



BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

Nogueira, Mara (2023) "The Worker's Party sold out the street vendors": Revanchist populism and the crisis of labor in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, ISSN 2399-6552.

Downloaded from: <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/52560/>

Usage Guidelines:

Please refer to usage guidelines at <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html> or alternatively contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.



BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

Nogueira, Mara (2023) "The Worker's Party sold out the street vendors": Revanchist populism and the crisis of labor in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, ISSN 2399-6552.

Downloaded from: <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/52560/>

Usage Guidelines:

Please refer to usage guidelines at <https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html>
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.

or alternatively

“The Worker’s Party sold out the street vendors”: Revanchist populism and the crisis of labor in Belo Horizonte, Brazil

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the links between revanchist populism and the labor crisis in Brazil, a country with a stratified labor market where informality is prevalent among low-income, racialized groups. I analyze the struggles of street vendors for accessing urban space in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, where the Worker’s Party (PT) played a key role in evicting vendors from public spaces and criminalizing their activity in the early 2000s. I focus on the connections between this initiative and a more recent “revitalization” policy that displaced street vendors from public spaces in the city center. In this context, I explore the political discourses of displaced workers during the 2018 elections that brought Bolsonaro to power. I show how the eviction stimulated *antipetismo* (anti-PT sentiment) among street vendors by triggering collective memories and rage against the party that “sold them out.” I argue that street vendors strongly identify as workers but are excluded from the unionized waged workingmen notion central to unions and Latin American left-wing parties. By discussing how street vendors reiterate their position as workers and not criminals, I highlight their identification with a moral notion of worker aligned with Bolsonaro’s conservative anti-crime agenda. I thus argue that support for Bolsonaro among street vendors was stimulated by the shortcomings of Brazil’s urban reform as well as the lack of appropriate policy responses to an increasingly heterogeneous and informalized workforce. I conclude by emphasizing the importance of supporting the collective struggles of non-waged workers as a path beyond revanchist populism.

1. Introduction

Bolsonaro's support grew during the 2018 Brazilian national election campaign, transitioning from an extremist upper-class and ultra-conservative support base to attracting a significant number of low-income black citizens, particularly in the South and Southeast regions (Richmond, 2018). Central to his success was the ability to mobilize broad support from the urban peripheries (see Richmond and McKenna (2023) in this issue) and the low-income classes. His victory marked a historic defeat for Brazil’s traditional working-class party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT – Worker’s Party), which held the presidency from 2003 until Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016. Renowned for its redistributive policies that reduced inequality and promoted social mobility, the party lost support amid corruption scandals and the impacts of a persistent economic crisis, combined with a vigorous anti-PT media campaign (Mitchell, 2021). While Brazil’s shift toward the far-right has been explored from various angles, the connection between *antipetismo* (anti-PT sentiment) and the deficiencies in Brazil’s urban policy has remained underexplored. Historically, the PT has played a central role in shaping Brazil’s innovative urban policy (Fernandes, 2007). Despite receiving international praise and achieving some significant advancements, Brazil's urban reform has failed to extend rights to informal street vendors, and legal frameworks often restrict their access to public spaces for their livelihoods (Nogueira & Shin, 2022; Pimentel Walker,

2015). In the context of the 2018 elections, this paper will investigate the role of restrictive local urban policies in stimulating support for Bolsonaro among street vendors in Belo Horizonte.

In 2017, a local “revitalization” policy initiated by Alexandre Kalil's (Humanist Party of Solidarity – PHS) mandate led to the eviction of street vendors from public spaces in Belo Horizonte and their relocation to popular shopping malls. Although implemented by a different party, this initiative echoed a similar intervention implemented in the early 2000s, when street vending was prohibited during the tenure of then-mayor Fernando Pimentel, a high-profile PT politician who later served as the governor of Minas Gerais (2015-2018). In this paper, I demonstrate how the resentful memories of street vendors against the PT were triggered by the re-enactment of the displacement, igniting rage against the party, and fueling support for Bolsonaro. By connecting local disputes over access to urban space to national politics, I contribute to recent debates on the potentials and challenges of working-class politics beyond the wage.

Contrary to long-standing narratives of modernization centered on the move from traditional/rural employment to “proper jobs”, labor precarity rather than formalized waged employment is becoming the global standard (Ferguson & Li, 2018). This is a key component of what Centner and Nogueira (in this issue) conceptualize as revanchist populism - the “people’s” attempt to retake space perceived as lost to them for the benefit of “underserving” populations. In different contexts, disadvantaged workers have directed the blame for the deterioration of their living standards towards “others” (such as migrants or criminals) while channeling their revanchist rage into support for conservative measures. While such narratives are usually centered on “blue collar” workers in Northern economies, I switch the attention to non-waged workers in the majority-world (Munck, 2013). I argue that “revanchist populism” manifests differently in Brazil, a country where labor informality is a historical feature recently amplified by deindustrialization and a conservative labor reform.¹ The “crisis of labor” is visible on the streets of the country’s major metropolitan areas, where a heterogenous urban economy unfolds amidst the porous boundaries between formality/informality and legality/illegality (Telles, 2009; Telles & Hirata, 2007). While key for livelihoods, street vendors’ access to urban space has been constrained by “revitalization” policies (Crossa, 2016; Magalhães, 2023) and restrictive legislations worldwide (Brown, 2015; Schindler, 2014). By focusing on the political discourses of street vendors struggling for rights to access urban space in Brazil, I foreground the relationship between populist rage, the crisis of labor and the urban scale in the periphery of capitalism.

The paper is based on my long-term engagement with Belo Horizonte, where I conducted field research on street vendors' struggles since 2013. When the campaign for the Brazilian national elections started, I was able to follow the political debates among street vendors remotely through two group chats on WhatsApp.² While a detailed discussion of "digital ethnography" is beyond this paper's scope, some clarifications about how I used this

¹ Implemented during Michel Temer’s government (2016-2018), the labor reform aimed to increase formalization. Despite this goal, the level of informality actually increased, with over 40% (equivalent to 38 million people) of the total labor force being in informal employment in 2019 (IBGE, 2020).

² All the information presented has been anonymized and no sensitive information is disclosed to protect the identity of participants.

method are relevant.³ Firstly, the groups were created to aid communication in the context of local struggles against the “revitalization” policy and I was invited to join by a movement leader due to my research involvement. My presence was, therefore, known and accepted. Secondly, these groups were used for other purposes such as banter and service advertising. During the 2018 elections, they unexpectedly became key forums for political debates, reflecting the significance of WhatsApp in Brazilian politics (Evangelista & Bruno, 2019). At the time, it felt like a meeting where the conversation veers of course, and as an ethnographer, I felt compelled to follow the debate. Thirdly, although the group enabled me to observe discussions among street vendors, this was limited to a subset of the population, which included those active in anti-displacement struggles. Additionally, some members were more active, mirroring the dynamics of in-person meetings. Finally, this “digital ethnography” was an extension of physical interactions that existed before and continued after. Being exposed to this online debate sparked my interest in the subject, which I further investigated through interviews with street vendors, politicians, activists, and local bureaucrats conducted throughout various fieldwork trips between 2018 and 2022. The focus of this paper is, however, on the pre-pandemic period.

The following section situates the discussion in recent debates about the crisis of labor while emphasizing the historical and geographical particularities of Brazil. I then introduce the trajectory of the PT in Belo Horizonte and the party’s rise and fall in the federal government. Following that, I present the local “revitalization” policy targeting street vendors in Belo Horizonte. The next section then focuses on a group of displaced street vendors, analyzing their political discourses in the context of the 2018 national elections. Finally, the conclusion draws attention to the multiscalar dimensions of the crisis of labor, foregrounding their urban repercussions and connections with revanchist populism.

2. Beyond the unions: the political organization of non-waged workers

The rise of a global precariat has garnered increasing scholarly attention in context to the dismantling of labor rights and growing job insecurity in Northern countries (Standing, 2011). According to Standing (2011), neoliberalism is producing an underclass of workers akin to Marx’s and Engels’s (1967, p. 7) “lumpenproletariat” - a “dangerous class” devoid of class consciousness and susceptible to cooptation by the elites. While these discussions shed light on the proliferation of unprotected and precarious employment worldwide, as further exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, they are marred by problematic assumptions (Munck, 2013). Firstly, the notion of a new “dangerous class” ignores the fact that precariousness has been a widespread feature in most of the world. Secondly, its claim to theoretical novelty overlooks long-standing scholarship on marginality and informality. Thirdly, it advocates inclusion in regulated wage employment as a solution, thereby reproducing “the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest” (Manzo, 1991, p. 8) while reaffirming the “normativity of capitalist wage labor” (Millar, 2020, p. 83). Finally, the notion

³ For further discussion on the ethical implications of conducting “digital ethnography” on WhatsApp, see [Williams et al \(2022\)](#).

of a “dangerous class” lacking class consciousness overlooks the political potential of a large and growing segment of workers outside wage relations, particularly in the majority world (Munck, 2013). In summary, such accounts reproduce a “nostalgic Eurocentric model of labourism” (Munck, 2013, p. 760) which reasserts the idea of a golden past limited to certain regions and demographics (Monteith et al., 2021).

In Brazil, the establishment of a regulated labor market dates back to the country's inaugural 1943 Labor Law. According to Holston (2008, p. 186), the regulations implemented by President Getúlio Vargas “constituted urban workers as special citizens by bestowing social rights they had never had and celebrating a dignity of labor it had never recognized.” However, this state-sponsored system of “regulated citizenship” (Santos, 1979) was limited to workers in the industrial and commercial sectors, offering security only to registered workers. In a nation grappling with the legacies of slavery, this legislation deepened preexisting racial, gender, and class-based inequalities, reinforcing a system of differentiated citizenship⁴ (Holston, 2008; Manzano et al., 2021). Barchiesi (2011) describes a similar “hierarchical ordering of citizenship” in post-apartheid South Africa, where a “work-citizenship nexus” system emerged as a governance technology to produce disciplined subjects whose access to full entitlements of social citizenship was mediated by wage employment. A parallel process unfolded in Brazil, where Vargas's labor reform solidified the notion of the *trabalhador* (worker) as a moral category symbolizing honesty and commitment to family values (Kopper & Richmond, 2021). Nonetheless, the working classes excluded from the benefits of Vargas's regime redefined the term by incorporating the use of *trabalhador* in everyday language to distinguish themselves from others deemed morally undeserving, such as the *vagabundo* (bum), the *malandro* (crook), and more recently, the *bandido* (criminal) (Fischer, 2008). Non-waged workers, including street vendors, remained at the bottom of this hierarchical order of regulated citizenship, and the state's historical relationship with them has been punitive.

Beyond exclusion from labor rights, informal workers have also been overlooked by unions (Chun & Agarwala, 2016). In Latin America, the emigration of productive capital from Northern economies led to the creation of a “powerful new labor movements rooted in expanding mass production industries” in Southern societies (Silver, 2003, pp. 5–6). In this context, the unions’ struggle for “labor rights and social security benefits remained restricted to a tiny portion of the total workforce” (Breman & van der Linden, 2014, p. 934). Following this trend, the new Brazilian trade unionism⁵ recruited most of its members from the industrial and public sectors (Tyler, 1982). Founded in 1980, the Worker’s Party (PT) is a product of this movement. While constituted by a heterogeneous support base, “[u]nions have long provided a major component of the PT’s membership, and leaders of Brazil’s ‘new unionism’ movement of the late 1970s not only formed the nucleus of the PT’s founding group but continued to play critical roles as the party evolved” (Samuels, 2004, p. 1006). This organized industrial urban proletariat provided the symbolic notion of “worker” that shaped the political agenda of both the unions and the party. Being the product of dependent capitalism in which formality was

⁴ Throughout time the legislation was expanded to include rural workers and, more recently, domestic workers.

⁵ The new trade unionism emerged in the late 1970s out of the crisis of the dictatorship and the developmental state. This new syndicalist movement replaced a corporatist union structure controlled by an authoritarian government.

never the norm, it failed to incorporate non-waged workers, a group in which women as well as black Brazilians have historically been overrepresented (Araújo & Lombardi, 2013).

Until recently, informal workers were often classified as apolitical (Fernández-Kelly & Shefner, 2006) and “lacking the capacity for collective organization and for activism of wider import” (Lindell, 2011, p. 4) while being perceived by trade unions as “unorganizable” (Gallin, 2001). However, the growing size and importance of workers without formal contracts in the context of informalization, precarisation and uberization has prompted calls for trade unions to incorporate and organize informal workers (Bonner & Spooner, 2011). Only recently have scholars started to explore the potentialities and limitations of the political organization of “unstable” work (Chun & Agarwala, 2016; Lago, 2011; Lindell, 2011). For the case of Brazil, Abilio et al (2021) investigated the strike of app delivery workers during the pandemic. Their research reveals the terrible working conditions under uberization while also demonstrating the potential of new forms of resistance against platform capitalism that turn “urban space into a field of resistance and organization” (ibid, p.599).⁶ While emphasising the growing precarity of labour conditions, this scholarship also highlights the “innovative self-organizing strategies” devised by casual and informal workers “that differ considerably from conventional trade unionism” (Lindell, 2011, p. 5).

In this paper, I focus on the collective struggle of street vendors displaced by an urban “revitalization” policy. Although fundamental for livelihoods, the “rights to the city” of street vendors are constrained in Brazil and worldwide (Nogueira, 2019; Schindler, 2014). By focusing on disputes over rights to space, I foreground the urban as a crucial arena for contemporary wageless struggles. Contrary to “traditional” working-class politics, such collective actions articulate political subjectivities forged by the rhythms of the city rather than those of the shop-floor (Millar, 2018). Such precarious politics are often promiscuous, simultaneously rejecting and embracing neoliberal reason (Gago, 2017), resisting and reproducing conservative ideals (Paret, 2013) as well as articulating demands on the bases of heterogeneity and difference (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; Crossa, 2016). In this paper, I foreground the connections between urban policy and non-traditional working-class struggles. To do so, I first situate the discussion by describing Belo Horizonte’s trajectory of urban policy and emphasizing the fundamental role played by the PT in its formulation before briefly discussing the party’s rise and fall in the federal government.

3. The PT way of governing: informality and urban policy

Urban reform and participatory democracy

The drafting of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution provided an opportunity for isolated groups struggling for urban rights to articulate a national agenda. This was achieved through the Urban Reform Movement (URM), which gathered “social movements focusing on housing and professionals in various areas, such as attorneys, architects and urban planners and engineers

⁶ On uberization, working conditions and collective organization in Brazil and beyond see Luna and Oliveira (2022).

in city halls and universities” (Rolnik, 2011, p. 241). Following popular pressure, the demands of the URM were partially included in a constitutional chapter dedicated to Urban Policy. Then a recently formalized party, the PT played a leading role in in this movement. Also in 1988, the party elected 36 mayors in the first democratic municipal elections and turned cities into laboratories for innovations in urban policy. Of particular relevance was the mandate of Olívio Dutra in Porto Alegre, where the internationally acclaimed experience of participatory budgeting (PB) was first implemented (Abers, 2001). The PB was one initiative in a longer list of experiences in participatory urban democracy adopted by PT administrations that also included the creation of urban policy councils, and the democratization of master plans (Navarro & de Lacerda Godinho, 2002). Within this favorable context, social movements emerging from the auto-constructed peripheries⁷ gained important tools to challenge evictions, engage with policy-makers, and demand rights (Rodrigues & Barbosa, 2010).

While partially successful in enabling popular participation in urban planning, advancing the rights of informal residents and creating tools for combating urban speculation, neither the URM nor the PT’s approach to participatory planning tackled the relationship between informal trade and cities effectively (Nogueira & Shin, 2022; Pimentel Walker, 2015). This limitation is illustrated by the case of Belo Horizonte where the party implemented conflictive policies targeting informality. The mandate of Patrus Ananias (PT), between 1993 and 1997, expanded rights to the city to marginalized citizens, particularly *favela* residents. His administration replicated successful experiences such as the PB, while also producing innovative urban policies. Noteworthy is the Municipal Housing Policy, an inclusive legal-institutional framework for social housing that partially recognized the rights of informal residents (Bedê & de Moura Costa, 2006). Such progressive approach to informal housing in the city contrasts with the PT’s role in criminalizing informal street vendors.

“Formalizing” the informal economy

A historical feature of Brazil’s urban centers, the presence of street vendors (known as *camelôs*) increased substantially after the 1980s alongside deindustrialization and the adoption of neoliberal agendas, such as market deregulation and privatization. In the wake of a prolonged economic crisis, unemployment and informality expanded substantially (Jayme & Neves, 2010). Simultaneously, increased availability of cheap industrialized products from East Asia, imported via Paraguay, transformed the activity of *camelôs* (Pinheiro-Machado, 2008). Higher profit margins improved the appeal of the activity as a profitable alternative to scarce waged employment, especially for low-educated workers (de Jesus, 2011).

In Belo Horizonte’s city center, the growing presence of street vendors in the 1980s/1990s increased the conflicts between vendors, shopkeepers, and everyday users of space (Zambelli, 2006). In the early 2000s, after a few unsuccessful attempts by local administrations to regulate *camelôs*, the then mayor Fernando Pimentel (PT) proposed a new municipal law that prohibited unlicensed street vending. The Code of Placements was enacted in 2004 following a public consultation that identified the disorderly occupation of public space

⁷ According to Holston (1991, p. 448), “[t]he term autoconstruction refers to the house-building activity of the poor within a specific set of historical and spatial circumstances, namely, the phenomenal growth of the so-called urban peripheries around Brazil’s metropolitan centres over the last five decades.”

by the informal economy as a public issue (Nogueira & Shin, 2022). In the same year, a program for the “revitalization” of the city center (*Centro Vivo*) was launched.⁸ The program is part of a wider move towards urban renewal projects, advocated as solutions for cities facing deindustrialization and increased inter-city competition for public and private resources (Vainer, 2009). In Belo Horizonte, Pimentel’s government marks a shift towards a new model of strategic planning disseminated in Brazil by the influential work of Castells and Borja (1997) (Canettieri, 2023). Despite critical voices, strategic planning was adopted by both “right and left-wing governments alike, in the context of the state’s fiscal crisis” (Fix & Arantes, 2022, p. 907).

One of the main goals of *Centro Vivo* was removing vendors from the streets and promoting their “formalization” through relocation to newly constructed popular shopping malls. Five malls were built, and shops were allocated to 2,119 licensed vendors through a lottery process. Those who remained on the streets, either by choice or because they were not covered by the policy, faced a “zero tolerance” approach to street vending. In the malls, the new “entrepreneurs” were expected to pay rent and utility bills. Unable to meet financial commitments, many vendors returned to the streets, encountering a more hostile environment. Although the policy enjoyed approval from the general population, who re-elected Pimentel in 2004, street vendors were critical of the removal and relocation process (Zambelli, 2006).

This policy inspired a similar experience in Porto Alegre, described by Kopper (2015), in which 800 *camelôs* were relocated from the historical center to a Popular Shopping Mall. Akin to the case of Belo Horizonte, the removal was part of a wider urban renewal program (*Viva Centro!*) announced in 2005 and completed in 2009. Pimentel Walker (2015) describes how the initiative, which involved a public-private partnership (PPP), was introduced as a PB demand by one of the *camelô* leaderships, who negotiated his support with the local government. In contrast to Belo Horizonte’s case, the PT opposed the relocation of street vendors, some of whom had been licensed during Olívio Dutra’s tenure.

In tandem, the cases of Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre illustrate the popularity of urban renewal initiatives targeting street vendors and reveal the interplay between participatory democracy and neoliberal urban governance in Brazil (Rolnik, 2011). In what follows, I discuss the evolving national scenario with a focus on the PT thereby providing relevant context to understanding the changing reactions to local policies.

The PT years in the federal government

After three failed attempts, Lula (PT) won the 2002 national election. During his mandate (2003-2010) some of the successful urban policy initiatives were federalized through the creation of the Ministry of Cities and the appointment of Olívio Dutra as minister. Moreover, combined with economic growth, the implementation of social policies generated decreasing inequality, unemployment, and labor informality (de Andrade Baltar et al., 2010). These policies benefitted street vendors through a general increase in disposable income and

⁸ The program contained a wide range of initiatives. For a detailed discussion, see Jayme & Neves (2010).

access to social programs and initiatives.⁹ Brazil's 2000s "success story" was, however, the result of a pragmatic strategy, only viable under a series of conditions (Loureiro & Saad-Filho, 2019).

When the favorable landscape changed, gains were rapidly lost, dissolving the support for the party, which became associated with corruption through the eruption of scandals, such as the *Mensalão*, in 2005, and the Operation Carwash (*Operação Lava Jato*), in 2014.¹⁰ The latter created the political climate for Dilma Rousseff's (PT) impeachment in 2016 and the justification – later nullified - for Lula's imprisonment in 2018. Moreover, the effects of the economic crisis, especially after 2014, also helped dissolve support for PT particularly among the so-called new "middle-classes",¹¹ whose gains were dissolved by the economic downturn (Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco, 2020). For Mitchell (2021), unscrupulous politicians of the right and center took the opportunity to propagate an anticorruption discourse that disseminated a form of "cruel pessimism". Characterized by a generalized disillusionment in Brazilian politics and even in Brazilians themselves, this affective disposition was crucial for the acceptance of Bolsonaro's highly moralizing rhetoric. Despite this context, Lula was leading the polls until his highly contested conviction¹² cleared room for Bolsonaro's victory in the 2018 elections.

The support of lower-income voters, particularly in the Southeast, was fundamental for Bolsonaro's election and various scholars have explored the role of different factors (e.g., corruption, religion and economic crisis) influencing their electoral behavior (Gracino Junior et al., 2021; Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco, 2020; Solano, 2020). In this paper, I shift the focus to the urban scale to shed light on an overlooked dimension of this political puzzle: the shortcomings of policies targeting an increasingly informalized labor force. By analyzing the struggle of street vendors over access to urban space in Belo Horizonte, I reveal how local dynamics combine with broader trends to fuel support for Bolsonaro in 2018.

4. Urban "revitalization" and displacement in Belo Horizonte

In 2017, an urban policy aimed at relocating street vendors operating in public spaces to popular shopping malls was sanctioned by a municipal law and implemented by the newly appointed mayor, Alexandre Kalil (then affiliated to the Humanist Party of Solidarity - PHS). According to Magalhães (2023), his administration continued many of the same urban planning principles and policies from the PT era. In fact, the initiative was conceived by Maria Caldas,

⁹ The most well-know and celebrated of such initiatives is *Bolsa Família*, a conditional cash transfer program for poor families. For a detailed discussion, see Soares (2011).

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of recent corruption scandals in Brazil as well as their political impacts, see Fontainha and Cavalcanti de Lima (2022)

¹¹ This disputed term refers to those who experienced social mobility during the PT years, supposedly climbing from poverty into the ranks of the middle-class. For a critique, see Pochmann (2012).

¹² Lula was convicted in July 2017 under corruption charges as part of the Operation Car Wash. His conviction was overturned in March 2021 by the Supreme Court who found the responsible judge, Sérgio Moro, biased in his judgment. In 2022, Lula was elected in a tight dispute against Bolsonaro.

the Secretary of Urban Policy (SUP), who was well-known among street vendors (*camelôs*) for her involvement in the removal process during the 2000s.

As Ursula,¹³ an employee at the SUP, pointed out, the relocation of vendors was made possible by an urban operation, “because the city hall needed partners as it couldn’t afford a construction like it was done in 2004/2005” (Interview, 05/09/2018). Urban operations (UOs) are instruments regulated by the City Statute, which defines them as urban development projects aimed at improving the economic, social, and environmental value of targeted urban areas. Highly popular and contested, UOs involve private partners and have been criticized for advancing a model of neoliberal urban governance (Rolnik, 2011). Presented as an attempt to promote “the social and productive inclusion of street vendors”, the UO selected partners through a public bidding process to offer small shops in exchange for rent and additional building potential¹⁴ (1.92 square meters per 1.00 square meter offered as renting space), which could be used within 10 years anywhere in the municipality. Only three companies met the criteria set by the legislation, and after one of them withdrew, two popular malls were selected as partners.¹⁵ While the policy was being developed, the SUP surveyed the affected areas to register and notify active street vendors. Meanwhile, the Public Ministry was consulted, and the policy was discussed in “several meetings with groups who claimed to represent the street vendor category” (Ursula - Interview, 05/09/2018). Rent was payable to the shop owners but subsidized by the local government. The fee was initially set at BRL30 (GBP4.96) for the first three months, followed by periodic adjustments until reaching BRL1,670.00 (GBP276.20) in the fifth and final year of the program, after which subsidies would end, and shop owners would set rents according to market dynamics.¹⁶

The UO was part of Kalil’s campaign promise and was, therefore, a priority. To inspect the use of public spaces, many *fiscais* (inspection agents) were hired and authorized to confiscate vendors’ products as well as to collect a newly increased fine of BRL2,034.11 (GBP336.42) – almost twice the minimum wage. Although conflicts between state agents and vendors had always been an issue, the previous administration had not been as rigorous. Elena, a street vendor, and social activist, noted, “Lacerda [the former mayor] also had *fiscais* after us, but not as much as now. Nowadays, the streets are full of them” (Interview, 03/07/2019).” Therefore, although participation in the UO was not compulsory,¹⁷ the move was not entirely optional as unlicensed street vending in public spaces remained illegal and new licenses were not being issued.¹⁸ In a recent paper, Magalhães (2023) argues that local repression against street vendors effectively “cleanse” public spaces of undesired elements, thus contributing to capital accumulation in two ways: by increasing property values and driving workers toward

¹³ Names of all participants have been anonymized.

¹⁴ Also regulated by the City Statute, additional building potential is a title that can be negotiated in the market to allow constructions beyond the limits set by urban planning parameters.

¹⁵ *Mais Invest Empreendimentos e Incorporações* and *BML Empreendimentos S/A*.

¹⁶ Values in pounds have been converted using the current official exchange rate (1GBP = BRL6.05) on 6 November 2023 to capture real values.

¹⁷ Previously surveyed vendors were invited to participate through public calls and other street vendors could join the wait list by providing their details to the SUP.

¹⁸ Some street vendors were also offered spots in *feiras livres* (open air markets) and a new program for licensing vendors (*Jornada Produtiva*) was launched in 2019 partially as a result of street vendors’ political pressures.

platform-based economies. In this context, those attempting to stay on the streets faced increasing levels of harassment.

The initiative was described by the policymakers as a way to promote the formalization of street vendors, as explained by Lucio, another SUP employee:

Our objective is to turn them into micro-entrepreneurs to the point of being formalized by the SEBRAE [Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service], so that this guy [sic] can organize himself to open every day at the same time and close at the same time. This is good for him. I mean, everyone knows what's best for them, but at least if his goal is to stop being a street vendor and become a shopkeeper, then I think this is the best path. (Interview, 03/09/2019)

Lucio's discourse demonstrates the intention of the policy to discipline behaviors and turn street vendors into shopkeepers. However, similar to what Kopper (2015) documented for Porto Alegre, the transformation into "entrepreneurs" ran up against the habits learned through the work on the streets. Vendors complained about having a schedule, felt bound by the enclosed location, and resented both the lack of mobility and the restrictions on counterfeit products. This incompatibility between the rules of the mall and street dynamics was perceived as a barrier that the policy would address by offering courses on entrepreneurialism through a partnership with SEBRAE.

One year after the policy's implementation, many street vendors had been relocated to Shopping UAI, a central popular shopping mall, where their livelihoods were threatened by rising costs and the low number of customers. In response, vendors were protesting and negotiating better conditions. Between June and September 2018, I followed their movement, joining in meetings, protests, and making visits to popular shopping malls as well as being added to different group chats used for planning and discussing actions. I met and interviewed Roberto, who was working at the mall. Like many others, he had been affected by the 2000s operation as described during a group conversation about a protest:

What do you think about inviting the *camelôs* who were evicted during the first round of displacement and went to Shopping Oi and Xavantes [popular malls]? My colleagues and I, who were also *camelôs* back then, are back on the streets due to the high rents charged by the mall owners, who are currently among the richest businesspeople in Belo Horizonte. The same will probably happen with the return of this failed program from the past. (Roberto - WhatsApp message, 14/08/2018)

The initiative was thus perceived as a repackaging of an old, failed policy. Moreover, while the first intervention happened in a period of economic prosperity, the new round was evolving amidst instability and crisis. In 2003, the country was starting a new growth cycle, Lula had just started his first mandate and low-income Brazilians were experiencing a sense of hope in the future. For Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco (2020), the implementation of redistributive policies under the PT enabled a process of social inclusion via consumption. Meanwhile, the rise to the federal government also inaugurated an institutionalization of the

party, coupled with a depoliticization of its base and “gradual emptying of community forums, such as PB” (ibid, p.23). In tandem, these trends produced new individualized and ephemeral modes of political socialization. Particularly after 2014, economic crisis started corroding previous social mobility gains of popular groups who turned against the party amidst corruption scandals and a coordinated attack by the media and the judiciary. Hope had then turned into hate, opening room for the growth of Bolsonaro’s conservative agenda.

It is in this context that street vendors in Belo Horizonte experienced threats to their livelihoods and displacement, which combined with such wider political trends to brood *antipetismo* and support for Bolsonaro.

5. “The PT sold out the street vendors”

Displacement, resentment and antipetismo

On July 1st 2019, I joined about 30 street vendors on a 183km bus journey from Belo Horizonte to Prados. We arrived in the middle of the night so vendors could save good spots to sell a wide range of products – from fruits to electronic tweezers – to Catholic pilgrims attending a religious celebration. That Sunday, I spent a long time with Ana, who had been a *camelô* for over forty years. When the conversation approached politics, I asked her about her presidential vote, and she replied, "I voted for Bolsonaro". When asked why, she replied, “Because I hate Pimentel”. As discussed, during Pimentel’s mandate, Belo Horizonte’s center was revitalized, the *camelôs* displaced from the streets, and their activity criminalized. Ana described this process as traumatic, leading some colleagues to get sick or even commit suicide. She said, “It’s very sad when someone works with something for their entire lives and suddenly, they are not allowed to do it anymore.” She also told me that all her children who are PT supporters are drug users and that PT’s government was great for her nephew who is a drug dealer. Later she said, “But for the *camelôs* the PT never did a thing. Not even Lula.”

Ana’s support for Bolsonaro was rooted in a negative perception of the PT’s governments, both at the local and national levels. The traumatic memory of the displacement suffered under the party’s local administration was still vivid. Meanwhile, she believed that the party did not impact her life positively, failing to represent the interests of street vendors on a national scale. That feeling is worsened by resentment against morally undeserving groups who secured benefits during the PT era. This aspect signals a conservatism that has been identified as one of the main features of *bolsonarismo*. For Gracino Junior et al (2021, p. 548), “resentment is the affect that catalyzed the identification bond between Bolsonaro's candidacy and his electorate”. This resentment was channeled through critiques at social inclusion policies aimed at minorities and structured by “the defense of traditional and conservative values” (ibid, p. 549). Ana’s political discourse did not surprise me since I had heard similar things from other street vendors.

When the electoral campaign started, I was not in Belo Horizonte, but I was following the political debates between street vendors through two group chats on WhatsApp. The groups

were aimed at promoting resistance against the urban operation, gathering displaced street vendors, activists, and allies, such as myself. During the elections, however, they turned into forums where workers discussed the candidates. Reading the exchanges, I was then surprised that several vendors held strong negative views of the PT while expressing support for Bolsonaro. Such a view is illustrated by the following message extracts:

"There's no point in wishing for a change from the PT. If it hasn't worked out during all these years, it won't in the next four. That's my opinion. Even if Bolsonaro turns out to be bad, he will still bring some sort of change. (...) To elect the PT again will bring no change. It only means accepting the disaster.

(...)

The PT likes workers so much that it built us little boxes to tell everyone that street vendors owned shops. The PT sold out the street vendors! (Lucas - WhatsApp message, 03/10/2018)

For Lucas, who is a street vendor relocated to a popular mall, the PT government has failed to bring positive change to his life. His message denotes a strong sense of betrayal against the party that was supposed to represent the interests of workers. Lucas also signals a desperate hope for change and a need for disruption. Moreover, his rejection of the PT has clearly been fueled by the unsuccessful results of the current local intervention, which he associates with the party even though it has been implemented by a different one.

This was a common view among street vendors who associated the party with strict local policies against vendors' rights to occupy urban space while feeling neglected by the PT's national agenda, which has been historically connected with a certain portion of the organized and formalized working class. One can thus argue that *antipetismo* among street vendors in Belo Horizonte is associated with historical and locally specific aspects of the party's trajectory.

The deserving poor: street vendors and the moral category of worker

While partially explained by *antipetismo*, support for Bolsonaro among street vendors is also rooted in his conservative rhetoric. As illustrated by this message extract, Bolsonaro's focus on public security also attracted enthusiasm:

Valuing the principles of traditional families, lowering the age of criminal responsibility, ending the privileges for prisoners, zero tolerance for crime, strengthening the military force against bandits, providing better arming to our police officers, and giving them more freedom to act against criminals. Military education for our children, aiming at discipline and consistency. Wrong is wrong and right is right. (Carlos - WhatsApp message, 19/10/2018)

At first glance, Carlos's adherence to a "zero tolerance to crime" discourse appears incompatible with his work as a street vendor, an irregular activity that might involve some degree of illegality (Telles, 2009; Telles & Hirata, 2007). However, this seeming paradox

becomes clearer when accounting for two factors. First, criminality disproportionately affects the urban poor. Second, historically, the popular classes have appropriated the meaning of *trabalhador* (worker) to signify hard work, honesty, and a commitment to family values (Kopper & Richmond, 2021). According to de Jesus (2011, p. 173), “[f]or street vendors, work is what dignifies, as in social imagination the option of selling products on the street contrasts with those who have chosen twisted paths, such as trafficking, theft, and vagrancy.” This is clearly enunciated in Elena’s discourse:

I was very angry with him [Pimentel]. Even though he was from a leftist party, I wasn’t aware of that because I had an aversion to the [political] system. Why? Because we wanted to work, we weren’t stealing, we weren’t killing, we weren’t dealing drugs. And we couldn’t work! (...) That was the deal. So, for me, he was a monster, the monster of *camelôs*. (Interview, 03/07/2019)

When complaining against being harassed by the police, vendors often differentiate themselves from criminals by reaffirming their condition as workers, struggling to make a living and feed their families, who should thus be respected rather than criminalized. This discourse positions them inside the “morally deserving” category of citizens that Bolsonaro’s populist discourse constructs in opposition to the criminal, portrayed as the enemy of the people and the nation (Laclau, 2005). I argue that this explains *camelôs*’s association with the conservative values sponsored by the far-right. Street vendors are indeed “workers” both from a material and a moral perspective. However, while they do not feel represented by the notion of waged and formalized worker traditionally sponsored by the PT, they are encompassed by the moral worker category constructed by Bolsonaro’s conservative narrative.

Working-class struggles beyond the “proper job”

Among the street vendors who were leading the anti-displacement struggles, support for the PT’s candidate, Fernando Haddad, was more widespread. This was the case of Elena and, Antonio, a street vendor who became a “formalized” employee working as an advisor in the office of councilwoman Isabella Gonçalves (Socialism and Liberty Party – PSOL):

[Before becoming an activist] I couldn’t see how politics could do anything good for us [street vendors]. So much so that this process of evicting vendors from the streets started with the PT. It was a huge deception to discover that those who were supposedly representing the workers were harming us severely. (Interview, 25/06/2019)

His discourse emphasizes how, through activism, he gained a different political perspective that changed his views on the PT, previously rooted in resentment. His narrative highlights the significance of collective struggle as a means to challenge the formation of conservative subjectivity. It also underscores the importance of left-wing parties, trade unions, and activists in supporting the struggles of non-waged workers.

Street vendors strongly identify as workers, but their labor experience differs significantly from that of industrial unionized wage workers, a restricted group from whose ranks the PT emerged. A geographical and historical exception (Breman & van der Linden, 2014), this idea of worker guided the political imaginary of the Latin American left highly influenced by developmentalism. The notion of the “proper job” as a normative telos (Ferguson & Li, 2018) has restricted the policy approaches towards informality, perceived as backward and precarious.¹⁹

In Belo Horizonte, although street vendors have historically formed associations to negotiate **access** to workspace, the organized struggle for **rights** to space is relatively recent. Nogueira and Shin (2022) describe how an alliance between housing movements and street vendors mediated by social activists and local PSOL politicians has catalyzed more attention to vendors’ collective struggle, who have formed an association to fight for their recognition as workers and rights to the city. This movement is, however, incipient and struggles to capitalize wider support due to the association between informality and precarity, which overlooks any progressive potential in the “dangerous class”. This challenge is noted by Isabella Gonçalves (PSOL), a local councilwoman whose mandate was closely linked to street-vendors’ collective struggles:

For social movements it’s challenging to understand that the Fordist category of worker that embodies the meaning of formalization doesn’t work anymore.

(...)

Unions have historically overlooked street vendors who have been around long before [global] precarity. However, now we’ll have to rethink the world of labor from the perspective of those who have been excluded. I believe that is the powerful thing about street vendors. (Interview, 25/06/2019)

The organized labor movement, including trade unions and labor parties, have long been rooted on the notion of wage employment. They struggle to address the challenges created by the new world of labor and mobilize working-class constituencies. In her ethnographic work with waste pickers in Rio, Millar (2018) draws on Thompson’s (1963) discussion on the making of the working-class to demonstrate how non-waged forms of labor produce diverse “forms of living” and working-class subjectivities. For many non-waged urban workers, the city is the primary site where their working lives and political struggles evolve. This has been examined by scholarship on other Brazilian cities like Rio (Lago, 2011), Porto Alegre (Kopper, 2015), and São Paulo (Itikawa, 2016) who demonstrate the potentialities and limitations of organizing non-wage workers. For Barchiesi (2010, p. 79), the permanence of wage labor as “the normative foundation of society and citizenship” risks “feeding a conservative and chauvinist political discourse. It is also likely to reflect the material conditions of only the shrinking minority of workers with stable and decent jobs while leaving the precarious majority voiceless and invisible.” I thus argue that envisioning more just urban futures involves

¹⁹ An important exception was the legal recognition of domestic workers’ rights during the PT years. A victory for the category who had a strong history of political organizing.

considering the diverse spatialities and rhythms of complex “forms of living” in the city as well as the political subjectivities forged under such diverse circumstances. To escape revanchist populism is necessary to imagine alternative articulations of citizenship and democracy beyond work while taking seriously the diverse demands arising from heterogenous working-class struggles.

6. Conclusion

Bolsonaro’s victory in Brazil’s 2018 election was possible due to a cross-class alliance between resentful members of the upper classes and poor and black Brazilians targeted as “underserving” by those very same elites. While Bolsonaro's defeat against Lula in 2022 may instill some optimism, the narrow gap between the candidates and the conservative makeup of the Congress and Senate should serve as a caution against underestimating the far right's strength. This special issue investigates the multiple geographies enabling the rise of this form of revanchist populism (Centner and Nogueira, this issue). In this paper, I contribute by interrogating the relationship between Bolsonaro’s rise and the shortcomings of the Brazilian urban reform in incorporating the demands of an expanding informal urban economy.

As noted by Sharma and Gupta (2009, p. 4), “[t]he emergent transnational economic order is not only reshaping the global labor map, but also transforming the relationship between citizenship, national identity, and the state.” The current labor crisis unfolds differently in Brazil, a country with a deeply stratified labor market associated with a hierarchical ordering of citizenship, wherein informal workers are placed at the bottom. Beyond the lack of labor rights, these workers have been historically ignored by unions and labor parties, such as the PT, whose foundation is strongly associated with the unionized industrial workingmen.

In the wake of Brazil’s urban reform, the interplay between participatory democracy and neoliberal urban governance led to the adoption of urban renewal programs across the country, including by left-wing parties, that further marginalized street vendors. Focusing on Belo Horizonte, I revealed the instrumental role played by the PT in criminalizing and displacing street vendors from public spaces. The vendors' painful memory was later triggered by a subsequent round of "urban revitalization" implemented by a different party but mirroring the PT approach in a context of wider discontentment with the party. By analyzing the political discourses of affected traders, I demonstrated how the reenactment of their displacement evoked rage against the party, fueling *antipetismo* translated into support for Bolsonaro’s candidacy in the 2018 national elections.

Considering the above, I argue that support for far-right populism among informal workers can be partially explained by their exclusion from the symbolic and idealized notion of the “worker” that populates the political imaginary of the Latin American left. The regional influence of developmentalism has shaped a perception of informal work as backward, leading to inadequate policy responses. An example is Brazil’s internationally praised and innovative urban policy, which has ignored the rights to the city of street vendors whose livelihoods are threatened by urban renewal programs and restrictive legislations. This neglect is further illustrated by the PT’s approach to street vending in Belo Horizonte. Betrayed by the Worker’s Party who “sold them out”, street vendors are captured by a conservative anti-crime rhetoric

that positions themselves as morally deserving workers against the undeserving criminal others.

Around the globe, the destabilization of welfare regimes is shaping working-class politics. In this paper, I showed how this crisis is multiscalar, manifesting itself particularly at the urban scale. In cities across the globe, street vendors and other hustlers are common presence, struggling to secure access to urban space for livelihoods. Their political subjectivities are shaped by such experiences and connected with the urban, a shared space that becomes the objective of collective struggle. I argue that constructing more socially just urban futures depends on recognizing the centrality of the urban for non-waged working-class struggles. With a new presidential mandate, the PT and Lula have another chance to respond adequately to changes in society driven by the new world of labor. I contend that looking beyond the wage is a necessary step towards more inclusive agendas.

References

- Abers, R. (2001). Learning democratic practice: Distributing government resources through popular participation in Porto Alegre, Brazil. *The Challenge of Urban Government: Policies and Practices*, 129–143.
- Abilio, L. C., Grohmann, R., & Weiss, H. C. (2021). Struggles of delivery workers in Brazil: Working conditions and collective organization during the pandemic. *Journal of Labor and Society*, 24(4), 598–616.
- Araújo, A. M. C., & Lombardi, M. R. (2013). Trabalho informal, gênero e raça no Brasil do início do século XXI. *Cadernos de Pesquisa*, 43(149), 452–477.
- Barchiesi, F. (2010). Informality and Casualization as Challenges to South Africa's Industrial Unionism: Manufacturing Workers in the East Rand/Ekurhuleni Region in the 1990s. *African Studies Quarterly*, 11.
- Barchiesi, F. (2011). *Precarious liberation: Workers, the state, and contested social citizenship in postapartheid South Africa*. Suny Press.
- Bedê, M. M. C., & de Moura Costa, H. S. (2006). Entre as idéias e o contexto: Uma discussão sobre a política municipal de habitação na gestão da Frente BH Popular (1993-1996). *Revista Geografias*, 2(2), 56–73.

- Bénit-Gbaffou, C. (2016). Do street traders have the ‘right to the city’? The politics of street trader organisations in inner city Johannesburg, post-Operation Clean Sweep. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(6), 1102–1129.
- Bonner, C., & Spooner, D. (2011). Organizing in the informal economy: A challenge for trade unions. *Internationale Politik Und Gesellschaft*, 2(2011), 87–105.
- Borja, J., & Castells, M. (1997). Planes estratégicos y proyectos metropolitanos. *Cadernos Ippur*, 11(1/2), 38.
- Breman, J., & van der Linden, M. (2014). Informalizing the economy: The return of the social question at a global level. *Development and Change*, 45(5), 920–940.
- Brown, A. (2015). Claiming the streets: Property rights and legal empowerment in the urban informal economy. *World Development*, 76, 238–248.
- Canettieri, T. (2023). A produção capitalista do espaço e a gestão empresarial da política urbana: O caso da PBH Ativos S/A. *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Urbanos e Regionais*, 19, 513–529.
- Chun, J. J., & Agarwala, R. (2016). Global labour politics in informal and precarious jobs. *The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Work and Employment*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications Ltd, 634–650.
- Crossa, V. (2016). Reading for difference on the street: De-homogenising street vending in Mexico City. *Urban Studies*, 53(2), 287–301.
- de Andrade Baltar, P. E., dos Santos, A. L., Krein, J. D., Leone, E., Weishaupt Proni, M., Moretto, A., Gori Maia, A., & Salas, C. (2010). *Moving towards Decent Work. Labour in the Lula government: Reflections on recent Brazilian experience*. Global Labour University Working Paper. <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/96389>
- de Jesus, C. R. (2011). *A Geografia Urbana do camelô belo-horizontino*. Federal University of Minas Gerais.

- Evangelista, R., & Bruno, F. (2019). WhatsApp and political instability in Brazil: Targeted messages and political radicalisation. *Internet Policy Review*, 8(4), 1–23.
- Ferguson, J., & Li, T. M. (2018). *Beyond the “proper job:” Political-economic analysis after the century of labouring man*.
- Fernandes, E. (2007). Implementing the urban reform agenda in Brazil. *Environment and Urbanization*, 19(1), 177–189.
- Fernández-Kelly, P., & Shefner, J. (2006). *Out of the shadows: Political action and the informal economy in Latin America*. Penn State Press.
- Fischer, B. M. (2008). *A poverty of rights: Citizenship and inequality in twentieth-century Rio de Janeiro*. Stanford University Press.
- Fix, M., & Arantes, P. F. (2022). On urban studies in Brazil: The favela, uneven urbanisation and beyond. *Urban Studies*, 59(5), 893–916.
- Fontainha, F., & Cavalcanti de Lima, A. (2022). Law and Political Crisis in Brazil: From ‘Mensalão’ to ‘Lava-Jato’. *Discourses on Corruption: Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Perspectives*, 2022, 190–214.
- Gago, V. (2017). *Neoliberalism from below: Popular pragmatics and baroque economies*. Duke University Press.
- Gallin, D. (2001). Propositions on trade unions and informal employment in times of globalisation. *Antipode*, 33(3), 531–549.
- Gracino Junior, P., Goulart, M., & Frias, P. (2021). “And those who humble themselves will be exalted”: Resentment and evangelical adherence to Bolsonarism. *Cadernos Metr pole*, 23, 547–580.
- Holston, J. (1991). Autoconstruction in working-class Brazil. *Cultural Anthropology*, 6(4), 447–465.

- Holston, J. (2008). *Insurgent citizenship: Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil*. Princeton University Press.
- IBGE. (2020). PNAD Contínua trimestral: Desocupação recua em nove das 27 UFs no 4º trimestre de 2019. *Agência IBGE Notícias*.
<https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/26912-pnad-continua-trimestral-desocupacao-recua-em-nove-das-27-ufs-no-4-trimestre-de-2019>
- Itikawa, L. F. (2016). Women on the periphery of Urbanism: Subordinate informality, disarticulated autonomy and resistance in São Paulo, Mumbai and Durban. *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Urbanos e Regionais*, 18(1), 51–70.
- Jayme, J. G., & Neves, M. de A. (2010). Cidade e espaço público: Política de revitalização urbana em Belo Horizonte. *Caderno CRH*, 23(60), 605–617.
- Kopper, M. (2015). DE CAMELÔS A LOJISTAS: A transição do mercado de rua para um shopping em Porto Alegre. *Caderno CRH*, 28(75), 591–605.
- Kopper, M., & Richmond, M. A. (2021). Housing Movements and the Politics of Worthiness in São Paulo. *The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology*, 26(2), 276–296.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On populist reason*. Verso.
- Lago, L. C. (2011). Trabalho e moradia na periferia de uma grande metrópole: Para uma política urbana economicamente orientada. *Território e Planejamento*, 195–216.
- Lindell, I. (2011). Introduction to the special issue: Organizing across the formal-informal worker constituencies. *Labour, Capital and Society/Travail, Capital et Société*, 2–16.
- Loureiro, P. M., & Saad-Filho, A. (2019). The limits of pragmatism: The rise and fall of the Brazilian Workers' Party (2002–2016). *Latin American Perspectives*, 46(1), 66–84.

- Luna, N. T. C. de, & Oliveira, A. S. M. de. (2022). App delivery workers and the fragmentation of the contemporary working class. *Revista Katálysis*, 25, 73–82.
- Magalhães, F. N. C. (2023). Popular Economies In, Against, and Through the Platform. *Antipode*, 55(2), 527–547. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12894>
- Manzano, M., Krein, J. D., & Abílio, L. C. (2021). The Dynamics of Labour Informality in Brazil, 2003-2019. *Global Labour Journal*, 12(3).
- Manzo, K. (1991). Modernist discourse and the crisis of development theory. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 26(2), 3–36.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1967). The communist manifesto. *Trans. Samuel Moore. London: Penguin*, 15(10.1215), 9780822392583–049.
- Millar, K. M. (2018). *Reclaiming the discarded: Life and labor on Rio's garbage dump*. Duke University Press.
- Millar, K. M. (2020). Decentering wage labor as a new class politics. *Dialectical Anthropology*, 44(1), 83–85.
- Mitchell, S. T. (2021). Cruel Pessimism: The Affect of Anticorruption and the End of the New Brazilian Middle Class. In *Precarious Democracy: Ethnographies of Hope, Despair, and Resistance in Brazil after the Pink Tide* (pp. 79–90). Rutgers University Press.
- Monteith, W., Vicol, D.-O., & Williams, P. (2021). *Beyond the Wage: Ordinary Work in Diverse Economies*. Bristol University Press.
- Munck, R. (2013). The Precariat: A view from the South. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5), 747–762.
- Navarro, R. G., & de Lacerda Godinho, M. H. (2002). Movimentos sociais (populares), Conselho Municipal e órgão gestor na definição e implementação da política habitacional em Belo Horizonte—década de 1990. *Cadernos Metrópole.*, 07, 59–74.

- Nogueira, M. (2019). Displacing Informality: Rights and Legitimacy in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 43(3), 517–534.
- Nogueira, M., & Shin, H. B. (2022). The “right to the city centre”: Political struggles of street vendors in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. *City*, 26(5–6), 1012–1028.
- Pimentel Walker, A. P. (2015). The conflation of participatory budgeting and public–private partnerships in Porto Alegre, Brazil: The construction of a working-class mall for street hawkers. *Economic Anthropology*, 2(1), 165–184.
- Pinheiro-Machado, R. (2008). China-Paraguai-Brasil: Uma rota para pensar a economia informal. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 23(67), 117–133.
- Pinheiro-Machado, R., & Scalco, L. M. (2020). From hope to hate: The rise of conservative subjectivity in Brazil. *HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, 10(1), 21–31.
- Pochmann, M. (2012). *Nova classe média?: O trabalho na base de pirâmide social brasileira*. Boitempo Editorial.
- Richmond, M. A., & McKenna, E. (2023). Placing the peripheries within Brazil’s rightward turn: Socio-spatial transformation and electoral realignment, 2002–2018. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 239965442311771. <https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544231177142>
- Rodrigues, E., & Barbosa, B. R. (2010). Popular movements and the City Statute. *The City Statute of Brazil: A Commentary*, 23–34.
- Rolnik, R. (2011). Democracy on the edge: Limits and possibilities in the implementation of an urban reform agenda in Brazil. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(2), 239–255.
- Samuels, D. (2004). From socialism to social democracy: Party organization and the transformation of the workers’ party in Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(9), 999–1024.

- Santos, W. G. dos. (1979). *Cidadania e Justiça*. Campus.
- Schindler, S. (2014). Understanding urban processes in Flint, Michigan: Approaching ‘subaltern urbanism’ inductively. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 38(3), 791–804.
- Sharma, A., & Gupta, A. (2009). *The anthropology of the state: A reader*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Silver, B. (2003). *Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870: Forces of Labour*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soares, F. V. (2011). Brazil’s Bolsa Família: A review. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 55–60.
- Solano, E. (2020). “It’s all corrupt”: The Roots of Bolsonaroism in Brazil. In *The Emergence of Illiberalism* (pp. 210–223). Routledge.
- Standing, G. (2011). *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. Bloomsbury Academic.
- Telles, V. da S. (2009). Ilegalismos urbanos e a cidade. *Novos Estudos CEBRAP*, 153–173.
- Telles, V. da S., & Hirata, D. V. (2007). Cidade e práticas urbanas: Nas fronteiras incertas entre o ilegal, o informal e o ilícito. *Estudos Avançados*, 21, 173–191.
- Tyler, C. (1982). Trade unionism in Brazil. *Third World Quarterly*, 4(2), 312–320.
- Vainer, C. B. (2009). Pátria, empresa e mercadoria. Notas sobre a estratégia discursiva do Planejamento Estratégico Urbano. *Anais: Encontros Nacionais Da ANPUR*, 8.
<http://unuhostpedagem.com.br/revista/rbeur/index.php/anais/article/viewFile/1866/183>
- 3
- Williams, P., Kamra, L., Johar, P., Khan, F. M., Kumar, M., & Oza, E. (2022). No room for dissent: Domesticating WhatsApp, digital private spaces, and lived democracy in India. *Antipode*, 54(1), 305–330.

Zambelli, P. H. L. (2006). *O Trabalho Informal dos Camelôs da Região Central de Belo Horizonte e a Transferência Para os Shoppings Populares*. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciências Sociais)-Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais.[Links].