- and English-born and have been brought up in more secure circumstances than their parents and grandparents. This has allowed them the time and resources to avail themselves of the opportunity to

‘consume’ nationhood. This can be seen in their behaviour as they have now begun to draw closer to non-Sikhs.

Evidence of this is in the decline of community (Punjabi) culture such as language, food, music, dress, and religiosity in younger Sikhs. I also note evidence of this in the increase of non-Sikh, non-Punjabi, British cultural influence in personal choices ‘performed’ en masse. This includes newer professions, social circles and personal relationships derived from them; wider choice of residence, vernacular language proficiency, decline in minority culinary choices; and, significantly for my study, a shift in citizenship to sub-state national identity. At the heart of this process is the efficacy of younger Sikhs as they strive for social mobility through professional and personal success.

Thus, the physicality of their lives in England and their deeper experiences means that younger Sikhs are less likely to be monochromatically British and more likely to vary in their national identity, including expressing sub-state identities such as Englishness, hybrid national-local identities such as English-Sikh-Londoner, or no national identity. Their identity is not conflated with their citizenship status – as amongst older Sikhs.

For older Sikhs, their choice of identifying as British is based on their lifestyles having changed very little since their youth. For example, they are able to sustain Sikh and South Asian peer links due to their long-term residence in community areas, they have well-maintained transnational links with the Sikh homeland, and hold an undimmed sentimentality of historical Britishness based on declining yet enduring symbols such as royalty and the BBC. These groups are closer to, or are, the immigrant settler generation. As such, they have not been as affected by acculturation processes as the newer British and English-born Sikhs.

Understanding Future British National Identity through Sikhs

The importance of this work is closely tied to major developments in British national identity such as the decline of British identity and the increase in popular Englishness. This is a process which could change the character and practice of British nationhood and, therefore, British national identity. Vernacular Englishness is at the centre of this change and is finding hitherto unexpected advocates such as Sikhs who, like many of the majority, are concerned about the lack of clarity in the meaning of British. Thus, as identifying as English grows, so will the importance of understanding the effects of this on British citizens. Much is known about majority groups but there is limited research on minority ethnic groups, so this is the research gap addressed here.

Furthermore, as Sikhs are representative of a growing segment of minority ethnic groups, these findings have wider implications. These form the broader contribution of this study. For instance, it is fair to say that other recently-settled minority groups could be subject to this British vs. English decision-making process. So, South Asian Muslims, Afro-Caribbeans and even European migrant groups could be taking part in this process today. Their identity politics could form an important vessel for nationhood in the population hubs of Britain where they are rapidly growing in numbers.

For these reasons, I, like others (Kaufmann, 2018; Morland, 2012), assess the current phase of national reproduction as being slightly different from earlier stages. Firstly, Britain is a liberal-progressive society where one's citizenship does not have the same influence on identity as it once did, say, immediately after the Second World War. Secondly, citizenship itself is not necessarily a good gauge of one's commitment to a nation-state. For example, it is possible to have more than one citizenship. In this situation, as white British groups decline in proportion to others, this may increase their

engagement with national identity politics. For them, like Sikhs, decentralised nationalism and demographic change have affected their national identity politics. This could have a significant impact on how we conceptualise both groups in liberal society.

Against this background, I summarise the wider contribution of this study. The first is in helping to understand the increased contestation and diversity of British national identities, especially in England. Second, within this, my study contributes to information on the national identity developments of two distinct ethnic groups, the Sikhs and white British.

Third, as a contribution to Sikh studies, it is significant that Englishness appears to have risen among Sikhs, in the context of a drop in religiosity, looser familial structures, the expansion of non-Sikhs in their personal circles, and the rise of white populist politics. Another possibility could be that as far as Sikhs and Englishness is concerned, closed ethnicity is giving way to open ethnicity. My evidence suggests there is now a porousness to English identity.

These findings may have practical applications. First in terms of the design and administration of services provided by the state, including social security, armed and police forces, and education. In this situation, a better understanding of national identity equates to understanding 'consumers' better. A second situation is that of national emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic or threat of terrorist attacks. In planning for these situations, understanding national identity is important for gauging support for national policies.

For example, carrying out a media campaign on Jihadist terrorism during Ramadan in Tower Hamlets may prove unsettling for London's Muslims. On the other hand, publicising that the Covid-19 infection is especially virulent amongst non-whites in the

same borough can help save lives. Put simply, informed understanding of the content of national identity can help a nation 'rise and overcome' challenges during crises. On the other hand, misunderstandings of national sentiment can lead to a breakdown in social cohesion and present a challenge to central authority in times when it is needed the most.

In addition to helping solve practical problems, this study also contributes to solving a theoretical one. This is on how minority groups develop national identity in a multi-national state. Apart from Britain, the question arises in several other locations. In Spain for example, testing Catalans to see if variables such as age or education moderate sentiment toward Spanish national, rather than regional Catalan, symbols may help inform the fractious situation there. The same theory can be applied to other culturally unique minority groups within nations such as the Cornish, Sardinians, Bretons, or even Sikhs in India.

On a technical level, this study contributes to advances in methodology, data and the application of substantive conceptual innovations in the study of national identity in minority and majority groups. This is especially so for the focus on variations in the symbolic content of national identity. Finally, this research adds to work on decentralised nationalism in liberal, peaceful societies. It can thus offer a case study of horizontal bottom-up Englishness displacing vertical Britishness.

In summary, during an unsettled time for British national identity research such as this may help citizens, authorities, and private sector providers better understand their roles in society. Concomitantly, national solidarity and social cohesion may also benefit from this information.

Outline of the Thesis

With regard to the presentation of the research, the thesis is structured as follows.

Following this introduction is a review of relevant scholarship. Here, I make clear how limited the literature on Sikh Britishness and more generally Sikh hostland identity is. Next comes a background chapter based on third-party statistical data. Both the review and background chapters frame the gap in research this study addresses. The core chapter follows and covers self-generated interview and survey data on Sikh Britishness from a sample of more than 120 Sikh subjects. The last two data-based chapters illustrate the continuity and change in Sikh British national identity. The following chapter draws comparisons with Britain's largest ethnic group, the white British. Here, the symbolic content of British Sikh and white British national identity is compared. This helps delineate which variables are important for determining choices made by both Sikh and white Britons. A summary and conclusion are presented in the final chapter.

Conclusion

At the start of this introductory chapter, I showed that the broader subfield in which I operate is firstly, scholarship on national identity in liberal-progressive societies and, secondly, the 'complexifying' of this national identity from state-driven ideology to ground-up emergence. After specifying the gap in current research, I set out the high-level objectives and methodology and clarified my use of terms. I then positioned my work within the current theory literature before presenting the main findings on age and complexity. This was followed by my choice of the theoretical lenses through which I analysed the findings. The timeliness and importance of the study were then clarified by situating this development against the decline in Britishness and rise of sub-state national identities such as English. Showing that this was partly caused by ongoing demographic

shifts highlighted the problems faced by minorities and majorities as they 'jostle' for personal belonging in the national narrative.

Given the above situation, this research offers knowledge to inform social policy and help practitioners better understand the future of British national identity. Ultimately, this work contributes new survey and qualitative data to advance our understanding of national solidarity in England and Britain. This is for both majority groups such as white British and minority groups such as Sikhs.

For Sikhs, it will be shown that their expressed British national identity or Britishness is not simple as is commonly thought. Instead, it is complicated, taking in account hitherto unresearched facets which moderate Sikh national identity, such as geography, age, food, education, and personal relationships. For example, Sikhs in Wales are likely to self-identify very strongly as Welsh more than British, irrespective of many of these facets. On the other hand, Sikhs in England exhibit a more uneven national identity where some are more likely to consider themselves English whilst others use British more. I also found this in my earlier work where I conceptualised London's Sikh youth as acculturated citizenry rather than settlers' children (Jandu, 2015).

Having established this, I ask whether age is the strongest moderator of Sikh British national identity. In successfully testing the hypothesis, the study contributes evidence that complexity in contemporary Britishness can illuminate current social and cultural processes. The importance of this is amplified when the rapid growth of non-white British citizens is considered. Therefore, this helps better assess related social and political problems such as spatial planning or ethno-racial tensions.

The study uses quantitative data from self-generated and, to a lesser extent, third-party surveys. As a precedent in British Sikh studies, close statistical testing through regression

and cluster analyses of this data is used to support the hypothesis that age is the most important factor to note when examining internal variation in Sikh Britishness. When compared to the sample of white British, Sikhs' Britishness is clearly more affected by age than that of the majority group. The wider implications of this include rethinking national identity in, firstly, minority groups, especially those formed of recent migrants such as South Asians or Afro-Caribbeans; and secondly, national identity in the majority white British group.

The complexity of Sikh subjects' identity goes some way to show that they are not 'faux' Britons (Koopmans and Stratham, 1999). They are attracted to, and strongly pursue, sentimental attachments to Britishness – not just their judicial status. Thus, a major finding is that whilst citizens are all British, Britishness or the expression of being British is much more complex. Indeed, Bhambra (2021) recently found that there were “many subtle shades of meaning surrounding British identity and great diversity in the way that young Sikh and Hindus express their relationship with the notion of Britishness.” (p. 6)

In everyday lives, it may be even more 'binding' than a legal status. This research also helps practitioners designing approaches to communities and societies acquire an improved understanding of how national identity operates in Britain among English, Scottish, Northern Irish or Welsh people – irrespective of ethnicity.

This concludes my introductory chapter and I next review literature pertinent to my thesis.

Chapter Two: Review of Literature, Methodology, and Conceptual Frameworks

Introduction

The primary research question this study seeks to answer is whether there is internal variation in Sikh Britishness, and, if there is, what the strongest moderator of this variation is. In this chapter, I locate this question in the existing literature. I do this to understand whether related research questions have previously been raised, investigated and answered. This, however, is not the case as I conclude in this chapter that there is only limited literature on the hostland national identity of Britain's Sikhs.

As a starting point, I note that there is limited work on the British national identity of minority ethnic groups in general. This is especially sparse for Sikhs in Britain. Despite this, the success of the study is greatly assisted by the existence of significant theoretical advancements in this field. Within this, there are many well-developed concepts that I use to examine complexity in Sikh hostland national identity. In the main, I use complexity and national identity (Kaufmann, 2017; 2018) to analyse my findings on Sikh Britishness. This is part of my wider conceptual approach, that of using theories of horizontal nationalism to understand Sikh Englishness.

Structure of the Chapter

As to the chapter's structure, I begin by discussing the work on Sikhs in Britain, showing that, whilst there is some historical material on Sikh Britishness, little contemporary research exists. This highlights the chronological gap in British Sikh research. Having dealt with Sikhs and national identity, I then briefly evaluate research on this group's religious identity. Through the analysis, I show that although this is an extensively researched area, the interplay between British national identity and Sikhism has not been examined in any

depth. This is another gap that could partly be filled by my study as I briefly discuss the inherent link between Sikhs and Sikhism in this section. However, a fuller examination of the place of Sikhism in Britishness is beyond the scope of this research.

Having considered Sikhs in Britain and elsewhere, I next discuss information available on non-Sikh groups in Britain. I consider the regional 'home' nations of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as Britain's ethnic majority, the white British. Within the latter, I pay special heed to the ethnic English in England.

The ethnic English are of particular importance as their nationalism is that of the majority group in which Sikhs operate in. This is due firstly, to their numerical majority secondly, due to the historical conflation of Englishness and Britishness and thirdly, due to a majority of Sikhs living in England and being English-born. Approaching this as the 'operative' nationalism that Sikhs exist in, I assess the notions and practices of Britishness, whiteness and Englishness that affect minority national identity.

In the last part of the chapter, I briefly cover the rapid changes to both population expansion and ethnic mix in Britain. This will provide a wider justification on the timeliness of my testing national identity in one of Britain's minority ethnic groups. To begin, I turn to my review of the literature on British Sikh national identity.

Sikhs and Minority Ethnic National Identity in Britain

In my study, I view Sikh Britishness as comprising symbols – including events, peoples, markers, and actions that are affected by, and affect, Sikh British national identity. In particular, I am interested in understanding if I can predict variations in Sikh Britishness based on a Sikh's active choices – on general election voting for instance. In this respect, I theorise that of the many variables that form parts of a Sikh's identity in Britain, it is their

age that is most significant in determining variations in national identity – for example in their choosing between English and British national identity.

As context, I analyse research on the role of nationality among other minority ethnic groups such as Pakistani Muslims and Afro-Caribbeans in Britain. In comparison to these groups, Sikh British national identity has remained relatively unexamined. In fact, Sikh Indian nationalism has a much greater corpus. One reason for this is that research on the other minority groups tends to follow the public and political impact of the individual communities.

So, for this reason, there is more research on Muslim Britishness. An example is Hussain and Bagguley (especially 2005) who describe the use of Britishness, not whiteness as self-identification amongst the Pakistani Muslim community in Leeds and Bradford following civil unrest in Bolton in 2001. In London, racially-skewed police profiling and race riots in the 1980s and 1990s prompted Gilroy (1993) and Hall (1992b) to write about inter-racial politics and identity in the capital's Afro-Caribbean community.

In addition to these two communities, it is important to mention the Jewish community. Partly due to their longer mass migration pattern and their minority ethnic national identity politics, I consider this group to be a forerunner of the development of Britishness amongst minority ethnic groups. Furthermore, Jews bear important similarities to Sikhs as their ethno-religious character can form an important component of Jewish British national identity.

Reverting back to Sikhs in Britain, a key theme is that the community is often studied like that of most other Sikhs outside of India, which is by using historical or theological approaches. Very little attention is given to hostland national politics – be this from the standpoint of sociology or politics. I find this surprising as Sikhs are a popular symbol of

ethnic diversity in Britain. On the other hand, Sikhs do not create any major political headlines either.

However, the key to this apparent lack of attention could be that, although Sikhs are visually distinct British citizens, they are only a small part of the population of England and Wales – just 0.87 per cent in the 2011 census.⁶ Moreover, they are a small minority even when compared to other mainly non-white British minorities such as Muslims (4.8 per cent in 2011 census). Despite this, the approximately 423,581 Sikhs in the census are significant in the Sikh world as they form the largest national group of Sikhs outside India (for relative numbers see Shani, 2007, p. 81, Table 5.1).

In summary, regardless of the century-old relationship with Britain, and despite having challenged ethnic discrimination constitutionally (see especially Juss, 1995), the bulk of work on Sikh British national identity has been an indirect result of either general studies of minority groups or of work focusing mainly on majority groups. This is the gap my study will address, much as Bhambra (2021) does.

I begin this by highlighting that, despite the dearth of research and literature, popular British Sikh national identity politics are not new. I note for instance the over-representation of Sikhs in Britain's armed forces (Hussain and Ishaq, 2002). This is connected to the fact that Sikhs, since the Victorian era, have had a strong identification with Britain's armed forces – a feature that continues to this day. For example, the first Sikhs to wear the famous bearskin hats of the Queen's Guard at Buckingham Palace were

⁶ Source: Office of National Statistics (ONS). Additionally, see Jandu (2015) for a discussion on the relative size of this figure in comparison to other minority groups such as the Irish and Jewish communities in Britain.

Signaller Simranjit Singh and Lance Cpl. Sarvit Singh in 2009. Kelly (2009) found these symbols of Sikh Britishness were much vaunted by both the community and wider society.

Historically speaking, Sikhs in Britain have since before World War 1 played important roles in changes to British identity. As either soldiers in the armed forces or as post-war settlers, they have been constitutional pioneers in British multiculturalism. For this reason, there is significant work covering the phenomenon of Sikhs helping move the idea of Britishness away from notions of whiteness, Christianity, and *jus sanguinis* citizenship. However, much of it is historical, with a limited amount of analysis of contemporary identity. An example is Singh and Tatla (2006) who cover this history comprehensively.

For instance, their analysis of the three turban campaigns that began in the 1950s is illuminating for my research. They show how this gave Sikhs the essential political experience to lead the campaign for anti-discrimination laws in the late 1980s. Visram's (2002) analysis adds further historical weight by showing that special religious concessions to Sikhs (as British soldiers) had long been in place in national institutions since before World War 1. Thandi in Fisher, Lahiri and Thandi (2007) covers the politicised, post-war rise of the hybrid identity category British-Sikh.

As a theme, much of this work is derived from the relentless public campaigning and political leveraging that resulted in the Sikh community being legally designated as a unique ethnic group. The case *Mandla vs. Dowell* is extensively documented, as are Sikh judicial case wins including those involving them as public transport bus drivers in a landmark publication by Beetham (1970).

In summary, the historic interplay between Sikhs and national identity is fairly well covered. As such, the omission on Sikhs and national identity in Britain since the 1980s is all the more conspicuous.

This gap is partly due to the large volume of research dedicated to the Sikh secessionist movement in India during the same period. In the late 1980s the movement in India to found a sovereign Sikh nation (Khalistan) collapsed. This caused serious political fallout in the global community, which in turn led to a downturn in British Sikh political activity and corresponding British themed output. India's Sikhs became the sole focus of much of British Sikh literature. However, following this lull, the community's civic and political participation in shaping British national culture has been on the rise since the mid-1990s (see for instance Bhachu, 1991). All the same, despite this wave of post-secessionist commentary, there has been very limited published research since Singh and Tatla (2006).

Before 2006, I note that Ballard's *The Growth and Changing Character of the Sikh presence in Britain* (2000) only briefly covers national identity as part of the character of Sikhs in Britain. Whilst he observed the upwards trend in national identity politics as being that of citizens rather than settlers, he did not explore this part of Sikh identity any further, concentrating instead on religiosity. For instance, he could have built on the change in British Sikh national identity politics in relation to both the post-1992 European integration of the Maastricht Treaty and the promotion of multiculturalism by New Labour.

Following on from these political changes, it is unclear what effect migration from East and Central Europe may have had on Sikh Britishness. This was a time when newer notions of whiteness (European rather than British) affected aspects such as Sikh social activity and personal behaviour. For example, Polish migrants had started to reside in areas of major Sikh presence such as Hounslow. However, Ballard's focus was the religious 're-construction' of identity in the Sikh diaspora, thereby reflecting much of the earlier British Sikh literature. Likewise, Singh and Tatla (2006) covered national identity only briefly in their important book *Sikhs in Britain: The Making of a Community*. As their book

was published after the 2004 mass migration from ex-Communist nations in Europe, an analysis of its impact may have increased the relevance of this key text in Sikh studies.

These and other authors working in the field have extensively researched the historical development of the community. In doing so, they have left the contemporary use of Britishness in Sikh identity construction as a rich area for study – something that this research partially addresses.

So far, I have shown that limited research exists on Sikh Britishness, and this goes some way toward justifying my study. In addition, I have noted the importance of my research by stating that Sikhs are no longer associated just with homeland nationalism but also with hostland national integration, though both strands coexist.⁷ Further justification comes from the observation that Sikhs now occupy a wider spectrum of society, including professional, personal and social circles.

This means that they are becoming more representative of a national culture that is, for instance, moving away from occupations in manufacturing to niche service industries. One effect of this has been to change their national profile and they are now perceived as more than just a religious group by many British majority groups.

As evidence of this wider national profile, I note the following examples. In 2013 the first-ever British Sikh Report was initiated, coinciding with an historic Commons debate on the British Sikh Community. In 2011, Plymouth Council had its first Sikh Deputy Lord Mayor in Chaz Singh, itself a remarkable development as he was only one of 89 registered Sikhs

⁷ In June 2014, large numbers of Sikhs gathered in London's Trafalgar Square to commemorate the storming of Sikhism's holiest shrine in India. See also 2016 British Sikh Report that reported 95 per cent of its respondents were 'proud' to be British rather than just Sikh.

in Plymouth. During the Scottish referendum campaign in 2015, Hardeep Kohli became a very prominent proponent for the Scottish 'Yes' vote. In England, the national cricketer Monty Panesar and other Sikhs such as the artists The Singh Twins or Luke Sital-Singh have all moved into more mainstream occupations that have not hitherto been associated with Sikhs.⁸

Thus, at a time when Sikhs are embedding themselves into the national identity more fully, I note that there is a lack of research on these changes. This is the focus of my study. To be sure, Kathleen Hall (2002; 2005) partially addresses this omission in the literature. Her research provides foundational knowledge on the role of national culture amongst Britain's Sikhs. She reported that for Britain's Sikhs "the cultural politics of nation-formation is the battlefield upon which the immigrants and their children fight for inclusion, and to shift the boundaries of belonging." (2002, p. 114). As such, national identity as a 'vehicle' for social mobility and belonging formed a key theme in Hall's Sikh study as it does in mine. This last finding, that of belonging, serves as psychological background as to why Sikh Britishness now shows more similarity to majority white Britishness in my study.

Though there are limitations to this work in both subject area and methodology, these gaps help me develop my research in the following ways. Firstly, Hall focuses on Sikh identity and treats Britishness as a minute component of Sikhness for all Sikhs, irrespective of age, education, or duration of residence. Secondly, her data was mainly generated by qualitatively interviewing subjects in majority Sikh or South Asian locales in Northern England. There were no Sikhs from London, Midlands, Scotland or Wales. Lastly, the

⁸ I have detailed the breadth of the Sikhs' new social setting in Britain in Jandu (2015).

study only uses a narrow range of survey data. I address all these gaps in my study's research design, using her research as a crucial platform.

Another author who has observed the changing trend in identity politics amongst British-born Sikhs is Jaspal (2013 amongst others). Jaspal researched the identity process amongst Sikhs in Britain using the popular theme of religion. Additionally, he explored the theme of “[M]aintaining group continuity and distinctiveness in a threatening social context”, concluding that Sikh youth are facing the rising influence of British mainstream culture over their Indic heritage (2013, p. 226). Jaspal's work is an important milestone in British Sikh literature because it charts the rising influence of non-Sikh factors on British Sikh identity.

One reason for the lack of associated research in newer areas such as hostland nationality is that this community is known to be difficult to access. As some are relatively recent migrants who have experienced prejudice, they are especially reticent about questions of political status. This sensitivity means that the ten individuals Jaspal interviewed cannot be taken as fully representative (nor does he suggest they are). They are, however, indicative of wider changes in Sikh identity. Modelling this in my work, I will also conduct interviews with members of the community. As a British Sikh knowledgeable in the culture, including being a Punjabi speaker, this gives me an opportunity to gain access quite readily to this source.

I have also been influenced by another study on Sikhs in Britain, albeit in a different subject area. Lloyd, Singh et al (2013) compared patient care between North Indian Punjabi Sikhs and their white British counterparts using third party datasets (in this case via health records). This provided the authors with a wide independent data pool. Therefore, by cross-checking health records against subject interviews, they formed

conclusions using both quantitative and qualitative data. This is a rare approach in Sikh studies as most work is qualitatively grounded. My study also uses a mixed-methods approach, combining narratives of twenty-five interviewees with a 50-question survey across a sample of 100 Sikhs.

In searching for research that considers how Sikhs interact with society, I find Avtar Brah's (2003) *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities* useful. It examined the reasons why British Sikh identity had taken on a more British emphasis. She found that Sikhs in Britain were one of the minority groups that were interested in adjusting the "relationality" between themselves and the "regimes of power" (p. 188). As such, this is a valuable addition to Sikh research. However, Brah did not offer any conclusions on Sikhs and national identity. This would have been very feasible given that her data samples were drawn from key Sikh population groups in Britain, such as those in Southall, London.

Part of the reason for this is that Sikhs were not the sole focus of her extensive field research, since she focused on improving theoretical frameworks for understanding minority groups more generally. Additionally, I note that Brah does not utilise any external, independent data from surveys or statistical datasets, whereas I rely on a wide range, including the national censuses of 2001 and 2011.

So far, I have noted that the use of survey data, third-party or otherwise, is missing from much extant work. The usefulness of such data lies in the statistical rigour this brings to any ethnographic study of British Sikhs. This is the reason Jasjit Singh (2011; 2012) gives for doing the same in his study of the religious socialisation of Sikh youth in Britain. To study identity formation among British Sikh youth, he surveyed over 600 subjects. This is a sizeable sample, meaning that his publications were based on the largest-ever Sikh youth data cache – a segment which represents the future of Sikh identity. His unpublished 2012

PhD thesis, “Keeping the Faith: The Transmission of Sikhism among young British Sikhs (18-30)” can thus be seen as the bedrock of quantitative approaches to analysing British Sikh identity.⁹ An additional aspect of gathering such a large sample is that Singh was been able to pinpoint changes in British Sikh identity across three generations.

So overall, he collected considerable data on Sikh youth in Britain and had important findings on identity changes. Yet there is no material specifically on national identity. Using his study as important research, I therefore bring new quantitative data to bear on the question of Sikh national identity together with qualitative data from interviews.

The foregoing analysis of work on Britain’s Sikhs reveals that significant gaps remain, with many questions left unanswered. Furthermore, I have shown that my study is differentiated by the objective of seeking to understand this group’s identity through the prism of secular Britishness rather than the heritage of religious or cultural identity. By this I mean not approaching Sikhs through Sikhism or their Indian or Punjabi ancestry.

So, if Sikh British national identity is important and that the literature on it is limited, this points to the need for a study of this kind. My research adds to both the embryonic field of Sikh studies as well as the more voluminous field of nationalism studies. For this reason, the study’s novel and distinct approach to British Sikhs will produce new perspectives, conclusions, and as personal interest for the author, can afford a glimpse into the future of British Sikh identity.

⁹ As an example, the annual British Sikh Report has utilised these quantitative approaches ever since, further justifying the same methodology in this study.

Sikhs and National Identity in North America

There is also a burgeoning quantity of Sikh research in North America. This is so for three reasons: first, due to events such as 9/11 and the Oak Creek shootings ¹⁰ second, because of the large number of Sikhs on the continent – over 500,000 according to Shani (2007, p. 81, Table 5.1) ¹¹ and third, there exists a well-funded research infrastructure for Sikh studies there. On this last point, several universities in California host Sikh studies Chairs, with two global Sikh studies journals based there. These are *The Journal of Punjab Studies* and *Sikh Formations*. A recent publication, *The Oxford Handbook of Sikh Studies* edited by Pashaura Singh and Louis E. Fenech in 2014 further appraises the strength of the research in North America.

However, despite these supportive factors, much of the North American Sikh literature remains broadly focused on communitarian identity. For instance, the above two research journals carry little on Sikh hostland national identity in North America.

A foundational essay that signposts this gap and the need for more research in this space is that by Ahluwalia (2011) entitled “At Home in Motion: Evolving Sikh Identities.”¹²

Ahluwalia, noticing the changes in Sikh identity over several decades, hinted at the need for future research on Sikh identity – such as my study. He stated that Sikh identity outside India is firstly, less dependent on homeland politics and secondly, more reliant on

¹⁰ In August 2012, a suspected white supremacist gunned down several Sikhs in a Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

¹¹ This enumeration is an approximation. Outside of Britain, very few countries that host Sikhs advocate the counting of religious groups.

¹² *Sikh Formations*, Aug. 2011, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 95–109.

interaction with non-Sikhs. Given this, he wrote that the key to analysing Sikhs as citizens abroad lies in understanding their setting in host societies. Although national identity politics is not specifically covered by Ahluwalia, his essay resonates with my own Sikh Britishness study as I consider Sikh national identity in Britain to be influenced by the wider society, not just the Sikh community. As such, he too identified a conceptual lacuna I address in this research.

Another study of this type is Verne Dusenbery's (2008) book *Sikhs at Large: Religion, Culture, and Politics in Global Perspective*. This contains an entire section titled "Sikhs and the State" that focused on firstly, "Sikh understandings of their social world and their place in it" and secondly, "Sikh responses to life as a minority in diverse political contexts" (p. 1). This all overlaps with the aims of my own study and forms useful background material. However, as Dusenbery's volume does not cover Sikhs in Britain, its relevance is limited for my case group.

In this way, Ahluwalia's essay and Dusenbery's book are good representations of the changing themes now emerging in North American Sikh studies. Where the group's identity is concerned, I identify more and more interest in societal rather than communitarian factors. So, for example, national identity is becoming popular whereas religiosity is lessening.

This strongly connects with my research in two main ways. First, these societal themes are very prominent in Britain – especially among younger Sikhs. This gives me a foundation to build on as I refine these themes to evidence both strong and weak symbolic differences within Sikh Britishness. Secondly, as this pioneering work is on North American Sikhs, it underlines the need for more research on the national identity of Sikhs in Britain.

Other observations can be drawn from the North American literature. For instance, there is a slightly different emphasis on community versus society in Sikh identity there. In North America, cultural identity, especially religion, supersedes hostland national identity. The names of the various Sikh organisations in America are indicative of this. Take for instance the ‘Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund’ or ‘The Sikh American Chamber of Commerce’. In Britain, nationality is at least on par with, if not in the ascendancy of, the community in naming conventions. Titles such as ‘British Sikh Association’ or ‘British Sikh Report’ have risen in popularity compared to ‘Sikh Messenger’ or ‘*Des Pardes*’ (roughly translated as ‘home and abroad’).

Another indicator is self-categorisation amongst Sikh youth in North America and Britain. Sikh youth in America popularly self-label as Sikh-American whilst in Britain this is often British-Sikh or even simply British or English. Whilst acknowledging these as anecdotal observations, these find an echo in the data I will produce and analyse in later chapters.

In short, there is significant literature on North American Sikhs, but it is limited with regard to hostland national identity. Thus, my research on ethnicity and nationalism can also inform the study of Sikhs’ national identity in North America.

Sikhs and National Identity in Mainland Europe

There are reportedly over 100,000 Sikhs in mainland Europe. This is the fourth largest cluster of Sikhs globally and the second largest in Europe after Britain (Shani, 2007, p. 81, Table 5.1).¹³ As such, the question of their national identity has become crucial in Sikh studies. This is despite the fact that most are recent migrant families (from the mid-1980s

¹³ This enumeration is an approximation. Outside Britain, very few countries that host Sikhs advocate the counting of religious groups.

onwards) and, more remarkably, many have yet to obtain national citizenship of their host countries.

One explanation for this increase in Sikh hostland national identity politics is the recent and sudden increase in Europe-wide political debates on ethnicity and national identity.¹⁴ In this political environment, Sikhs in mainland Europe are engaging with party politics as they seek to secure their futures. This development makes my study timely as I too try and determine the nature of a Sikh's national identity away from India. For this reason, my findings can help understand migrant Sikh communities in Italy, France, Spain, Germany and Scandinavia and, to a lesser extent, in Portugal, Belgium, Holland and Ireland.

In spite of this political phenomenon and the participation of Sikhs in mainstream politics, the literature on Sikhs in Europe remains centred on religiosity. For instance, in 2009, one of the first Spanish book on Sikhism was published. This was Agustin Paniker's *Los Sikhs: Historia, identidad y religion*. This book offered a simplistic 'world religions' introduction to Sikhism without offering any insight into the identity of the tens of thousands of migrant Sikhs who cannot obtain Spanish citizenship. This is a missed opportunity in understanding the thousands of Sikhs that work in the service economy in cities such as Barcelona and Madrid.

This is also the case with Sandra Santos Fraile (2013). In her essay she referred to Sikhs in Barcelona as being *nouvinguts* or a newly arrived community which had no political demands (p. 251). This has partly been corrected by Garha and Valls (2017) who have

¹⁴ Implied by this is the rise of racialised party politics in Europe. For instance, in Italy through the Northern Alliance, in France through the National Front, in Germany through Alternative for Germany, in Spain through the party VOX and in the Netherlands through the Party for Freedom.

provided detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of the identity formations of Spain's Sikhs. Fraile herself in 2020 produced a more nuanced work on gender and agency amongst the different generations of Sikhs in Spain. Her conclusions that younger Sikhs are less traditional in their gender roles show that newer Sikhs are more likely to fit in with mainstream than communitarian mores.

In Scandinavia, Sikh studies is more developed than in Spain. This is mainly due to the large volume of collected essays by Jacobsen and Myrvold, (2011, 2012 and 2015).

However, despite the extensive output, I note that it was not until 2015 that an essay on Sikh national identity was included, which was authored by this researcher. All the same, given that the first volume was published in 2011, this is a much swifter development than has generally been the case in this field.

So, even though these publications have quickly expanded the research field, their focus is on the religious identity of migrant Sikhs as a non-dominant minority in European societies. They do not contain much in the way of Sikhs' interaction with the dominant majority group or culture. For instance, they have omitted topics such as the rise of inter-ethnic marriage, voting behaviour, or host national identification. Nevertheless, Jacobsen and Myrvold offer a new perspective on the community's migration story, as these Scandinavian Sikh communities form an even smaller minority group than in Britain. Owing to this, these three books contain valuable essays on religious and cultural identity amongst newer Sikh groups outside India.

As such, this body of the literature too is reflective of the general state of Sikh studies literature. Sikhs' hostland national identity is not covered as a part of Sikh identity, which remains focused on Indian heritage. Only three essays of thirty-seven across the three volumes discuss Sikhs interacting with non-Sikhs. These are first, Qureshi (in Jacobsen

and Myrvold, 2015) who explored the issue of Punjabi and non-Punjabi culture ‘switching’ amongst British Punjabi youth and second, Papageorgiou (in Jacobsen and Myrvold, 2011) who tested the reasons for the lack of integration of Sikhs in Greece. Finally, this author (in Jacobsen and Myrvold, 2015) who argued that the national identity politics of Sikh youth in London represented a new direction in Sikh identity politics abroad. Furthermore, two of these very recent essays are by British authors, namely myself and Qureshi. This again shows how little has been done in this field as this is significantly more than elsewhere in the non-Indian scholarship.

Sikhs and National Identity in Italy

When compared to other nations of mainland Europe, the literature on Sikhs in Italy stands out for two reasons. First, it is relatively large because significant research on Sikhs in Italy is now reaching publication stage. Second, the themes covered are mainly hostland, rather than homeland politics. Another characteristic of research on Sikhs in Italy is that it involves more researchers from the ‘host’ society, by which I mean non-Sikh Italians rather than Sikh Italians.

I am convinced of its value by the meaningful and substantive data the researchers have gathered. By this I refer to Bertolani (e.g., 2011, 2013a); Grillo and Pratt (2002); Ferraris and Sai (2009); Lum (2012); Gallo (2012) and Hastir (2013). They have all published extensively on the transformation of Sikhs from settlers to citizens. In discussions with some of these authors and the community, one reason for this becomes clear. Members of the community have made themselves accessible to researchers in a bid to increase their national profile, especially in trying to gain Italian citizenship for first generation Sikhs. Many Sikh societies, such as *Sikhi Sewa Society* in Central Italy have active publication drives.

Thus, despite the relatively recent arrival of Sikhs in Italy in the late 1980s, the research already reflects their widespread engagement with Italy's majority white Catholics. Significant for my work, it is clear that both Sikhs and Catholics share a common and strong pride in being Italian. Most of the output, including that in popular media such as *Facebook*, supports this theme. In some ways, this literature and community is reminiscent of Sikhs in Britain at the end of the 1990s. At that stage, considerable attention was paid to them due to the popularity of multiculturalism.

For Sikhs in Italy, researchers emphasise the use of religion, both Sikhism and Catholicism, in the identity formation of both Sikh and non-Sikh youth in Sikh-populated parts of central Italy (Bertolani, 2013a). I follow this model by comparing British Sikhs to British whites. In the same volume, Bertolani identified the importance of food as a connection to Italianness. She showed that even first-generation Sikhs cooked pizzas at home but added popular Indian ingredients such as spicy 'masala' and Bird's Eye chillies. This formed a simple and effective link with non-Sikh Italians.

The theme of food also characterises the place of Sikhs in Italianness. Many run the agriculture and dairy farms producing Italian foods such as Parmesan and Mozzarella. As these foods are key national symbols, the Sikhs' roles in reviving and sustaining their production is a national success story (Lum, 2012). Based on this, I include British and Indian culinary symbols as tests of Britishness in my survey.

As a final example, Singh and Holland's article (2011) on the newly-erected war monument in Forli, Northern Italy uncovered the vigorous nationalistic nature of Sikh political activity in Italy. Here the community have helped fund a war memorial to commemorate the Sikh soldiers who fell in Italy during the two World Wars. It is a part of the Indian War Cemetery maintained by the local municipality. As comparison, it was not until 2019 that a

similar memorial was erected in Britain, a nation in which Sikhs are a much longer settled community.

In summary, the presence of Italian Sikhs in the dairy industry, the war memorial to Sikhs, and Sikh school childrens' voluntary learning of Catholicism provide examples of how this group has carefully used Italian, not Sikh or Indian, identity components in their identity politics. Perhaps connected to this politically-motivated mainstream engagement, I note that Sikhs in Italy are fairly well acculturated migrants. Evidence of this is provided in the recent publications I listed earlier. One that stands out is Lum (2012) on the politics of building new Sikh Temples in an overwhelmingly Catholic country. This is a key reference for my study as she has collected data from local politicians on the subject of Sikhs and Italianness. This interaction between Sikhs and white Italian groups has led me to survey white British groups in my study.

In closing this section on Sikhs in Italy, I note the research is based on two broad developments in Sikh engagement with Italian national politics. First is the rise of ethnic and racial debates in Italian mainstream and local politics. Second, and maybe in response to the first, is the assertion by second generation Italian Sikh youth of their *jus soli* right of residency and equality of social standing. This situation is very similar to Sikhs in Britain as shown by Jaspal (2013), Singh and Tatla (2006) or myself in Jandu (2015) for instance. In many respects, I consider the Sikh Italian national hostland identity literature to reflect the future of British Sikh hostland politics. This is because it has moved on from Sikh Indian nationalism or Sikh homeland politics. I examine this next.

Sikhs and National Identity in India

Sikh Indian national identity is comprehensively covered, especially for the period after 1980. This is mainly because Sikhs in India have long campaigned and agitated for an

independent Sikh state – even before Partition in 1947. This culminated in a separatist movement for Khalistan in the mid to late 1980s. As such, virtually all of this work can be classed as the politics of minority ethnicity or religious nationalism rather than Sikh Indianness. Despite this, Sikh Indian national identity forms an important but distant backdrop for my study, since India is the source of the homeland politics that affects Sikh British national identity in some Sikhs.

Apart from the heritage aspect of Indian culture, the influence from India is significant because the movement for sovereignty gained widespread support from Sikhs in Britain. Darshan Tatla's (1999) *The Sikh Diaspora. The Search for Statehood* and Brian Axel's (2001) *The Nation's Tortured Body: Violence, Representation, and the Formation of a Sikh "Diaspora"* as well as his *Diasporic Imaginary* are good examples of this. These books researched the effect this violent movement had on Sikh identity in Britain and abroad. Giorgio Shani (2007) did the same in *Sikh Nationalism and Identity in a Global Age*. Shani perceived a Sikh identity debased from an ancestral homeland but maintained that religion is key to understanding Sikhs abroad.

In addition, the theme of Indian Sikh nationalism forms the most popular discourse in the two academic journals centred on Sikhs, *Sikh Formations* and *The Journal of Punjab Studies*. In fact, the latter was founded and launched as an academic response to the 1984 Amritsar incident.¹⁵ More generally speaking, after the theological study of Sikhism, homeland politics forms the second most popular subject in Sikh studies. It has affected how some Sikhs in Britain treat their Indian identity heritage, for instance by 'Sikhizing' Indian freedom fighters. An example is Louis Fenech's essay (2002) on Udham Singh. He

¹⁵ This refers to the storming of Sikhism's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple (*Harmandir Sahib*), by Indian armed forces in June 1984.

evidenced the influential role of Indian nationalism for Sikhs in Britain, as did Shani (2007) who listed over seven Sikh nationalist organisations with memberships in Britain.

However, this popularity of Indian Sikh nationalism is not uniform across all Sikhs in Britain. Its segmented appeal reveals two clear variations in Sikh Britishness. First, many British Sikhs from earlier generations continue to identify with the Sikh nationalist movement in India. They consider themselves either a part of an Indian-Sikh “ethno-nationalist movement” (Singh, P., 2011) or a “subaltern nationalism” (Behl, 2007). This is Sikh homeland politics and is mainly associated with older Sikhs.

Second, British politics is becoming more important than Indian politics for younger Sikhs. Hence, the focus on Sikh Britishness. Using Indian national identity politics as a pivot, I note that younger Sikhs choose not to “fuse religion and nationalist concerns” in their identity politics (Kinvall, 2002, p. 34) due to what Mandair. A. (2007) suggests is a “(dis)Order of Indian Identity” (p. 338).

In summary, Sikh Indian nationalism is useful in my study as it is linked to a very obvious variation in identity across generations. When coupled with the lack of research on Sikh Britishness, I aim to contribute to existing research by utilising national identity, rather than religion or ethnicity, as the framework to study Sikhs in Britain. Furthermore, the extensive work on Sikh nationalism elsewhere serves, once again, to show that firstly, national identity remains very important to Sikhs and secondly, that a large gap exists in the study of national identity among British Sikhs. Specifically, the more hostland-focused identity of younger Sikhs has received little treatment. My study helps rectify this.

Having analysed research on one group of Sikhs who show high levels of national identity politics, I move to another group who, likewise, consider hostland national identity a key part of their lives. These are Sikhs in Kenya.

Sikhs and National Identity in Kenya

Sikhs in Kenya provide my study with an unusual case group on Sikhs and hostland national identity. This is because this community has invested significantly in their Kenyanness. As a result, Kenya is the only present example in which Sikhs have helped construct contemporary hostland national identity through wilful acts of nationhood. As this has been achieved amongst a majority non-Sikh population, it forms a compellingly reflective and comparative example for my study on Britain's Sikhs and their national identity.

As such, Kenyanness could be one possible direction for understanding the development of Sikh Britishness. Kenyan Sikhs such as Makhan Singh, Chanan Singh and Jaswant Singh have all played an important part in creating post-colonial Kenyan national identity. However, when it comes to the literature, the key role of these freedom fighters in identity construction is limited and lacking in analytical depth.

The Kenyan literature on Sikhs has two streams. Firstly, there is the general literature that focused on the role of South Asians, including Sikhs, in the political struggle for Kenyan independence. Examples of this literature includes Seidenberg (1983); Patel, Z. (1997 and 2006); Mangat (1969) and Singh, M. (1969 & 1980). Here, South Asian minority groups are approached as diligent mercantile classes utilised by the British colonial forces for trade infrastructure purposes. However, these authors did not cover the national identity politics of Sikhs or South Asians more generally. For example, Mangat's (1969) *A History of the Asians in East Africa. ca. 1886 to 1945* covered the "immigration and settlement of the Asians in East Africa" (p. ix). National identity was not singled out for comment for any Asian community in this critical publication.

As for the second type of research, there is work that focused solely on the role of Sikhs in the independence struggle and nation-building. In this category, the literature on Makhan Singh is the most popular. It includes Patel, Z.'s (2006) *Unquiet: The Life and Times of Makhan Singh*; Durrani's (2015) *Makhan Singh: A Revolutionary Kenyan Trade Unionist*; Singh, M. (1969) *History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952*; Singh, M. (1980) *1952-1956 Crucial Years of Kenya Trade Unions* and finally Patel, A. (1963) *Struggle for Release: Jomo Kenyatta and his colleagues*. One drawback of this literature is that it is not critical enough. The tone struck is one of lore that is based on limited historical and interview data.

I divide this second type of Kenyan Sikh research into two periods. The first covers the period between the Partition of Africa and the start of World War 2. In this period, very little is written about Sikhs and Kenyan national identity, probably because the independence movement was in its infancy. In contrast, the period after World War 2 is much better covered. Many publications contribute information on the active role Sikhs played in the independence struggle as well as the creation of Kenyan national identity. However, given that the involvement of Asians in nation-building was short-lived and not very widespread, the literature likewise follows a similar path.

Makhan Singh's writings (1969; 1980) stand out as critical texts in understanding how Sikhs contributed to, and what they made of, the new nation. His work illuminates how Sikhs were easily accepted as equal citizens and became celebrated freedom fighters. Singh's (1969) autobiography is exemplary for the study of national identity politics as it details his use of the trade union movement in the fight for independence. This same theme is found in Ambu Patel's' (1963) *Struggle for Release: Jomo Kenyatta and his colleagues*.

To summarise this section, the literature on Sikhs and nationalism in Kenya is narrow and iconographic. Because of its limited nature, it underestimates the extent to which Sikhs, like many other Asians, contributed significantly to the establishment of the Kenyan nation in 1963. It can even be said that they were at one time considered African rather than Asian due to their efforts in fighting for independence. Take for example the popular Swahili name used to describe this African-Sikh hybridity, *kalasingha*. In direct translation, it means 'black Sikh' and is used by both black and non-black Africans to describe Sikhs in Kenya as a sign of their integration. Another is *dugu* or brother. Despite this, no author has covered the use of these totemic phrases. In summary, further research is needed on the Kenyan national identity of Sikhs in Kenya.

Having analysed literature on the various Sikh communities, I now turn my attention to examining research on various aspects of Sikh identity. This helps understand how far Sikh national identity has been looked at in theoretical terms. I find that there is limited work on this. I start by considering the work on Sikh identity and Sikhism next.

Sikh Identity and Sikhism in Britain

So far, I have shown that work on Sikh national identity is limited. This is not the case for Sikh religiosity or Sikhism. One possible reason for the popularity of religion is connected to its success in helping the community overcome political challenges.¹⁶ As such, current literature treats religion as the crucial factor in Sikh cultural politics right across the global community.

¹⁶ This may also be accounted for by the fact that Sikhism is the world's fifth largest religion in numbers. Therefore, the most voluminous literature available on Sikh identity is that on the role of religion in community identity.

In Britain, there is work on Sikhism as a social barrier between Sikhs and non-Sikhs (e.g., Singh, J., 2010), the effects of Punjabi-Sikh upbringing on identity during teenage schooling years (e.g., Nesbitt, 2009), religion and gender in Sikhism (e.g., Jakobsh, 2006 and 2010; Bhachu, 1991) as well as Casteism (Takhar, 2005; Hirvi, 2010). As such, religion remains a significant influence on the Sikhs' social action and identity. However, its interplay with nationalism is beyond the remit of my study. For this reason, my study will take religion into account in a slightly different manner. I discuss this briefly next.

In my research, I fold religiosity into the ethnicity of Sikhs rather than treating it as a separate part of identity. This is because I do not consider religion as a dominant factor, nor do I consider that it works in isolation when testing national identity in this case group. This is not to say that it does not affect Sikh identity; it remains a very important factor, but not for Sikh Britishness. Instead, I use ethnicity. I do this for two reasons, first religious and secular aspects of Sikh identity overlap. One powerful example is that of the Sikh turban. The turban, strictly speaking, is not part of the five faith symbols in Sikhism, yet it is often at the forefront of religious discrimination cases.¹⁷ So, my approach simplifies the various components of a Sikh's heritage and allows me to include non-religious aspects into my study, thereby widening its relevance beyond simple ethno-religious community boundaries.

Second, I conceptualise that ethnicity rather than religion has a greater effect on contemporary and future Britishness. I base this on the fact that Britishness is becoming more secular and that society itself is less religiously organised. Furthermore, as a greater

¹⁷ See Singh and Tatla (2006) or McLeod (1989).

volume of work, including statistics, exists on ethnic, not religious, Britishness, this makes more sense for this thesis.

Thus, separating and treating religion on its own would not lead me to findings that I can contextualise in the field of nationalism studies. Based on work I have examined so far this would be an erroneous reflection of British Sikh national identity politics. Further support for my theorisation that Sikhism on its own does not affect national identity in the same way as ethnicity comes from existing publications. For instance, the analysis by Singh and Tatla (2006) of the court case of *Mandla vs. Dowell* shows that the use of culture, rather than religion, led to very successful 'opt-outs' of rules for Sikhs. Following this landmark ruling, Sikhs have been excluded from wearing helmets whilst riding motorbikes, whilst working on construction sites, and in jobs that where a turban can be considered a contravention of uniform rules.

This completes my review of the literature on Sikhs and national identity globally, as well as relevant work on Sikh religious identity. In summary, I have shown that there is limited work on Sikh Britishness. I consider this is a surprise for several reasons. First, there is long history of Sikhs being recognised as part of Britain's ethnic mosaic. Second, a significant amount of work exists on Indian Sikh nationalism and finally, work on Sikh identity in North America and Europe is gathering pace. This gap in British Sikh studies is all the more noticeable due to the prominent role the community has played in multicultural debates, race relations rulings, and its affinity with the British Armed Forces. My work helps to address this omission.

In the next part of this chapter, I analyse two non-Sikh categories in Britain. First, I look at studies on the British national identity of non-Sikh ethnic minorities and second, I examine work dealing with the national identity of the white British majority. These two

groups form the British Sikhs' immediate minority and majority groups and, thus, their identity politics affects Sikhs. It also helps me design my study based on the success of this research.

National Identity Amongst Non-Sikh Ethnic Minorities in Britain

I broadly classify research on national identity amongst non-Sikh ethnic minorities in Britain into two categories: non-territorial and territorial minorities. Among non-territorial minorities I include groups such as white Europeans, Asian Muslims, as well as the Jewish and Afro-Caribbean communities. The second group is the territorially-bound British groups, such as the Scottish and the Welsh. For the latter, I very briefly examine the depth and quality of the literature that covers ethnic Scottish and Welsh identities. My focus in this section is on research covering non-territorial minorities such as South Asian Muslims. These, I theorise, are groups whose national identity politics most closely resemble that of Sikhs in Britain. This is in the main (but not only) due to the lack of a territorial British homeland for these groups when compared to the Welsh or Scottish.

My discussion of non-territorial minorities' national identity begins with a community that has received mass attention since the 1990s. This is the Asian Muslim community in Britain. The Pakistani Muslim community in particular has an identity which has been well researched. With regard to my study of Sikh Britishness, I note that the literature on British Pakistani Muslims is already regularly cited in British Sikh studies. As such, it provides an important stimulus and reference for my own study, inspiring a similar approach and research design for my study of Sikh Britishness.

South Asian Muslims and Britishness

Examining the literature covering South Asian Muslims in Britain reveals that a pattern seems to exist. The early literature, from the 1980s onwards, placed this group at the centre of national discussions on secular multiculturalism and diversity, not religion and ethnicity. This literature was produced by authors who approached this group as an ethnic community sharing similar characteristics with other South Asian groups such as Hindus and Sikhs. A decade or so later, there seems to have been a shift in the literature. The literature of the 1990s includes the analysis of South Asian Muslims as a 'problem' religious community with belief-based radicalisation and resulting marginalisation.

Much of this analysis was centred on the fact that British South Asian Muslims share Islam with Arab Muslims living in areas affected by conflict. In addition, some of the shift in focus can be attributed to the transnational nature of the financial aid and armed support offered by British Muslims to Muslims involved in the Bosnian War in 1992. More recently, literature has been focused on intra-community dynamics. These include sexuality, gender, and citizenship strands. It is this literature that is most appropriate for my aim of assessing national identity amongst Sikhs.

On this latter theme, there is a significant body of work dealing with Pakistani Muslim conceptions of Britishness. The large size of this literature is partly a response to several highly public incidents such as the 1988 Rushdie affair, 9/11 and 7/7. Following these events, a vast literature has developed on this group, covering their national identity in host societies such as Britain and the USA.

This research is useful due to the shared ancestry and South Asian heritage of Sikhs and most British Muslims. As in Sikh studies, the role of religion is the most popular subject and religious traditions such as outward appearance, communal gatherings, and gendered

practices remain a key component of work on identity among both communities. A large part of the research can be classified into one of two streams. One focuses on this group as a marginalised part of society and the other as an integral part of a diverse Britain.

Muslims in Britain as an Ethnic Group

Literature published in the 1980s on British South Asian Muslims covers them as a group possessing distinct characteristics associated with an ethnic group. So, for instance, very specific kinds of food, clothing, physical features, music, and literature have all been attributed to Muslims whose ancestry is South Asian. This in itself was an attempt by authors to move beyond the binary racial terms, prevalent at that time, of black and white. In this categorisation, Muslims, like other South Asian minorities, were classified as black. This cultural emphasis is found in the work of Modood (1990; 1994 and 2000) and Anwar (1981; 1985).

These authors emphasised the specific and separate cultural politics that had not yet been highlighted by those who placed South Asian Muslims in the same category as Africans or Afro-Caribbeans. Modood's work (e.g., 1988) can be assessed as being successful in affecting a political environment where ethnic groups such as Sikhs were examined in their "own terms" which, in addition to those already mentioned, included family structures and language (p. 403).

Muslims in Britain as a Religious Group

In the 1990s, literature on British Muslims became a little more specialised, focusing on the interplay between ethnic groups and Islam. The rapid growth of this literature was partly due to the heightened level of media interest in British Muslims and Islam following on from violent incidents in the 1990s. These include the First Gulf War in 1991 and World

Trade Centre bombing in 1993. This work also highlights the increasing levels of interest amongst the British Muslim community in the Arab/Israeli conflict. Furthermore, it conceptualises British Muslims as ‘Muslims first, then British’. Authors here include Baser (2015) who wrote on religious plurality within Muslims and Mac an Ghaill and Haywood (2015) who covered religious and race issues amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi men in Britain.

It is noteworthy that this work did not delineate South Asian Muslim groups into, say, Bangladeshi or Pakistani Muslims. Instead, they are all conceptualised as one religious group. This approach to South Asian Muslims, where religion is essentialised, undermines several other important cultural identity markers, such as secular culture and language differences. In order to recognise these, the approach of my research avoids placing primacy on religion over secular aspects of British life, such as political behaviour, when considering Sikh national identity.

Authors who examined this group’s own identity dynamics, that is as Muslims rather than South Asians, include Mac an Ghaill and Haywood (2015); Jacobson (1997) or Asad (1990). They investigated the assertion in popular commentary that Muslim identities were shifting away from ethnicity to religion, with some arguing that this shift in Muslim identity could cause a crisis on a national level (Rahsaan, 2006). Other, more recent, researchers challenged the popular idea that Islam was a factor in the community’s marginalisation (Meer and Modood, 2015), thereby testing the notion that Muslims in Britain were problematic or segregationist.

Muslim Britishness in Britain

A significant portion of the more recent (2000s onwards) literature questions the idea that Muslims in Britain are not mainstream and avoid Britishness. For example, Deborah

Phillips (2015) tested the theory that British Muslims vie with the “majority white British population and its institutions” (p. 62). Her work analysed the ‘neighbourly’ nature of the daily interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims. As such, she focused on shared living spaces where Muslims and the newer migrants, such as Eastern Europeans, met.

She concluded that the settlement of white Christian communities in popular Muslim areas had not caused concern amongst British Muslims. Instead, it had brought out notions of British citizenship or civically-minded behaviour in them. She suggested that this was the beginning of a new dynamic of British identity politics, where minority groups play wider roles in civic cohesion, much as Parekh (2000a) did. She concluded by highlighting the rapid ethnic changes taking place via migration and differential natural increase. This, she stated, made research on the development of Britain’s minority ethnic groups essential.

Phillips (2015) noted that since Britishness formed a key part of this group’s identity, some Muslims leading ‘parallel lives’ could not be considered representative of the wider Muslim population. Bearing in mind that Sikhs in certain areas have also been considered in this manner (e.g., in Birmingham and Southall), I consider her approach illuminating.

Additionally, I borrow Phillips’ successful data reporting methodology. Rather than referring to secondary source generalisations, she utilises Geertz’s approach of ‘thick description’ to report interview data. I take a similar approach in my qualitative research.

Finally, her work is topical as it covers the society-wide demographic changes taking place in Britain due to migration, differential natural birth rates, and the youthful average ages in minority ethnic communities. These changes deeply affected the Muslim community over a decade ago, much as they do the Sikhs I study today. Other key authors here include Hussain and Bagguley (2005), Werbner (2000), Basit (2009) and Baser (2015).

Hussain and Bagguley stand out for several reasons. First, this is due to the data collection method they used and secondly, because of their finding that South Asian communities had begun to utilise mainstream identity politics in their personal identities. This included popular culture, political behaviour, and social class over religiosity and community culture. Thirdly, their delineation of the three Muslim generations in Britain informs my study on how an intra-ethnic analysis can work. I apply the same technique when testing Sikh Britishness, noting variation in national identity by age.

For instance, Hussain and Bagguley used two enlightening terms to describe the age groups of Pakistani Muslims in the Bradford area. They used ‘denizens’ to describe the first generation and ‘citizens’ to describe the second. Since I theorise that Sikh identity varies by age, this terminology and its differentiation by age provides me with a useful lexicon. In particular, their finding that younger Muslims were likely to connect with national identity supports my choice of studying the Britishness of Sikhs. Put simply, my hypothesis is not without analogies elsewhere, thus this research on British Muslims provides a useful template for my own work.

Despite the fact that many aspects of this literature lend support to my approach, I build on it to include the third generation of British Sikhs, missed by most of this Muslim research. For this reason, my chapters on Sikhs, especially the younger ones, prioritise their native-born Britishness as an intra-communal identity marker. This, I theorise, sets them apart from earlier Sikhs as newer groups in both communities are more aware of national identity politics and, unlike their predecessors, are more likely to base their social actions on it.

In summary, the above study examples on British Muslims show that the politics of national belonging amongst minority ethnic groups form part of their identity. As both

Sikhs and Muslims utilise Britishness in their identity construction, this provides further justification for my study. Finally, there is considerably less work on the Britishness of Sikhs than of Muslims – this further highlights the contribution of my study.

Muslims in Britain and Gender Studies

Apart from national identity, there are other well-developed fields of British Muslim identity politics now coming to fruition. One rapidly expanding area is that of Muslim gender politics. Within this field, two subdisciplines are emerging. The first is gender equality politics for Muslim women, while the second deals with male Muslim identity. Of the latter, the role of masculinity in male gender politics, as well as work on gay Muslims, is of increasing scholarly interest. In female gender politics, Vasilaki (2015), Werbner (2007), Hutnik and Street (2010) and Butler (1999) have all argued that women in British Muslim communities are currently not equal to men in agency. Some of this scholarship, such as Hutnik and Street (2010) and Vasilaki (2015), can be considered activist literature.

Whilst female gender politics does not link with national identity in the same way as generational studies, the work of Meer, Dwyer and Modood (2010) is an exception. Theirs is an analysis of the Islamic veil, described as a ‘visible statement of separation and of difference’ by the then-sitting MP and Leader of the House of Commons, Jack Straw. By connecting Islamic female traditions to nationhood and British national identity, they provided new insight into the media’s reaction to Straw’s comments. The authors concluded that Britishness remains problematic to define, it was however portrayed as excluding the Islamic veil. So, whilst this literature still treated Muslims as a group whose religion created a difference, its importance for my work lies in the connection of this discussion to conceptions of national identity.

Sikhs, like Muslims, have prominent religious symbols that make up key aspects of their identity. One in particular, the turban, has played a central role in Sikh-British legal battles. Meer, Dwyer and Modood (2010) found that the public perception of religious articles was that they create differences and reduce ease of communication. If this logic is applied to Sikhs, it can then be suggested that turbans or Punjabi clothing can lead to separatism and indifference to Britishness. Accordingly, I consider the question of religious dress among adherent Sikhs in my study.

The second body of emerging literature in Muslim gender studies concerns Muslim men. This is split into two branches, one covering those who self-identify as being gay, and the other focusing on masculinity in British Muslim male identities. In the first branch, that of gay Muslim identities, one author stands out. This is Rusi Jaspal (e.g., 2010). Jaspal's writings are of importance to my study because alongside his work on Asian Muslims, he has also examined British Sikh identity more generally. This is not the only overlap between his studies of Sikhs and Muslims. He approached both groups as being under 'threat', feeling 'disconnected', and 'struggling' for recognition (Jaspal, 2013). Apart from this author's literature and a few other mentions in general British Muslim literature, this is still an emerging area of research.

The second branch of male Muslim gender studies literature, on male Muslim masculinity, has wider authorship and covers two facets of masculinity in British Muslim identity. The first is the role of masculinity in traditional Muslim circles, amongst those who have just emigrated to Britain for instance. This covers masculinity and arranged marriages, as well as the role of males in a multi-generational family home. The second is the role of masculinity in more contemporary situations, such as national identity, or the perceived 'crises' of masculinity amongst young Muslim men. This is a popular and growing body of literature and authors in this section include Archer (2001) and Hopkins (2009).

It is popular mainly because its subjects are young Muslim men who attract popular media attention. In the main, these studies show that British male Muslim identity is developing away from hyper-masculinity to something more akin to the range of male identities found in majority groups.

An overall summary of male Muslim gender studies is to say that this is a relatively new direction in Muslim studies in Britain. As such, its use in my Britishness study is unknown at present. However, I include it here as this area of study, including Gay studies, has yet to emerge within Sikh studies, where the focus is mainly on feminist gender studies.

Young Muslim Men in Britain and Britishness

The literature on young Muslims, particularly men, is fairly voluminous. This is linked to the popular notion that young Muslim men are most at risk of social marginalisation and religious radicalisation. Perhaps for this reason, the theme that runs through much of the literature is the idea of dual identity and the purported binary choices that Muslims make in their British identity formation. In other words, young Muslims face either being British or Muslim. This literature falls into two categories.

On the one hand, there are authors who have examined young Muslim identity as British or Muslim, via the testing of nationality and ethnicity. On the other hand, there are other authors who have approached this group as Islamic or secular. A selection of authors in this section includes Jacobson (1997), Saeed, Blain and Forbes (1999) and Archer (2001). This fairly large body of British Muslim literature is useful when testing Sikh Britishness because of its use of certain interview techniques and other research design features. These have given rise to high-quality data on sensitive issues for the community.

One example is the use of ‘snowballing’ via family members and friends to locate interview subjects. Another is the use of English and Urdu in the survey. This last feature of research design, that of offering multiple languages, helped me find Sikh subjects for interviews. Apart from making my interviewees more comfortable, it also helped make them more candid.

There appears to be a well-developed literature in South Asian British Muslim studies. However, there are still some omissions. One concerns secular cultural Muslim identity. As many South Asian Muslims and Sikhs struggle with balancing religious and national identity, this kind of focus could help predict developments in national identity politics amongst ethno-religious minority groups. Many British Asian Muslims, like British Sikhs, eschew religion in their identity in certain situations. By doing so, they project a secular identity in situations such as workplaces and in professional networking. This aspect is missing in much Muslim and Sikh research.

Furthermore, this development is important as it challenges much of the current typology of both Muslim and, by extension, Sikh identity in the current literature. For instance, Ansari (2000) acknowledges that “Muslims without Islam” exist but that they are “still Muslims” (p. 186). I suggest that in a growing number of circumstances, they, like Sikhs, may wish to be British. This is in contrast to Ansari’s assertion.

In conclusion, I have shown that research on British Muslims is significantly more developed than that on British Sikhs. However, it bears many similarities to the current field of Sikh studies as, in the main, it focuses on the role of religion. This makes it only somewhat germane to my work, which focuses on national identity.

Having covered Britain’s South Asian Muslim community, I now consider another non-territorial ethnic minority community in Britain, the Jews.

The Jewish Community in Britain

Contemporary literature on Britishness amongst Jewish groups is limited. Furthermore, very little general literature exists for the modern-day community as compared to the output on the history of the community from over a century ago. This is a surprise given that this community is a long-established British group, and one that has produced considerable scholarship and attracted much attention. For instance, there exists significant historical and sociological literature on Jews living in the early decades after 1900, for example Neustatter (in Freedman, 1955).

This is the same for many other aspects of Jewish life in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. An example is the literature that covers the portrayal of Jews in popular literature and film (e.g., Travis, 2013 or Goldblatt, 2006). Other historically focused research is that of Alderman (1983) who records the prominent role of Jews as British MPs from the 1880s onwards. Others include Cesarani (1990) and Williams (1985).

The lack of research on present day British Jews is noted too by Ben Gidley and Keith Kahn Harris (2010). As a preamble to their project on British Jews, they state that “There has been no comprehensive study of contemporary Anglo-Jewry for over two decades.” (p. 1). They point to Brooks (1990) and Bermant (1969; 1971) as exceptions that make the lack of research all the more conspicuous.

However, this situation is changing as debates about ethnicity in Britain become more popular. In addition, the community’s profile has steadily risen within contemporary British society. This means there is a renewed interest in the community, both in popular media as well as academic research. Whilst this interest can be loosely tied to the rise of multiculturalism in the late 1970s onwards and the more recent idea of British society being a ‘community of communities’, there is also work on the Jewish community’s

relationship to British national identity. As part of this, key British Jewish public figures openly discuss the Britishness of the Jewish community and have produced literature on this. One such individual is Baroness Rabbi Julia Neuberger whose lecture *Identity as a British Jew: The Van Der Zyl Lecture* was published in 2010.

Both the publication date and the lecture's theme support my assessment that British Jewish literature has recently begun to attract wider interest. Neuberger suggested the community has never been so "fashionable" (p. 1). She argued that being considered British is a signal of successfully integrating into society and, as such, it ought to be a focus of Jewish institutions. This, she said, will allow future Jewish generations to feel settled and behave with permanency in their social actions.

Another Jewish public figure in the popular media, comedian David Baddiel, suggested in 2012 that the recent rise of highly visible public Jewish figures such as Lord Alan Sugar has given encouragement to those who may not have previously declared their interest in the community. These fairly recent publication dates in much Anglo-Jewish literature show the gap that preceded them. An example of the latter is Geoffrey Alderman's *Modern British Jewry*, a book that was first published in 1998, filling a vacuum that has lasted until recently. So, the field is becoming popular and attracting more authorship.

Despite this increasing literature, there is still only a limited amount that focuses on the British national identity of Jews. This is not to suggest that national identity politics do not exist in the community as, in some ways, when compared to the other minorities so far covered, there are above average levels of homeland nationalism amongst Britain's Jews.

One example is Jonathan Sacks (2014) who writes about the assertive legitimacy of the State of Israel. Another is Azria (1993) on the existence of Zionism in the British community, and finally there is the concept of national self-determination in Jewish

traditions by Wolfe (2012). However, much of this work is linked with the politics of Israel as a homeland, rather than Britain. For research specifically covering Jewish Britishness, there is Cooper and Morrison (1990), Sinclair and Milner (2005) or Kudenko and Phillips (2010), but this is a relatively short list.

Moreover, these authors do not directly test national identity in the community. Instead, they cover social identities and the impact of secular British society on Jewish religious identity. Cooper and Morrison (1991), for example, deal with the revival of Judaism in the community and the recent resurgence of interest in its heritage. They do not include national identity as part of their findings on the “dilemmas” of Jewish identity in Britain (p. 281). This exclusion marks out most other authors who cover socio-religious identity extensively in the same way as Cooper and Morrison. I discuss this aspect next.

The Jewish Community in Britain and Socio-Religious Identities

Another example of this socio-religious literature is Sinclair and Milner (2005). As this is a good example of the current focus of new British Jewish literature, I examine it in detail here. These researchers examine Jewish identity amongst young adults in Northern England (Leeds). In order to test the identity of young Jews, they selected 18 youths from a pool of over 600 volunteers. Following this, they focused on just two areas of identity they considered to be key to British Jewish identity. These were ethnic identity and Judaism.

They select these with the aim “to further our understanding of how emerging adults, who are members of ethnic and religious minority groups, experience their identity.” (p. 94). This partially explains the lack of work on British Jewish national identity. Ethno-religious variables are deemed more interesting than national identity.

Nevertheless, Neuberger (2010) and Baddiel (2012) show that national identity is becoming an important part of Jewish youth identity in Britain. For this reason, Sinclair and Milner appear to have only partially fulfilled their aims. This is evident in their conclusions where they identify five major themes of Jewish youth identity, none of which are national identity.

All the same, I draw on this work to contribute to minority national identity studies in Britain. As a measure of this, I have already shown that Sikh youth as emerging adults show a strong appreciation of, and tend to reflect, British national identity in their social actions (Jandu, 2015). In this way Sinclair and Milner provide me with the impetus to improve understanding of what it means to be an ethno-religious British minority. Likewise, I find Kudenko and Phillips (2010) have also overlooked British minorities' hostland national identity. I discuss them next.

The Jewish Community in Britain and Multiculturalism

Kudenko and Philips (2010) sought to understand the impact of multiculturalism on Jews in Britain. In studying this, they uncover an interesting link between the emergence of "Jewish selves" and "multicultural citizenship" (p. 65). In a section they title "Researching Jewishness through Citizenship", they present evidence to show that being British has shaped Jewish identity historically (p. 67). I use this to understand whether citizenship is a political, ethnic, or social notion among Britain's Sikhs. Despite their insights, the research stops short of testing whether nationality plays a formative role in identity amongst present-day British Jews in Leeds. All the same, it is another case study on minority ethnic groups and national identity that can help contextualise my own. I use their work to test my idea that Britishness can play a formative role in Sikh identity.

The work of David Feldman and the Pears Institute is another good indicator of both the current state of the field, and of newer areas of emerging literature. Using their well-established presence and expertise on the community, they produce work on the wider political and social infrastructure in which Jews in Britain operate. One pertinent example is Feldman's essay (in Feldman and Lawrence, 2011) entitled "Why the English like Turbans: a history of multiculturalism in one country". Using Sikh legal challenges on the right to grow beards, wear turbans, and bear ceremonial daggers, Feldman suggests that British identity was already a composite derived from a long tradition of pluralism that morphed into political multiculturalism in the 1970s. As such, he suggests, British national identity is an overarching and inclusive concept, not rooted in post-war history, but in centuries of migration and integration. This newer research suggests that contemporary British Jewish studies is well aligned with the aims of my study on Sikh Britishness.

In order to summarise the literature on British Jews, I revert back to Gidley and Kahn Harris (2010) who stated that there is "no Jewish Stuart Hall or Paul Gilroy" (p. 1). This is a surprising situation given the wealth of history, data, and older publications. One assessment could be that as the community sought survival after the 1880s, self-examination appears to have declined. This seems to be changing as a result of a resurgence of interest in Jewish heritage as more Jews marry non-Jews (Neuberger, 2010). However, there is still a lack of focus on British national identity within the emerging scholarship on Jews. Some of this could be due to a notional allegiance to Israel, some to British Jewish anationalism or lack of national sentiment, and to some to British Zionism (e.g., Markus, 2011; Hakim, 2015).

The limited research may also be attributable to the fact that parts of the community in Britain, such as the ultra-Orthodox Haredi in north east London, have deliberately maintained a low-public profile. However, despite all this, Britain's Jews remain a good

case for understanding minority ethnic British national identity. Thus, I conclude that, at present, work on Jews' British national identity lags behind the role this minority community plays in British society. A similar situation characterises the Afro-Caribbeans, whom I turn to next.

The Afro-Caribbean Community in Britain

The literature on the Afro-Caribbean community in Britain is large in volume and covers a wide variety of aspects. However, only some of it covers national identity. I consider this unusual given the prominent role that the community, which largely dates from the arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948, has played in post-war British identity changes. Among the themes present in the research, I note that one stands out. This is the theme of race, black identities or blackness. Additionally, there is a prominent sub-theme within this, the racial stereotyping of Afro-Caribbeans and other African-origin groups. As such, this area of minority group identity politics differs from the others I have covered so far in my review chapter. Hitherto, I have not assessed any work dealing with race in national identity politics. Even so, Britishness amongst Afro-Caribbeans gets less attention than other aspects of the community.

Aside from examining Britishness, there are several authors who have contributed to the understanding of this community. Some have produced historical and migratory experience stories, for instance the essays edited by Winston and Clyde (1993). Others covered Afro-Caribbean identity issues such as Alexander (1996). Youth identity is a popular theme and forms an important subfield of the black identity literature, for instance in Nathan (1998). The community's physical and mental health is also a well-researched area (Bhui, Lawrence et al, 2005). In addition, there are other topics that have drawn considerable attention such as slavery and family genealogy.

So, the literature on this community is popular and has prominent researchers on a variety of subject areas, both historical and contemporary. However, there is limited amount of literature on Afro-Caribbean Britishness. One reason for this could be that this minority group has been less economically successful than other minorities in British society (Baumann, 1995). This is despite their high level of intermarriage with whites, which can signal a high level of mainstream integration.

Afro-Caribbean Identity and Assimilation in Britain

Earlier I stated that assimilation affects the level and nature of Britishness among Sikhs. I base this partly on Nandi and Platt's (2014) paper "Britishness and Identity Assimilation among the UK's Minority and Majority ethnic groups". They confirm both my assertion and the anomalous situation with regard to the lack of research in this area. According to them, Afro-Caribbeans are less likely to have a British identity, because they are less likely to consider British identity in a positive light. With regard to the limited research, Nandi and Platt considered their findings on Afro-Caribbean British national identity as "striking", because, of all the non-Muslim ethnic groups in Britain, they found that Afro-Caribbeans had the least invested in alternative (including national) identities (p. 5).

In a similar way to Nandi and Platt (2014), others have to some extent examined the community's national identity. Lam and Smith's (2009) study is an example of this small but significant literature. Firstly, they confirmed Nandi and Platt's finding on the lower level of assimilation and Britishness among Afro-Caribbeans compared to other minorities and secondly, they introduce the idea of locality into national identity politics. Notable is their finding that this group displays a relatively lower level of attachment – compared to other groups - to Britain, as compared with their ethnic 'homeland'. As such, I consider

what low levels of national attachment and a rejection of nationalism – anationalism and anti-nationalism - respectively mean when I test Sikh Britishness.

Locality and Identities in British Afro-Caribbean Identity

Expanding on Lam and Smith's (2009) locality and national identity, I assess that this has the potential to be a powerful aspect of minority ethnic community identity. Afro-Caribbeans, like Sikhs, tend to reside and work in localised communities within cities and college towns. This, the authors suggested, is perhaps why the Afro-Caribbean community expressed stronger relationships with local identities, such as being a 'Londoner'.

This is a significant factor in my study as I have encountered this 'localisation of attachment' in field research amongst Sikhs in places such as London, Swansea and Glasgow. Furthermore, it represents a key part of the complexity theory of nationalism, that is, the local gaze on the national, as part of a ground-up dynamic. Kaufmann (2017) discusses this emergent national identity as "the sum of local interactions." (p. 13). For this reason, I also consider the spatial perspective of Sikhs in my data.

Another useful observation from Lam and Smith (2009) was that despite the lack of attachment to national identities amongst Afro-Caribbeans, there was not enough evidence to suggest that ethnic and national identities conflict (p. 1263). This is a useful observation for assessing my survey of Sikh Britishness. Sikhs are known to find balancing ethnicity and nationality problematic, as Jaspal, Singh and Tatla, and Takhar note. Thus, comparing the two communities could help me isolate why this is the case for Sikhs and not the Afro-Caribbeans, thereby helping me understand the uniqueness of Sikh Britishness.

In addition to providing data and analysis on the Afro-Caribbean community as a comparative group in my study, Lam and Smith (2009) also furnish me with ideas on data collection techniques. In particular, I regard their methodology in testing Britishness using everyday conversational language to be very instructive. For instance, on national description, they asked “Let’s imagine that you were on holiday in America. If someone from there asked you where you were from, what would you say?” (p. 1254). This introduces an informality to the interviews that is useful when questioning Sikhs about their national identity, especially Sikh youth. I use a similar approach in my survey on British symbols. So, both the subject area and methodology makes their work a useful resource.

Race in British Afro-Caribbean Studies

For balance, I note that there is an aspect of work I perceive to be less pertinent in studying Sikhs. This is the concept of race. In many cases, the literature on Afro-Caribbeans in Britain uses an all-encompassing black identity for both African and Caribbean-derived communities. This approach would not be suitable for the notional Indic race of Sikhs. Instead, it would be akin to conceptualising Sikhs from Kenya and Muslims from Pakistan as one group. This is reductive, collapsing ethnic identity into race whilst reducing aspects such as religion, language and food to minor factors.

Therefore, as I elaborated in the introductory chapter on concepts and terms, I find it more useful to consider them all, compounded together, as part of ethnicity. Lam and Smith’s (2009) and Winston and Clyde’s (1993) concept of a ‘black’ community is therefore of less use in studying Sikhs. For this same reason, Paul Gilroy’s work (1993, 2004 amongst others) is less applicable as he adopted a similar approach.

Stuart Hall's research can be considered the same way. Although Hall does not always specify the African or Caribbean communities, his work widely utilised them in examining non-dominant communities in immigrant settlement areas. This is because he (Hall, 1992 amongst others) was interested in political power structures. For instance, he assessed the use of statistics by institutions such the media to politically racialise a plural British national identity. As context for my study on Sikhs, the literature on identity formation (1996a) is more useful than the analysis of Caribbean identities in Britain (1995). Hall's overall theoretical advances in examining the political situation of minority groups have given me a strong reason to test Sikh Britishness, which is to understand their place in society. For this reason, I find his conceptual methodology informative.

In short, I conclude that the value of using race as the framework for studying Sikhs is limited, even though it is an important part of the picture of Sikh ethnicity in Britain. This means that research on the content of British national identity is itself limited in work on Afro-Caribbeans in Britain – again pointing to an important area for further research.

Having summarised relevant literature on British ethnic and racial minority groups, I consider work on European immigrants next.

White Europeans' British National Identity

This subject area is relatively understudied due to the small size and ethnic variety of the white European population through much of contemporary British history. In addition, the relative ease of moving between European nations, the short-term economic reasons for entering Britain, and the prominence of homeland politics makes it less likely that studies of these Europeans' sense of British identity have been completed. Despite this, there still some relevant research. One paper that stands out is that by Linda McDowell (2003) on Latvian women workers who settled in Britain immediately after the Second

World War. This adds significantly to the field of migration studies as it covers the lesser-known communities of first-generation European female, rather than male, migrants.

With reference to my study on Sikhs, this Latvian case study provides evidence that racial 'passing' insulated the group from confronting national identity questions. As McDowell stated of the Latvians "(T)heir relatively small numbers, their skin colour and their commitment to a strong ethic of self-help and hard work allowed them to recreate imagined versions of essentialised European identities without disruption from racist reactions." (p. 883).

There is also a more recent literature that covers the arrival of European migrants. This is on them as refugees to Britain since the late 1980s due to firstly, regime changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and secondly, the enlargement of the European Union. This work is relevant for my work as some Sikhs encountered in early field research expressed interest in concepts such as postnational citizenship (see Koopmans and Stratham, 2001 or Baban, 2006). However, these liberal ideas of citizenship are not particularly applicable to most Sikhs in Britain as Sikhs are becoming a less transnational community, with fast-fading attachment to an Indian homeland.

Moreover, I find that for some Sikhs, interest in the idea of a European citizenship is derived from the notion that European identity is a more civic, rather than ethnic, concept compared to British identity. Sikh European identity is, however, beyond the scope for my study on British national identity. I will, all the same, make use of this research when testing Sikhs on Britain's membership of the European Union.

This section on Europeans concludes my survey on the British non-territorial minorities' literature. Overall, I surmise that these groups have all helped develop British national identity. However, for each individual group, there is limited literature on that group's

construction of British national identity. In addressing this omission amongst Sikhs in Britain, I contribute to the wider body of work on the identities of minority groups.

Britain's Majority: Whiteness, Britishness, and Englishness

Having assessed British national identity amongst minorities in Britain, I now consider research on Britain's majority in order to examine differences in the content of national identity between Sikhs and the ethnic majority. I focus particularly on the wider white British and narrower white English groups. These form the main subject of literature that covers whiteness, Britishness, and Englishness. I consider these crucial to testing the distinctiveness of Sikh Britishness.

For example, Kaufmann and Harris (2015) noted that England had 84 per cent of Britain's population (p. 23). Furthermore, in England, the census category of "White British" accounted for 77 per cent of the population, whilst those whom these authors denoted as the (white) "English ethnic core" made up 73 per cent of England's people (p. 24, Fig. 1). So, according to these authors, the majority of England's population was accounted for by white English (73 per cent), not just white British (77 per cent).

Whilst there are other concepts and analyses for the other British nationalities and groups, such as Scottishness and Welshness, or smaller identity movements like that of the Cornish, these are minority groups that, at present, do not significantly affect the national identity of Sikhs in Britain. Although, I note that Scottishness could one day become a factor for the small number of Sikhs residing in Scotland.

However, I argue here that Sikh Britishness is predominantly affected by the three phenomena of whiteness, Britishness, and Englishness as these cover many facets of social life for most members of the community. Furthermore, due to these two groups' (English

and British) clout within essential public and private institutions as well as the elite class, they heavily shape national consciousness. Thus, the national identity of the white British and white English forms the main characteristic of the nation's nationalism.

For this reason, I next turn to literature on the majority group in Britain, and its conception of national identity.

Whiteness in Britain

The research within white studies is very focused on the USA. This is partly due to the fact that this field originated in the USA (Du Bois, 1996 [1899]). Furthermore, it is of limited application to my study for two main reasons. Firstly, it concentrates on historical racial privileges for whites in society rather than the nature of their national identities. This is not to suggest that this phenomenon does not exist in British society, but simply that it is less useful in thinking about majority national identity in Britain.

The second reason is because most concepts in this field draw a direct connection between race and ethnicity. As Bolaffi (2003) shows, whites can be viewed as both a race and a homogenous ethnic group. This concept becomes problematic when attempts are made to apply this approach to the various ethnicities that make up the white racial group in the British Isles.

Related to this is another reason for its lack of applicability here. Many US authors focus on the imbalance of power and control between groups of white and non-white citizens. This again is problematic due to class and region in Britain. Thus, in England and Wales – the location of my study - it is not simply a case of whites and non-whites.

For example, amongst many territorial ethnic groups in Britain, the rhetoric of power and its imbalance is very much one of anti-English sentiment by many Scots, Welsh and

Northern Irish. Applying whiteness to this situation would preclude examining evidence of white Scottish nationalists accusing white English MPs of not allowing them control over their nation. So, in this way, a homogenised approach to whites in Britain is not very useful for assessing white national identity. However, it is of some applicability when testing national identity amongst non-white minorities in Britain.

When applied to Sikhs in Britain, there is some relevance as Sikhs are not only ethnically different to the majority but are racially different too (Bolaffi, 2003). So, as whiteness conceptualises the “mechanisms and sites of racial domination and subordination” (Anderson, M., 2003, p. 28), the literature can be used to assess the politics of national identity formation among a ‘dominated’ minority. For example, the work by Essed and Trienekens (2008) on Dutch cultural typology is illuminating. In my own ethnographic work conducted in 2015, I referred to the Dutch terms *autochtoon* and *allochtoon* as being useful in describing how Sikh youth in London both felt and were, in some cases, perceived with regard to their national identity.

The two authors, Essed and Trienekens (2008), suggest that these same two terms are used in the Netherlands to refer to those who are ‘real’ Dutch and ‘not quite’ Dutch. The latter, whilst not purporting to be concerned with race, is tied to where someone is born, their ancestry, and length of residence in the nation. The inference is that white and ‘real’ are closely connected in Dutch society. These authors additionally note that *allochtoon* replaced another Dutch term in wide circulation, that of *apartheid*.

In some ways, this concept of whiteness can be applied to British Sikhs. Many Sikhs still feel that race as denoted by skin colour is another layer of qualification for Britishness. This is due to this group’s difficult citizenship history. The post-war history of immigration in Britain has tones of racism associated with it in both legislative and societal events. The

Immigration Act of 1962, its subsequent amendment in 1968, and the Act of 1971 all introduced controls on immigration at a time when mainly non-white Commonwealth citizens were on the cusp of mass migration to the UK. In this way, Sikhs, like blacks in the USA, have been the victims of racially-motivated, white-privileged national policy. In the USA, this phenomenon has been the subject of much of the theorisation and data collection reviewed by Nayak (2007).

However, it is not just history that makes whiteness relevant when testing national identity amongst Sikhs in Britain today. Populist party politics is an important factor in Sikh Britishness. This is because Sikh identity is shaped by an awareness of an upsurge in extreme racial politics by political parties. For example, the English Defence League as well as the British National Party have both been accused of advocating racially-biased policies. As such, this rise in racial politics with undertones of whiteness has led to a situation where Sikhs are the minority in a society where whites are “a singularly dominant social hierarchy.” (Duster, 2001, p. 114). To support this idea of whiteness as the dominant social factor, authors such as Twine and Gallagher (2008) show that whiteness is rising in popularity as part of a ‘third wave’.

However, research on the British case is still in train, as whiteness has not been widely used to study British national identity. The lack of application to the British case is most probably due to the fact that the field is nascent, having only been established formally in Britain in the 1990s. However, as Stephen Garner (2009) suggested when confronting the dearth of whiteness studies in the UK, authors may have historically used racially neutral language when addressing issues of whiteness. So, there may have been studies that have assessed race, but may have been published under the rubric of culture or class. Despite this, and whilst race is not specifically covered in any detail in my research, its inherent

and “invisible” role in shaping Sikh, white, English, and British identity cannot be overlooked (Garner, 2009, p. 1).

In concluding the literature on whiteness, it is useful to utilise Garner’s (2009) assessment of the literature on whiteness within British studies. Whilst Garner sought to analyse the empirical work on British whiteness, the themes he identified in this field are relevant for my study. These were “invisibility; norms/values; cultural capital and integration; contingent hierarchies; and Empire” (p. 2). Considering that my research question concerns how Sikh Britishness develops, then aspects such Empire and racism can better help comprehend the environment in which it forms.

For instance, by wearing national flag colours in their turbans, Sikhs could be seen as becoming more British. This itself can be appreciated as an attempt to acquire the requisite “cultural capital” of a Briton (Garner, 2009, p. 9). Alternatively, they could be doing this to confront ‘everyday’ racism such as racially biased office jokes. Finally, they may be doing this in order to integrate and, as I suggest, acquire social mobility. This raises the question of the interplay between whiteness, Britishness, and Englishness. I cover this next.

Britishness and British Identity

The literature on Britishness provides essential context for Sikh Britishness due mainly to the way it documents the history of British national identity (for instance see Grube, 2011; Smith, 1991; McCrone, 2013). Understanding its many changes allows me to compare its contemporary type and character to that expressed by my Sikh respondents. As a general observation, work on Britishness has increased due to the Devolution Acts in the late 1990s, the Scotland Independence referendum of 2014 and, more recently, Britain’s membership of the European Union. In addition, changes to Britain’s ethnic mix (i.e.,

decline in the “White British” share in favour of “Other White”, BAME and “Mixed” ethnic groups) has meant that British national identity seems more unsettled than it had been prior to these shifts.

Although I concentrate on post-war British identity rather than pre-World War II, I note that the latter is amply covered by work on colonialism, royalty and Christianity in British identity. For contemporary Britishness, newer themes are being covered in addition to historical ones. Examples include the importance of Britain’s rurality and green pastures (e.g., Wallwork and Dixon, 2004; Lowenthal, 1991), the dominance of Englishness in Britishness (e.g., Kumar, 2010; Wellings, 2007), religion (Karlsen and Nazroo, 2015), war and Empire (Macleod, 2013) and political citizenship status (e.g., Andreouli and Howarth, 2013). These all relate directly to my research question and help inform the symbols of Britishness I test among my Sikh respondents.

Historical British Identity

For many authors, British identity is closely linked to the social and political conditions that led to the creation of the Union in 1707. Despite this important event, the question of the exact nature of British identity has long attracted debate and disagreement. Much of this debate has centred on challenging the idea that a national identity that encompassed the culture of the four nations of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland could have ever existed in anything but theory. This is because each territory has long had unique and persistent local cultural politics such as language or local administrative autonomy. This interpretation became prominent in the wake of the devolution reforms of the 1990s.

As such, Britishness as practice was a problematic concept for many pre-devolution researchers who preferred to think of Britain as a political framework where voluntary unification took place between elites. Take for instance Bernard Crick (1993) who

suggested that Britain for him “implies the Union itself, the laws, the Crown and parliament, not a whole way of life.” (p. 262). For similar reasons, there are other several strands of research that cover the usefulness of conceptualising British identity as a citizenship, a state governance mechanism or simply a political identity, rather than a civic one. Key authors here include Colley (e.g., 1992 and 2017) on the formation of British national identity, as well as others such as Kearney (e.g., 1995) and Porter (1993) on the historical role of England in British identity. Nearly all are dedicated to challenging the usefulness of British identity due to the fact that whilst there is a British state, there is no singular British nation.

A summary of the literature dealing with this topic can be understood by comparing comments made by Linda Colley to those made by Bernard Crick. Colley (in Gamble and Wright, 2009) wrote that people in individual nations in the UK are “immersed in their locality for the most part but able in certain circumstances to identify with the UK” (p. 21). In contrast, in a review of Colley’s earlier (1992) book, Crick (1993) refers to Colley’s idea of the UK as the “state cult of Britishness” (p. 262).

By this, he infers that Britishness, and many other national identities were an “invention” that held limited social relevance locally (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1984, p. 126). Everson (2003) supports this in her statement that, “citizenship is little more than a bourgeois panacea: a convenient rallying-call used to conceal the fact that power is exercised by relatively few people” (p. 58). More recent work departs from these high-political interpretations to ask how Britishness is consumed by ordinary citizens. This includes the majority identity English which I cover next.

Englishness and the English Nation

The literature on Englishness is ample and varied. There is significant work on the history of English national identity (e.g., Kumar, 2003) as well as its contemporary manifestations. In what follows, I argue that the resurgence of Englishness has occurred at the same time as an increase in Sikh British national identification, which is itself a part of national political and social change. Both phenomena appear to be linked to changes in the ethnic mix in Britain.

English nationalism and identity have been forged in an environment of Britishness and are both often invisible, yet omnipresent. For the English, being British was symbolic of their achievements and superiority as conquerors (Porter, 1993). This has had an impact on the Sikhs I study today. In colonial India, homeland to Sikhs, Britain and England blended to the extent that many Sikhs I encounter are unable to specify exactly what the difference is. Singh and Tatla (2006) suggest that this could be a reason why Sikhs, like many other Indian minorities, self-categorise as British rather than Sikh across all four British nations. Kumar (2003) furthermore suggests that as the British Empire fell, it was only then that a need to distinguish Englishness from Britishness arose. For many Sikhs, this was not a change they would have noted, perhaps because they now viewed Britain and England as one oppressive invader.

Contemporary English National Identity

English identity began its ascendancy as the desirability of Britishness cooled with the decline of Empire. Existing work on Englishness includes scholarship relating to Empire, cricket and other national sports, music, class, race, language and literature, Great Britain, diversity, religion, landscape and, fittingly for my study, ethnicity. Whilst this is not an exhaustive list, it is easy to see that the array of topics in the literature, both historic and

contemporary, show that the debate on English national identity is far from settled. It is a rich area of academic exploration and one my study can contribute to in a small way.

As I investigate Sikh homeland national identity, it is essential to understand Englishness. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, it is the national identity of the numerical majority that Sikhs in Britain interact with. Secondly, Englishness is going through a popular resurgence in mainstream political circles. I hypothesise that the rise in British national identity politics amongst Sikhs in Britain is partly a reaction to the resurgence of British nationalism, including Englishness.

Furthermore, I note that this Englishness is divided into a right-wing nativist movement as well as the general, multi-ethnic, increase in English pride and sentiment. Both are linked to shifts in the ethnic mix in Britain, devolution in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, a reduced Britishness amongst Commonwealth nations. Both strains also affect Sikhs in Britain with results varying from increased Englishness in the younger and greater avoidance in the older.

Englishness and Ethnicity

Ethnicity and Englishness, or more reductively race and Englishness, are closely linked to whiteness and national belonging. For this reason, they are key concepts to bear in mind with regard to Sikh Britishness. These terms reflect key notions of national belonging for Sikhs due to the wider effects they have for their inter-ethnic socialisation and acculturation. For many in this minority community, having an English national identity is not simply part of being English-born. Instead, it has long been viewed by Sikhs as an exclusionary political device with little social or civic application to them. On the other hand, I have shown that political and ethnic identity are aspects of Englishness which are

closely connected for the white English majority. So, if someone is not white, they (the majority) find it difficult to consider them English.

As a result, many Sikhs have had difficulty self-identifying as English. This means that Englishness has been essentialised as being white for both the white majority and Sikh minority. For this reason, Sikhs in Britain have generally self-identified as British and English-identifying Sikhs have been a small minority. However, I show that this is less the case nowadays as more young Sikhs are identifying as English. As an area of research, this aspect of Englishness and minorities is largely uncharted. Thus, in exploring Sikh Englishness, my study breaks new ground.

The Essentialisation of Ethnicity in Englishness

Here, I select a key author and bring in other significant writers in the field of race, ethnicity, and national identity in England. I begin with the important work of Charles Leddy-Owen. Leddy-Owen has focused on race and ethnicity as a window on the nature of national identity in Britain overall, but especially in England. In order to study national identity, he has also studied both white and minority subjects. In his work on Englishness, he shows how whiteness and Englishness are connected in many white British minds. Thus, English identity is “constrained” or made exclusive by the pre-conditions of ancestry and whiteness that post-war (and post-cold war) migration waves have challenged (Leddy-Owen, 2014, p. 1448). This has led to what he calls the “precariousness” of English identities (p. 1453). These he categorises into three types as: exclusive Englishness, non-exclusive Englishness, and open Englishness. I use all these concepts to evaluate my findings on Englishness among Sikhs.

One conclusion that Leddy-Owen draws is that whilst anyone can qualify as English in principle, actual ‘membership’ is far less open. This, as I suggested earlier, is the difference

between civic and political Englishness, or in more illustrative terms, top-down or bottom-up identity formation, respectively. This has widespread repercussions for Sikhs in England as well as in Britain because a majority of them, over 57 per cent in the 2011 census, are British-born. Furthermore, a large majority of these are English-born, a figure that can be forecast to increase exponentially.

Despite this, many find that Englishness is a problematic identity to lay claim to. The pre-eminence of whiteness in Englishness is clearly reflected in the mixed-ethnicity subjects interviewed by Leddy-Owen (2014). None, including those with one white English parent, considered themselves English. This phenomenon differs from findings in the work on non-British whites. The studies on Jewish communities show that Jews have not had to face the same kind of racism in their national identity expressions, partly due to the fact that they are accepted as racially white (Alderman, 1983; Neuberger, 2010). This is similarly the case for white Europeans (Phillips, 2015).

However, there are challenges to this idea of essentialised Englishness. These are variously described as ‘optimistic Englishness’ (Painter, 2011); the ‘re-enchanting of Englishness’ (Mandair, N., 2007) or the ‘Britishing’ of the English (Kumar, 2003). Concerning the latter, it is interesting to note that the eighth chapter of his influential book, *The Making of English National Identity* is entitled “The English and British Today”. This perhaps signifies that research into Englishness has reached a point where essentialised practices, not principles (these may never have existed according to Kumar), are under challenge.

All this may ironically have contributed to the resurgence of white Englishness for the populist right and many other groups. Likewise, Leddy-Owen (2014) encountered subjects in his field research who did not subscribe to the idea that Englishness entailed whiteness. This is in contrast to an essentialised English identity trope identified in the work of

Ghassan Hage (1998) for example. Englishness has now become a good example of ethnic politicisation within British national identity.

Research on white Englishness also includes that by Condor, Gibson and Abell (2006). These authors' work is recognised as valuable by Leddy-Owen (2014) as it explores less simplistic and "more complicated" Englishness (p. 1450). Similar research includes, again, Kumar (2003) who shows that the overlap between Englishness and Britishness more adequately reflects those being described, given the history of all the multiple (sometimes foreign) identities that have contributed to the English one.

Furthermore, the presence of non-racial Englishness in highly-urbanised areas of England is valuable in understanding minority English national identity. Sources here include Back (1996), whose focus on close-living spaces in urban areas which give rise to new or mixed ethnicities helps illuminate my data on Sikh intermarriage. Furthermore, the Ipsos-Mori report on young people and national identity by Phillips and Gayatri (2006) informs my focus on young Sikhs as a vanguard of Sikh Englishness. On race, ethnicity and Englishness, Leddy-Owen (2014) mentions Tilley, Exley and Heath (2004) and Paul Gilroy (1993), all of whom have explored being non-white in England.

Englishness and Whiteness

If Englishness can be essentialised as white, it follows that those who are not white and seek Englishness may face barriers from whites in being accepted as English. This may help explain why Sikhs tend to opt for Britishness over Englishness as a 'felt' national identity, usually in addition to valuing its instrumental role as a citizenship status.

Although this is changing, British citizenship doubles as a nationality for many Sikhs. The racial connotations associated with Englishness, for instance (until recently) in national football teams, discouraged English sentiment amongst Sikhs. This is despite the fact that

English sporting teams have been of mixed ethnic backgrounds for a long time now. However, I acknowledge that the fact that very few Sikhs play at the national level is partly responsible for this sentiment too.

The link between whiteness and Englishness has been the focus of an important body of work. Stephen Garner (2009) as well as Kaufmann and Harris (2015) examine English identity, racism and whiteness, and the effect it has on mobility decisions among England's white British majority. Knowing that Sikhs in mixed ethnic relationships still tend to self-identify as British rather than English confirms that they may associate Englishness with whiteness. This is something I examine in my data.

Garner's work is comprehensive and provides a helpful bibliography of the empirical research into white identities in Britain. Earlier in the section of whiteness and Britishness, I noted that in one analysis on the state of the field, he suggests that the following have been researched: invisibility; norms/values; cultural capital and integration; contingent hierarchies; and Empire. This list shows that there is very little work on the effect whiteness has on the national identity, whether British or English, of ethnic minority groups – particularly non-territorial ones such as Sikhs, Muslims or Hindus.

I partially address this by providing insight into how Sikhs balance the notions of whiteness, their own non-whiteness, and the enduring association of whiteness with Englishness. For them, it has long been the case that England and whiteness are an inherent and invisible norm as found in Phoenix (1997) or Farough (2004).

The Inherency and Invisibility of Englishness

Due to this inherency and invisibility of Englishness in those that are white English, there exists an intangible and mostly unspoken barrier to 'fuller' national identification and social belonging for non-white English citizens. Leddy-Owen, Garner, Hage, and others have all researched this, with the conclusion that the authenticity of an undefined Englishness is achieved through the utilisation of symbols, practices, and rituals (especially Leddy-Owen, 2014). These unpublicised acts of Englishness combine with whiteness to create a group whose membership is controlled, yet problematic to define (see Garner, 2009).

For Sikhs and national identity, this means that they may find that they already engage in the rituals and practices that define Englishness, or that they may already possess the required cultural capital. However, many find that white Englishness delimits who can feel and act English. This despite the fact that significant research exists showing many subjects have agreed that in principle anyone can be English given the already multicultural nature of England's ancestral occupants (Byrne, 2006).

The Undefinable Nature of Englishness

Englishness today is therefore a difficult concept to define for Sikhs and non-Sikhs alike. Many authors cover the loose and undefinable nature of Englishness in both theory and practice. This is a particularly curious situation given that this identity can be considered an ethnic not civic one and, furthermore, one covering an overwhelmingly dominant majority group. As Kaufmann (2004) suggests, one reason for this may have been the hegemony of Britishness until recently.

Closely linked to this is the fact that historically, Englishness was the driving force behind Britishness and as such its nature was not examined (Kumar, 2003). Leddy-Owen (2014) uses a blunter description when he suggests that the lack of a definable English nature and identity is the “elephant in the room” (p. 1451).

These and other authors gravitate towards the argument that Englishness is best defined as a retro-reflective exercise in what the English ‘are not’. Thus, going back to Leddy-Owen’s (2014) field research in south London, he discovered that practices, rituals, heritage, and ancestry are all important but not “unassailable” (p. 1452). As such, Sikhs may eat Sunday roasts, wash their cars on Sunday or follow the England cricket team, yet find that Englishness evades them. They find it difficult to convince the group they wish to join that they are English, much as authors such as Barth (1969) or Eriksen (2001) show. For this reason, I bear questions of ethnic exclusiveness in mind when analysing survey data.

The Reclamation and Resurgence of Englishness

Pertinent to my study, there exists research that covers the increased interest in ‘reclaiming’ English national identity. Leddy-Owen (2014) partly ascribes this popularisation of English uniqueness to devolution since the late 1990s. To add to Leddy-Owen’s statement of the fairly recent nature of this nationalism, I include the loosening of border controls since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the increase in mass migration from East and Central Europe from 2004. In addition to these political changes, there has been a sharp rise in non-white British citizens from the BAME and mixed ethnic groups due to differential natural growth rates and pan-ethnic Englishness.

Therefore, in this newer society of rising net migration, increasing non-white British ethnic change, and the regionalisation of state powers, Englishness has been placed under

examination, if not outright challenge. Partly for this reason, there has been a resurgence of populist right English nationalism as a reaction, particularly to uncontrolled immigration. The UKIP and EDL political parties are examples of this development.

There is historical precedent for this. As the British Empire and influence rapidly decreased in size, the English identity that had long gone unnoticed suddenly became a cause to campaign for. Kumar (2003) has covered this particularly well, stating that this is the moment that Englishness now needed to be formally “identified” due to the failure of the hegemony of the Empire as well as the rise of other European languages and literature (p. 224). This he notes is around the early nineteenth century when the term Englishness appears to have been created in “conscious imitation” to the German term “Deutschtum” or Germanness (p. 224).

There is also a more recent resurgence of Englishness in Britain which can be linked to the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, the outcome of which is that the UK has now left the EU. This has been linked to a Eurosceptic attitude in many citizens, some of whom hold white ethnic ideas of Englishness. There is evidence of this in Kaufmann’s (2018) work, where the success of the Brexit side in the EU referendum of 2016 is seen to be a direct result of popular English nationalism. The rise of extreme right-wing parties such as the English Defence League or Britain First is a further manifestation of this. Even though Sikhs have participated, to some extent, in most forms of English nationalism, however, work on the effect of this new nationalism on Sikhs is limited. This includes research on their participation in, and sympathy with, such movements. Again, my work addresses this as aspects of Englishness and voting patterns in the EU referendum are variables I test in my analysis.

So far, I have shown that, even if we bracket the question of ethnic diversity, national identity has long been problematic in Britain. Not only is this the case with historical Britishness but with historical Englishness too, as I noted when discussing its current unsettled status. I next review work on what Britishness has meant to majority and minority groups since the end of WWII. This includes Sikhs, for whom this holds a century-old sentimental attachment.

Post-war British Identity

If historical British identity is problematic to define, then the contemporary aspects that unite the nations of Britain under Britishness are even more complicated to identify. Indeed, it is easier to suggest what British identity is not. This is in part due to factors that undermine national identity, and also to the infancy of this post-war identity development. To help elucidate this situation, Jacobson's 1997's paper "Perceptions of Britishness" is very useful. In this paper, she points out that when examined using the major theories of nationalism, three factors complicate Britain's fit into the concept of nation as outlined by Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) or Smith (1991).

The first of these factors is geography. Britain's national identity can vary widely depending on the sub-national locality, even within the identities of English, Welsh, Northern Irish or Scottish. Furthermore, Britain's international borders have also been difficult to define. Consider also the existence of settlement rights for Britain's Empire citizens before 1948. Under these rights, millions of people globally called themselves British. Closely connected to dominance in geographical scale is the political power of England.

Jacobson (1997) suggests that both the majority landmass of England and the political hegemony of its monarchist and parliamentary institutions has resulted in the dominance

of Englishness in Britishness. This is an aspect that has led to Osmond (1988) describing British identity as “Anglo-British” (p. 26). In this way, territory has a significant role as per classic nationalism theory (Smith, 1991).

A second factor that Jacobson (1997) suggests makes British identity problematic is the advent of European integration. This, it is suggested, had two counteracting effects. Firstly, the feeling of Britishness was reduced as integration continued and national identity was submerged within an environment of free movement and communication. Secondly, this process led to a rearguard action to protect Britishness. Thus, historical anti-continental constructions of Britishness were perpetuated. The third factor she suggests impinges on ideas of British identity is Britain’s long-term decline in global economic and political influence.

In addition to this recent historical work, the dramatic change in Britain’s ethnic composition between the two national censuses of 2001 and 2011 adds important context. This is seen in the likes of Morland (2012) whose thesis on the political effects of rapid changes to a nation’s ethnic mix can be applied to Britain. Kaufmann takes up this theme, thereby contributing to a growing field of national identity studies and political demographic change. Taking just one of his publications, *Whiteshift* (2018), Kaufmann presents data on how ethnic change is associated with a rise of populism in Britain.

His data, and BBC data that both he and I draw on, also shows that the content of English nationalism varies considerably by ideology and ethnicity. That is, Britishness is as much emergent and complex as top-down and uniform. This is important since many Sikhs – especially younger ones - differ significantly from older Sikhs in their conception of Britishness. The former, as I will show, are more likely than older Sikhs to call themselves English.

Furthermore, crucial institutions that held cultural and political sway over the nation are undergoing rapid change. Everson (2003) is particularly emphatic about this, referring to the UK being “agog with modernisation” (p. 57). She uses the democratic changes to the House of Lords and the mooted Bill of Rights as evidence of this. To this I add the Devolution Acts for Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland and finally the drop in public interest in the monarchy and Parliament. All of which, when examined with regard to their impact on the citizen of Britain, make the ‘non-definition’ or the aspirational ‘non-territorial’ dimension of modern citizenry akin to the ideas of postnational citizenry (Everson, 2003; Baban, 2006).

This short summary of the debate on Britishness by Jacobson, Everson and others shows that there is very little agreement on the theoretical and practical definition of British identity. This is evidenced further by the recent attention given to unconvincing attempts by politicians to define British identity as a set of values (Alex and Ghale, 2015). However, despite the lack of agreement as to what British identity is, its relevance to my study is incontestable. This is because the majority of Sikhs, since settlement, have historically self-identified as British more than any other nationality, including English.

This is still the case with the community today as a majority of them continue actively to align themselves with a national identity based on the nation-state they call home. The fact that the identity they utilise is notional or undefinable has not posed a problem so far. Considering the unsettled nature of British identity and the knowledge that an overwhelming majority of Sikhs live in England, it is understandable that this situation may be changing. It is this intra-community change, a facet of the bottom-up complexity of nationalism, that my study will explore.

British Identity, Britishness, and Minority Ethnic Groups: Theoretical Frameworks

In this section I consider research on British national identity and minority ethnic groups. As a reminder, I stated earlier that literature here is limited, an aspect that becomes apparent when compared to work on broader themes of Englishness and Britishness. I likewise note that the work of some of the authors I draw on has already been discussed earlier in this chapter under the sections dealing with the specific minority groups. For example, Modood has been examined under the section on Muslim groups, that of Hall and Gilroy under the section on Afro-Caribbeans and that of Singh and Tatla in the Sikh section. Whilst this may appear a duplication, my focus here will be on the theories on nationalism used in these writers' work.

Therefore, being careful to avoid duplication, I have selected three texts to analyse in detail, all under the heading of Britishness and minority ethnic groups. I do this because, whilst they merited inclusion for covering specific ethnic groups, it is their approach to testing Britishness and British identity that I now review. I consider these key publications for my study for the following reasons. First, they all focus solely on British national identity. Second, they cover minority groups in Britain and finally, they show which methods of collecting sensitive data work in hard-to-reach communities.

The three texts I review are: Jaspal and Cinnirella's (2013) paper on British national identity amongst British South Asians, Jessica Jacobson's influential (1997) study of Britishness amongst young Pakistanis in London and finally, the research study report produced by ETHNOS in 2005 on behalf of the Commission for Racial Equality entitled *Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness*. All three build on Bhikhu Parekh's work (amongst others, 1995a, 1995b and 2000a & b) and Alibhai-Brown (2000).

I am testing the theory that Sikhs in Britain display complex variation in their Britishness and that the most significant differences in Sikh Britishness are age-related. Thus, Jaspal and Cinnirella's (2013) findings and methodology are informative as they have been successful in testing national identity amongst Sikhs through the use of British South Asians' identity-constructing processes, using specific community elements like language. They, like me, build on work by Bradley (2008) and Parekh (2000) as well as studies by two other authors already covered under Scottish national identity, McCrone and Bechhofer (e.g., 2015).

Furthermore, the existence of these authors' 2013 paper provides added justification for the undertaking of my study. This is because whilst they have studied Sikhs as one of their South Asian groups, no study focuses solely on Sikh Britishness. In the next few paragraphs, I scrutinise this text closely and finish by linking it to other similar literature.

Utilising a socio-psychological approach, these authors have detailed the changes in national identity post-war. They suggest that Britishness has moved away from aspects such as Empire, Christianity, and royalty – much as Kumar (2010) and Smith (1991) do. Therefore, national identity and Britishness is no longer straightforward for British South Asian minorities, such as Sikhs for example. This is because the immigrant generation used citizenship as identity during a time when British national identity was closely linked to a white British majority. Thus, citizenship gave the minority community a right to its own space and place. However, they suggest that the conditions are now different as these communities contemporarily seek an identity that requires “social and psychological functions” and not just politico-economic security (Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2013, p. 157). This strongly chimes with my findings on Sikh youth in this study.

Other useful aspects of this work are the conceptual frameworks used to analyse the data. By building on McCrone and Bechhofer (2015 for instance), these authors found that notions of Britishness in their subjects could be separated into six areas. These are loosely grouped into two groups, the 'sentimental' and the 'instrumental', both of which are affected by temporal factors such as length of attachment and residence, as well as individual psychology. My previous research (Jandu, 2015) had already identified that the above binary is relevant for Sikh Britishness.

For example, I noted that earlier generations of Sikhs are more likely to self-identify as British for instrumental reasons, as it aids their economic welfare. This is in contrast to younger Sikhs who exhibit an affective attachment to Britain expressed, for example, through more a widespread adoption of national symbols. Furthermore, this idea of sentimental / instrumental interests me as I postulate that Sikhs are becoming increasingly nationalistic for reasons of social mobility. This is an aspect that these authors have likewise found in their subjects, which they refer to as "self-efficacy" (Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2013, p. 172).

This work is useful for my study as it provides information on what to develop further and where the omissions in the literature lie. One of these concerns the wider demographic changes taking place in Britain's ethnic composition which Jaspal and Cinnirella do not cover in any detail. Their work is based on the responses of a small group of British South Asians, using an interpretive method. As such, wider population shifts, such as the decline in white British majorities in cities like London or the rise of mixed ethnicity groups, is often overlooked. I have already shown in previous chapters that these demographic changes have a direct impact on the national identity of the Sikhs. For example, the rise in the number of Sikhs increasingly expressing their Britishness is occurring at the same time that Britishness may be becoming less connected to the white British majority.

The next paper I revisit is Jacobson (1997). I have already referred to this in the section on young Muslims and identity in this chapter and return to it here for methodological reasons. For instance, she chose to refine the sample group even further by selecting respondents who are young Pakistanis in London and the English Midlands. This gave her the opportunity to comment on a very specific place, community and time. As an approach I find this instructive in assessing young Sikhs in London. Her use of theories of national identity is also pioneering. In her assessment of national identity theory, she suggests that ethnicity, social identity and postmodernism must all be incorporated when examining national identity among a minority group. Otherwise, any model of identity is unrepresentative of what is an updated dimension of Vertovec's (2007) intra-community 'super-diversity'. This approach to interrogating national identity amongst South Asian groups is important as she points out that for minority groups such as Muslim youth, Britishness has civic, racial, and cultural boundaries. This resonates strongly with my own analysis of field research on Sikhs.

Jacobson's paper, like that of Jaspal and Cinnirella, has set the standard for the successful examination of national identity amongst minorities. I hope to build on this work by using a mixed-methods approach. In her 1997 paper, Jacobson only utilised qualitative research methods. In contrast, I also include statistical surveys of both Sikh and white British ethnic groups to complement my own qualitative work. This allows me to incorporate data from a wider range of subjects. I also seek to add to Jacobson's findings by examining the role of ethnic shifts since the paper was published in 1997.

All these additions mean using the paper as a foundation whilst adding to its methods and considering the effect of demographic factors. This should yield a more contemporary and externally-valid set of data on national identity amongst minority groups. In this way, I am

able to develop my argument utilising the work of Jacobson. Through it, I hope to be able to increase the understanding of what Britishness means to Sikhs.

The last of the three sources I assess closely in this section is a report, entitled *Citizenship and Belonging: What is Britishness*. It was initiated by the Commission for Racial Equality and was carried out by ETHNOS in 2005. This long report tests what Britishness means to various groups, both minority and majority, in England, Wales and Scotland and is very comprehensive in its coverage, methodology and findings. In summary, its researchers have been able to identify what Britishness is and is not. As such it can be linked to Colley (1992) who suggested that seventeenth century British identity was very similar in as much as it was a reflective process that sought to differentiate the British Isles from, in particular, Europe at that time.

By collecting large scale data, this report helped advance the debate on what Britishness means among a wide-ranging set of both minority and majority citizens. For example, the study reported the following eight dimensions of Britishness: geography, national symbols, people (especially whites) as citizens, values and attitudes, cultural habits and behaviour, citizenship, language, and achievements.

These all bear a striking resemblance to Jacobson's civic, racial, and cultural concepts and to Jaspal and Cinnirella's six conceptions of Britishness as a synonym for Englishness: symbolising the possession of a British passport; a symbol of a regrettable, primarily racist past; a proud and nostalgic legacy of greatness; a statement of political unity between the nations, which could be positive or negative; and a liberal, civic identity uniting peoples of diverse nations and ethnicities under a common umbrella of statehood. Building on this approach, I use a questionnaire to test analogous dimensions of Britishness amongst Sikhs.

The second feature for which the ETHNOS report stands out is its data collection methodology. Whilst both Jacobson and Jaspal and Cinnirella utilised direct interviews with a small group of subjects from amongst the Pakistani and South Asian community, the ETHNOS report includes data collected using direct interviews with 96 subjects from a much wider group of respondents. This has made me realise the importance of large-scale data, including a control group. Thus, I include a non-Sikh group of white British against which to measure my qualitative and quantitative feedback.

As a final note on the report, it has another design that I utilised in my field research. This is the way in which the authors engaged with respondents on sensitive questions. The report has formulated a work-around for the gaps in conversation that can occur in open-ended discussions. This is the innovative use of ‘word association’ and ‘sentence completion’ exercises. An example of the former is “Please write down the first three words that come to mind when you read the word British” (p. 69, Appendix b). Another example is the sentence completion exercise where subjects were asked to finish sentences that started with set themes such as, “Britishness is...” (p. 70, Appendix c). This method of reducing the face-to-face time in discussions made subjects more comfortable and allowed those who prefer written communication over oral to express themselves better.

In summary, by closely examining three field research-based papers, two of which focus on minority groups, and linking them to the vibrancy of their theoretical work, I have shown the depth of the literature dedicated to being British and Britishness. It can be said that all three publications exhibit the influence of specialist writers on nationalism. These include Anderson (1983) in the ETHNOS report, Guibernau (e.g., 2013) in Jaspal and Cinnirella, whilst Jacobson illustrates the work of Billig (1995) and Osmond (1988).

As such it is easy to summarise that Britishness has come to the fore as a subject of study since the 1990s, raising questions about what children should be taught about British history (Crick, 1990). Crick was reviewing the final report put forward by the National Curriculum Working Group that recommended placing authors such as Kearney, Samuel, Ascheron, Nairn, and Osmond onto the education syllabus for 7-17-year-olds.

Further progress in the field of British nationalism studies and practice should also take into account the perspective of the minority groups that also make up British identity, such as Sikhs. This is one objective of my study. The history of Sikhs and their Britishness can speak to the descriptions offered by authors such as Kearney (2000) when arguing the case for 'The Importance of Being British'. To his observation that English nationalism is on the rise amongst the majority ethnic group in Britain as a reaction to European unification, I add that Sikh Englishness is likewise on the rise, though as a response to other forces.

Given the paucity of studies dealing with minorities and Britishness, as well as the long and storied link between Sikhs and Britishness, my thesis offers a productive case study for examining the development of Britishness. More generally, the Sikh response may also prove illuminating for other minorities. In short, with minorities becoming majorities in several British cities, my study on Sikhs addresses an increasingly important oversight in work on contemporary and future Britishness.

Conclusion

My thesis asks if there is internal variation in Sikh Britishness and, if so, what the strongest moderator of this variation is. I have placed this question in the context of existing work in three main fields. First is Britain on Sikh and non-Sikh minorities, second is the majority group in Britain, and finally is research into Sikhs outside Britain. In so doing, I locate a clear lacuna: the study of Sikh hostland national identity. I showed this in

the review of work on the major Sikh populations globally including North America, Mainland Europe, India and, finally, Kenya. Assessing work on Sikh identity reveals that national identity has only been lightly covered, with most work focused on religion.

I also examined the literature on national identity among non-Sikh minorities in Britain, finding that even though Muslims, Jews and Afro-Caribbeans were well represented, work on these groups' British national identity was limited to secondary research questions. Moving onto theories of Britishness, I examined those encompassing whiteness and Englishness, where I identified limited work on minority variants of these national identities. As background to all this, I also observed that demographic changes, most recently in the early 2000s, have affected both British national identity and minorities' relationship to this identity, although in differing ways.

All of this has framed the omissions in the current literature and the way my research seeks to address this. In the next chapter I present existing and new analyses of current statistical data on Sikh British national identity. This will also serve to highlight the empirical gap in extant datasets, which I will subsequently seek to address by producing my own, new, data in the chapter thereafter.

Chapter Three: Measuring Sikh Britishness: Current Dimensions of Continuity and Change

Introduction

In this chapter, I present independent statistical survey data that supports my hypothesis that internal variations exist in the Britishness of Sikhs in England and Wales. This third-party data will successfully form the basis of my answer to the research question of whether the content of British Sikh hostland national identity differs by age. In a subsequent chapter, I present self-collected data to further support my thesis on Sikh Englishness. However, my objective in this chapter is to show, using current third-party statistics, that intra-community variations have existed in Sikh British national identity since at least the 2011 census.

My statistical evidence comes from two types of survey. Broadly classified, the first consists of the 2001 and 2011 national censuses of England and Wales as well as the linked ONS Longitudinal Survey (ONS LS). The second comprises more specialised surveys, such as those that examine more detailed aspects of British society as well as those that are focused solely on Sikhs. Using these, I analyse current data on Sikhs through two aspects of their 'socially participative' behaviour. These are political, due to their status as citizens, and civic, as consuming members of society. I do this in similar fashion to Almond and Verba (1963) and more relevantly Fennema and Tillie (2001). At this point I reiterate that the religious identity of Sikhs does not form a core part of my study. It has been amply covered in extant literature.

As part of my analysis, I use nationalism theories that challenge the classic modernist ideas of national identity. In particular, I analyse Sikhs applying Kaufmann's (2017) complexity theory of nationalism. I also interpret Sikh data by using other ground-up

nationalism theories, including banal nationalism (Billig, 1995). Additionally, I build on the work of Edensor (2002) regarding the value of modern social capital over elite cultural tradition in nationalism. Other theories I deploy include various forms of everyday nationalism as explored in Leddy-Owen (2014); Condor, Gibson and Abell (2006) and in Ghassan Hage's critique of whiteness (1998). All are important in my Sikh case study since they have criticised essentialised ideas of national identity. For the same reason, I am also somewhat critical of top-down theories such as ethnosymbolism (Smith, 1986) and modernism (Gellner, 1983). By working through these and other theories, I compare Sikhs to other British minority groups and, briefly, to majority groups.

Therefore, by the end of this chapter, I will have shown through my quantitative research and theoretical interpretation that the Britishness of Sikhs is not as monolithic as is currently perceived by, for instance, Jaspal (2013), Singh and Tatla (2003) and Singh, J. (2010). Instead, I conclude that there is internal variation in British Sikh hostland national identity. The factor that moderates national identity most is age.

Focusing on age as a variable in national identification, I show that older Sikhs have maintained strong private political tendencies rather than public civic tendencies. This is one reason why non-Sikhs often describe the community as a model minority.¹⁸ The situation is different for younger Sikhs among whom civic engagement, often carried out with a political end in mind, is commonplace. One explanation for this increase in public politicisation is that of self-protection and what Jaspal (2013) refers to as 'group continuity'. Evidence for this can be found in the rise of regional Sikh national

¹⁸ Johnson, G. (2013). *Comment: British Sikhs are the best example of cultural integration*. Available at www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2013/03/14/comment-british-sikhs-are-the-best-example-of-cultural-integ (Accessed: October 2016).

identification, such as English and Scottish, especially amongst the community's British-born youth.

Stated simply, Sikhs have historically shown a great regard for the political status they have obtained through their hostland Britain. However, the more settled they have become, the more likely they are to feel a national belonging, resulting in its use in their identity politics. This situation is accelerated by the wider ethnic, racial, and religious diversity brought about by increases in migration, intermarriage and globalisation in the places where Sikhs reside. For this reason, younger Sikhs' wider socialisation and political circles give rise to the conditions in which complexity theory becomes most relevant to analyse their identity politics.

Using Smith's (1991) five-criteria model of national identity, I posit that this is a predictable development for my case group. As evidence of this, I show that for younger groups of Sikhs, Britishness, or expressed national identity, is becoming their "common, mass public culture" (p. 14). It is not just an intangible categorisation as it was, and still remains, for older Sikh groups. This is partly due to the transition of Sikh identity politics away from homeland to hostland. Due to this, British national identity has become as important to Sikhs as it is to society.

Evidence of the importance of national identity to British society can be seen in the Citizenship Survey of 2010–2011. In this survey, 48.2 per cent of all respondents reported that national identity was "very important to them", 37.9 per cent stated that it was "quite important", and only 10.6 per cent stated that it was "not very important".¹⁹ Therefore, given that data for the hostland in which Sikhs live shows the importance of national

¹⁹ Source: DCLG and NatCen, Citizenship Survey, 2010–2011.

identity, I feel that the meaning of British identity for Sikh citizens needs reconsideration in the light of such society-wide findings. This is my aim in this study. Further motivation is derived from the fact that very little research on the dimensions of Sikh hostland national identity exists. As I showed in the review of literature much of the research assigns a monolithic Britishness to them, for instance in Bhambra (2021); Singh and Tatla (2006) or Jivraj (2013).

Structure of the Chapter

The structure of this chapter is as follows. I begin by describing the datasets and surveys I use, then briefly recall the complex nature of post-war British identity. Following this, a comparison of census data from 2001 to 2011 will show that this complexity accelerated due to mainly European migration and mixed-ethnicity families during this period. Next, I show how decentralisation or regionalisation and the diversification of British ethnicity have together brought about major developments in national identity. Having covered British society using the censuses and the ONS LS, I then focus on Sikhs in England and Wales. After briefly comparing their metrics to that of the wider society, I then concentrate on finding reasons for statistical variations in several aspects of their national identity as evidenced in the data. Alongside this, I examine the data using concepts drawn from theories of complexity and nationalism. My findings provide the basis for my conclusions about British Sikh hostland national identity.

Current Data on Sikhs in Britain

As background, there are over 25 million Sikhs globally.²⁰ In the 2011 national census, there were 423,158 Sikhs within the 56 million population of England and Wales, making

²⁰ Shani (2008, p. 81, Table 5.1).

it the largest Sikh national diaspora.²¹ Overall in England and Wales, this was a change from 2001 when the Sikhs numbered 329,358. Between the two censuses, Sikh numbers have grown by 22 per cent, significantly above the national average of 7.75 per cent. Sikhs accounted for 0.59 per cent of Britain's population in 2001, whilst in 2011 they made up 0.87 per cent.

As justification for my study, I note that these figures are important because a category for religious identification was only introduced in the 2001 census. Sikhs overwhelmingly self-identify as a religious group, so it has only been possible to enumerate them accurately since this date. In addition to this, one further development has made my study feasible. In the 2011 census, a category for national identity was introduced. These two developments are essential for my study as statistical data on British Sikh national identity is very limited. As context to evidencing my theory, I use this data in the following way.

I first set out the basic metrics of the community, such as location and country of birth, using the national censuses and their linked longitudinal survey, the ONS LS. I next show the internal variation in hostland national identity using data from specialist surveys. These are of two kinds. First there are Sikh community surveys. The main one is known as the British Sikh Report (BSR), which this author has helped design.²² I note for the sake of completeness that there was also the UK Sikh Survey of 2016. It is however not suitable for this level of study because of the lack of respondent vetting. To support these community surveys and to counter self-selection bias, I use specialised society-wide (i.e., not Sikh-

²¹ Office for National Statistics, 2001 & 2011 Census.

²² Singh, J. et al. (2016) *British Sikh Report*. Available at: <http://www.britishsikhreport.org/british-sikh-report-download-2016/> (Accessed: July 2016).

specific) surveys. Here, I include the Citizenship Survey and the British Election Study, including its specialist branch, the Ethnic Minorities British Election Study (EMBES).²³

I use these latter society-wide surveys for independent reference rather than core analysis, because the number of Sikh respondents in them is very low and, apart from basic demography, there is only limited data on national identity. For instance, with this data it is easy to analyse if respondents are foreign, British or one of the four regional identities of English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish. However, it is not possible to describe the specific symbolic character of their national identity, thus it is impossible to see, for example, how the content of national identity varies by locale or the national symbols which are important to the respondents. Whilst acknowledging this, I have included them as they allow for individual-level analysis in areas such as lifestyle, political outlook and national identity.

Using all these surveys, I focus on England and Wales, and only refer to Scotland and Ireland for context as data on the latter two regions is very limited and can be inconclusive. For example, I acknowledge that Sikh identity politics in Scotland is complicated by new developments such as Scottish devolution and the small number of Sikhs there. I furthermore note that the small numbers of Sikhs in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as well as the lack of data on them, makes their national identities difficult to study. All the same, these remain vibrant areas for research enrichment.

²³ Sources are: DCLG, Ipsos MORI. (2012), Citizenship Survey, 2010-2011; Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J., Prosser, C. (2016). *British Election Study, 2015: Face-to-Face Post-Election Survey*. [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 7972: 10.5255/UKDA-SN-7972-1.

Next, I move onto introducing the statistical information. Before I present the data evidencing my thesis, I first frame my research question by commenting on the changing nature of national identity in Britain. I start with an overview and then present evidence showing the rapid effects of two contemporary shifts, namely the changing ethnic mix and regionalisation.

The Complexity of British National Identity and Sikh Britishness

I have in the review of literature covered the origins and development of national identity in Britain. Hence, this section comprises just a brief description of the complexity of national identity in present-day Britain and its link to the variations in British Sikh hostland national identity. Here, just as with Sikhs, I note that national identity in Britain is complex and unsettled. This is a key point as, in some ways, it is due to this widespread development that Sikhs have altered their sense of British national identity since the war.

This is backed up by McCrone and Bechhofer (e.g., 2015) who show that being a “national”, is altogether different from being a citizen (p. i). I interpret this as the latter being a ‘latent’ status, whilst the former requires active participation. Applying this to my study, a Sikh’s political status does not necessarily determine their civic life. This is one strong reason why different Sikh groups view and express their national identity so disparately. As my research question suggests, I posit that these groups are most strongly demarcated by age. The chronological character of this complexity means that something in Britishness has changed over time for Sikhs. I cover this next.

In British national identity in the twenty first century, one main development, with two major effects, stands out. This is the post-war change in the importance of historical symbols for contemporary British identity. The salience of these historical elements has declined and along with them so has this type of Britishness. This is valid for Sikhs and

non-Sikhs alike, even though Sikhs may not share the same elements and to the same extent. As I have shown in the review chapter, historically Protestantism, royalty, language, whiteness, and Empire were central themes in British identity.

Some of these, such as Empire, are themes connected to the Britishness of older Sikhs as they link their own national identity to Britain's global supremacy. As historical elements of identity have declined and there is no agreement as to their replacements, a problematic national issue has arisen. This has created a gap in British national 'feeling' and, to a lesser extent, national belonging. In turn, this has aided in the creation of a different Britishness, or as complexity theory would predict, many kinds of Britishness. For instance, there is one based on British values, and one derived from local traditions. Bhambra (2021), labels this complexity as "thick and thin version of Britishness" (p .13). Therefore, these chronological changes in Britishness as Smith's (1991) common mass public culture have split national identity, which varies across age and other dimensions, and, as part of this, Sikhs too have changed their national identity.

One notable factor in this shift from historical to contemporary symbolism in national identity has been the ethnic and racial diversification of British society. With this development, there have been deep cultural changes, especially in cities. For younger, more established Sikhs, their variations in Britishness have developed because historic national identity cannot be reconciled with the growth of Calhoun's "liberal cosmopolitanism" (in McCrone and Bechhofer, 2015, p. 200).

Here, the freer movement of people in Europe as well as the rapid changes to ethnicity in Britain have made the Britishness of younger Sikhs a more cosmopolitan one. For example, British identity was associated with white Christian citizens pre-war. As white Christians have declined as a share of the total, the character of national identity has

begun to change too. For Sikhs, this means that the younger Sikhs, who generally reside in cities, have become keen 'stakeholders' in this new national identity.

However, I note that the small size of the group means that they are unlikely to influence the development of British national identity. All the same, this change is the next step in the development of Sikhs, who, as Mattausch (1998) suggested, have already transformed from subjects to citizens. I show data evidencing this metamorphosis further in this section.

The second major effect of the post-war change in Britishness has been the decentralisation of the four British nations. As Empire, royalty and centralised bureaucracy were binding elements of Britishness, their decline has given rise to localised or regional control and the re-surfacing of local identity. This can be seen in the institutions that have been empowered through devolution, such as the Scottish Parliament as well as the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies. As part of this, the re-emergence of local identity, for instance through language in Wales, is cutting across other divisions, such as ethnicity. This I consider to be a local community, grassroots-level movement. Again, further along I present evidence of this phenomenon.

A summary of this section on the new complexity in Britishness is as follows. The change in global British power, the diversification of ethnicity, the decentralisation of governance, and peer-to-peer national identity politics rising 'from below' have all changed what it means to be a Briton. In the case of Sikhs, these factors have had the effect of increasing their public, or civic, expression of national identity over their political status. This is a challenge to a modernist and elitist idea of national identity. For this reason, Sikhs are not the only community affected. Other groups hitherto categorised as British, such as the

white English, Afro-Caribbeans and Jews have all been affected. Furthermore, this phenomenon is found in various degrees across all four British nations.

Having briefly described the changes in present-day Britishness affecting Sikhs, in the next section I use census data for England and Wales to illustrate these changes. This begins with showing how the ethnicity of England and Wales has changed since the 2001 census.

The Changing Majority and Minority Demographics in England and Wales

The 2011 census revealed that the ethnic mix of England and Wales had changed dramatically since the previous census. The nations still comprised majority white British populations, but ethnic minority groups are rapidly increasing as a percentage of the population. This is particularly significant as the development was unexpected. For example, there are now white British minorities in several urban areas such as Leicester and London.

Alongside this came other major changes. For example, Asians, a group that includes Sikhs, dramatically increased in numbers, as did the black population and those of mixed heritage. As an explanation, Lessard-Phillips (2017) suggests that this is a consequence of two waves of migration. The first is a product of the 20th century after the Second World War and decolonisation, the other a 21st century phenomenon based on political and economic links with Europe. Although the latter period did not affect Sikh numbers, the suddenness of it means it is presently under-researched. Part of this is the sharp growth of Sikhs alongside the large-scale European migration. My study will help fill this research gap, especially for minority ethnic groups such as Sikhs. The significance of the effect of this wave for the ethnic mix in Britain can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3

Population Changes Within Ethnic Categories in England and Wales: 2001 to 2011

Ethnic Group	2011	Percentage of Total	2001	Percentage of Total	Change in Persons	Percentage Change	As Part of Total Change
White British	45,134,686	80.49%	42,747,136	86.99%	2,387,550	5.59%	34.42%
White Other	2,485,942	4.43%	1,308,110	2.66%	1,177,832	90.04%	16.98%
Total white	47,620,628	84.92%	44,055,246	89.65%	3,565,382	8.09%	51.40%
Mixed	1,224,400	2.18%	643,373	1.27%	581,027	85.22%	8.38%
Asian	3,820,390	7.51%	2,248,289	4.37%	1,572,101	85.31%	22.66%
Black	1,864,890	3.33%	1,132,508	2.19%	732,382	63.65%	10.56%
Total Population	56,075,912	100.00%	49,138,831	100.00%	6,937,081	7.75%	100.00%

Sources: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016); Office for National Statistics (2011): 2001 Census aggregate data (Edition: May 2011). UK Data Service. (N=56,075, 912).

This data shows how significantly the ethnic mix of the population in England and Wales has changed since 2001. From this table and other data from the two censuses, two trends relevant to my study are evident. Firstly, non-British White or “White Other”, a group that includes European migrant workers, has grown significantly, in fact by more than 90 per cent. Secondly, the “White British” category has only increased by 5.59 per cent, below the overall national average population increase of 7.75 per cent. However, I note that white (British and Other) still remains the largest category at 84.92 per cent, although it has decreased from 89.65 per cent in 2001. “White British” is 6.5 per cent less of the population. This means that the national population increase has mainly been the result of growth in the category of “White Other”, as well as among the other non-white British

groups. Of importance to my study, the category of “Asian” has grown by 85.31 per cent, contributing 22.66 per cent to the overall change nationwide. They are a small group with a large percentage increase, meaning a large gross population increase has occurred, especially in Asian-majority wards.

One result of these fast demographic changes has been an alteration of the way Sikhs perceive and express Britishness. This is partly because the ‘pathways’ through which national culture is formed, such as the education system, religious organisations, national sports, the police and armed forces, neighbourhood or local culture, and local government are now more ethnically and culturally diverse. One direct impact of this change on Britishness has been to reduce the association between British identity and whiteness.

Partly because of this, Britishness has developed into a more diverse notion for younger Sikhs when compared to older ones. Thus, different demographic segments of Sikhs hold different versions of British national identity – a phenomenon covered in Kaufmann’s (2017) peer-to-peer complexity theory. Based on this concept, one may extrapolate that, as this change has affected younger Sikhs more, the same may hold for other minority ethnic categories. Therefore, by testing this argument for Sikhs, this research contributes to knowledge in the wider field of nationalism theory.

Apart from the changes in the mix of ethnic groups, another prominent trend is the regionalisation of national identity. Whilst this only minimally affects Sikhs at present, it is an important trend in Scotland and Wales. Thus, it is worth noting for future research on Sikhs. In these regions, where there are strong nationalist movements, it will be interesting to see if Sikhs will vary their Britishness accordingly. As part of this, I cover the impact of devolution in British national identity next.

The Regionalisation of British National Identity

Regional Britishness is very strongly expressed by those who are either born in a particular region or are established residents. In order to understand this, I compared four-nation identities from census to notional regional populations using data from the 2011 census. The results are in Table 4.

Table 4

Regional British Identities of Sikhs and Non-Sikhs in England, Scotland and Wales

National Identity	Persons in Category	Regional Population	Percentage of Population per National Identity in Region
British Only	11,134,274	63,182,178 (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)	18%
English Only	32,472,725	53,012,456 (England Only)	61%
English and British	4,867,862	53,012,456 (England Only)	9%
Welsh Only	2,053,419	3,063,456 (Wales Only)	67%
Welsh and British	274,547	3,063,456 (Wales Only)	9%
Scottish Only	3,741,089	5,295,403 (Scotland Only)	71%
Scottish and British	1,052,171	5,295,403 (Scotland Only)	20%

Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016).

(N=63,182,178).

In this data, due mainly to the large population in England compared to other nations, English identity was the most common response (in number of persons) to the 2011 census

question on national identity. Furthermore, and in contrast to ideas put forward by Kumar (2009), Colley (2014) and Greenfeld (2006) who suggested that Englishness and Britishness are interchangeable, “British Only” identity was only chosen by a minority of white British respondents, whether selected either on its own or in combination with another choice. This regional trend is evident in all three nations above, with identities in Wales and Scotland being much more locally biased. As this data shows, majority groups in Wales and Scotland did not self-identify with Britishness only, but with their smaller-nation identity with minor percentages combining regional and British identities. This is not the case with Sikhs.

British Sikhs have historically been less likely to self-identify with one of the four nations. There are several explanations for this. The strongest is that smaller-nation identities are associated with white ethnicity. Garner (2009) calls this “a distinct British Habitus for white identity formation” (p. 16). Thus, Sikhs have not been able to connect to being English, Welsh or, up until very recently, Scottish. This is one reason why older Sikhs have long self-identified as British. Furthermore, I suggest they have done so because British is not as ‘tangible’ as Scottish or English. That is, it is not specific enough to engender a sense of ethnic, historical, or ‘native’ attachment to a territory. In some ways, it is the same as calling someone Asian or European.

Because of this, it has in the past offered Sikhs a ‘safe’ civic political status through which they do not have to declare their loyalty to a region. This has allowed Sikhs to steer clear of ethnic identities and their conjoined social issues, such as whiteness in Englishness, which they perceive to be attached to them. For early transnationally-linked Sikhs, these would have been important hurdles to their initial survival and then later, success in an early postcolonial British society. Hence, we have the situation today where some Sikhs still choose to identify as British only. Whatever the reason may be, it is the case at present that

the majority of Sikhs still self-identify the same way as other minorities, such as Muslims for instance. They call themselves British in contrast to many in the majority white ethnic group.


Having discussed how national identity was expressed in the 2011 census, I now focus more closely on Sikhs. First, I examine present-day Sikhs by age, country of origin and physical setting. Then I focus on the details of Sikhs in the 2011 census results, specifically their chosen national identities as well as the ethnic group they identify with, thus setting out basic metrics on Britain's Sikhs before I move onto on their identity politics. I start with data on their national identification.

Sikhs and National Identity

The majority of Sikhs self-identify as British. This is the case for Sikhs in England and Wales, but not necessarily for those who reside in Scotland. This finding follows the same pattern for minorities in Britain as that shown by Jivraj (2013) earlier in this chapter and by Kaufmann and Harris (2014); Khor (2015) and McCrone and Bechhofer (2015) amongst others. Figure 2 shows how Sikhs chose their national identity in the 2011 census.

Figure 2

National Identity Among Sikhs in England and Wales



Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census of England and Wales aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016). Table DC2204. (N=423,158).

Earlier I gave some reasons as to why Sikhs have historically called themselves British. Here, I show the numerical strength of those reasons which included anonymity, colonialism, and whiteness. Using the table above it is easy to suggest that these Sikhs' Britishness is unquestionable since 63 per cent of those surveyed in 2011 chose the national identity "British Only". Partly due to this, it is the most common national identity found in the limited literature on Sikhs and British identity, such as that by Singh and Tatla (2006); Singh, J. (2010) and Jaspal (2013).

However, while I note these findings, I posit that, given my observations and newer data, Sikh identity in Britain is becoming more complex. I analyse this further on in this chapter, using community-specific datasets. At this point, I note that it is important that a


significant share of Sikhs (32 per cent) chose “English” and “Other National Identity” as their nationality. This, as I show later in this chapter, varies significantly by age in this community, which in turn affects how Sikhs ‘connect’ to the hostland. Hence, age defines how different groups of Sikhs express national identity. However, I acknowledge that this is a recent development as the census category “British Only” remains very common among other minorities. I show this next.

Sikhs, National Identity and Other Groups

In order to contextualise the Britishness of Sikhs in relation to other groups, I have made use of the fact that they are classed as a unique religious group in the census. Therefore first, using religion as a group marker, I have shown the interplay between that and national identity. From the data, I conclude that these religious groups overwhelmingly self-identified as British (this includes English, Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish either solely or in combination) rather than foreign in the 2011 census in England and Wales. This is shown in Figure 3 where I draw attention to the comparative levels of “English Only” identity in these groups using data labels. Here Sikhs show a slightly higher level when compared to a similar religious group, Muslims.

Figure 3

National Identity Among Selected Religious Groups in England




Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census of England and Wales aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016); Table no. LC2204EW. (N=423,158 Sikhs; 2,706,066 Muslims; 263,346 Jews; 33,243,175 Christians).

Notes: Minor numerical replies such as blanks have been omitted.

Second, I examined data on national identity by ethnicity. Here, a similar assessment by Stephen Jivraj (2013) by ethnic group using the 2011 census provides illumination. Jivraj has shown that ethnic minorities are 2.7 times more likely to choose the “British Only” category than “White British” respondents. I have adapted his data in Figure 4 to show the strength of Sikh Britishness using slightly different identity choices.

Figure 4

National Identity Among Sikhs and Selected Other Ethnic Groups



Source: Jivraj (2013), "Who feels British? The Dynamics of Diversity: Evidence from the 2011 Census".

Notes: Minor numerical replies such as blanks have been omitted.

From this data, I further establish that Sikhs are very likely to call themselves British. But, importantly for my study, changes to this historic self-identification are underway. For example, Sikhs were more likely to identify with "Other" when compared to Jews or Christians. Furthermore, even though some Sikhs identify with regional nations such as Scottish or Welsh, this is a relatively new development. Of note is the important minority of Sikhs (15 per cent) who in 2011 already identified with the majority group English in Figure 4. They illustrate my point on complexity in Sikh Britishness well.

As I will demonstrate more clearly in a subsequent chapter using data collected exclusively for this thesis, Sikh groups who choose not to select British as an identity represent an

important development in Sikh hostland identity. This is in line with the society-wide trend I showed in my section on regionalisation earlier in Table 4. Another trend is some groups using combinations or eschewing national identity completely as it does not fit their identity politics. All these developments will support my argument that Sikhs are more usefully understood as having a British national identity that is complex and diverse, rather than undifferentiated or simplistic.

Having shown the nature of Sikh hostland national identity in Britain, I here recall my research question of whether the content of Sikh hostland national identity differs by age. To begin answering this question using quantitative data, I next show age breakdown.

Sikhs by Age Range

Sikhs are a relatively young community compared to the ethnic majority. Table 5 shows how Sikhs' age structure compares to other groups in England and Wales in 2011. The final column shows each group's share of the total population as enumerated in previous tables.

Table 5
Age Breakdown of Selected Religious Groups

Age Range / Religion	0-15	16-24	25-34	35-49	50-64	65-74	75 plus	Share of National Population
Sikhs	21%	14%	20%	22%	16%	5%	3%	0.87%
Hindus	19%	13%	24%	22%	15%	5%	3%	1.68%
Christians	16%	10%	11%	21%	21%	11%	11%	68.43%
No Religion	23%	17%	19%	24%	13%	4%	2%	29.02%

Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census of England and Wales aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016). (N=816,633 Hindus; 423,158 Sikhs; 33,243,175 Christians; 14,097,229 No Religion).

Most younger Sikhs will also be British and English-born, meaning that there is more likelihood of them being influenced by wider national identity politics. This will further distinguish them from their parents and grandparents, as there will be fewer transnational links influencing Sikh identity. Furthermore, considering the increase in mixed-ethnicity families due to intermarriage, it is likely that Sikhs will identify increasingly less with religion and ethnicity and more with national identity. The former identities are seen as being more divisive as opposed to unifying when compared to, say, Britishness. Apart from national identity, I note that other non-ethnic minority heritage identities such as non-Indic ones could additionally become more popular, for example being a Londoner, Yorkshireman or a Midlander. These ‘geocentric’ identities compete with ‘ethnocentric’ identities in daily Sikh lives – further illustrating the growing complexity of Sikh Britishness.

Furthermore, this development could also become common amongst other British youth who belong to religious groups, such as Muslims for instance. For this reason, I theorise that national identity could become of profound importance to their cultural politics, as they will seek fuller integration and social mobility. Accordingly, this study could speak to a number of groups beyond that of the Sikh community.


I next show that country of birth plays an important role in national identity.

Sikhs by Country of Birth

A large proportion of Sikhs are British-born. In trying to gauge the significance of this when compared to others in the ethnic category of Indian, I selected Hindus for comparison in the 2011 census. This showed that over 57 per cent of Sikhs were British-

born, compared to only 37 per cent of Hindus.²⁴ This indicates the longer, more established nature of the Sikh community, whereas the lower Hindu percentage is due to the students and migrant-workers who have arrived recently. Despite this, and the fact most Sikhs self-identify as British, it is still surprising that so many Sikhs (43 per cent) are foreign-born. Figure 5 shows the data.

Figure 5
Sikhs by Country of Birth



Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016).
(N=423,158).

All the same, foreign birth may not necessarily reduce the likelihood of Sikhs identifying as British, the opposite may be the case instead. Many of them were born in

²⁴ Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016).

Commonwealth countries, which contributes to the Sikhs' attraction to Britishness as a political status. Additionally, as many older Sikhs found it a challenge to gain automatic British citizenship, they 'amplify' it in order to protect it (Jandu, 2015). This is the same phenomenon that Khor (2015) found in newly naturalised British citizens.

However, this is not the case with younger Sikhs, who are more interested in socio-civic notions of what it means to be British. They have automatically inherited British citizenship and, rather than treat it as a source of status, they utilise it for social mobility and have more involvement in the politics of national identity. In this way, country of birth is related to age variation in British Sikh hostland identity. This will be shown in detail further on in this chapter using Sikh surveys.

As noted, Sikhs, who are largely British-born, identify mainly as British and not English. One could view this as perplexing as, due to their location, most Sikhs will actually be English-born. To explain it, recall that I have already presented anonymity, colonialism, and whiteness as reasons for Sikhs gravitating to Britishness. Of these three, the perceived whiteness of Englishness is the most significant hurdle to Sikhs identifying as English.

This finding is similar to Leddy-Owen's (2014) data on English identity. In the cases he reports, one of which was a Sikh male, country of birth remained a significant factor in national identity formation. Those interviewees who were British-born and from an ethnic minority found it complicated to self-identify as English. This was the case even if they were of mixed, part-white ethnicity. I note that in the case of the Sikh male subject, religion was also raised as a possible issue in identifying as English where Englishness was considered to be a Christian identity.

One of Leddy-Owen's subjects referred to English identity as a "club" with an exclusivity tied to whiteness while another, a non-white woman (Jacqui) felt that that her skin colour

“obviously” prevents her from being “a hundred percent” English. (p. 1456). Thus, most of his non-white respondents identified as British, finding in Englishness an identity they were not “allowed” (p. 1454).

His English respondents were in all cases white respondents who had been born in England and none opted to self-identify as British. In this way, Leddy-Owen’s work can be used to suggest that since whites who are English-born tend to self-identify as English, country of birth among Sikhs has created a perceived ‘proxy’ for whiteness in English national identification. This then could be one reason why most English-born Sikhs still do not self-identify as English.

In addition to Leddy-Owen, others working on the connection between national identity and country of birth have discovered that country of birth is an important factor in ethnic minority group national identification. For instance, this has been covered generally for both majority and minority groups in Nandi and Platt (2013). Hussain and Bagguley (2005) have found the same among Muslims, and Lam and Smith (2009) reported a similar if weaker trend amongst Afro-Caribbeans. Despite this, the situation looks to be changing in Scotland where there is a rise in the likelihood of Sikhs self-identifying as Scottish. However, this is a recent development whose impact remains unknown but could be a fruitful area of research.

Later in this chapter, I use a community-based survey to show the symbolic difference in national identity between Sikhs who are British-born and those who are not. I note that this was not a statistic I was able to gain from the census data. Having thus exhausted the census data on country of birth, I next develop my argument about complexity using ethnicity in Sikh British national identification.

Sikhs and Ethnicity

Whilst Sikhs overwhelmingly self-identify as British, an increasing percentage, however, are identifying with different ethnic categories. This is an important development as most Sikhs are Indian by heritage due their ancestral country of origin. Furthermore, they have historically identified as such in most parts of the diaspora, for instance in Africa and South-East Asia (Mangat, 1969 and McCann, 2011). Exceptions do exist in places where Sikhs are in small numbers where they utilise the category Asian. Globally, there are only a small number of Sikh converts, so the community is still perceived as Indian by outsiders (Singh and Tatla, 2008; Cole and Sambhi, 1973). An example of the strength of Sikhs self-identifying as Indian can be seen in the 2011 census where most Sikhs (74 per cent) identified as Indian.

Despite this, I found an interesting pattern by comparing the ethnic group categories using the datasets from the 2001 and 2011 censuses. In these, there has been a major shift in the number of Sikhs who identify with non-Indian and non-Asian categories. I acknowledge here that the categories used in the census across the two datasets have been slightly amended, making some direct comparisons difficult. However, the overall picture is compelling; fewer and fewer Sikhs are likely to use Indian as a category, whilst those in nearly all the other categories have increased dramatically. Table 6 shows the patterns of increase.

Table 6
Changes to Selected Ethnic Categories Among Sikhs
in England and Wales: 2001 to 2011

Ethnic Category	2011	2001	Change in Persons	Change in Percentage
Indian	312,965	301,295	11,670	4%
Other Asian	51,583	15,009	36,574	244%
Any Other	40,133	2,323	37,810	1628%
White	7,460	6,893	567	8%
Mixed All	5,122	2,760	2,362	86%
Pakistani	3,283	346	2,937	849%
Black	1,431	617	814	132%
Bangladeshi	672	112	560	500%
Arab	509	111	398	359%

Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016).
(N=423,158).

I note three distinct changes in this comparison. Firstly, given that white British is the majority group with whom many Sikhs interact, of particular note is the changes to the categories of “White” and “Mixed All”. Here, I find further evidence of my thesis that a chronological change has taken place in the Britishness of Sikhs. As a reminder, I have already shown that Englishness is less associated with Indian than it is with white ethnic groups, and that Sikhs are a young community. Therefore, the increase seen in the census categories of “White” and “Mixed”, the second of which is majority “Mixed White”, is probably due to younger Sikhs coming from a mixed or white parentage. I apply the same

analysis for the other growing category of “Black”. Here again, due to the society-wide rise in mixed relationships, younger Sikhs are considering their ethnicity based on parentage rather than an ancestral country.

However, I note that this decision to use ethno-racial rather than nationality-based connections to be perceived as white or black as opposed to Indian or Asian could simply be political, as with the ‘blackness’ movement. Whatever the reason and despite this being an important development for the community, the small number of Sikhs it affects means that, as yet, Sikhs’ national identity is unlikely to be greatly affected. Thus, a Sikh with white parentage is more likely not to choose Indian as their ethnicity but still quite likely to call themselves British rather than English. This is most likely, as noted, due to the perceived whiteness of English national identity, much as Leddy-Owen (2014) found in his field research.

Secondly, more Sikhs are identifying with other non-Indian, yet Asian categories. So, for instance, there has been a noticeable increase in “Pakistani” and “Bangladeshi” Sikhs.

Thirdly, the rise in “Other Asian” is mainly a result of Sikh identity politics, where Sikhs from neighbouring countries to India wishing to have Sikh as an ethnic group are identifying with different ethnic origins, and, to a much lesser extent, we also see some Chinese Sikhs. As a side note, “Arab” now contains Sikhs who are “twice-migrants” from India via the Gulf region (Bhachu, 1985). Overall, I posit that ethnicity has the potential to become an important mediator of Sikh Britishness but, as yet, affects a very small number of Sikhs. All the same, it signals the growth in the complexity of Sikh identity in Britain.

So far, I have presented and analysed British Sikhs’ nationalities, age range distribution and ethnicity. I will soon begin a more detailed analysis of their political lives, but first I


present another wider variable that could affect their national identity politics, choice of residence.

Sikhs and Residential Choices

The majority of Sikhs reside in England’s population hubs. The 2011 census result counted 423,158 self-identifying Sikhs in England and Wales, with the latter region accounting for just 2,962. As Figure 6 shows, Sikh communities in Britain are heavily concentrated (over 60 percent) in two regions, the English Midlands and London. With regard to specific districts, five areas are most heavily Sikh-populated: Hounslow and Southall in West London as well as Sandwell, Wolverhampton and Birmingham in the West Midlands. This is due to their over-representation in heavy-industry jobs as post-war migrants, as well as their chain migration patterns. Figure 6 illustrates this.

Figure 6

Sikh Populations in Various Regions in England



Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016). (N=423,158).

The physical location of Sikhs is important as they reside in areas which are more likely to be affected by ethnic changes and cosmopolitanism. One group for whom this is especially the case is that of the younger adult British Sikhs, aged 18–30. They are more likely to adapt to social and professional networks by, for instance, curtailing facets of identity that create barriers to mobility in these networks, or in some cases, even defensively ‘amplify’ aspects of their identity to stand out. An example is the recent increase of inter-racial marriages amongst them. Over the participant observation period of the last five years several of my Sikh subjects married out of the Sikh and South Asian communities. This is also becoming more common among non-Sikh South Asians residing in Britain’s more densely-populated areas. So, among Sikhs who have intermarried there is a move away from an ethno-religious Sikhness to a more diverse identity.

One broader aspect to bear in mind is that, even though the number of Sikhs marrying outside the faith is comparable to numbers in the other South Asian minority groups such as Hindus or Muslims, this is still very small when compared to non-South Asian minority groups such as Afro-Caribbeans or Africans.

Sikhs and White British Naming Practices

As further evidence of this inter-ethnic mobility, non-Sikh and non-Punjabi names given to newer-born Sikh children are becoming more and more common. Apart from personal observation and experience we now have recent data that shows the link between the changes in Sikh naming practices and locality. In addition to these two elements, I include age as an important factor as it will be the younger Sikhs, those that are more likely to have personal relationships with non-Sikhs and white Britons, that are more likely to name their children white British, or, at least, non-Sikh names. The data I will explore (the Webber-Phillips *Origins* database) does not unfortunately include age. Yet it forms an

important part of the evidence showing that Sikh identity in Britain is not as uniform as it once was.

The new Webber-Phillips *Origins* database of 2021 is described as helping to “enable users to infer the cultural background of people whose names appear on customer and client files and, more particularly, to compare the percentage of names on a file that are associated with particular cultural backgrounds with the overall percentage of names in the adult population as a whole.”²⁵ For this reason, it forms an important source in testing migrant community origins, an aspect that can differ from the census (ONS and ONS LS)—which allows for more focus on changes associated with the second and third generations where naming practices may have changed.

The Webber-Phillips *Origins* software 2021, based on a sample of 1 million people, shows that the overall percentage of UK adults in the database with Sikh surnames is 0.6 per cent. Of those, 9.49 per cent had white British first names as of 2020. Stronger Sikh areas show less ‘anglicised’ first names: where Sikhs are the largest group in a particular postcode, just 5.10 per cent of adults with Sikh surnames in that postcode have white British personal names. Where white British are the largest group in a postcode, the share of people with white British first names and Sikh surnames jumps to 19.81 per cent. Across the UK as a whole 9.49 per cent of all adults with Sikhs surnames have white British personal names. This share is considerably lower in the most popular Sikh neighbourhoods, such as Wolverhampton, which is 8.4 per cent Sikh (3.03 per cent have white British first names) or Sandwell, which is 7.9 per cent Sikh (just 2.7 per cent have white British first names).

²⁵ Webber Phillips.com (2021). *FAQ 7: Why Origins totals and percentages differs from ONS country of birth statistics*. Available at: <https://webberphillips.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/faq-7-information-note-why-origins-totals-differ-from-country-of-birth1.pdf> (Accessed: November 2021).


We see similarly low levels of white British first names among Sikhs in locations where Hindu Indians are the largest group.

Using other South Asian Muslim groups for comparison, we see that other South Asian groups have a similar pattern to Sikhs. In areas where Pakistani Muslims are the largest group in the postcode just 4.34 per cent of adults with Muslim surnames have white British personal names. These are levels similar to postcodes where Bangladeshi Muslims are the largest group. Across the UK as a whole 10.82 per cent of all adults with Muslim surnames have white British personal names. This rises to 32.77 per cent of Muslims living in white British-plurality or majority neighbourhoods.

When it comes to location and Sikh naming practices, the same source shows that Local Authority areas are linked to predicting how Britain's Sikhs choose names. A cross tabulation of Sikh surnames against white British first names gives a measure of current Sikh naming practices across different types of Local Authority areas. As expected, popular Sikh residential areas such as Wolverhampton and Hounslow have a lower figure for white British first names. This relationship is statistically significant across Local Authorities at the 1 percent level. Figure 7a illustrates this below.

Figure 7a

Share of Sikhs with White British First Names by Local Authority




Source: The Webber-Phillips *Origins* software 2021. (N=2,473 Sikhs).

Another way of illustrating this is to rank Local Authorities by the percentage of Sikhs who have Sikh surnames and white British first names. I show this in Figure 7b for a select number of Local Authorities where there were sizeable Sikh populations reported.

Figure 7b

Percentage of Sikh Surnames with White British First Names by Select Local Authority



Source: The Webber-Phillips *Origins* software 2021. (N=2,473 Sikhs).

Notes: Only areas with high Sikh numbers have been included.

Analysing this with the previous information presented on Sikh residential choices and locality, I determine the following two points. First, Sikhs residing in areas with higher white British populations such as Telford and Wrekin, Southampton, and Spelthorne have a higher likelihood of having white British first names and Sikh surnames. Second, Sikhs that reside in high-Sikh population areas such as Sandwell, Blaby, Leicester and Gravesham have a lower likelihood of having white British first names and Sikh surnames. And this makes sense given that there is much less of an opportunity for them to meet, socialise and form personal relationships with white Britons.

Despite this, it is difficult to make a fully qualified statement as to the direction of causation between white British first names and the ethnic composition of a locality. For instance, it may be that local exposure to white British people is a correlate of white British first names among Sikhs in this data. It may also be that Sikhs who are more ‘white British-inclined’ choose less diverse areas, or they may be influenced more by their neighbours.

As a secondary observation, many of the high white British population areas in this data are close to high-Sikh population areas. For instance, Spelthorne is close to Hounslow, whilst Telford and Wrekin is not far from the English West Midlands. This suggests that any findings based on this data are only provisional. Nevertheless, they do point to a Sikh identity dependent on more varied aspects than has been previously conceptualised by researchers such as Singh and Tatla (2006); Nesbitt (2009) and Cole and Sambhi (1973) amongst others.

To summarise third party data presented thus far: through the analysis of the census figures, I have shown that even though Sikhs are mostly British in their national identification, many changes are taking place, all of which are reflective of conditions that make complex national identity a possibility. I have also examined data on first name-surname pairings from the 2021 *Origins* database to show how indicators of assimilation and intermarriage vary by locality.

I next present data from the ONS LS. The ONS LS is important to my age-related thesis on Sikh Britishness due to its representativeness and size as a 1 per cent random ONS census sample.

Sikh British National Identity in the ONS Longitudinal Survey

In order to get a representative sample of the national identity of British Sikhs, I present statistics from the ONS's Longitudinal Study, a 1 per cent sample of the census of England and Wales. This is the most powerful statistical portrait of the national identity of the British Sikh community. This shows the over-time composition of identity among a randomly-selected 1 per cent census sample of Sikhs in England and Wales (approximately 4,238 Sikhs) which is tracked at each successive census. I use it to compare Sikh identity with similar South Asian religious groups such as Muslims and Hindus. For example, it shows that younger Sikhs, those under 49 years of age, were more likely than Muslims or Hindus to identify as English rather than British.²⁶

As background, the following ONS LS statistics show the relatively high level of national identity complexity amongst Britain's Sikhs. The national identity question on the census asks respondents to choose from among "English", "Welsh", "Scottish", "Northern Irish", "British", "Other", and "Write in". People were asked to "tick all that apply" so could answer more than one category. Compared to similar ethnic groups, such as Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims, Sikhs were more likely to choose "Other" as a national identity. This finding increases the possibility of Sikhs not being simply British when compared to British Muslims. The full results are represented in Table 7 and Figure 8.

²⁶ I acknowledge that this is a slightly different age break to that in my own statistics which I introduce later, which puts the age break at between 40 and 45. However, the qualitative research suggests that this is due to sample differences between the surveys rather than overall group behaviour.

Table 7

Sikhs and Muslims Choosing “Other” as a National Identity by Age Group


Age Group	Sikhs	Bangladeshi/ Pakistani Muslims
Under 20	4.25%	4.74%
20 - 34	16.76%	17.85%
35 - 49	15.25%	10.71%
50 - 64	17.36%	9.10%
65 +	21.83%	10.70%

Source: ONS LS Survey.

N=4,238

Figure 8

Sikhs and Muslims Choosing “Other” as a National Identity by Age Group



Source: ONS LS Survey.

N=4,238

When the detailed age break is examined, I find significant differences in how Sikhs express national identity as compared to Muslims in England and Wales. So, amongst Sikhs and Muslims aged over 65, the former were nearly twice as likely to choose a non-British national identity. However, among those younger than 35, there was only a small difference between Sikhs and Muslims.

The pattern among young Sikhs is important as Sikhs in Britain are a younger community than the national average for England and Wales. For example, in the 2011 census, 76 per cent were under the age of 50 as compared to 57 per cent of Christians. The same source showed that 54 per cent of Sikhs were under 35 years of age as compared to 36 per cent of Christians.

Sikhs are also distinctive in having a stronger preference for “English” rather than “British” when compared to South Asian Muslim groups.

I explore this using multiple regression analysis of the ONS LS data, excluding Sikhs who have a foreign national identity so as to restrict the focus to English vs British identity. Here, I use a logistic regression where the outcome measure is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for English and 0 for another British national identity (mainly British). Using indicative factors and their controls, the data in Table 8 shows that age is a significant factor in predicting English identity amongst Sikhs, with older Sikhs significantly less likely to identify as English compared to younger Sikhs. As respondents had to identify as either English or British, this gives me evidence of variation in this group. The asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent *, 1 percent ** and .1 percent *** levels. Thus, in Table 8, five variables can be deemed to be significant.

Table 8

Predictors of Sikhs with a British-Based National Identity Identifying as English

ONS Variable	Englishness
Age	-0.008 * (.004)
University Degree	-0.040 (.120)
London Resident	-0.724* (.334)
UK Born	1.106*** (.142)
Single Status	-0.115 (.145)
Renting Abode	0.542** (.158)
Living in a Mixed-Ethnic House	0.242* (.123)
White British Share in Ward	0.067 (.066)
Indian / Bangladeshi - Pakistani Muslim share in ward (1-5 quintile score)	0.040 (.044)
Professional / Manager	-0.190 (.112)
Constant	-1.622*** -0.461
(ONS Regions-Not Significant but controlled for)	
Observations	4,238
Pseudo R ² = 0.08	
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Source: ONS LS Survey. (N=4,238 Sikhs).

Table 8 shows that age is a significant predictor of Sikh Englishness. Every year of age, moving from the oldest to the youngest, is associated with a .8 of a percentage point increase in the likelihood of a Sikh person identifying as English. Even though the above data indicates that being UK-born and being a renter (rather than an owner or council tenant) are stronger predictors (in terms of standardized effect size), age remains statistically significant – a finding also reflected in my interview data. Its effect is about the same as that of living in a mixed-ethnicity household, which is an indicator of being in an interracial partnership. London Sikhs are significantly less likely to identify as English as Sikhs outside London. Professionals of all ages, single people and those with degrees were no less likely to identify as English than those of other occupational statuses, married people and those without degrees.


The representative nature of the above ONS LS data, with its 1 percent national sample of 4,238 Sikhs, shows that younger Sikhs are significantly more likely to identify as English even when we control for birthplace, education, occupational status, region, marital status and housing status. Thus, based on the strength of this data we can say that Sikh hostland national identity in Britain, it appears, does differ by age.

Age is significant amongst Sikhs as a predictor of English identification. Comparing them and South Asian Muslims shows that the same pattern does not hold among Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims. This can be seen in Figures 9 and 10 where the t- statistic for (older) age for Sikhs in predicting English identity is -2.020 and is statistically-significant at the $p < .05$ level whereas for Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims it is -.240 and not significant. Thus, the greater negative value for Sikhs supports the thesis that they are more likely to be English the younger they are.

On the other hand, amongst the South Asian Muslim grouping, age is not a significant predictor of English identity in the logistic regression analysis. Instead, being UK-born, living in a mixed-ethnic household, and own-ethnic share in ward are significant at the $p < .001$ level. Figure 9 illustrates the comparison. Living in London predicts lower Englishness for both groups while living in a mixed-ethnic household predicts higher Englishness among both.

Figure 9

Sikhs and Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims with a British-based National Identity Identifying as English




Source: ONS LS Survey.

Notes: Symbols on each side of the hyphen refer to statistical significance for Sikhs vs. Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims, with ‘-’ as not significant, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. (N=4,238 Sikhs; 15,075 Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims)

By contrast, models predicting whether an individual will identify as British, as distinct from a regional national identity (i.e., Welsh, Scottish) or ticking both English and British rather than just one, finds a more similar pattern between Sikhs and South Asian Muslims, as Figure 10 shows. Older people and professionals are more likely to identify as British only in both groups, while those in mixed-ethnic households are significantly less likely to identify as British only in both groups.

Figure 10

Predictors of Sikh and Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims with a British-based National Identity Identifying as British Only



Source: ONS LS Survey. (N=4,238 Sikhs; 15,075 Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims)

In addition to the 2011 ONS LS, a more recent (BBC 2018) survey illustrates the same point as Figure 9, that (younger) age correlates with a greater chance of identifying as English amongst Sikhs. Table 9 is a regression analysis of the 2018 BBC/YouGov data on Englishness.

Table 9

Variables on the Likelihood of Sikhs identifying as English

ONS Variable	Englishness Variable
Age	-0.580** (.214)
University Degree	-0.000 (.290)
Living in Rural Area	-0.109 (.294)
Gender	-.970 (.270)
Voted for Brexit	.0712 (.310)
Voted Conservative in 2017	-0.222 (.220)
Lives in London	0.734 -0.345
R² = 0.220	
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Sources: YouGov / BBC Survey (9th March to 26th March 2018). (N=100).


In the table above, younger Sikhs are more likely to identify as English in this survey. Therefore, my thesis challenges the current view that Sikh national identity, alongside that of other South Asian groups, is wholly British rather than English, as intimated in Bhambra (2021); Nandi and Platt (2015) or Jivraj (2013). As such, my study helps illustrate that an age-based approach to Britishness can inform studies on minority Britishness and hostland national identity in general.

Sikh and White British National Identity in the ONS Longitudinal Survey

Expanding the comparison to include the majority ethnic group, the white British, illustrates the wider context of the society Sikhs live in. Of particular importance is the high level of Englishness amongst the majority ethnic group. Using the same 2011 ONS LS data, Figure 11 shows the comparative findings for “Sikh”, “Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims” and “White British” groups identifying as English (this excludes those who have selected “Other”).

Figure 11

Age Breakdown of Ethnic Groups Choosing English National Identity



Source: ONS LS Survey. (N=4,238 Sikhs; 15,075 Bangladeshi/Pakistani Muslims; 382,019 White British).

Englishness among white British groups is important as it may have a direct effect on Sikhs. Note that younger Sikhs are more likely than the other South Asian groups used here to live in a mixed-ethnic household, which predicts higher English identity. In many cases this is with a white British partner, itself an aspect which is borne out in the interviews presented later.

Using ONS LS figures, 13.38 per cent of Sikhs were found to be in mixed-ethnic households as compared to 7.68 per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims in England. Amongst the Sikh age groups, this number was highest for those in their 20s and decreased after 34 years of age. This I take as a proxy for the higher possibility of

interethnic relationships with non-Sikhs and the possibility of personal relationships with white British citizens.

These partners I have shown are likely to be English given the data from censuses and the ONS LS figures. Thus, younger Sikhs have a higher likelihood of associating themselves with Englishness than older Sikhs or young Asian Muslims. There is support for this in the interviews where Sikhs with white partners are more likely to call themselves English. One (Sarbdeep) even changed her national identity from British to English once she had met a Cornish partner who identified as English. In all cases these were younger Sikhs, under the age of 40.

Therefore, using the ONS LS, I am able to posit an approximate age where the difference between the two age groups becomes apparent. This is somewhere between 35-49 years of age. The majority of Sikhs under 49 years of age constitute a group of younger, British-born Sikhs. In this segment, age more than class, gender, or region is the most influential factor in the content of national identity according to the ONS LS. This I deem to be a marker of everyday complexity leading to complex nationalism. As an early introduction to the interview data, below is an extract of an interview showing this:

GJ: Do think that there are variations amongst Sikhs in their Britishness?

Sukhi: Loads now! When I look at my mum and dad and their crew, they are all just alike. But my [Sikh] mates are more mixed. One of them is a proper Sikh, one is a Buddhist, and another is from a mixed-race family.

Sukhi, aged 40, Hounslow, West London, April 2018

Here the interviewee commented that the intricacies of a Sikh's life, such as being of non-Sikh faith or of mixed-race, affected their national identity. This 'circumstantial' nationality is not something I found for older Sikhs in the interviews or survey. Instead,

they expressed a simpler national identity. For example, one based around being British only, whereas younger Sikhs were more likely to identify with regional nations. As a result, I found from the interviews that a mixture of foreign and British national identities is not uncommon for many first generation (and thus older) Sikhs. For this reason, I assert that age is a strong predictor of the content of a Sikh's Britishness.

This interviewee also demonstrates that for many third and, to a lesser extent, second, generation Sikhs the origin of identity variation lies in hostland politics. I have support for this in the research showing that mixed ethnicity individuals tend to identify with their country of birth rather than that of their foreign-birth parent. Sikhs of this ilk will thus often identify as English. This has been researched by Kaufmann and Harris (2014) who cite examples from history being replete with mixed-background nationalist figures such as the half-Spanish Irish nationalist Eamon De Valera, mixed-race black American intellectual WEB Du Bois, or part-Indonesian Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, all of whom express hostland national identity.

Reverting back to Sikhs, their hostland identities are significantly different to those of their parents and grandparents. For example, their social and professional networks reach further than the community, making lived experiences much less Sikh-based and more diverse. One key reason for this is that, as children of settlers, they are financially and juridically stable. This means that younger Sikhs have the time and resources to reflect upon their identity, including nationality. Therefore, being secure in their lifestyles they go beyond 'survival', shaping their identity content based on their daily lives, thus making it changeable in its detail, including its nationhood. This contrasts with their parents' generation, who rely on institutional 'forces' to provide security of identity. For them, due to the 'unidirectional' and generic nature of this official source, their national identity is simpler.

To summarise this section, it can be said that the national identity of Sikhs is complex rather than simple. For instance, based on the ONS LS, younger Sikhs are more likely than older Sikhs to be English rather than just British in their national identity. This becomes very apparent when they are compared to both older Sikhs and to South Asian Muslims and Hindus. It was observing this same rise of Sikh Englishness amongst youth in my personal networks that prompted this doctoral research. I therefore single them out for detailed examination in subsequent chapters.

This section on the ONS LS concludes my analysis on the demography and identity categories of Sikhs in Britain. Keeping with the aim of presenting independent data on Sikhs in England and Wales, I next focus on the social and political characteristics of the community. As the national census and the ONS LS does not contain enough detailed information, I have chosen more specialised surveys. These include the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), the Citizenship Survey and the British Sikh Report. In the following section I cover the British Sikh Report in detail and augment it with the other two. I do this as the Sikh report contains a larger sample of the community and has more relevant data for my study of Sikh hostland national identity.

The British Sikh Report

The British Sikh Report (BSR) has been running since 2013 as an annual online community-run survey. Its success is due to it being the first of its kind, and the fact that it has a large sample size. In 2013, there were 662 respondents, or approximately 0.15 per cent of the 423,158 Sikh population of England and Wales (as at 2011 census). In 2016, the sample size of the BSR was 1417 respondents, or 0.34 per cent of the total population. In 2017, the sample size had increased to 2011 Sikhs, 0.45 per cent of the community. As this survey's sample remains the largest pool of Sikhs sampled in Britain outside the census,

and is set to increase over the years ahead, I utilise it extensively in my research. Partly because of this, I have become involved in the design of the survey. In 2016, I authored the report's lead article and in 2017, questions directly arising from this study were included in the survey at my request.

However, despite its significance, the survey lacks independent monitoring and is missing some crucial elements of data for my study of nationalism. For example, until 2017, there had not been a question on country of birth, nor on length of settlement in Britain.

Furthermore, because it gathers data online and in English only, it has a bias towards those who are technologically knowledgeable, such as younger Sikhs.²⁷ It is also less of a random draw from the Sikh population than the ONS LS 1 percent sample used earlier.

Like most surveys, it also contains few questions on the content of national identity. I can only use the data to test nationality in categorial terms, i.e., foreign, British or four-nation identity. The data does not allow me to understand the specific detail of what national identity entails for Sikhs. For example, I am unable to answer questions such as whether the Union Flag has a different meaning for older and younger Sikhs. To surmount such difficulties, I combine the BSR with my own custom-built survey in a later chapter.

Beginning with the BSR, I first briefly cover basic Sikh demographic data then move onto examining the variables that cause variations in Sikh Britishness. At the end of this section, I will have identified age, gender, education, and profession as major variables mediating Sikh British national identity, and political viewpoints and education as minor

²⁷ Also, many questions did not contain an option for declining the given options, such as 'prefer not to say' or 'none of the above'. Whilst changes are underway, this may have a minor effect on data quality.

ones. I conclude, based on these variables, that it is possible to predict, in varying degrees, whether a Sikh identifies as foreign, British or English.

National Self-Identification

As I have already established, Sikhs strongly identify as British. This is further supported by the BSR data in 2016, where 63 per cent of Sikhs identified as British either as an identity on its own or across all combinations. In 2017, the same figure had increased to 82 per cent. These high levels of self-described Britishness are important as the question in both surveys, rather than being a direct question on national identity, was “How would you describe yourself?”. This establishes further that Sikhs express themselves to be British. Furthermore, this is supported by the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) of 2010 which contained a question on national identities. Out of a sample of 164 Sikhs in EMBES (6.8 per cent of the whole sample), 62 per cent self-identified as British, 23 per cent as Indian, and nearly 10 per cent as English.

Although a clear majority of Sikhs pick British as a national identity, there were several variations in answering the national identity question that are noteworthy. As such I restate here that my thesis will show that, due to horizontal networking and the emergence of national identity among Sikhs, there exists significant variation within ‘umbrella’ national identity terms such as Britishness. Furthermore, this phenomenon is well-covered in the literature on the role of localism as well as personal and social settings and choices. My study will add Britain’s Sikhs to the case studies used to support these theories.

Thus, taking the BSR 2016 dataset for instance, the question was openly phrased as “How would you describe yourself?”. In answer to this, 15 per cent chose “Sikh” to describe themselves, a figure only marginally higher than “British only” at 13.8 per cent. Another variation is that “Scottish” was more frequent than “English”, even though Sikhs are

heavily concentrated in England. In the 2017 BSR there is even stronger evidence for these variations. A large majority, 82 per cent, selected British, both on its own and in other combinations. However, 34 per cent chose “English”. Meanwhile, 82 per cent self-identified as “Sikh” and 61 per cent considered themselves “Indian”. These various (non-exclusive) categories of self-identification show that depending on specific questions, Sikhs are very likely to express different identities, including Britishness.

As I noted earlier, this variation appears to be a recent phenomenon and provides rationale for my study. However, I acknowledge that this phenomenon is difficult to gauge as, due to the recent nature of it, longer-term data is limited. Despite this, values such as the 34 per cent of respondents who selected “English” in 2017 furnish evidence of variation in Sikh hostland national identity today. This ‘hint’ at Sikh Englishness is further supported by the combined results of the 2009-10 and 2010-11 Citizenship Survey sample of 663 Sikhs. In those Citizenship Survey waves, when asked “What do you consider your national identity to be?”, 10 per cent chose “English”.

Having established that Sikh Britishness in the BSR is both an established identity as well as one that exhibits variation, I next present the complexity of Sikh hostland nationalism. I do this by using simple demographic variables as well as more analytical ones. Therefore, I next cross tabulate the BSR 2016 and 2017 data on Sikhs, examining national identity by age, place of birth, date of arrival in the UK, level of education, and socio-economic class.

I then ask how more subjective variables relate to national identification, such as: diversity of social networks, diversity of residential ward, EU referendum vote, gender, attitude towards joining the army, attitude towards an independent Sikh state, religious observance (uncut hair) and, finally, attitudes towards refugees and migrants. This

analysis will show that these variables often condition whether a Sikh person identifies with a foreign, British, or English national identity. I start with age.


Age and Britishness

In this section, I analyse the data in age-brackets for those who included British, either solely or in combination, in the BSR in 2016 and 2017. However, as a reminder these figures should be viewed as indicative as they are drawn from non-representative survey samples whereas the ONS LS data presented earlier in Figure 11 are representative data.

Returning to the BSR, I discover significant variation in hostland national identity by age. The following figures show that those aged between 25 and 44 are most likely to identify as British (either solely or in combination). They made up a large majority of those who selected this national identity. I show the relative prominence of this identity when compared to English and foreign identities by using simplified age-graded data from the BSR 2016 report in Figure 12.

Figure 12

National Identities Among Select Sikh Age Groups in BSR 2016




Source: City Sikh Network (2016), British Sikh Report 2016. (N=1,417).

Thus, as Figure 12 shows, foreign national identity is more prominent among Sikhs 55 and over. As further evidence, this trend is also present in the BSR 2017 where the use of British, either solely or in combination, is again most likely amongst Sikhs aged between 25 and 44. Englishness too is more likely in younger Sikhs as the figure shows. The data are somewhat noisier than the census (ONS LS) due to the non-representative nature of the sample, hence we cannot read too much into the exceptional Englishness of the 25 to 34s compared to older or younger cohorts. However, the pattern of foreign identity being less common among younger cohorts than British or English holds.

Comparing this to the youth in the wider population, “British Only” identity is more common here. We see this in Figure 13 using the 2011 census for England and Wales.

Figure 13

Age Groups of Sikhs and Non-Sikhs who Identify as British in England and Wales




Source: Office for National Statistics (2011): 2011 Census aggregate data (Edition: May 2011). (N=21,381,998).

An alternative way of showing the importance of national identity by age groups is by using Sikh data in the Citizenship Surveys of 2009-10 and 2010-11. Having shown the importance of age in Sikhs self-identifying as British, we can now see the role of age in those who choose English over other national identities. In Figure 14, it is clear that Sikhs who mentioned “English” in their replies were concentrated in very similar age groups to those illustrated in the ONS LS in Figure 11 shown earlier.

Figure 14

Age Groups of Sikhs who Identify as English in Citizenship Surveys



Source: Department for Communities and Local Government / Ipsos MORI, 2012, Citizenship Survey, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 waves, UK Data Service. (N=663).


Figure 14 shows that, in the Citizenship Surveys of 2009-10 and 2010-11, national identity as English is greater among younger Sikhs. This specialist survey's question was formulated as "What do you consider your national identity to be?". The answers were: "English", "Scottish", "Welsh", "Irish", "British" and "Other". The answers to which produces an inverted 'u' shaped relationship between Englishness and Sikh age groups in the Citizenship Survey of 2009-2010 and 2010-2011.

Having established that Britishness has a strong connection to age, I next compared Englishness to Britishness by age, excluding other national identities and limiting the

sample to England. I did this by utilising the age categories in the BSR 2017. Here, I discovered that there was a slight difference in the age groups where the two national identities peaked. Below, in Figure 15, using the BSR 2017, I find that the younger age groups of 0–24 and 25–49 differ significantly from the next oldest 50–64 and 65–74 groups in their share of English-identifiers. As an extreme case, only 7 per cent of 65–74-year-old Sikhs chose English identity compared to 33 per cent of 0–24-year-olds. Again, this should be viewed as a measure of how well the BSR is picking up on the actual representative data in the ONS LS in Figure 11 shown earlier in this chapter.

Figure 15

Age Groups of Sikhs who Identify as English in the BSR



Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

Whilst acknowledging that this statistical significance may not be high, I suggest that, amongst this community, younger Sikhs are more likely to identify as English rather than

with British, which has popularly and historically been associated with the community – for reasons stated earlier such as colonialism, whiteness and political security. Therefore, the phenomenon of Sikh youth Englishness is evidence of a form of nationalism ‘from below’ amongst Britain’s youth as opposed to top-down national identity insofar as Englishness is not an officially promulgated identity.

Based on this data, I stress that the age-split of those Sikhs who selected British or English as an identity signifies an important generational variation in how the community differs on self-identity. There are two patterns that come through in the data. Firstly, there are those Sikhs who are older and closer to the migrant generation that arrived in Britain. These Sikhs tend to identify more with the places they have left behind such as India, Pakistan or Africa. I also note that these Sikhs are more likely to choose a ‘supra’ national identity such as Indian or Kenyan, over say Punjabi or Gujarati. Secondly, there are those who are younger and are more likely to be British-born, they are more likely to link themselves solely to hostland national identity, including British and now English. This variation or complication divides Sikhs into those who express a hostland identity as opposed to homeland identity.

This is an important finding for my study as the age-inflected pattern of national identification among Sikhs reflects horizontal peer-to-peer links to non-Sikhs.

Provisionally, and before I discuss the results from my own survey, I suggest this stems from local or peer-based networks such as school, early professional socialisation, and vocational classes. These help younger Sikhs create a nationalism that is not dependent on a state or historical narrative.

This move away from vertical or ‘trickle-down’ nationalism has been identified by many researchers already, including Kaufmann (2017) who uses the work of Edensor (2002) to

show that this localised (or subgroup-specific) nationalism differs from the state-deployed political apparatus of national identity. With regard to Sikhs, the younger age groups thus differ from their migrant parents and grandparents whose national identity has been state-driven through their desire to attain British citizenship.


So far in this section, I have shown that the national identity data contained in the BSR is significant for Sikh and nationalism studies as it illustrates that hostland national identity varies by age. I next analyse other variables in the data to prove that there exist many other such variations in Sikh hostland identity. Through this process, by the end of the chapter, I will have shown the relative importance of each and formed a conclusion as to which is dominant for the community. I cover place of birth next.

Place of birth

The BSR 2017 (sample size 2,011) further supports the hypothesis that British-born Sikhs are more likely to identify as British when compared to those who are foreign-born. However, despite this, they are much less likely to use the category “English” to describe themselves. All the same, a Sikh who identifies as English is more likely to be British-born than a Sikh who identifies as foreign. This comports with ONS LS data we visited earlier. Figure 16 illustrates this.

Figure 16

Sikh English National Identity by Place of Birth




Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

In addition to the Sikh survey data, the EMBES 2010 data helped me further make this same point. In its sample of 164 Sikhs, those that were English-born were more likely to be firstly British, then English and finally Indian. Those Sikhs that were Indian-born were more likely to be firstly British, then Indian and then lastly English. This is visually represented in Figure 17.

Figure 17

Sikhs, Country of Birth and National Identity



Source: Heath, A., Fisher, S., Sanders, D., Sobolewska, M., 2012, *British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey, 2010*. UK Data Service. (N=164).

I interpret this as follows, Sikhs choose to classify themselves as British for reasons of security and social mobility. I base this on the knowledge that firstly, Sikhs are recent mass migrants (1960s onwards) to Britain and secondly, they are still a small community. Due to this, they are as yet unable to take their political and social statuses as secure platforms on which to develop their identity. For example, their, at times, hard-earned citizenship is still 'mythologised' in the community. However, there is a marked difference in British-born Sikhs identifying as British when compared to foreign-born Sikhs, the latter are more likely to be older. For this reason, place of birth ties in closely with the age variable, so that younger Sikhs are most likely British-born.

However, age in itself is not an explanation for the differing identities I found in Sikh age groups. Instead, I posit that it is due to the experiences younger Sikhs go through being born in the hostland rather than elsewhere. These younger Sikhs are more likely to have a different Britishness to their older counterparts, one that is more akin to their non-Sikh peers. This creates age-specific variation in Sikh hostland identity where the community is still perceived as British, but this national identity has different meanings for varying age groups.

This is supported in research by Khor (2015) who finds that a British experience is engendered through “taking part in a civic identity and shared values” (p. 14). As such, younger Sikhs are more likely to have taken part, and for longer, in the process Khor identifies. They would be the most affected and ‘moulded’ by it. Further research supporting my findings on the importance of age and its connected generational difference in British identity is found in Tilley, Exley and Heath (2004).

Extending this idea to future generations of Sikhs, I suggest that the specific place of a Sikh’s birth in Britain could be an important variable in the community. Interpreting the work of Cohen (1996) on personal details affecting national identity, I predict that it will become important as to whether a Sikh is born in East or West London or say Yorkshire or Lancashire. They will all have developed different nationalisms through local networking that contribute to a national identity that is, to some degree, removed from the state. It will be subgroup-specific. This idea of personal agency is again something that Cohen (1996) argues for. Thus, combining personal agency with localised networking can yield interesting results for Sikhs and Britishness.

Recalling that my aim is to challenge the idea of a hegemonic Britishness among Sikhs, the following is evidence of complexity in Sikh Britishness. For instance, a Sikh from Yorkshire

will rightly be proud that the Tour de France chose Harrogate as the finishing point of one of the race's British stages in 2014. The East Londoner may feel that their area contributes more to the British creative industry than the Sikh from West London. For this reason, one Sikh may hold up Sir Bradley Wiggins as a British hero whilst the other may use Alexander McQueen.

In all this, the state will have had little or no influence on the Sikh's sense of Britishness. Much of it would be based on the area's contribution to, and interpretation of, the national story. In this way, a localised, decentralised form of Sikh British nationalism may develop.

Having analysed the mediating effect of birthplace, I next consider the importance of date of arrival to Britain.

Arrival in the UK

Sikhs are recent migrants, with mass settlement beginning in the 1960s. It is these older Sikh migrants who are more likely to identify as British than English. This is an understandable response, given that they, like many other non-white minority groups, feel that Englishness was a less accessible identity to foreign-derived citizens in the 1960s and 1970s. However, this does not explain why this pattern of national identity is the same for the 2000s wave of Sikh migrants, since by this period, English society had been changed by decades of race equality laws.

The exclusivity of Englishness and its close link to whiteness can be found in the literature by Leddy Owen (2014); Uberoi and Modood (2013) and Kumar (2003). In these publications, the analysis of why minority groups such as Sikhs choose Britishness over Englishness has been explained by their perception that it is an exclusive identity based on being born in England to white British parents. As Sikhs born overseas see Englishness as

being the preserve of the white British, they prefer to describe their identity based on the political status they hold, that is being a British citizen.

As a predictor of national identity then, I can say that being foreign-born is associated with a Sikh being less likely to identify as English. Furthermore, based on a complex view of national identity, I surmise that the symbolic content of their Britishness will differ from those who are British-born. For instance, the Britishness of foreign-born Sikhs may be tied to older symbols of Britishness such as the queen or the British Armed Forces. This is in some cases simply due to the older median age of foreign-born Sikhs, but in the case of newer, foreign-born Sikhs, these are the international symbols of Britishness as perceived in the Commonwealth.

I next turn to the education levels of Sikhs.

Education and Britishness

Education shapes Sikh British national identity. This ought to be considered in the light of the knowledge that Sikhs who identified as British have high levels of British education when compared to the national average in the 2011 census. In the same census, this is especially the case with younger Sikhs. Using the attainment of 'A' levels, undergraduate and master's degrees as variables, we can see that younger respondents in the BSR 2016 sample are significantly better educated than their older Sikh counterparts. Together, these categories contain 71 per cent of the overall count of younger Sikhs.

So, despite the over-representation of younger Sikhs in this survey, I suggest that in the BSR 2016, education linked to age is a prominent variable predicting the content of Sikh British identity. Adding this to my theory that education is an important factor in how

Sikhs express Britishness, it means that a Sikh's age is linked to education and thereby to a particular form of Britishness. I explain this next using nationalism theory.

Much of my argument is around popular ground-up forms of national identity, but top-down forms issuing from the state are also important. Ozkirimli (2010) who cites Hechter (1975) shows that national structures such as the military, religion, and education are important in the formation of national identity. This is particularly applicable for those citizens from immigrant communities, such as Sikhs, for whom these can be quick routes to gaining a social status alongside their political one. Sikhs already have citizenship and are British by law. By making full use of the education system, they can better (and more expediently) attain mainstream social status and wider social acceptance.

As further reasoning as to how education may affect Sikh Britishness, this process has the side-effect of allowing them to quickly pick up social customs and mores not present in their own community. As I have already shown, Sikhs tend to reside in densely Sikh communities that have a lower white British share. Therefore, as part of their education, where they encounter more white Britons, they gain insights into ways of integrating and gaining greater social acceptance as British.

Therefore, the reverse is also true, whereby those Sikhs who have not been through the British education system are less likely to be perceived as British, or as having lower national consciousness. All of this means that younger Sikhs, who have had more British education, are more likely to identify with British, rather than foreign, national identity. Whilst the evidence for this is limited so far, it is something I will be testing fully later in my study using the BSR and self-collected data.

In continuing to look at personal variables, I now turn to religion. I restate here that Sikhs are not only a single ethnic group, but, in addition to that, they are also a single religious


group. Given that they are a relatively new religion, their practices are an important part of their identity. For instance, keeping or cutting hair is an important signifier of a Sikh's identity. I examine its impact on nationalism next.

Religious Observance (Uncut Hair)

The BSR 2017 showed that a Sikh's choice to keep their hair cut or uncut only makes a small difference in their choice of identifying as British, foreign or English. All the same, in this wave of the BSR, the data shows that a male or female Sikh who cuts their hair is slightly more likely to identify as British than one who keeps their hair. The question on religious articles in this BSR survey is "Please select the *Panj Kakkar* (the 5 Ks or Articles of Faith) that you keep, if any...". To this, five choices were provided with "uncut hair" or *Kesh* being one of them. There was no other choice of answer, including 'don't know'. Figures 18 and 19 show the limited difference in the propensity to identify as British between Sikhs who keep cut or uncut hair. Overall, they both are majority British-identifying.

Figure 18


National Identity Among Sikhs who have Cut Hair



Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

Figure 19

National Identity Among Sikhs who have Uncut Hair



Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

Furthermore, the situation is only slightly different when it comes to Englishness over Britishness. Even though both sets of Sikhs are less likely to be English than British, there is only a limited difference in their choice to keep or cut their hair. Lastly, when it comes to Sikhs who are neither British or English, that is they identify as 'other', again there is a very minor difference between those who keep cut or uncut hair.

However, a Sikh who does or does not observe this religious orthodoxy is more than twice as likely to be British than English. This supports my earlier evidence that Sikhs find Englishness problematic.

Given the slight differences I found in comparing national identity by hair, I take this as a proof that the choice a Sikh makes with their hair is a limited indicator of national identity. This is an important finding as keeping hair has long been culturally, and not just religiously, associated with Sikh identity. This has meant that those Sikhs who keep their hair uncut, have generally prioritised 'Sikhness' over hostland national identity. This can be seen particularly in research by Hall, K. (2002; 2005) amongst others. My data challenges this notion as it shows that Sikhs who cut their hair are only slightly more likely to have a hostland national identity. However, given the younger profile of the BSR, this is more likely to apply to younger Sikhs.

I have shown that a Sikh's hair only slightly influences their particular national identity. To show why this is an important challenge to current literature as well cultural perception, I have selected examples of popular Sikh figures in British society today. When Sikhs and Britishness are thought of, there is a bias towards those who are observant Sikhs, especially male Sikhs with turbans. For example, Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, the MP for Slough and Monty Panesar, the England cricketer.

However, I have shown these Sikhs are no more likely to be British or English. As such, outwardly non-observant Sikhs who are British such as the singer Luke Sital-Singh or the MP for Egbaston Preet Kaur Gill are quickly becoming newer national Sikh figures of Britishness (Jandu, 2015). They represent a distinctly different phase of public Sikh national perception compared to more traditional Sikh personalities such as Hardeep Kohli or The Singh Twins. This phase reflects my findings where hair only slightly affects hostland national identity.

Having analysed a select few simple variables, I next focus on more analytic variables, including those that measure the community's social politics. This section is quite revealing as I show how different groups of Sikhs perceive themselves as part of Britain in the world order of politics and social responsibility. Before I cover these, I recap that so far in this section, I have shown that Sikh national identity differs to varying degrees by the personal and social elements that make up their nationalism, notably age, place of birth, and arrival in Britain.

In the next section, I have deliberately selected variables on mainstream or popular issues. This will show how Sikhs have reacted to them age-wise as well as whether or not their responses matched or contrasted with the majority white British of the same age categories. For this reason, even though gender is a personal variable, I have included it in the following, rather than the preceding, section. To begin my section on social variables from which I hypothesise variations in nationalism arise, I start with the Sikhs' socio-economic position in British society.

Socio-economic Class

A Sikh's attitudes to class can predict their nationality, but only to a limited extent. This can be seen in the Citizenship Survey data of 2009-10 and 2010-11. These surveys,

comprising 664 Sikhs across the two survey waves, show only a small effect arising from social class on a Sikh's decision to self-identify as English or British. In this survey, the question on class was framed as the "Importance of class to who you are" and answers were categorised using a fixed five-point scale from "Very" to "Not at all". Only in the category of "Very" was there a large difference. However, given the small sample size, overall, this is not significant enough to conclude that class categories are useful in distinguishing between English and British-identifying Sikhs.

Despite this, it has been shown through other research such as Park, Bennam et al (2015) who analysed the British Social Attitude survey data that class makes a difference to white majority groups. This is in similar fashion to Bond (2017). Thus, it could be affecting Sikhs too but is imperceptible in my data. Another variable closely related to class being key to a Sikh's success in Britain is their profession, I cover this next.

Employment and Professions

Using the BSR, I found that the profession a Sikh pursued is not a good indicator of the strength and type of national identity they expressed. The sample size is too small to explore this fully. But, given the close link amongst white British groups between occupation, Englishness and Britishness, this could be a worthwhile area for future research.

As an indication of the importance of this variable, I found that Sikhs in the "Accountancy and Financial Management" sector are more likely to express British or English, rather than foreign, national identity. In addition, Sikhs in the same sector are much more likely than those in the "Construction and Building Sector" to consider themselves English. The difference between the Sikhs in the two sectors calling themselves British is only slight.

If it is accepted that a job in the financial sector represents Sikhs who earn a higher income and network in a higher social class, then I state that those Sikhs operating at higher class and income levels are more likely to be nationalistic (Bond, 2017). This situation is different to the majority ethnic population where the working classes, rather than middle classes, are more likely to be nationalistic. However, I reiterate that this is a provisional assessment as I do not have representative microdata to investigate this fully, to understand, for instance if there are more foreign-born Sikhs in the construction sector.

This seemingly contradictory finding leads me onto the next set of variables, the ethnic mix of a Sikh's social network and their area of residence. I cover their social networks next. These proved to be more convincing.

Diversity of Social Networks


Social networks are significantly more important than profession in determining a Sikh's national identity. As Sikhs in England and Wales tend to live in densely Sikh and minority ethnic areas, it is feasible that they may mix with other minority ethnic groups more than the majority ones. As has been shown at the beginning of this chapter using Jivraj (2013) and Leddy-Owen (2014), minority ethnic groups have a very specific national identity, one that is different to white citizens. Thus, if a Sikh mixes with the majority, they could be influenced through this cross-ethnic 'interconnection' as Edensor (in Kaufmann, 2017) shows. However, data that allows me to test this idea for Sikhs is limited.

A hint of this inter-connectedness can be discerned in the Citizenship Surveys of 2009-10 and 2010-11. In these, there was a question on the frequency with which Sikhs "mixed with different ethnic and religious groups: at work, school or college". As this was a binary response question, I find that English-identifiers are more likely to socialise with other ethnic groups. I illustrate this in Figures 20 and 21 where the comparative frequency of

mixing daily with non-Sikhs was 50 per cent for those who did not mention English identity and 72 per cent for those that did mention English as a national identity. This is a large overall difference. Depending on the ward involved the difference could be even higher for some Sikhs.

Figure 20


Frequency of Mixing with Other Ethnic Groups Among Non-English Identifying Sikhs



Department for Communities and Local Government, Ipsos MORI, 2012, Citizenship Survey, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 waves, [data collection], UK Data Service. (N=663).

Figure 21

Frequency of Mixing with Other Ethnic Groups Among English-Identifying Sikhs



Department for Communities and Local Government, Ipsos MORI, 2012, Citizenship Survey, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 waves, [data collection], UK Data Service. (N=663).

I acknowledge that the data does not specify which non-Sikh ethnic groups that Sikhs socialise with, so this may well be with other minority ethnic groups. However, since I have shown that Englishness is more expressed by white groups than non-white groups, I

therefore hypothesise that those Sikhs who identify as English are more likely to have built connections with white rather than non-white networks.

Using this limited dataset and my own knowledge of the community, it is reasonable to say that diversity of social networks does affect Sikh Britishness, but to what extent it does so is difficult to substantiate. Despite this, in combination with other factors, especially that of age, I can state that younger Sikhs, who I have earlier shown to be more likely to be English in national identity, are also more likely to have more diverse social connections than their parents and grandparents. Similarly, area of residence can also influence a Sikh's national identity.

Origins (names) and ONS LS data found that Sikhs are more likely to identify as English if they are in mixed-race households or live in more white British wards. Through simple proximity, these Sikhs have connections and relationships with members of the majority group – white British - who influence them to identify as English. For this reason, a Sikh who lives Sandhurst, Berkshire – a less mixed area - is more likely to self-identify as English than one who lives in Southall, Ealing – a very mixed area.

European Union Membership


As a reminder, in this section I examine the political views that Sikhs hold on mainstream issues and how they affect their national identity. For this reason, the Sikh opinion on the UK's European Union (EU) membership is important. It shows how Sikhs view the nation's place in the world and how they fit into the nation's societal structure. In terms of data, I turn back to the BSR since across the two waves, it surveyed both Sikh voting intentions in 2016 and their reaction to the UK's exit result in 2017. In 2016, a sizeable proportion, 57 per cent, wished to remain part of Europe, both with and without reforms.

Only 12 per cent were looking to exit the EU. However, a large percentage, 31 per cent, were undecided.

In the 2017 survey, a majority of British or English Sikhs stated they had voted to stay in the EU (over 70 per cent in both cases, thus almost certainly an overestimate given that over 30 percent of minorities voted Leave nationally). A Sikh's identity as English or British did not correlate with their choice of remaining or leaving the European Union during the 2016 referendum. Figure 22 shows that the Brexit vote was identical among English- and British-identifying Sikhs. This is quite different from the white British population where English identifiers are more Remain voting than British identifiers.

Figure 22

Voting in EU Referendum by English-Only and British-Only Nationality (Sikhs)




Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

With this in mind, I analyse their EU membership vote as follows. The closure of free movement in Europe (by opting out of the EU) is counter-intuitive to Sikh history in Britain. Additionally, with their history of being discriminated against as migrants, the options that the freer borders of the EU bring ought to be important to Sikhs, especially the educated ones in the BSR sample. Lastly, being part of a larger region economically will provide Sikhs with security should they need to leave Britain. Given all three assessments, the relatively high level of Leave support in 2017 is a surprise.

Another surprising finding was that there was no statistically significant difference across the age categories in this sample. Those who voted to remain part of the EU had an average age of 32 and those who voted to exit the EU had an average age of 35. This differs from the white British population where there was a steep age difference in Brexit voting, with young people far more Remain-oriented. Despite this there was a difference in the spread of voters across both voting choices by age categories in the sample. The younger age groups are most likely to differ in their political attitude to leaving the EU. Figure 23 shows this. However, accounting for sample sizes in each age group, and other variables, age was not a significant predictor of Brexit voting among Sikhs.

Figure 23

Voting in the EU Referendum by Age Category (Sikhs)



Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

Note that, given the educated nature of the BSR sample, this likely undercounts the Brexit vote share among Sikhs in Britain.

Therefore, it appears that nationalist sentiments associated with Brexit voting have a resonance with an important group of Sikh voters. This is further supported by the large number (42 per cent) of Sikhs across the BSR 2017 sample who wished to remain in the EU but with reforms. For them, like many from the majority, British nationalism may have been a consideration for a minority of Sikhs. According to this reasoning, Sikhs may have thought themselves less as an ethnic minority group that had faced prejudice and more as citizens with a concern for their country's perceived maltreatment as part of the EU.

However, Brexit vote is not a strong predictor of the community's internal variations in hostland national identity. Whilst I did not find a strong variation in European membership vote by age, I did find an interesting relationship by gender. Recall I suggested that Sikh women are better represented in political discussions. With this in mind, I next show that they differ slightly on some aspects of Sikh British identity. This includes their choice of self-national identification and EU membership.

Gender and Britishness

When I compared those that selected a British identity over a foreign one, I found minimal difference between the two genders. However, there is more of a difference by gender for English identity, with women slightly less likely to identify as English.


This is not, however, a statistically significant finding. Women in the survey are also less likely to have a clear view on the Brexit vote than men, though there was no obvious pattern of gender affecting Brexit vote.

Gender, Equal Pay and Nationality

In the discussion to come, I focus on variables that had the most effect on the choice of English and/or British identity. In the area of paid work, there were important differences by national identification between Sikh women who thought that equal pay was or was not an issue. The BSR 2017 with its sample of 2011 (996 women) showed that a Sikh woman is more likely to identify as British or English rather than foreign if they think that equal pay is an issue. In addition, a Sikh woman who self-identifies as English-only is more likely than one who identifies as British-only to think that equality in pay is an issue. I illustrate this in Figure 24.

Figure 24

Equality and Pay Among Sikh Women by National Identity



Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

As those women who identify with a hostland identity are more likely to feel that equal pay is an issue, I understand this to mean that those who hold this opinion occupy a mainstream position with regard to their professions. This indicates that they are more likely to engage with mainstream issues such as equality of pay. Those who identify as foreign are more likely to be in less secure positions in the professions and are thus less likely to be concerned with equal pay over simply having a job.²⁸

Examples of these Sikhs can be found in the cleaning, hospitality and catering sectors where they are often on contracts with narrower worker rights than Sikhs in law,

²⁸ I acknowledge that there could be other reasons for this difference such as a patriarchal or traditional identity as well as there being an age-related link to paid work.

management or medical sectors. Therefore, a Sikh woman who thinks that equal pay is an issue is more likely to be English or British in identity rather than foreign and is more likely to be in a higher paid job.

Next, staying with the theme of gender among Sikhs I examine its role, alongside the relationship between age and attitudes, in Sikhs joining the armed forces.

Gender, Age and The Armed Forces


The BSR 2017 contained a question on sons or daughters joining the British Armed Forces with replies measured across a five-point scale from “Disagree strongly” to “Support strongly”. In the replies, there was no age variation. Sikhs with different views on whether they wanted their children joining the military did not differ in national identity. The most popular answer (over 40 per cent) for both nationalities was that these Sikhs “Disagree somewhat” with their offspring enlisting. However, when testing the data by gender, I noted an interesting pattern showing that British Sikh women are less likely to support their sons or daughters enlisting.

Sikhs in Britain and an Independent Sikh State

In the British Sikh community, the issue of an independent Sikh state has been responsible for strong opinions within the community since at least the early 1980s. This is the case with the 2,011 Sikhs surveyed in the BSR 2017. In general, the largest share (approximately 29 per cent) of British as well as English-identifying Sikhs were “Positive” about the “political case for an independent Sikh state”. This shows that there is little internal variation by British or English national identity. There is however no significant difference between those with hostland identities when compared to those with a foreign identity. I show this in Figure 25.

Figure 25

Attitude Towards an Independent Sikh State Among British Sikhs by National Identity



Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,011).

So, for the variable of supporting the political case for an independent Sikh state, a Sikh who has a foreign identity differs only slightly in their support than one who identifies either British or English. Between the two hostland identities, there is virtually no difference in the attitude towards a sovereign Sikh state as we see in Figure 25. Despite the youthful sample, this is a significant finding since I have shown at the beginning of the BSR section that different groups of Sikhs make up the two groups. For instance, Sikh English identity is skewed towards younger, British-born Sikhs whereas British Sikh identity tends to include older, foreign-born Sikhs.

So far in the sections above, I have included gender and age as my key foci with regard to variables that predict and even define dimensions of Sikh Britishness. At this stage, I note

that whilst gender is important, it is not as significant as age. For this reason, I cover age in more detail than gender as I consider other variables.


As Sikhs are a migrant community in Britain, I hypothesise that their attitude to migrant workers and settlers could be an important signifier of their nationalism. I consider this next.

Attitudes towards Migrants

In order to understand the overall Sikh viewpoint towards migrants, I used the BSR 2016 as it contained a scaled reply to the statement, “We should continue to allow an unlimited number of EU migrants to stay, live and work within the UK.” I note here that the following analysis is based on the entire 1,416 sample of Sikhs, not just those who considered themselves British. In this survey, Sikhs agreed with restricting the numbers of migrants and refugees who are allowed into Britain. Figure 26 shows that 44 per cent either disagreed or strongly disagreed with unlimited migration from the EU, and only 29 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with unrestricted access to Britain by EU nationals.

Figure 26

Attitude Among Sikhs Towards Unlimited EU Migration Continuing



Source: City Sikh Network (2016), British Sikh Report 2016. (N=1,417).

This is backed up by data from the British Election Study that shows that 26 per cent of Sikhs thought that immigration was “Getting a lot higher”.²⁹ As such, I can state that Sikhs are against unlimited immigration, and as the British Election Study shows, this view is in line with society, but is not as high as it is among white British citizens.

Before I further analyse this internal variation, I first explain why Sikhs holding strong views on immigration is important to my study on their national identity and its expression. For instance, ethnosymbolic approaches would suggest that cultural

²⁹ Source: Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, C. van der Eijk, J. Mellon & C. Prosser (2016) *British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-9*. London: ONS Publications.

conservatism in the form of restriction of immigration could be important (Smith, 1999; Ozkirimli, 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence in Sides and Citrin (2007) who worked on European attitudes to migration and Tilley, Exley and Heath (2004) who researched British immigration attitudes that there is a link between ethnic or civic national identification and views on immigration. Sniderman et al (2007) find that when Dutch people are primed to think about their national identity, they become more anti-immigration. These sources show that national identity reflects not being an outsider and the desire to protect the status and territory attached to it.

Thus, the attitude that Sikhs hold to outsiders, such as migrants and refugees, coming into Britain is one indicator of the nature and intensity of their Britishness. However, Sikhs strongly opposing unlimited migrants is not straightforward to explain as they themselves are a recently-settled group. Furthermore, I have shown that Sikhs are problematic to classify as ethnically British. Rather, they are easier to classify as civically British.

Against this, I suggest we are seeing a new phase of Sikh Britishness. Ethnosymbolism theory might suggest that the ethnicity of the nation's forebears is important to its citizens today. In the case of Britain, this ethnicity is white British. Keeping foreigners out could therefore be seen as a significant factor in keeping an ethnic version of British national identity intact. So, Sikhs, a 'non-native' ethnic group, ought to be the outsiders in this situation. Yet they are strongly against letting in an unlimited number of EU settlers. Whilst this is conceptually an oddity, Sikhs are not alone in this.

Data from the British Election Study shows that other minority ethnic groups are also opposed to increasing immigration levels. Furthermore, 30 per cent of these minority

groups voted to leave in the EU membership referendum.³⁰ Despite this, I still maintain that this poses conceptual problems for conventional nationalism theory due to Sikhs' recent settler status and, as I showed earlier, that the popular perception of Englishness is closely linked to whiteness.

However, this could be happening due to a change in Sikh Britishness, from migrants to hosts, as Mattausch (1998) suggests. As migrant citizens, they were attracted to a multi-ethnic, national identity derived from the history of Britain being composed of peoples from the four regions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Therefore, to Sikhs, Britishness was diverse and inclusive.

This appears to be changing, however, as Sikhs seem less likely to desire a more diverse Britain than one might surmise on the basis of the foregoing. I therefore suggest that their idea of Britishness has moved away from one of inclusiveness to a more contemporary one of exclusiveness – similar to that associated with Englishness, as reported by Leddy-Owen (2014).

However, I note that there could be additional factors involved in this situation, in particular the issue of public resources. For instance, Sikhs could be acting on ideals of fairness or material and security concerns, rather than identity issues. Michael Skey (2011) found this sense of “entitlement” or “belonging” in majority groups (p. 1). If this is the case, I consider it significant that a minority group such as Sikhs might share the same sentiments. However, I acknowledge that this is a provisional notion to be tested further in this study.

³⁰ Source: Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, C. van der Eijk, J. Mellon & C. Prosser (2016) *British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 1-9*. London: ONS Publications.

In seeking to understand which, if any, intra-communal Sikh categories manifest this nativist aspect of Britishness, I cross-tabulated attitudes to immigration with age, gender, residential location, and highest qualification. Whilst there were small differences using these factors, they were too small to construe as being conclusive. The one factor that, in theory, would have made a difference is country of birth. However, this is not contained in the British Sikh Report of 2016 in which the question on migration featured.

Nevertheless, this factor can be examined using the British Election Study. Those that were born in Britain were marginally more likely (41 per cent) to think that immigration was getting too high as opposed to those born in a Commonwealth country (37 per cent).

Recollecting here that many Sikhs (43 per cent) are born in either the Middle East/Asia or Africa, reinforces my earlier point that a variation in Britishness exists by country of birth, with this coming through in their respective attitudes towards immigration.

So, this newer 'defensive' position is further evidence that Britishness and national identity among Sikhs is complicated and could be structured by the country of birth variable. I connect this development to work by Kaufmann (2017) on complex nationalism based on a peer-to-peer influence in which national identification varies by ethnic community and, within that, by demographic and cultural characteristics.

Applying this to the Sikhs who are more against EU migration, or those that are British-born, I hypothesise that they would be more likely to have absorbed a more homegrown pathway of Britishness. Education could be important in instilling this, meaning that British-educated Sikhs have a greater likelihood of encountering white British peers who are more likely to be against unlimited EU migration (as compared to Sikhs). As such, this could be a reason for the new 'anti-outsider' dimension of Sikh Britishness. Simply put,

native-born Sikhs are more likely to be influenced by mainstream ideas of protectionist-minded white Britons.

There is, however, a slight mismatch of this stance towards migration among Sikhs when it comes to the impact of outsiders.

Attitudes towards Refugees

In the last section, I showed that Sikhs tended to oppose unrestricted EU migration, despite many being recent migrants. This disparity is further highlighted by the finding that Sikhs have a mixed approach to refugees in the BSR 2016. Looking at three sets of replies to related questions reveals the ambivalence of opinion among the 1,416 Sikhs in the survey. First, 59 per cent strongly agreed with the statement that “Refugees make a positive contribution to UK society.” Second, 53 per cent also strongly agreed with the statement that “The diversity and social cohesion of the UK will not be affected by the current level of net immigration”, and finally, 51 per cent agreed that “The Government should provide greater help and assistance with refugees throughout Europe”.

Thus, at the same time as opposing unlimited migration and acknowledging that refugees in Europe may require help, many Sikhs do not consider those who have settled here to have had a negative influence. This approach to immigration where lower levels are desired, yet the contribution is considered positive, is commonplace in the literature and can be termed as “NIMBY” or “Not in My Back Yard”, where there is sympathy, but not citizenship for displaced people who need assistance.³¹

³¹ See Ford, R., Morrell, G. and Heath, A. (2012), *Fewer but Better? British attitudes to immigration*, *British Social Attitudes: the 29th Report*. London: NatCen Social Research.

To illustrate this point further, the BSR 2016 had a question related to the statement “Britain should accept more Syrian refugees than currently proposed by the Government (20,000 over the next five years)”. In response, only 42 per cent agreed / strongly agreed with offering them settlement as an option. Whilst this percentage echoes the position in British society, I still consider this an unexpected finding for a recent migrant community which had significant difficulty in achieving the right to settle its relatively low numbers of East African-origin refugees in the 1970s.

It is further difficult to account for since Sikh attitudes do not necessarily match the working-class outlook of British society with which this protectionist stance is closely associated. Some Sikhs are employed in jobs that can be categorised as working-class manual occupations. However, it appears that they may hold different views to their peers, further supporting the hypothesis on Sikh uniqueness that I evidence in this thesis.

Despite this, it could be a sign of a new variation in Sikh identity politics. So, a theory about this could be as follows: those older Sikhs who have memories of their refugee status, such as many East African Sikhs, may wish to offer Syrians a home. The younger ones, those more likely to connect frequently with majority groups, are less likely to recall the refugee status of their predecessors and are thus less inclined to help. Yet the data, presented in Table 10, shows the reverse pattern.

Table 10

Age Breakdown to the Question

“Should Britain accept more Syrian refugees?” Among Sikhs

	Age: 50 plus		Age: Under 50	
	Persons	%	Persons	%
Agree / Strongly Agree	58	24%	347	37%
Disagree / Strongly Disagree	138	58%	247	27%
Neutral	41	17%	338	36%
Total	237	20%	932	80%

Source: City Sikh Network (2016), British Sikh Report 2016. (N=1,417).

The views of younger Sikhs may be a simple reflection of the pattern of the wider British society, where younger people are more tolerant and sympathetic to conflict-driven immigration. Therefore, it is the younger Sikhs who are more likely to accept more Syrian refugees. Building on this data and using my own experiences, I reason that for many older Sikhs above the age of 50 this is a defensive strategy used to assert their hard-earned right to Britishness. Reverting back to attitudes among Sikhs to European migration confirms this pattern. The ease with which EU nationals move around, gain income in Britain, and extract it back in their country of origin is often seen as a lack of commitment to Britain. Many Sikhs view them as guest workers, not settlers – this is especially the case with older Sikhs.

In this way, Britain's Sikhs appear to have undergone a process similar to the one described by McCrone and Bechhofer (2015) in their research on newer (English) settlers on the England / Scotland borders. These two British nationalism researchers found that English settlers in places such as Berwick had become very defensive about newcomers due to their own difficult process of settlement, acculturation and, finally, acceptance into local Scottish society. This was clear in the comments these migrants made about belonging being less about birthplace and more about the permanency of settlement. The more emotional comments by these settlers included "I will die here" and "I have a stronger sense of being Scottish" (p. 100).

In this same way, British-born Sikhs, now less transnational and more integrated, could be behaving in the same way as these English border settlers in Scotland. That is, as locals concerned about the effect newcomers may have on local culture, as well as on their own status within that culture. This can even be interpreted as Sikh British patriotism.

For this reason, I surmise that both these questions on refugees and migrants in the BSR 2016 provide data to positively answer my research question: Does the content of Sikh hostland national identity differ by age? Sikhs are very likely to vary in their response to international migration by age, though it is unclear whether this is a specifically Sikh pattern. With regard to age being the most important factor, I acknowledge that more statistical evidence is required, and so I present my own survey findings in the next chapter.

Despite this, we can make some straightforward comments based on the BSR data, particularly that of the 2017 wave with its large sample of 2,000 plus Sikhs. As Table 11 and the preceding figures show, being younger, having a British rather than foreign national identity, being male, having arrived in the UK a long time ago, being in favour of

women's equal pay, and working rather than being retired significantly predict having English national identity.

Furthermore, as the question was just whether the Sikh respondent identified as English (and people could pick several identities), virtually no one who picked English did not pick British as well. Even so, when I control for British identity, being young makes a Sikh individual more likely to identify as English. This can be seen in the regression analysis in Table 11.

Table 11

Significant Factors Affecting Sikhs Identifying as English

Regression Statistics	
Number of obs=	2,003
Pseudo R2=	0.151
BSR Variable	Standard Coefficient
British Identity	2.343 (0.252)***
Age	-0.103 (.0245)***
Gender (Male)	0.484 (0.109)***
Year of Arrival	-0.101 (0.022)***
Equal Pay (Women)	0.447 (0.111)***
Living in Scotland	-1.805 (0.765)*
Retired	-0.802 (0.397)*
EU Expansion	0.225 (0.123)+
EU Sovereignty	0.214 (0.121)+
Other Employment	0.307 (0.173)+
Part-time Employment	-0.382 (0.210)
Self-Employed	0.272 (0.156)+
Child Joining Army	0.052 (0.044)
Independent Sikh State	-0.058 (0.041)
Home Maker	-0.211 (0.596)
Unable to work	0 (0)
Unemployed	-0.703 (0.452)
Voluntary	0 (0)
Constant	-4.656 (0.515)
Number of Obs =	2,003
Factor Significance: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; +p<.1.	

Source: City Sikh Network (2017), British Sikh Report 2017. (N=2,003).

This ends my section on secondary-source British Sikh data. Through it I have shown compelling evidence on the complexity of Sikh national identity, thereby building on current knowledge of a hegemonic Sikh Britishness.

Conclusion

I argue that British national identity is not monolithic but varies by group and individual perspective. In order to show this, I used national census data, including the highly representative ONS LS, to explore variation in how different types of Sikhs nationally identify. As part of this, I presented data that showed migration and mixed relationships changing the nation's ethnic composition. I next presented basic data on Britain's Sikhs, comprising their enumeration, location, country of birth, national identity, and ethnicity. This allowed me to place Sikhs in the context of British society and, thus, concluded my socio-demographic analysis.

Next, I presented more detailed analyses using data from specialised surveys that contain, amongst other aspects, comprehensive information about the political aspects of Sikh lives in Britain. These range from society-wide datasets, such as the British Social Attitudes Survey and the British Election Study, to community-derived ones such as the British Sikh Report. From these, I selected themes that preliminary analysis suggested may moderate the national identity politics of this community, as set out by both nationalism theories and my early field research. These included choice of residence, foreign education, housing tenure, country of birth, gender, age, views on Britain's EU membership and migration, and attitudes to refugees.

After closely considering gender, I provided evidence that a Sikh's age is, of all variables analysed so far, the most important correlate of whether they identify as British rather than with a foreign national identity. It is also an important predictor of whether they

identify as English. This offers evidence that the idea of a monolithic Sikh Britishness is misleading. This should not be a surprise, as this development is well covered by theories of horizontal nationalism such as complex nationalism.

The internal variations I have found in British Sikh hostland national identity reflect those discussed by Kaufmann (2017) in his work on nationalism and complexity theory. His concept is based on the observation that some groups display “puzzling” variety in their national identity (p.1). I find this amongst British Sikhs.

Education, like age, was an important influence on whether Sikhs identify as British. When it comes to identifying as English or British, however, those with more connections to white Britons, linked to those living in more white British areas, are more likely to think of themselves as English rather than British. Put simply, when it comes to Englishness, peer-to-peer cultural links are arguably more important than state nationalism or communitarian politics for Britain’s Sikhs. All of which makes sense given the lack of English-only government institutions.

This concludes my sections on Sikhs in Britain using data from third-party surveys. From this data, I find that age significantly affects British identity over foreign identity, with younger Sikhs less likely to have a non-British national identity. Younger Sikhs are also more likely to identify as English, as we saw in the representative ONS LS 1 percent sample. In the next part of the study, I introduce my own survey of 100 Sikhs, analyse its results, and then make conclusions in conjunction with the data so far used.

Chapter Four: Age as Key Variable in Sikh Britishness:

Results from Self-Collected Data

Introduction

Chapter four provides further quantitative and qualitative data to support my thesis that age is key in predicting the content of Sikh Britishness. It differs from the previous chapter as the findings presented are based on self-collected rather than third-party information. This consists of statistics collected via an online survey of 100 Sikhs, interviews with 25 subjects and a lengthy period of participant observation in England and Wales. By analysing these sources, I show that, in addition to state-led top-down nationalism, various horizontal processes now shape the content of British Sikh national identities. The key differentiator is age.

The latter phenomenon is best seen in younger Sikhs who express nationality in a different way than older Sikhs. As Cohen (1996) shows, a personalised form of Britishness leads people to diverge from each other in their view of nationhood. In the Sikh case, young people differ from their older co-ethnics whilst converging with white Britons in some respects. Given that most Sikhs are English-born, there is now a significant likelihood of some of them identifying as English. This holds additional interest as it contrasts with a more static pattern among younger white Britons in England. Furthermore, the spread of this amongst a wide-range of younger Sikhs can be said to be a nationalism phenomenon for two reasons. Firstly, it challenges commonly held white definitions of Englishness. Secondly, as stated earlier, the tendency of young people to identify more with Englishness is not apparent in white British groups.

Therefore, by the end of the chapter I show that there is no single mytho-symbolic construction of Britishness among Sikhs. The cause of this appears to be top-down

Britishness being displaced by bottom-up nationalism. This change means that Sikhs in Britain can be added to the cases covered in horizontal theories of nationalism – such as those focusing on complexity and everyday nationalism by authors such as Kaufmann and Brubaker.

Structure of the Chapter

The chapter starts with a profile of the respondents from my online Sikh survey. This is followed by cluster and regression analyses of the data on symbols of Sikh Britishness in the survey. Testing the statistics reveals both strong and weak themes in the content of Sikh Britishness – most of which are correlates of distinct Sikh age groups. I scrutinise these closely, weaving in interview findings to expand on age-related differences within themes. After this, I summarise the findings thus far, pinpointing that age is the key differentiator between top-down and bottom-up varieties of Sikh Britishness.

To further emphasise this finding, I document two developments amongst one Sikh subgroup – younger Sikhs who I analyse using a recent BBC/YouGov survey. I show, first, the ‘uniqueness’ of Englishness amongst younger Sikhs as compared to their older co-ethnics and younger Britons and second, their growing convergence with older whites in England. In all, I conclude that, as per my thesis, age is the critical variable moderating the content of Sikh British hostland national identity.

Next, I introduce the data obtained from my self-designed survey.

The Symbolic Constitution of Sikh Britishness

The data from my own Sikh national identity survey is essential to understanding British Sikh hostland national identity as it unravels the symbolic content of people’s Britishness – something missing from the census and most third-party surveys which tend to be

limited to categories such as English or British. Examples of these were presented in the previous chapter.

Study Sikh Survey Methodology and Profile of Respondents

I begin with the methodology employed. The study's Sikh survey consisted of an online questionnaire carried out between July 2017 and December 2018. It attracted over 100 responses from Sikhs in England, Wales and Scotland. Respondents were located using personal, professional and social networks. After vetting for exclusions, the number was reduced to 94. The survey contained 50 questions and generally took less than 5 minutes to complete. Its main instrument for collecting national identity content were questions asking respondents to evaluate 20 symbols of Britishness. This is the substantive conceptual innovation strived for in this thesis.

Here, subjects were asked to assign the degree to which each symbol, ranging from the royal family to Asian TV, represented British nationhood for them. This I deem the 'sentiment' of Britishness to which the respondents assigned a value out of 100. The full survey form can be seen in Appendix 1. Given the limited number of detailed questions on the content of national identity available in both the academic literature and in national surveys such as the census, its results are unique for yielding insight into Sikh Britishness.

The Sikhs in the study survey were, in the main, between the ages of 40 to 52 with an average age of 43. However, there were spikes at ages 22 and 63 which become important when the self-collected data is cross-tested against the ONS LS.

On national identification, 48 per cent chose British from a list of "British", "English", "Welsh", "Scottish" and "Other". However, and importantly for this thesis, English was chosen second at 43 per cent, Welsh at 6 per cent and Scottish at 2 per cent. As context,

this small difference between British (48 per cent) and English (43 per cent) is striking for a Sikh survey. All the other surveys used thus far, such as the ONS Censuses of 2001 and 2011 or the British Sikh Reports, show a much larger difference between the two nationalities. Whilst I acknowledge that the study survey is not representative, the headline figures between Englishness and Britishness remain ‘uncommon’ and, as such, can form the basis of a larger project on Sikh Britishness or Sikh Englishness.³²

One reason for these findings on Sikh Englishness could be that the study survey was solely about national identity and, therefore, may have elicited better reflection on the matter by its respondents. For this reason, perhaps there is a large percentage of Sikhs (51 per cent) who chose regional British identities, exceeding those who selected “British” (48 per cent). Age-wise, it emerges that the English group were younger, averaging 36 years, whereas the British group averaged 50 years of age.

Sikhs are predominantly English-born. Despite this, only 46 per cent of those I surveyed were born in England. As a possible explanation, “Britain” and “UK” were 3 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. So, there may have been selected in synonymity with “England”. With regard to foreign births, it is noteworthy that Kenya was the birthplace of 12 per cent of respondents, whilst India and Punjab are 4 per cent and 6 per cent each. This combined figure of 22 per cent is sizeable and reflects the community’s recent migration history. This itself is a recognised factor in the formation and consumption of nationhood. An assortment of African and Asian countries made up a fairly short tail.

³² It is noted that the differing study survey results may have been affected by both the skewed nature of the sample and by question wording differences. This reduces, but does not eradicate, the value of comparing this survey to the ONS LS or the BBC Englishness survey.

Next, I analysed the respondents' level of education as, again, this can impact national identification. Sikhs were well-educated with nearly 47 per cent holding either a master's and/or an undergraduate degree. Only a small minority (1 per cent) held no qualifications. A significant percentage (14 per cent) held a foreign qualification. Again, this is to be expected as Sikhs are a more recent migrant group.

In terms of income, most respondents are well-to-do, with households earning £40,000 or more comprising over 58 per cent of the sample. This sample is thus of higher socio-economic status than the community as a whole.

Symbols, Age and Britishness in Study Sikh Survey

Having presented a basic profile of survey respondents, I next analyse the core data as it relates to my thesis. As a reminder, I theorise that the content of Sikh homeland national identity differs by age. Therefore, in order to understand this content, the survey's main function was to collect information on popular and author-perceived symbols of Sikh Britishness. This was done by creating an imaginary situation where the respondent had to choose a value to which each symbol represented their Britishness.

The question was worded thus "A travel magazine published a list of things that tourists from India found distinctive about Britain. On a scale of 0 to 100, how British do you feel when you think of each of the following (0 = not at all British, 100 = very British)". This follows Kaufmann's (2018) schema, designed to elicit affective attachments towards particular symbols within the national myth-symbol corpus. These are dubbed 'sentiments' in this study.

There are 20 symbols surveyed, ranging from institutional icons such as the royal family, to community-specific ones such as British-Indian food. Also included are more obscure

items such as the physical appearance of British people. Cumulatively, these yielded each respondent's national identity content profile into a quantitative value, thereby allowing numerical analysis to inform this study. This proved to be an important counterpart to the qualitative data gathered, say, from interviews. The full survey form can be found in Appendix 1. Figure 27 is a visual of the sliding scale format used in the online form via the online research platform Prolific Academic.

Figure 27

Sliding Scale Format in Study Sikh Survey

A travel magazine published a list of things that tourists from India found distinctive about Britain. On a scale of 0 to 100, how British do you feel when you think of each of the following (0 = not at all British, 100 = very British):

Please note: We don't want to know whether you like each item or not, but rather how British it makes you feel. Indicate this by moving the the slider scale button left or right.

* 21 The Royal family

0 100

* 22 The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars

0 100

* 23 The English language, spoken in a regional accent

0 100

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 and December 2018). (N=94).

Thus, by looking at the average value of the responses, I am able to rank the symbols in order of their importance for Sikh Britishness. The overall average sentiment, across all symbols, was 53/100. The relative importance, or sentimental value, of the different symbols is shown in Table 12 where the survey value is in italics.

Table 12

Average Rating of Symbols of Britishness by Respondents in Study Sikh Survey

Symbol of Britishness	Average Sentiment
Rugby	70
The National Health Service	66
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	65
The mix of different people living in Britain	63
Football	60
The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	55
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	54
British Trade Union banners	54
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	54
<i>Survey Average</i>	53
BBC Asian Network	52
The National Trust	51
Punk-rock music	48
Drinking Tea	48
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	48

Anglican churches	47
The Royal Family	46
Cricket	45
Chicken Tikka Masala	43
The TV personality Hardeep Kohli	42
The TV Series <i>Goodness Gracious Me</i>	41

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 and December 2018). (N=94).

Having done this, I then carried out some simple analysis by selecting sets of symbols at the two extremes of the scale. That is, those with a high score of Britishness such as rugby and those with a low score such as the TV series *Goodness Gracious Me*. In order to link this to my hypothesis, I needed an age split to understand if a correlation exists between high and low scoring symbols and specific Sikh age groups. For this, I chose the average age of Sikhs in the survey, 43. Based on this, Table 13 shows how the two age groups responded to the top and bottom five symbols of Britishness.

Table 13

Age Evaluation of Symbols of Britishness by Respondents in Study Sikh Survey

Symbol	Sentiment Rating for those aged 42 and below	Sentiment Rating for those aged above 42	Difference between Age Groups
The Royal Family	36	56	20
The National Health Service	58	75	17
The National Trust	45	61	16
The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	48	63	15
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	47	61	14
Drinking Tea	41	54	13
Chicken Tikka Masala	38	50	12
Football	55	65	10
The TV Series Goodness Gracious Me	38	46	8
Anglican churches	43	51	8

British Trade Union banners	52	56	4
Cricket	44	46	2
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	65	64	-1
BBC Asian Network	53	52	-1
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	56	54	-2
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	49	45	-4
The mix of different people living in Britain	65	60	-5
The TV personality Hardeep Kohli	45	40	-5
Rugby	73	66	-7
Punk-rock music	53	44	-9

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

The table shows a significant difference in how each age group viewed their symbols of Britishness. This can particularly be seen in the symbols of NHS, royalty, food and drink, rugby, and the mix of people living in Britain. The first two are well known historical symbols of Britishness and are thus more likely to be selected by older British citizens,

including older Sikhs. However, the higher-valued choice amongst younger Sikhs of rugby is slightly unexpected. This is because it is an established post-war symbol of non-Sikh life in Britain, meaning that it is less likely for younger Sikhs to associate it with Britishness.

Despite this minor anomaly, it is straightforward to establish distinct symbols and themes for those below and above the age of 42. For example, those who are older were more likely to choose institutional symbols, whilst younger Sikhs leaned more toward popular culture. These differences are enumerated in the fourth column “Difference between Age Groups” in Table 13. Here the symbols of “Royal Family” and “The mix of people living in Britain” stand out as illustrative of each age group’s distinct Britishness.

Having established basic patterns of what symbols are selected by which age group in the survey, in the next sections I add statistical analysis to these patterns and then test for usefulness of the data. For the former, I use cluster testing to attach numerical values to the ‘sameness’ of the symbols, or the clusters they form. This allows me to understand the age range of those who selected each cluster overall. Although the result is weak in some parts it still shows that, overall, age-related choices are made.

Cluster Evaluation of Symbols in Study Sikh Survey

As a reminder, there were 20 symbols in the survey. Once these are tested for grouping, they cluster into seven sets with decreasing sameness to one another from factor 1 to factor 7. The data was analysed using SPSS software and the principal components analysis was produced by varimax rotation in STATA 13.0. The main factor results can be seen in Table 14.

Table 14

Cluster Evaluation of Symbols of Britishness by Respondents in Study Sikh Survey

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Uniqueness
The Royal Family	0.7224	0.0435	0.01	0.2352	0.0531	0.0783	0.4119
The Indian Regiments	0.7745	-0.0353	0.0496	0.1033	-0.1616	-0.1601	0.334
The Regional English Language	0.1168	0.1149	0.0598	0.1379	-0.0034	0.8321	0.2582
Paleness in Britishness	-0.0522	0.0163	0.7848	-0.0171	0.0028	0.3018	0.2898
Drinking Tea	0.4353	-0.0106	0.2607	0.3749	0.4009	0.0605	0.4375
Punk-rock music	-0.1795	0.6441	0.2211	0.3197	0.016	0.2946	0.3148
The TV Series Goodness Gracious Me	0.123	0.4021	0.1742	0.5648	0.3533	0.0046	0.3489
The Mix of People in Britain	0.0798	0.0406	0.0562	0.6957	-0.1982	0.3084	0.3704
Anglican Churches	0.3739	0.7075	-0.0354	0.1451	0.0033	-0.0919	0.3289
Chicken Tikka Masala	0.3156	0.4475	0.1791	0.4527	0.2911	-0.1051	0.3674
Cricket	0.2684	0.349	0.3372	-0.1184	0.3751	-0.3224	0.4338
Football	0.1516	0.093	-0.0071	0.0076	0.8852	0.0122	0.1845
Rugby	-0.011	0.6634	0.1296	-0.1826	0.1811	0.4248	0.2964
British Trade Union Banners	0.5286	0.5052	0.163	-0.0425	0.1058	0.0583	0.4224
The National Health Service	0.7258	0.0362	-0.2458	0.1533	0.3471	-0.0081	0.2673
The National Trust	0.6735	0.1448	0.3543	-0.0522	0.2561	0.1398	0.3121
BBC Asian Network	0.1201	-0.0257	0.6253	0.448	0.125	-0.1017	0.3673
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	-0.1461	0.4737	0.5619	0.2371	0.1633	-0.0925	0.3471
Rural Britain	0.7012	0.1458	-0.0446	-0.1425	0.2262	0.235	0.3584
Hardeep Kohli	0.1138	0.3013	0.6897	0.0695	-0.1193	-0.1091	0.3897


Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Of these, the scree plot in Figure 28 shows that there are two major latent variables that explain an important share of the variation in how people rate symbols in the survey, notably 'royal/highbrow' (factor 1) and 'sport/pop culture' (factor 2). That is, those who rate the British Royal Family highly tend also to rank the National Trust and other traditional elite symbols highly (hence royal/highbrow). Those who rank punk rock highly

tend to rank rugby highly (sport/pop culture). These form the two major points of differentiation as the other latent variables do not load heavily on any particular set of symbols, as the scree plot in Figure 28 shows. The young and native-born were less attached to ‘royal/highbrow’ symbols, and only young Sikhs were less attached to UK Asian community symbols. As a secondary finding, younger Sikhs were somewhat more attached to pop cultural aspects (factor 2 on sport/pop culture), but this is a weaker relationship. Factor 3, that of ‘multiculture/pop culture’, was much weaker again.

Figure 28

Scree plot of Eigen Values after Factor in Study Sikh Cluster Analysis



Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

The above suggests there is some evidence that the content of Britishness differs with age. This is partly because younger people are much less attached to a basket of all symbols when compared to older citizens. The importance of this is further highlighted by the fact that younger Sikhs’ place of birth (native or foreign born) does not correlate with their

preference for particular symbols. Given that the current literature such as Jivraj (2013) suggests foreign-born Sikhs are more likely to be British rather than English, this is an interesting finding – even as we must bear in mind the relatively small sample.

Conceptually, the clusters of symbols show that there is no single Sikh British identity, but rather two distinct, and age-related, clusters. These speak to two different schools of nationalism theory, the state-led top-down theory as represented by elite symbols like the monarchy, and ground-up theory as represented by more popular culture such as rugby.

Despite this, the results are less clear-cut in other ways. As stated before, we see what symbols younger Sikhs are cooler towards (monarchy, British Asian icons) but less about what they are for. However, this may be related to the survey design, which only had one open-text option on symbols. For example, it is possible that younger Sikhs were simply unsure of their attachment to national identity/symbols of nationhood. This was not tested for in the survey but is a key part of the interview discussions.

Regression Analysis of Symbols in Sikh Study Survey

Having identified two major factors or clusters of symbols that group together, I next test the significance of the findings. After excluding variables that do not load heavily onto these two factors, the variables I tested included young (defined as ages 18 to 42), old (defined as ages 43 to 60 plus), foreign birthplace, and being a Conservative voter. Table 15 shows the output for the model based on the ‘royal/highbrow’ symbolic nationalism cluster (factor 1).

Table 15

Significant Factors Predicting Factor 1 (Royal/Highbrow)

Survey Variable	Royal / Highbrow
Foreign Born	0.534** (0.157)
Younger Sikhs	-0.920 (0.233)
Older Sikhs	-0.000*** (0.000)
Conservative Voter	-1.037 (0.734)
R2	0.475
*** p<.0001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

In the above table I show that factor 1, that of ‘royal/highbrow’ is significantly associated with being foreign-born and an older Sikh. This factor did not appeal to younger Sikhs.

The next clustering is illustrated in Table 16.

Table 16

Significant Factors Predicting Factor 2 (Sport/Pop Culture)

Survey Variable	Sports/Pop Culture
Foreign Born	-0.531** (0.175)
Younger Sikhs	0.232 (0.259)
Older Sikhs	-0.001 (0.001)
Conservative Voter	-1.582 (0.816)
R2 =	0.32
*** p<.0001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Here, those of British birth were most likely to show affinity with this combination of symbols, such as punk rock and rugby. The fact this cluster also included attachment to Anglican churches as a national symbol suggests that these UK-born Sikhs are more attracted to an 'everyday' form of nationhood based on popular cultures and landmarks (Edensor, 2002). Age did not turn out to be significant despite the fact that the principal components analysis showed younger people relatively inclined towards this. Among Sikhs under 40, however, younger people were more favourable to the sport/pop culture symbols than those closer to age 40. This infers that age does matter, but that the age split may differ depending on the context.

Though less important in the factor analysis, I also decided to examine predictors of support for a third principal component, defined as the 'multiculture/pop culture' cluster associated with the Ali G accent, BBC Asian Network and pale complexion as a symbol of Britishness. This is shown in Table 17.

Table 17

Significant Factors Predicting Factor 3 (Multi-culture/Pop-culture)

Survey Variable	Multi-culture / Pop Culture
Foreign Born	-0.785*** (-0.190)
Younger Sikhs	-0.023 (0.293)
Older Sikhs	-0.000 (0.000)
Education Level	-0.192** (0.072)
Britain's past was better	0.365** (0.112)
Conservative voter	-0.249 (-0.890)
R2=	0.320
*** p<.0001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

The blend of popular culture and characteristics associated with this third factor appealed to those who were native-born, were in the middle of the age range, were less well-educated, and saw Britain's past as better than its future. Even so, it is worth noting that this cluster explains a relatively small share of the variance across the symbols so we should not attach too much significance to these findings.

Write-In Replies on Symbols of Britishness

The survey design allowed for respondents to record what symbols, other than those mentioned, made them feel British. The question was worded thus “In addition, do any other symbols make you feel British? Please give as many answers as you wish”. The results show that significant variation on the content of Sikh Britishness exists. Of the 94 replies, there was some repetition but not a significant amount. It is the large number and differing nature of the symbols that stands out for this group. I show this using a word cloud and tree map analysis in Figure 29 and 30.

Figure 29

Write-In Replies on Symbols of Britishness as a Word Cloud





Figure 30

Write-In Replies on Symbols of Britishness in a Tree Map



Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

The main themes in the open-ended replies were in line with the rest of the survey. British institutional symbols such as the BBC, pound sterling currency, parliament, the unwritten constitution, and the Union Flag were all popular replies. More popular ‘everyday’ culture symbols such as fish and chips, pies, music, film, and humour were also recorded. Much less popular were Sikh symbols such as bhangra music – a popularised form of Punjabi folk music or Southall Broadway – a well-known area of Sikh residents in London. The words chips, flag, seaside, and music all appeared the most frequently either solely or in combination with others.

In summarising this section, several symbols that differentiate the two major clusters (or cultural complexes) emerge. Using regression analyses I now know that these clusters and the overall statistical findings are significant for the group surveyed. By taking these and

the write-in answers into account, I am able to translate these symbols into thematic groups that affect the content of Sikh Britishness. Those I choose to elaborate on are the strongest of these: institutions, citizen ethnic mix/racial paleness, place of birth, regional culture, national sports, food, and, finally, social and workplace milieus.

Given that the survey findings are not fully conclusive, this requires me to utilise qualitative field research. This helps clarify if these variables are indeed significant by relating the statistics to the deeper lived experience of 25 British Sikhs. Here, through the more expansive nature of the interviews, I sought to unearth the fuller content of Sikhs' British national identity. Together, both quantitative and qualitative approaches draw a clearer picture of the content of Sikh Britishness. I find that it is more complex than simple.

To begin, I outline my interview methodology and then describe the profile of the subjects.

Interview Methodology and Profile of Respondents

The records here are from 25 semi-structured, one-to-one interviews with Sikhs from England and Wales held between January 2018 to December 2018. Some subjects were part of the survey, others were 'snowball' contacts, and many are part of my personal and professional networks. As a precondition, all had to self-identify as Sikh and British. The age range is between 18 and 62 and the gender split is 11 females and 14 males. In terms of region, most interviewees were from either London or the English Midlands with one Welsh Sikh. A small number were from the home counties, mainly in the South of England. Locations have been approximated for the privacy of the subjects.

All discussants were given an alias and an option to digitally record the interview aurally only.³³ Most interviews took place in public places such as restaurants, universities, Sikh places of worship, and occasionally the subject’s offices. For several Sikhs, telephone interviews formed either all or part of the research. All transcripts and notes were available to discussants for commentary and as records. Where relevant, I have inserted or translated non-English words to improve understanding. The initials “GJ” indicate the author. The interviewees’ profile is in Table 18.

Table 18
Overview of Interviewee Profiles

Interview number	Alias	Age	Occupation	Gender	National Identity	Place of Birth	Relationship Status	Period of Settlement	Children	Region of Residence	Highest level of Education
1	Sukhi	40	Did not ask	Female	English	London	Did not ask	NA	Did not ask	West London	O Levels
2	Sam	51	PhD Chem Eng	Male	British	Punjab	Married	30 years +	Did not ask	Essex	PhD
3	Mark	55	Surveyor	Male	Welsh	Wales	Married	NA	Did not ask	Wales	A Levels
4	Bubby	41	Academic	F	British	England	Married	NA	Did not ask	Midlands	PhD
5	Jasbir	40	CEO	M	British	Singapore	Single	30 years +	Did not ask	London	BSc
6	Karan	33	Finance Manager	M	English	England	Single	NA	Did not ask	London	A levels
7	Jessie	50	IT Consultant	F	British	Nairobi	Single	30 years	Did not ask	London	Masters
8	Bob	40	Engineer	M	British	Mombasa	Married	25	Did not ask	London	Undergraduate
9	Permjit	45	IT Coder	M	English	Coventry	Living with partner	NA	Did not ask	London	Masters
10	Bunty	47	Biochemist	m	British	Bedford	Married	NA	Did not ask	London	Undergraduate
11	Jassa	30	Actor	Male	British	Leicester	Single	NA	No	London	A Levels
12	Kaval	25	Council Worker	Female	English	Midlands	Married	NA	No	Hatfield	O Levels
13	Jess	55	Librarian	Female	British	Malaysia	Married	20 years	Yes	Hammersmith	A Levels
14	Manj	21	Mechanic	Male	English	London	No	NA	No	Hounslow	GCSE
15	Kam	53	Postal Worker	Female	English	Southampton	No	NA	Yes	Portsmouth	O Levels
16	Dil	62	Baggage Handler	Male	British	Punjab	Married	30 years plus	Yes	Camden	None
17	Raj	35	Construction Worker	Male	English	Kent	Single	NA	No	Rochester	GCSE
18	Gurj	23	Waiting Staff	Female	English	London	Living with partner	NA	No	London	A levels
19	Harjit	19	Garbage Collector	Male	English	Birmingham	Living with partner	NA	No	Dudley	GCSE
20	Sarbdeep	22	Nurse	Female	English	Cornwall	Living with partner	NA	No	London	A Levels
21	Teddy	56	Cleaning Contractor	Female	British	London	Married	NA	No	London	A Levels
23	Permdip	60	Doctor	Female	English	Nottingham	Married	NA	Yes	Coventry	PhD
24	Kuki	18	Student	Female	English	London	Single	NA	No	London	A Levels
25	Soni	55	Kitchen Porter	British	British	Punjab	Married	15 years	No	London	Foreign

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

³³ Sample questions and areas for discussion are reproduced in Appendix 2.

Using the national census, I attempted to attain a sample which represented the British Sikh community in terms of social economic class, nativity, age, and gender. However, the Sikh community has proven hard to reach mainly for two reasons. The first is its small size, since in the 2011 census they made up just 0.87 per cent of the population of England and Wales. Second is the reservations many Sikhs have about taking part in research that singles them out. As a recent migrant community in a time of rapid political change, its members have security concerns. The limited state of research available for this study to build on can be partly ascribed to this reticence.

Having briefly described the interviewees and my methodology, in the next few sections I cover the main trends emerging from the survey and interviews. For the interviews, I drew on the questions in the survey in order to form a semi-structured interview that connects with the survey. This was made possible as I had grouped the symbols thematically in the survey results. So, the following areas emerge to investigate: ethnicity, place of birth, regionality, national sporting teams, food, social networks and workplace cultures. These can all be thought of as proxies carrying information in predicting the content of a Sikh's Britishness.

At the end of this analysis, I show that symbols and themes have direct correlations with age, allowing me to conclude that age affects Sikh Britishness. To start, I cover a well-known aspect of state-national Britishness, that of institutional symbols, notably Britain's monarchy and the NHS.

Age and Institutional Symbols

In the survey, I showed that many older Sikhs associate their national identity with institutional British symbols.³⁴ As a reminder, this was the strongest cluster found earlier in the survey, that of ‘royal/highbrow’. All the other latent variables were significantly weaker. And this pattern can be seen throughout the interviews. One example is provided below:

GJ: I would like to know what things that made you feel British?

Sam: The royal family, Fish and Chips are some easy ones. Others not so easy, such as equality, the treatment of women and simpler things like speaking English in a modern way, not a Victorian-type of way.

Sam, aged 51, Redbridge, East London, April 2018

In this interview with an older Sikh, Sam, he also spoke of the importance the British Armed Forces held for his Britishness. As background to this, I note that the origin of this association is one of the oldest in Sikh Britishness due to colonial Indian Sikh soldiers serving Britain in the First and Second World Wars. Thus, Sikhs remain strongly associated with the nation’s armed forces. However, today this is largely figurative as there are no longer large numbers of serving soldiers among Sikhs when compared to South Asian Hindus or Muslims. I assess that this is a result of younger Sikhs associating less with the armed forces compared to their older Sikh counterparts.

³⁴ I understand the possibility that younger people in general are less attached to state and military symbols, regardless of ethnicity. Furthermore, they may become more so as they age, however the limitations of my data put these aspects out of scope in this study.

Thus, in contrast, and as I have already shown in the survey, younger Sikhs associate themselves with a different set of symbols, staying clearer of institutional ones. Here is one example of a younger Sikh's thoughts on this:

GJ: Okay the last part of the interview is about the things that make your national identity what it is.

K: So, the obvious similarity [with parents] is that we live in England but the factors that make us feel British or English are quite different. So, mum and dad watch the Queen's Speech every year without fail at the opening of Parliament and Christmas but for me it means nothing really. For me the things that make me English are my [white] partner, my mates, my freedom to live how I like and then the fact that I want my kids to feel secure where they live, which is England, not Britain.

Kaval, aged 25, Hatfield, November 2018

So, for Kaval, Britishness was about security, personal freedom and open choices – aspects she associated with England - rather than British royalty or state-national occasions. The value of the latter is reflected in her parents' high estimate of the Queen's Speech. She valued her choice of being a vegetarian, being in a mixed relationship and being a local. In other words, her symbolic and identity influences were not the same as those of her parents.

Like Kaval and her parents, there are similar examples throughout the interviews, where older Sikhs expound on long-established aspects of British life such as education, parliament, or the Queen's Speech. Furthermore, this interviewee raises the question of whether symbols of any kind are valuable to younger Sikhs when compared to values, behaviours and ideas.

All the same, this theme of lower attachment to establishment symbols is the one most associated with age and Britishness amongst Sikhs. Evidence of this can be seen in the

survey ratings where the NHS, a state symbol of health security, drew the highest sentiment amongst the institutional symbols at 66/100 (the average is 53/100).

Furthermore, it produced the second-largest difference between older and younger Sikhs (17), though this may be a function of older people using the NHS more. Only the royal family divided the age groups more, and that was only marginally so (20).

I next focus on other mass-cultural symbols, beginning with perceptions of 'British' ethnicity.

Age, Ethnic Mix and Whiteness in Britishness

In the survey, I asked Sikhs whether "The mix of different people living in Britain" was a symbol of Britishness. Overall, this question attracted an average rating of 63. Given that the average sentiment rating across all symbols is 53, this shows the strong reaction from all respondents. Looking at specific age groups, I found that older Sikhs felt this was a less strong symbol of their Britishness than younger Sikhs. Those aged 42 and below averaged a sentiment of 68/100, whereas those above age 42 averaged 59/100. Using qualitative research to go beyond this statistic, I assess two issues.

Firstly, older Sikhs are closer to, or are in fact, the settler generation. Thus, they may still be reflecting on a British society that has historically been less ethnically diverse. These Sikhs would have been a very small minority amongst a largely white British majority. In addition, they had limited ethnic representation amongst policy makers. As such, they are representative of a generation that identifies with a more distant, top-down nationalism. This includes the notion that Britishness is official and administered by an elite white British class. For them, a diverse mix of citizenry is less symbolic of Britishness.

My second assessment is that younger Sikhs, who I know from the survey value popular culture and diversity, are more influenced by ground-up national identity. They are, therefore, less likely to think that Britishness is an official notion or is reflected by a white British elite.

This extrapolation ‘comes to life’ when interview data is assessed. Older Sikhs put forward white British politicians, inventors and business personalities as public figures symbolising Britishness. These included Margaret Thatcher, Richard Branson and James Dyson. Younger Sikhs on the other hand thought of a more diverse ethnic range of people including Lewis Hamilton, the black Formula 1 driver, or Preeti Gill, the Sikh MP for Birmingham, alongside white British personalities such as Theresa May or David Beckham.

Below is one interview example showing that younger Sikhs are more likely to think of diverse ethnicity, including mixed ethnicity, as a more important feature of Britishness to them.

GJ: What about the ethnic mix of people in Britain?

Sukhi: That is a strong feature of Britain – yes.

GJ: How would you score that?

Sukhi: 80 – 90%

Sukhi, aged 40, Hounslow, West London, April 2018

Above, I note the same strength of opinion with this interviewee. British-born Sukhi spoke at length about the changes in the ethnic mix in Britain, especially in the cities. When asked about how her comments differed from her parents or older Sikhs, she replied that she and her peers saw being a British citizen differently. In her experience, older Sikhs had

become settlers and adults in an early post-colonial Britain. In this situation, she said, they are used to being physically surrounded in their locales by white British people. In addition to this, I know through being a participant in majority Sikh locales that, in the main, they were being advised, governed, managed, and instructed by the same white ethnic group. As such, it is no surprise that for older Sikhs, white British groups are symbolic of Britain's bureaucracy and citizenry. However, this has slowly been receding post-war. So, for younger Sikhs the situation is somewhat different nowadays.

Therefore, for Sukhi, Britishness was not represented by just white British citizens. She perceived it in much more complex terms. This was for two main reasons, both related to ethnic groups in her locale, which is the same as her parents. This subject and her parents live in Hounslow, a well-known area of high South-Asian population. Less well-known is that it also has a large non-white British presence. This affects Sukhi in two main ways.

First, her daily experiences involved many non-white groups such as British South Asians, British Somalis and British Arabs. When asked about the 'elite white' that older Sikhs thought of in Hounslow, such as business and local government leaders, she acknowledged that they still exist. However, she felt that this situation was historical and in time local leadership would increasingly reflect the local community. Given the predicted increase in Britain's ethnic diversity, this is an understandable comment from a younger Sikh.

The second reason Sukhi thought of Britishness so differently was due to the recent and rapid increases in white European migrant groups in Britain. This has significantly changed the white ethnic mix in cities and college towns. In much the same way as it has done so nationally via the 90.04 per cent spike in "Other White" between the 2001 and 2011 censuses. In Hounslow, it has made a greater than national-average difference, as large numbers of East and Central Europeans have taken up long-term residence there.

With this has come their support of the amenities of shops, personal services, and even employment in 'Indian' shops. There is also a significant amount of socialisation and personal relationships. This includes marriages between Sikhs and these new migrants with the resulting families and mixed ethnicity children. Thus, for this subject, when rating ethnic mix so highly as a symbol of Britishness, non-British whiteness played an important part. One comment reflects this well:

Sukhi: In London for example there is a mega mix, but pale people are a large group. Hold on, maybe that's why London is so different! Maybe its coz the people in power are generally pale but around me, it's all so mixed nowadays. Even the Polish friends I have, they're pale but not British, so in the future white people may not mean British to me.

Sukhi, aged 40, Hounslow, West London, April 2018

Contrast this with an older, foreign-born Sikh whose alias is Jessie in this exchange:

GJ: Do you think that Britishness is made distinctive due to the majority of white citizens?

J: I would not say distinct but maybe more associative if that makes sense. Britain has mainly had a white population whether migrant or settlers, so it is easy for outsiders to see non-whites as non-British.

Jessie, aged 55, Hammersmith, West London, December 2018

However, for completeness I note that age-related Britishness may have its own 'temporal' complexity. Sam is a good example of this. For example, when questioned as to how his Britishness may or may not be affected by looking different to most British people he said:

Sam: It's something you think about – you know that you are not automatically thought of as British because you are brown or with a turban, but that is quite an old-fashioned way of thinking about Britain today. In many adverts you see Sikhs with turbans in the shots.

Sam, aged 51, Redbridge, East London, April 2018

Sam perceived Britishness may have changed. This is signalled by his comment that it is an old-fashioned idea that a brown or turbaned person may not automatically be thought of as British. He further seemed to suggest that his non-white ethnicity is not excluded from what is perceived as Britishness by others. For him, the place Britain's Sikhs occupy may be changing contemporarily as Sikhs are often used in media productions without concern about their ethnicity or their religion. This is something I observed amongst younger Sikhs who value multiculturalism and equality, but not necessarily in older ones.

Thus, older Sikhs, such as Sam above, can adopt erstwhile 'young' symbols and ideas of Britishness depending on their personal circumstances. The reverse can therefore also be true for younger Sikhs. Together, both 'circumstantial' phenomena show that ground-up nationalism is becoming important for Sikhs in Britain, displacing top-down elements.

Sikh National Identity and Political Attitudes

Reverting back to my own survey, I next enquire into how different symbolic attachments within British national identity predict Sikhs' attitudes to Brexit and immigration. Below is a regression table that shows the most significant variables associated with Sikhs' attitude towards firstly, Brexit and secondly, the idea of physical paleness as a British racial characteristic – the latter being a form of 'ethno-traditional' nationalism in which an ethnic symbol doesn't define membership but does constitute a distinguishing characteristic of the national whole (Kaufmann, 2019).

Thus, using logistic regression I show the relative significance of each variable through its coefficients. Hence, there are several significant predictors of a Leave vote among Sikhs. For example, immigration opinion is significant, as it is among white Britons. Under this variable, Leavers or those who voted for Brexit tend to have restrictionist views on immigration and support the death penalty. An aspect that is borne out in the table below

where the death penalty is likely indicator of a Leave-voting Sikh. Whilst we know this the case for non-Sikhs, it is interesting that the same predictors also hold in the Sikh population. Note that I have controlled for age, gender, class and education in these models, none of which are significant.

Those who identified their Britishness with its diverse mix of people, regional accents, and cricket were less likely to have voted for Brexit. Finally, those who identified their Britishness with Hardip Kohli and the TV series *Goodness Gracious Me* were more likely to have voted for Brexit. From the interviews, these may be the ‘middle’ or second-generation Sikhs who are parents of Sikh youth. Here is the fuller variable regression analysis in Table 19.

Table 19

Significant Factors Predicting Brexit Voters (Leavers) in Study Sikh Survey

Survey Variable	Brexit Voters
Reduce Immigration	1.294* (0.013)
Support Death Penalty	0.844* (0.034)
Hardip Kohli	0.030* (0.063)
Mix of People	-0.044* (0.014)
Regional English Language	-0.03 (0.066)
Goodness Gracious Me	0.033* (0.023)
Cricket	-0.039* (0.022)

Conservative Voter	-1.336 (0.476)
Pseudo R2 =	0.390
*** p<.0001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

A similar regression analysis also allows me to predict which Sikhs are more likely to identify with ‘ethno-traditional’ nationalism, in this case with pale physical features as one component of what makes Britain distinctive. These Sikhs scored significantly lower on attachment to the NHS, Anglican churches, punk rock, football, royals, regiments, the mix of different people in Britain, and chicken tikka as symbols of Britishness. They score somewhat higher on attachment to the National Trust as a symbol and are more likely to vote Conservative. Surprisingly, among Sikhs, neither attitudes to immigration nor preference for Brexit matters when it comes to who identifies with paleness as an aspect of their Britishness. This, however, may be an artefact of the symbols chosen rather than group behaviour.

Table 20 shows the correlations between each symbol of Britishness and identification with paleness (i.e., ‘ethno-traditional’ British nationalism) among Sikhs in this survey.

Table 20

Significant Factors Predicting Paleness as Britishness in Study Sikh Survey

Survey Variable	Brexit Voters
The NHS	-0.449*** (0.086)
Anglican Churches	-0.490*** (0.081)
The National Trust	0.159* (0.073)
Punk Rock Music	-0.444*** (0.084)
Football	-0.429*** (0.080)
The Royal Family	-0.338*** (0.071)
Colonial Indian Regiments	-0.181* (-0.071)
The Mix of Different People	-0.248** (0.834)
Chicken Tikka Masala	-0.272** (0.085)
Conservative Voters	19.701* (7.878)
R2=	0.645
*** p<.0001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

To conclude this section on the predictors of conservative political and nationalist attitudes, I began by providing examples in the interviews of how age predicts variation in symbolic patterns of British national identity. Older Sikhs are more attached to the traditional high-cultural state symbols of Britishness while younger Sikhs are somewhat more drawn to pop cultural symbols. Whilst it is not possible to reproduce the full transcripts here, this pattern is evident amongst many of the Sikhs I interviewed.

Having covered ethnic mix, I next briefly discuss place of birth. This is highlighted in both the survey and in nationalism theory as significant for national identity.

Age and Foreign / British Birth

The respondents' place of birth might be assumed to affect the nature of national identity. However, upon closer examination, it closely correlates with the age of the respondent.

The reason for this is that, in general, older Sikhs are very likely to be of foreign birth and younger Sikhs to be of British birth. Furthermore, Sikhs who are foreign-born, and most likely older, tend to self-identify as British. This can be seen in the survey data in which the average age was 50 for the British-identifying group and 36 for the English-identifying one. Therefore, within the scope of this study, it is difficult to separate the two correlated variables to find any arguments against their shared effect on Britishness.

Whilst acknowledging place of birth as a factor in a Sikh's British national identity, it is important to note an anomaly. A vast majority of Sikhs in the research were English-born and yet many still stated their national identity as British, just like the foreign-born interviewees. This may indicate that the correlate of place of birth and Britishness amongst Sikhs is not a simple one. Some data on this can be found in Khor (2016) who finds that foreign birth may enhance Britishness across all ethnic groups and ages.

Age and Regional Differences

The nature of national identity in younger Sikhs is differentiated by birth or residence in a particular 'home nation' of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. This is reasonable given that first, there are significant cultural differences between these regions and second, younger Sikhs are more likely to be influenced by vernacular nationalism (Smith, 2003; Kymlicka, 2001). For example, I have already noted that Sikhs in Scotland,

such as the Sikh comedian Hardeep Singh Kohli, have been very public proponents of Scottish independence. As popular as he is in Scotland, he only scored an average of 43 as a symbol of Britishness in the survey, which is largely dominated by English respondents. In interviews, when I asked Sikhs born in England why they assigned him a low score, many stated that it was because he is Scottish. This ‘othering’ of the Scots is a well-known symbolic and social aspect of Englishness. It has until now gone unrecorded among England’s Sikhs.

This regional factor can furthermore be seen amongst Sikhs in Wales who recorded very strong associations with Wales and Welshness over Britain and Britishness – the so-called Moreno question (Moreno, 2006). Below, the interviewee Mark shows how strong this regional affinity can be:

GJ: Okay, thanks. Going back to yourself, you said you were Welsh, rather than British or any other national identity. Why did you not choose British?

Mark: I’m a proud Welshman, that’s why! Plus, British is just English, isn’t it?

Mark, aged 49, Birmingham, May 2018

Mark continued this theme of a strong and localised Welshness in his identity throughout the discussion. He talked about the solidarity he felt as part of the mainly white farming village he now lived in. Thus, being part of a close rural community added to his sense of national belonging, notwithstanding of his minority ethnicity. The strength of his rural Welshness was strong even though he was born in a major city in South Wales where there is a large Sikh community. The result is that Mark, who at 49 years of age is above the average survey age, remained very influenced by his Welsh ‘lived experiences’.

Analysing Mark’s case with all the research so far, this supports the broader pattern of change noted earlier in Sikh Britishness. That is the shift from top-down influence to

ground-up national identity formation and maintenance. In Mark's case this includes daily occurrences of nationhood, such as the arcane knowledge of historic Welsh rugby in daily conversations and Welsh language singing for his children. Apart from region, Mark's case raises another prevalent theme. This is support amongst Sikhs for Britain's national sports teams. I cover this next.

Age and National Sports Teams

There is a case to be made for predicting the content of Sikh Britishness using national sports. As background to British national identity, sports and Sikhs, there is the 'Tebbit test' (Weinfeld, 2011; Clavane, 2012; Howe, 2006). Here, a Sikh's national identity can be 'tested' based on the cricket team they support, the idea being that groups who do not support England over, say India, may be less British. So, Sikhs, who sometimes support non-British sporting teams, may be considered less British, or not British at all (Ratna, 2014).

However, whilst this simplistic notion can be seen in the interviews, a more nuanced and age-related theme emerges here. This is the complete eschewing of 'South Asian' sports, such as cricket, by younger Sikhs. In some cases, it is done to avoid the 'Tebbit test' but in many other cases, it is simply because cricket is not seen as exciting or as socially relevant for younger Sikhs.

The case of Monty Panesar serves as a good example on Sikh Englishness and cricket. Here, a Sikh player in the England cricket team avoided spectator abuse as he was not considered English by the opposition fans. Monty Panesar's tour of Australia in 2006-7 led to interesting research on why he was not considered a "Pommie Bastard" (Lee, 2008, p. 23). Here Lee showed that the more serious part of the pejorative phrase was that Panesar, who is a Sikh with unshorn hair and brown skin, was that he was not considered English.

Eschewing 'South Asian' sports has a two-fold effect. First, younger Sikhs are more likely to follow football or rugby over cricket or hockey. Second, Sikhs who either are, or aspire to be, socially mobile tend to support rugby over football, and these are generally younger Sikhs in England. This youth-rugby axis is borne out in my study survey results. Here the average age of Sikhs who rated this sport higher than average was 42, or relatively younger Sikhs.

Away from England, I find similar situations with Sikhs in other home nations too. For example, I found that rugby in Wales formed an important part of one interviewee's (Mark) national identity. Because it played an initial acculturation and integration function, he still felt more Welsh through it as a middle-aged person. Through its localised and small-scale points of contact, it had become a proxy for his national identity – much like it is for most people in Wales.

As further evidence from my research, the following excerpts below show the idea well.

The first is from Jess:

J: The rugby kids are so much more English if you know what I mean, and that is mainly because their parents are so much more English. They are generally more likely to have longer roots in England and so it makes sense. What would be interesting is what my grandkids will be like!

GJ: And what do you think they will be like?

J: English, super-English even!

Jess, aged 55, London, November 2018

Next is my interview with a 21-year-old male Sikh who supported the England football and rugby teams as they made him feel English, not British as he made clear in the comments below:

GJ: So apart from your workmates being English, is there anything else that makes you feel English?

M: Yeah, the England rugby and football teams.

GJ: What about the British Olympic teams over the years? Like the one in 2012, I mean Mo Farah grew up not far from here.

M: Yeah, but still he's English! I mean he's an Arsenal fan!

Manj, aged 21, Surrey, November 2018

In thinking of Britishness, whiteness and ethnicity the above finding stands out. This is because Sikhs have historically eschewed rugby for two main reasons. Firstly, there are no Sikhs playing at any high levels of the game. Secondly, it is a sport strongly associated with white British supporters in Britain. Therefore, I assess the following from this. If younger Sikhs now relate to rugby despite its mainly white following, they may possess a strong desire to reject white Britishness in national sport.³⁵ This logic can be extended to their rejection of whiteness in British and English national identity. For this reason, rugby stands out when compared with football at national level. The latter already appeals more to Sikhs due to the diversity of its players and its mixed fanbase in Britain. It also connects with the working-class roots of British Sikhs.

Therefore, I assess two age-related aspects here. First, younger Sikhs prefer rugby over cricket. Second, younger and socially-ambitious Sikhs prefer rugby over football – especially in England. This shows that age, through sport, can signal the content of Sikh Britishness. Younger Sikhs are more likely to support rugby and to be of a higher socio-

³⁵ At the annual World Rugby Sevens Series tournament held in Twickenham, London, it is striking to see so many non-white rugby fans when compared to the full-sided game which is majority white.

economic class, which can affect their Englishness or Britishness. This leads me to consider if it is class and not rugby that is the discernible factor.

However, my field research indicates that following rugby precedes the move into higher social classes and as such, rugby and not class predicts the content of Britishness. All the same, should rugby assist with mass social mobility amongst Sikhs, then its role may be superseded by class. I also note that rugby in Wales is not a marker of high social class, instead it is a general icon of successful Welsh nationhood.

In this way, contemporary Sikh youth can develop a sense of Englishness through national sports at a fairly early age, much like white British groups. I found this in the case of Bunty's children where the youngest was keen on following English sporting teams rather than British ones. Here is an excerpt of the interview with him:

GJ: What is the future for British identity?

B: More specialisation, I think. Scotland is becoming more and more Scottish and suddenly English identity is on the surge again.

GJ: What about for Sikhs such as your kids?

B: I am sure they will follow the general trends now and become more English or ignore the political drama that come with being a nationally proud person. The older one certainly is showing that apathy towards Britishness.

Bunty, aged 45-50, Southall, August 2018

This 'trend' that Bunty mentioned would not have been the case for him or his parents. They all generally stayed away from British national sporting teams due to concerns about racism towards non-whites. It was also not the case with Bunty's older son. Due to this,

Bunty's case was of additional interest with regard to the influence of family on national identity.

His older child had more of a sense of Indianness or Punjabiness which Bunty suggested was partly due to the length of time his grandmother had spent with him. This is indicative of many Sikh households where multiple generations have traditionally resided together. It raises the possibility of family spaces affecting Britishness, and younger Sikhs, such as Bunty's first child, not feeling English.

However, the overall thesis on younger Sikhs and Englishness is still relevant, whereby younger Sikhs are more likely to be English. This is because it is now highly likely that young Sikh adults move away from family homes at an earlier age. In many cases they move away from majority Sikh areas to seek employment and socialisation. All the same, this case shows that Sikh heritage can play an important role. This includes food – which I cover next.

Age and British, British and Indian Food

For Sikhs, like many other groups, food can form an important part of personal and group identity. When national dishes such as Haggis or jellied eels are considered together with identity, I assess that food can be a shaper of national identity. In many migrant ethnic minority groups, food has the strong potential to link an individual instantly with an ancestral land. For this reason, some Sikhs fall into the same category as Polish migrants in London who have 'ritualised' their ancestral food to maintain diasporic connections to Poland (Rabikowska, 2010).

Whilst this may have applied to older Sikhs, more pertinent to Sikhs and Britishness is Leddy-Owen (2014) who finds that a Sunday roast was tantamount to one (non-white)

interviewee's idea of Englishness. My research too shows that younger Sikhs are more likely to identify with non-Indian cuisine as part of their sense of British national identity. Older Sikhs are more likely to eat Indian food, a foodstuff which, for them, is linked to 'curry culture' rather than Britishness.

The role of food in Sikh Britishness is clear in the study survey where replies to the open-ended question "In addition, do any other symbols make you feel British?" included "apples", "ales", "beer", "pies", "chips", "gin", "muffins" and "fish". This is a striking amount of food items for a specialist survey such as this. More tellingly, the average age of those who chose these notionally British foodstuffs is 41 years of age, a younger than average demographic.

In contrast, the responses to the sole food question on the survey reveals very little. Asked about Chicken Tikka as a symbol of Britishness, the results showed that both younger and older Sikhs were equally attracted to the symbol. Furthermore, there was little age differentiation between those who are English and British (41 and 45 respectively). It also received an average rating of only 45/100, which is low compared to the overall symbolic average of 53/100. This could be because I selected a passé food item on the survey, thus the write-in question provided respondents with a better opportunity to comment on food.

Overall, these findings reveal a familiar pattern. Between the interviews and the survey, younger Sikhs aligned with 'British' foods. Below are some interview comments from younger Sikhs about food. First is Raj, a younger male who lived in a white-majority part of Kent.

GJ: So, what kind of things, symbols, activities, history or places make you feel English?

R: It is so many things, all little ones, but when you tie them up, they really make a difference. Because of where we live, it starts with nature, the landscape; greenery, beaches and then you have the food; ales, cheeses and stuff like that. In the summer, these places are like the *pind* [Punjabi village] because of the harvest.

Raj, aged 35, Kent, September 2018

Next is Harj who was from an area that has a rich food history, the English Midlands. His connection to English and Midland foods was not centred on his Indian ethnicity but on his growing sense of Black Country Englishness. This is a notable finding as the English Midlands are well-known for Indian and South Asian foods. Many of the region's cities such as Coventry, Leicester and Birmingham have famed 'Curry Miles' where these types of restaurants are present in abundance. For this reason, a longer excerpt from his interview is presented below:

GJ: What about now, what, if anything, makes you feel English?

H: Pies! More specifically Melton Mowbray Pies plus all the other dishes we have in the Midlands, Bakewells and that. Yeah, I discovered the area has got some serious foods!

GJ: Its quite unusual to hear that from someone so young and Sikh for that matter! How did you get that interested in regional cuisine?

H: I'm studying in college to get a qualification in food hygiene and went to an exhibition as part of that. I just thought wow! Such few people know about this, and everyone knows about curry. Did you know that there is regional oatcake that got made because soldiers returning from India wanted to make *rotis* [chapattis]?

GJ: So, these foods and their heritage make you feel English and not British?

H: Yeah, definitely. I mean you could say that it was in the big picture of Britain that these regional foods got forgotten.

Harj, aged 19, Dudley, December 2018

These last two discussants show the importance of localised English, not British or Indian, foods as a way of connecting to ‘personal’ Englishness. In contrast to these two cases, older Sikhs in the interviewees did not mention food, either Indian or British as part of their national identity. This evidences two aspects of identity in the wider community of Sikhs. Firstly, younger Sikhs are more likely to consider food an important part of their national identity. Secondly, the food they choose is more likely to be non-Indian. In the two cases presented here (of Raj and Harj), the subjects’ commentary on foods and national identity is more akin to non-Sikh, and most likely white British, citizens.

In trying to explain this research finding, it is possible that younger Sikhs, who consume more ‘British’ food, are less likely to associate this food with white Englishness. This further strengthens the idea that younger Sikhs do not identify Englishness with whiteness. This is unlike their older co-ethnics but more akin to some whites. For young Sikhs, their food choices provide rationale and legitimacy for their own, non-white, Englishness, such as the Sunday roast in Leddy-Owen’s (2014) research. Based on this, I assert that age and its related choices in food determines the content of Sikh Britishness. In this case it is Sikh Englishness – which I showed to be emerging amongst younger members of the community through this eschewing of ‘curry culture’.

In summarising this section, I surmise that the choices younger Sikhs make in food have overarching similarities to national sport, the nation’s ethnic mix and regional identities. In all these aspects of identity, younger Sikhs reject the notion that Englishness is exclusively white. As support for this, the survey revealed that these same Sikhs do not consider the whiteness of British history to be very important. White Englishness is perceived in similar terms – not very important.

All the same, white Britons continue to play an important role in shaping British Sikh identity, not in an ‘official’ capacity but in a social and personal way. This makes sense as they remain an overwhelming majority of the population, even though they have minority status in places like London and Leicester. Hence, I cover them more fully in a subsequent chapter. Here, I briefly assess their role in the Sikh Britishness survey and field research.

Age, Social Milieu and Whiteness

Throughout the chapter, I have hinted that the socialisation network of a Sikh can determine the content of their national identity. A Sikh’s friends, partner and extended family can all play a significant role in shaping their national identity. For example, a Sikh from Hounslow who marries a Polish white is less likely to think of whiteness as emblematic of Britishness but of Europeanness. As to the age aspect of this variable, I have already shown that younger Sikhs are more likely to socialise and partner with non-Sikhs, notably white Britons. So, in the case of the Sikh who marries a Polish citizen, it is very likely that they will be under the age of 40.

In addition, several surveys used thus far, such as the ONS LS, have all revealed that white British groups were highly likely to self-identify differently from Sikhs. Here, English rather than British identity predominated in the 2011 census among white Britons of all ages. Given that there is a rise in the number of Sikh/white relationships and families, this makes Englishness the predominant and more persuasive of British identities for British-born Sikhs.

Linking these two phenomena creates a model that predicts the following pattern. A younger rather than older Sikh is more likely to socialise and partner with a white British person. This Sikh is also more likely to not identify as British but English. Furthermore, simple enumeration in England shows that this Sikh is most likely to be English-born.

Going to the field research, this was ‘lived out’ in the interview with Sarbdeep, a nurse from Cornwall whose partner was white British and identified as Cornish. She herself only recently decided to identify as English. Below is her reasoning:

S: It’s a choice I made only recently, in fact since I moved to Cornwall. I don’t know if you know but there is a very strong regional identity here and it made me really think about what kind of national identity British was. As I spoke to people and met my partner, I realised that British is a kind of a legal status with little social application. But English reflected so much of my life, the language, the freedom and liberty I enjoy and the place too – I mean Cornwall really is one the most beautiful places in England.

Sarbdeep, aged 22, Cornwall, July 2018

In Sarbdeep’s case, it appears that meeting her partner and relocation played a crucial role in national identity. For her, being surrounded by others who were less likely to identify as British had influenced her decision to focus her nationality in two ways. First, is the physical location, that is Cornwall and English geography/landscape, which is a well-known factor in nationhood. Secondly, she had been influenced by her social or personal milieu in this case her partner and his network.

If Sarbdeep reconsidered her long-held Britishness after meeting her white partner, then it is reasonable to propose that entire Sikh groups are affected by white identity politics. This is true when one considers the large number of Sikhs who voted to leave the EU, or the smaller number of Sikhs who are members of radical political organisations such as UKIP or the EDL. Assessing this further with my thesis in mind, that age is a key factor moderating Britishness, I hypothesise that such trends will impact younger Sikhs the most. Simply as they are more likely to socialise and partner with whites.

This can be said to be part of the “accommodation” for the sake of social cohesion that Kaufmann and Harris (2014, p. 11) suggest. Even though they discuss white reactions, it is

easy to comprehend that the idea has value for Sarbdeep, and other younger Sikhs like her. In more recent research, Kaufmann (2018) shows that a common attachment to vernacular traditions supersedes ethnicity. This idea is present throughout the interviews and study survey with younger Sikhs in particular.

To summarise, a younger Sikh is less likely to be part of a majority Sikh network. Through their choices of partners, where they live, and their social mobility, they have powerful and personal non-Sikh influences. Taken together, this means these younger Sikhs are more likely not to identify as simply British. In this way, age and its related social choices determines the content of Sikh Britishness.

Age and Profession

Having discussed attachment to several British symbols such as food, sport, residence, and social milieu, all of which show variation by age, I cover one that may not reflect this age-graded trend. My research indicates that a Sikh's professional and occupational culture is likely to affect the content of their Britishness, irrespective of age. Thus, a Sikh's profession or simply the group identity at their place of work could make them English, British or foreign. This may not support my thesis, but it is in line with research on the majority white British groups regarding profession, social class, and Britishness (SurrIDGE, 2007; Miles and Leguina, 2018). Here socio-economic status (SES) predicts the content of national identity irrespective of age.

This pattern can be seen from the interviews. The Sikhs in blue collar jobs such as the postal worker (aged 53), the mechanic (aged 21), the construction worker (aged 35), and finally the garbage collector (aged 19) all identified as English. In many cases, the reason for this was that their co-workers shared the same identity. Below is a conversation with Manj about the influence of his workplace:

GJ: Right now, I am interested in talking a little more about the same things I asked on the survey. For example, what makes you English rather than say British?

M: I think the main thing is that the place and people I work with all say they are English.

GJ: Are these people South Asian or something else?

M: I work at Kwikfit in Surrey, and they are mostly white with one or two blacks.

Manj, aged 21, West London, November 2018

Looking at the other end of the SES scale, the pattern is the same but with British being the choice of national identity. Thus, the interviewees in professional or highly skilled occupations such as the academic (aged 40-45), the Chemical Engineer (aged 51), the IT Consultant (aged 50), or the Biochemist (47) were all British. Whilst I acknowledge that the age range is not as wide as those who identify as English, this is still an interesting finding, albeit one that requires further research.

Given the scope of the thesis, I am unable to use the study survey to elaborate on this: I did not collect data on profession. However, income and class were measured, and an association between them and the content of identity failed to emerge. This would suggest that socio-economic status is not a particularly important differentiator among Sikhs. However, given what I have shown on rugby as a higher-class sport and its link with Sikh Englishness amongst younger Sikhs, class may be one variable where the interview data may not fully concur with the survey data.³⁶

³⁶ Despite this lack of data, I acknowledge that it is logical that socio-economic statuses amongst the Sikh community's young will be higher due to their higher levels of education and language proficiency. This, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

This completes the sections based on the self-collected Sikh survey and interview data. Through the themes presented of food, institutions, national sports, region, and social and occupational cultures, I have shown that age moderates the form of British (or English) identity of Sikh individuals more than other variables. Evidence from the survey showed that older Sikhs, those over 42 years of age, are more attached to British institutions and Sikh or Asian communitarian symbols whilst younger respondents are more attached to Britain's diversity of people, national sports, and popular culture. These symbols can, therefore, be used to predict variations in Sikh Britishness. This finding was complemented by the interviews in which younger Sikhs commented that social milieu, workplace culture, and region of residence played important roles in their national identity formation.

Further analyses showed that this last group can additionally be linked to support for 'home nation' sporting teams, British food and a positive opinion about diversity in Britain's ethnic mix. However, the survey revealed that social class, gender, education, income, and membership of the EU make less of an impact on national identity. As further evidence, these are noticeably missing from the interview material as well as the write-in survey question. Finally, foreign versus British-birth is closely linked to age and does not make a significant impact on their own.

Therefore, the data collected on symbols of Britishness amongst Sikhs allows me to conclude that age is the critical determinant of the content of Sikh hostland national identity. This is best seen in younger English Sikhs, who exhibit a more popular, English-inflected, form of Britishness.

In the next part of this chapter, I turn my focus on younger Sikhs, a group who originally sparked my interest in the nature of British national identity in the community as a vehicle of their place in their hostland society.

Younger Sikhs, British National Identity and Britishness

As we saw in the ONS LS in previous chapters and British Sikh Report data in this chapter, younger Sikhs are the most likely to identify as English and older Sikhs least likely. This is an important finding as it challenges the notion that Englishness is racially-coded (Leddy-Owen, 2014; Skey, 2011; Hickman et al, 2005; Garner, 2012).

In this part of the chapter, I start by covering how and why younger Sikhs rebut commonly held ideas about British national identity. In particular is how they deal with the challenge of white ethno-nationalism in Englishness as discussed, for example, in Leddy Owen's (2014) work. I present first, a concept of Englishness and second, a case study of regional Britishness. This will show that sub-state nationalism is an important way for citizens – now including Sikhs - to express national identity.

I begin with the concept of 'British Englishness', a term used to describe a resurgent English trope in British Folk Music. The next idea is that of a multicultural, multi-ethnic, or civic Scottishness as found amongst minority ethnic groups in Scotland. Lastly, I end this section by showing that Sikh youth in England are setting a precedent in identifying with Englishness.

First, as background, I reiterate the difference in sentiment rating and age between those identifying as English and British in the survey. Table 21 summarises this.

Table 21

Englishness and Britishness Among Sikh Age Groups in Study Sikh Survey

Survey Averages	English	British	Difference
Average Age	36	50	14
Average Symbols Rating	50	55	5
Individual Symbol Rating			
Individual Symbol Rating	English	British	Difference
The Royal family	30	63	33
The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	44	66	22
The National Health Service	56	76	20
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	46	60	14
Drinking Tea	39	52	13
The National Trust	46	58	12
British Trade Union banners	50	59	9
Football	55	63	8

Cricket	41	48	7
Chicken Tikka Masala	41	45	4
Anglican churches	47	48	1
The TV personality Hardeep Kohli	43	43	0
BBC Asian Network	53	51	-2
The TV Series Goodness Gracious Me	44	41	-3
Rugby	70	67	-3
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	66	62	-4
The mix of different people living in Britain	67	61	-6
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	58	51	-7
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	53	44	-9
Punk-rock music	57	41	-16

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

From Table 21, I note several differences between the two Sikh groups. I have already shown that younger Sikhs are more likely to self-identify as English, hence the average age

is 36. This group is less likely to identify with institutions and community symbols, instead choosing popular social culture and erstwhile 'white' national sports. They are also less likely to choose the symbols on the survey as they only averaged 50/100 across all compared to 55/100 in older Sikhs. This lower national enthusiasm is mainly a function of age rather than Englishness. Furthermore, it has been observed in other groups and Western countries.

So, why is the younger subset of the community more bottom-up and non-statist in their national identity? As part of the explanation, an older Sikh's experience of national identity is closer to that of being settlers in Britain rather than England. In interviews, they often told me that they held British, not English, citizenship so they could not be English. Additionally, they are more likely to socialise and form personal relationships with like-minded citizens, many of whom will be from a similar ethnic group as themselves. For reasons such as these, they are much less secure in their national identity. One reason I add to this is the prejudice older Sikhs may have faced as either first or second-generation immigrants. Thus, their 'narrower' position on national identity becomes more understandable.

In contrast, I suggest from my interviews that a majority of younger Sikhs hold birthright citizenship and socialise with a wider range of ethnic groups. This includes whites who are more likely to self-identify as English than British. This influences younger Sikhs into Englishness by 'association', as most of them are now British-born and follow a less ethno-communitarian focused lifestyle. This gives rise to the concomitant phenomenon that 'proper English' identity could either be redefined in a non-ethnic manner, or rely on non-racial and more post-ethnic factors such as behaviour.

Given that the community is a young one, this entails the possibility that most Sikhs in England may one day call themselves English. This is a significant finding as it challenges ethno-national ideas of white Englishness noted by, amongst others, Back (1996) and Byrne (2006).

Younger Sikhs and White Englishness

Sikhs identifying as English is a complicated and interesting finding. This is because of the close connection between whiteness being if not a prerequisite, at least strongly associated with Englishness. This can be found in some of the literature I have already used by Leddy-Owen (2014) who discussed 'Reimagining Englishness' via race and in Phoenix (1997) or Garner (2009) more generally. Apart from this, it features regularly in my Sikh interviews and survey. For many Sikhs whiteness was a concern and even a 'barrier' to Sikhs calling themselves English. Since I have found that many Sikhs are beginning to feel English but are not thought of as English due to their Indian or Asian ethnicity, this issue of whiteness and Englishness stands out as a conundrum in my research. Indeed Bhabra (2021) found that Britishness was thought of by some Sikhs and Hindus as being about "white people doing white things" (p. 13).

For example, in the survey many Sikhs thought whiteness was a distinct feature of Britishness. However, they were less in agreement as to whether the reduction of the white majority would result in a loss of national distinctiveness. This was indicated by several interviewees. Of these, younger Sikhs, such as Sukhi, were least likely to consider white ethnicity a distinctive feature of Britishness. For them, a reduction in the white majority would not seriously affect British national identity. Some, such as Raj, even stated this population change would enhance national distinctiveness due to its complex pre-medieval migration history.

Therefore, theories of ethno-national identity, in which nations are bound by shared heritage including language, faith, and common ethnic ancestry do not necessarily apply to Sikh perceptions of the boundaries of Englishness, proving it an important exception. Comparing Sikhs to other South Asian ethnic minority groups such as Pakistani/Bangladeshi Muslims or Indian Hindus showed indeed that Sikhs are more distinctive in that the other two religious communities were somewhat more likely to self-identify as British rather than English, across all age groups. Viewed conceptually, the Sikh case is an exception and thus an important finding. It supports the idea that mono-ethnic national identity may abate somewhat in liberal progressive societies during long periods of peacetime.³⁷

Having already used Leddy-Owen extensively to illustrate my point about exceptionalism and how some younger Sikhs are defying existing theoretical predictions, here I present two other examples of minority identity politics in practice. The first is ‘British Englishness’ whilst the second is multicultural nationalism.

Younger Sikhs and ‘British Englishness’

I have already shown the resurgence of Englishness in public life. It stands out in areas such as sports, political governance, language proficiency and other such regional culture. In amongst this, the research on English folk music introduced the idea of ‘British Englishness’ (Keegan-Phillips, 2017). This term was used to describe the resurgence of an historically-rooted, ethnically pure music genre by contemporary English folk musicians

³⁷ Despite this, it is equally important to note that it is still only a minority of young Sikhs that identify as English. Most of them remain simply British, an aspect which accords with existing literature. As further caution, I acknowledge it is beyond the scope of this study to show if the white British conception of Englishness has expanded – even though it may have for some of the Sikhs I survey.

seeking ‘uniqueness’ in amongst the plethora of British music. This regional music assertion can also be seen in the increased popularity of pop music in the Welsh language. I appreciate that these cases may appear oxymoronic when applied to Sikhs, given that they are not considered ethnically English, or perhaps even ethnically British. However, it serves me well in offering a part-explanation for Sikh Englishness. This is for two reasons. Firstly, younger Sikhs have begun to call themselves English as they are born in England and secondly, adding ‘British’ invokes ethnic diversity, including the four-nation kind. So, for this group, there is no contradiction given that the terms English and British are imbued with the same rights and freedoms. Secondly, If I take into account that the vast majority of Sikhs are second or third generation English-born, then I begin to understand why this idea appeals in describing them.

Simply put, they can maintain the same juridical privileges as older Sikhs and, in addition, they can also express their attachment to a specific localised culture, not the official ‘supra’ national British one. In the interviews this was very prevalent. In some cases, it was used as a tool of acculturation and integration, whilst in others it reinforced birth rights to Englishness. This was the case with Sukhi from Hounslow and Sarbdeep who lived in Cornwall. For these Sikhs, it may simply be a case of the children of immigrants coming of age, as Lee (2012) states. However, it may also reflect society-wide changes as I describe next.

Younger Sikhs, Englishness, and Multicultural Nationalism

During the campaign leading up to the Scottish referendum in 2014, a group of researchers sought to understand nationalism amongst ethnic and religious minority youth groups. At the end of the research, they concluded that, in the main, amongst young Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus there was an “openness and inclusivity...which are rarely associated with

nationalism elsewhere” (Botterill et al, 2014, p. 128). For example, they found that all groups were involved in the ‘othering’ of Englishness, thus creating a strong bond of Scottishness. A non-discriminatory campaign by all political parties was also a factor in increasing the subjects feeling Scottishness was a civic, rather than an ethnic national identity. This latter aspect may indicate that top-down policy is still be an important instrument in situations of fluctuating nationhood.

Scottish minority ethnic youth subjects talked about lived experiences shaping their national identity, summing this up well in the phrase “intimacy-geopolitics” (Botterill et al, 2014, p. 132). This case study research gives substance to the same idea in the younger Sikhs researched here. For these Sikhs, like the Scottish youth, their national identity was dependent on social, familial, personal and occupational networks, rather than institutional forces such as schools or government. Even though in the Scottish case, political leadership had inculcated a bottom-up swell of nationhood. As such, this similarity further supports the theory that underpins my thesis, namely that ‘nationalism from below’ is emerging as the more powerful of factors in national identity formation and maintenance among Britain’s Sikhs.

So, both the preceding Scotland and England case studies show that complexity of symbolic constructions of personal nationhood ought to be a strong consideration when thinking about how British national identity is contested. The theory helps explain the relative prevalence of Englishness in younger Sikhs and Britishness in older ones. Additionally, they show that my work has precedents in Britain, supporting my contention that the content of Sikh hostland national identity can indeed differ by age.

Conclusion

At the start of this chapter, my own survey data was used to show that Sikh British national identity is not simple but complex. I then showed that many factors, collated into themes, affect the content of this group's national identity. These include place of birth, social and personal circles, family structures, place of residence and age. In the main part of the chapter, my analyses suggested that of these, age is key to predicting variation in Sikh Britishness. Even though there are exceptions, younger Sikhs leaned toward a more popular, English-oriented Britishness and older Sikhs toward state-led Britishness.

In this respect, a further characteristic, and perhaps a reason why these two groups differ, is that younger Sikhs form national identity horizontally – toward popular culture, whilst older ones form it vertically to the state. One result of this is that younger Sikhs are more likely to feel English than older Sikhs. This is the critical finding in this chapter, that more young than old Sikhs may in fact be English, an identity erstwhile associated with white British groups.

Whilst the importance of this finding is new to British Sikh identity studies, it has precedents in other minority and majority nationalism studies, for example in different ethnic groups striving for national unity during the recent Scottish independence referendum campaign (Botterill, Hopkins, Sanghera and Arshad, 2016). Another such study is Kaufmann's (2017) research where he considers the possibility of disparate ethnic groups coming together through localised contact points.

In addition, Brubaker (2004) writes that any group within an 'umbrella' national identity may break away from that national identity if "practical categories" are more important on a daily basis (2006, p. 14). So, for example, an English person in Berwick-upon-Tweed

may behave more Scottish if the local cultural idioms are strongly Scottish in their nature (McCrone, 1998 and 2015; Kiely, McCrone and Bechhofer, 2015).

This kind of shift echoes the ‘lived experiences’ I find in England’s Sikhs who veer away from Britishness towards Englishness. This finding is thus a rebuttal of research such as that by Bond (2017); Karlsen and Nazroo (2015) or Nandi and Platt (2015) who argue that minority ethnic groups exhibit high levels of Britishness but not sub-state national identity. In Bond’s work only 16 per cent of Sikhs in England were found to identify as English. Given that these researchers use the 2011 census but are not sensitive to age, I surmise that this thesis has revealed a very recent and previously unnoticed development amongst Sikhs and perhaps other minority groups in Britain.

Returning to Brubaker’s (2004) work on ‘ethnicity without groups’, I find its importance to my findings on Englishness illuminating. It is thus worthwhile reproducing his list of what I term ‘experiential’ categories here. These were “cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, commonsense knowledge, organizational routines and resources, discursive frames, institutionalized forms, political projects, contingent events and variable groupness” (2004, p. 186). So, reversing this logic, an ethnic group not considered part of the country’s ethno-national identity, such as Sikhs and Englishness, may in due course fall into the routine of Brubaker’s practical categories and align themselves closer to that national identity, which in this case is Englishness. In this sense, Englishness is not a sharp category but a matter of degree. Hence, Englishness amongst Sikhs in England has become the dialectical process Bond (2017) alluded to when discussing the limitations of quantitative data. Hence, stronger evidence (than that in the survey) is found in the interview data.

Herein lies the fundamental discovery in my chapter and thesis. That many Sikhs, as non-whites, consider themselves English. This shows the strong desire in this group, and particularly among their youth, to cross the ethno-national 'line'. Older Sikhs will, in the main, remain British rather than English. Given the youthful nature of the community, it predicts the continued rise of Sikh Englishness. I consider this robust evidence to support my thesis that, at present, age is the most influential factor in predicting variation in the content of Sikh Britishness.

This concludes my chapter on self-collected data and age-related complexity in Sikh Britishness.

Chapter Five: Age and Britishness Amongst White British Groups:

A Comparison with Sikhs

Introduction

In this chapter I seek to place age-related national identity variation amongst Britain's Sikhs against similar differences within white British groups. This follows on from the finding in the last chapter that Englishness was on the rise amongst Sikhs in Britain – especially amongst younger members of the community.³⁸ By testing British Sikh national identity against that of white contemporaries in this manner, two results emerge. First, this youthful Sikh Englishness is not part of a society-wide phenomenon. Secondly, variation in white British national identity is much less likely to be a correlate of age. Therefore, I find age-related differences in the content of Sikh Britishness to be unique.

As with the Sikh survey, I employed an online tool to gauge the white British response. The format and methodology of the survey remained the same. After some basic demographic questions, a sliding scale tool was used to rate the respondents' 'sentiment' towards different symbols of Britishness. This follows Kaufmann's (2018) schema, designed to elicit affective attachments towards particular symbols within the national myth-symbol corpus. For the white British sample, a small number of Sikh community-based symbols were excluded from the questionnaire, leaving most as probes of the majority group's national identity. This broad overlap allowed for a useful like for like comparison. The full survey form can be found in Appendix 3.

³⁸ I note that British remains the identity of the majority of Sikhs in Britain, However, it is of interest that Englishness attracted over 43 per cent of Sikhs in my survey, most prominently amongst those under the age of 40.

Structure of the Chapter

The chapter is structured as follows. Using the England and Wales Census of 2011 and a 2018 BBC/YouGov survey, I show the nature of national identity among various ethnic groups. In particular I draw attention to the difference in age-related Englishness and Britishness between white and Sikh Britons. Next, I present the symbols data from my survey. Here, I first show the comparative differences by symbol for Sikhs and whites. Second, I discuss symbols that drew disparate responses from the two ethnic groups. To illustrate this, I focus on how the Remain v. Leave EU referendum vote distinguishes competing forms of national identity among white Britons, but not among Sikhs. I highlight this by analysing white Remainers on their marked difference from both white Leavers and Sikhs in their low appraisal of racial appearance as a feature of British national distinctiveness.

Having shown that whites and Sikhs differ significantly in their national identity, I proceed to present cluster analysis for whites and Sikhs, showing that differing symbol sets make up each group's national identity. As evidence on the statistical relevance of the findings, I then present regression tables to support the impact of individual factors in accounting for different forms of national identity among white Britons. This allows me to conclude that the differences in white Britons' English national identity result from factors not found among Sikhs in respect of their English national identity. The divergent variable sets, therefore, provide evidence that age is an important differentiator of type of national identity amongst Sikhs but not white Britons. An aspect that becomes apparent when I compare Englishness amongst Sikh and white youth using the 2018 BBC/YouGov survey.

White British and Sikh National Identity in Public Surveys

I begin with data on the relative strength of English and British alternatives among white Britons and Sikhs in England. The 2011 census showed that, amongst the three major ethnic groups, white British groups (ethnic English, Scottish and Welsh) formed 88 per cent of the population in England that identify as English or British only – that means excluding those who state they are British and English, or of foreign nationality. Each ethnic group’s respective national identities in England are enumerated in Table 22.

Table 22
Englishness and Britishness by Ethnic Group in England

	English Only	British Only	Percentage of Total Population
All England	76%	24%	100%
White	83%	17%	88%
Mixed	60%	40%	2%
Asian	17%	83%	7%
Black	27%	73%	3%

Source: Office for National Statistics, (2016): 2011 Census aggregate data. UK Data Service (Edition: June 2016); UK Data Service. (N=56,075,912).

Furthermore, whites expressed high levels of Englishness (83 per cent), whilst Asians (including Sikhs) had fairly low levels of “English only” sentiment. There was a reverse trend between the two groups’ sense of British identity, with this foremost for just 17 per

cent of whites and 83 per cent of Asians. A similar, if less pronounced, trend can be seen for black Britons in the same data.

White English National Identity in Public Surveys

When four-nation regional identities from the same census are analysed, Englishness (English-only identity) amongst white British groups in England and Wales was very high (72 per cent). It is fairly low amongst Sikhs (15 per cent). As a comparison, the same figure – across all ethnic groups - is 67 per cent for Welsh-only identity in Wales and 71 per cent for Scottish-only identity in Scotland. Even when combined with British (another census option), affirmative responses were lower among Sikhs, who preferred a superordinate and non-nationally hyphenated British identity. Despite this Sikh ‘proclivity’ towards British rather than English identity, the 2011 census still provides a strong foundation and justification for my research into non-white Englishness. This is because Sikh Englishness (15 per cent) is clearly visible in current national datasets such as the 2011 census.


Given the close connection between whiteness and Englishness shown earlier in this thesis, I find Sikh Englishness an ‘extraordinary’ development. This is due to the relatively high levels of English identity in the Sikh survey I fielded (43 per cent). Since only a very small percentage of Sikhs self-identify as white, it is feasible that I have uncovered a newer phase of Sikh British national identity development. Furthermore, as predicted by Kaufmann (2018), this could be extended to many other non-white minorities in Britain, thereby suggesting an increasing porousness of the English nationality category.

As further background to Englishness in England, the 2018 BBC/YouGov survey revealed that 85 per cent of white Britons in England feel either “very strongly” or “fairly strongly” English. The equivalent figure for black and minority ethnic groups (BAME) – including Sikhs - is 45 per cent. So, while lower for Sikhs, a substantial number still identify as

English. On age, an interesting correlate emerges when it is cross-tabulated against Englishness. A snapshot of the strength of Englishness by age in the total population can be seen in Figure 31.

Figure 31

Strength of Feeling English by Age across all Ethnic Groups in YouGov/BBC Survey



Percentage of Respondents

Sources: YouGov / BBC Survey (9th March to 26th March 2018). (N=20,081).

So, the older the respondent, the greater the likelihood of them being proudly English. Whilst the figures above are for all ethnic groups, given that whites form a majority of the sample, I find that age plays a role in the degree of pride in white Englishness. Yet the notion that younger people have less national pride is a general finding in a number of western countries and may not provide much information on the content of national identification.

Having theorised that there may be different factors affecting national identity within the white British group, I analyse the role of age in this group, since, as I found in the previous chapter, this is important when identifying variation in Sikhs' hostland national identities. I begin by profiling the online white British study survey and then move to compare the role of age in Britishness and Englishness in Sikh and white groups.

White British Study Survey: Methodology and Profile

Undertaken in June 2019 via the online platform Prolific Academic, my custom survey received 100 responses. The age-range of the respondents was 19 to 70, averaging 36. All were British citizens and self-identified as white British. A very small minority of responses were from Scotland, Wales and foreign countries. There were 73 female respondents and a large percentage of Remain voters – 58. Only a small percentage (7 per cent) did not have parents born in the UK.

Overall, 51 per cent self-identified as British and 34 per cent as English. The average age of these groups was 35 and 34, respectively. As this is an opt-in survey using a crowdsourcing platform, the survey is skewed towards young and liberal respondents. There were only a few Conservative voters, and most felt that Britain is a diverse nation of immigrants rather than a nation of white Protestant natives. The average national sentiment rating across all the symbols was 58/100, slightly higher than the Sikh survey of 53/100. As further context, the average age in the respective surveys was 36 for whites and 43 for Sikhs.

Having profiled the survey respondents, the next part of the chapter covers variation in symbols of nationhood by respondent characteristic. This starts by examining symbolic variation in the content of national identity by ethnic group. Here I show that age – as central to my thesis on Sikhs - plays a less significant role amongst white British respondents. I begin with an overview of the symbols and then focus on those that

produced age gap-related responses among Sikhs to understand if they engendered the same among white British respondents.

Overview of Symbols of Britishness in White British Survey

By looking at the average rating of the responses on a 0-100 ‘thermometer’ for specific symbols among white Britons, I rank the symbols in order of their importance for national identity (see Table 23). This is the same method used previously in my Sikh survey. Recall that this question relates to understanding how ‘British’ people felt when they thought about these symbols, rather than simply asking them whether they liked these symbols.

Table 23

Average Sentiment Rating of Symbols of Britishness in Study Survey of White Britons

Symbol of Britishness	Average Sentiment
The National Health Service	86
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	77
The National Trust	77
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	76
Drinking Tea	75
The Royal family	75
The mix of different people living in Britain	64

The overseas regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	63
Rugby	61
Cricket	59
Football	59
BBC Radio 4	52
British Trade Union banners	45
Punk-rock music	44
The singer Freddie Mercury	43
Anglican churches	43
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	38
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	37
Chicken Tikka Masala	35

Source: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100).

This shows that symbols such as rural geography, language, and British institutions were highly valued as reference points for national identity. More contemporary or pop culture symbols were not as popular. The low rating seen for Anglican churches could be

attributed to the relatively young average age of the survey respondents as they are less likely to be religious. Chicken Tikka Masala attracted a low rating – much as I noted amongst Sikhs. Overall, the symbols proved to have very different degrees of popularity, as 51 points separate the top and bottom-ranked symbols. The corresponding figure was 29 in the custom Sikh survey, making the white group 75 per cent more variegated than Sikhs.

Age and Symbols in White and Sikh British Surveys

Having seen how whites rated the symbols, I next compare Sikh and white British groups by their respective attachment to symbols of Britishness. I start with the average sentiment rating for each group. Within this there are some surprises, such as the royal family’s lower rating among Sikhs or the higher rating Sikhs accord to rugby. The ethno-specific difference in ratings for each symbol can be seen in Table 24, which is sorted by inter-ethnic differences.

Table 24

Comparison of Symbol Sentiment Rating between Sikhs and Whites in Study Surveys

White British	Average Sentiment Rating	Sikh	Average Sentiment Rating	Difference
The Royal family	75	The Royal family	46	-29
Drinking Tea	75	Drinking Tea	47	-28
The National Trust	77	The National Trust	52	-25
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	76	Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	54	-22

The National Health Service	86	The National Health Service	66	-20
Cricket	59	Cricket	45	-14
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	77	The English language, spoken in a regional accent	65	-12
Football	59	Football	60	1
The mix of different people living in Britain	64	The mix of different people living in Britain	64	0
Anglican churches	43	Anglican churches	47	4
Punk-rock music	44	Punk-rock music	49	5
Chicken Tikka Masala	35	Chicken Tikka Masala	43	8
Rugby	61	Rugby	70	9
British Trade Union banners	45	British Trade Union banners	54	9
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	37	The London 'Ali G'-style accent	47	10
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	38	The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	55	17

Source: White British National Identity Survey (June 2019). (N=100).

First of all, it is noteworthy that the average ‘warmth’ towards these symbols among white Britons was 60, whereas for Sikhs this was lower, at 54. This may reflect a somewhat

stronger symbolic attachment to nationhood across these dimensions among white Britons, though the sample size is too small to confirm that this is significant. Even so, there are other important differences that emerge. A set of elite and/or rural symbols such as the “Royal Family”, “National Trust” or landscape rank lower for Sikhs than white Britons. These appear in the top half of Table 24.

More South Asian-inflected symbols (Chicken tikka, Ali-G accent) were rated somewhat higher by Sikhs. Curiously, the physical appearance of the ethnic majority ranks higher (55) for Sikhs than white Britons (38), an example of what Kaufmann (2018) terms minority ‘ethno-traditional’ nationalism. This could also reflect majority liberal unease around identifying with whiteness, as noted in America (Jardina, 2019) – indeed, white Leave voters resemble Sikhs on this measure whereas white Remain voters rank considerably lower.

Are younger respondents different for both ethnic groups? Combining Sikh and white respondents, younger respondents across both ethnic groups rated pop-culture markers higher than institutional symbols, and vice versa for the elderly. Table 25 shows the overall comparison.

Table 25

Comparing Joint Symbol Sentiment Rating by Age in Sikh and White British Study Surveys

Symbol of Britishness	Average for Younger Sikh and White British Groups	Average for Older Sikh and White British Groups	Difference in Sentiment Rating
The National Trust	59	76	17
The National Health Service	69	82	13
Football	56	67	11
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	60	69	10
Cricket	48	57	9
Chicken Tikka Masala	33	42	9
The Royal family	53	61	8
Anglican churches	44	52	8
Drinking Tea	58	61	3
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	70	72	2
British Trade Union banners	49	47	-2
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	45	40	-5
Rugby	66	60	-6
The mix of different people living in Britain	63	54	-9
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	50	42	-9
Punk-rock music	53	42	-11

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

The table shows that older respondents regardless of ethnicity were more patriotic as they generally had a higher rating across most symbols. This was especially true for elite or traditional symbols such as the NHS, National Trust and cricket. By contrast, ethnic characteristics, be this the mix of people or the racial appearance of whites, ranked higher among young than old – though the latter finding was more driven by the Sikh respondents. Subsequent work will investigate which of these differences are statistically significant from what might have occurred by chance.

I next compare the age gaps for each symbol by average survey age separately for the Sikh and white British surveys. Amongst Sikhs, Table 26 shows the symbols that resulted in the widest age-gap.

Table 26

Evaluation of Symbols of Britishness by Age in Study Sikh Survey

Symbol	Sentiment Rating for those aged 42 and below	Sentiment Rating for those aged above 42	Difference between Age Groups
The Royal Family	36	56	20
The National Health Service	58	75	17
The National Trust	45	61	16
The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	48	63	15
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	47	61	14

Drinking Tea	41	54	13
Chicken Tikka Masala	38	50	12
Football	55	65	10
The TV Series Goodness Gracious Me	38	46	8
Anglican churches	43	51	8
British Trade Union banners	52	56	4
Cricket	44	46	2
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	65	64	-1
BBC Asian Network	53	52	-1
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	56	54	-2
The London 'Ali G'- style accent	49	45	-4
The mix of different people living in Britain	65	60	-5

The TV personality Hardeep Kohli	45	40	-5
Rugby	73	66	-7
Punk-rock music	53	44	-9

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Thus, older Sikhs rated institutional symbols higher whilst younger Sikhs were more likely to choose popular symbols such as punk-rock music, regional accents and rugby to reflect their British national identity (though differences are not large and will be tested for significance).

I next present age-divided data on the white British sample. Using the average age for this group, Table 27 shows the differences between whites on either side of this divide. Once again, older respondents were more attached across most symbols, especially elite institutions or older traditions.

Table 27

Evaluation of Symbols of Britishness by Age in Study White British Survey

Symbol	Sentiment Amongst those aged 36 and below	Sentiment Amongst those aged over 36	Difference between Age Groups
The singer Freddie Mercury	34	53	19
Cricket	53	66	13
British Trade Union banners	41	49	8
BBC Radio 4	48	56	8
Chicken Tikka Masala	32	39	7
Anglican churches	40	46	6
The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	36	40	4
Football	58	61	3
The National Trust	76	79	3
Rugby	60	62	2

The mix of different people living in Britain	63	64	1
The overseas regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	63	63	0
Punk-rock music	45	42	-3
The National Health Service	88	85	-3
The Royal Family	77	73	-4
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	78	74	-4
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	81	74	-7
Drinking Tea	79	71	-8
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	41	33	-8

Source: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100).

In Table 27 I note that there were key pop cultural differences at either end of the scale (enumerated in column 4). So, Freddie Mercury, the 1980s British pop music artist, was more popular with older respondents, while the 'Ali G'-style London accent was more

popular with younger citizens. However, the difference between the age groups for both symbols was quite different with the London accent drawing much less disparity in value.

The preceding analysis highlights some important differences and similarities between Sikhs and white British, and between the young and old within each ethnic group. Table 28 summarises the main ethnic differences in symbolic age-gradation between Sikhs and white Britons.³⁹ These lie with the monarchy, tea, the NHS and overseas regiments, where age differences were much larger among Sikhs. On the other hand, attachment to cricket as a national symbol seems to be linked to age among white Britons but not Sikhs. Beyond a mild youth preference for punk rock and the Ali-G accent as compared to elders, there was little in the way of a common youthful form of national identity among Sikh and white British youth.

Table 28

Comparing Age Differences by Symbol between Sikhs and Whites in Study Surveys

Sikhs		White British		
Symbol	Difference between Age Groups	Symbol	Difference between Age Groups	Difference of Difference
The Royal Family	20	The Royal family	-4	24
Drinking Tea	13	Drinking Tea	-8	21

³⁹ I have not included an equivalent to the following symbols from the Sikh survey as they do not have direct equivalents in the white British survey: *Goodness Gracious Me*, BBC Asian Network and Hardeep Kohli. These are all marked in the white British column as ‘null’ and are italicised for clarity.

The National Health Service	17	The National Health Service	-3	20
Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	14	Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms	-4	18
The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	15	The overseas regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars	0	15
The National Trust	16	The National Trust	3	13
The TV Series <i>Goodness Gracious Me</i>	8	Null	Null	Null
Football	10	Football	3	7
The English language, spoken in a regional accent	-1	The English language, spoken in a regional accent	-7	6
Chicken Tikka Masala	12	Chicken Tikka Masala	7	5
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	-4	The London 'Ali G'-style accent	-8	4
Anglican churches	8	Anglican churches	6	2
British Trade Union banners	4	British Trade Union banners	8	-4

The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	-2	The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair	4	-6
Punk-rock music	-9	Punk-rock music	-3	-6
The mix of different people living in Britain	-5	The mix of different people living in Britain	1	-6
Rugby	-7	Rugby	2	-9
<i>BBC Asian Network</i>	-1	<i>BBC Radio 4</i>	8	Null
Cricket	2	Cricket	13	-11
<i>The TV personality Hardeep Kohli</i>	-5	<i>The singer Freddie Mercury</i>	19	Null

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

At each extreme end of the table, the royal family divided Sikh sentiment the most by age whilst the singer Freddie Mercury divided white British sentiment the most by age. This simple analysis shows that the symbolic makeup of white Britishness is different to Sikh Britishness in two ways.

Firstly, various everyday symbols of nationhood attract different sentiment ratings among ethnic groups. Secondly, various sets of symbols appeal to each age group within the two ethnic groups. Overall, Sikhs show the largest division by age as the average of overall age

differences for symbols is 5.25 points whilst for whites it is only 1.94 points. This ‘average of difference’ between the age groups for each community shows that Sikhs are nearly three times more likely than whites to display age-related variation in the content of people’s Britishness where these symbols are concerned. Thus, the Sikh age dynamics seem distinct.

Based on this I next discuss symbols that underpin the larger ‘difference of differences’ between white British and Sikh groups. These are: royal family, food, overseas/Indian regiments, rugby, rurality, and the mix of people living in Britain. For the latter two symbols, I go further and compare how each age group among both Sikhs and whites voted in the 2016 EU referendum. As a technical point, I omit symbols that do not have a clear comparison between the two groups. For example, I used BBC Asian Network for Sikhs but used BBC Radio 4 for whites.

Age and Royal Family Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

White Britons have more affection for royalty than Sikhs – their average rating was 75/100 whilst Sikhs rated it at just 46/100. This is a surprise as recent migrant communities – especially those hailing from ex-South Asian British colonies - are known to express strong sentiment for institutional symbols. While this may be an artefact of the sample, given the lower average age of whites in the survey, I would have expected lower affinity for symbols such as the royal family among whites. All the same, amongst Sikhs there is a clear intragroup contrast to the white British on the royal family. Among Sikhs, age is a more influential factor in affecting whether the royal family forms an important part of people’s Britishness. Table 29 shows the large difference between the two age groups split across the average age.

Table 29

Age Comparison on Sentiment Rating for Royalty Between
Sikhs and Whites in Study Surveys

Sikhs	Sentiment Amongst those aged 42 and below	Sentiment Amongst those aged above 42	Difference between Age Groups
	36	56	20
White British	Sentiment Amongst those aged 36 and below	Sentiment Amongst those aged over 36	Difference between Age Groups
	77	73	-4
Difference of Difference			24

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

For Sikhs and perhaps other minority communities, age may be a more significant discriminant where Britishness and royalty are concerned. This may be related to their relatively recent mass migration and thus shorter settlement period. There is further evidence of this when Sikh interview data is considered. Here, many older Sikhs expressed strong attachment to institutional symbols of Britain. In contrast many younger Sikhs considered this as a postcolonial phenomenon with one youth using the phrase “...more British than the [white] British” to describe his father and grandfather. Simply put, older Sikhs are closer to the first generation, and are attached to elite symbols of Britishness. This may be similar to many other migrant groups hailing from the Commonwealth nations.

On the other hand, whilst older whites belong to a generation that was attached to royalty, they may have been more likely than Sikhs to have changed their perceptions post-war –

though the limited sample size makes it difficult to be sure. Class may be a factor too. In Billig's (1991) work on the royal family, he found that class had a profound influence on sixty-three English Midland families. Amongst them, occupations and newspaper readership both predicted the sentimental (and practical) value of Britain's Royal Family. Those in less well-paid occupations or who read tabloids rated the royal family highly.⁴⁰ However, it is important to note that no major class gradation was found in my white British survey.

Food Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

Where food is concerned, there is strong evidence that age is an important factor in Sikh Britishness but not white Britishness. First, Sikhs rated the two food symbols lower than whites — 46 as opposed to 55. Second, the average age-difference was lower among whites than Sikhs. Sikhs were divided not only in their sentiment overall on food symbols, but also individually by symbol. However, from the interview data and participant observation, I note that older British Sikhs did not generally view Britishness as connected to their food culture as compared to those with an Indian or African national identity. Whites and younger British-born Sikhs, on the other hand, did consider food — especially regional foods — a key part of national identity, both theirs and more conceptually.

As evidence of the importance of food to national identity among whites, the open response question in the white British survey elicited a full response on food. When asked to name additional symbols of Britishness, a list of food emerged that included the following: “gin”, “fish and chips”, “pies”, “cream scones”, “black pudding”, “haggis”, “roast

⁴⁰ Whilst acknowledging that Billig's work does not demarcate whites from non-whites clearly enough, it is logical that a majority would have been white British.

beef”, “cucumber sandwiches” and “roast dinner”. This is also reflected in research on Englishness and Britishness where partaking in a specific national food is tantamount to ‘being’ English or British. Leddy-Owen’s (2014) qualitative work shows this is prevalent amongst English-identifying whites who did not have a ‘competing’ food culture to consider. This is unlike many older Sikhs who identify as British not English, and mainly consume Indian food.

Age and Overseas / Indian Regiments Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

White Britons are much less likely than Sikhs to vary by age in their Britishness where non-British service personnel are concerned. In the survey there was no difference in the ratings between the two white age groups, whereas among Sikhs it was 15 points higher for older Sikhs. In addition, whites were more likely than Sikhs to be attached to this symbol as part of their national identity – they rated it at 63/100 on average as opposed to 56/100 among Sikhs. Among whites, this is somewhat surprising as, generally speaking, younger people – such as those in this survey - are both less attached to war-related iconography, and more likely to oppose war (Ender, Rohall and Matthews, 2015). Thus, I expected an age-split. However, the broad appeal of the symbol may indicate the ‘universal’ nature of Britain’s role in the World Wars. It may also be linked to the timing of the survey as the national commemoration of the beginning of the First World War was fairly recent.

For Sikhs, the result is much less surprising. I note from interviews and personal observations that younger Sikhs were much less likely to view the Indian Sikh soldiers as symbols of Britishness. As the survey showed, they are more likely not to allow their children to join the armed forces. As younger people are more likely to be liberal-minded and thus oppose war-based symbols, this is partly explicable.

Age and National Sports Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

In the last chapter, I noted that Sikhs can differ by age in their evaluation of rugby as part of their Britishness. Younger Sikhs were more likely to utilise it as part of their national identity than older Sikhs. For whites in Britain, there was a similar age split for cricket but much less so for football or rugby. Interestingly, in these three sports, there was little difference in the sports symbols' overall rating between Sikhs and white British groups (58/100 and 60/100).

Age is a slightly less of an influential factor in predicting the weight of sports for white Britons' national identity as compared to Sikhs. When the Sikh interview data is considered, this was particularly palpable for rugby across the two communities. Amongst Sikhs, I found that younger members of the community rated it comparatively highly. In the case of whites, age played a much less important role in determining whether rugby contributed to national identity. The interview data from the Sikh sample partially explains why there is an age divide amongst Sikhs. The sport has a more prestigious and less-working class status in Britain more generally, and in England in particular. Younger Sikhs, who are very likely to live in England, tended to rate the sport highly as a symbol of their everyday Britishness.

Age, Citizen Ethnic Mix, and Paleness Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

I also tested physical appearance and ethnic patterns as symbols of national identity. White respondents were asked to rate these two 'ethno-traditional' aspects of Britishness. First, I examined the extent to which the "mix of different people living in Britain" contributed toward people's sense of Britishness. Second, the degree to which the racial appearance of many white British people, notably "pale skin with blue eyes and red or light

hair”, informed their British identity.⁴¹ Both whites and Sikhs showed very little difference in sentiment on these items by age. Looking at the slight differences by age, older whites rated these higher than younger whites whereas among Sikhs, older Sikhs rated them lower than their younger co-ethnics. These differences were not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, though the effect was stronger among whites, with young whites less keen on racial appearance as a national symbol. In addition, on average, it is interesting that white groups rated this symbol significantly lower than Sikhs (38/100 versus 55/100).

The lower rating by whites can be linked to an idea by Kaufmann (2018) he calls ‘left-modernism’. Here, white racial appearance as tantamount to Britishness is considered ‘politically incorrect’ and is displaced by a more morally-acceptable notion of national identity. Given the lower age group of the white respondents, this fits the profile of liberal-minded young people not associating national identity with one ethnic group.

The statistics bear the above out where the younger-than-average respondents in both groups thought that paleness was less likely to be a symbol of Britishness. Amongst Sikhs the relatively high-rating (when compared to whites) can once again be explained by Kaufmann (2018) as the phenomenon of minorities identifying preponderant ethnic characteristics of the nation as part of their national identity (ethno-traditional nationalism). Here minority ethnic citizens recognise whiteness as a distinguishing feature of the whole, but not a membership criterion. It is seen as just one facet of British national identity among many, including diversity. This is not to say that Sikhs consider themselves white, instead they are comfortable with the notion that Britishness, and Englishness

⁴¹ The full set of questions is in Appendix 3.

especially, has a particular ethnic matrix compared to many other countries, in which a white majority is a distinguishing feature.

Paleness and the 2016 EU Referendum Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

The 2016 EU membership vote is important to my analysis of the symbol of the appearance of British people. Just as age is an important division within Sikhs, Brexit vote was a key divide among white Britons in the survey. For example, in the survey there was a large Brexit-related divide in rating the racial symbols among whites, but not for Sikhs. In Table 30 I begin by looking at the average age of Leave and Remain share of the vote in each ethnic group.

Table 30
Age Comparison between Sikhs and Whites on
2016 EU Referendum Vote in Study Surveys

	Sikh	White British
Average Age of Leavers	45	41
Average Age of Remainers	44	36

Source: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100). British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

In the above there is evidence that Sikh voting patterns in the referendum to leave the EU are much less likely to depend on age compared to white Britons. Younger whites leaned towards Remain compared to older whites, whereas younger Sikhs did not differ much on Brexit from older Sikhs.

When I used Brexit vote to parse the symbol of ‘pale’ appearance, the Brexit-related pattern among whites becomes clearer. Table 31 shows this.

Table 31

Comparison between Sikhs and Whites on Paleness
and the 2016 EU Referendum Vote in Study Surveys

White British	Average Rating of Paleness	Average Age
Remain	32	36
Leave	56	41
	-24	-5
Sikhs	Average Rating of Paleness	Average Age
Remain	53	44
Leave	56	45
	-3	-1

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

This shows that it is white Remainers (average rating 32) who are the outliers in the data and are driving the inter-ethnic difference on this symbol. To partly explain this, I can use the data on Sikh and white responses to levels of immigration.

As part of the questionnaire, I asked both sets of respondents the following question “In your opinion, should immigration to Britain be increased, left as is or reduced?”. When I

cross-tabulate replies to the EU membership vote and assess the age of each group, I find that younger whites were more likely to vote to remain in the EU and to call for current or increased immigration than older whites, who were more likely to have voted to leave the EU and to favour reduced immigration levels. Amongst Sikhs, this age-related pattern did not hold to any significant extent.

Turning to Hix, Kaufmann and Leeper (2019), there is support for the close connection between EU membership voting and attitudes to immigration found in my own surveys.⁴² Among Leavers, the desire to control immigrant numbers is so strong that they will sacrifice personal income to reduce immigration from the EU. Amongst the Leavers cited in this study, 70 per cent were willing to make some personal income sacrifices to reduce EU immigration, and 35 per cent were willing to pay the maximum of 5 per cent of their income. The overwhelming majority of Hix, Kaufmann and Leeper's sample are white British.

Another symbol that polled significantly differently between Sikhs and whites is rural landscape or rurality. I discuss this next.

Age and Rurality Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

This symbol drew out important differences in age-related national identity variation between the two ethnic groups. Whites rated rurality higher as a symbol, an aspect which accords with the findings from the June 2018 YouGov/BBC Englishness survey. In this survey, minorities were found to be 35 points less invested in rural landscape as a symbol of their Englishness. With white groups, this response may be explained through their

⁴² Hix, S., Kaufmann, E. and Leeper, T. J., (2019). Pricing immigration. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*. 8 (1). pp. 63–74.

longer settlement period and greater geographic dispersion compared to Sikhs who, like other British minorities, are heavily urbanised.

From the literature and through common British iconography, it is clear that landscape is ingrained in expressions of British nationhood, both past and present. Examples of this phenomenon include the ‘white cliffs of Dover’ that Readman (2014) describes as being more than just cliffs. Using National Trust comment books, he shows the depth of sentiment towards this particular landscape as follows “(T)hese are more than cliffs, they’re history, they’re habitat, they’re Britain...Historical, defiant, defensive, known world-wide, immortalised in song, bastion of strength, part of my home” (p. 269).

Similar to this are the lyrics to the popular song *Jerusalem* which reference the green pastures and clouded hills of rural Britain. Even whites who do not live in rural areas are familiar with this representation of British patriotism, having had it passed down from pre-war and post-war generations. This ‘universal’ appeal of rurality can be seen in the much higher rating given by whites when compared to Sikhs (76/100 and 54/100 respectively).

In addition, my surveys showed a considerably greater age gap among Sikhs than white Britons in attachment to the rural landscape as national symbol. This could be due to older Sikhs rating established or elite symbols like landscape higher than younger Sikhs.

Rurality and the 2016 EU Referendum Amongst Sikh and White British Groups

As with paleness, the EU referendum vote is also important for regulating attachment to rurality. Leavers were more likely than Remainers in the YouGov/BBC Englishness survey (of mostly white British respondents) to identify their Englishness with the landscape. The

young, being more Remain, were less attached to landscape. This pattern is found among the white British respondents in my data too, captured in Table 32.

Table 32

Comparison between Sikhs and Whites on Rurality
and the 2016 EU Referendum Vote in Study Surveys

White British	Average Rating of Rurality	Average Age
Remain	71	36
Leave	83	41
Difference	-12	-5
Sikhs	Average Rating of Rurality	Average Age
Remain	61	44
Leave	55	45
Difference	6	-1

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Here again, the Brexit divide looms larger among white Britons when it comes to driving the content of national identity. Rural dwellers among the white majority are older and were likely to have voted to leave the EU, so there is some connection with age here as seen in Table 32.

This closes the section analysing data on symbolic attachment between the British ethnic majority and Sikhs. Here I showed that significant differences by age exist in the symbolic identity signatures of Sikhs and white Britons. Next, I subject the white British survey data

to statistical tests. This helps to refine the observations made from cross-tabular data and reveals thematic clustering amongst the symbols. As a precursor to this testing, I briefly compare themes in white and Sikh data in order to understand any grouping in the symbolic content of each group's British national identity.

Themes in White British Survey Data

Here I present some of the prominent themes from the cluster analysis. I do this to further understand what factors can reliably predict variation in a white Briton's form of national identity. This builds on the finding in the last chapter that age is useful in predicting the content and thus variation in Sikh Britishness. Amongst whites, the following themes stand out due to their higher-than-average factor loadings: institutions, national sports, citizen ethnic mix, food, geography, and language. The component symbols for each composite variable, or factor, are listed in Figure 32.

Figure 32

Factor Analysis of White British National Identity in Study White British Survey

Factor	Component Symbol
Institution	The Royal family
Institution	The National Trust
Institution	The National Health Service
Institution	Anglican churches
Institution	British Trade Union banners
Institution	The overseas regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars
Institution	BBC Radio 4
National Sports	Cricket
National Sports	Football
National Sports	Rugby
Ethnic Mix	The mix of different people living in Britain
Ethnic Mix	The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair
Food	Drinking Tea
Food	Chicken Tikka Masala
Pop Culture	Punk-rock music
Pop Culture	The London 'Ali G'-style accent
Geography	Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms
Language	The English language, spoken in a regional accent

Source: White British National Identity Survey (June 2019). (N=100).

To further highlight the importance of my findings, I subjected the white British data to cluster analysis, thereby establishing the statistical relevance of symbol groupings.

Cluster Evaluation of Symbols in White British Survey

As with the Sikh survey, the 100 responses to the 20 symbols created a large volume of information. Factor analysis is used to help group and collate symbols. The resulting 'clusters' now represent data-driven themes of how many respondents feel about Britishness. In simple numerical terms, Table 33 shows factor loadings for the principal components.

Table 33

Cluster Evaluation of British Symbols in Study White British Survey


Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Uniqueness
The Royal Family	0.4748	0.4945	0.0351	0.0280	-0.3987	0.1768	0.3378
British Army Overseas Regiments	0.3192	0.6436	-0.0518	-0.1503	0.1412	0.2946	0.3519
Regional English Language	0.0633	0.2165	0.1101	0.0666	0.0058	0.7877	0.3121
Paleness in Britishness	0.3240	-0.0262	0.5174	-0.0981	0.1389	0.4254	0.4167
Drinking Tea	0.4178	0.1584	0.2661	0.0926	-0.6077	0.2427	0.2928
Punk-rock music	0.0894	0.1107	0.6739	0.4240	0.1571	0.0629	0.3173
The Mix of People in Britain	0.0410	0.1091	0.0868	0.8543	-0.0439	0.0621	0.2433
Anglican Churches	0.5245	0.3516	0.2492	-0.1407	0.2249	-0.117	0.4551
Chicken Tikka Masala	0.3014	0.0618	0.1355	0.6196	0.2429	-0.2863	0.3622
Cricket	0.8663	0.1343	0.1339	0.0845	0.0466	-0.0834	0.1973
Football	0.7846	0.1444	0.0607	0.161	-0.0135	0.1375	0.3148
Rugby	0.8238	0.1288	0.0423	0.0727	0.1181	0.109	0.2719
British Trade Union Banners	0.3622	0.2374	0.1115	-0.0065	0.6588	0.1388	0.3467
The National Health Service	0.1072	0.6622	-0.0681	0.5313	-0.0076	0.2397	0.2056
The National Trust	0.0499	0.8657	0.1288	0.1767	0.0786	-0.0649	0.1898
BBC Radio 4	0.3098	0.4842	0.4061	0.0792	0.218	-0.3618	0.3199
London 'Ali G'-style accent	0.0759	0.0969	0.8255	0.0138	-0.1234	0.0413	0.2863
Rural Britain	0.2534	0.6915	0.1705	-0.015	-0.1239	0.2111	0.3684
Freddie Mercury	0.2887	0.0615	0.1009	0.3178	0.6091	0.0995	0.4208

Source: White British National Identity Survey (June 2019). (N=100).

The scree plot in Figure 33 shows that the first factor is by far the most important, accounting for a very large amount of the variation in the data.

Figure 33

Scree plot of Eigen Values after Factor in Study White British Survey



Source: White British National Identity Survey (June 2019). (N=100).

From the table and figure above the following clusters emerge. First is factor 1 or ‘hi sports’ grouping that loads around the national sports of cricket, rugby and football. This is by far the most important cluster, accounting for 38 per cent of the variation. Factor 2 I label ‘elite/established’ symbols. This is centred on the National Trust, NHS, the overseas regiments in the British army, BBC Radio 4, and rural Britain. Of these two clusters, the symbols in the first factor explain a much larger share of the variance in the data than the second, which accounts for just 15 per cent of the variation. The remaining symbols do not explain much of the variation in the data.

Having looked at the clustering of symbols in the white British group, I move to the Sikh cluster analysis to uncover any similarities and differences. Sikh factor analysis appears in Table 34, with a scree plot in Figure 34.

Table 34


Cluster Evaluation of British Symbols in Study Sikh Survey

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Uniqueness
The Royal Family	0.7224	0.0435	0.01	0.2352	0.0531	0.0783	0.4119
The Indian Regiments	0.7745	-0.0353	0.0496	0.1033	-0.1616	-0.1601	0.334
The Regional English Language	0.1168	0.1149	0.0598	0.1379	-0.0034	0.8321	0.2582
Paleness in Britishness	-0.0522	0.0163	0.7848	-0.0171	0.0028	0.3018	0.2898
Drinking Tea	0.4353	-0.0106	0.2607	0.3749	0.4009	0.0605	0.4375
Punk-rock music	-0.1795	0.6441	0.2211	0.3197	0.016	0.2946	0.3148
The TV Series Goodness Gracious Me	0.123	0.4021	0.1742	0.5648	0.3533	0.0046	0.3489
The Mix of People in Britain	0.0798	0.0406	0.0562	0.6957	-0.1982	0.3084	0.3704
Anglican Churches	0.3739	0.7075	-0.0354	0.1451	0.0033	-0.0919	0.3289
Chicken Tikka Masala	0.3156	0.4475	0.1791	0.4527	0.2911	-0.1051	0.3674
Cricket	0.2684	0.349	0.3372	-0.1184	0.3751	-0.3224	0.4338
Football	0.1516	0.093	-0.0071	0.0076	0.8852	0.0122	0.1845
Rugby	-0.011	0.6634	0.1296	-0.1826	0.1811	0.4248	0.2964
British Trade Union Banners	0.5286	0.5052	0.163	-0.0425	0.1058	0.0583	0.4224
The National Health Service	0.7258	0.0362	-0.2458	0.1533	0.3471	-0.0081	0.2673
The National Trust	0.6735	0.1448	0.3543	-0.0522	0.2561	0.1398	0.3121
BBC Asian Network	0.1201	-0.0257	0.6253	0.448	0.125	-0.1017	0.3673
The London 'Ali G'-style accent	-0.1461	0.4737	0.5619	0.2371	0.1633	-0.0925	0.3471
Rural Britain	0.7012	0.1458	-0.0446	-0.1425	0.2262	0.235	0.3584
Hardeep Kohli	0.1138	0.3013	0.6897	0.0695	-0.1193	-0.1091	0.3897

Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Figure 34

Scree plot of Eigen Values after Factor in Study Sikh Survey



Source: British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Based on the above, two significant clusters emerge for Sikhs, those of ‘royal/highbrow’ (factor 1) and ‘sport/pop culture’ (factor 2). The former corresponds to factor 2 in the white British data referring to ‘elite/established’ symbols. The latter is more eclectic, featuring some pop cultural and everyday symbols such as punk rock, rugby, the Ali G accent. It somewhat corresponds to the ‘hi-sports’ factor amongst whites. In cross-tabulating age against average scores for these two factors, young and native-born Sikhs seem less attached to both the ‘royal/highbrow’ and Asian community symbols.

Secondarily, these youth are somewhat more attached to ‘multicultural/pop cultural’ aspects (factor 3) such as punk rock music but this is a weaker latent variable.

Comparatively, amongst whites the ‘hi sports’ grouping that loads around the national sports of cricket, rugby and football is most important whilst the second most important is ‘elite/established’.

Given the relatively small sample groups for whites and Sikhs, we can say that these two groups show significant distinctiveness in symbolic clustering apart from the fact that one sub-group in each ethnic group is attached to 'elite/established' symbols of England. Among Sikhs this is closely related to age whilst for whites there is much less of an age pattern.

From the foregoing, I can speak of several macro-factors aggregating the individual responses. These are related to major subject themes among the survey questions as shown in Figure 35.

Figure 35

Factor Analysis of White British National Identity in Study White British Survey

Factor	Component Symbol
Institution	The Royal family
Institution	The National Trust
Institution	The National Health Service
Institution	Anglican churches
Institution	British Trade Union banners
Institution	The overseas regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars
Institution	BBC Radio 4
National Sports	Cricket
National Sports	Football
National Sports	Rugby
Ethnic Mix	The mix of different people living in Britain
Ethnic Mix	The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair
Food	Drinking Tea
Food	Chicken Tikka Masala
Pop Culture	Punk-rock music
Pop Culture	The London 'Ali G'-style accent
Geography	Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms
Language	The English language, spoken in a regional accent

Source: White British National Identity Survey (June 2019). (N=100).

Seven themes are apparent in the questions. These are summarised as: institutions, national sports, citizen ethnic mix, regional differences, and food. The clusters are related to these themes but not quite the same.

Age Variation Amongst Sikh and White British Clusters

To illustrate the different impact of age on symbolic attachments among the Sikh and white British groups, I make it part of the cluster analysis. The critical factor 1, which accounts for by far the most variation in the data, I term 'traditional Britishness' as it incorporates royal and highbrow symbols as well as institutional symbols such as the NHS. Younger Sikhs were much less likely than younger whites to select traditional symbols of Britishness as important for their British national identity. Table 35 shows how the different variables load onto this factor. There is much less of an age-related gradation amongst whites as I evidence in Table 35 where the age variable ("Year of Birth") in the bottom row carries a lower coefficient of -0.14 compared to -0.38 for Sikhs.

Table 35

Loading of British Symbols onto Traditional Britishness Factor Among
Sikhs and Whites by Year of Birth in Study Surveys


Factor 1: Traditional Britishness		
Variable	Sikhs	Whites
The Royal Family	0.7204	0.6017
Indian Army Overseas Regiments	0.7763	0.5976
Regional English Language	0.1299	0.3522
Paleness in Britishness	-0.07	0.4427
Drinking Tea	0.4075	0.4478
Punk-rock music	-0.1866	0.4835
The Mix of People living in Britain	0.0763	0.3377
Anglican Churches	0.3539	0.6096
Chicken Tikka Masala	0.2887	0.4214
Cricket	0.2535	0.7183
Football	0.1542	0.6935
Rugby	-0.0281	0.6916
British Trade Union Banners	0.5105	0.5212
The National Health Service	0.7205	0.6009
The National Trust	0.6499	0.617
London 'Ali G'-style accent	-0.1443	0.3721
Rural Britain	0.695	0.6404
Year of Birth	-0.3834	-0.1414

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Having established that a difference exists, Figure 36 shows that across the 18 questions (each with its consecutive variable number), there is more age-related variation on most of the items among whites (in orange) than Sikhs (in blue).

Figure 36

Age-Related Variance in British Symbols Among Sikhs and Whites in Study Surveys



Note: Respective age ranges are Sikhs 18-62; White British 19-70.

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

However, from Figure 36 I also note that, for Sikhs (in blue), there is more variation from one variable to the next across the vertical axis. This indicates that the degree of age-related variation is highly sensitive to which question we are considering, whereas among white Britons, there is a relatively similar level of vertical variation across most questions.

Thus, traditional Britishness is more strongly moderated by age amongst Sikhs than whites. Conversely, using Brexit voting, there is more of an age gap among whites compared to Sikhs. Here, there is more Brexit separation in the white data on factors 1 and 2 (i.e., traditional British attachment and left-multicultural Britishness) than for Sikhs. I show this in Table 36 where Brexit voting correlates with traditional Britishness for whites but not for Sikhs, as seen in the bottom row. Broadly speaking, whites are ideologically-divided by age (including associated symbols like mixing and paleness) whereas Sikhs are symbolically-divided by age.

Table 36

Factor Loadings for ‘Traditional Britishness’ Factor for
Symbol Variables, Among Sikhs and Whites

Variable	Sikhs	Whites
The Royal Family	0.499	0.585
Indian/Overseas Army Overseas Regiments	0.364	0.610
Regional English Language	0.441	0.274
Paleness in Britishness	0.462	0.510
Drinking Tea	0.546	0.450
Punk-rock music	0.614	0.476
The Mix of People living in Britain	0.385	0.294
Anglican Churches	0.580	0.647
Chicken Tikka Masala	0.709	0.425
Cricket	0.564	0.730
Football	0.380	0.711
Rugby	0.540	0.692
British Trade Union Banners	0.687	0.503
The National Health Service	0.411	0.487
The National Trust	0.657	0.558
BBC Asian Network	0.550	0.560
London 'Ali G'-style accent	0.676	0.495
Rural Britain	0.475	0.660
Year of Birth	-0.473	-0.235
Brexit Vote	-0.103	0.183

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94).

Apart from age and Brexit, other less strong, but still noticeable, patterns offer supplementary evidence of how the content of traditional British national identity differs between Sikhs and whites. One is that there is more age separation in general patriotic attachment, that is, the older respondents were more passionate about all symbols than younger subjects among whites, though not among Sikhs. Another aspect is that amongst whites there are some liberal clusters connected with appreciating both diversity and Britain's landscape that do not exist for Sikhs. Finally, there is a cluster of older people who valued traditional Asian British cultural reference points among Sikhs but not among whites. The latter is to be expected.

Multivariate Analysis of Sikh and White British Study Surveys

Having used factor analysis to reduce the data, I next use multivariate statistics to show that there is a different set of associations among whites compared to Sikhs. Using regression analysis to understand the importance of age and voting Brexit, where the symbols in this study are concerned, I find that Sikhs and whites clearly differ in their Britishness.

Taking the Brexit vote first, I find two somewhat different patterns of Britishness in these samples. Table 37 shows that views on immigration and the death penalty mattered much more for predicting a Brexit vote among whites than Sikhs (note that the table only lists statistically-significant variables even as others were all tested). Moreover, the model fit (R^2) is weaker for Sikhs, and the variables show weaker coefficients than those in the white British model.

Table 37

Significance of Variables in Predicting Brexit Vote Among
Sikhs and Whites in Study Surveys

Sikhs		White British	
Regression Statistics		Regression Statistics	
LR chi2(7) =	30.240	LR chi2(3) =	49.230
Prob > chi2=	0.000	Prob > chi2 =	0.000
Log likelihood=	29.116	Log likelihood =	-22.437
	Standard Coefficient		Standard Coefficient
Controls to Immigration	1.639 (0.508)**	Controls to Immigration	1.702 (0.577)**
Favours Death Penalty	-0.192 (0.215)	Favours Death Penalty	1.307 (0.455)**
Hardip Kohli	0.216 (0.014)		
Mix of People	-0.0385 (0.016)*		
Regional English Accent	-0.031 (0.0152)*		
Goodness Gracious Me	0.028 (0.013)*		
Cricket	-0.031 (0.015)*		
		Hi-Sports Factor	1.028 (0.477)*
Constant	0.713 (1.713)	Constant	-11.972 (3.028)**
Pseudo R2=	0.342	Pseudo R2 =	0.523
Number of observations	64	Number of observations	80
Factor Significance: +p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01			

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94). Statistically-significant variables only.

In Table 37, amongst both Sikhs and white Britons, those who voted to leave the EU had more restrictive views on immigration. Those in favour of the death penalty were more

strongly pro-Remain among whites, and whilst the same relationship exists for Sikhs, it was a less strong one. Among Sikhs, those who voted to remain in the EU were more likely to associate their Britishness with a diverse mix of people in society, the various regional accents and the sport of cricket. Finally, among Sikhs who identified their Britishness with the Scottish-Sikh TV personality Hardip Kohli and the TV series *Goodness Gracious Me* were more likely to have voted to leave the EU. Again, only significant variables are shown, though all were tested.

This holds even when controlling for age, so these symbols exert an independent effect in predicting Brexit voting, even as older Sikhs tended to be more attached to them. For whites, most symbols apart from the important 'hi-sports' factor do not add to the model's fit to the data. Instead, using similar variables, Table 37 illustrates that, among whites, support for the death penalty, an anti-immigration attitude and scoring high on factor 1 or 'hi-sports' usefully predicts support for leaving the EU across the full sample. It should be noted, however, that, in whites, attachment to sports like rugby as symbols of Britishness is a weaker predictor than views on the death penalty and immigration.

On age, I use the notion of symbols that represent traditional or historical Britishness such as the royal family, rurality and the NHS to show that among Sikhs, age is more significant in predicting a high sentiment for this type of Britishness. This is not to say that traditional Britishness is unrelated to age in the white sample, only that the relationship is less strong, so age is less useful in predicting traditional Britishness amongst white British citizens. I show the comparative coefficient variables for each group in Table 38.

Table 38

Significance of Variables in Predicting Traditional Britishness
Among Sikhs and Whites in Study Surveys

Sikhs		White British	
Regression Statistics		Regression Statistics	
F (3, 97)	35.800	F (2, 97)	23.600
Prob > F	0.000	Prob > F	0.000
R-squared	0.525	R-squared	0.327
Adj. R-squared	0.511	Adj. R-squared	0.313
Root MSE	0.699	Root MSE	0.828
Average Sentiment Rating	0.0022 (0.000)**		0.0017 (0.000)**
Foreign Born	0.344 (0.159)**		
Year Born in	0.0311 (0.006)**		
English rather than British			0.460 (0.175)**
Constant	-2.961 (0.319)**	Constant	-2.083 (0.325)**
Number of obs. =	101	Number of obs. =	100
Factor Significance: +p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01			

Sources: White British National Identity Survey (May 2019). (N=100); British Sikh National Identity Survey (July 2017 to December 2018). (N=94). Notes: Only significant variables listed.

From the table above I assess that for Sikhs, traditional Britishness is predicted by factors of foreign-birth and being older. These symbols of Britishness have much less appeal to younger British-born Sikhs. For whites, these factors are not significant. Other than the

importance of my control variable of average attachment to all symbols, the only predictor of attachment to traditional British symbols is feeling English (or other sub-state national identity) rather than British. This is somewhat surprising in that traditional symbols like the monarchy are seen as quintessentially British. Yet it is also the case that these are often interpreted in England as essentially English. All the same, it is important to note that this is not a powerful effect.

Sikh and White Youth Englishness: Context and Comparison

In the next section, I focus on Englishness amongst Sikh youth to show how it differs from English identity among other youth, especially whites. For this purpose, I once again chose a recent nation-wide survey on English national identity as conducted by YouGov on behalf of the BBC.⁴³ I re-introduce this next.

In order to provide a comparative backdrop to my Sikh youth findings using representative data, I present data from a recent large-scale national survey on Englishness which, amongst other aspects, tested strength of pride in being English. This forms the dependent variable in the regression analysis that follows and illuminates my findings on Sikh Englishness by considering the same phenomenon in England more generally. As a reminder, I do this as I have found, using my own survey, that younger Sikhs are drawing closer to Englishness when compared to older Sikhs in Britain.


As a reminder of the nature of the data on whites, the BBC survey was run by YouGov from the 9th of March to 26th March 2018. It had a significant sample size of 20,081 adults across

⁴³ Smith, M. (June 2018). *Young people are less proud of being English than their elders*. YouGov. <https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/06/18/young-people-are-less-proud-being-english-their-el> (Accessed: December 2018).

England. As context, whilst this sample size is large, it is not as representative as the ONS Longitudinal Survey used throughout the three quantitative chapters in this thesis. All the same, one finding stands out. This is that young people are far less likely to feel proud to be English than older generations. Figure 37 shows this – note that this data covers all Britons and is not specific to Sikhs. All the same, I note that the survey will consist of mainly white British respondents as they represent the ethnic majority group in England.

Figure 37

Feelings towards Englishness by Age in YouGov/BBC Survey



Percentage of Respondents

Sources: YouGov / BBC Survey (9th March to 26th March 2018). (N=20,081).


A secondary finding was that amongst minority (non-white) ethnic groups, English identity was much lower – at just 32 per cent - than amongst the majority white groups at 61 per cent. Additionally, the BBC survey found that people in England valued Englishness to nearly the same degree as Britishness. In total, 80 per cent vs 82 per cent, respectively, replied “Very strongly and “Fairly strongly” to the question “How strongly, if at all, do you

identify yourself as being English/British?" This is nearly the same level of affinity that people in Scotland attached to their regional Scottishness (over 80 per cent) across all age groups in the 2011 censuses.

As part of what makes someone English, the BBC survey of mainly white respondents found that birth and parentage both play a central role while voluntary or acquired elements are rated as less central. Figure 38 demonstrates this.

Figure 38

Replies to What Makes a Person English in YouGov/BBC Survey



Sources: YouGov / BBC Survey (9th March to 26th March 2018). (N=20,081).

Do Sikhs apply the same 'Englishness' criteria? The BBC Survey shows that they largely do, with the 67 Sikh respondents not differing much from the mainly white-driven pattern above.

In my interviews with Sikhs, I found that the top three reasons given for denoting an English person can be re-ordered as “Born in England”, “Growing up in England” and in most, but not all, cases, “Having two English parents”. Despite the perceived importance of not having two English parents in the BBC survey, Sikhs, and especially younger ones, still seemed confident in calling themselves English in my survey and interviews. Bearing in mind their recent migration history, and that the English Sikhs of today will be the English parents of the future, this forecasts the rapid growth of Sikh Englishness.

In seeking to test the importance of factors in the BBC/YouGov survey, I present the following regression analysis on the four-category question, “How strongly, if at all, do you identify yourself as being English”. Possible answers are “very”, “fairly”, “not very”, and “not at all”. The regression is run as a linear ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Using data just on the 65 Sikhs in the BBC survey (51 after listwise deletion), I find that younger Sikhs are significantly more likely to identify as English, corroborating ONS and BSR findings. Many other factors are not as significant as those found in the study survey or interviews. The small number of respondents, however, makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions as only very powerful effects are significant in small samples. Table 39 shows this.

Table 39

Factors in the Strength of Identification with Englishness
Among Sikhs in the BBC/YouGov Survey

ONS Variable	Englishness Variable
Age	-0.580**
	(.214)
University Degree	-0.000
	(.290)
Living in Rural Area	-0.109
	(.294)
Gender	-.970
	(.270)
Voted for Brexit	.0712
	(.310)
Voted Conservative in 2017	-0.222
	(.220)
Lives in London	0.734
	-0.345
$R^2 = 0.220$	
N = 51	
*** p<.0001, **p<.01, *p<.05	

Sources: YouGov / BBC Survey (9th March to 26th March 2018). (N=51).

This adds balance to my own survey figures on age and Englishness. Therefore, I can say that whilst the BBC survey finds that younger people in England are less likely to be proud of being English, it is less clear that Sikh youth are part of this ‘age gap’ trend.

Summarising this section on younger Sikhs, the YouGov/BBC survey further shows that this group is more likely to identify as English and may be somewhat unique in its national

identity politics compared to white British youth in not identifying against the English pride of an older generation. My analysis shows they (younger Sikhs) are less concerned about white English ethnocentricity in their national identity formation. They may hold a civic or multicultural idea of Britishness more generally, and of Englishness especially. In addition, using the ONS LS, we saw that younger Sikhs are somewhat more likely to identify as English compared to other young South Asians such as Muslims or Hindus. I consider my finding on younger Sikhs in this chapter to be an important one as the existing literature treats Sikhs and most other South Asian minority ethnic groups as identifying as 'simply' British.

This completes my section comparing custom statistics gathered on whites and Sikhs.

Conclusion

In this chapter I sought to test my finding on age-related complexity in Sikh Britishness by comparing it to white Britishness. This was deemed necessary not just for academic rigour, but to test whether one specific finding, that of youth feeling more English, was unique to Sikhs.

As a result of this strategy, I noted two aspects of Sikh Britishness. First, youthful Sikh Englishness is not simply a reflection of a society-wide phenomenon of young people feeling more English than British. The pattern of younger people feeling more English than the old was not seen among the white British sample here. Second, within the white majority group, the elderly were – in contrast to the pattern among Sikhs - no more attached to traditional elite forms of Britishness than the young.

Thus, by the measures set out in this study, age-mediated variations in Britishness are a Sikh phenomenon. This is clearly seen when Sikhs are compared to whites, but the

difference is much less marked when they are compared to other British minorities, who resemble the Sikh pattern more. This may indicate that older or foreign-born Sikhs, like those in some other minorities, are attached to an archaic form of Britishness that was preserved overseas but has less relevance for both younger Sikhs and for the white population.

As a recap, the chapter began by drawing on public survey data on the content of national identity amongst Sikhs and white British in England and Wales. It was shown that in the 2011 national census, 88 per cent of the white population of England identified as English only or British only. English, alone or in combination, was selected by 83 per cent of white Britons. This is significantly higher when compared to Asians (including Sikhs) among whom only 17 per cent self-identify as English, with the majority identifying as British. Thus, national data on people's national identity formed the essential context for my own survey on the symbolic attachments of white Britons and Sikhs.

Despite this lower Englishness, it was then shown that the age pattern among Sikhs and other minorities signalled the possibility of a 'porousness' in English identity with regard to its 'freighted' whiteness. Apart from the 17 per cent of Asians identifying as English in the 2011 census, there was further evidence of this in the 2018 BBC/YouGov survey where non-whites were found to be strongly attached to many English symbols.

Thus, even though whites across all ages are more likely to be English in identity when compared to Asians (including Sikhs) in general datasets such as the national censuses, I was able to build upon and develop this data using my own survey. I found that first, Sikhs are more than just British; and that second, younger Sikhs are more likely to be English. Therefore, the original contribution of the small-scale research advanced here is to show

that Sikhs attach to being British in somewhat different ways from whites, following Kaufmann (2008; 2017).

With regard to the study survey on whites, I sampled 100 subjects in a similar fashion to the British Sikh survey. Using symbols, I was able to test both the content and depth of a respondent's connection to various symbols of Britishness. The conclusion to the survey results was that there was some similarity between Sikhs' and whites' national identities — but not when it comes to age-related variation.

Similar themes were identified in both datasets, of the importance of institutions, national sports, citizen ethnic mix, regional differences, and food. However, the major finding was that despite this similarity, there is much less age-based differentiation in the content of national identity among whites than there is among Sikhs. For instance, institutional symbols such as royalty, the BBC or rurality attracted a high rating across the entire white group. However, amongst Sikhs it was the older respondents who rated them highly.

To further illustrate the different impact of age amongst Sikhs and white British groups, I made age a part of the cluster analysis. On the critical first factor, that of traditional or elite British symbols, younger Sikhs were much less likely than younger whites to attach their British identity to these. Overall, among white British there was much less of an age-related gradation on this form of Britishness. Conversely, age matters a lot for Brexit voting and support for diversity among whites, but not among Sikhs.

Through the above process of analysing British identity nationally and then in a sample, I draw some conclusions about white Britishness. First, white Britons' national identity is influenced by different variables from those influencing their Sikh peers. For example, the Brexit divide is more important in shaping the national identity of white Britons than Sikhs. This was clearly visible where paleness and rurality were age-tested using EU

membership voting, with a sharp difference among white Britons but not among Sikhs. Second, the differing variable sets show that age is important amongst Sikhs but not amongst white British in predicting the content of their national identity.

Extrapolating from this, I predict that younger Sikhs of today and the future are set to be significantly different in their national identity compared to older Sikhs. For example, they are more likely to be English rather than British and less likely to attach to Britain through traditional elite symbols like tea and the monarchy, or to elements of British-Asian diaspora culture. In addition, I found from my interview data that they are likely to have hybrid or complex national identities such as English-Sikh-Londoner.

This concludes my comparative chapter on the content of white British and Sikh national identification, thereby ending the sections on the interview and survey data.

In the next chapter, I summarise and conclude the thesis.

Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion

Sikh hostland national identity is diverse rather than coalescing around a central myth-symbol complex. This is best illustrated by the increasing minority of Sikhs now identifying as English over British. Age stands out as the dominant factor in predicting this dimension of Sikh Britishness. Thus, English Sikhs are more likely to be under the age of 49. While this phenomenon is somewhat unexpected, it ought not to be a surprise as theories of nationalism ‘from below’ predict exactly such a development (e.g., Kaufmann, 2017).

As a summary, early in this thesis, I noted that there was a paucity of work on the hostland national identity of minority ethnic groups, both in Britain and elsewhere. There was also little attention paid to internal differences in national identity among such groups. Thus, I have sought to contribute to filling this gap. Specifically, I set out to test the hypothesis that there is internal variation in British Sikhs’ national identity, especially on the grounds of age, and to examine how this compares with internal variation in white Britons’ national identity. This study found that, indeed, age is an important variable in predicting how Sikhs view their national identity, but that age is less important for explaining differences in the content of national identity among white Britons.

After locating a lacuna in the literature, I provided background statistics to fill a gap in our understanding of the national identity of Britain’s Sikh population. To address this, I used existing data, first from the national censuses of 2011 and 2001, including the over-time, linked ONS LS. The 2011 census recorded 423,158 Sikhs. Here, whilst the sample is large, the question on national identity was too simple to answer my research question. The second source was the annual British Sikh Reports (BSR), which, in 2017, generated over 2,000 Sikh responses. Although the BSR sample was considerably smaller, it was more

detailed as there were three questions pertaining to Sikh British national identity. I augmented all these with a 2018 BBC/YouGov survey on Englishness, though this contained only a small Sikh sample.

Nevertheless, these sources did not have enough detail on the symbolic construction of national identity to provide a fully satisfactory answer to the research question on age-related variation in Sikh Britishness. This explains why my analysis also draws from a self-generated survey that posed 50 questions to 100 Sikhs. To numerically gauge the sentimental value of an individual Sikh's Britishness, respondents were asked to rate their attachment to various symbols of Britishness on a scale from 0 to 100. This gave rise to substantial data ready for statistical testing. In addition, I interviewed 25 Sikhs and accumulated over 100 hours of interview data.

The censuses, the ONS LS, my own Sikh survey, the BSR, and the BBC/YouGov Englishness survey results all show first, that Sikhs in England and Wales are no longer simply British in their national identity. Whilst British remains the majority identity, a more complex pattern has been revealed in which age is the key variable moderating a Sikh's choice between state and sub-state identity, or a combination of both. To support this, highly specialist surveys were used as further cross-checks. These included the Citizenship Surveys and EMBES. In all of them, more than 10 per cent of Sikhs identified as English over British. In my own 2018 Sikh survey, 43 per cent of respondents reported an English identity, alone or in combination with British.

Whilst this percentage may have been a surprise a decade ago, the phenomenon itself is not entirely unexpected. Theories of vertical nationalism show that top-down state-directed nationalism is being displaced by horizontal, bottom-up nationalism in modern consumer societies like Britain. Hence, apart from statistical data, the theoretical

significance of this study is two-fold. First, it offers evidence that hegemonic, state-led identities may become less useful in understanding the British Sikhs of tomorrow. Second, it suggests that, in terms of its ethnic composition, Englishness may be more porous than previously thought.

The discovery that Sikh national identity is complex is thus consistent with newer theories of nationalism such as multivocality, everyday nationalism, personal nationalism, and complexity in national identity. These suggest that state-led identities tend to decline in liberal-progressive societies that have experienced long periods of peacetime. So, whilst this work challenges the common notion that Sikhs use a singular, state-level national identity, as seen in Bhambra (2021); Jivraj (2013), Singh and Tatla (2006), Singh, J. (2010) and Jaspal (2013), its findings conform to the predictions of newer theories.

For example, in my thesis I have shown that Kaufmann (2017) discussed how local sports clubs, community events, and local leaders can incubate a distinct vantage point on the nation. These are also crucial for the development of small-nation identities, and it is no accident that Sikhs actively participate in this process. For example, in the English Midlands, London and Cornwall I showed that food, personal relationships and landscape all gave rise to sub-state variations in Sikh Britishness. Furthermore, younger Sikhs (those under 40) in Kent were found to be very comfortable in identifying with Englishness over Britishness, very much like the wider changes I note in British national identity post-war.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ As a reminder, evidence presented for this includes McCrone and Bechhofer (2015) on changes in national identity due to state and national conditions growing independently; Leddy-Owen (2014) on challenges to whiteness in Englishness by minority ethnic groups; Nandi and Platt (2013) on regional national identity in English cities; Hussain and Bagguley (2005) on English Muslims, and finally Lam and Smith (2009) on English Afro-Caribbeans.

This study has therefore contributed to theory and provided case study data to add to the nationalism studies literature.

Looking to the future, it is especially important for my thesis that most English-identifying Sikhs in my sample were below the average Sikh age. This is not only a fairly significant discovery about British identity, but also one that speaks to the research question of whether or not age-related variations in Sikh Britishness exist. Furthermore, I have shown that this age-related variation in Britishness also obtains for the symbolic content of nationhood, where Sikh identification with royal symbolism is more prominent among older Sikhs. Furthermore, this age pattern in symbolic identification is characteristic of Sikhs but not the majority ethnic white British. Considering this with the knowledge that most Sikhs live in England it is thus possible that this community will overwhelmingly self-identify as English over several generations.

In summarising the research by chapter, I note the following. As part of the literature review in chapter two I showed that the originality of the research partly derives from the limited amount of extant work on ethnic minorities' British national identity. This is particularly true of Sikhs in Britain where a large portion of the literature on Sikhs is theological, scriptural and historical, focusing on Sikhism as a five-hundred-year-old religious order. As a result, the current literature does not focus on secular mainstream politics, such as Sikhs' interaction with British society through national identity – as is the case here. As such, this research on variations in Sikh Britishness adds to the limited literature on Sikhs in Britain and, to a lesser extent, work on minority ethnic Britishness and majority white Britishness. It also contributes to an emerging conversation about the content of minority hostland national identity.

In the same chapter I explained the methodology employed. The data was collected using a mixed methods strategy of surveys, interviews and participant observation. This was undertaken for two main reasons. First, there was an acute need to generate specialist statistical data as there is very limited numerical information available on the content of Sikh British national identity. Second, multiple data sources help triangulate toward a fuller picture. By the end of the second chapter, the gap in the literature had been identified and the rationale for developing a mixed methods approach firmly established. The next two chapters were focused on the Sikh numerical data, both third-party and self-collected.

In chapter three I analysed current datasets as the precursors to my specialist Sikh survey, showing that the current knowledge of Sikh national identity in Britain is derived mainly from the 2001 and 2011 national censuses of England and Wales as well as the ONS LS. I then discussed other smaller national surveys such as the Citizenship Survey and the British Election Study, including its specialist branch, the Ethnic Minorities British Election Study (EMBES). These, with their limited set of questions on the nature of national identity among Sikhs, pointed to the shortcomings of current surveys in providing evidence for my research question on age-related variation in Sikh Britishness.

Despite these flaws, these general UK surveys did provide some indication of the variegated nature of post-war British identity within both white and non-white communities. After briefly comparing Sikh metrics to that of the wider society, I analysed variations in several aspects of Sikh national identity in British society. I probed the data using indicators and their corresponding concepts drawn from theories of everyday and complex nationalism. This allowed me to conclude that, even in current datasets, British Sikh hostland national identity fits the pattern of varying by social characteristics. Sikhs are not 'British only' as is currently thought.

Furthermore, I showed that of all the variables examined, such as class, education and profession, it is age that most significantly affects British identity among Sikhs. Older, foreign-born Sikhs tended to identify with India or another foreign national identity more than younger, native-born Sikhs. Age also had an impact on whether a Sikh chose to identify as English or British. On Englishness, these results suggest that peer-to-peer cultural processes are arguably more important than state nationalism or ethno-communitarian politics for Britain's Sikhs. Finally, I closed the chapter by stating that despite this evidence for complexity in Sikh Britishness, further data was needed to verify the thesis.

Chapter four provided the required specialist quantitative and qualitative data to support my thesis that age is key in predicting the content of Sikh Britishness. For thoroughness, I once again drew on the ONS Longitudinal Survey and a 2018 BBC/YouGov survey. The ONS LS showed that that younger Sikhs, those under 49 years of age, are more likely than Muslims or Hindus to identify as English rather than British – even as younger members of all three groups were more English-identifying. To further explore this finding, I used the BBC/YouGov survey to explore the relatively higher incidence of Englishness among younger Sikhs compared to their older co-ethnics. This too showed that age is the critical variable moderating the content of Sikh hostland national identity. The BBC survey also found that youthful Englishness is not visible in other minority or majority ethnic groups in England.

The BSR, the ONS LS, and the 2001 and 2011 censuses of England and Wales are all useful for analysing how many Sikhs fall in different identity categories but lack finely-textured survey data on the symbolic content of Sikh British national identity. The BBC data has some detail on symbols, but only a small Sikh sample. Hence the need for my customised online study survey data presented in this chapter. It was based on an original online

survey of 100 Sikhs in Britain and was complimented by personal interviews and a lengthy period of participant observation.

The qualitative research included semi-structured interviews with 25 subjects and over 100 hours of participant observation. Most of this was done in conjunction with, rather than independent of, the quantitative data. Indeed, some of the interview questions were only formulated after the results of the survey data had been analysed, allowing quantitative and qualitative methods to inform each other. For this reason, much of the discussion with subjects was based on symbols of Britishness. Furthermore, of the 25 interviewees, 14 had already taken part in the survey. This allowed me to neatly follow-up their statistical answers with open-ended discussions for further insight. In this way, mixed research methods helped elicit candid and detailed data on an understudied community.

Having obtained fine-grained data on the symbols of Sikh Britishness through my online survey, I then subjected it to cluster and regression analysis. These revealed both strong and weak themes in the content of Sikh Britishness – some of which had an age divide in them. I weaved in interview findings to expand on the differences within themes that emerged from quantitative analysis. This allowed me to pinpoint age as the key differentiator between traditional-elite and, to a lesser degree, more contemporary pop-cultural forms of Sikh Britishness.

I had chosen to explore Sikh Britishness since I was seeking reasons for the apparent rise of Englishness among British Sikhs. Indeed, it was this casual observation that had originally kindled my research nearly a decade ago. Part of my interest is derived from the knowledge that Englishness has a strong connection to whiteness. So, Sikh Englishness seems idiosyncratic – almost a misnomer. However, by the chapter's end, I realised and

showed that it may no longer be incongruous. Sikh Englishness is a not just a sporadic development, but a national trend, as was found using the 2011 census – albeit concentrated among younger Sikhs. The former’s personal form of national identity (Cohen, 1996) leads them to diverge from their older co-ethnics whilst converging with some white Britons.

Thus, the key finding in this chapter was the following. Given that most younger Sikhs are English born, there is now a significant likelihood of them identifying as English. This holds additional interest as it contrasts with younger non-Sikh Britons, who tend to be more liberal-leaning, which, if anything, inclines them somewhat against Englishness compared to their elders. I found this in the 2018 YouGov/BBC survey on Englishness. Thus, I have shown the phenomenon of Sikh Englishness and its unique age-related demography. For this reason, younger Sikhs can be used as a case study to argue against strict ethnic definitions of contemporary Englishness as Kaufmann (2018) does.

By the end of this core chapter, I had shown that there is no single concept of Britishness among Sikhs. This reflects horizontal nationalism theory’s mechanism of top-down Britishness being displaced by bottom-up nationalism. In itself, this change means that the case of Sikhs in Britain contributes to the broader field of nationalism theories focusing on complexity, the everyday, vernacular mobilisation, and multivocalism by authors such as Kaufmann, Brubaker, Smith, Kymlicka, Fox, and Miller-Idriss.

Herein lies a fundamental discovery in my thesis. That many younger rather than older Sikhs consider themselves English. This shows the strong desire for this group, and particularly their youth, to appropriate English national identity, thereby crossing a formerly ethno-national ‘line’. Older Sikhs do, in the main, remain British rather than English in identification. Given the youthful nature of the Sikh community, this suggests a

continued rise in Sikh Englishness is likely. Hence, at present, age is the most influential factor in predicting variation in the content of Sikh Britishness. This concluded my chapter on self-collected data and age-related complexity in Sikh Britishness.

In chapter 5, I sought to compare age-related national identity variation amongst Britain's Sikhs with the national identities of their peer white British groups. As with Sikhs, I generated my own survey data and supplemented it with the England and Wales censuses of 2011 and 2011, as well as the 2018 BBC/YouGov survey. I drew particular attention to the difference in age-related Englishness and Britishness between white and Sikh Britons in existing national data. Age differentiation among Sikhs in English identification was not replicated for the white British.

Next, I analysed the symbol data from my survey. Here, I showed firstly, the comparative differences in sentiment rating by symbol for Sikhs and whites. Secondly, I highlighted symbols that drew very disparate responses from the two ethnic groups. As part of this, I focused on the considerable difference between Sikhs and whites on paleness and rurality as symbols of Britishness. Among whites, the Brexit divide, strongly linked to age and English v British identity, loomed large. This shaped whites' perceptions of whether racial paleness and rural symbolism were important for Britishness. However, there was no comparable effect among Sikhs. While age is an important differentiator among Sikhs for the content of national identity, the Brexit divide was more important for whites' national identification.

After showing that whites and Sikhs differ significantly in the content of their national identity via tests of symbols and attitudes, I carried out cluster analysis of symbols for both groups. I showed that relative differences in symbol sets comprise each group's national identity. In order to test the relevance of these findings, I presented regression tables to

show the significance of key variables in white British national identity as compared to Sikhs. This allowed me to conclude that white Britons' English national identity is influenced by different variables than those found for their Sikh peers. By testing British Sikh national identity against that of white contemporaries, two aspects become clear. Firstly, youthful Sikh Englishness is not merely a reflection of a society-wide phenomenon. Secondly, variation in white British national identity is much less likely to be a correlate of age. Therefore, age-differentiated Sikh Britishness is distinctive.

There were other, additional, findings that should also be noted. In my qualitative research, I found evidence of a growing integrationist aspect coming through, with local and regional identities impacting on Sikh identity. I found that Sikhs from London, Yorkshire, Cornwall and the English Midlands all clearly identify with symbols representing their locality. This included landscape, food, sporting teams, accented language and even humorous mocking of other regional characteristics such as accents, foods, and social class. Case study support for this finding comes from Khor (2015) who notes that for new British citizens "life is lived at a local level" (p. 207). Furthermore, this has been predicted amongst ethnic minority communities as part of an intra-community 'super-diversity' by Vertovec (2007). This finding concluded the chapters on my survey results.

Based on the summary above, this work tested the argument for internal variation in Sikh Britishness and found evidence for it. Quantitative and qualitative evidence showed that age is key in predicting symbolic variations in Sikh Britishness. For example, in the interviews, I found that younger Sikhs were more likely to self-identify as English whilst older Sikhs were most likely to call themselves British. In the symbolic data analysis, older Sikhs were more likely to associate themselves with traditional Britishness consisting of the royal family, NHS, BBC, trade union banners and the National Trust. Younger Sikhs on

the other hand were more likely to be sentimental about regional English accents, rugby, the ethnic mix of people living in Britain and punk-rock music. For thoroughness, several other variables – class, education, country of birth, profession, gender, religious identity and area of residence - were examined and found to be of lesser or no significance in differentiating attachment to different symbols.

In reaching this conclusion about age and variations in Britishness, this research supports the idea that third-generation (i.e., ‘everyday’) theories of nationalism are gaining momentum in interpreting contemporary British national identity. Furthermore, as Sikhs are both non-whites and recent migrants, their complex national identity politics show that rethinking how migrants fit into the national narrative may benefit our understanding of national identity more broadly. For example, if it is accepted that third-generation Sikhs are English, an identity previously associated with whiteness, then perhaps a more civic, or at least less ethnocentric, notion of Englishness may further emerge, thereby aiding integration, societal cohesion, and social mobility. And this makes sense as these are all indicators of an effective liberal-progressive society such as Britain.

Aside from the key finding on age-related Englishness and Britishness, other contributions might be inferred. One is that many Sikhs desire to be perceived as more than a religious minority, even though many of them wear articles of faith such as turbans. Many consider themselves to be secular Sikhs or cultural Sikhs, rather than observant Sikhs. This is a phenomenon that has not attracted much research, but given its role in a secularising society, deserves further research.

My work balances large-scale surveys like the national censuses of 2001 and 2011, ONS LS, BBC/YouGov Englishness survey, EMBES and BSR with bespoke original survey work on smaller sample sizes. The latter allowed me to ask more questions and address in fine

detail questions not asked in larger third-party surveys. One could argue that my use of whites, as opposed to say Muslims or Afro-Caribbeans, as a comparison to Sikhs may have limited the context. In this instance, it was not clear in the literature whether the inclusion of another group of minority ethnic citizens, with all the difficulties of sample size this entails, merited the expense and time. This said, I was able in some surveys (like ONS LS) to make inter-ethnic comparisons with these groups. Finally, the study virtually ignores Sikhs in Scotland even though they are active protagonists of Scottish and British national identity politics. Here too the time and expense in trying to gain information from a relatively small number of Sikhs shaped my approach.

Further research could explore the increase of Englishness amongst Sikhs in more depth. This is interesting for many reasons other than simply challenging an ethnocentric white Englishness. It may also signal the rising importance of minority ethnic groups in England. This is significant when considered alongside other demographic and political changes. One is the dramatic increase in mixed-race families and non-British whites from Europe. Together these trends mean that in some wards, white British are a minority. However, this is to be expected as Gundara (2000) suggests that the “vibrancy” of Englishness lies in it being viewed as “multi-layered, vivacious and interactive” (p. 19).

In conclusion, my study has sought to concretise the terms Sikh Britishness and Sikh Englishness. Indeed, partly as a result of this research, I find Sikhs featuring in recent work by Kaufmann (2018) on the importance of culture, rather than just race or ethnicity, in the politics of national identity. Moreover, the novel use of these two definitive terms will hopefully lead to their wider adoption. Finally, the age-stratified nature of Sikh Britishness may be of interest to scholars of minority national identity as older Sikhs utilise citizenship-based Britishness as identification whilst younger Sikhs have a distinctive national identity.

More generally, the trajectory of Englishness amongst both majority and minority ethnic groups has been shaped by the UK's exit from the EU, the 2014 Scottish referendum and finally, the post-1999 devolution settlements in Northern Ireland and Wales. All have occurred during the lifecycle of this thesis, demonstrating that far from national identity being diminished in significance, it remains an important vessel for ideas and people.

For this reason, it is a personal success that the place of Sikhs in British national identity politics has been documented. As my thesis shows, Sikhs are well placed to take part in discussions on Britishness – just like other Britons.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Sikh British National Identity Survey Questionnaire

British Sikh National Identity Survey

This survey is part of an academic study into the complexity of Sikh 'Britishness'

Please note that all questions require answers. Thank you for taking part.

1. Do you self-identify as Sikh?

Yes

No

2. Are you a British citizen?

Yes

No

3. What year were you born in?

4. What is your place of birth?

5. If you were born outside of the UK, what is the year of your arrival to the UK?

(Please leave blank if not applicable)

6. If you are UK-born: are both your parents born in the UK?

Yes

No

7. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Decline to state

8. How attached are you to your Sikh identity?

Completely attached

Mostly attached

Slightly attached

Slightly unattached

Mostly Unattached

Completely unattached

9. Are you an Amritdhari Sikh?

Yes

No

10. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Please select one reply only)

Decline to state

Foreign Qualifications

Professional Qualifications E.g., Chartered, Nursing or teaching

No Education

PhD

Master's

HNC or HND

B-Tec, NVQ, City & Guilds or equivalent

Undergraduate Degree

A-Levels

GCSEs, O-Levels or equivalent

11. What is your approximate annual household income?

£60,000 or more

£40,000 - £59,999

£30,000 - £39,999

£15,000 - £29,999

under £15,000

12. Do you own your own home?

No

Yes

13. What is your relationship status?

Married

Widowed

Divorced

Separated

In a domestic partnership or civil union

Single, but cohabiting with a significant other

Single, never married

14. What is your residential postcode?

Full postcode e.g., PO32 6JX

15. What do you consider to be your national identity? (Please select one reply only)

Northern Irish

Welsh

Scottish

English

British

Other (please specify)

16. How would you classify your political views?

Far left

Left

Left of Centre

Centre

Right of Centre

Right

Far Right

N/A

17. How did you vote in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union?

Don't Know

Didn't Vote

Leave

Remain

18. In your opinion, should immigration to Britain be increased, left as is or reduced?

Increased a lot

Increased a little

Left as is

Reduced a little

Reduced a lot

19. Which party did you vote for in the 2017 general election?

Did not vote

Other

Green Party

UK Independence Party

Plaid Cymru

Liberal Democrats

Scottish National Party

Labour Party

Conservative Party

20. Which party did you vote for in the 2015 general election?

Conservative Party

Labour Party

Scottish National Party

Liberal Democrats

Plaid Cymru

UK Independence Party

Green Party

Other

Did not vote

A travel magazine published a list of things that tourists from India found distinctive about Britain. On a scale of 0 to 100, how British do you feel when you think of each of the following (0 = not at all British, 100 = very British):

Please note: We don't want to know whether you like each item or not, but rather how British it makes you feel. Indicate this by moving the slider scale button left or right.

21. The Royal family

22. The Indian regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars

23. The English language, spoken in a regional accent

24. The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair

25. Drinking Tea

26. Punk-rock music

27. The TV Series *Goodness Gracious Me*

28. The mix of different people living in Britain

29. Anglican churches

30. Chicken Tikka Masala

31. Cricket

32. Football

33. Rugby
34. British Trade Union banners
35. The National Health Service
36. The National Trust
37. BBC Asian Network
38. The London 'Ali G'-style accent
39. Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms
40. The TV personality Hardeep Kohli
41. In addition, do any other symbols make you feel British? Please give as many answers as you wish
42. In your view, which of the following is a more accurate description of Britain:
 - Britain is a mainly Protestant country with a historic White majority population and ethnic minorities in the cities
 - Britain is a multi-religious country formed of many races and ethnicities

Which of the above strikes you as a more accurate description of British history?

43. Which strikes you as a more accurate description of British history?
 - Britain is a nation of immigrants. Each wave of new immigrants brings their culture and changes the country into something new
 - Britain is a nation of mainly native-born people. Those of immigrant background assimilated into the culture and institutions laid down centuries ago
44. Would you like for your son or daughter to join Britain's armed forces?

No

Yes
45. Thinking of the last time you socialised with friends; what share were Sikh?

None

Less than half

About half

Most

All

46. In your view, is the death penalty appropriate for some crimes

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly agree

Strongly disagree

47. Do you agree that things in Britain were better in the past?

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly agree

48. Do you support the movement for an independent Sikh homeland?

Unsure

No

Yes

49. Do you think that things in Britain will get better in the future?

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly agree

50. Which of these makes you feel more British?

The Victorian Sikh, Prince Duleep Singh

The MP for Slough, Tanmanjit Singh Dhesi

The MP for Birmingham Edgbaston, Preet Kaur Gill

The Victorian Sikh, Prince Duleep Singh



The MP from Slough, Tanmanjit Singh Desi



The MP from Birmingham Edgbaston, Preet Kaur Gill



Appendix 2: Sikh British Identity Interview Questions

Sikh Britishness Interviews: Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews

1. What is your national identity?
2. Parents identity?
3. Siblings and peer family?
4. Friends?
5. Peer group identity?
6. How would you feel if your white mixed-race children called themselves white?
7. Is Britain's best behind it or ahead of it?
8. What makes your identity what it is?
 - Places, people, events?
 - Images, history symbols?
 - Locality?
 - Social circle?
 - Family?
 - Language?
9. Are you attached to symbols of nationalism or the nation itself?
10. Daily life affecting identity?
11. Governmental / Institutional influence?
12. Migration?
13. Brexit?
14. Vote?
15. Should Britain focus on its past or future?
16. Is Britishness Whiteness?

17. Does the changing ethnic mix affect your answer?
18. Will the changing ethnic mix reduce the distinctiveness in Britishness / Englishness?
19. Is whiteness in Britishness worth preserving as such?
20. What is the future of British identity?

Appendix 3: White British National Identity Survey Template

White British National Identity Survey

1. Are you a British citizen?

Yes

No

2. What year were you born in?

Year

3. What is your place of birth?

Country

4. If you were born outside of the UK, what is the year of your arrival to the UK?

(Please leave blank if not applicable)

Year

5. If you are UK-born: are both your parents born in the UK?

Yes

No

6. What is your gender?

Male

Female

Decline to state

7. How attached are you to your British identity?

Completely attached

Mostly attached

Slightly attached

Slightly unattached

Mostly unattached

Completely unattached

8. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Please select one reply only)

Decline to state

Foreign Qualifications

Professional Qualifications E.g., Chartered, Nursing or teaching

No Education

PhD

Master's

HNC or HND

B-Tec, NVQ, City & Guilds or equivalent

Undergraduate Degree

A-Levels

GCSEs, O-Levels or equivalent

9. What is your approximate annual household income?

under £15,000

£15,000 - £29,999

£30,000 - £39,999

£40,000 - £59,999

£60,000 or more

10. Do you own your own home?

No

Yes

11. What is your relationship status?

Married

Widowed

Divorced

Separated

In a domestic partnership or civil union

Single, but cohabiting with a significant other

Single, never married

12. What is your residential postcode?

Full postcode e.g., PO32 6JX

13. What do you consider to be your national identity? (Please select one reply only)

British

English

Scottish

Welsh

Northern Irish

Other (please specify)

14. What do you consider to be your ethnic group? (Please select one reply only)

White

Black

Mixed

Other (please specify)

15. How would you classify your political views?

Far left

Left

Left of Centre

Centre

Right of Centre

Right Far Right

N/A

16. How did you vote in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union?

Don't Know

Didn't Vote

Leave

Remain

17. In your opinion, should immigration to Britain be increased, left as is or reduced?

Increased a lot

Increased a little

Left as is

Reduced a little

Reduced a lot

18. Which party did you vote for in the 2017 general election?

Did not vote

Other

Green Party

UK Independence Party

Plaid Cymru

Liberal Democrats

Scottish National Party

Labour Party

Conservative Party

19. Which party did you vote for in the 2015 general election?

Conservative Party

Labour Party

Scottish National Party

Liberal Democrats

Plaid Cymru

UK Independence Party

Green Party

Other

Did not vote

A travel magazine published a list of things that tourists found distinctive about Britain. On a scale of 0 to 100, how British do you feel when you think of each of the following (0 = not at all British, 100 = very British):

Please note: We don't want to know whether you like each item or not, but rather how British it makes you feel. Indicate this by moving the slider scale button left or right.

20. The Royal family

21. The overseas regiments who fought in the British army in the World Wars

22. The English language, spoken in a regional accent

23. The appearance of many British people: pale skin, blue eyes and red or light hair

24. Drinking Tea

25. Punk-rock music

26. The mix of different people living in Britain

27. Anglican churches

28. Chicken Tikka Masala

29. Cricket

30. Football

31. Rugby

32. British Trade Union banners

33. The National Health Service

34. The National Trust

35. BBC Radio 4

36. The London 'Ali G'-style accent

37. Rural Britain, with its hedgerows, rolling hills and neat farms

38. The singer Freddie Mercury

39. In addition, do any other symbols make you feel British? Please give as many answers as you wish

40. In your view, which of the following is a more accurate description of Britain:

- Britain is a mainly Protestant country with a historic White majority population and ethnic minorities in the cities
- Britain is a multi-religious country formed of many races and ethnicities

41. Which strikes you as a more accurate description of British history?

- Britain is a nation of immigrants. Each wave of new immigrants brings their culture and changes the country into something new
- Britain is a nation of mainly native-born people. Those of immigrant background assimilated into the culture and institutions laid down centuries ago

42. Would you like for your son or daughter to join Britain's armed forces?

No

Yes

43. Thinking of the last time you socialised with friends; what share were British?

None

Less than half

About half

Most

All

None

44. In your view, is the death penalty appropriate for some crimes

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly agree

45. Do you agree that things in Britain were better in the past?

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly agree

46. Should there be an institution with separate decision-making powers for voters in England?

Yes

No

Unsure

47. Do you think that things in Britain will get better in the future?

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Agree

Strongly agree

48. What is your Prolific ID?