A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks

Yang, Mu and Sassone, V. and Hamadou, S. (2012) A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks. In: Principles of Security and Trust, 24 Mar - 1 Apr 2012, Tallinn, Estonia.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_15

Abstract

Anonymity systems are of paramount and growing importance in communication networks. They rely on users to cooperate to the realisation of an effective anonymity service. Yet, existing systems are marred by the action of ‘selfish’ free-loaders, so that several cooperation incentives are being proposed. We propose a game-theoretic model of incentives in anonymity networks based on parametric utility functions, which make it flexible, adaptable and realistic. We then use the framework to analyse the cost of cooperation and the performance of the gold-star incentive scheme in the Crowds protocol.

Metadata

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Keyword(s) / Subject(s):	Nash Equilibrium, Equilibrium Point, Mixed Strategy, Malicious User, Forwarding Path
School:	Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School
Depositing User:	Mu Yang
Date Deposited:	04 Oct 2022 13:06
Last Modified:	02 Aug 2023 18:17
URI:	https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/49069

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