Minimising anonymity loss in anonymity networks under DoS attacks
Yang, Mu and Sassone, V. (2011) Minimising anonymity loss in anonymity networks under DoS attacks. In: International Conference on Information and Communications Security, 23-26 Nov 2011, Beijing, China.
Abstract
Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance as it helps to protect users’ privacy by ensuring that their identity remains unknown. Anonymity protocols generally suffer from denial of service (DoS) attack, as repeated message retransmission affords more opportunities for attackers to analyse traffic and lower the protocols’ privacy. In this paper, we analyse how users can minimise their anonymity loss under DoS attacks by choosing to remove or keep ‘failed’ nodes from router lists. We also investigate the strategy effectiveness in those cases where users cannot decide whether the ‘failed’ node are the targets of DoS attacks.
Metadata
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
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Additional Information: | Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC, volume 7043) |
Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Nash Equilibrium, Mixed Strategy, Target Node, Failed Node, Malicious User |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
Depositing User: | Mu Yang |
Date Deposited: | 04 Oct 2022 12:54 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 18:17 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/49071 |
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