
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk. or alternatively
The Glyphosate Saga Continues: ‘Dissenting’ Member States and the European Way Forward

Giulia Claudia Leonelli*

Abstract:
A decision will soon have to be taken regarding the renewal of approval of glyphosate at EU level. Nonetheless, this pesticidal active substance is more controversial than ever. This article critically assesses different strategies pursued by EU Member States and regional authorities that challenge the EU approach to glyphosate and aim to safeguard their higher levels of public health and environmental protection. It reflects on the prospects of success of these strategies, and their compatibility with EU law. The analysis encompasses the action for the annulment of glyphosate’s 2017 re-approval brought by the Brussels-Capital Region, the Austrian attempt to enact a blanket ban on glyphosate-based pesticidal formulations, and the more sophisticated strategies pursued by Luxemburg and France. The article concludes that, while France has set an example, adopting the French approach may prove rather difficult for other Member States. An EU-wide strategy on glyphosate is urgently needed.

Keywords: Glyphosate, Pesticides, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Precautionary Principle, Environmental Public Interest Litigation, Access to Justice

1. INTRODUCTION

The deadline for glyphosate’s renewal of approval at the European Union (EU) level is fast approaching.¹ This pesticidal active substance is more controversial than ever, and the re-authorization procedure is likely to be even more troubled than it was back in 2017. A considerable number of EU Member States are challenging the EU approach to the governance of the uncertain risks posed by glyphosate. Ultimately, these Member States advocate the setting of a higher level of protection and lower threshold of acceptable risk at EU level. As explained in further detail in the following section, two radically different approaches to scientific uncertainty and two diametrically opposed long-term visions for the agricultural and food production systems are clashing across the EU. In the face of persisting uncertainty, the risks posed by the use of glyphosate and their acceptability are differently evaluated by different stakeholders in the light of their different normative perspectives, value systems and goals.

This article critically assesses different strategies pursued by Member States and regional authorities to challenge the EU regulatory approach to glyphosate and safeguard their intended level of protection and threshold of acceptable risk. These national or regional measures call into question the EU determination that glyphosate is safe enough for use in pesticidal formulations, and seek to deviate from the EU’s 2017 decision to renew the approval

this active substance. The article focuses on the prospects of success of these measures and their compatibility with EU law.

The next section sets the stage for the analysis. Section 3 takes a close look at the action for the annulment of glyphosate’s EU-wide renewal of approval brought in Brussels-Capital Region, laying particular emphasis on the obstacles to the admissibility of this action and the prospective limits in the assessment of the merits of this case. Section 4 focuses on the Austrian attempt to enact a legislative ban on the use of all pesticides containing the active substance glyphosate, as a class. The analysis is conducted against the backdrop of the unsuccessful challenge brought by Austria and the Upper Austria region in the Upper Austria case. Section 5 evaluates the more complex strategies pursued by Luxemburg and France to challenge glyphosate’s re-approval. Upon suggesting that Luxemburg’s measures are incompatible with EU law, this section highlights the overall strength and effectiveness of the French approach. The final section concludes that the French strategy is effective in risk regulation terms, and compatible with EU law. As such, it provides a viable way forward for other ‘dissenting’ Member States. Nonetheless, a unitary position at EU level on the acceptability of glyphosate’s risks is urgently needed; this is all the more important in light of the European Green Deal commitments and the Farm to Fork Strategy.

2. THE GLYPHOSATE CONUNDRUM AND THE PPP REGULATION ARRANGEMENTS

The EU-wide renewal of approval of the pesticidal active substance glyphosate has sparked controversy across the EU. Ever since the 2015 decision by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) to classify it as ‘probably carcinogenic’, glyphosate has been the object of heated debate. The ‘Ban Glyphosate’ European Citizens’ Initiative succeeded in mobilizing consumers, farmers, and stakeholders across the EU. The Commission, by contrast, struggled to build a qualified majority in Comitology in favour of glyphosate’s re-authorization, and only managed to muster one at the very last minute in December 2017. Science can neither confirm nor categorically exclude the hazardousness (namely, the carcinogenicity) of this active substance. The 2021 Draft Assessment Report of the designated co-Rapporteur EU Member States has confirmed the absence of conclusive scientific proof of a causal link between exposure to glyphosate, on the one hand, and adverse (tumour initiating

3 Case T-366/03, Land Oberösterreich and Austria v. Commission EU:T:2005:347; and Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05, Land Oberösterreich and Austria v. Commission EU:C:2007:510 (Upper Austria).
and tumour promoting) effects, on the other. Nonetheless, in the wake of the ‘Monsanto Papers’ scandal and after successful class actions in the United States (US), the question of glyphosate’s carcinogenicity is more controversial than ever. US courts have found that the available scientific evidence is solid enough to establish a causal link between exposure to glyphosate and the development of Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma, awarding unprecedentedly high damages to the plaintiffs.

Far from being a mere scientific matter, the assessment of the uncertain risks posed by glyphosate and the evaluation of their acceptability raise questions of a normative nature. Facts and values, scientific and non-scientific considerations are structurally intertwined in the field of risk regulation. The determination of the threshold of legally relevant adverse effects, which warrants regulatory intervention, is never a matter of ‘pure’ science. Rather, this determination results from three different factors.

The first factor consists of recourse to more or less prudential approaches to risk assessment: this results in a different evidence base. Risk assessment involves an evaluation and characterization of uncertain risks, conducted by technical-scientific experts. As openly acknowledged in the scientific community, different ‘science-policy choices’ are required throughout the risk assessment stage and will influence the final results of a risk assessment to a considerable extent. Ideal ‘sound scientific’ approaches are premised on the assumption that uncertainty and variability are predictable, objectively quantifiable and manageable. Adopting a cautious approach and referring to worst case scenarios is thus unwarranted from a sound scientific perspective. By contrast, prudential approaches postulate a very cautious approach in the exercise of scientific judgment and in the selection of specific methods, data

---

7 In May 2019, the Commission appointed 4 Member States (France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden) as co-Rapporteurs for the first stage in the glyphosate risk assessment. In Dec. 2019, the ‘Glyphosate Renewal Group’ submitted an application for renewal of approval after Dec. 2022. In June 2021, the co-Rapporteurs finalized their Draft Assessment Report and a further Report on the (proposed) harmonized classification and labelling of this active substance: these will be reviewed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). See European Commission, ‘Status of Glyphosate in the EU’, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/glyphosate_en.


12 For an analysis of ‘sound scientific’ and ‘prudential’ approaches through the lens of ideal ‘evidence-based’ and ‘socially acceptable risk’ paradigms, see Leonelli, n. 10 above. In a similar vein, albeit from the different (procedural) perspective of Rational-Instrumental and Deliberative-Constitutive paradigms, see E. Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart, 2007). The terminology of ‘sound scientific’ risk assessments and ‘sound science’) has been traditionally employed by the denigrators of the precautionary principle. For an analysis, see e.g. W.E. Wagner, ‘The Bad Science Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation’ (2003) 66(4) Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 63-134.
and default assumptions. In the context of the glyphosate controversy, the application of more or less prudential approaches to risk assessment has resulted in the coexistence of different data and different bodies of scientific research.13

The second factor is the varying extent to which regulators focus on conclusive scientific proof of the existence of a hazard and pathway for the materialization of a risk,14 as opposed to persisting uncertainty surrounding the hazardous properties of a product or the potential materialization of a risk. This is the ‘sound science’ versus ‘uncertainty’ dichotomy.15 The extent to which regulators adhere to ‘sound science’ or take persisting uncertainty and the perceived insufficiency of the available data into account influences the inferences which are drawn from the available scientific evidence.16 The ‘sound science’ versus ‘uncertainty’ dimension is prominent in the glyphosate debate: as already explained, scientific research has neither established nor excluded glyphosate’s carcinogenicity.

The third and final factor is the level of protection pursued by regulators. In this respect, the extent to which regulators prioritize the economic cost-benefit effectiveness of risk governance, as opposed to pursuing enhanced protection and considering other legitimate factors, comes into play. This third factor is the normative frame which informs the entire risk regulation process.

In cases where hazards and risks have been conclusively established, this normative frame emerges directly.17 In risk regulation systems characterized by reliance on ‘sound scientific’ approaches to risk assessment and regulatory adherence to ‘sound science’, economic cost-benefit analysis is employed to determine whether and to what extent conclusively established risks should be regulated. Hazardous products should only be regulated in so far as the public health and environmental benefits of regulatory intervention are expected to outweigh the economic costs of risk regulation and the economic benefits of the relevant product. Under different systems of risk regulation, regulators may choose to pursue enhanced (namely, higher than cost-benefit effective) levels of protection and take other legitimate factors into account. In either case, the normative frames informing the regulatory process will directly and expressly feed into the determination of the threshold of acceptable risk.

---


14 A ‘hazard’ is defined as a biological, chemical or physical agent with the potential to cause adverse effects. A ‘risk’, on the other hand, is a function of the probability of occurrence of adverse effects and the severity of these effects, consequential to exposure to a hazard (see Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 27th edn (Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2019), p. 128).

15 Leonelli, n. 10 above.

16 This second dimension is distinct from the one of recourse to ‘sound scientific’ or ‘prudential’ approaches to risk assessment. First, the ‘sound science’ versus ‘uncertainty’ dichotomy does not centre on scientific methodological questions pertaining to the risk assessment stage, but on the interpretation of the available data by regulators. Second, it encompasses a focus on the different ways in which the ‘same’ evidence base may be differently interpreted by different regulators. Third, in cases where hazards and risks have been conclusively established, the former dimension (recourse to ‘sound scientific’ or ‘prudential’ approaches) may result in regulatory divergencies; the latter dimension (‘sound science’ versus ‘uncertainty’), by contrast, will not come into play.

17 For an in-depth analysis of this and the following points, including the linkage between ‘sound scientific’ approaches to risk assessment, adherence to ‘sound science’ and the pursuit of cost-benefit effective levels of protection, see Leonelli, n. 10 above.
In cases where hazards and risks have not been conclusively established, by contrast, the normative frames informing the regulatory process will only come into play indirectly. In the glyphosate controversy, the point is not whether economic cost-benefit analysis, enhanced protection or other legitimate factors should inform regulatory responses, but rather whether regulators should act, despite the absence of conclusive proof of glyphosate’s carcinogenicity. The answer to this question depends on the selection by regulators of a specific evidence base, and on their specific inferences. These regulatory determinations are still (albeit indirectly) informed by normative frames.

In the face of high levels of scientific complexity, ‘sound science’ will not necessarily yield any factually ‘correct’ answer: the boundaries between ‘objective’ facts and ‘subjective’ values thus fade in the field of risk regulation. Far from being neutral and objective, the assumption that ‘sound scientific’ approaches must be relied on and that ‘sound science’ must be adhered to is informed by considerations surrounding the economic cost-benefit effectiveness of risk regulation. Clearly, adherence to ‘sound science’ relieves market actors from the economic costs and regulatory burdens associated with precautionary measures. By contrast, prudential risk assessment policies and a focus on different forms of scientific uncertainty reflect the pursuit of enhanced levels of protection and consideration of other legitimate factors. In this sense, as famously argued, ‘facts’ and ‘values’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘normative’ evaluations, ‘science’ and ‘social order’ are co-produced.\(^\text{18}\)

This sheds some light on the glyphosate controversy. The constituencies in favour of glyphosate’s re-authorization have consistently pointed to sound scientific data, stressing that there is no conclusive scientific proof of glyphosate’s carcinogenicity. The assumption that the uncertain risks posed by glyphosate must be taken because (and as long as) its hazardous properties have not been conclusively established is indirectly informed by economic considerations surrounding the important role of glyphosate-based pesticides in the agricultural sector.

Conversely, Member States and societal stakeholders in favour of a ban or stringent restrictions have drawn on prudential risk assessments and focused on persisting uncertainty. Reliance on this evidence base and this interpretation of the available data indirectly reflect the pursuit of enhanced levels of protection, precautionary evaluations, and consideration of other legitimate factors: these include a long-term vision for more sustainable agricultural approaches, and the potential development of less hazardous alternatives to glyphosate. Science can by no means solve the conundrum. It can neither provide a single ‘valid’ answer, nor a universally agreeable one.

The 2017 EU-wide renewal of approval of glyphosate has caused considerable discontent among Member States, triggering the enactment of several national or regional measures. Through these measures, national or regional authorities have sought to safeguard their higher levels of protection. The measures under analysis in this article are connected to the exercise of specific Member State powers, under the complex multi-level regulatory architecture of the Plant Protection Products Regulation (‘PPP Regulation’).\(^\text{19}\) As reconstructed throughout the next sections, the PPP Regulation provides for the EU-wide approval of

\(^{18}\) On the notion of co-production, see Jasanoff (2004), n. 11 above.

pesticidal active substances. When deciding on approval or renewal of approval, the Commission should take into account the results of risk assessment, the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle, and any relevant other legitimate factors. Specific pesticides (plant protection products, hereafter ‘PPPs’) containing an active substance, however, may only be marketed or used at the national level after the relevant Member State has authorized them. PPPs are made up of one or more active substances and a number of co-constituents; the same active substance will be present in a plurality of different PPPs. Specific criteria apply to the national authorization process, which takes place in the broader context of the ‘zonal system’. National regulators may also have recourse to the precautionary principle.

20 Member States may refuse to grant authorizations for specific glyphosate-based pesticidal products, or subject them to specific risk management measures. Nonetheless, structural-regulatory as well as practical constraints come into play. The next section begins the examination by focusing on the first (unsuccessful) strategy: the one pursued by the Brussels-Capital Region.


The factual and legal background of Brussels-Capital Region sheds some light on a few problematic aspects associated with the institutional architecture of the PPP Regulation zonal system. The discretion of the Member States and their margins of manoeuvre in the evaluation of the risks posed by PPPs are limited by the specificities of the zonal system arrangements.

Where the approval of an active substance has been renewed at EU level, the applicants for authorization of specific PPPs containing that active substance shall apply to each Member State where they are seeking re-authorization of the relevant pesticidal formulations. Just like in the case of the first authorization of a PPP, each application will be examined by a Rapporteur Member State in the relevant zone. Every Zonal Steering Committee will take the final decision as to which Member State should act as zonal Rapporteur. Where applications for the renewal of approval of different PPPs containing the same active substance are pending in a zone, the Zonal Steering Committee is encouraged to appoint a single Rapporteur; nonetheless, this may not occur in practice. The other Member States in the zone will be involved in the procedure and will submit their comments; however, they shall refrain from taking any decision pending the Rapporteur’s examination of the dossiers. Once the

---

20 PPP Regulation, Recital 8 and Art. 13(2).
21 Annex I of the PPP Regulation identifies three zones for the assessment of PPPs: these are Zone A (North), Zone B (Centre), and Zone C (South). The three zones are characterized by specific agricultural, plant health, environmental and climatic conditions.
22 PPP Regulation, Recital (8) and Art. 1(4).
23 Ibid., Art. 43(1) and (2).
24 Ibid., Arts 43(3) to (6), 35 and 36.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 13.
28 PPP Regulation, Art. 35.
Rapporteur’s assessment is ready, the Member States shall ‘grant or refuse authorizations [for the specific PPP] accordingly on the basis of the conclusions of the assessment of the [Rapporteur]’.²⁹

If the Rapporteur and other Member States in the zone diverge in their evaluation of the uncertain risks posed by a pesticidal product and their acceptability, the margins of discretion for the latter not to re-authorize a PPP are ultimately curtailed. There are two exceptions. Firstly, a Member State may in its authorization set additional risk mitigation measures.³⁰ Secondly, where the concerns of a Member State cannot be controlled through these additional measures, the relevant Member State may refuse authorization if, ‘due to its specific environmental or agricultural circumstances, it has substantiated reasons to consider that the [PPP] still poses an unacceptable risk to human or animal health or the environment’.³¹ The latter exception may be employed by ‘dissenting’ Member States, in circumstances where the acceptability of the uncertain risks posed by a PPP lies at the heart of zonal disagreements. However, as a matter of law, this exception only enables a Member State to refuse authorization if it can point to specific national ‘environmental or agricultural circumstances’.³²

Similar considerations apply to the mutual recognition procedure. This involves an applicant’s request to a Member State to recognize the authorization for a PPP which has been granted in another Member State. If the two Member States are part of the same zone, the Member State which has received the request cannot refuse mutual recognition; the only applicable exceptions are the two provided for in Article 36(3), as illustrated above.³³ Clearly, the mutual recognition procedure erodes the discretionary powers of the Member States to a greater extent than authorizations in the zonal system. In the case of mutual recognition, Member States can only recognize a pre-existing authorization granted by a different national authority, without being involved in the risk assessment stage.

Delays and disagreements among Member States in the zonal assessment of glyphosate-based PPPs³⁴ prompted the Brussels-Capital Region to bring an action for the annulment of Implementing Regulation 2017/2324, by which the Commission had re-authorizered the active substance glyphosate at EU level. The Brussels-Capital Region sought the annulment of glyphosate’s re-approval by alleging, inter alia, an infringement of the principle that a high level of protection shall be pursued in the Union and an infringement of the precautionary principle.³⁵ The Region raised a number of more or less pertinent points surrounding the admissibility of the action. For the purposes of the present enquiry, two specific points deserve particular attention. These relate to the assessment of the Region’s direct concern within the meaning of the second limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, and the interpretation of PPP authorizations as implementing acts. The following sub-sections address these points. They illustrate why the Region’s challenge was overall very likely to be deemed

²⁹ Ibid., Arts 36(2), (3).
³⁰ Ibid., Art. 36(3).
³¹ Ibid.
³² A refusal to authorize a PPP must also be notified to the Commission with a specific technical-scientific justification (ibid., Art. 36(2)).
³³ PPP Regulation, Arts 40(1) and 41(1).
³⁴ See the express references in Case T-178/18, Brussels-Capital Region, paras 45 and 46; and in the Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-352/19 P, Brussels-Capital Region EU:C:2020:588, paras 88-98 and 99-104.
inadmissible and why, even if considered admissible, the action would have been unlikely to succeed in the merits.

3.1 Interpretation of Direct Effect *In Concreto: Not Impossible, But Unlikely To Succeed*

The Brussels-Capital Region argued that it was directly and individually concerned by glyphosate’s re-approval under the second limb of Article 263(4) TFEU. The Region claimed that it was individually concerned by the renewal of approval of glyphosate, in so far as this compromised the exercise of its environmental competences under national law. Importantly, the Region also maintained that it was directly concerned by the Implementing Regulation of 2017, in the specific circumstances of the case.

In accordance with settled case law, the Court will find that an applicant is directly concerned within the meaning of the second limb of Article 263(4) TFEU if two conditions are met. First, the act must directly affect the legal position of the applicant. Second, the implementation of the act must be automatic and exclude the exercise of discretion by other authorities. In the case under analysis, the Region pointed to the specific dynamics underlying the re-authorization of PPPs in the zonal system to advance the argument that it was directly concerned.

Pursuant to Article 43(5) and (6) of the PPP Regulation, the Member States which have received an application for the re-authorization of PPPs shall adopt their decision at the latest 12 months after the renewal of the approval of the relevant active substance. Where this proves impossible in the zonal system, the Member States shall extend the authorization for the period necessary to complete the examination. In this case, the Region claimed that glyphosate’s re-approval at EU level automatically affected its own legal position (exercise of environmental competences), in so far as all Member States in the zone were pro tempore bound to extend the authorizations of glyphosate-based PPPs.

The GC rejected this argument, finding that it was based on a misinterpretation of the PPP Regulation. It noted that the renewal of approval of an active substance does not automatically cause the confirmation, extension or renewal of marketing authorizations for PPPs. Rather, the holders of national authorizations for PPPs must request the renewal of their authorizations at Member State level. The GC indirectly suggested that the temporary extension referred to by the applicant did not automatically result from glyphosate’s renewal of approval, but from delays in the context of the zonal system. It thus concluded that the Region was not directly concerned.

AG Bobek, by contrast, embraced a substantive reading and developed a teleological interpretation of the standing criteria. The Opinion emphasizes that the EU Courts have increasingly assessed the ways in which EU acts may alter the applicant’s legal situation *in concreto*. The AG focused on both the EU Courts’ evaluation of direct concern in light of the

---

36 Case T-178/18 Brussels-Capital Region, para. 44.
38 Case T-178/18, Brussels-Capital Region, para. 53.
39 Ibid., para. 54.
specific purpose of the contested measure, and their assessment of the margins of discretion that could be exercised in practice.\textsuperscript{40} He underlined that the existing national PPP authorizations were automatically maintained as a direct consequence of the adoption of the act under challenge.\textsuperscript{41}

It is hard to disagree with the AG on this point. If a substantive rather than a formal perspective is taken, the Region would certainly qualify as being directly concerned. Still, in his Opinion, the AG chose to focus on the EU Courts’ alleged ‘regional blindness’.\textsuperscript{42} He did neither engage with the specificities of judicial review of EU environmental and public health law, nor elaborate on the EU Courts’ (different) interpretation of direct concern in actions brought in this area by market actors; yet, raising the question of the equality of arms\textsuperscript{43} might have proved helpful to underpin the AG’s substantive-teleological interpretation of direct concern.

EU refusals to authorize active substances, EU authorizations subject to specific restrictions and EU withdrawals of or amendments to pre-existing authorizations of active substances have been the object of several challenges by market actors. The notifiers of an active substance have been consistently held to be individually concerned. Further, the Courts have repeatedly found notifiers to be directly concerned in that these EU measures do not leave any margins of discretion to the Member States.\textsuperscript{44} This is unproblematic in the context of EU refusals to authorize active substances or EU withdrawals of authorizations. However, the picture changes in case of EU authorizations subject to specific restrictions or EU amendments to existing authorizations.\textsuperscript{45} In these cases, the GC has still found that implementation is automatic, thus granting standing to market actors; however, the question is more complex than it may seem at first sight.

On the one hand, it is certainly true that Member States do not enjoy any discretion as regards the implementation of the EU-wide restrictive measures enshrined in the authorizations of active substances. On the other hand, it is equally true that Member States may add further restrictions and requirements, or choose not to authorize specific PPPs containing an active substance. From this perspective, the Member States enjoy discretion and the implementation of the EU measures is not automatic; the notifiers’ direct concern thus becomes questionable.

The Court’s non-restrictive interpretation of the TFEU standing criteria in challenges brought by market actors in the field of pesticidal products and the question of the equality of arms in public health and environmental litigation could have strengthened the AG’s assessment of direct effect \textit{in concreto}. Nonetheless, it is still worth noting that a substantive-teleological interpretation of direct effect was overall quite unlikely to be successful in the

\textsuperscript{40} Opinion in Case C-352/19 P, \textit{Brussels-Capital Region}, paras 49-55.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., paras 83-86, and all the case law cited therein.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., paras 97 and 141.
\textsuperscript{43} For an express reference to this principle, see the applicants’ arguments in Case T-236/04, \textit{EEB and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission} EU:T:2005:426, para. 47.
\textsuperscript{44} With the only exception of challenges against a decision to have recourse to the comparative assessment procedure: see Case C-244/16 P, \textit{IQV v. Commission} EU:C:2018:177, and Case C-384/16 P, \textit{Copper v. Commission} EU:C:2018:176.
specific circumstances of this case. The ECJ straight forwardly adhered to the formalistic, yet perfectly tenable, interpretation of the GC. The Region’s ground of appeal was dismissed.

3.2 A Bold But Unsuccessful Argument: The Absence of Implementing Measures

Besides laying emphasis on the automaticity of Belgium’s extension of the authorizations for glyphosate-based PPPs, the AG put forward a much bolder argument to establish the Region’s standing. He contended that glyphosate’s re-approval impacted on the Region’s environmental competences by its very existence. From this perspective, the contested act did not entail implementing measures, at all; thus, the appellant could also be held to have standing under the third limb of Article 263(4).

To begin with, the AG argued that the authorization of an active substance, despite being a preliminary step in the authorization of PPPs, ‘produces significant legal effects on its own, independently of any national decision authorizing specific products’ (emphasis added).46 Thus, ‘the fact that decisions on the renewal of the specific authorizations [for glyphosate-based PPPs] are not automatic […] does not detract from the fact that the determination as to the safety of that [active] substance does not need any implementing measure to deploy legal effects’.47 Further, he emphasized that non-substantive or ancillary measures should not qualify as implementing measures where an EU act is ‘fully and autonomously operational in the light of its purpose, content and effects on the applicant’s legal situation’.48

Building on this premise, he noted that the Region was not contesting any specific authorizations of PPPs, but the safety of the active substance as such. This is ‘an aspect on which the contested act provides a final determination [and] no measure of implementation is necessary or provided for in that respect’ (emphasis added).49 On these grounds, he argued that the Region had standing under the third limb of Article 263(4).

This point in the Opinion raises the complex issue of the relationship between EU approvals of active substances and national authorizations of PPPs containing them, the nature of the latter measures, and the extent to which they may qualify as stricto sensu implementing acts. While national measures automatically incorporate some provisions enshrined in the EU approval of active substances, they may expand the scope of the relevant restrictions. Member State authorizations are thus located on a spectrum from automatic implementation to the point where national discretion is so broad that the national measures cease to be implementing measures, at all. From this perspective, both EU approvals of active substances and national authorizations of PPPs containing them qualify as self-standing, self-contained acts.

It is indeed possible to make a case that national authorizations of PPPs differ from EU approvals of active substances in their scope ratione materiae and ratione personae to such an

46 Opinion in Case C-352/19 P, Brussels-Capital Region, para. 77.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid., para. 163.
extent that they do not qualify as proper implementing measures.\textsuperscript{50} In the former respect, the authorization of an active substance as present in representative PPPs is structurally different from the authorization of a plurality of different pesticidal products containing the active substance \textit{and} different co-constituents. The relevant approval criteria also differ. Symmetrically, challenging the legal determination that an active substance is safe enough for representative PPPs containing it to be authorized at the national level is structurally different from challenging national authorizations of specific PPPs. In the latter respect, the approval of an active substance and the authorization of PPPs produce different legal effects for different constituencies.

In \textit{Brussels-Capital Region}, paradoxically, the acknowledgment that EU approvals of active substances are self-contained acts could not underpin the argument on the Region’s direct concern. The reason is that the Member States (or regional and local authorities) can only regulate \textit{PPPs}; they have no competence in the exhaustively harmonized area of regulation of \textit{active substances}, and cannot exercise their powers in this respect. This point is illustrated in the following sections.

On these grounds, the EU finding that glyphosate is safe enough to meet the approval criteria of the PPP Regulation could not alter the \textit{legal sphere} of the Region; the latter’s regulatory powers may only be exercised in regards of glyphosate-based PPPs, whose authorizations qualify as self-standing acts and encroach on the Region’s legal position. However, the recognition that the approval of an active substance can be challenged as a self-contained act and that national authorizations do not qualify as \textit{stricto sensu} implementing measures would be extremely helpful to environmental NGOs. The reference to ‘regulatory acts which do not entail implementation’ in the third limb of Article 263(4) is one of the main obstacles to direct access to the EU Courts, for this category of non-privileged applicants.

Against this backdrop, the strategy pursued by the Brussels-Capital Region was unlikely to be successful. As the analysis has demonstrated, the finding of inadmissibility was overall predictable.

\textbf{3.3 The Merits of the Case: Regrettably, Unlikely to Succeed}

As anticipated at the beginning of this section, the Brussels-Capital Region alleged an infringement of the precautionary principle and an infringement of the principle that a high level of protection shall be pursued in the Union. This triggers the question whether, had the action been deemed admissible, the Region’s challenge stood any chances of being successful in the merits.

Throughout the years, market actors have challenged several EU acts adopted in the field of risk regulation; some of the complaints raised by the applicants relate to an alleged misapplication of the precautionary principle by the EU institutions.\textsuperscript{51} The CJEU has always acknowledged that the EU institutions enjoy a broad administrative discretion in cases involving complex technical-scientific evaluations. Consequently, in challenges against acts


which are deemed *too restrictive*, the CJEU has confined itself to ‘examining whether [an act] contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the authority [clearly exceeded] the bounds of its discretion’.\(^{52}\) The CJEU has thus employed a deferential, procedural standard of review. This is connected to a more or less explicit acknowledgment by the EU Courts that the EU risk managers exercised their administrative discretion in precautionary risk management.\(^{53}\) In these cases, the *power* of the EU institutions to have recourse to the precautionary principle goes hand in hand with *procedural* review by the EU Courts.

An analysis of actions against EU risk regulation acts challenged for being *insufficiently protective* offers a different picture. As regards regulatory (non-legislative) acts, the EU Courts have ruled on alleged infringements of the precautionary principle *stricto sensu* on two occasions: in *Paraquat*, and in *France v. Commission.*\(^{54}\) In these cases, the relevant point is not whether the EU risk managers incurred a manifest error of assessment in the exercise of precautionary risk management. Rather, the applicants’ complaints relate to the EU institutions’ *failure to comply* with the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle. As a result, the EU Courts have employed a more intense standard of scrutiny. Rather than focusing on the *procedural* conditions for the exercise of administrative discretion in precautionary risk management, the EU Courts have ultimately sought to review *substantive* compliance with the tenets of the precautionary principle. In this sense, the precautionary principle operates as an inner limit to the EU institutions’ broad administrative discretion in the field of risk regulation.

Firstly, in *Paraquat* and *France v. Commission*, procedural questions as to whether the EU institutions incurred a manifest error of assessment or took all relevant factors into account are either not prominent, or not dealt with at all.\(^{55}\) The applicants straight forwardly alleged a substantive infringement of the precautionary principle and of the principle that a high level of protection shall be pursued in the Union. Secondly, in these cases, the EU Courts have exercised a more intrusive review of the scientific evidence relied upon by the Commission. Procedural questions are not salient. When dealing with the applicant’s points in *Paraquat*, for instance, the Court of First Instance famously found that an interpretation of the pre-2009 framework for the governance of pesticidal active substances in the light of the precautionary principle implies that “the existence of solid evidence which, while not resolving scientific


\(^{53}\) In a limited number of cases, the CJEU has instead employed a quasi-substantive standard. For an analysis of different strands of procedural review, see Leonelli, n. 51 above.

\(^{54}\) Reference here is made to actions for annulment or preliminary rulings on the validity of EU non-legislative acts adopted in the field of risk regulation (rather than in the broader field of environmental law) and challenged for being insufficiently protective on the grounds of an infringement of the precautionary principle (*stricto sensu*). *Paraquat* is, to date, the only successful action: see Case T-229/04, *Sweden v Commission* EU:T:2007:217 (*Paraquat*). In Case T-257/07, *France v. Commission* EU:T:2011:444, unsuccessfully appealed in Case C-601/11 *P*, *France v. Commission* EU:C:2013:465, the EU Courts assessed France’s claims on alleged breaches of the precautionary principle and rejected them.

\(^{55}\) The former applies to *France v. Commission*, where the GC applied the manifest error of assessment test in a very different way from the ‘traditional’ application in challenges to acts which are deemed too restrictive. The latter applies to *Paraquat*, in this case, the application of a procedural standard of review would have not justified the annulment of the act under challenge. See G.C. Leonelli, ‘Judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle from *Paraquat* to *Blaise*: quantitative thresholds, risk assessment and the gap between regulation and regulatory implementation’ (2021) 22(2) German Law Journal, pp. 184-215.
uncertainty, may reasonably raise doubts as to the safety of a substance, justifies, in principle, the refusal to [approve an active substance]’ (emphasis added). In a similar vein, referring to the tenets of the precautionary principle, the Court of First Instance held that in order to approve an active substance the EU institutions must establish ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the restrictions on the use of the substance involved make it possible to ensure that use of that substance will be in accordance with the [legislative requirements]’ (emphasis added).57

Undeniably, judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle poses several challenges for the CJEU. In the face of high levels of complexity and scientific pluralism, the level of protection pursued by regulators could always be challenged for not being high enough. Furthermore, the complete definition of the precautionary principle stipulates that when scientific evidence is incomplete, inconclusive or insufficient and a risk may be too high to meet the intended level of protection, EU risk managers may take precautionary action.58 This entails the exercise of administrative discretion in three respects: in the determination that the available evidence is incomplete, inconclusive or insufficient, in the setting of the intended level of protection in a specific regulatory area, and in the final determination that the relevant risk may be too high to meet the intended level of protection. A balance must then be struck between the acknowledgment that the EU institutions are bound to comply with the precautionary principle, and the recognition of their margins of administrative discretion in complying with the principle.59

A close examination of Paraquat and France v. Commission suggests that, in challenges against acts deemed insufficiently protective, the EU Courts have sought to carve out a ‘quantitative threshold’ standard of review.60 A set of indicators can be inferred from these two cases. If the challenge brought in Brussels-Capital Region is assessed against these indicators, it is reasonable to suggest that the action for annulment was unlikely to succeed in the merits.

Firstly, an action brought on the grounds of the precautionary principle will be more likely to succeed where, persisting uncertainty and scientific complexity notwithstanding, the applicants can make a case that the probability that a risk will materialize and that the relevant adverse effects will occur is high.61 This occurred in Paraquat; the applicant pointed to scientific evidence showing that, under realistic conditions of use, risks would materialize and adverse effects would occur due to specific operator exposures to paraquat-based PPPs. In France v. Commission, by contrast, the GC expressly and repeatedly referred to the finding that the relevant risks would materialize was ‘low’, ‘very low’ or ‘extremely low’.62 In the case of glyphosate, the absence of conclusive scientific proof of carcinogenicity acts as an obstacle to a finding that specific risks will materialize.

56 Case T-229/04, Paraquat, para. 161.
57 Ibid., para. 170.
59 See Leonelli, n. 55 above.
60 Ibid.
61 Whether the severity of the relevant potential adverse effects also plays a role, on the other hand, is less clear-cut.
62 Case T-257/07, France v. Commission, paras 96, 98, 100, 104, 107 to 109, 137, 149 to 151, 155, 159, 163 to 171, 219, 229, 230, 250, 240, 251, 261 and 265.
Secondly, the prospects of success will be considerably higher where the applicants can point to a specific evidence base to substantiate their claims, rather than merely focus on a diverging interpretation of the evidence relied upon by the EU institutions. Different evaluations as to the acceptability of a risk will not make a convincing case. This emerges from a comparison of Paraquat, where the applicant pointed to specific data, and France v. Commission, where the disagreements largely centred on a diverging interpretation of the EFSA’s evidence base. For this reason, the applicants should invoke prudential risk assessments to substantiate their claim. In the case of glyphosate, the Brussels-Capital Region could have referred to the IARC’s monograph and other studies highlighting persisting uncertainty surrounding glyphosate’s carcinogenicity.

Nonetheless, this would have probably not been sufficient; this point brings us to the third indicator. Persisting uncertainty and scientific complexity notwithstanding, the evidence relied upon by the applicants should be as cogent and as specific as possible to the claims that they are making. To borrow the words of the Court of First Instance, the relevant evidence should be ‘solid’ and, ‘while not resolving scientific uncertainty, [it should] reasonably raise doubts as to the safety [of a product or process]’.63 In Paraquat, Sweden relied on studies on exposure to paraquat-based PPPs which cast serious doubts on the EU institutions’ determination that the Acceptable Operator Exposure Level (‘AOEL’) established for paraquat would be met.64 In the case of glyphosate, by contrast, scientific proof of carcinogenic effects is missing; science can neither confirm nor exclude them. If minority scientific opinion could establish a potential mechanism of action associated to glyphosate’s tumour initiating or tumour promoting effects, the scenario would be different. However, at the current stage of technical-scientific knowledge, applicants in a potential challenge could only point to persisting uncertainty and the insufficiency of the available evidence, which would most probably not suffice to meet the criterion of ‘solid’ scientific evidence.

Finally, specific legal underpinnings and the applicants’ reliance on robust references in the relevant regulatory frameworks will be crucial to assist the EU Courts in judicial review. In Paraquat, Sweden could rely on two express legislative requirements.65 In the case of glyphosate, legal underpinnings are not entirely missing. The PPP Regulation’s hazard-based cut-off criteria set a rebuttable presumption that carcinogenic active substances shall not be approved.66 However, evidence of a potential mechanism of action by which glyphosate could exert tumour initiating and tumour promoting effects is currently missing. Against this overall backdrop, even assuming that the Courts had found the action to be admissible, the annulment of glyphosate’s re-approval was on balance unlikely to succeed in the merits.

4. THE SECOND UNSUCCESSFUL STRATEGY AND THE UPPER AUSTRIA DÉJÀ-VU

---

63 Case T-229/04, Paraquat, para. 161.
64 Ibid., paras 70-71 and 172-192.
65 The relevant requirements were enshrined in Article 5 and Annex VI of Directive 91/414, the predecessor of the PPP Regulation.
66 See Annex II, point 3.6.3, and Article 4(7) of the PPP Regulation.
In July 2019, the Austrian Parliament passed a legislative measure enshrining a national ban on all glyphosate-based pesticides, on precautionary grounds. In May 2020, Austria provided the correct formal notification under Directive 2015/1535 on the provision of information in the field of technical regulations. The standstill period ended in August 2020. Regrettably, the Commission’s and the Member States’ comments and objections throughout the 2015 Directive procedures are not public. According to leaked documents publicized on the media, however, the Commission objected that ‘in an area governed by directly applicable EU law, Member States may not adopt national provisions that would affect the correct and full application of EU law’. It also noted that the Austrian measure would be irreconcilable with the 2017 Commission’s Implementing Regulation renewing the approval of glyphosate and that ‘problems linking pesticides to biodiversity decline [are] not unique to Austria’.

An analysis of the Austrian strategy begs the question whether a national, general legislative ban on all glyphosate-based PPPs, as a class, is compatible with EU law. The multi-level authorization procedure provided for under the PPP Regulation allocates exclusive authority to EU institutions as regards the approval of active substances. Final decision-making rests with the Commission and harmonization is exhaustive. The Member States, by contrast, have exclusive authority as regards the authorization of PPPs.

The relevant approval criteria are analysed in further detail in section 5. However, it is worth noting that the procedure for the EU-wide approval of an active substance involves an assessment of representative uses of representative PPPs containing the active substance. This is because active substances are never used on their own, but rather in specific pesticidal formulations. Pursuant to Article 4(5), the criteria for the approval of an active substance enshrined in Article 4(1), (2) and (3) ‘shall be deemed to be satisfied where [compliance with these criteria] has been established with respect to one or more representative uses of at least one [PPP] containing that active substance’. Symmetrically, the criteria of Article 4 shall be considered as complied with where authorization is expected to be possible for at least one of the representative uses of at least one pesticidal formulation containing that active substance. In sum, the EU-wide approval of an active substance implies a finding by the EU institutions that the relevant active substance is safe for use in at least some pesticidal formulations containing it.

These points trigger some considerations. A national blanket ban on all glyphosate-based PPPs, as a class, is tantamount to a finding that glyphosate is not safe for any use in any pesticidal formulations. Such a determination, however, could only be made at EU level, by means of a refusal to re-authorize glyphosate.

69 Ibid.
70 Recital (10) and Chapter II, Section 1 of the PPP Regulation, Arts 4 to 24.
71 Recital (23) and Chapter III of the PPP Regulation, Arts 28 to 57.
72 See also the references in Arts 8(1)(a), 8(1)(c), 14(1), 29(3), and Annex II.
73 Ibid., Annex II, para. 2.1.
A connected point was raised in the public comments submitted by market stakeholders in the context of the 2015 notification procedure. As rightly noted, Member State ‘evaluations [on PPPs] should be specific to the end products, comprising co-formulants and the overall formulation’;74 the PPP Regulation only allows ‘for a case-by-case refusal or withdrawal of authorizations of products’.75 Member States shall assess the risks associated with specific pesticidal formulations, made up of active substances and several co-constituents; particular attention should be paid to the risks posed by the interactions between the relevant active substance(s) and any co-formulants present in specific PPPs. Clearly, a blanket ban on all glyphosate-based PPPs does not respond to this rationale.76

Another salient point raised in the public comments relates to Austria’s impossibility to invoke Article 114(5) TFEU, on the introduction of national measures derogating from a (pre-existing) harmonization measure. Article 114(5) stipulates that the national measures must be based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment, on the grounds of a problem specific to that Member State and that arose after the adoption of the harmonization measure. As in the famous Upper Austria case, Austria sought to invoke this Article in its comments during the notification procedure. This was bound to be an unsuccessful strategy.

The Article’s reference to new scientific evidence does not allow for national justifications on the grounds of a different (precautionary) interpretation of existing data. Whether the Member States have drawn different scientific inferences in the face of persisting uncertainty, by taking a higher level of protection and a lower threshold of acceptable risk into account, is completely irrelevant.77 As regards the requirement of a problem specific to the Member State, both the AG and the ECJ in Upper Austria accepted that the word ‘specific’ does not mean the same as ‘unique’; rather, this terminology refers to situations which are particular, exceptional or unusual, and which distinguish the situation of the Member State from that of other Member States.78 This condition is rather difficult to meet. Finally, the requirement that the problem must have arisen after the adoption of the harmonization measure is the most difficult to comply with.

In Upper Austria, the Republic of Austria and the Upper Austria region sought the annulment of a 2003 Decision of the Commission, by which the latter had rejected Austria’s request for a derogation from the 2001 Directive on the Deliberate Release of GMOs on the grounds of (what is now) Article 114(5). As the AG noted, the evidence that they had produced on hybridization and crop-to-crop gene flow did not constitute new scientific evidence within the meaning of Article 114(5).79 As regards the specificity of the problem, the evidence could not point to unusual or specific ecosystems in the Region which would justify the adoption of

---

75 See the comments submitted by Nufarm Europe GmbH on 5 Aug. 2020.
76 Ultimately, national discretion must be exercised within the specific boundaries of the PPP Regulation; if a Member State wishes to challenge the EU regulatory approach to a specific active substance, it must have recourse to the Regulation’s specific procedures (PPP Regulation, Arts 21, 36, 40-41, 44, 69-71).
77 Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05, Upper Austria, paras 61 to 64.
78 Opinion of AG Sharpston in Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05, Upper Austria EU:C:2007:285, para. 109; and Judgment, para. 64.
79 Opinion, para. 122.
the measure. The applicants also failed to establish that the specific problem had arisen after the harmonization measure.

A potential Austrian challenge in the case of glyphosate-based PPPs would have met exactly the same fate. Firstly, it is unlikely that Austria would have been able to point to new diverging scientific evidence pointing to glyphosate’s carcinogenicity. As regards the second requirement, Austria invoked the risks posed by glyphosate-based PPPs to human health, groundwater and biodiversity. It is not impossible but rather difficult to imagine how Austria could identify peculiar or unusual characteristics which could render this problem specific to it. Even if Austria managed to do this, it would still face the hurdle of explaining how such specific problems only materialized after the adoption of the 2017 Implementing Regulation re-approving glyphosate.

The conditions of Article 114(5) TFEU are exceedingly stringent and cannot possibly accommodate diverging, precautionary national evaluations of uncertain risks vis-à-vis a higher national intended level of protection. The Austrian strategy was bound to be both incompatible with EU law and unsuccessful.

5. THE SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES OF LUXEMBURG AND FRANCE: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THEY COMPATIBLE WITH EU LAW?

In January 2020, the Minister of Agriculture of Luxemburg announced that all national marketing authorizations of glyphosate-based PPPs would be withdrawn from 1 February 2020. The grace period for use of these products lasted until 31 December 2020; as of 1 January 2021, the use of any glyphosate-based PPPs is prohibited in Luxemburg. Luxemburg has thus become the first EU Member State to ban glyphosate.

The Commission’s reaction to the Austrian planned legislative ban, analysed in section 4, begs the question how Luxemburg managed to take this course of action without any objections from the EU institutions. The answer can be evinced from the declarations of Luxemburg’s Minister of Agriculture. In October 2020, a Member of Luxemburg’s Parliament addressed a written question regarding the compatibility of Luxemburg’s measures with EU law to the Minister of Agriculture. This question made express reference to the Commission’s response to the Austrian notification of its legislative ban. The Minister’s official answer states that ‘unlike Austria, which [tried to] ban the introduction of glyphosate-based plant protection products by law, Luxemburg has withdrawn the authorizations for all plant protection products containing glyphosate’. According to the official answer, the Commission was simply informed of these withdrawals under the procedure provided for in Article 44(4) of the PPP Regulation.

80 Ibid., paras 114-123.
81 Ibid., paras 127-134.
Article 44 regulates the withdrawal or amendment of pre-existing authorizations for PPPs in the context of the zonal system. Pursuant to Article 44(1), Member States may review an authorization at any time where there are indications that a requirement for authorization is no longer met. The authorization shall be amended or withdrawn when, inter alia, the Member State finds that any requirements for authorization are no longer satisfied. Article 44(4) stipulates that where a Member State proceeds to withdraw or amend an authorization, it shall immediately inform the authorization holder, the other Member States, the Commission and the EFSA. The other Member States in the same zone shall withdraw or amend the authorization accordingly, taking into account national conditions and risk mitigation measures, except for the cases where they had previously refused authorization for the product on the grounds of national specificities.

Taking the text of this Article into consideration, the reasons behind the Commission’s silence become clearer. The review and withdrawal procedure of Article 44 does not provide the Commission with any opportunity to submit specific objections; nor does it enable the Commission to submit the national measure to Comitology for a vote on extension, amendment or repeal. From this perspective, Luxemburg’s choice to have recourse to this specific procedure was undoubtedly effective; so far, these measures have not been challenged. What remains to be seen is whether these measures are compatible with EU law.

Firstly, starting from the text of Article 44(4), it is worth stressing that the article employs the singular and refers to the review, withdrawal or amendment of ‘an authorization’. This shows that the rationale of this procedure was to enable a Member State to take action on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis and in respect of specific pesticidal formulations. This responds to the institutional architecture of the PPP Regulation, as explained in section 4 above. The relevant question then becomes whether the Luxemburgish authorities have proceeded on a case-by-case basis, providing a specific scientific justification for the withdrawal of each and every glyphosate-based PPP on the grounds of its specific formulation. This is not impossible, but rather difficult to envisage.

Secondly, as concerns the delicate balance between the competences allocated to the EU and the Member State level, the effects of the Luxemburgish strategy do not differ from the Austrian legislative ban. While different in their form, the two measures are identical in their substance. Just like in the case of the Austrian ban, the Luxemburgish withdrawal of all glyphosate-based PPPs, as a class, is tantamount to a finding that glyphosate is not safe for any use in any pesticidal formulations. Such a determination, however, rests with the EU institutions, and any measure which deviates from it is incompatible with directly applicable EU law. In the specific circumstances of Luxemburg’s measures, it is also worth underscoring that the withdrawals will have targeted some of the representative glyphosate-based pesticidal formulations assessed by the EFSA throughout glyphosate’s EU-wide risk assessment. This is hardly reconcilable with the provisions of the PPP Regulation. Therefore, while Luxemburg’s strategy has so far proven successful, it may still be open to a challenge by the EU institutions.

The French strategy appears to be the only one which is both satisfactory in public health and environmental protection terms, and compatible with EU law. After considering a national legislative ban, France started to focus on specific glyphosate-based PPPs, on a case-

84 Unlike the emergency procedure of the PPP Regulation: compare Art. 44(4) and Arts 71(1), (2) and (3).
by-case basis. Throughout 2018 and 2019, the French public health and environmental regulator (ANSES) re-evaluated the authorizations for 69 glyphosate-based PPPs in the context of the procedure for their renewal of approval, and assessed 11 applications for new glyphosate-based products. The agency refused authorization for 4 of the new products. It also refused to renew the authorization for 36 previously approved glyphosate-based PPPs, with effect from January 2021. The products account for 75% of the volume of glyphosate-based pesticides sold in France in 2018.85

These decisions were taken in the context of the zonal system. It is legitimate to presume that, within its zone, France acts as Rapporteur Member State for a considerable number of PPPs; in these cases, it simply proposed and enacted a decision to refuse the renewal of approval.86 In other cases, it is likely that it proposed a withdrawal of authorization of specific pesticidal formulations, again in the context of the zonal system. In some cases, it may have also resorted to the narrow exceptions of Articles 36(3) (zonal system) and 41(1) (mutual recognition).

Crucially, the ANSES has consistently followed a prudential approach to risk assessment, it has taken persisting uncertainty into due consideration in its scientific inferences, and it has set enhanced levels of protection and a very low threshold of acceptable risk as the relevant benchmark. The decisions of the ANSES reflect a precautionary stance on the uncertain risks posed by glyphosate-based PPPs. This is fully consistent with the PPP Regulation, pursuant to which the Member States shall take the precautionary principle into due account when authorizing PPPs.87 Since 2016, the ANSES has advocated a re-classification of glyphosate as a category 2 (substances suspected of being carcinogenic to humans) substance under the CLP Regulation.88 Throughout the 2017-2019 re-evaluation of glyphosate-based PPPs, it has consistently affirmed that glyphosate’s genotoxicity cannot be ruled out due to the insufficiency of the available data:89 if glyphosate’s genotoxic properties were scientifically established, they would demonstrate its carcinogenic effects. Most importantly, the ANSES has conducted thorough assessments and closely focused on the uncertain risks posed by the interaction of glyphosate and the co-constituents which are present (in different quantities) in different pesticidal formulations. This has resulted in the withdrawal of specific PPPs.

The ANSES’s close focus on the risks posed by the interaction of the active substance (glyphosate) and co-formulants in PPPs should be an example for all national regulatory agencies. Such a focus would be the only way to remedy the ‘Blaise conundrum’ and fill in the missing gap in the multi-level arrangements of the PPP Regulation.90 This would be of fundamental importance. Indeed, the assessment of active substances at EU level encompasses highly complex evaluations and can only set a presumption that different pesticidal formulations containing an active substance should be safe.

86 France is part of Zone C (South).
87 See Recitals (8), (23) and (24) and Arts 1(4) and 29 of the PPP Regulation.
89 Reuters, n. 84 above.
90 Case C-616/17, Blaise and Others EU:C:2019:800; and the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-616/17, Blaise and Others EU:C:2019:190. For a detailed analysis of Blaise, see Leonelli, n. 55 above.
Once the EFSA has determined that an active substance meets the Regulation’s hazard-based cut-off criteria,\(^9\) compliance with the requirements enshrined in Articles 4(2) and 4(3) must be assessed; specific reference values for such an assessment will be set.\(^92\) The criteria of Article 4(2) refer to the residuum of representative pesticidal formulations containing the relevant active substance, whereas the criteria of Article 4(3) relate to the representative pesticidal formulations in and of themselves.\(^93\) As already mentioned, an active substance may be approved when these criteria have been met in respect of ‘one or more representative uses of at least one plant protection product containing that active substance’.\(^94\) However, this limited preliminary assessment cannot provide a guarantee that any pesticidal formulations containing the active substance will be safe enough to meet the PPP Regulation criteria. This should be for the Member States to assess, when authorizing PPPs. This is the missing gap of the PPP Regulation, and the real point raised in the famous Blaise case: the EU assessment of active substances cannot provide the full picture of their risks, and the determination that an active substance is safe enough to be approved at EU level does by no means imply that all pesticidal products containing it will also be safe enough to meet the relevant criteria. This largely overlooked aspect lay at the heart of the Blaise challenge to the PPP Regulation, on the grounds of the precautionary principle.\(^95\)

Regrettably, as highlighted by the European Parliament, national authorities do not conduct sufficiently thorough risk assessments of PPPs and do not pay due consideration to the interactions between active substances and PPP co-constituents.\(^96\) In this sense, they have largely failed to fill in the missing gap of the PPP Regulation. From this perspective, the approach followed by the ANSES in its assessment of glyphosate-based PPPs should set an example for other national authorities, especially in highly controversial cases.

Finally, the ANSES’s 2020 choice to have recourse to the Article 50(2) procedure, conduct a comparative evaluation of non-chemical alternatives to glyphosate and integrate its results in the conditions for use of glyphosate-based PPPs is proving successful.\(^97\) Upon identifying the specific situations in which glyphosate-based PPPs can be substituted by non-chemical alternatives, the agency has amended the authorizations for these PPPs to prohibit or restrict their use in those circumstances. This should also set an example for national authorities, and is fully compliant with the Commission’s Farm to Fork Strategy and new approach to the sustainable use of pesticides.

---

\(^9\) As mandated by Art 4(1) and Annex II of the PPP Regulation.

\(^92\) See point 3.6.1 of Annex II.

\(^93\) The ‘cumulative and synergistic effects’ of the interaction between active substance and co-constituents in the representative pesticides must also be taken into account.

\(^94\) See Art 4(1) and (5) of the PPP Regulation.

\(^95\) Leonelli, n. 55 above, pp. 202-214. Despite their odd framing and imprecise formulation, the first and the third question of the referring court pointed to this specific aspect and to the missing gap in the multi-level dynamics of the PPP Regulation.


\(^97\) In October 2020, the ANSES finalized its research on the existence of available alternatives to glyphosate-based PPPs. All relevant data is available at: https://www.anses.fr. Taking this data into consideration, it relied on the procedure of Art 50(2) of the PPP Regulation to further restrict the use of the glyphosate-based PPPs which it had re-authorized.
Against this overall backdrop, to draw a summary, the French strategy is both compatible with EU law and successful from a public health and environmental protection perspective. The ANSES approach to glyphosate-based PPPs illustrates how national authorities may help solve the ‘Blaise conundrum’ and make effective use of the procedure of Article 50(2). Nonetheless, adopting the French approach may prove rather difficult for some Member States, due to both structural-regulatory and practical constraints. In the former respect, it is worth stressing again that both the zonal system and the mutual recognition system arrangements limit the regulatory authority of the Member States. This clearly emerges from the factual background of Brussels-Capital Region. In the latter respect, specific practical constraints come into play; as the European Parliament has noted throughout the years, national regulatory authorities too often lack institutional capacity, sufficient technical-scientific expertise, as well as economic and staff resources. For this reason, an EU-wide strategy on the active substance glyphosate is urgently needed.

6. FROM MEMBER STATE REACTIONS TO THE EU LEVEL: THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE EU INSTITUTIONS IN 2022

This article has explored and critically assessed the different reactions of EU Member States and regional authorities after the EU-wide re-approval of glyphosate in 2017. It has emphasized that these measures result from far-reaching disagreements surrounding the level of public health and environmental protection and the threshold of acceptable risk set by EU institutions in this area. A clash between different perspectives on scientific uncertainty and different long-term visions for the agricultural and food system has led to high levels of controversy within and across EU Member States.

The article has evaluated more or less successful national and regional strategies and assessed their compatibility with EU law. Section 3 has shown that the Brussels-Capital Region’s attempt to challenge the EU re-approval of glyphosate was highly likely to fail, on admissibility grounds as well as in the merits. Section 4 has highlighted the specific reasons why the Austrian strategy was also bound to fail. Section 5 has focused on the strategy pursued by Luxemburg, showing that, although so far successful, such strategy is incompatible with the institutional architecture of the PPP Regulation. The same section has illustrated the more sophisticated approach followed by France. The ANSES’s close focus on the synergistic and combinatorial effects of the interactions of glyphosate and co-formulants and its reliance on the comparative assessment procedure are fully compliant with EU law and can remedy the ‘Blaise conundrum’. The French approach offers a way forward. Nonetheless, undeniably, it may prove difficult to implement for many Member States.

Against this backdrop, the development of a European strategy on glyphosate is urgently needed. As the EU institutions start to implement their European Green Deal agenda and the Farm to Fork strategy, their plan of action on glyphosate should be consistent with their declared public health and environmental goals. The institutions should not fail to live up to the high expectations that they have raised themselves.

The European strategy on glyphosate should be ambitious, long-term, and pursue a high level of public health and environmental protection. The Commission should take into due
consideration disagreements within and across the EU Member States surrounding the acceptability of the uncertain risks posed by glyphosate; it should not merely reiterate that the scientific community has not conclusively established glyphosate’s tumour initiating or promoting effects. As already mentioned, this has recently been confirmed by the Draft Assessment Report of the four appointed co-Rapporteur Member States for the glyphosate dossier. However, in the face of persisting uncertainty and high levels of complexity, these scientific findings do not categorically exclude that the active substance glyphosate is carcinogenic; nor can they, by any means, settle the thorny question of whether the uncertain risks that glyphosate may pose are acceptable for civil society in the EU. This is a normative question involving a consideration of the intended EU level of protection, the value of the precautionary principle in the EU system of risk regulation, and other legitimate factors such as public opinion, the overarching tenets of the substitution principle, and an EU-wide long-term vision for the development of a sustainable agricultural and food system: a question that science cannot possibly address.

If the controversy reaches the levels of 2017, the Commission should consider refusing to re-approve glyphosate. It would neither be the first nor the last time that the EU institutions disregard the positive results of a risk assessment, pointing to persisting uncertainty and the insufficiency of the available evidence at the current stage of technical-scientific knowledge. Alternatively, the Commission could re-approve it for a limited period and include stringent EU-wide restrictions in its act of re-approval; these could include limitations on the co-constituents allowed for use in glyphosate-based PPPs, and limitations on the conditions of application, categories of users, and areas where the PPPs containing the active substance may be used. These measures, like the ones adopted by the French authorities, could reduce the use of glyphosate-based PPPs and promote the use of alternative PPPs, whenever feasible.98

The identification of a European way forward would also be of crucial importance for the EU institutions not to disavow their political responsibilities in setting a European level of protection and European threshold of acceptable risk. This could breathe new life into the democratic component of EU risk regulation.99 The Commission should not leave allegedly ‘political’ questions to the Member States. This would further undermine the democratic legitimacy of EU risk regulation.

EU risk governance is grounded on a prudential approach to risk assessment, a focus on persisting uncertainty, the pursuit of enhanced levels of protection, and due consideration of the precautionary principle and other legitimate factors. Facts and values are intertwined in risk governance, and determining the intended level of protection and threshold of acceptable risk are never a mere ‘scientific’ matter. Normative frames are always, directly or indirectly, at stake. In the case of glyphosate, the EU institutions should take the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle into due consideration and learn from the mistakes that they committed in 2017. This would finally bring the glyphosate saga to an end.

---

98 Regrettably, at the current stage of technical-scientific knowledge, the preconditions to classify glyphosate as a candidate for substitution and to activate the comparative assessment procedure are not likely to be met (Recital (19), Art. 50, point 4 of Annex II, and Annex IV to the PPP Regulation).

99 See Leonelli, n. 6 above.