Sovereignty without statehood: International relations, Marxism and the forms of political rule in Morocco

Sovereignty without Statehood:

International Relations, Marxism and the Forms of Political Rule in Morocco

Meriam Mabrouk

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Politics

Birkbeck College, University of London

April 2024

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled: 'Sovereignty without Statehood: International Relations, Marxism and the Forms of Political Rule in Morocco' is the result of my own work.

Table of Contents

Chapter 5: Crises of imperialism

Chapter 6: Ecocide and Agents of Empire in the Desert Hinterlands: The case of the British North West African Company

ABSTRACT

This inter-disciplinary thesis asks the following question: How can sovereignty be conceptualised in a non-capitalist space? This thesis reconstructs the forms of political rule in Morocco to demonstrate the specific cumulative historical processes that shaped the production of *sovereignty without modern territorial statehood*. Situated in International Relations/International Historical Sociology, it does so through a comparative historicist methodology which compares state-society-international relations within two periods: 1666-1727 (ecosystems) and 1860-1895 (ecocide). To overcome defective debates in the literature, which conceptualise sovereignty and statehood as permanent transhistorical fixtures, or anomalise the Moroccan political trajectory by over-relying on cultural criteria such as 'tribalism', this thesis traces this dialectical and dynamic process to the intersections of endogenous and exogenous tensions that marked the geopolitical terrain. Thus, this thesis introduces the concepts of *ecosystems of sovereignty* and *ecocide* as analytical frameworks analysing the long-term transition to different forms of politics and shows the historically contingent relationship through which they were forged. These concepts stretch the conceptual frameworks of sovereignty in IR, and might help to better understand the different layers, cultures, and levels of political claim making in the Moroccan context, as well as the changing relationship between actors in different *environmental* contexts. Through case studies of political accumulation (slavery and piracy) and accumulation under imperialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this thesis investigates contradictions between articulations of political practice and the context which characterised the transition from an *ecosystem of sovereignty* to a system of *ecocide* in which territoriality was negotiated with empire. By focusing on different forms of accumulation – of labour, of racial and religious differences, of money, of diplomatic rights, and of territory in the context of empire – this thesis demonstrates the ways in which the expansion of capitalism and empire in the Moroccan milieu irreversibly altered its political forms.

LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES

MAPS

TABLES

ACKNOWLEGMENTS

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي بِنِعْمَتِهِ تَتِمُّ الصَّالِحَات

Eleven years ago, I dreamed of pursuing a PhD. Getting to this point – of writing acknowledgements – is an almost surreal experience. Getting this far would not have been possible without all the 'ecosystems' of support that I have had over the years. This is a modest attempt to acknowledge them.

I extend my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my PhD supervisor, Professor Alejandro (Alex) Colás, for his unwavering support, encouragement, and constructive feedback over four and a half years. I would like to thank him for believing in my research when it was in its infancy, for guiding me through the process of producing a thesis while encouraging me to take ownership of my own work, and for commenting on and helping refine my generally confused drafts. Most of all, for encouraging me to think outside the box, I am truly grateful.

I would also like to profusely thank my PhD examiners, Dr Maïa Pal and Dr Roberto Roccu. First, for making the viva a productive and intellectually stimulating conversation, and one of the most memorable experiences of my life. Second, I would also like to thank for their generosity in providing mentorship, feedback, and comments, for their intellectual rigour, and for treating my work with a caring and critical eye.

I extend my deepest gratitude also to Dr Lisa Tilley and Dr Ali Burak Güven, who provided immensely helpful comments on drafts of some of my PhD chapters, and to Prof. Charles Post for raising pertinent questions about a presented form of Chapter 6 during Historical Materialism London 2023. At Birkbeck, I would like to thank Dr Samantha Ashenden, and express my most profound gratitude towards Prof. Dermot Hodson, who was a generous pillar of support for all the PhD at the Politics Department, including myself. To colleagues and fellow PhD researchers in the Birkbeck Politics PhD programme, past and present. I would especially like to thank Dr. Ashima Ghandi for having being an exceptional friend and an academic companion, Alessandro Colasanti, Dr Kieran Andrieu, Dr Conor Kelly, and Mohammed Al Hajri. My deepest gratitude also to the Birkbeck Graduate Research School and Birkbeck Library staff, who made this journey possible; and to the cleaners at Birkbeck who keep our environment clean and safe for work, including during a pandemic.

In terms of academic support, I would like to thank my former lecturers at the Université Hassan II de Casablanca, Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines Ben M'sik. I would especially like to express my most profound gratitude towards Prof. Karim Bejjit for encouraging me to pursue academia, to Prof. Mohammed Kandoussi, Prof. Said Zaidoune, and Prof. Samira Rguibi. At the University of Sussex, where I studied for a Master's in IR, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Benno Teschke, who not only encouraged me to pursue and apply to a PhD, but also encouraged me to be more active in seminars, generously provided feedback, and supported many rounds of PhD applications. I would also like to profusely and sincerely thank Dr. Julian Germann

An acknowledgment of a different kind

Writing about imperial expansion and colonialism has political and ethical implications. Writing about 'sovereignty' while watching a genocide unfold and the world irreversibly changed and split along the colour lines of imperialism should push us to think about decolonisation not just as an academic endeavour, but as an ongoing and unfinished struggle. In Fanonian terms, as a struggle by all means for total liberation. On the day I am writing acknowledgements, it is 21 April 2024 nearly seven months after the genocidal violence against Gaza and Palestine began, and almost 76 years since the Nakba in 1948. Over the last few months, I – as have all of us – have watched a settler-colonial entity systematically attempt to destroy the totality of life in Gaza: its people, men, women, and children – at least 30,000 of whom were killed and 70,000 injured – its journalists, librarians, and academics; its housing and healthcare infrastructure; its mosques and churches; its archival and cultural institutions; and its universities.[1] I would like to dedicate this modest work of scholarship to all of souls of the šuhadā'[2] [martyrs] of injustice, occupation and genocide, including Mazen al-Hummada, Shireen Abu Akleh, Walid Daqqah, Dr. Refaat Alareer, and Aaron Bushnell. May our world be free of barbaric imperialism.

---

[1] See the MESA Board Joint Statement with CAF. 11 March 2024.

[2] In Arabic, this word comes from the verb 'shahada' [witness or see] and has different connotations than it does in English. It is used to refer to the unjust context of death and the unjust /violent ways through which one's soul leaves one's body. If your body is witness to an injustice or a crime, you are a shahid/a, regardless of religious background.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1. Introducing the thesis

This thesis tells the story of an unlikely set of characters who are gathered around the same historical table. It is neither strictly a history from above nor strictly a history from below, that is, a history of *ālmuhammašyn* (the maginalised). It is rather a historically guided International Relations (IR) and International Historical Sociology (IHS) account of the political form of Moroccan society in the space between the above and the below. It is one which demonstrates the role and capacity of actors from different backgrounds, existing within distinctive relations of production and belonging to distinctive social forces, to generate socio-historical change. In this story, the dispossessed (the enslaved), rulers (whether they are sultans or local governors), pirates, merchants, and diplomats all form a part of complex whole. In the tapestry of a *zellij* (tile) of the totality of Morocco – these actors are Maghrib[3] and world-making actors each with their own role, their own positions in the long-term process of statecraft, and their own colourful, meticulously designed patterns of agency.

The aim of this thesis is to first explore how practices of statecraft in Morocco functioned economically and socially within different eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historical (pre-)colonial contexts, and second, to analyse the ways in which these manifestations of political expression were conditioned by the developments the global economy. This thesis questions the epistemological foundations of state formation in International Relations. It fills a gap in IR – a discipline which is 'disinterestedly silent about other regions' beyond the west on the question of the emergence and nature of sovereignty.[4] In relying on Morocco as a space through which to examine the trajectories of sovereignty, it asks a fundamental question that dislodges conceptions of political development from the so-called west to push for a deeper and historically grounded understanding of the variegated practices of statecraft in the global South. What is sovereignty? How, if at all, did it manifest in the Moroccan milieu? Answering these questions requires not only breaking away from the Eurocentric

---

[3] The term Maghrib means west. It also means 'setting sun' or 'lands of the setting sun'. I use the term of the Maghrib not as a geographical designation, but as a historically-grounded dynamic unit of analysis. However, I don't use it in the manner Laroui does to denote a people with a shared language and identity. I instead use the term Maghrib to refer to a liberationist imaginary of politics beyond territorial configurations and boundaries; and to attach Morocco (and the Maghrib) to a shared history of anti-imperialism. Morocco is used in a geographical sense to denote what is 'modern-day' Morocco. In this sense, Morocco and Maghrib are not used interchangeably. See: Abdelmajid Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb: Between Africa and the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 112-113; Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 9.

[4] Ayşe Zarakol, 'A Non-Eurocentric Approach to Sovereignty', *International Studies Review*, Forum: In the Beginning There was No Word (for it): Terms, Concepts and Early Sovereignty, 3, no. 20 (2018): 27–32.

paradigms of historical enquiry, that is, universal laws of historical motion, but also questioning the ways in which capitalism – as a 'historically specific social relation'[5] – interacts with existing economic and political systems in different historical spaces and times.

As such, this PhD thesis investigates the forms of political expression (as a long-term process of the production of sovereignty without modern territorial statehood) in relation to socio-political and economic transformations in Morocco in two distinct periods: the first is from 1666 to 1727, a period analysed as the height of Morocco's *ecosystems of sovereignty*, and the second is from 1860 to 1895, a period analysed as exemplifying the process of *ecocide*. This research is premised on a historicist, qualitative, archive-focused,[6] and historically comparative methodology. More specifically, this thesis aims to compare and examine state-society-international relations during these two periods. The selection of these two distinct periods might seem unusual, even heretical to some. Nevertheless, they reflect a three-fold rationale. In investigating sovereignty (without territorial statehood) as a dynamic and evolving social relation, this thesis focuses on three layers and practices of politics which have framed the selection of case studies. The first is *conventional* politics, which focuses on the Makhzen's system of governance and the strategies of political centralisation of power. As the central tributary state sought to widen its military and political power, it re-arranged people into distinct geographical zones and relied on the legal and sociological condition of unfreedom as the basis for the expansion of its own into peripheral spaces. Thus, the creation of a personal army of soldier-slaves for Moulay Ismail forced the pinnacle of that strategy. Thus, this level of politics refers to the pursuing and implementation of strategies aiming to reproduce and expand the power and rule of the central tributary state. The second layer is *alternative* politics, which focuses on the agencies of political actors outside the purview of the central tributary state. This is particularly encapsulated in the formation of the maritime pirate Republic of Salé. I use the term 'alternative' to showcase on the one hand, the contentious relationship pirates had with Europeans, the material articulations of race that punctuated this relationship, and the ways in which they both disturbed established western visions of political practice and operate in a sphere of politics separate from the political unit of the Makhzen. On the other hand, I also use the term alternative politics to refer to all the ways in which the political agency of these actors has been sidelined through their epistemological and ideological incarceration in racialised narratives of 'barbarity' or submission. As a polity centred around maritime skill and collective imaginaries of the sea, the republic was a unique political experimentation in which the Salétins was an expensive social category, and in which the legal, educational, and political systems were initially separate from the sphere of rule of the Makhzen. In this sense, Chapter 4 explores the synergy and tension between these two levels of political practice. While the conventional politics of

---

[5] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (Verso, 2002), p. 34.
[6] I use the term 'archive-focused' to denote a specific approach towards the archives, in which they are both tools of historicising and tools offering insight into the historical actors and processes that are the subject of this research. In other words, the usage of archives in this research project focuses both on answering the questions of *what* happened and *how*.

the Ismaili central tributary state relied on a military and repressive apparatus, a centralised administrative body to manage the population, and a system of taxation to provide 'security' from internal and external threats in exchange for loyalty to the sultan; the republic relied on cosmopolitanism as a feature through which a population of ambitious and skilled maritime workers could experiment with labour, raiding, and maritime warfare. The Salétins collectively elected their Diwan [council] and formed their own legal system. Thus, the politics of consensus (of the Republic of Salé) are contrasted with the politics of autocratic rule (of Moulay Ismail's rule via the army of soldier-slaves). The third level of politics which frames the selection of the three case studies of this thesis is *imperial* politics during the nineteenth century. Discussed at length in Chapters 5 and 6, the focus here is thus on three dimensions of imperial expansion; (i) the long-term structural socio-economic changes that occur within the Moroccan sphere (such as the emergence of the figure of the settler-protégé and imperial accumulation by debt); (ii) the emergence of trans-imperial networks in which connectivity and imperial competition are 'entangled processes';[7] (iii) the ways in which the trans-imperial dynamics impact and shape territorialisation and the reproduction of political life in Morocco, both when it comes how the Makhzen and its agents view territory, and how agents semi-incorporated into the Makhzen's sphere of rule conceptualise geographical space. Thus, the focus on imperial politics is rooted in a methodological approach which aims to determine origins, causes, and patterns of long-term socio-historical change, whilst unpacking their contradictions and transformative effects across historical time and space.

Why is the focus of the thesis then on Morocco? In the social sciences and humanities, and especially in the discipline of International Relations, modernity continues to be predominantly associated with Europe, and with the patterns of socio-historical change relevant to its limited boundaries. Non-western states are conceived as places without governments, without states, and without international politics prior to their contact with the west. Thus, the selection of Morocco is based on methodological approach which seeks to disturb the privileging of historically limited and limiting European case studies through which the entirety of global socio-historical change can be understood. The case of sovereignty without modern territorial statehood challenges the historical ontologies and established narratives in IR regarding the interwoven nature of sovereignty and territoriality. It shows that there existed a world of political practices and norms; a world of cosmopolitan maritime workers of the world, sultans, and political *fonctionnaires* who had different political imaginaries contextualised within their *own* material and historical circumstances. Above all, focusing on Morocco allows us to think of the extent to which territorial statehood was neither a normal, nor an inevitable historical path, but was rather a product of historically contingent circumstances, and a backward superimposition of so-called European (imperial) modernity. Second, interrogating the layers, forms, and functions of political rule allow us to move beyond the dominant

---

[7] Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé, 'Transimperial History - Connectivity, Cooperation and Competition', *Journal of Modern European History* 16, no. 4 (2018): 429–52.

historical narratives of a perennial Moroccan statehood – one which is viewed through the lens of the continuities of sultanic rule or the unproblematic persistence of 'tribal' structures, and posed as a uniquely distinct phenomenon of statecraft in the Maghrib. The third reason for the focus on Morocco is reflective of a broader problem in IR, which is a notable muteness and disinterest pertaining to historical questions in the Maghrib. One of the hurdles that presented itself throughout the writing of this thesis is that the IR literature on Morocco is scarce, even rarer and almost non-existent in the case of International Historical Sociology. This raises a crucial question before us: why there is no international historical sociology of Morocco,[8] and indeed, of North Africa? This disinterest in the Maghrib is especially perplexing considering that the discipline of IR is taught in various universities in Morocco, in multiple languages, and that the discipline itself includes a spectrum of methods and ways of *thinking* and *conceptualising* IR starting from history-centric approaches (where IR is a sub-field of History) to critical approaches towards International Relations. This muteness on histories of the Maghrib in IR is not incidental; it is a reflection of the extent to which IR has absorbed colonial semantics, geographies of power, and colonial categories of socio-historical difference. Through these dynamics, the Maghrib emerged as a space '… with an Arab identity that linked its past and destiny to the Middle East and that made it part and parcel of a geopolitical entity called the Arab world…'.[9] At the same time, this dynamic reproduced the classic colonial schism between the Maghrib and the wider African continent, or in stricter colonial terms, the racist dichotomy of 'white Africa' and 'black Africa' whereby Africanness in measured by blackness. This puts the Maghrib is in an arcane position of unintelligibility – where it is neither quite within the invented geographies of the Middle East, nor quite within the wider African continent. This is not to suggest that African space is uniform or homogeneous, or that there aren't diverse cultures, differing historical trajectories, and socio-political distinctions between its many components, but that these distinctions were '…misconstrued as a boundary' and thus ontologically reproduced the 'continental drift'.[10] In other words, the muteness on the histories and trajectories of the Maghrib in IR are reflective of a deeply entrenched difference rooted in coloniality, where on the one hand, the North African has no place in the 'real' Africa; and on the other hand, as Sudanese scholar Hassan Mohamed argues, an idea is replicated whereby the black person is '… a creature of tropical bliss … [that] does not belong in the Mediterranean world.'[11] Additionally, the epistemological framing through which Morocco's political development is perceived has other consequences. In IR narratives on state formation in the Arabic-speaking world, the tendency to examine sovereignty through the prism of legacies of the Ottoman Empire, or through statecraft during the (post-)colonial period puts Morocco in uncomfortable position where it becomes

---

[8] I borrow this expression from: Justin Rosenberg, 'Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?', *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 307–40.

[9] Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, pp. 234-5.

[10] Ziad Bentahar, 'Continental Drift: The Disjunction of North and Sub-Saharan Africa', *Research in African Literatures* 42, no. 1 (2011): 1–13.

[11] Mohamed Hassan Mohamed. 'Africanists and Africans of the Maghrib: Casualties of Analogy'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 349–374.

a footnote in a broader narrative and/or an exception to the rule. After all, North Africa is a space characterised by '… never having known that sort of cultural synthesis between the Muslim East and Europe (especially Central Europe) that was attempted in the Middle East under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, roughly between 1850 and 1914.'[12] Thus, critically examining Morocco's political forms of rule from an IR and an International Historical Sociology approach is to fill the gap of historical sociological Morocco in IR, and to prompt a questioning of the ways in which the discipline has absorbed, recreated, and refashioned the power relations of colonial categories. As a remedy to these shortcomings, this thesis opposes 'regionalist' perspectives and instead, attaches Morocco to an analysis which gives primacy to the patterns of geopolitical domination.

By investigating the manifestations of sovereignty and practices of statecraft both within historical capitalism on a global scale and within Morocco's non-capitalist social relations – as opposed to their existence within a linear post-colonial encounter of the West vs. the rest – an insight is gained into the processes of the development of capitalism beyond the spaces within which it originated and into the adoption of the modern territorial state as a form of political structuring. This thesis explores these dynamics by introducing two key terms to analyse the historically contingent dialectic of political rule in Morocco: *ecosystems of sovereignty* and *ecocide*. In doing so, it focuses on a series of 'in' and 'out' political and economic processes of accumulation: slavery, piracy, diplomacy, and the expansion of capitalism and empire into the Moroccan sphere. By focusing on different forms of accumulation – of labour, of racial and religious differences, of money, of political and diplomatic rights, and of territory in the context of empire – this thesis demonstrates the ways in which the acceleration of socio-economic and political transformations challenged and irreversibly altered the existing 'legal cultures' of sovereignty.[13] This thesis dissects the complex relationship between the state, society, and the international[14] and diverse material realities of agency. Within this historical reconstruction, a range of fresh reinterpretations of the production of sameness and difference punctuate all the case studies. These reinterpretations fall within the realm of the political (through the analysis of change in political structures and visions, the system of taxation, and the expansion of extraterritorial rights), social (through processes of racialisation and social hierarchies within the pyramid of the relations of production and domination or exploitation), and economic (through patterns in the market and taxation). In other words, the historically specific form(s) of sovereignty are analysed through the lens of temporal episodes prior to and during the interaction with capitalism and subordination to European imperialism. During the 18th century, Morocco's socio-historical development took place independently of the web of capitalism. However, this changed drastically in the second half of 19th century. The expansion of capitalist and imperialist exploitation

---

[12] Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 169.
[13] I borrow this term from Benton, see: Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[14] Throughout this thesis, International Relations (IR) to refer to the academic discipline; whereas terms such as the international or international relations refer to social and political relations not only between states as such, but also between political communities and societies conceived in a broader historical sense.

into the Moroccan sphere, whether directly or indirectly, led to an increase in extra-territorial rights for agents of empire and the exportation of surplus money and commodities. This thesis aims to highlight these relations of exploitation at the empirical and analytical levels while offering insight into the ways in which these tensions are produced, challenged, and negotiated.

2. Research questions and contribution

This transdisciplinary thesis is situated in International Relations, specifically in the sub-field of International Historical Sociology. It poses the following historical and theoretical questions: What constituted sovereignty, if at all, in the Moroccan space? What is the nature of the transformations that occurred within this period and how did they inform the making of sovereignty? How can sovereignty be conceptualised in a non-capitalist space? To address these questions, this study achieves a two-pronged objective. At the theoretical level, this thesis offers an account of sovereignty in light of specific long-term historical transitions beyond the Anglo-European sphere. In so doing, it rewrites and confronts International Relations by challenging the mere conception and application of sovereignty as a European legal creation and normative ideological construction in non-Western contexts. By meticulously exploring the construction of sovereignty in its relationship to class, empire and political rule in different historical contexts, this study contributes to on the one hand, rethinking and reconceptualising forms of political rule and layers of stateness in the global South where both sovereignty and social class are dynamic; and on the other, to conceptualising a new model of sovereignty beyond the European case study model of territorial sovereignty. More specifically, this theoretical account questions the dominance and centrality of territorial statehood as an unproblematic and inevitable outcome of socio-historical development in International Relations. At a historical level, this thesis aims to challenge the existing (nationalist and colonialist) accounts of statehood in Moroccan literature. This thesis shows that these accounts have not only overlooked theorising sovereignty in the Moroccan milieu. They also considered the nation-state as a model against which socio-historical development is measured. In other words, through attempts to prove the existence of the longitudinal state, the state becomes the unifying thread for a narrative which presupposes and normalises its existence through a cyclical conception of history. However, this thesis does not aim to reproduce the 'general ideological framework that governed approaches towards the nineteenth century [in Morocco]'[15] – approaches which overly relied on the sempiternal, immutable tensions between the Makhzen and the 'tribe' and focused in providing 'ready-made answers' about the European role in weakening the Moroccan state. Instead, it showcases that a form of worldmaking and political practices existed in Morocco that was multi-layered with separate, but overlapping realms of politics; and in exploiting the spatially diverse political and economic articulations of Moroccan society, specifically European imperialism imposed a different political project of territorial configuration. At the core of this thesis is the argumentative thread that the 'political form [of the

---

[15] Abdelahad Sebti, *āttāryḫ wāḏḏākira: awrāš fy tāryḫ ālmaġrib [History and Memory: Workshops in the History of Morocco]* (Casablanca: Markaz Takafi Arabi, 2012), p. 191.

nation-state is] incapable of realizing the ideals of a democratic, egalitarian, and anti-imperial future.'[16] As such, the historical contribution of this thesis is not only a historical exercise in the sense of reclaiming, challenging, and reconstructing the narratives of state formation. Rather, it is an exercise in epistemology and ontology that aims to reorient both IR and narratives on Moroccan state formation. In other words, it is an exercise of comparison and contrast that examines different imaginaries of political rule within their own historical contexts.

The dominance of sovereignty as territorial statehood, this thesis argues and demonstrates, severely restricts our understanding of the realm of diverse realities of politics outside the European context, notably in Morocco. On one hand, the casting of territorial statehood as a long-term fixture of Moroccan history on a paradoxical epistemological framework grounded in Eurocentrism ignores the ways in which actors within and without the central tributary state of Morocco carved out their own political spaces and had different political practices. On the other hand, the construction of sovereignty in exclusive terms of territoriality normalises statehood as a historical trajectory and as an inevitable outcome to which all societies were marching. In other words, it fails to conceptualise the different manifestations and complex layers of historical time and the ways in which the past influences the ever-shifting location and temporality of the present.[17]

Crucially, Morocco's case challenges the existing moulds of sovereign territorial statehood. How so? Morocco neither fits the box of the colonial argument which denies its multiple temporalities and agencies, nor does it fit the imperially-driven ideological box where sovereignty is conceptualised under the umbrella of a French colonial administration seen to represent the *origins* of statehood. The case of Morocco also challenges culturalist lenses in which it is reduced to a 'tribal' society of immutability. Lastly, this sovereignty model does not fit the box of 'anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism', which ascribes a sense of timelessness to its political structures and institutions, thus ignoring not only the long-term processes of socio-historical change, but also the contradictions punctuating those changes. Thus, we have a case of sovereignty that challenges these conceptual boxes. How do we make sense of a republic that had delineated geographical boundaries, independent legal structures, that conducted diplomatic agreements with various European states, a fully functioning economy, and collectively elected political leaders? In particular, how do we make sense of this with the knowledge that at the same historical time and space, there existed another potent political force (represented in the rule of Moulay Ismail) which also had delineated geographical boundaries, a military apparatus, a system of tax extraction, and this political force, too, was conducting trade and diplomacy with European states? Through the historical and theoretical construction of its 'neither/nor' argument, it expands on the ways in which the case of sovereignty in Morocco is not merely about providing

---

[16] Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), p. 1.

[17] Harry Harootunian, *Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), pp. 23-24.

empirical analysis but about rethinking the expressions of political agency and the ways in which historicising them would open up new horizons that transcend mainstream debates in IR.

In a space where the relations of exploitation were both the product of incremental internal socio-historical change and long-term subordination to the imperatives of capitalism, capturing sovereignty as a historically specific and yet dynamic and evolving abstract *social relation* helps both capture the complex nuances of the political trajectories of Morocco and challenge existing mainstream accounts of sovereignty in International Relations, while stretching the conceptual dimensions of sovereignty in Marxist International Relations, most notably in the sub-field of International Historical Sociology. As such, this thesis posits that sovereignty manifested differently in Morocco; it reimagines sovereignty beyond the anachronistic lens of 'statehood', beyond colonial trans-historical legacies, and the absolutist context,[18] instead framing it as a dialectic between politics from above and below, and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. This thesis, therefore, achieves these objectives by making the case for the conceptualisation of sovereignty without (modern) statehood. In this context, this thesis introduces the concepts of ecosystems of sovereignty and ecocide as analytical frameworks analysing the long-term transition to different forms of politics and shows the historically contingent, dialectical relationship through which they were forged. These concepts might help to better understand the different layers, cultures, and levels of political claim making in the Moroccan context, as well as the changing relationship between actors in different *environmental* contexts, whether they are in land-based or maritime spaces.

Following from that, I introduce the concept of ecosystems of sovereignty as one which captures these intricate dynamics of the 'extended Middle Ages' and the imperial era.[19] Ecosystems of sovereignty is defined as a system within which separate but overlapping realms of politics reproduce, maintain, or challenge each other, and as a system which is premised on the symbiotic and contentious relationship between various political blocks (within or outside the boundaries of the central tributary state) and the social relations of the geographical space within which they exist, whether in the maritime or in the terrestrial space. Ecocide, on the other hand, refers to a long-term process which saw the reversal of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty and the societal narrowing of legitimacies. Overseeing this transition was a move away from negotiating political rule with various actors towards negotiating territorial claims with the commercial and political agents of empire. In other words, capitalism and empire represent the couscousier within which the grains of this transition are steamed.

What are the stakes and implications of positing sovereignty without modern territorial statehood? How does this inform our theoretical work in IR and understanding of international

---

[18] Pedro Dutra Salgado, 'Against Sovereignty: The Colonial Limits of Modern Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 52, no. 1 (2023): 85–108.

[19] Mohammed Hubayda, *Bu's al-tārīkh : murāja'āt wa-muqārabāt [The Misery of History: Reviews and Approaches]*, 2nd ed. (Rabat: Dār al-Amān, 2016), p. 30.

relations throughout various historical times and geographies? First, there are political implications to making such an argument and to asking these research questions. In our present time, South West Asia and North Africa (SWANA) is witness to a genocide, revolutions, occupations, imperial interventionism, counter-revolutions, and a prolonged state of neo-colonialism. Then, there is a profound schism between the agency of states and the agency of people, agencies from above and those from below, and a profound schism between over the liberation Palestine and the question of normalisation with genocide and settler-colonialism. As Nkrumah argues, imperialism's '… final bid for existence, as monopoly-capitalism or imperialism is the last stage of capitalism'[20] is premised on the ideological production of sovereignty as alien to the spaces which it seeks to subjugate – spaces which are conceptualised as geographically barren, historically linear, and politically undeveloped prior to their contact with the west.

The Maghribi space itself is witness to an increasing arms race and political rivalry between Morocco and Algeria; thus, to reproduce themselves, both states are ideologically constructed in opposition to each other despite a long history *populaire* from below showing the opposite (both before and during colonialism). Thus, the aim is to challenge these modern conceptions of the Maghrib as a space of transhistorical territorial (dis)continuities and continuities. In doing that, there is also an explicit questioning of the extent to which the modern nation-state was a political form that Morocco aspired to, and the extent to which these current territorial configurations match Morocco's historical trajectory. In essence, this line of thought posits that modern territoriality was a backward super-imposition of historical contingency and questions the extent to which 'international legal sovereignty was almost universally desired', as Krasner argues.[21] This superimposition led to the incipience of territoriality and the necessity of having a centralised, unified, and coercive political instrument against the tide of imperialism (that of the modern nation-state) where political power becomes '… the official expression of the class antagonism within bourgeois society.'[22] This is not to say that territoriality and rudimentary conceptions of territory were entirely absent from the Moroccan landscape, but that they were not fundamental to conceptions of political rule and power under this paradigm of sovereignty. As will be argued and shown later, the second half of the nineteenth century saw the gradual emergence of new political arrangements – the core of which was territoriality under imperialism – between the sovereign and the central tributary state on the one hand; and between people, the sovereign, and land on the other.

---

[20] Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1966), p. 31.

[21] Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 155.

[22] Vladimir Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), p. 21.

Second, there are IR disciplinary implications in presenting a case of sovereignty without territorial statehood. As Zarakol argues, when IR theorists discuss sovereignty, it is primarily through the categories of supreme authority, control, or territoriality.[23] For example, for Krasner:

> The term sovereignty has been commonly used in at least four different ways: domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority; interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to control transborder movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations.[24]

If that is the case, then how do we make sense of societies and historical times (such as the extended Middle Ages in Morocco or in European terms, the 'early modern period') in which the distinctions between internal and external, domestic and international were blurred and fluid? How do we conceptualise sovereignty in spaces in which authority and control were not absolute, but negotiated? Situating long-term changes in Morocco's political dynamics has implications for understanding various forms of subjectivities, whether they be institutional (the army of soldier-slaves), personal (the sultan), societal, or subjectivities which dislodge globally dominant conceptions of power (pirates). Conceptualising sovereignty as an historically contingent product of material processes and social relations pries away the European idea that statehood is necessary for sovereignty and helps imagine all the ways in which non-European societies had sovereignty in their own terms. In simple words, Morocco has its own sovereignty tradition, its own practices of world-making and repertoire of political experiments which are in need of attention in their own right, not merely as 'regional' case studies, but as repositories of socio-political and historical development in need of theorising. Opening ourselves to this very possibility – of a sovereignty that is not restricted to notions of authority or territoriality – enables us to perceive the making of global politics in a different light. The second implication of such a conceptualisation of sovereignty in IR is that it makes a contribution to the entanglements of structure and agency in the extra-European periphery. In advancing a new conceptual framework of sovereignty that opposes the reification of western agency and primacy given to European case studies in IR, it widens the scope of which actors are perceived as practitioners of *legitimate* politics; and excavates and recovers politics and agencies outside of the purview of actors conceived as the key shapers of politics. What is at stake is, on the one hand, an urgency to seriously conceptualise non-western agency as an historically, ontologically, and epistemologically key shaper and maker of global politics; and on the other hand, a necessity to

---

[23] Ayşe Zarakol, *Before the West: The Rise and Fall of Eastern World Orders*, LSE International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), p. 12.
[24] Krasner, *Sovereignty*, p. 9; See also: Stephen Krasner, 'Problematic Sovereignty', in *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*, ed. Stephen Krasner (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1–23.

conceptualise the complex and at times, contradictory manifestations of these agencies. This thesis achieves this in two ways in particular. The first is a critical approach toward the question of piracy and the agency of pirates in the Maghrib in the extended Middle Ages. In unpacking the contentious racialised dimensions of piracy in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, pirates are extricated from a conceptual box in which they are villainised subjects battling the inconsistencies of the European Law of Nations and the hypocrisies of political appropriateness, to a wider conceptual framework in which they are not merely pirates, but *royass al-bahr* [commanders of the sea]. They are practitioners of maritime naval warfare and cosmopolitan maritime workers not just of the Republic of Salé, but of the world, with the ability to practice, shape, and imagines politics globally and beyond the remit of their polity. The second is a critical approach toward the question of agency during the age of imperial politics in the nineteenth century. In investigating the dynamics contextualising the emergence and demise of the British North West African Company, a crucial insight is gained into the complexities of political practice, whereby Shaikh Mohammed Bayrouk is not merely an agent submissive to the whims of British imperialism and oblivious of the expansionist project of Donald Mackenzie, but rather a diplomatic practitioner negotiating rule under the structural constraints of empire and the jurisdictional power of the Makhzen. Correspondingly, the Moroccan space ceases to be a receptable and a sponge absorbing western agency; instead becoming conceptualised as a space which has both modified imperialism and been modified by it. That is to say that the practices of agency and social relations of the desert (including those of actors such as Mohammed Bayrouk) placed a limit on the extent to which this semi-private enterprise of entrepreneurial and banking imperialists could metastasise and survive in the desert; simultaneously, the structural constraints of capitalist and imperial expansion placed a limit on the agencies of Moroccan actors by highlighting the abstract contradictions between the personal rule of the sultan and the jurisdiction of the Makhzen.

When IR theorists discuss sovereignty, it is still predominantly in terms of the existence or non-existence of the territorial state (through notions of authority, territory, power). This approach does not help capture the various meanings and levels of stateness in other historical and geographical circumstances. Shifting sovereignty from absolute authority and territory – as the final outcome exemplified in the nation-state – to forms of political rule and political claim-making helps understand the historical nuances and trajectories of places *beyond* Europe. Ultimately, the aim is to rescue from sovereignty the idea that it was not the exclusive realm of individual rulers or states, but that everyday people and communities shaped sovereignty and *were sovereign* in one way or another. It is also to emphasise the historical significance of syāda šaʿbya [sovereignty of the people and the community] in challenging, shaping, and negotiating dominant forms of political rule. Thus, this redefinition of sovereignty can be applied to predominantly Muslim societies and would help especially rethink decentralised forms of governance in light of the Qu'ranic concept of the Umma (community)[25] –

---

[25] According to Abdou, the concept of the Umma has a revolutionary spirit which transcends identity and religion-based affiliations. The Umma stands for 'a global coalitional polity of Muslims and non-Muslims, whose boundaries and identity are premised solely on the existence of identifiable ethical-political spiritual

both during the early modern period and the encounter with imperialism – from a new perspective. According to Hallaq:

> In Islam, it is the Community (Umma) that displaces the nation of the modern state. The Community is both abstract and concrete, but in either case it is governed by the same moral rules. In its abstract form, the Community is also a political formation delimited by moral-legal concepts… Whereas the nation-state is the end of all ends, knows only itself, and therefore is metaphysically the ultimate foundation of sovereign will, the Community and its individual members are a means to a greater end. This implies that the Community itself neither possesses sovereignty nor does it have — in the sense the modern state has—an autonomous political or legal will, since the sovereign is God and God alone.[26]

In Muslim societies, the pre-modern period was characterised by decentralised forms of governance in which the '"units" regulating the political and the social were not as closely intertwined as they are in the modern state.'[27] Thus, the expansive view of sovereignty that this thesis offers helps rethink different levels of separation within the political sphere (such as the contradictions between individual sultanic rule and the jurisdictional power the Makhzen), as well as the distinctions and linkages between political and social 'units' of organising society.

The predicament of the conceptualisation of sovereignty as territorial statehood, and thus treating it as a universal law of history, in the words of Benedict Anderson, lies in the fact that it 'turn[s] chance into destiny', and contingencies into historical inevitabilities.[28] In turning sovereign statehood into a benchmark of political development, the historically specific nature, role, and character of the state itself become obscured. In this case, the state – that is, the political state – is not a 'hypostatised abstraction'. For Marx, the state is a modern and abstract social force whose emergence was conditioned by the separation of the state from society – in other words, the separation of the political from the economic sphere, and the separation of the public from the private sphere. In accordance with this thesis of the state, this thesis draws a separation between what I refer to as the central tributary state (the ruling and dominant political entity embodied in the structures of the Makhzen) and the 'political state' – which falls outside the remit of the conceptual demarcations of this research as it would necessitate studying different historical times, changes, and processes in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the former, the nature of accumulation through warfare and commerce, illustrated through the case studies of slavery and piracy in Chapter 4, highlights the peculiar dynamics at play. While the tributary state makes its own political claims, constructs an army

---

socially just commitments.' See: Mohamed Abdou, *Islam and Anarchism: Relationships and Resonances* (London: Pluto Press, 2022), p. 114.

[26] Wael Hallaq, *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 42.

[27] Hallaq, p. 35.

[28] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 12.

of the enslaved, extracts tribute through the former, and holds an administrative and repressive apparatus, it also works with and recognises the political claims of other actors who, despite forming their own political communities with separate legal and diplomatic systems in place (as was the case in the Republic of Salé), were not always construed as a threat. In other words, while the centralised tributary state acted as the political umbrella of spatial and temporal power, during that period, it never considered autonomous non-state actors as 'illegitimate' to the extent that the premise of their existence was not called into question until the acceleration of imperial expansion. However, the incipience of the 'political state' shows a radically different picture. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the economic basis of Moroccan society began to change at an accelerated pace, and new forms of political power and political claim making began to emerge. Here, the relationship between these actors begins to shift from one of alternating symbiosis and tension to one of political hierarchy. In the shadow of imperialism and capitalist accumulation, the natural development of political structures and the economic basis of society were obstructed. Thus, the political structuring of Moroccan society transformed from one in which various actors – in different historical times and spaces – worked with or against, and above or below one another, to one which saw the ideological and material construction of a stricter form of territoriality and the emergence of a new form of *statecraft* centred upon sultanic rule. Thus, the emergence of an inflexible conception of territoriality (tied to the exclusive rights of rulership, personhood, and political authority of the sultan) was positioned against other forms of autonomous political claim making. To understand this particular shift in political dynamics from sovereignty as the accumulation of the political experiments and agency of groups from different socio-historical backgrounds (the enslaved, pirates, as well as central tributary stateness) to sultanic statecraft, it is crucial to reflect on the political ramifications and historical role of the relationship between imperialism and the 'headquarters of capitalism'.[29]

As such, the hypothesis is that sovereignty must be recontextualised within the long-term interplay between different forms of antagonism (including but not limited to class), local political agencies and structures, and geopolitical interferences to rectify the defective views prevalent in the literature. More specifically, this thesis argues that the shift from tribute-taking polities which relied on distinctive forms of political accumulation, which varied across time and space, to a state with a broadly delineated conception of sovereignty occurred *within* the reverberations of capitalism and European imperial expansion in Morocco, while tensions around the founding of the British North West African Company in Tarfaya represented the pinnacle of that process. The specific payoff of this thesis is twofold. At a theoretical level, it challenges the general theoretical models of International Relations which exclude the trajectories of the extra-European periphery and broadens the conception of sovereignty in International Relations. On a historical level, by investigating the dynamics of differentiation from within (through race and class) and without (through the reverberations of capitalism and imperial expansion), this research offers a fresh interpretation of the levels and layers

---

[29] Henry Heller, *A Marxist History of Capitalism* (Oxford: Routledge, 2019), p. 46.

of political articulation in Morocco, one in which sovereignty is conceptualised beyond the long-term ideological foundations of the nation-state and beyond the formation of national consciousness.

This thesis is, therefore, not focused on interrogating the longevity of 'Alawi rule. Here, sovereignty is analysed not on the basis of trans-historical temporality or the succession of dynastic rule but rather on the basis of the historical specificities and contingencies which propelled the production and creation of different cultures of sovereignty. Indeed, any attempt at peculiarising the 'Alawi dynasty in and of itself through the notion of historical time (or rather, perpetuity) fails to consider the intra-spatial and temporal dynamics of structural weakness which punctuated socio-historical development in Morocco. Moreover, focusing on the temporal character of the 'state as such' highlights that the state itself as a unifying thread of Moroccan history does not acknowledge the internal contradictions inherent to the process, whether they take the form of politically differentiated and autonomous jurisdictions, or spatio-temporally diverse social antagonisms. Thus, this research aims to broaden the debates on sovereignty in IR and to challenge the defective debates in the International Relations literature in which sovereignty and capitalism are conjoined, and in which the former is a manifestation of a strictly European process of legal codification. It also challenges narratives which, in the quest for an anti-Eurocentric re-conceptualisation of state formation in the global South, result in producing an 'inverse' form of Eurocentrism: first, through accounts which conflate vibrant forms of trade and markets with capitalism; and second, through accounts which reify sovereignty into a self-evident invariable historical entity. Ultimately, this study seeks both to disturb and hold conversation with these accounts while formulating an International Historical Sociology of the Maghribi milieu.

3. International Relations and the problem of Eurocentrism

Despite multi-disciplinary, and indeed, inter-disciplinary attempts to overcome the *impasse* of Eurocentrism, its spectre continues to haunt IR. The centrality of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, 'a constitutive foundation myth within IR',[30] meant that it became an embodiment of the principles of modern sovereignty and secularism, thus representative of a *fictionalised* breakthrough in the modern inter-state system and by extension, the foundation of IR as an academic discipline. Although this myth has been heavily unpacked and criticised,[31] the Westphalian inter-state system framework is still dominant in the English School, which locates the idea of a unique and distinctive European civilisation within the spatio-temporal edifices of Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire.

The postcolonial turn in IR is not left unscathed by the *problématique* of the international. Opposing the charting of international society through processes in the west that radiate towards the

---

[30] Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003), p. 3.

[31] Teschke; Stéphane Beaulac, 'The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth', *Australian Journal of Legal History* 8, no. 2 (2004): 181–213; Andreas Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth', *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87.

rest,[32] and aiming to disrupt narratives that reproduce and re-enact European forms of knowing, thinking, and theorising, the postcolonial canon is positioned in isolation and separation from other critical canons,[33] particularly Marxism,[34] in what Julian Go refers to as the classic sociological tendency towards 'analytic bifurcation'.[35] According to Go, this tendency relies on the separation of relationships and categories which are otherwise intertwined. Whilst post-colonial discourse theory might fall into the pitfall of tracing ideological-cultural phenomena and discursive abstractions at the expense of theorising the structural conditions within which they emerge, the postcolonial canon in International Relations is a broad intellectual tradition which, far from being homogeneous, provides scope for 'reparative possibilities'[36] between different theoretical formulations. Indeed, the interplay between global capital, the cultural and the colonial in intellectual traditions of the global South is testament to the importance of framework of 'reparation' and the necessity of investigating the connections between the material and cultural – within International Historical Sociology[37] – in a way that does not position '[an] analytical and normative priority of certain forms of subordination over others'.[38]

To be clear, the conceptualisation of Eurocentrism as a question of geography reproduces features of Eurocentrism while leaving its most pressing questions unaddressed – the questions of framing, analysis, methodology, and theoretical construction. As a means of illuminating the confusion surrounding the notion of Eurocentrism, Hobson distinguished between 'conscious' and 'subliminal' Eurocentrism. According to Hobson, the former is a calculated process that involves praising the West and denigrating the rest, while the latter revolves around subtlety.[39] In other debates,[40] Eurocentrism is not merely centred on the geographies of the uneven global order, but is an ideological construct that shapes the ever-shifting, imagined boundaries of the west and the global South. In this context, Eurocentrism becomes an epistemological and teleological mover that structures, fractures, and conquers the Global South while simultaneously shaping narratives about their socio-historical trajectories. Furthermore, Eurocentrism here is neither theory, nor simply ideology; 'it is rather a prejudice that distorts social theories. It draws from its storehouse of [several]

---

[32] Sanjay Seth, 'Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations', *Millennium* 40, no. 1 (1 September 2011): 167–83.

[33] See Vivek Chibber, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital* (London: Verso, 2013).

[34] Sara Salem, '"Stretching" Marxism in the Postcolonial World: Egyptian Decolonisation and the Contradictions of National Sovereignty', *Historical Materialism* 27, no. 4 (19 December 2019): 3–28.

[35] Julian Go, 'For a Postcolonial Sociology', *Theory and Society* 42, no. 1 (1 January 2013): 25–55.

[36] Rahul Rao, 'Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism' *Critical Sociology* 43, no. 4-5 (2016): 587-598.

[37] See: Adam David Morton, 'The Age of Absolutism: Capitalism, the Modern States-System and International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005): 495–517.

[38] Rahul Rao, 'Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism'.

[39] John M. Hobson, 'Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian towards a Post-Racist Critical IR', *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 91–116.

[40] Shampa Biswas, 'Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist', *Millennium* 36, no. 1 (2007): 117–33; Geeta Chowdhry, 'Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Interventions in International Relations', *Millennium* 36, no. 1 (2007): 101–16.

components, retaining one or rejecting another according to the ideological needs of the moment.'[41] However, in engaging in debates which aim to specifically overcome epistemic and geopolitical Eurocentrism in IR, there is a looming risk of inadvertently producing it in resorting to rhetorical criticism.[42] For example, John Hobson argued that producing an ontologically pluralist account of international relations necessitates recuperating sovereignty in non-Western spaces.[43] Accounts which view the process as one located 'endogenously within Europe', argues Hobson, fail to take theorise the agencies of actors in the periphery. However, in so doing, Hobson naturalises sovereignty as a linear historical process and benchmark for progress and liberation. Indeed, in seeking to rectify Eurocentric narratives through the notion of 'Oriental Globalization', Hobson ascribes a modernity to 'sovereignty' - thus not only reifying the term but treating as a natural development which all market societies were walking towards since the fifteenth century. Most crucially, in looking at the role of 'capitalist agents' in China and India as part of an historical process of 'Oriental globalisation', and yet, prior to the actual emergence of capitalism, Hobson relies on a parochial continuity (albeit arguing that 'discontinuity' is at the core of the argument) – a continuity of trade, capitalism, and sovereignty. Under this view, a developed market and global trading system are equated with capitalism and sovereignty in the East itself, mystified. Both Wood and Wallerstein have referred to this trend as 'Eurocentric anti-Eurocentrism'[44] or as 'anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism',[45] respectively.

According to Samir Amin, one way in which Eurocentrism structures analyses of capitalism is through the religion-based approaches. In these analyses, Christianity, broadly conceived as the religion of Europeans, was more prone than other religions to encourage individual and technological advancement, thus leading to the flourishing of capitalism in Europe and not in other places.[46] However, another facet of the Eurocentric coin is analyses in which an anti-Eurocentric approach merely becomes an ontological inversion towards multiplicities which provincialise without historicising. Samir Amin's work provides key insights into constructions of Eurocentrism and their capitalist linages. Amin argues that the 'tendency [that] leads to a refusal to grant imperialism all of the decisive importance that it has in really existing capitalism' poses a serious challenge in theoretical constructions. [47] Amin asserts that at the core of Eurocentrism, lies a 'mythical construct', that on the one hand, fosters a cultural conception of the homogeneity of Europe that guides

---

[41] Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*, trans. Russell Moore and James Membrez, 2nd ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), p. 166.
[42] Juliette Tolay, 'Inadvertent Reproduction of Eurocentrism in IR: The Politics of Critiquing Eurocentrism', *Review of International Studies* 47, no. 5 (December 2021): 692–713.
[43] John M. Hobson, 'Provincializing Westphalia: The Eastern Origins of Sovereignty', *International Politics* 46, no. 6 (2009): 671–90.
[44] Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'Eurocentric Anti-Eurocentrism', *Against the Current*, no. 92 (2001).
[45] Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science', *Sociological Bulletin* 46, no. 1 (1997): 21–39.
[46] Amin, *Eurocentrism*, pp. 161-2.
[47] Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*, trans. Russell Moore and James Membrez, 2nd ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), p. 89.

conceptions of the world,[48] and on the other hand, fabricates a myth of the Oriental non-West located in Afro-Asian regions.[49] Samir Amin argues that Eurocentrism emerged both with the Renaissance, the discovery of the New World in 1492 and the European transition to capitalism specifically. Crucially, Amin advances that projecting Eurocentrism unto societies prior to this point misunderstands the way in which societies themselves were perceived, and that at best, what appears to Edward Said to have been Eurocentrism prior to this point was in fact nothing more than a 'banal provincialism' which existed in the minds of all parties. Consequently, Eurocentrism is not defined as a global force that transcends time and space, but as a 'theory of world history' and a 'global political project' that is inscribed in the rise and expansion of capitalism.[50]

In IR, Eurocentrism presents itself in a distinctive manner: it posits the universalities of capitalist development as particularities, and vice versa, or advances a supra-historical, developmentalist, and universalist general theory of history from which the extra-European periphery is *othered*, excluded, and conceptualised as historically stagnant, i.e., as the antithesis of European modernity. This is a particularly problematic view for the extra-European periphery as its history becomes the pillar of two poles, one of them is a history depicted through 'jumps', and the other one is a history perceived through colonial scientism and documentation. Campbell argues that one of the hurdles to overcoming Eurocentrism lies in (inter)disciplinary foundations and origins as historiography itself is 'a product of European-inspired scholarship, established initially during the modern colonial, but mainly during the postcolonial era'.[51] The 'self-enclosed' nature of the Realist school of IR not only defined the key ingredients and areas of research to be addressed within the discipline, but that also perpetuated a 'lack of self-reflexivity' as a result of this disciplinary and paradigmatic rigidity.[52] This raises a few urgent questions: What are the foundations of a genuinely global IR? How can knowledge be built in a way that addresses structural Eurocentrism within the discipline? Writing about Morocco, Laroui argues that decentring history and historiography should begin by questioning its positionality and notion of agency, whether it is agency as *acted*, or agency as *enacted upon*. Laroui uses the term 'division ternaire'[53] [ternary division] to refer to divisions in which history is classified into the following categories: Ancient History, the Middle Ages, the Modern Age, as categories punctuated by intermittent barbaric invasions and the Renaissance period. For example, in the case of the Maghrib, Laroui posits that it is portrayed as having being a terrain for invasions in the 5th century, followed by the Ottoman conquest, and then French colonialism. Laroui emphasises that these classifications, adopted both by colonial and native historians, serve the

---

[48] Amin, p. 103.

[49] Amin, p. 141.

[50] Amin, p. 154.

[51] Gwyn Campbell, 'Africa, the Indian OceanWorld, and the "Early Modern": Historiographical Conventions and Problems', in *Africa, Empire and Globalization*, ed. Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2011), 81–92.

[52] Phillip Darby and A. J. Paolini, 'Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 19, no. 3 (1994): 371–97.

[53] Abdallah Laroui, *L'histoire Du Maghreb. Un Essai de Synthèse* (Paris : Maspéro, 1982), p. 14.

political purpose of constructing an image of the Maghrib in which it is a battlefield of two opposing ideologies and two clashing forces: The Orient and the Occident.[54]

Thus, Eurocentrism in IR homogenises the non-synchronous character of intertwined yet distinct temporalities. Interrogating the linkages between sovereignty and the structured and historically-specific realities of the origins of capitalism necessitates a methodological approach which utilises 'a totality *of relational and dialectical concepts* that are adequate to comprehend capital as a historically specific social relation'.[55] In studies of the dynamic historical unit of the Maghrib, this problem can be discerned in the ways in which this space is conceptualised as separate from both the Mashriq and the wider African continent,[56] a bifurcation which often eclipses the presence, linkages between, and agency of 'ordinary practitioners'.[57] Thus, an antidote to Eurocentrism is less about the 'explicit theoretical incorporation of the universal'[58] in a way that challenges internalist modes of reasoning, and more about challenging intellectual, spatial, geographical 'provincialism' inherent to Eurocentrism, as well as 'the temporal provincialism that produces the self-representation of the Western world as the tip of the arrow of historical time'.[59] Crucially, going beyond Eurocentrism (and debates about Eurocentrism in IR) requires neither the normalisation of capitalism as a fatalist historical trajectory nor as a means of reversing ontological and epistemic Eurocentrism or the universalisation of capitalism and its historically specific class formations into trade and markets. Instead, it demands interrogating the connections between non-capitalism and sovereignty in the extra-European periphery: are they inextricably intertwined, or might they have a different relationship than that which they had in Europe and, more specifically, England and France?

Throughout this thesis, an anti-Eurocentric approach permeates theoretical constructions and historical analysis. This approach begins with the deliberate usage of certain terminologies to designate spaces: the west uncapitalised, the Maghrib to denote a collective political imaginary of emancipatory possibilities, and to root Morocco within a shared historical context and heritage of anti-imperialism. Tanja is used instead of Tangier, Slaoui society, and Royass al-Bahr [commanders of the sea) to denote the maritime agency and transformative character of the polity of pirates. This level of historical sensitivity is also fundamental to the choices of context-specific translations – choices which denote a specific approach to temporalities. For instance, ʿAbid al-Bukhari is the adopted translation instead of the 'Black Guard Army'; the latter is seen to superimpose a strict racial dimension which goes against the fluid and often inconsistent construction of race in seventeenth

---

[54] Laroui, pp. 10-14.
[55] Dale Tomich, 'The Limits of Theory: Capital, Temporality, and History', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 38, no. 4 (2015): 329–68.
[56] See: Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*.
[57] Michel de Certeau, Luce Giard, and Pierre Mayol, *L'invention du quotidien. 1. Arts de Faire* (Paris: Gallimard Folio, 1990).
[58] Kamran Matin, 'Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism', *European Journal of International Relations* 19 (2013): 353–77.
[59] Tomba, *Marx's Temporalities,* p. 13.

century Morocco. To denote the historically specific and epochally changing character of political rule, Dawla is translated as 'polity' and Iyyala as 'empire', with the latter term denoting the area of space ruled by a given sultan or 'emperor'. Thus, the usage of this term, instead of the anachronistic concept of Dawla [usually translated as 'state'] is reflective of a methodological approach to which historicism and historical specificity are key. At the same time, this anti-Eurocentric approach is discernible in the historical sensitivity through which various long-term processes, social formations, and social relations in the Maghribi space were approached: Is it a clan or a 'tribe'? Is it a *mahalla* or a *harka*? Are we talking of a pirate, a privateer, or a corsair? Is Morocco a polity, an empire, or a state? Is it a slave-based society and mode of production, or a society in which slavery became the dominant and non-economic mechanism of extraction at a particular historical juncture? Are we speaking of exploitation or a political form of domination? Is it class or social antagonism? Thus, this thesis is attentive with the terminology it uses in different historical times and contexts to avoid the traps of trans-historicising and creating a narrative of historical linearity. For example, the reader will notice that in Chapter 4 on conventional and alternative practices of politics via slavery and piracy, situated between 1666 and 1727, the term 'global' figures instead of 'international'; political accumulation via race instead of 'racial capitalism'; domination instead of 'exploitation'. The latter terms are viewed to be processes located within the nexus of the historically distinct social relations of capitalism and the rise of the modern nation-state (how can there be an 'international' system with no territorial nation-states?). In Chapters 5 and 6, on the other hand, different terminologies begin to shape the analysis. In this latter half of the nineteenth century, we then begin to talk about imperialism, reverberations of capitalism, classes, and exploitation. In other words, these choices were not merely reflective of linguistic or editorial decisions. Instead, they are rooted in an anti-Eurocentric, historicist method whose purpose is to strike a balance between the dialectic of the universal and historical specificity, while simultaneously avoiding anachronism and the theoretical super-imposition of analytical categories drawn from European case studies.

4. Statecraft and the case of Morocco

As an alternative to the previously discussed challenges of Eurocentrism in International Relations, this thesis reconstructs the tensions and forms of sovereignty in the Moroccan context to shed light on the specific cumulative historical processes that shaped its emergence. It does so through a comparative historicist methodology which compares state-society-international relations within two periods: 1666-1727 and 1860-1895, with the aim of identifying the nature of the socio-political and economic transformations which have generated territoriality in Morocco shaped by capital and empire. This argument traces this process to the intersections of the processes of expropriation, the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion, and the endogenous and exogenous tensions that marked the geopolitical terrain through case studies of political accumulation (slavery and piracy) and imperial accumulation. As such, the argument investigates contradictions between political practice and the context which characterised the transition from an *ecosystem of sovereignty* to a system of *ecocide* in

which territoriality was negotiated. The radical change in the articulation of sovereignty is neither explicated through the structuralism of a general theoretical model of international societies,[60] nor through the Neo-Realist lens of 'society of states',[61] a Waltzian analytical tool which codifies peripheries whilst systemically neglecting the relations of exploitation and underdevelopment between metropolitan centres and peripheries – '… relationship[s] … which allowed capitalist parasites to grow fat and impoverished the dependencies'[62] – thus providing a severely flawed account of the international system. Instead, sovereignty here is framed as a specific outcome of the transformation in social relations.

This theoretical-historical reconstruction draws on Moroccan historiography to highlight the ways in which agency and counter-agency were enacted and the extent to which the manoeuvres deployed by these actors were the product of their own historical time and circumstances.

How can IR theory include a theoretical, analytical account of the trajectories of statecraft and the manifestations of sovereignty in the Global South without falling into bourgeois conceptions of the international system, or essentialising 'stable ontologies, transhistorical categories of analysis and causal laws of history'?[63] How can IR theory overcome the eternal internalism/externalism and history/theory divides? As Robert Young notes, the challenge at hand is 'the question of how a politics, based on an account of history whose teleology was always directed towards an inexorable closure, could be opened up for difference'.[64]

The process of state formation in Morocco was rife with sociopolitical, ideological, and economic contradictions. Laroui theorises the development of an 'imagined community' using an expansive critical narrative in which social and institutional political forces,[65] myths, history, popular tales and legends, places of memory, arts, food, customs, and languages, are assembled to formulate a historical and historicist narrative about practices of state-building and the emergence of nationalism in the Moroccan arena beginning in the nineteenth century, in 1830. In doing so, an image and idea is reproduced about Morocco (and the wider Maghrib) being a space with a shared language and identity. Although these elements provide important insights into the process of nation-building, they do not explain the articulations of sovereignty in the extended Middle Ages and their development into a longer-term project of absolute territorialisation. Indeed, they reflect a methodological nationalism which, in rectifying coloniality, reproduces it in a different form: through anachronism. With the assertion of the 'rival nationalities' of European nation-states in the 19th century, the nation-

---

[60] Barry Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School', *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 327–52.

[61] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 2001).

[62] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 21.

[63] Benno Teschke, 'IR Theory, Historical Materialism, and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology', *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6, no. 1 (1 June 2014): 1–66.

[64] Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (Psychology Press, 2004).

[65] See : Laroui, *L'histoire Du Maghreb. Un Essai de Synthèse*; Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*, 2nd ed. (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009).

state model continued to grow exponentially.[66] Contrarily, Mouline adopts a pluriversal view of the Moroccan political trajectory – representing a 'pluriversal encounter'[67] of *histories* as the outcome of contingencies in different spaces and in different historical times that converge through the creation of new forms of domination or new political regimes.[68] This thesis, therefore, adopts pluriversality as an ontological framework offering a fresh perspective into socio-historical development, one which is not bound by an ahistorical reification of 'modes of production' but by historical specificity. Here, pluriversality refers to a radical reimagining of agency in which '… it cannot be asserted *over* but *in relation to* 'others'.'[69] Thus, this thesis goes beyond accounts which rely on the ways in which the mode of production structures Moroccan pre-capitalist society as a means of understanding political and historical development. As Salgado tells us, an emphasis on the mode of production as an analytical framework reifies socio-historical change through universalising abstract ontologies and ready-made theoretical formulas, without accounting for the patterns of geopolitical domination.[70] Indeed, whether it was feudalist[71] and relied on a 'feudalism of command',[72] khammas-based and premised on the relationship of khammas peasants[73] (those who work on land for a fifth of the produce) with the processes of production, ancient,[74] caidal,[75] or an economy of subsistence,[76] relying on the mode of production approach does not grapple with Moroccan society in its totality; nor does it account for the conditions of geopolitical competition and global domination which the Maghrib had experienced. More specifically, the fault with this approach is that it aims to find a single term to

[66] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (London: Abacus, 1997), p. 103.

[67] Tamara Trownsell, 'Recrafting Ontology', *Review of International Studies* 48, no. 5 (2022): 801–20.

[68] Mouline provides a historical account of the ideological, discursive, and political strategies of legitimation of the rule of sultan Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (1578-1603) in the context of imperial and geopolitical competition. In providing a compelling account of the patterns of socio-historical change and the reproduction of the Saadi (or 'Zaydanid') califal ideology, Mouline challenges narratives in which statehood is posited as a transhistorical fixture of Moroccan society. See: Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire d'Ahmad al-Mansûr: Pouvoir et diplomatie au Maroc au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2009).

[69] Giorgio Shani and Navnita Chadha Behera, 'Provincialising International Relations through a Reading of Dharma', *Review of International Studies* 48, no. 5 (2022): 837–56.

[70] Pedro Dutra Salgado, 'Anti-Eurocentric Historicism: Political Marxism in a Broader Context', *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2021): 199–223.

[71] Jean Poncet, *La colonisation et l'agriculture européennes en Tunisie depuis 1881: étude de géographie historique et économique*, Recherches méditerranéennes (Centre de recherches et d'études sur les sociétés méditerranéennes) (Paris: Mouton, 1962); Driss. Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste* (Rabat: Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1983).

[72] René. Gallissot, *L'Algérie précoloniale: classes sociales en système précapitaliste, mise en question du mode de production féodal*, Cahiers du Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes (Paris: Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes, 1968), p. 169.

[73] Timoumi Hédi, *Ālkādiḥun Ālḥamāsa Fy Āl'aryāf Āttunusya 1861-1943: Ālisti'mār Ārra'smāly Wāttškylāt Āliğtimā'ya Mā Qabl Ārra'smālya [Khammas Peasants in the Tunisian Countryside 1861-1943: Colonial Capitalism And Pre-Capitalist Social Formations]* (Tunis: Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales de Tunis, 1999).

[74] Lucette Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest* (New York: Africana, 1977).

[75] Paul. Pascon, *Le Haouz de Marrakech* (Rabat: Editions marocaines et internationales, 1983).

[76] Nicholas Michel, *Une Économie de Subsistances. Le Maroc Précolonial* (Cairo: IFAO, 1977); Ahmed Toufiq, *ālmuğtama'a ālmaġriby fy ālqrn āttāsi' 'ašar (ynultān min 1850-1912) [Moroccan Society in the Nineteenth Century: Inoultan 1850-1912]*, 3rd ed. (Casablanca: Maṭba'at ānnağāḥ ālğadyda, 2011).

explain a variety of social formations, some of which have existed for a long period and until the beginning of colonialism.[77] Whereas history shows a more complex reality in various African spaces in which modes of production co-existed and were entangled; within societies simultaneously characterised by 'rigid class definitions' and a lack of 'decisive class struggles'.[78] Another example of this historical complexity is the pre-colonial Nigerian space. According to Onimode, different modes of production of slavery, feudalism, and communalism existed simultaneously in distinct parts of Nigeria at varying degrees[79] – and this was a historical trajectory interrupted by the systemic exploitation of Portuguese and British imperialism, thus transforming social relations and the political system from 'egalitarian-democracy' and a distinct form of social cohesion to militarism.

Thus, while each of those (feudalist, ancient, caidal, khammas-based, etc.) perspectives on modes of production has its own rationale, its own methodologies, and conceptual tools, the historical situation in Morocco prior to the nineteenth century has less distinguishable historical characteristics; the structure of Moroccan society (particularly in the countryside) differs at multiple levels: historically, geographically, legally, politically, and economically. Further, there is an interconnectedness between patterns of geopolitical domination and the nature of geographical space. As this thesis shows in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the political strategies pursued in the desert space of Tarfaya were unlike those pursued in the maritime and littoral space of Salé, and unlike those pursued in Essaouira. In different geographies, the agricultural system changes, as do social relations, forms of political organisation, strategies of rule and centralisation (such as the mahalla taking place in areas peripheral to the power of the central tributary state), and relationships with the Makhzen.[80] As such, reading Moroccan socio-historical development through the lens of modes of production results either in extrapolating historical specificities into broader socioeconomic trends or overstating the distinctiveness of broader historical patterns.

In the late seventeenth century, the Moroccan geopolitical sphere was marked by constellations of diffused political forms and layers of power, which meant that the development of autonomous and overlapping forces was possible and took place in separation from the immediate control of the Makhzen, or the central tributary state.[81] These included, for instance, the development of the Republic of Salé (1624-1668) whose first admiral and governor of the Diwan [council] was Dutch-born Morat-Rais,[82] whose real name was Jan Janszoon. Surrounded by fellow compatriot Mathys van Bostel Oosterlynch and at least eight Flemish renegades,[83] reflecting the cosmopolitan

---

[77] Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, p. 38.

[78] Bade. Onimode, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: The Dialectics of Mass Poverty* (London; Westport, Conn., U.S.A.: Zed Press ; U.S. distributor, L. Hill, 1982), p. 14.

[79] Onimode, pp. 10-4.

[80] Mohammed Hubaida, *Kitābat al-tārīkh : qirā'āt wa-ta'wīlāt* (Rabat: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2021), p. 46.

[81] Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, vol. 15, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 16.

[82] Leila Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain* (Caen: Press Universitaires de Caen - Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2007), p. 52.

[83] Maziane, p. 53.

social fabric of the Republic, Morat-Rais joined the infamous Salé Rovers, a group of pirates who carried out a raid on the Island of Lundy.

The government of the Republic was a self-organised political community *populaire* in which the Salétins,[84] the inhabitants of the city, had an electoral voice despite their origins or (non-)religious affiliations. Elections took place annually in May, guaranteeing the election of two types of governors called Caïd or Cajas, one from the city and the other from the Alcaffave or palace.[85] The Republic also developed its own criminal justice system by appointing two cadis or judges.[86] Perhaps most importantly, the Republic negotiated and signed treaties with France and Britain – without the involvement of the central tributary state – stipulating that French and British merchants were to 'come freely and without danger to the Port of Salé, with their ships and merchandise' to conduct trade and negotiate as if 'in the land of friends'.[87]

Salé's historical trajectory is of particular importance, as although the port was smaller and less politically significant than Algiers,[88] much like other Maghribi ports and regencies, Salé's fictionalised perception as a hotbed of Muslim pirates hostile to Christendom, civilization and the European 'balance of power' – an argument that is undermined by the very social fabric of the city at the time – shows the arbitrariness of jurisdictional and definitional notions, as well as the European Law of Nations which oscillated between a recognition of Salé as a republic and branding it as a hotbed of beastly pirates on the outskirts of the modernity.[89]

Salé, however, was not always dubbed unruly. Dutch jurist Cornelius Bynkershoek problematised an established vision of the global order by recognising the temporally and spatially variegated manifestations of the sovereignty of such Maghribi political expressions of agency:

> … I do not think that we can reasonably agree with Alberico Gentili and others who class as pirates the so-called Barbary peoples of Africa, and that captures made by them entail no

---

[84] People of Salé.

[85] Pierre Dan, *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses corsaires, des royaumes, et des villes d'Alger, de Tunis, de Salé et de Tripoly* (Paris: Pierre Rocolet, 1649), p. 209.

[86] Dan, p. 210.

[87] Dan, p. 216.

[88] Nabil Matar, 'The Maghariba and the Sea : Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period', in *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean : Braudel's Maritime Legacy*, ed. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), 117–38.

[89] For an extensive discussion of the influence of the European Law of Nations on the perceptions of and attitudes towards Maghrebi corsairs, see: Guillaume Calafat, "Ottoman North Africa and Ius Publicum Europaeum: The Case of the Treaties of Peace and Trade (1600-1750) (," in *War, Trade and Neutrality : Europe and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011), 171–87; Christian Windler, "Towards the Empire of a 'Civilizing Nation': The French Revolution and Its Impact on Relations with the Ottoman Regencies in the Maghreb," in *International Law and Empire: Historical Explorations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 201–24; Matar, "The Maghariba and the Sea : Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period"; Nat Cutter, "Peace with Pirates? Maghrebi Maritime Combat, Diplomacy, and Trade in English Periodical News, 1622–1714," *Humanities* 8, no. 4 (December 2019): 179.

changes in property. The peoples of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Salee are not pirates,[90] but rather organized states, which have a fixed territory in which there an established government, and with which, as with other nations, we are now at peace, now at war. Hence they seem to be entitled to the rights of independent states.[91]

One marker of social antagonism – in juxtaposition with the cosmopolitanism of the Salé society – is the creation of a figure of the soldier-slave and the institutionalisation of slavery in 1699. While the central tributary state used a fluid form of racialism to justify enslavement through culturalist-theological arguments which contradict the moral teachings of the Qur'an recommending manumission;[92] it also relied on existing social bonds and relations as a means through which to enslave. In other words, the central tributary state extricated the enslaved from society by deploying their status of landlessness and non-belonging to clan-based formations and reinvented them as a personal sultanic army of soldier-slaves collecting tribute and carrying out warfare.

Economic manifestations of contradiction can be discerned at various levels. On the one hand, piracy-slavery regimes of accumulation relied on distinct markers of *otherness*, drawing on fluid conceptions of race, the relationship to land, and religion. While the central tributary state sought to create a 'bureaucratised' army and to appropriate local commodities such as grains and revenues from piracy, social groups were atomised into distinct hierarchies on the basis of land ownership and labour, which rendered them more vulnerable to crises, whether socio-political, economic, or ecological. However, in the period beginning in 1860, the radical transformations witnessed in the taxation and monetary systems not only led to rural dissent but also allowed the emergence of monetised loans and loan-sharks whose functions included expropriating *fellahs* (peasants). These contradictions were not merely a product of socio-historical transformations in the Moroccan terrain, but were strictly located within the nexus of the international system and growing imperial and capitalist encroachment.[93] One such example of these local-global linkages is the ways in which a system of diplomatic protection resulted in changing property relations and creating a nascent inter-imperial class of Moroccan semi-entrepreneurs. This 'class' took on the function of administering land and cattle by proxy purchased by French settlers.

It is in the context of the reshaping of these social antagonisms, I argue, that sovereignty begins to take shape in the Moroccan context. First, intra-spatial relations during the rule of Moulay Ismail were structured by a tributary process of 'political accumulation'.[94] The nature of the Ismaili polity as a tribute-taking empire necessitated a form of accumulation which relied not on class, but on

---

[90] In primary historical sources, Salé is spelled in a variety of ways, including Salee and Sally.

[91] Cornelius Bynkershoek, "Quaestionum Juris Publici Libri Duo (1773)," in *Classics of International Law*, ed. James Brown Scott, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 99.

[92] For further details, see Chapter 4.

[93] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review* 6, no. 1 (1953): 1–15.

[94] Robert Brenner, 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism', *Past & Present*, no. 97 (1982): 16–113.

diminishing and neutralising military tensions. While pirates were being paid a maritime tribute to prevent attacks, they themselves paid tribute to the sultan at an amount that kept growing as the trade of piracy developed further. Although Ismail's strategies of rule varied according to the spaces governed – with the northern regions, for example, being subjected to a different strategy of rule which can be described as 'local despotism' through caids (notables) and taxation[95] – the racialist project of ʿAbid al-Bukhari was used to create a slave-based army of soldiers, who neither own land nor are active agents in clan-based structures. Such dynamics facilitated the extraction of tribute for personal gain and the exercising of social and political control over the land-based population and its means of production through a personal army. At the same time, even with the tension between the republic and Ismaili rule, the latter did not see the former as illegitimate, and actors from both realms traversed both political contexts in a phenomenon which I refer to in this thesis as *trans sovereignties*. As such, the nature of this (diffused) political rule allowed agents beyond the confines of the Makhzen greater levels of autonomy, a pattern discerned in the emergence of the Republic of Salé. These autonomous agents, it is argued, flourish not as an anti-Makhzen commune or a 'utopia',[96] but as a result of the absence of political and economic imperatives which would prevent their emergence, as well as a result of the dominance of the diffusion of power as opposed to a strict, legally-defined territoriality. The shift (from diffused, contentious, and symbiotic forms of political rule) can be located in the reverberations of capitalism in Morocco, and in the second half of the nineteenth century, it generated different forms of accumulation, distinct from the process of political accumulation under Ismaili rule. Thus, the marketisation of tea, monetisation of tax, and commodification of interpersonal relations are transformations that took place within the nexus of European imperialism and 'the tidal wave of western capitalism',[97] and ones in which both the city and the countryside acted as prominent sites of contention and change. The case of the British North West Africa Company (1875-1894) represents the pinnacle of the ecocide process, illustrating the narrowing of legitimacies and the shift of sovereignty to territoriality. It draws on legal and religious modes of political rule through the notion of *white* [pledge of allegiance],[98] while simultaneously being structured by the distinctive social relations of the geographical space within which it was contextualised.

5. Methodology

In light of these historical circumstances, a set of crucial questions arise: Is there sovereignty? What does it look like in a space which is neither feudal nor capitalist? How would the particular case of Morocco help broaden our understanding of statecraft and state formation in International

---

[95] Lbachir Aberzaq, *šamāl ġarb ālmaġrib fy ʿahd ālsulṭān ālmawla ismāʿyl (1672-1727) ǧawānib min āltāryẖ ālsyāsy wālāǧtmāʿy* (Marrakech: Afaq, 2017), p. 47.

[96] Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs & European Renegadoes* (New York: Autonomedia, 1996).

[97] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, p. 113.

[98] See Chapter 6 for a full explanation.

Relations? Framing the research in such a way helps move beyond peculiarities arising in the Alawi polities through the notion of historical time which, on the one hand, perpetuates a spatially and temporally linear narrative of its development; on the other hand, it undermines discontents and geopolitical tensions between different social forces, the increasing pressures of capital and empire – dynamics which ultimately disturb and demonstrate the limitations of the core-periphery model of theorising the global relations of colonialism. From this perspective, a conceptualisation of sovereignty emerges, where it is neither a strictly European phenomenon nor a miracle of legal codification, nor a trans-historical facet of political rule in the extra-European periphery, but a product of specific *local* social relations in their connection with empire-building and capitalism on a *global* scale.

Thus, to answer these questions, this trans-disciplinary project is based on a historicist, qualitative, comparative, and archive-focused approach to the analysis of the geopolitical and historical relations between sovereignty and (non-)capitalist social relations in Morocco. First, it adopts a historicist, post-positivist approach which problematises historical assumptions and uses a historicist method of enquiry while interrogating the social and political context of the theory itself.[99] This approach draws from debates within Marxist International Relations (specifically International Historical Sociology) and is guided by a method that provincializes without producing historical narratives of linearity.

Second, this research uses detailed historical comparative and explanatory case studies of historical phenomena to identify long-term changes in processes and outcomes. More specifically, these case-studies focus on comparing the dialectic between 'state', society, and the international system within the periods of 1666-1727 and 1860-1895. The selection of these case studies and periodisation are part of a methodology rooted in a longue durée approach. This approach conceives differentiated circuits of temporality as developing through a multidimensional reality. It also approaches historical time with a lens that opposes linear historical continua in which various timelines are synchronised to centre long-term socio-historical change.[100] First, these historical periods were not selected on the basis of the individual rules of each sultan. Instead, these historical periods were selected based on a dynamic understanding of historical time which transcends the mainstream periodisation of Moroccan history into the rigid categories of ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary eras. Therefore, this methodology is rooted in Mohammed Hubayda's conception of the *longue-durée* and is situated between the periods he refers to as the 'extended Middle Ages' and the 'lower Middle Ages'.[101] In historiographical terms, this thesis challenges periodisation as an

[99] Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.
[100] Massimiliano Tomba, *Marx's Temporalities* (Leiden, NL : Brill, 2013), pp. 7-8.
[101] Mohammed Hubayda, *Bu's al-tārīkh : murāja'āt wa-muqārabāt [The Misery of History: Reviews and Approaches]*, 2nd ed. (Rabat: Dār al-Amān, 2016), p. 30.

allochthonous form of historical sequencing that relies on categories such as the 'early modern period' as a tool through which Morocco becomes subsumed into other histories.

Second, these case studies are meticulously selected to historicise the transitions in the articulations of the forms of political rule. As such, the first period of 1666-1727 provides the historical framework for the theoretical construction of ecosystems of sovereignty, and the second period of 1860-1895, the framework for ecocide—that is, the gradual and violent reversal of the former. The 1727-1860 period is excluded from the purview of this study for various reasons. First, the first period of 1666-1727 is the apogee of the particular expression of political life that is ecosystems of sovereignty; while the second period of 1860-1895 is conceptualised as the explicit beginning of its decline through the introduction of territoriality. Thus, the evolving and flexible dynamics of political life during both periods are contextualised within the historically contingent dialectic of political rule, society, and the global system. Second, as stated earlier, an element of the methodological approach adopted throughout this thesis is dynamic perception of historical time, in which the two periods of 1666-1727 and 1869-1895 are distinct, but neither historically separate, nor classified according to European historical categories of 'early modern' and 'modern' periods. These are classifications whose application in African spaces this thesis opposes. Third, these two periods are compared to map out broad patterns of socio-historical change, the evolving nature of social antagonisms, and to determine the Maghrib's position within the global system via its changing relationship with Europe, which shifted from relative independence and reciprocity during the late seventeenth century, to one of structural dependence in the nineteenth. Fourth, the selection of these historical periods is conceptually framed within an approach towards different levels and practices of politics, and one which seeks to capture the totality of the reproduction of political life in its conventional, alternative, and imperial dimensions. The eighteenth-century population in Morocco did not exceed 3 million people.[102] A century marked by famine, contagious illness, death, and various struggles for political power in the aftermath of Moulay Ismail's death and the collapse of Ismaili rule, it is excluded from the remit of this study as it goes beyond the long-term and wider patterns of socio-historical change that this thesis traces. According to Aberzaq: 'The main feature that distinguished Moroccan political history is the contrast between periods of relatively stable politics followed by periods of political instability.'[103] Thus, including this century in this thesis requires a different approach (one which centres the dynamics of political instability) and analysis from the ones which form the backbone of this research. Last but not least, while the eighteenth century is a rich century and one which is well-deserving of further research (especially from an IR perspective), this is ultimately not a longue durée history thesis; nor is it a political history of Morocco. It is a thesis that uses various tools of historical research (including archival research, and a longue durée approach towards historical time) to map long-term patterns of change and (dis)continuities, to remedy the

---

[102] Jean Brignon, *Histoire du Maroc* (Casablanca, Paris: Librairie Nationale Hatier, 1968), p. 273.
[103] Aberzaq, *šamāl ġarb ālmaġrib fy ʿahd ālsulṭān ālmawla ismāʿyl (1672-1727) ğawānib min āltāryḫ ālsyāsy wālāğtmāʿy*, p. 31.

Maghribi gap in IR, make interventions in IR debates, and conceptualise Moroccan history from historical sociological perspective.

The choice of these particular historical periods allows, on the one hand, rethinking sovereignty as a historical category in light of racial and religious regimes of exclusion. On the other hand, it allows tracing the 'revolutionary ruptures' and drastic transformations in the Moroccan sphere in the latter half of the nineteenth century,[104] a period which has seen profound changes in the totality of Moroccan society and the economy as a result of the tides of capitalism and imperialism. It does so without running the risk of producing a narrative of ahistorical continuities. Such an approach helps identify local processes within which money, labour, racial distinctions, animals, and interpersonal relationships are commodified, while situating the international system as a prominent site for these patterns. The third aspect of this methodology is that it adopts a micro- and actor-oriented approach to historical change to analyse the multiple and often competing agencies of actors and understand their own perception of change and reality. The protagonists of this approach are rulers, slaves, pirates, merchants, diplomats, the landless, and the impoverished – all of whom create, shape, and transform 'reflexive' and 'situational' agency in their immediate space and in the global arena.[105] The fourth element of this methodology is that it focuses on making systematic observations from primary and secondary sources on Morocco, such as the work of chroniclers of the sultan, newspapers, diplomatic texts, and personal correspondence. Most importantly, this PhD thesis adopts an archive-focused approach which serves both to historicise and to answer the 'what' and 'how' questions central to this research. To this end, this thesis is based on archival research in Morocco (Les archives du Maroc and Mudīrīyat al-Wathāʾiq al-Malakīyah),[106] France (Archives diplomatiques de Nantes), and Britain (The National Archives).

This method of archival research is premised on two fundamental elements. The first is one which challenges a rigid definition of the archive as 'accumulations of unpublished historical records, usually of an institution or an individual'[107] such that not only are the uneven patterns of knowledge production within and among archival institutions in the Global South and North blurred, but also the expansion, re-materialisation, and reimagining of the archive in the non-institutional setting and the creation of alternative archives where and when they are not available. This acts as a democratisation and preservation of hidden histories through digital, artistic, and community-based archiving on the one hand, and on the other, expands the very meaning of what constitutes an archival source whereby

---

[104] Roberto Roccu, 'Democratization beyond Capitalist Time: Temporalities of Transition in the Middle East after the Arab Uprisings', *Middle East Critique* 28, no. 3 (2019): 227–41.

[105] Bernd Bucher, 'Moving beyond the Substantialist Foundations of the Agency-Structure Dichotomy: Figurational Thinking in International Relations', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20, no. 2 (2017): 408–33; Mustafa Emirbayer, 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology', *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997): 281–317; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, 'Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory', *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (2009): 907–30.

[106] Throughout the thesis, this institution is referred to as 'Royal Archives'.

[107] Alexander Lee, 'How (and How Not) to Use Archival Sources in Political Science', *Journal of Historical Political Economy* 2, no. 3 (2022): 499–526.

travel narratives, genealogy sources, books of āl-nawāzil, and āl-manāqib all constitute archives in their own right. The second element of this archive-focused methodology challenges nationalist (and even Marxist) approaches to archives which aim to counter Eurocentrism by focusing only and exclusively on the archives of the geographical space being studied, or the 'local document', that is, that which is produced by local actors and preserved within that context. An example of this methodologically nationalist Marxist approach can be found in Ayache's veneration of the archive, which gives primacy to the original and local document.[108] While I agree that it is essential to study the totality of Morocco beyond European eyes, languages, and documents, such an approach to archives treats Morocco as a hermetically sealed space of historical essentialism. It also ignores the ways in which the 'local' archive itself reproduces societal relations of power through a deafening muteness on the marginalised and the poor – a muteness which then has to be reconstructed through those silences and beyond the archive itself.

Implicit in this methodology is a critical approach towards archives within the discipline of International Relations. According to positivist logic, archives are a supplementary element in a scientific toolkit for deriving hypotheses. Archives are, but a means to an end, a way of confirming already existing assumptions. Such a conception not only distances the archive (as a locus of power and counter-power) from the formulation of empirical questions, but also leaves the historical and political contexts, origins, and uneven terrains of power of those very archives unexplored. As Mbembe argues, whilst archives are material agents and perpetrators of state power, they are also repositories which shape and create agency and the subjectivity of individuals, notably through the people who access and use them, the people who interrogate and question them, the people who preserve them, and those who create alternatives to institutional archives.[109] Indeed, the perception of the archive as a mere tool of hypothesis confirmation relies on a double-edged normative approach, one in which the archive can only be institutional, and one in which the social sciences are premised on reductive and scientistic positivism. Thus, the archival method and the historical materialist method form the backbone of the thesis. Both have a symbiotic relationship which guided the process of research starting from formulating research questions to assessing and interpreting and analysing archival sources. For example, the discussions in Chapter 4 unpacking processes and forms of racialisation in seventeenth century Morocco through the archive go hand in hand with historical materialist approaches conceptualising the relationship between race and class. In Chapter 6, the analysis of the historic cycle of imperialism in the nineteenth century Moroccan landscape unearths not the only the ideological foundations of British expansionism, but also the economic imperatives structuring those motives, i.e., this phase of imperial expansion in Morocco was intrinsically connected to capitalism's constant quest to expand and find new markets and new spaces to conquer.

---

[108] Germain Ayache, 'L'utilisation et l'apport Des Archives Historiques Marocaines', *Hespéris-Tamuda* VII (1966): 69–86.
[109] Achille Mbembe, 'The Power of the Archive and Its Limits', in *Refiguring the Archive*, ed. Carolyn Hamilton et al. (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002).

This analysis takes place through historical primary sources which have been neglected not only in Moroccan historiography, but also in the discipline of IR, and thus they provide crucial insights into the contentious position of the Maghrib within the international system, as well as the uneven nature of that system itself during the age of colonial capitalist expansion. These sources show prolonged diplomatic tensions between the rulers of Morocco and British imperialist forces over territorial matters. My reading of these diplomatic tensions provides a *new* perspective showing the multiplicities of agencies (of rulers, of ruled populations, of imperialists) playing out in the Moroccan terrain. In other words, in capitalising on micro-forms of political rule, the phenomenon of imperialism reproduced new political rivalries which can be captured through these sources. All this is to say that this reading of the archive (and by extension, conceptualising the idea of the archive itself) is a reflection of my own subjectivities as a researcher whose interests lie in a cross-over between Marxism, the Maghrib, and International Relations.

A crucial question, therefore, poses itself in this context: How are archives to be read, interpreted from an IR perspective? Indeed, what is an IR approach towards archives? The collection and analysis of archival sources throughout this thesis highlight the ways in which they operate at multiple registers of agency and counter-agency. They are a site of imperially-driven structural unevenness, but they are also a contested site of a world of possibilities, transformations, and negotiations of power. However, institutional archives do not provide objective or transparent readings of the past. In the British archives surrounding the formation and debacle of the British North West African Company, Moroccan political agency is openly treated with derision; the Moroccan practice of politics is thought of as irrational and as having no basis in reality; local populations of the desert are treated as instrumental, subservient, and unthinking human tools through which profit could be accumulated and commodities sold; and the wider Moroccan population is neatly categorised along racialist lines determining which would be more amenable to British imperialist scheming (through trade). In other archives consulted about the nineteenth century, a range of protagonists appear: merchants from the Maghribi space, merchants from Europe, settlers, diplomats. However, there is a marked absence of the life of everyday people, the poor, the downtrodden, the 'wretched', ālkādiḥyn [the toilers] of Morocco. How did the drastic transformations of the nineteenth century impact their lives, materially, politically, and socially? Therefore, it is important to reflect on the functions, lives, and afterlives of the archive. While it tells us about many things, there are equally things it *untells* us, as it is a space of gaps, biases, and silences – silences of everyday life. In many ways, these archives reproduce imperial power relations, the legacies of colonial civilising missions, and the social hierarchies enforced by the central tributary state. However, a careful reading of these archives allows us to understand colonial hegemonies, structural inequalities, and exclusionary logic of these documents and institutions, and thus they can give us crucial insights into the ways in which different forms of power dynamics shape the production and preservation of these archives. They can also reveal alternative stories, alternative voices, and alternative agencies. Thus, this IR historical sociological approach to the archives goes beyond narrating diplomatic histories, beyond narrating

tensions between states, and beyond advancing grand theories about the international system. Instead, it is premised on a post-positivist reading of the archive which on the one hand, acknowledges the centrality of silences, gaps, conflicts, and systemic power imbalances to historical documentation and to our theories and practices of international relations; and on the other, fills those gaps by centring the lives of everyday people and injecting their agencies in the analysis of each case study – whether they are sailors turned 'pirates', enslaved people, the poor fleeing famine and epidemiological disease, poets writing about tea and imperialism, or locals in the desert negotiating with and challenging imperialists in their own ways.

6. Outline and structure of the thesis

Thus, the arguments of this thesis are as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of the literature on statehood in Morocco, identifying some of the key problems that arise from over-reliance on cultural criteria to explain the form of political expression. This chapter also provides a systematic literature review of sovereignty and state formation in the extra-European periphery, covering both mainstream and critical IR. This chapter shows that (neo-)realism, social constructivism, neo-Gramscian IR and Weberian Historical Sociology do not help explain the Moroccan case. In addition to raising questions about epistemological framing in IR, they also conceptualise Morocco in terms of both exclusion and inclusion; Morocco is included in the geographical construction of the Middle East only to serve as a model of exception to the general rule of Arab state formation.

Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundation of the thesis and explains the framework of ecosystems/ecocide. This chapter begins by engaging with the Political Marxist tradition, specifically the stream focusing on the state and sovereignty. It shows that while PM provides important insights into the relationship between capitalism and sovereignty, its inattentiveness towards the ways in which capitalism developed *differently* and *differentially* in the extra-European periphery represents a serious challenge towards its construction of sovereignty. Second, this chapter proposes and elaborates on the notions of ecosystems and ecocide, explaining their usefulness in explaining the articulations of agency in the Moroccan context. Third, this chapter presents the case of historicising ecosystems/ecocide within the distinctive forms of accumulation in the Moroccan milieu.

Chapter 4 focuses on evidencing the peculiar and intricate dynamics of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty through a double-pronged historical episode of slavery and piracy. This chapter traces the strategies of political accumulation pursued within this context.. It argues that the existence on the outside/margins of social bonds produces two different dynamics in two different contexts. In the Republic of Salé, being on the outside of social bonds resulted in the creation of a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious form of political rule rooted in a vision of politics by consensus and centred around the maritime sector. In contrast, in the Ismaili sphere rule, being outside of social bonds (either via the status of no land or clan-based affiliations, or via enslavement from

other societies) resulted in a racialist form of political accumulation through the creation of the ʿAbid al-Bukhari army. In other words, people racialised ambiguously and contingently as black were enslaved based on this status, extricated entirely from society, and then reinserted through the figure of the soldier-slave. In the process of historicizing sovereignty in this particular historical juncture, this chapter provides critical Marxist reflections on the construction of race and blackness in Morocco, as well as reflections on the analytical categories through which Maghribi maritime actors are conceptualised.

Chapter 5 then lays the groundwork for historicising the long-term process of ecocide through a series of consecutive crises within the period of 1860-1895. These crises not only changed the terms through which Moroccans have thus far engaged with external actors and pressures, but also reconfigured key elements in the economic base and political juridical superstructure which have determined the form of the Moroccan milieu. In this chapter, the dynamics of ecocide are conceptualised within the framework of imperial and capitalist expansion in Morocco. Under the imperialist tide, not only does the articulation of political rule change, but also the political and socioeconomic textures of the Moroccan space. In order to empirically and historically ground ecocide, this chapter analyses accumulation under imperialism through three mini case studies: marketisation (through the commodity of tea), monetisation (of the taxation system), and commodification (of interpersonal relations through the irreversible acceleration of the diplomatic protection system and the emergence of the figure of the protégé-settler and the protégé-native).

Chapter 6 then discusses the transformations in the expressions of political rule that took place within the same period–1860-1895. It demonstrates the ways in which the process of ecocide was politically forged within the collusion of capitalism and empire with non-capitalist ways of life and forms of societal organisation. This chapter shows the complex set of circumstances in which different groups and individuals acted as agents of social change and empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It does so by focusing on the (political and diplomatic) tensions surrounding the creation of the British North West African Company in Tarfaya as a historical juncture that epitomises the transition from negotiating and contesting rulership, to negotiating territoriality with the agents of empire. This chapter shows the ways in which the desert acted as a conduit for British informal imperialism (in the form of commercial dealings) through the collaboration of local notables of influence and social mediators looking to barter, while simultaneously acting as a space within which the territoriality of the Makhzen was reproduced on the basis of the sociopolitical contract of *bay'a*. Second, this chapter delves into the question of private property in relation to the company, highlighting the positions of both Moroccan and British actors in Mackenzie's industrialist ventures. The chapter ends by reflecting on the implications of the diplomatic squabbles surrounding the company, specifically in terms of the articulation of a new form of political rule: territoriality. Lastly, Chapter 7, the conclusion of this thesis, provides a summary of the key contributions and reflects on its methodology, its limitations, and the future realms of sovereignty.

CHAPTER 2

State Formation in the Extra-European Periphery:[110] Debates in International Relations

1. Introduction

The aim of this research is to investigate the genesis and long-term forms of political rule in Morocco, firmly placing sovereignty within socio-historical, geopolitical and economic perspective. In this context, the concept of 'state formation' is utilised to refer not to the final form, but to the *unfinished* and *interrupted* degrees of stateness. In particular, the term is deployed to refer to the dynamics of statecraft in two specific ways: first, the politics of contention and consensus surrounding loose geographical demarcations of the material boundaries of the Moroccan iyyāla [empire/polity]; and second, the contextual transformations within which sovereignty was produced, legitimised, and contested. At a theoretical level, this thesis opposes accounts which give primacy to 'external' actors (i.e. the inter-state system) in defining sovereignty in the Global South. It also rejects accounts reifying 'authoritarianism' as a concept through which various historical questions about the region can be scrutinised, and Eurocentric accounts in which sovereignty is an exclusively European phenomenon. At a historical level, this thesis challenges accounts which rely on juxtaposing traditional or ancestral social structures (such as 'tribalism') with modernity in Europe as a mode of explanation. It also challenges accounts within which the mode of production – as a category of analysis – is either a distinctly regional argument extrapolated into a wider Moroccan sphere, or a wider structural pattern in the Maghreb argued to be distinctive to Morocco. Both cases culminate in either the flattening of socio-historical trajectories through extrapolation, or overstating historical distinctions by adopting a framework premised on the idea that patterns of social relations that can be discerned in various parts of the wider Maghreb only exist in Morocco under the umbrella of the institutional authoritarianism and 'archaic' nature of the *Makhzen*. Thus, the overarching aim of this historicist method is to demonstrate the ways in sovereignty was a product of the dialectic between the universal and the specific, rooted in material social relations and the nature of global relations of domination and exploitation structuring the Moroccan context on land and sea.

---

[110] My usage of this term does not follow the centre, periphery and semi-periphery model of Dependency Theory. Instead, it draws inspiration from Moroccan Marxist scholar Belal's definition of structural under-development. To Belal, under-development is a 'sociohistorical process that emerged following the violent impact of capitalism and modern imperialism on pre-capitalist social formations whose structure and trajectory of evolution had not been similar to that of Western European societies on the eve of the emergence of the capitalist mode of production (between the 16th and 18th centuries).' In other words, the 'periphery' here represents the non-European space within which capitalist social (class) relations collude within non-capitalist structures through the dynamics of imperialist expansion. For this reason, the term of the 'extra-European periphery' is not used in Chapter 4 on slavery and piracy between 1666 and 1727, as using the term in this context would be anachronistic and ahistorical. See: Abdel Aziz. Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques* (Rabat: SMER Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1980), p. 2.

Additionally, the term of 'state' is used not to refer to a modern, territorial nation-state, but to a historically specific political form: 'the central tributary state', a term borrowed from Samir Amin and used throughout this thesis. Samir Amin argues that the 'central tributary form' was dominant in the 'Arab-Islamic Orient'[111] unlike the peripheral tributary form in Europe, which, Amin argues, was more flexible and likely to move towards capitalism.[112] It is important to note that, however, Amin's definition the tributary mode of production was contradictory as, on the one hand, feudalism was conceptualised as a 'progression' of the tributary form, and on the other, it was argued to be separate from the 'tributary' mode of production. However, in this thesis, the central tributary state is used not to generate a grand-theoretical social history of pre-capitalist societies; rather, the term is used as a hypernym that points out to the relationship between the institutional and organisational layers of the central government (Makhzen, local agents, military apparatus, legal and tax systems) and the relations of collaboration and domination between various groups and in which tribute is extracted from the primary producers via forms of coercion 'other than economic pressure' whether that be political or military.[113] Amin distinguishes between the appropriation of surplus product by an exploiting class and the appropriation of product for 'collective use' where 'the extraction of the surplus product is, thus, like a tribute paid to the exploiting class.'[114] In other words, the term of the central tributary state is not used to extrapolate or grand-theorise about a particular mode of production which is simultaneously unique to Morocco and the 'Arab-Islamic Orient' but rather to understand the constructions and material manifestations of political practice, as well as the collaboration and struggle for political power between various actors in light of their historical connection to productive forces, and to point out – in a general sense – to the 'social interconnection of production'[115] with different forms of political rule, both in its conventional dimension (through the Makhzen and the army of al-Bukhari soldier-slaves),[116] in its alternative dimension (through an analysis of the historical context within which the Republic of Salé emerged),[117] and in its imperial 'peripheral' dimension (through the analysis of the contradictions shaping the project of the British North West African company in Tarfaya).[118] As such, the usage of 'state' throughout this thesis also does not refer to the complete separation between the economic and the political that forms the backbone of capitalist social relations. Instead, the case study in Chapter 6 focuses on delineating the beginnings of a shift in the political form of the central polity, a shift away from 'personal rule'[119] and rights of rulership towards a political power that is, on the one hand, growing increasingly detached

---

[111] Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*, trans. Russell Moore and James Membrez, 2nd ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), p. 192.
[112] Amin, p. 102.
[113] Karl Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 927.
[114] Amin, *Eurocentrism,* p. 227.
[115] Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, p. 1021.
[116] See Chapter 4.
[117] See Chapter 5.
[118] See Chapter 6.
[119] Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, vol. 15, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 12.

from the social structures within which it was embedded, and on the other, witnessing the territorialisation of political rule as a direct result of imperial encroachment.

Thus, the second chapter of this thesis begins with a concise scoping that focuses on surveying and critically engaging with debates about sovereignty in International Relations as well as debates about state formation in the extra-European periphery (particularly the Southwest Asia and North Africa regions, that is, SWANA), which this thesis calls into question. The purpose of following this strategy of inclusion and exclusion is two-fold. On the one hand, it serves to clearly delineate the conceptual parameters of the thesis, situating it within the discipline of International Relations, more specifically within its sub-field of International Historical Sociology, while leaving out historical debates and questions which might not be directly relevant to the project, or those which might shift the focus of the thesis. This strategy is applied not only to debates in the IR literature but also to debates in the literature on Morocco. As the strategy of inclusion has been explained, it is now important to explain what elements were excluded from the analysis and why this is the case.

The first element is related to the core category of analysis used throughout this thesis: the state. As previously mentioned, the state is used to refer to two forms of political rule: the central tributary state and the political state. While the latter specifically points out the territorialisation of political rule, the former refers to the polity and dynastic bureaucratic empires or kingdoms rather than the modern, territorial nation-state. As such, this thesis neither investigates the dynamics of the transition of frontiers over the centuries or the transition from multiple polities to a single political unit, that is, the origins of the modern Moroccan nation-state, nor does it investigate the development of national consciousness and the creation of distinctive Moroccan people. In this sense, this research does not engage in depth with the vast and innovative literature tracing the cultural roots and temporalities of the Moroccan neoliberal nation-state,[120] or, indeed, its long-term ideological construction.[121] The development of nationalism – as the expression of a common societal language and shared identity that erupted from specific sociopolitical struggles during the second half of the nineteenth century[122] – is therefore considered a separate and distinctive historical process which does not fall into the remit of the questions posed and would require the study of different historical periods. Moreover, undertaking research on the genesis of the modern Moroccan nation-state would drastically alter the thesis at the conceptual and disciplinary levels, necessitating the use of different research methodologies, engaging with different literature(s), posing new questions, and dealing with different chronological periods in which 17th and 18th century histories of piracy and slavery in the Maghribi sphere would have no place. In short, the boundaries of this project are firmly marked so as to situate it within International Relations, specifically within International Historical Sociology, and

---

[120] Béatrice Hibou and Mohamed Tozy, *Tisser le temps politique au Maroc: imaginaire de l'État à l'âge néolibéral* (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2021).

[121] Mouline, *Le califat imaginaire d'Ahmad al-Mansûr: Pouvoir et diplomatie au Maroc au XVIe siècle*.

[122] Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain,1830-1912.* (Paris: Éditions Maspero, 1977).

to exclude these research questions, as they would veer the project in a new direction and towards different conclusions. Whereas modern territoriality represents the final form of a long-term process, this thesis interrogates all the extant political practices and historical transformations, the continuities and discontinuities preceding that.

The second element relates to historical research methodologies and interpretations. This thesis offers a series of *new* historical-theoretical interpretations, while introducing hidden and obscure archives (such the archives of the British North West African Company) to IR audiences. However, as this research project addresses the academic audience of IHS, this thesis reinterprets extant debates in Moroccan historiography on state formation within the context of International Relations by introducing Moroccan literature which is generally unfamiliar to IR audiences. While this research has largely benefited from critical discussions on historical research methods in Morocco, particularly on the questions of historical periodisation, state-society relations, and the production of *forgotten* and *just* histories,[123] it is nevertheless not a history project and, as such, does not delve extensively into historical debates unless it is deemed necessary for the argument advanced. In other words, the focus is neither on intervening in debates about Moroccan historiography nor on exclusively evaluating the merits of specific historical arguments; rather, it is on redirecting these debates towards an IR context and creating a bridge between studies of the Maghrib and International Historical Sociology. As such, this chapter addresses some issues which arise within the Moroccan literature on statehood, but primarily focuses on systematically engaging with debates in International Relations about state formation and sovereignty in the extra-European periphery, namely (neo-) realism, social constructivism, Weberian Historical Sociology, and neo-Gramscianism. Due to the scarcity of IR literature on state formation in Morocco and, more broadly, in North Africa, this chapter relies on cases of state formation in the Middle East and the Arabic-speaking region. This chapter lays the ground for interrogating Morocco's position in the international from a Marxist IR perspective. The thread that unifies this chapter is the argument that despite their significant contributions, these theoretical cannons do not offer conceptual tools allowing a full exploration the manifestations of sovereignty in Morocco. The chapter concludes with reflections on the challenges of re-constructing sovereignty in Morocco, and more broadly, in post-colonial spaces in the Global South.

2.   Sovereignty and state in Morocco: Beyond the division model

Approaches to 'sovereignty' and 'state formation' in Moroccan historiography can be roughly divided into two strands. Both are rooted in distinctive epistemological and ontological premises whereby sovereignty is seen either through the lens of a fragmented or a unified ephemeral 'cultural' state. The first one, mainstream in Anglo-American anthropology on Morocco, is referred to as the

---

[123] Ali Saleh Moula, *Min al-tārīkh al-mansī ilá al-tārīkh al-ʿādil : dirāsāt fī tajribat al-muʾarrikh Ibrāhīm al-Qādirī Būtshīsh [From Forgotten to Just History: Studies on the work of historian Brahim Elkadiri Boutchich]* (Rabat: Dār Nashr al-Maʿrifah, 2021).

segmentary model; the second is composed of a range of critical approaches aiming to challenge, rewrite the former, and provide a historicist narrative that counters the rigid categories of analysis that Euro-American approaches rely on. Thus, this section of the chapter provides a brief overview and analysis of both, arguing that although the foundations are different – the former saw Moroccan pre-colonial society through a lens in which history did not occur prior to colonialism and the latter focused on liberating sociology in Morocco from these colonial imprints – both rely on a variation of culture as a primary vehicle of social analysis and are two opposing sides of the same coin.

In reviewing the Anglo-American anthropological tradition on Morocco, Bouslaa Tibari divides it into three key categories: 1) *Dynamic* anthropology, which particularly focused on changes in clan-based structures and the relationship of kinship relations to modes of production and exchange, was broadly concerned with the social relations, structures, and modal changes of socio-economic development; both in the rural and urban contexts; 2) *Interpretative* anthropology,[124] which focuses on the agency of individual social actors (as opposed to the former category focusing on communities and clans) as a lens through which to analyse socio-historical change; 3) *Segmentary* anthropology, whose understanding of social relations and socio-political development (broadly conceptualised) is analytically understood through the tensions and 'clashes' between various dichotomies, such as the tensions between the lands of the Makhzen (central authority/polity) and the lands of *Siba*, a colonial category referring a permanent state of dissent with clans, and political and social communities outside of the control of the central authority, and between Islam, traditional and customary rule and modernity.[125] The segmentary model primarily focused on analysing social relations in the countryside.

Scholarly debates about the segmentary model have been vibrant for decades, touching on its origins and afterlives beyond the anthropological discipline – with the aim of challenging its premises, decolonising, and embracing the revolutionary horizons of Moroccan historiography. Indeed, the rigid binaries inherent to the segmentary model's analysis act as dehistoricizing umbrella categories which, on the one hand, overlook historical specificity, and on the other, imply homogeneity and downplay the role of contradictions. There are many interpretations of the origins of the segmentary model in Moroccan literature; however, in the literature, there is it is argued to have two foundations. The first is a 'reductionist' interpretation of Ibn Khaldun's cyclical theory – one in which the 'prime mover' in Moroccan socio-historical development is a sempiternal struggle for political power between the 'tribe' and the state.[126] The second is colonial sociology such as the work of Michaux-Bellaire on

---

[124] Dale F. Eickelman, 'Not Lost in Translation: The Influence of Clifford Geertz's Work and Life on Anthropology in Morocco', *The Journal of North African Studies* 14, no. 3–4 (2009): 385–95.

[125] Siba's literal translation is disorder or anarchy; in contrast to 'Makhzen' lands which referred to a regime of order. The dichotomy of Siba/Makhzen is a colonial framework which flattens socio-historical difference in Morocco in favour of a ready-made theoretical model.

[126] Mohammed Masbah, 'Anglo-Saxon Anthropology in Morocco: Evaluating Gellner's Segmentary Theory', *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 6, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 260–76.

mountain-region tribe in the Habt (a region in northwest Morocco),[127] Edmond Doutté on tribal societies,[128] and French colonial officer Georges Spillman's work on the clan of Ait Atta,[129] among others.

Thus, it can be argued that the segmentary model is ontologically based on two key elements, according to which Moroccan society is interpretation through a horizontal and vertical dichotomy of socio-political polarisation. First, the tensions between units within a horizontal system of social organisation. Second, the alliances and mechanisms of cooperation taking place between concatenated units within a top-down system of politics. For instance, in *Saints of the Atlas*, Ernest Gellner, one of the pioneers of the segmentary model, summarises the dynamics of the tensions between horizontal and vertical systems of socio-political organisation:

> Thus if their [the tribes'] traditional condition were to be described as 'anarchy', then it was an anarchy opposed to something, contrasted with the central Moroccan Government, or, to give its usual and surviving name, the Makhzen. The history of Morocco until the nineteen-thirties is written largely in terms of the relations between the land of the makhzen, the pale, and the land of siba, beyond the pale. Each of these constituted a permanent menace to other.[130]

Indeed, Gellner sees a contradiction between the tribal notion of political organisations and Islam, arguing that the tensions between the two make it very difficult to establish the extent to which one could consider North African states to have an established regime of territoriality and a collective sense of identitarian belonging that is crucial to the birth of the modern nation-state.[131] Gellner also argues that the political presence of hereditary sainthood acts as a 'mitigation' of the anarchical nature of clan-based societal order. According to him, saints provided the political balance required to maintain and reproduce the 'tribal' segmentary system. As such, Gellner concludes that the segmentary principle is a unique and inherent feature to Amazigh society in particular where the 'maintenance of political order' over large and disparate spaces and populations does not require a centralised state or a centralisation of political power.[132] Gellner echoes this static and fragmented vision of the Moroccan political order in Muslim Societies and indeed broadens it to the wider Muslim world in his definition of the tribe. According to Gellner, tribes could be '… defined as rural communities which partly or totally escape control by central government, and within which the maintenance of order, such as it is, is left largely to the interplay of local groups, generally conceived

---

[127] Edouard Michaux-Bellaire, *Quelques tribus de montagnes de la région du Habt*, Archives marocaines. (Paris: E. Leroux, 1911).
[128] Doutté, Edmond, *En tribu: missions au Maroc*, 1914.
[129] Georges Spillman, *Les Ait Atta Du Sahara et La Pacification Du Haut Dra* (Rabat: Editions Felix Moncho, 1936).
[130] Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 2.
[131] Gellner, p. 15.
[132] Gellner, p. 64.

in terms of kinship.'[133] The fault with this approach is that it presupposes that on the one hand, that territoriality was or ought to have been a fundamental element of political claim-making in Morocco; and on the other, territoriality and sovereignty are always intertwined; and thus applies conceptually limiting and distinct historical trajectories of Europe into the Moroccan milieu. While this thesis shows and agrees with the argument that the territorialisation of rule takes place in the nineteenth century within the qualitative differences generated by imperial expansion, it also demonstrates the importance of thinking of sovereignty beyond territorial practices.

In a similar vein, Hart refers to 'tribalism' as 'the backbone of the Moroccan nation'.[134] Hart also argues that it is '… a central fact of Moroccan political sociology' that prior to the establishment of colonialism in Morocco in 1912, the country was divided into three axes: Arab-Berber, urban-tribal, and makhzen-siba. Simultaneously, Hart acknowledges that these categories represent a 'colonialist viewpoint'.[135]

Thus, central government or the state is defined in two ways: either in terms of its relationship to the socio-political unit of the 'tribe', or in terms of its ideological premises, that is, that the 'false consciousness' that is perpetuated to create a collective cultural and territorial sense of belonging.[136] While the 'tribe' is romanticised and reified as one that exists in inherent opposition to political power, it is also perceived as one which encapsulates political power, albeit in a more egalitarian sense. Such an argument superimposes the category of the nation-state on the tribe, failing to theorise the ways in which sovereignty in this context is not based on political power, but on an idea of cultural oneness, whether imagined or real (as is the case with lineage). In other words, the segmentary model follows a contradictory version of the classic Weberian definition of the state, in which it has a territorially fixed border and a homogenous population, and in which it holds a monopoly of violence, and any political unit that does not fit neatly within the box of the state can only exist in opposition to it. However, neither clans nor the Makhzen held territorially fixed borders – hence the contradiction in the dichotomy of Makhzen and 'Siba' – nor did they hold a monopoly of violence entirely. Accordingly, both the central tributary state and the 'tribe' are epistemologically construed as permanent and fragmented, while sovereignty and the state are treated as synonymous concepts and historical processes. In other words, state-society relationships in Morocco are not viewed as variable phenomena. Such a perception, however, fails to consider the various ways in which the boundaries of the land of the Makhzen and the land of Siba have been redrawn throughout history – often blending into one another. Thus, the colonial (and dominant) understanding of 'Siba' provides a limited analysis of its sociological meanings, instead of wider, structural analysis which

---

[133] Ernest Gellner, *Muslim society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 100.

[134] David M. Hart, *Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco*, History and Society in the Islamic World (Hoboken: Routledge, 2014), p. 7.

[135] Hart, pp. 8-9.

[136] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd ed, New Perspectives on the Past (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 124.

would denote the tensions between 'indirect forms of administration and customary law in opposition to shra'.[137] More pertinently, the mere idea of political organisation is reduced to a particular conception of sovereignty – based on the European historical trajectory, which fails to take into consideration various political practices in different spatial and temporal contexts that offer alternative imaginaries of political claim-making. Thus, there is a reification of the state in which these various political practices are construed either as a threat or as an extension of the European nation-state – in both cases static – rather than as a historically evolving entity whose social, political, and cultural structures continually reshape it.

The structural fault within the segmentary model is that it generalises a partial explanation. It does so through an approach based on the hyperbole of kinship relations, invoking Ibn Khaldun's cycles of degeneration and natural balance. Though such an approach, structuralist and mechanistic factors are deemed 'organic' to Moroccan socio-historical development. Furthermore, these dynamics only exist in a space of economic-cultural relations which obfuscate internal societal contradictions and hierarchies of power (even within the same group), as they are obscured by analyses of lineage solidarities and political alliances. Sainthood – and, by extension, Islam itself – become elements that politically structure Moroccan society. Not only is this a functionalist perspective on Morocco, it is also tautological.

The segmentary model has received a lot of criticism from Moroccan scholars, who have found themselves confronted with the task of deconstructing its origins and challenging its premises. The main criticism leveraged against the segmentary model is that it was intended as a tool of analysis for societies which lacked a state structure (however embryonic), which explains the balance achieved in clan-based societies through horizontal-level tensions and conflicts between units within the same system. However, Morocco has a clan-based society and a certain *degree of stateness* with distinctive characteristics.

For example, Abdellah Hammoudi was one of the first scholars to provide an extensive critique of the segmentary model.[138] According to Hammoudi, this approach relies on the unintended consequences of structural factors as a means of explaining human behaviour without accounting for the multiple ways in which Moroccan society continually adapts to its spatial surroundings and material circumstances. Indeed, the countryside is neither a space where history freezes, nor is it subject to mechanical repetition. Ayache argues that while we cannot talk about 'nationalist sentiment' in Morocco until the nineteenth century, there was nevertheless an embryonic state of the

---

[137] On this point, Laroui asks the following questions : 'Is the siba then a means of defending customary law, or is the latter, which is in this case the justification of siba, only an implementation of the ʿassabiyah [social cohesion] which allows one to win battles and thereby participate in power, which is then the shortest path to putting an end to the custom itself?' See : Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocainlaw,1830-1912*, pp. 166-7.

[138] Abdellah Hammoudi, 'Āl-Inqisāmya Wā Āl-tarātub Āl-Iǧtimāʿy Wāssulṭa Āssyāsya Wālqadāsa: Mulāḥaẓāt Ḥawla Uṭrouḥāt Gellner [Segmentarity, Social Hierarchy, Political Authority, and Sanctity: Notes on Gellner's Theses]', *Journal of the College of Arts and Humanities, Mohammed V University* 11 (1985): 193–224.

Makhzen which could be discerned since the 17th century, with the military institution and practices in Moulay Ismail's age.[139] I will push arguments further and posit that instead of digging for signs and registers of stateness (an approach that comes with a risk of the anachronist trap), focusing on the dimensions of sovereignty in the seventeenth century can help make sense of the wider patterns of geopolitical domination in their relationship with conventional, alternative, and imperial political agencies. Ayache also demonstrates that if the segmentary model is as pertinent as it is advanced, then spaces like the Rif would be entirely depopulated as a result of inter- and intra-clan feuding.[140] Laroui focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the segmentary model. According to Laroui, the segmentary model is so formalistic that it loses the ability to interpret the Moroccan socio-historical context and provides no satisfactory definition of the 'tribe', a category of analysis that is key to the argument. Further, he argues that the segmentary approach confuses the concepts of structuralism, fragmentation, and marginality and is rife with contradictions. The Amazigh clan is deemed both marginal and crucial in Morocco's general history. Moreover, Laroui dismisses the segmentary model as one which replaces already existing terminologies in Francophone literature, with an added touch of structuralism and without offering anything new in the way of analysis.[141]

Masbah describes this pattern of the relationship between the segmentary model and its critics as a loop which obfuscates the extent to which these post-colonial critiques of the segmentary model have escaped the 'colonial gaze'.[142] According to him, the proponents of these criticisms continue to pinpoint the problem without resolving it, as they also rely on analytical tools developed in other (namely, Western) contexts. However, in making this argument, Masbah also insists on cultural specificity and resorts to cultural criteria to explain Moroccan socio-historical development and state formation. In other words, while the segmentary model and its critics offer radically different analyses and interpretations, both rely on some variants of cultural specificity as an explanatory tool. For the segmentary proponents, it is a structuralist interpretation of the 'tribe' and the Makhzen guiding the analysis. History is reduced to a series of essentialist, rigid binaries perpetually confined in Khaldounian cycles and defined through the lens of lineage and immutable opposition, without any consideration for those clans which, for instance, were tools and extensions of the Makhzen's political power or those spaces of so-called Siba, which oscillated between autonomy and falling under the Makhzen's control. However, in a contrastive argument, critics posit that the historical uniqueness of Morocco is overlooked in favour of ready-made theoretical models, but they neither explore these

[139] Germain Ayache, 'Le Sentiment National Dans Le Maroc Du XIX e Siècle', *Revue Historique* 240, no. 2 (1968) : 393–410.

[140] Germain Ayache, 'Société Rifaine et Pouvoir Central Marocain (1850-1920)', *Revue Historique* 254, no. Fasc. 2 (516) (1975) : 345–70.

[141] Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*; Abdallah Laroui, 'Nakd Al-Otroha al-Inkissamiya [Critique of Segmentarity]', in *Al-Antrubūlūjıȳā Wa-al-Tārık̄h: Ḥālat al-Maghrib al-'Arabı [Anthropolgy and History: The Case of the Arab Maghreb]*, trans. Abdelahad Sebti and Abdellatif Alfalag (Casablanca: Dar Toubkal Press, 2007).

[142] Masbah, 'Anglo-Saxon Anthropology in Morocco'.

cultural specificities in the wider Maghrib, nor in terms of their interdependence with economic and geopolitical patterns of domination.[143]

Indeed, the case of Morocco showcases an institutional complex providing some form of tension, adaptation, and coexistence between different political entities and communities of the Moroccan polity. In this order, political authority tended to be dispersed between various levels: the Makhzen, fully or semi-autonomous social forces and religious brotherhoods, local rulers and notables, marginalised social actors, and clans – in a sense that is drastically different from the political oneness underpinning the modern sovereign nation-state. Omar Ibourki explains these various levels of political authority in his sociological work. Ibourki argues that there are two levels of power that have punctuated the Moroccan political sphere: one based on collective (consensus politics), and one based on the individual.[144] According to Ibourki, political power can be defined as the ability to impose the decisions and willpower of the individual over the wider social fabric – a process which occurs not only through a monopoly of violence to enforce that will, but also through the acceptance of the legitimacy of that in exchange for favours. Furthermore, Ibourki states that a key element of statecraft throughout Moroccan history involved the breakdown of consensus politics and the emergence of the political authority of individuals (such as sheikhs and local notables) as a gradual replacement of the former.[145] Indeed, this multilayered regime of rule resulted in a malleable political system in which the material boundaries of power and loyalties were anything but stagnant. The assumption that Europeans created the sovereign state in absence of any contributions from the South falls into the pitfall of normalising the state (as an inevitable political outcome) and assuming that its emergence is an ideal to which all political communities aspired or should have, regardless of their own historical contexts and trajectories. As Navnita Chadha Behera argues, it is important to transcend the idea of sovereign statehood as a universal ideal, to acknowledge and analyse different levels of political power, degrees, and forms of statehood reflecting divergent histories of state formation.[146] Thus, prescribing ontological universality to the sovereign state or digging for historical traces of statehood places distinctive practices of statecraft into a container of European history and obscures all those histories – of the Global South in particular – in which the state was not merely a permanent fixture.

---

[143] Louis Dupré, 'Marx's Critique of Culture and Its Interpretations', *The Review of Metaphysics* 34, no. 1 (1980): 91–121.

[144] Omar Ibourki, *Āssulṭa Wālmuǧtamaʿ Ālqāʾid Ālmaġriby: Ālǧuḏur Wāl Imtidādāt* [Authority and Power, the Moroccan Caid: Roots and Extensions] (Rabat: Rabat Net, 2019), p. 36.

[145] Ibourki, p. 54.

[146] Navnita Chadha Behera, 'State and Sovereignty', in *International Relations from the Global South: Worlds of Difference*, ed. Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith (Oxford: Routledge, 2020), 139–60, p. 151.

3. International Relations beyond the Perpetuity of the (Neo)Realist Moment

This section of the chapter explores the ways in which (Neo) realist schools of International Relations conceptualise sovereignty. In doing so, it aims to provide a general background of these schools of thought, to evaluate their methodological premises, and to determine the extent to which their theorisation of sovereignty helps understand the Moroccan case. To achieve this goal, this section delves into the context within which (Neo-) realism has emerged, introduces some of its main arguments, and their implications.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and its alliances, and as a result, the collapse of communism as an alternative vision to the single socio-economic system of capitalism,[147] criticisms of mainstream approaches to International Relations have shown no sign of retreating. In fact, the fragmentation between these two visions of socio-historical realities has produced contending theoretical debates of a kaleidoscopic nature: neoclassical realism, liberalism, idealism, constructivism, and a resuscitated English School, all standing in opposition to the Neorealist School of International Relations on the basis of ontological, epistemological, and empirical foundations.[148] Astonishingly, these theoretical bifurcations have rekindled the conflictual side of IR while introducing counter-trends that shifted attention towards sociological and historical approaches with the aim of creating an analytical and theoretical project recasting state, society, and the international system.

The origins of realism are presumed to go back to some of the earliest writings produced, specifically the history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) of Thucydides, who is often described as the first realist theorist and the unknowing founding figure of the discipline of International Relations, centuries before its inception and development.[149] Realism also found inspiration in the 'resolutive-compositive' methodology towards world politics in the work of Thomas Hobbes, and in the 'empiricism' of Machiavelli in analysing self-interest as an essential component of human nature.[150] However, in International Relations, the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau has been significantly influential in demarcating the parameters of the realist tradition. His *Politics Among Nations* (1948) – described as '… the single most important vehicle for establishing the dominance of the realist paradigm within the field [of IR]' – has established a theoretically distinctive conception of

[147] Fred Halliday, 'The Third World and the End of the Cold War: An Interim Assessment', in *After the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Asia and Africa*, ed. William Hale and Eberhard Kienle (London, 1997).

[148] George Lawson, 'The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations', *International Studies Review* 8, no. 3 (2006): 397–423.

[149] Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, 'The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations', *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 131–53.

[150] Jerónimo Rilla, 'Hobbes on Rebellious Groups', *History of European Ideas* 47, no. 1 (2021): 1–16.

politics which, albeit extremely narrow, helped propel and establish the realist paradigm at the heart of the International Relations agenda.[151]

Morgenthau argues that the international system is one '… whose moving force is the aspiration for power of sovereign nations …'.[152] Thus, the struggle for gaining, maintaining and distributing 'political power' – defined as 'the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and people at large'[153] – becomes a distinguishing element structuring the mechanisms of inter-state relations. According to this conceptualisation, both domestic and international politics become but expressions of the vagaries of political power fluctuating according to the context of various historical periods. Morgenthau decries the economically reductionist approaches to the analysis of imperialism – of amongst other theorists, the Marxists – describing it as a 'particular type of foreign policy'. Indeed, he argues that 'imperialism' as a concept has been diluted and lost its meaning when it became a description of foreign policy direction of a group which one would oppose, and that imperialism needs an '… ethically neutral, objective, and definable meaning…',[154] which would allow a better grasp of the dynamics of the international system. While sanitising imperialism, Morgenthau declares that 'the economic interpretation of imperialism erects a limited historic experience based on certain isolated cases into a universal law of history'.[155] Yet, Morgenthau falls into the same trap warned against, that is, conceptualising 'power' in an abstracted sense and in a trans-historical manner such that everything – from sovereignty to domestic politics, foreign policy, diplomacy, capitalism, and imperialism – becomes a mere expression of a loosely defined and omniscient power. In Morgenthau's vision of world politics, the relations of economic, ideological, and political domination are eclipsed in favour of an account where the structural causes of historical difference and the uneven classed and racialised dimensions of political power are not only mystified but flattened. In other words, in accusing critics of economic reductionism and abstraction, Morgenthau overlooks the ideological, political, and economic reductionism structuring this canonical work of realist tradition: meta-theoretical ahistoricism. Indeed, such a vision of world politics reifies both the concepts of 'state' and 'power' and divorces them their distinctive socio-historical dynamics by relying on transhistorical modes of explanation.

---

[151] Barry Buzan, 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?', in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 47–65; Jack Donnelly, 'Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations', in *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions*, ed. James Farr and John S. Dryzek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 175–97; Robert Jervis, 'Realism in the Study of World Politics', *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 971–91; Jonathan Haslam, *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
[152] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948), p. 8-9.
[153] Morgenthau, p. 13.
[154] Morgenthau, p. 26.
[155] Morgenthau, p. 31.

Although the realist tradition involves many iterations with different focuses and arguments, most can be described as state-centric.[156] According to realists, the international is composed of a system of states that exists within a constant process of securitisation, and within which each unit (i.e. the state) seeks to enhance its own position vis-à-vis other states by prioritising its own national interests. In other words, these traditions share the assumption that the state is the primary actor and main unit of analysis in IR and that questions of security and competition are central to the hierarchy of the international. Consequently, non-state actors – not merely in reference to international organisations, but rather in reference to those actors who seek to reinforce, challenge, or subvert power dynamics within the entity of the 'state' – although not always dismissed, hold little analytical space in such a conception of world politics.[157]

It is thus not an exaggeration to argue that realism blurs the multi-layered complexities and socio-economic contexts of the inter-state system, and therefore, it operates in the service of 'simplistic theories about our being slaves to the nature of our species …'.[158] Bull agrees with Morgenthau regarding the importance of states within the international system. In this case, states are defined as 'independent political communities' which assert two forms of sovereignty: on the one hand, an internal sovereignty which is exercised over the population within the given state, and an external sovereignty which refers to the 'independence of outside authorities'.[159] As will be later argued, this dichotomy between internal and external politics is deeply problematic, especially when applied to the early modern period as there was a spectrum of tensions and synergies between both with their characteristics not clearly distinguishable. To overcome the *problématique* of the ambiguity of the terminology of 'independent political communities' – that is, the vast variety of entities which fall within the remit of this descriptive term, from the polis, the commune, and ancient bureaucratic kingdom to the modern nation-state – Bull points out that not all independent political communities could be considered part of the international system, and that only the modern nation-state possesses both internal and external sovereignty. This point receives little further attention, as it is argued to be outside the scope of the discipline of International Relations. However, Bull's understanding of the international system is premised on the exclusion of the histories of the extra-European periphery, since they were not states but 'primitive societies' with no government. Bull proclaims that:

> In parts of Africa, Australia and Oceania, before the European intrusion, there were
> independent political communities held together by ties of lineage or kinship, in which there
> was no such institution as government. Entities such as these fall outside the purview of

[156] Deborah Stienstra, 'Assessing International Relations Theory: Nonstate Actors, Change and Gender', in *Women's Movements and International Organizations*, ed. Deborah Stienstra, International Political Economy Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1994), 1–21.

[157] Jervis, 'Realism in the Study of World Politics'.

[158] Thomas Sankara, *Women's Liberation and the African Freedom Struggle* (Pathfinder, 2007), p. 11.

[159] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Fourth edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 8.

'international relations', if by this we mean (as we generally do) not the relations of nations but the relations of states in the strict sense.[160]

Thus, according to this unhistorical mode of reasoning, the cultural elements of 'tribe', 'lineage' and 'kinship' become explanatory tools in and of themselves. They are cultural fantasies which simultaneously explain and can be explained by the 'primitive' societies within which they are rooted. As a result, these essentialist explanations of political rule in so-called primitive societies serve a dual purpose. First, they stem from a cultural reductionism which moves the attention and analysis away the *material* realities of stateness towards the final form of political rule (the modern territorial nation-state). Second, the same cultural reductionism is used to deny forms of political organisation and agency which fall outside of the remit of the mainstream categories of IR analysis. If socio-historical development cannot be explained through existing theoretical models, then it either exists in a historical vacuum of primitiveness or does not exist at all. Crucially, this version of IR concerns itself with the inter-state relations of the global North, dismissing different forms of political rule elsewhere and putting them in the box of neither state nor government. It portrays people and societies outside the Euro-American sphere as those unable to govern themselves or have political visions of the world, as people unable and unwilling to shape their *own* histories. This is precisely the ahistorical narrative that this thesis challenges. Acknowledging the fact that there are *other* historical trajectories and another world beyond Europe, with its own norms and diverse political practices, opens up new lines of enquires and enables us to do International Relations differently. In fact, the case studies on slavery and piracy in Chapter 4 show the opposite of such arguments: the existence of social bonds – whether they are kinship relations or otherwise – do not preclude, but rather reinforce, influence, and shape the formation of political structures, both in terms of the politics from above pursued by the central tributary state and the politics from below pursued by actors external to it.

Moreover, the realist argument advances that political systems in the Islamic world were reliant on structures of 'tribalism' and fell outside the remit of the sovereign territorial statehood which existed in Europe; indeed, the adoption of the state as a model of political and their inclusion within the international system of states was a direct result of the diffusion of the model of the European state:

> There has been a geographical spreading of the state, from Europe outwards. Two centuries ago most of the non-European world lay beyond the boundaries of any sovereign state, in the sphere of the Islamic system or of Oriental empires or of tribal societies. Today the sovereign state is established throughout the world.[161]

However, if we reverse this realist logic: it is not that 'tribal' political systems fall outside the remit of sovereign territorial statehood and therefore are to be dismissed, but that existing theoretical

---

[160] Bull, p. 9.
[161] Hedley Bull, 'The State's Positive Role in World Affairs', *Daedalus* 108, no. 4 (1979): 111–23.

moulds continue to discount sovereignty models that do not neatly fit into that conception. As such, this conception of the international system leaves the contingencies of history and political trajectories beyond those of Euro-American case-studies unexplained. On one hand, the explanation of sovereignty along dichotomous and opposing lines of 'external' (inter-state) and 'internal' (domestic) factors reifies the relationship between different levels of political practice, which, in turn, renders the often-blurred distinctions between the 'internal' and 'external' throughout history unproblematic. Do the pirates of Salé, for example, count as internal or external actors? What about the clan chiefs in 19th century Tarfaya enacting different forms of agencies with (imperial and native) social forces on opposite sides of the spectrum? To whom are they external or internal; and what is the yardstick against which such a fixed status is measured? Thus, this approach visualises political forms of rule purely through the complete absence or presence of absolute authority and territoriality; it focuses on describing sovereignty in the context of a distinctively European historical moment without accounting for origins and diverse iterations beyond that context. Here, the state becomes an inevitable achievement and not the product of historical contingency. The protagonists of that achievement or progress – the Europeans – pave the way, while the rest of the world follows suit in due time. On the other hand, relying on a specific European mode of explaining state formation would naturally lead to one-dimensional historical conclusions about political development in the Global South. In other words, one does not investigate state formation within the African continent by looking at Europe, much in the same way that one does not look towards Algeria to explain state formation in England. Most importantly, such an analysis relies on the binaries on 'modernity' and 'traditionalism' wherein the absence of an IR-centric form of sovereign territorial statehood in the extra-European periphery acts as both an explanation of *cause* and *effect*. According to this conception, the more natural order for African societies is one that is suitable for their conditions of backwardness: a communal 'tribal' order within which no government exists. In this context, the government – as the political authority which rules a given community – is used interchangeably with the abstract 'state'. The reasoning is that if there is no modern nation-state, then by extension, there is no government; in short, societies in the extra-European periphery are characterised by a linear social, cultural, and political stagnation which only the European modern nation-state helped resolve. Here, a crucial question poses itself: Does the absence of the nation-state (as a modern phenomenon) preclude the existence of an organised form of political rule? Does its absence preclude the existence of government? As the case studies of this thesis will demonstrate, this is not the case: the case of the socio-historical development of the North African order challenges the very tenets of these theoretical boxes. How is the case of the Republic of Salé, for example, explained in Chapter 4, to be understood in IR terms? While it was not a modern nation-state, it was certainly an 'independent political

community', a city-state with a fully functioning government and legal system recognised both by the central tributary state of the Makhzen and by European states through diplomatic practice.[162]

While the realist tradition draws on philosophical epistemologies and human nature as analytic tools through which the international system is dissected, neorealism, on the other hand, disposes of the centrality of human nature in explicating the competitive nature of the international, in favour of the impact of anarchy in assimilating and socialising the behaviours of states across various spaces and timelines.

For example, Kenneth Waltz departs from Miltonian and Thucydidian and claims that there is causality between war and the rivalling poles of human nature, goodness, and evil. Instead, Waltz posits that the role of 'the society of states' is an essential element in understanding the nature of the international system, the behaviour of states, and their proneness towards war.[163] Under the anarchical system, it has been argued that the state is the primary actor, and the international system is seen as a space dominated by competitiveness, conflict, self-interest, uncertainty, and insecurity. In a defence against the charge of minimising the role of non-state actors in global politics, neo-realists posit that although non-state actors exist (and that they do not deny their existence throughout history), their role cannot be exaggerated; that is, they have only marginally impacted the international system of states.[164] Thus, according to Waltz, centring the state as the main unit of analysis in IR theory and the existence of non-state actors are not mutually exclusive.

> To say that major states maintain their central importance is not to say that actors of some importance do not exist. The "state-centric" phrase suggests something about the system's structure.[165]

However, this argument is quixotic as it unveils the inherent contradictions of (neo-)realism. Arguments abound in reaffirming the existence of non-state actors and their minimal role in the inter-state system. At the same time, the recognition of non-state actors does not translate into a paradigmatic transformation within the tradition. These non-state actors are not only theoretically detached from the international system but are also divorced from their social and historical contexts. In other words, these actors are not situated within their own historical context: the forms of 'collective agency' structuring positions and relations both within the realm of non-state actors, as well as between the former and the inter-state system, are largely ignored.[166]

---

[162] For example, England was conducting diplomatic negotiation with the Moriscos of the Republic since 1627, namely through John Harrisson who was keen on finding a solution the question of captives. Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, p. 241.

[163] Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Press, 2010).

[164] Hedley Bull also advances a similar argument. See: Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

[165] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed (Illinois: Waveland Press, 1979), p. 95.

[166] Alejandro Colás, *International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 12.

When it comes to sovereignty, Waltz's understanding does not seem to differ from Bull's in that the former also defines it in terms of the dichotomy of 'internal' and 'external' capabilities:

> What then is sovereignty? To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them. States develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop.[167]

Under this conception, the development of sovereignty as a historical process is obscured in favour of a descriptive view where the state is a tabula rasa, a void through which abstract forces flow, and where a combination of internal and external agency is lacking.[168] Perhaps more problematically, such an understanding of sovereignty as strictly European focuses on domestic factors whilst simultaneously conflating them with the international, thereby extrapolating the globality of historical development from a distinctive, 'regional' process. The regional case study that is Europe then becomes the emblem of global historical development and international politics. Such a conception is emblematic of a longer pattern of separation and tension between theory and history in IR, which in turn is partly premised on the *scienticisation* and professionalisation of the discipline. Thus, through the scientistic 'fetishism of facts', socio-historical developments become divorced from their contextual knowledge and the scholar of the humanities and social sciences is positioned as a 'non-historical observer'.[169] Consequently, the relations of domination punctuating the very international system which (neo-)realists seek to theorise – relations based '… upon the links created by trade, investment or diplomacy, often supplemented by unequal treaties and periodic armed intervention, to draw new regions into the world-system of an imperial power' are further invisibilised.[170]

However, eloquent and insightful of the development and limitations of IR theory, the (neo-)realist account of state formation and sovereignty severely lacks explanatory power and rests upon a series of problematic assumptions about non-European societies. This tradition homogenises a variety of historical and spatio-political contexts into one mould and reproduces a theoretical and ideological demarcation of the capitalist 'West' and the non-capitalist 'rest', without examining the social property relations and class compositions which characterise the extra-European periphery and how these might shape internal forms of agency. The codification of peripheries in Waltzian analysis (and more broadly, neo-realism) mingled with the systematic neglect of the relations of exploitation and underdevelopment between the global North and South – '… relationship[s] … which allowed

---

[167] Waltz, p. 96.

[168] Julian Go, 'Capital, Containment, and Competition: The Dynamics of British Imperialism, 1730–1939', *Social Science History* 38, no. 1–2 (2014): 43–69.

[169] Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Beacon Press, 1995), p. 151.

[170] John Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *The English Historical Review* 112, no. 447 (1997): 614–42.

capitalist parasites to grow fat and impoverished the dependencies'[171] – provides an ahistorical and one-dimensional account of the international system.

It is unquestionable that (neo-)realism has offered a rejuvenated version of realism, one which moves away from human nature towards structure as a tool for understanding the relations amongst states, hence also referring to it as 'structural realism'. However, this school of thought could also be credited with creating a troublesome shift in International Relations (the discipline) and international relations (the practice and relations between different societies), one in which the international system is defined according to anarchical structures and states' quest for power in a system where competitiveness reigns. In addition to the oxymoron of the international system being defined in terms of anarchical structures, neo-realism has more in common with realism than either of the theories' proponents would admit. While neo-realism is supposedly a departure from the focus on the character of human nature as a way of explicating the international, the neo-realist variables of power, anarchy, and sempiternal competition that this theoretical strand of IR keenly advocates are steeped in philosophical epistemologies of human nature.[172]

However, the temptation to harmonise realism into one body of literature as a by-product of realist thinking that focuses on the state as the primary actor in international relations means that this strand of IR theory is not homogeneous. It is, therefore, necessary to address the challenges of neo-realism from within. The following question stands at the centre of that theoretical challenge: Do states seek to maximise power or security? Proponents of 'defensive realism' argue that the development of states and state policies is linked to their aspiration to maximise security through defensiveness. Under the notion of anarchy in defensive realism or the absence of universal sovereignty, there is a correlation between a state's efforts to increase its security and other states' decrease in security.[173] This security dilemma creates a global atmosphere of uncertainty in which states worry about the power and future behaviours of other states. However, realists have opposed this line of thinking. For instance, Fareed Zakaria and Randall Schweller charge defensive realism with an inability to theorise state development and expansion due to its focus on domestic factors at the expense of the global context within which they emerge.[174] The proponents of 'offensive structural realism' claim that uncertainty is a definite constraint on the behaviour of states. Unable to successfully predict the intentions and schemes of other states in the present or future, they are doomed to exist in an environment of fear which conditions their behaviour and their quest for

[171] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 21.
[172] Steven Forde, 'International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism', *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1995): 141–60.
[173] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 128–61.
[174] Fareed Zakaria, 'Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay', *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992): 177–98; Randall L. Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?', *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): 90–121.

maximum power.[175] Under the anarchy of offensive structural realism, theorising state actions is not based on the intuitive logic of self-defeating and unavoidable state-actor agency; rather, it is centred on a self-infatuated and calculated vision of state-actor agency.

Neorealism transforms social, (geo)political, and economic problems into security problems and applies an all-encompassing security to the entire world regardless of the context; therefore, the origins and development of states in the global North and South are mere attempts to seek security and power. The international becomes a space that is not only ruled and determined by survival and the security dilemma; history is rendered linear in a narrative that sidelines historical differences across time and space.

What results from this perspective is a theory that naturalises the world order, creates a politicised discourse that justifies statecraft, sanitises warfare and capitalism, flattens history to a point in which spatio-temporal distinctions cease to exist – or at least, are argued to be not as important as states – subjugate the behaviour of states to an interest in power, control, and security; depoliticises the international system; capitulates on the vagrancies of socio-political power; and dismisses the agency of non-state actors within the local and global contexts. This tradition thereby stifles the theorisation of long-term historical change in favour of a narrative of perpetuity; in other words, it merely describes, predicts, justifies, and defends a global narrative, a global project of inequality: 'the rationalisation of [the current state of] global politics.'[176] There is a political expediency in conceptualising sovereignty in a different manner and outside the realm of the European model. The ways in which the world's 'Great Powers' – including the US, Germany, and Britain – rush to provide military and financial support to a settler-colonial entity which has been occupying Palestine since 1948 and carrying out a televised genocide of Palestinians in Gaza since October 2023 is not symptomatic of a mere power struggle between states in an international system structured by anarchy, security concerns, and competitiveness. Neither is the bombing of Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. Instead, it must be contextualised within the interests of imperialism on a global scale; these histories currently in the making are symptomatic of imperialism gasping for breath to survive and reproduce itself, and in the process, victimising entire peoples who continue to resist through whichever means they have.

The neo-colonial hegemonic theorising and flattening of history that neo-realism perpetuates portrays the African continent as a geographical space of barrenness and conceptual backwardness of dichotomies of continuity and/or change, with continuity representing a fall into bloodied tribal conflicts and change representing an expected assimilation to western forms of political organisation. More specifically, if the international system is to be analysed through the lens of warring states, then projects of colonialism and imperialism with all they entail from expropriation and dispossession,

---

[175] Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy'.
[176] Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225–86.

capital accumulation to structural and agential functions of race within capital and society, would become nothing more than a reflection of the egos of practitioners of statecraft.[177] In this sense, the (neo-)realist tradition cannot account for the dynamics of sovereignty in the Moroccan case, which, as later chapters will demonstrate, challenges many of its basic assumptions and their pertinence and validity within and beyond the European sphere.

4.   Arab state formation: The social constructivist perspective

This section undertakes the same task as in the previous section; it provides an overview of social constructivism in IR with the aim of determining its explanatory value for conceptualising sovereignty in Morocco. As the IR literature on Morocco on this particular question is scarce, and this begs the question of 'why there is no International Historical Sociology of North Africa', this section will draw on literature about state formation in the extra-European periphery beyond Morocco and in spaces which are seen to be relevant to the case, notably in the South West Asia and North Africa (SWANA) region. Much like the (neo-)realist tradition, constructivism must not be approached as a homogeneous tradition, as it presents a variety of different arguments and approaches; indeed, there are multiple approaches to constructivism in IR.[178] However, focusing on work that addresses the case of Arab state formation, in particular, serves to create some distance between this PhD thesis and the literature which might not be historically or geographically relevant.

Constructivism within International Relations has blossomed as a challenge for mainstream IR approaches. It has introduced a new dimension to the discipline, one in which ideas, norms, values, and social culture matter and are useful tools through which the state and international system can be analysed. Constructivism offers an alternative understanding of the international, in which reality is constructed, dynamic, and subject to change. Sometimes described as a 'methodology'[179] rather than a theory, the vibrant debates of constructivism about the role of culture in the international and what constructivism is or what it is not attests to its importance as a body of literature in IR.[180] In constructivism, agents and structures are intertwined, and the latter shape the behaviours and actions of the former. As such, social constructivism aims to theorise the international system through an analysis of the connections between the political and the social (i.e. the construction of the self and the

[177] Lisa Tilley and Robbie Shilliam, 'Raced Markets: An Introduction', *New Political Economy* 23, no. 5 (2018): 534–43.

[178] Maja Zehfuss, 'Constructivisms in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil', in *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 54.

[179] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 324–48; James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View', in *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 52–72.

[180] See, for example: Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); Jongsuk Chay, *Culture and International Relations* (Connecticut: Praeger, 1990); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

other). According to constructivism, norms – defined as '… a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' – are central to the making and reshaping of world politics. Here, both individual and state behaviour are explained through 'rule-governed action and logics of appropriateness'.[181]

In *Dialogues in Arab politics*, Barnett embarks on the arduous task of re-imagining the normative history of inter-Arab politics in order to understand the role of symbolism in in '… establish[ing] the norms of Arabism' and to determine the root cause of fragmentation within the Arabic-speaking world, and to chart the different meanings of Arab nationalism across time and space.[182] Barnett provides a theoretically oriented account which investigates the 'regulative' and 'constitutive' norms that helped Arab states shape and enact their identities as a means of achieving collective objectives. Barnett's main argument is Arab politics are premised on Arabism and sovereignty or what is referred to as 'cultural tool kit',[183] which, in turn, has '… shaped the strategic, symbolic, and social interactions that ensued between Arab states in this encounter.'[184] Rubin advances a similar argument in conceptualising 'Arabism' as a key element shaping the interests and behaviours of states in the region.[185] Further, Barnett challenges the theoretical deficiencies of realism which imprison state formation in the Arabic-speaking world in the box of the security dilemma, anarchy, and constraints on state behaviour by going beyond the myth of Arab politics as realist politics and deconstructing the position of the Middle East as a laboratory for realist thought.[186] This body of literature rightly argues that there is a divide between Arab historiography on state formation and IR scholarship on Arab states; while the former focus on the social and political dimensions of Arab state formation, the latter rely on a self-perpetuating narrative that narrates historical development in the Arab region through the lens of security and anarchical conflict. However, relying on a 'cultural tool kit' as a mode of explanation might lead to falling into the trap of overlooking the ways in which the dynamics between culture and politics have fluidly shaped and reproduced '… a whole range of large-scale political and social forces which arose out of the profound social transformations of the Arab World since the mid- 19th Century.'[187] According to this logic:

> Arab states were sovereign states, and their leaders had a strong interest in defending the
> territorial and sovereign basis of their authority and power. The mandate system and
> colonialism created the territorial boundaries of these states, and the anticolonial tide in these

---

[181] Checkel, 'The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory'.
[182] Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 12.
[183] Barnett, p. 15.
[184] Barnett, p. 21.
[185] See: Barry Rubin, *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981).
[186] Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: A Region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?', *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 5 (1999): 911–25.
[187] Aziz Al-Azmeh, 'Nationalism and the Arabs', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 1/2 (1995): 1–17.

countries largely demanded immediate independence and sovereignty rather than rewriting the borders that were a gift of the West.[188]

In this context, sovereignty is again assumed to come hand in hand with territoriality, but where does that leave Arab stateness in the early modern period, or in the extended Middle Ages as Hubayda calls it? This is the charge that is leveraged against constructivist IR accounts of Arab state formation in this section: in focusing on the final package of sovereignty (as the building of a distinctive Arab states system),[189] ideological and cultural meanings and manifestations of Arab states are emphasised at the expense of exploring the linkages between the international system and those social relations which produced sovereignty as a distinctive historical system of politico-legal differentiation. Most importantly, as Hannoum amply demonstrates, the argument that political form of the nation is a colonial importation from the west is severely flawed, because '… what the nationalists have imagined – that is, created – whether in Algeria, India, or elsewhere, is a transformation of [already] available colonial semantics.'[190] These tales of state formation, in analysing patterns of ephemeral Arab unities and similarities, often collapse North Africa into the Middle East, thus flattering historical differences. Indeed, this argument is based on a logic of homogenisation and fragmentation '… exemplify[ing] the Middle East as the eternal 'exceptional' case, being out of step with history and immune to the trends affecting other parts of the world.'[191]

This conception of sovereignty neglects, on the one hand, theorising the connection between the norms of 'Arabism' and sovereignty as well as theoretically grappling with the latter term, and on the other hand, neglects defining sovereignty beyond theoretical moulds specific to the case study of Europe. Such an approach does not allow a full exploration of the mechanisms and stakes of the reproduction of sovereignty *within* the global reverberations of capitalism and their ramifications on in the extra-European periphery, nor does it allow conceptualising the extent to which the production of sovereignty on a global scale was a racial project. In other words, while social constructivism illuminates the latter history of state formation (as nation-building), it does not fully account for the diverse political agencies and historical production and reproduction of sovereignty in the Arabic-speaking world, and more specifically, in Morocco.

The problématique of Arab state formation is discernible in two different but overlapping ways in the constructivist literature. The first can be observed in normative accounts of the contradictions between Arabism and sovereignty, or what might be more aptly called the 'regionalist' perspective.[192] As a whole, the Middle East is portrayed as a distinctive region in which theoretical

---

[188] Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*, p. 34.

[189] Michael Barnett, 'Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System', *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 271–96.

[190] Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, p. 225.

[191] Aarts, 'The Middle East'.

[192] Louise Fawcett, 'Alliances, Cooperation and Regionalism in the Middle East', in *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. Louise Fawcett, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

generalisations do not help explain the nature of political development. In some accounts adopting this perspective, states are the product of particular histories and shared identities (language, culture, Arabism) often found in specific areas of the Middle East. In others, 'legitimacy' (or rather, its absence) is positioned as the main tool of analysis explaining the region's political system. According to this argument, fragility, instability, and insecurity characterise Arab politics. Such a view, however, is rife with contradictions. It portrays the 'Arab' state – from Morocco to Egypt, Oman, and Saudi Arabia – as one which has the capabilities of asserting its political legitimacy albeit experiencing a crisis of authority. In this context, the state shaped by the norms of 'Arabism' is threatened by the western ideologies seeping into the consciousness of its people, whilst simultaneously being united by a metaphysical, trans-historical 'Arabism'; it is thus fractionalised according to sectarian, ethnic, and ideological lines. One example of such an account is Michael Hudson's *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* in which the nature of Arab states become modes of explaining the latter's variegated trajectories:

> The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy. The shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the present Arab governments.[193]

Crucially, the nature of Arabs themselves – as homogenised people epitomising a clash of western and Arab civilisations – serves to explain the process of state formation:

> Arabs are still socialized into accepting traditional rationales for obedience based on kinship, religion, dynastic despotism, and feudalism. Yet at the same time, they are influenced by Western ideologies which justify authority on altogether different grounds like "the will of the people."[194]

While Hudson is right in pointing out that the political systems of Arab states should not be conceptualised according to the (Westphalian) territoriality of Europe, this argument relies on the assumption that the primary reason for this is the case in internal fragmentation.[195] This argument not only leaves sovereignty under-theorised but also presupposes that the only situation under which sovereignty can exist is the territorial statehood which characterised European statehood. Moreover, it diminishes the agencies of everyday people shaping their histories, whether they are conscious of the fact or not, and assumes that modes of resistance from below can only come from western influence.

The second problem is an account of state formation which adopts a norm-based perspective of the 'politics of fragmentation'. Here, the focus is on the analysis of the divide between internal state behaviour (within its given territory) and collective behaviours at the regional or international level. In other words, these accounts focus on the tensions between the discourses of Arab states and

---

[193] Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 2.
[194] Hudson, p. 83.
[195] Hudson, p. 207.

Arab collective interests as well as the tensions between these and the principles of non-interference and mutual recognition within the international system. They highlight the incompatibility among domestic, regional, and international norms. However, as stated earlier, historically, the distinction between what constituted 'internal' and 'external' dynamics was not clearly marked prior to the adoption of the modern territorial nation-state form. Thus, in portraying the internal and external as inherently and trans-historically dichotomous in this manner, one runs the risk of simplifying complex historical realities in which different sovereignty models existed concurrently with a lack of modern, clearly demarcated borders.[196] For example, Gause argues that the weaker states in the Global South are protected within the context of the international system; however, their position is externally threatened because of the inability of local elites to domestically reach the same historical conditions which produced sovereignty in the European context. Thus, stagnation of the elites in the Middle East is the root cause of international norms in which conflict is prioritised over non-interference.[197] Baram identifies 1970 as the starting point of Arab states, arguing that states in the region were not '… promoting the identification of the population with a territorial pre-Islamic and pre-Arab past' through various innovative means.[198] However, as Luciani and Salamé argue, the focus on fragmentation and the assumption that social divisions have a greater impact on Arab states than others, whether based on ideological or sectarian lines, should be questioned.[199]

While providing important insights into Arab state formation, such a perspective broadly relies on a limited understanding of stateness, one in which it either begins with the emergence of a national consciousness in the form of Arabism or with the formation of the modern territorial nation-state. Here, sovereignty, state, and nation-state become interchangeable terms in the case of the Arab state and sovereignty is assumed to be go hand in hand with modern territorial statehood; in turn, this leaves the specific context of sovereignty as a distinctive historical process unexplored. Furthermore, this approach raises several fundamental questions. What is the historical context of the politics of fragmentation? Is the politics of fragmentation a useful lens through which to conceptualise stateness in this part of the world – where territoriality existed in certain degrees but not to the extent of being a fundamental element of sovereignties at all historical times? How can sovereignty be conceptualised in a historical context without falling into the traps of anachronism or cultural essentialism that assumes an inherent incompatibility between Arab politics and the dynamics of the global system?

The tradition-modernity paradigm not only has influenced IR constructivist accounts about state formation in the Arab case, but has helped adopt a view of the North African state as one which

---

[196] Ayşe Zarakol, *Before the West: The Rise and Fall of Eastern World Orders*, LSE International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), p. 17.

[197] F. Gregory Gause, 'Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East', *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1992): 441–69.

[198] Amatzia Baram, 'Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East', *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 4 (1990): 425–48.

[199] Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salamé, 'The Politics of Arab Integration', in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 398-99.

'… advance[s] modernisation and contain[s] praetorianism.'[200] This pattern becomes clearer in the third problem which can be identified in the IR constructive literature on state formation in the Middle East. This problem is characterised with the reliance on interpreting the Middle East as a space within which states are seen as the outcome of 'diffusionism' – an argument which found inspiration within the modernisation paradigm. According to this argument, the state in the Middle East is viewed either as an appendage of western forms of political organisation, an arena upon which European agency and conflicts are enacted, or as an appendage to the Ottoman Empire. In other words, either state formation becomes the product of the diffusion of an external political culture, which leaves the 'internal' degrees of stateness unaccounted for, or it becomes exemplified by a permanent conflict between modernity and tradition. According to Brown, the distinctiveness of the international politics of the Middle East – which includes all the 'Arab world' except Morocco and Mauritania, and excludes Turkey and the settler-colonial entity of Israel – lies in understanding the ways in which its position, as a region '… more consistently and more thoroughly ensnarled in great power politics than any other part of the non-Western world',[201] has shaped not only the actions and behaviours of its states, but also their diplomatic and political cultures. Key to understanding state behaviour in the Middle East, argues Brown, is the 'Eastern Question' which helped create a distinctive political culture in the region. To achieve this, Brown attempts to root the long-term influence of Ottoman heritage in its historical context, alongside Arabism, defined as 'the reordering of very old bonds of social solidarity'.[202] According to this argument, doing so from within Ottoman history, acts as means of rectifying the Eurocentrism '… of classical Eastern Question diplomatic history'.[203] Such a view of the region, as merely an extension of and a reaction to Ottoman political influences, produces tautological assumptions in which Middle Eastern political identity is argued to be 'established not in terms of outsiders' interest but by indigenous standard',[204] that is, the common cultures of Arabism and Ottomanism, while simultaneously being described as an extension of outsiders' interests (in this case, the interests of both European states and the Ottoman Empire). Indeed, the exclusion of Morocco from this theoretical framing is not incidental. Since Morocco 'was never under Ottoman tutelage',[205] it challenges the thesis positing that Ottoman influence is central to the long-term process of Arab state formation. In this sense, the anti-Eurocentrism that is the departure point of deconstructing state formation in the Middle East away from the ramifications of the Westphalian model, produces a different form of ontological *centrism*.

---

[200] Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 1 (2015): 12–30.
[201] Leon Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 3.
[202] Leon Carl Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 140.
[203] Brown, p. 39.
[204] Brown, p. 8.
[205] M'hamed Oualdi, *A Slave Between Empires: A Transimperial History of North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), p. 8.

Constructivism expands our understanding of the international, and as Morton points out, theories of state formation in International Historical Sociology would greatly benefit from critical engagement with various intersubjectivities in the making of the state.[206] Thus, the argument in this section was not a reiteration of the realist critique of the constructivist paradigm as methodologically centred on inter-subjective factors such as identity and culture, but rather that constructivism falls short of explaining sovereignty as a historical process and juncture in the case of Morocco. It does so on two levels: first, through ontological determinism and an understanding of social causality in which outcomes equate causes.[207] A theorisation of stateness that views it primarily through the final form of political rule (the modern territorial nation-state) not only fails to consider the complex and distinctive nature which sovereignty could assume in the extra-European periphery but implicitly assumes sovereignty to be unique to European modernity. Correspondingly, such an understanding of stateness posits the Middle East as a space of conflictual and transhistorical identities: Arabism versus sovereignty, sectarianism, and political ideological distinctions. This results in a problem-solving approach in which the state itself is reified, on the one hand, by homogenising and over-emphasising the *distinctiveness* of the Middle East or the 'Arab state', and on the other, by relying on these categories as modes of explanation in abstraction from their 'base' and without explaining the social transformations which took place over the longue durée. As a result, the Middle East becomes an appendage of other histories; while North Africa is collapsed between the Middle East and the Mediterranean,[208] and conceptualised as separate from the wider African continent. Thus, this analysis offers a repackaging of historical patterns and categories of colonial difference. While the method of constructivism in IR offers a range of analytical tools which can better grasp different material and intersubjective realities, it neither explains sovereignty nor accounts for the long-term trajectory of statecraft in Morocco.

5. Historical Sociology and Sovereignty

5.1 Historical Sociology and the Problem of Weberianism

If neorealism, with its defensive and offensive variants, harbours a linear view of history and advances a *depoliticised*, rationalised version of the international system, and if constructivism in International Relations espouses a binary view of norms and structures in the Arab state, International Historical Sociology is one of the most critical bodies of literature that emerged to rectify the 'ahistoricism' and 'asociologism' of mainstream IR theory. Over the last three decades, International Relations has witnessed a reinvigorated interest in the work of historical sociologists. This interest is driven by a return to Max Weber's macro-sociology, combined with the historical shift in sociology.

---

[206] Morton, 'The Age of Absolutism'.

[207] Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63.

[208] For a critical analysis of the racial connotations of the 'Meditarranean' as a constructed space in North Africa, see Chapter 2: Muriam Haleh Davis, *Markets of Civilization: Islam and Racial Capitalism in Algeria*, Theory in Forms (Durham: Duke University Press, 2022), pp. 43-68.

It is also driven by the concern to 'bring the state back in' that is present in the work of theorists such as Anthony Giddens, Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly, and by the necessity to understand the 'paradox of the actor[s]' involved in state-formation and contention.[209] The work of Skocpol and Tilly addresses theoretical shortcomings in the social sciences that overlook the organisational structure and autonomous, centralised, and differentiated agency of the state.[210] For Charles Tilly, state-formation is a process in which 'war makes states and states make war'.[211] Tilly uses the development of the nation-state in Western Europe, particularly France, from 1600 onwards to illustrate the dynamics and continuum between state-making and organised forms of violence, ranging from piracy and banditry to policing. Tilly posits that 'the builders of national power all played a mixed strategy: eliminating, subjugating, dividing, conquering, cajoling, buying as the occasions presented themselves' by adopting strategies of 'massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion', which are in turn faced with waves of popular resistance.[212] To illustrate this point, Tilly analyses the systematic role of 'terrestrial piracy' and maritime piracy as instruments of statecraft, notably through the positioning of pirates and bandits as servants of state interests without royal protection and at the expense of the civilian population, who endure pillage and gendered violence for the former's survival. Indeed, Tilly argues that piracy is representative of 'accumulation's coercive means'[213] within a system of fragmented sovereignty under which local rulers were autonomous.[214]

However, this approach does not illuminate the variations in state capacity and state-building in areas of conflict in the Global South.[215] Nevertheless, scholars have sought to apply and test the validity of state and war-making arguments in countries of the Global South. According to Lustick, the absence of 'great powers' in the Middle East can be explained both by the colonial subjugation to which the region was subjected, as well as by as the external promulgation of norms pertaining to the European system of states. These norms did not allow significant transformations to occur in states internally as a result of preventing cross-border wars.[216] In other words, political violence is seen as an essential component of war-making in Europe; whilst the hegemony of great powers structures the Middle East. Indeed, the international norms of the European inter-state system are conceptualised as hurdles to state formation in the Middle East. One can hardly deny the hegemonic dominance of the west in the Middle East in our present time, but where does that leave early modern histories – all

[209] John Krinsky and Ann Mische, 'Formations and Formalisms: Charles Tilly and the Paradox of the Actor', *Annual Review of Sociology* 39 (2013): 1–26.
[210] Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[211] Charles Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[212] Tilly.
[213] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, (Massachussetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 55.
[214] Tilly, p. 21.
[215] Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, 'Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World', *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2008): 27–56.
[216] Ian S. Lustick, 'The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective', *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 653–83.

those histories that took place before colonial imperialism and the uneven power relations with the west? And where does that leave the people who shaped those histories through everyday agencies?

Herbst notes that war and territorial conquests have been key to the making of the state because they generate imperatives to extract taxation, create military institutions, and create a range of bureaucratic infrastructures which help maintain and reproduce it.[217] According to Herbst, the absence of an expansionist state project with a consolidated sense of national sentiment reflects the interests of local rulers who deemed it an unprofitable venture. In turn, this creates a political environment in which power and authority are concentrically organised while simultaneously being fragmented across different actors and geographical areas. As such, the claim here is that 'there was often no immediate imperative to improve tax collection in the hinterlands or to do the necessary work so that those outside of the capital could be bound to the state through symbolic politics.'[218] If that is indeed the case, then what is the function of the mahalla, if not 'to improve tax collection in the hinterlands' and legitimating power? Is the mahalla itself not an armed expedition of the suzerain, a military and mobile expression of political power with a social configuration specifically targeting peripheral zones? For example, in the case of Ottoman Tunisia, the mahalla functioned not only as '… the visible expression of power but also as the mechanism for transmitting legitimate power and sovereignty.'[219] Thus, there was a distinct Ottoman-Tunisian duality of political power in the eighteenth century – a 'beylical sovereignty', whereby the systematisation of the symbolic rituals of the mahalla (such as the *bay'a* [pledge of allegiance]) came hand in hand with a growing of the mahalla's parameters '… to encompass increasing political and economic dimensions, as well as military, fiscal and judiciary functions.'[220] In Morocco too, the mahalla held an important function as a mechanism for the centralisation of power and the legitimation of the Makhzen. Here, the mahalla – comprising between 10,000 and 20,000 men including military chiefs – is 'a flexible and effective means of movement for the Makhzen that can be considered the most important tool of Makhzenian diffusionism in the countryside.'[221]

Thus, despite the broadening focus of these historical sociologies of the international system beyond the European sphere to include countries of the Global South, a key problem persists. In this articulation of a global historical sociology, the divergence of isomorphic political structures conceptualise the state in the extra-European as an anomaly within the international system of states, that is, one which deviated from the global historical trajectory of state-formation either through some

---

[217] Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 13-14.

[218] Herbst, p. 134.

[219] Dalenda Largueche, Julia Clancy-Smith, and Caroline Audet, 'The Mahalla: The Origins of Beylical Sovereignty in Ottoman Tunisia during the Early Modern Period', *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2001): 105–16.

[220] Largueche, Clancy-Smith, and Audet.

[221] Abderrahmane El Moudden, *Ālbawādy Ālmaġribya Qabl Āl-Istiʿmār: Qabāil Innāwen Wālmaḫzan Bayn Ālqarn Āl-Sādis ʿašar Wā Attāsi ʿašar [The Moroccan Countryside before Colonialism: The Inaoun Clans and the Makhzen between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth C]Enturies* (Rabat: Mohammed V University, 1995), p. 313.

form of weakness or inherent 'backwardness'. Most importantly, these arguments espouse a structuralist geographical plurality of social change which focuses on abstract understandings of power and authority and fails to look at the development of capitalism and the social relations of production as central to the explanation of historical change.[222]

Indeed, in this Weberian wave of historical sociology, the state in the extra-European periphery is merely a delayed opportunity waiting to happen, obstructed either by the lack of ambition of its rulers or by Westphalian principles of the European system of states. As a result, the 'base' of state-formation is overlooked, that is, the long-term patterns of conflict between the relations of production and the property relations within which they emerge, and the tension between the structures of the old world and new social formations. While states are politically produced, these political structures provide little insight into the *totality* of socio-economic and historical foundations that shape the relations between state and society. The European model of sovereignty, in which it is 'the idea of an absolute and indivisible locus of political authority and … of legislative power'[223] does not enable us to fully explore the distinctive historical development of sovereignty in other spaces beyond notions of absolute territoriality and authority. In the case of Morocco, sovereignty is the product of its material circumstances and the social relations characterising the Moroccan milieu (which include practicing politics at different levels). It is shaped within the extant property relations and the patterns of geopolitical domination structuring Morocco's position within the international. To provide a truly ontologically conception of international socio-historical change, it is essential to move beyond conceptual boxes through which sovereignty in Morocco is either an anomaly or simply a coerced enforcing of the European trajectory.

The importance of this strand of historical sociology is unquestionable, because not only do its proponents address the structure-agency problem in International Relations, and provide innovative approaches towards capturing the agency of actors conceptually marginalised in IR scholarship, but they also address the ontological and epistemological muteness of IR surrounding socio-historical development in the periphery.[224] Nevertheless, Weberian historical sociology falls into the same neo-realist trap that it warns against: a structural determinism in which state-actor conflict (from within and without) is given primacy at the expense of providing historicist analyses of global difference that go beyond diversifying geographical case studies. Can the periphery speak and be conceptualised beyond narratives in which it is a recipient and receptable for the agency of the (western) international? Can its agency be fully captured if the focus is the actions of the elites? In other words, such accounts of state formation in the extra-European periphery disregard the materialist histories of

[222] Craig Calhoun, 'Book Review: As Sociology Meets History by Charles Tilly', *The University of Chicago Press* 55, no. 3 (1983): 503–5.

[223] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2015), p. 43.

[224] Gurminder K Bhambra, 'Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2010): 127–43.

sovereignty, instead focusing on providing an account of a unidirectional flow of power, coercion, and extraction, thus blurring the multidimensional origins of political practice.

However, Weberian Historical Sociology also offers conceptual and analytical tools which can broaden the way we think about world orders in different spatial and temporal contexts.[225] In *Before the West*, Zarakol shows us how the historical realities of political trajectories in non-western contexts are much more complex than a linear diffusionism from the west to the rest of the world. In analysing the Chinggisid sovereignty model in Asia and Eurasia, Zarakol shows the importance of looking at '… political actors with a particular vision of the whole world (not just their regions), who want to order it in a particular way and, in doing so, create, modify and reproduce political, economic and social institutions in the world.'[226] Similarly to Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty, the Chinggisid model does not posit that notions of territory did not exist, but that they granted symbolic power and were therefore not fundamental '… to the legitimation of Chinggisid sovereignty, except in a more general sense of having achieved an expansive reach.'[227] Thus, the Chinggisid model of sovereignty comprises 'inter-house orders' whose basis is '…territorial reach and an accompanying preoccupation with astronomy and astrology.' According to Zarakol, the Chinggisid model had long-lasting causal effects in that it profoundly influenced political norms, practices, and institutions in Asia for centuries. One such example of this long-lasting impact is Genghis Khan's reorganisation of military forces. Much like Moulay Ismail's army of soldiers-slaves – which relied on deploying the status of landlessness to extricate people who have no clan affiliations from the social relations within which they exist, and then reinserting them in society as dependent military labourers – Genghis Khan had structured military forces along non-tribal lines, granting leadership roles to individuals in the military. In this sense, '… the imperial guard essentially became the administrative bureaucracy of the [Chinggisid] empire.'[228] Consequently, the Chinggisid notions of sovereignty do not only have the capacity to transform the ways in which we conceive of the geopolitical terrain in IR, they also provide a blueprint for untangling the complexities of sovereignty models beyond Europe, and beyond notions of absolute authority and territoriality.

While Weberian historical sociology provides a critical toolkit through which to bring the non-west 'back in' and to seriously to conceptualise sovereignty models beyond those of European historical trajectories, the structuralism positing a unidirectional flow of modernity falls short of accounting for different layers and forms of stateness in Morocco. Theorising state formation in Morocco necessitates going beyond the norm-based analyses of constructivism, beyond the security dilemma of anarchy, and beyond the structuralism of historical sociology. In the case of Morocco, this would translate to viewing sovereignty not merely as an interchangeable category with statehood, but would rather locate these transformations (and the various forms of agency within) *historically* and

---

[225] Zarakol, *Before the West*, p. 227.
[226] Zarakol, p. 25.
[227] Zarakol, p. 19.
[228] Zarakol, p. 78.

materially within a process of 'large-scale social change, or 'economic development', in turn, [as] the aggregate and unintended result of the economically rational actions of individual actors…' who creatively act and make history within the constraints imposed on them.[229]

5.2. Marxism in International Relations: the neo-Gramscian current

Marxism in International Relations represents a serious challenge to the intrinsic assumptions of realism and, more broadly, to mainstream IR theory. Marxism within IR brought the questions of *dialectics*, class, and ontological and historical interconnections to the forefront of the IR agenda. However, it is a serious mistake to consider Marxism in IR as a single current of thought. This subsection briefly overviews one such iteration of Marxism in International Relations: neo-Gramscianism. It aims to assess the extent to which this theoretical tradition could help explain the case of state formation in Morocco. Again, the focus here on neo-Gramscianism is not incidental; it is the IR Marxist current with the most significant scholarly contributions to debates on state formation in the Arabic-speaking region.

Taking inspiration in the work of southern Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and through the work of Canadian scholar Robert Cox, neo-Gramscianism emerged in the 1980s as an approach in IR providing a critical theory of world historical change and hegemony. It is a tradition that on the one hand, questions the nature of the dominant world order and structures of power, the ways in which the social order, institutions and 'norms' emerge, and one the other hand, interrogates the mechanisms of hegemony and the nature of forces at play within domestically and within the international. As such, neo-Gramscianism sought key concepts in Antonio Gramsci's work to expand the international IR understanding and theorise its concomitant modes of exploitation. Additionally, Gramscian ideas have gained increasing importance in scholarship about the Middle East, a space into which these ideas were 'stretched'[230] specifically to theorise the relationship between capitalism and hegemony in the post-colonial sphere. According to Bieler and Morton, neo-Gramscianism captures the complexity of social processes and the ways in which they shape different forms of states, as well as the inter-state system. They argue that the neo-Gramscian tradition reconceptualises the ontological foundations of IR through 'a theory of hegemony that focuses on social forces engendered by changes in the social relations of production, forms of state and world order.'[231]

---

[229] Robert Brenner, 'The Social Basis of Economic Development', in *Analytical Marxism*, ed. John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) cited in Clemens Hoffmann and Can Cemgil, 'The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the Social-Historical Roots of Foreign Policy', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2016): 1279–1302.

[230] I borrow the terms of 'stretching' and 'stretched' Marxism from Knox and Salem. See: Salem, '"Stretching" Marxism in the Postcolonial World'; Robert Knox, 'Valuing Race? Stretched Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism', *London Review of International Law* 4, no. 1 (2016): 81–126.

[231] Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 'A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations', *Capital & Class* 28, no. 1 (2004): 85–113.

Cox argues that the state is a key element in Gramsci's conception of the international, not only as the centre of social conflicts, but also as 'the place … where hegemonies of social classes can be built.'[232] According to Cox, the 'method of historical structures' overcomes the linearity and stagnation of the 'problem-solving approach' in mainstream IR by connecting historical structures to distinctive intertwined spheres of action: first, the organisation of production, which pertains to the social relations structuring the processes of production; second, 'forms of state', which refers to the dialectic between the state and society; and third, 'world orders', which relates to the distinctive architectures of power which punctuate conflicts within the international system.[233] Thus, Cox's method highlights a wider problem that plagues IR debates: the structure-agency problem. On the one hand, this approach sought to extricate 'hegemony' in IR – as an analytical framework – from the structuralist stronghold and deterministic explanations of social change (whether it is in the anarchy-driven accounts of realism or the under-theorisation of the state and its conflation with the global economy which is found in world-systems theory);[234] on the other hand, it also challenged approaches which gave primacy to agency at the expense of interrogating its structural, socio-historical contexts.[235] According to Cox, class is an important factor that mediates between the spheres of production and the state as well as between the world economy and inter-spatial relations:

> The mediating role of class between production and the state is most clearly perceptible within particular societies or social formations. The same mediating role can also be examined at the global level. Here class formation and conflict mediate between the world economy of production and the interstate system. The classes that participate in this mediation have their origins in national societies, but form links across the boundaries separating national societies.[236]

As such, Cox's work illuminates the position of 'historical blocs' within the state, and the ways in which the inter-spatial system connects them through the organisation of production on a global scale, that is, through the linkages of transnational classes. According to Cox, these dualities have shaped the international since the 19th century as, arguing that internally, historic blocs structure the relationship between the state and the sphere of production, and externally, the military and economic constraints and transnational connections of the dominant classes within the international, in turn, shape the state.[237] Cox's method seeks to position class as a 'real historical relationship' as a means of avoid the trap of reification; it does so by distinguishing between 'classes' and dominant

---

[232] Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium* 12, no. 2 (1 June 1983): 162–75.

[233] Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.

[234] Robert W. Cox, *Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, Political Economy of International Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 357.

[235] Jonathan Pass, 'Gramsci Meets Emergentist Materialism: Towards a Neo Neo-Gramscian Perspective on World Order', *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 4 (October 2018): 595–618.

[236] Cox, *Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, p. 357.

[237] Cox, pp. 108-9.

groups as well by analysing the hierarchies of various dominant groups which Cox divides into three categories: the first are those who exercise control over corporations globally, the second are those corporations and industries locally, and the third are domestic 'petty capitalists'. However, the problem with this method is that it does not provide us with tools to analyse social antagonisms in the early modern period, or its Moroccan equivalent, the extended Middle Ages. How do we conceptualise antagonisms which fall outside the remit of these categories? In the case of Morocco, while social antagonisms and 'classes' were defined by their position in the process of production and the means through which they obtain social products, the hierarchical social division of dominant groups in the pre-colonial Maghreb included a wider range of groups, including those exercising coercion via non-economic means and those with symbolic social capital such as the *ulamas* and those with *chorfa* (sainthood) lineage. Indeed, Moroccan scholars oppose the reification of the 'bourgeoisie' as a class in Morocco with regard to wealthy merchants, arguing that they were not a class in the European sense as they neither provoked radical transformations in the socio-economic structures of Morocco, nor did they prompt the emergence of capitalism.[238]

In the case of the Middle East and North Africa, neo-Gramscian perspectives[239] have been creatively critical and deployed a range of innovative conceptual tools to historicise the dialectic between capital, labour, and the state in a way that problematises conceptions of historical time.[240] However, these conceptual tools do not sufficiently explain state-society relations and political forms of agency in the Arabic-speaking world during the historical periods this thesis addresses. In *Overstating the Arab State*, Nazih Ayubi turns the attention to Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent, Yemen, Lebanon, and Morocco to tackle the *problématique* of the contemporary political Arab milieu: the causes of the persistence of the 'weakness' of the Arab state, despite the existence of elaborate bureaucratic, military institutions and policing practices, as well as the weakness of the Arab state when it comes to tax collection.[241] Ayubi relied on neo-Gramscian thought as part of a sophisticated toolkit to explain this weakness. Thus, according to Ayubi, precolonial societies in the Middle East can generally be described as tributary. In the modern context, the articulation of those tributary modes of production was a system of a 'circulationist' nature – one in which there are ruling classes

---

[238] Abdel Aziz. Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques* (Rabat: SMER Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1980), pp. 17-21.

[239] See, for example: Sara Salem, 'Gramsci in the Postcolony: Hegemony and Anticolonialism in Nasserist Egypt', *Theory, Culture & Society* 38, no. 1 (1 January 2021): 79–99; John Chalcraft, 'Revolutionary Weakness in Gramscian Perspective: The Arab Middle East and North Africa since 2011', *Middle East Critique* 30, no. 1 (2021): 87–104; John Chalcraft, 'Middle East Popular Politics in Gramscian Perspective', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 41, no. 3 (2021): 469–84; Alessandra Marchi, 'Molecular Transformations: Reading the Arab Uprisings with and beyond Gramsci', *Middle East Critique* 30, no. 1 (2021): 67–85; Brecht De Smet, *Gramsci on Tahrir: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt* (London: Pluto Press, 2016).

[240] Roccu, 'Democratization beyond Capitalist Time'.

[241] Nazih Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 12.

that are autonomous from the processes of production and domestic hierarchies of class, but are also dependent on capitalism as a global system.[242] While Ayubi emphasises the relationship between colonialism and the pre-colonial embryonic nature of the 'state' in much of Arab world – in other words, it is both true that colonialism was instrumental in establishing the territoriality of Arab states, and that other domestic factors were at play to the extent that stateness existed in some embryonic shape or form – this method of explaining state-society relations is at odds with Gramsci's conception of hegemony[243] as the classes of the various countries which Ayubi investigates do not form a single homogeneous social class which achieves an equilibrium between consent and coercion as a means of asserting domination across society.[244] In other words, the hegemony that underpins the tensions between these various classed actors is conceptualised in an ambiguous manner. Indeed, can one speak of hegemony of classes in these cases? And if so, at which historical time does this dynamic present itself? Thus, the charge that is leveraged against the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework is, on the one hand, related to its own limitations and the extent to which it can be applied to different historical times despite its valuable contributions; and on the other hand, is a problem related to approaching complex historical realities through the lens of intersubjectivities and class consciousness.[245]

Hinnebusch argues that an approach which combines the English school of IR's concept of 'the international society' with the neo-Gramscian perspective helps explain socio-historical change in the 'regional order' of Middle East, as it sheds light on the ways in which 'the interaction of ideational and material factors explains stability and change.'[246] The Middle East regional system, argues Hinnebush, was imposed by Western imperialism; the boundaries which were imposed were in contradiction with a 'pre-modern' system of individual states and identities not bound by territorial rule':

> The Middle East is centred on a fragmented core made up of weak, initially pre-modern territorial states sharing an Arab identity and a periphery of more or less hostile stronger and more modern non-Arab states (Iran, Turkey and Israel); tied together by conflict, they constitute a 'security complex' but only the thinnest of international societies.[247]

[242] Ayubi, p. 25.

[243] Marsha Pripstein Posusney, 'Review: Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 1 (1998): 148–50.

[244] For a systematic analysis of the Gramscian concept of hegemony, see: Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[245] Jonathan Pass, '(Re)Introducing World Hegemony into the "Global Organic Crisis"', *International Affairs* 100, no. 1 (2024): 323–43.

[246] Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Order and Change in the Middle East: A Neo-Gramscian Twist on the International Society Approach', in *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, ed. Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), 201–25.

[247] Hinnebusch.

However, the problem with this approach is the adoption of a transhistorical conception of Arab identity that structures a fragmented political milieu. As Hannoum rightly argues, identities – including Arabness – are not fixed and immutable;[248] they are the product of their own circumstances, shaped and refashioned with the extant relations of coloniality and domination. In this account, the inter-spatial relations of the Arab sphere are subject to a tension tradition and modernity. Such an account ascribes an eschatological dimension to the distinctiveness of Arabism: it is beyond history but also beyond politics. In utilising the concepts of 'order' and international society' to illustrate the connection between (imagined) shared norms and the behaviour of agents and the inter-state system, we are left with unanswered questions about the material contexts and nature of political rule in the early modern period. In other words, how can we understand the unique relationship to territory in these pre-modern states? And indeed, why did they not transition towards capitalist territorial sovereignty in the way the Anglo-Saxon space did?

It is undeniable that the neo-Gramscian theoretical and methodological framework provides important insights into the nature of state-society relations, revolutions, resistance movements, and neoliberalism in the Middle East. It also provides us with a creative and critical toolkit through which to interpret and analyse the development and diffusion of hegemonic orders. However, this framework also has limitations. Its contributions become much more problematic when applied to the extended Middle Ages (or in European terms, the 'early modern period') – a period which did not see a clear forming of class consciousness and a period in which the distinctions between internal/external were blurred. In reifying class, the neo-Gramscian perspective does not account for the specificities of state-society relations prior to the advent of colonialism – that is, the tension between specific local social formations and the wider geopolitical contexts within which they are structured. Most importantly, in leaving the connections between the social relations of (non-)capitalism and sovereignty in the extra-European periphery under-theorised, the neo-Gramscian perspective leaves out the analysis of non-colonial and non-capitalist socio-historical change over the longue durée.

6. Conclusion: Towards a 'social history of spatial relations'

This chapter started with presenting a broad– but by no means comprehensive – picture of the conceptual and historical challenges that arise when historicising sovereignty and/or statehood in the complex terrain of Morocco. These challenges frame not only the ways in which sovereignty is conceptualised and the methods used to achieve that objective, but also the language used to do so. In essence, these challenges are as much about ontological and epistemological framing, as they are about historical and theoretical approaches. A recurring question that arose during the process of producing this thesis is: how does on refer to Morocco in the eighteenth and nineteenth century? In the Moroccan archives of the Makhzen, Morocco is referred to using the term of āl-iyyāla āššaryfa [honourable empire] – a term which comes up throughout this thesis. Is Morocco then a state, a

---

[248] Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, pp. 285-6.

polity, or an empire? Is the Sultan a sovereign,[249] a ruler, or a 'royal'?[250] While these are important questions that help scrutinise the problems of trans historicity and presentism that naturally arise from such research enquiries, the focus of this thesis is on the overall articulations of modes of political practices in the Moroccan space, not on the final and historically specific form through which they are formalised, that is, statehood.

This chapter has outlined the strengths and deficiencies within various strands of IR theory: (neo-)realism, social constructivism, neo-Gramscianism and Weberian historical sociology. While the methods, tools and approaches differ, the recurring problem for these divergent approaches are shortcomings when it comes to conceptualising sovereignty in the Moroccan case. In some cases, sovereignty is obscured, as it assumes the position of both a tool explaining statehood and a tool through which statehood can be explained. In other cases, sovereignty is reflective of a statehood which is not historically specific but natural and linear representing the pinnacle of the historical march towards modernity, while the extra-European periphery is conceptualised as a space which lacks these qualities. How do we conceptualise spaces in which history has simply assumed a different character? As a result, the *particularism* of the legal creation of sovereignty in the European context is generalised into a grand theory which obscures the transformation of extra-polity political imaginaries and structures of power into sovereignties. This leads to the obscuring of the epistemological and historical origins of sovereignty in the South and ascribes to Anglo-Saxon (more broadly, European) sovereignty an epistemic primacy in the discipline of International Relations. As a result, the *particularism* of the production of sovereignty in the European context is generalised into a grand theory which obscures the transformation of extra-polity political imaginaries and structures of power into sovereignties.

This chapter does not conceptualise capitalism or the form of political rule in Morocco as an aberration and an anomaly of the European trajectory, nor does it argue that they are 'uneven' and 'combined'. Put differently, Morocco is not conceptualised as a space of 'capitalism's Other' – or as a space in which historical development is a 'deviant, and perverted' version of that which took place in Europe.[251] Instead, the historicist method reveals Morocco a space in with different political imaginaries and different economic bases which were altered in the long-term process of imperial expansion.

In IR, history-centric approaches help understand historically contingent transformations and the dynamics between continuity, change, and stability.[252] In fact, studying history is essential

---

[249] Pascon, *Le Haouz de Marrakech*.

[250] Mohammed Kenbib, 'Changing Aspects of State and Society in 19th Century Morocco', in *The Moroccan State in Historical Perspective 1850-1985*, ed. Abdelali Doumou, trans. Ayi Kwei Armah (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1990).

[251] Ilias Alami and Adam D. Dixon, 'The Strange Geographies of the "New" State Capitalism', *Political Geography* 82 (2020).

[252] Arthur N. Gilbert, 'International Relations and the Relevance of History', *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (1968): 351–59.

precisely because it serves 'as a means of problematising and critically exploring the origins of modern domestic and international institutions and practices'.[253] Yet, the rift between the disciplines and scholarship of IR and International History still persists, often amounting to what Kennedy-Pipe refers to as a disciplinary 'Cold War',[254] which is emphasised by monolithic conceptions of states as pragmatic, self-interested, and power-driven. Within this context, International Historical Sociology, or using different terms, the 'social history of spatial relations',[255] a vibrant sub-field of research within International Relations, emerged as a challenge to different modes of ahistoricism.

IHS provides a richer body of intellectual resources and theoretical backgrounds than mainstream IR does, particularly as this sub-field of IR has taken the task of historicising and socialising the concept of international anarchy as a form of geopolitical interaction in the context of broader, long-term changes within particular polities.[256] In other words, International Historical Sociology developed as a rejection of the transhistorical idea – in IR – of the nation-state as a unit of perpetual conflict with fixed political rationality and *raison d'être*. This political rationality has ambushed IR in a systemic conception of inter-state relations that sees world history through the microscope of general, universally applicable laws and models as well as through the innate nature of powerful state actors. More importantly, abandoning that rigid political rationality signifies recovering the contested and collective agency of polities, geopolitical entities, strategic state-level conduct, and non-state level resistance, as well as rejecting state centrism,[257] transhistorical and static ontologies, and immovable political and *depoliticised* rationalities. The next chapter builds on this this tradition to make the case for *sovereignty without statehood* in Morocco.

---

[253] John M. Hobson, 'The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations', *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 2 (1998): 284–320.

[254] Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 'International History and International Relations Theory: A Dialogue beyond the Cold War', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 76, no. 4 (2000): 741–54.

[255] Benno Teschke, 'Advances and Impasses in Fred Halliday's International Historical Sociology: A Critical Appraisal', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 87, no. 5 (2011): 1087–1106.

[256] Benno Teschke, 'IR Theory, Historical Materialism, and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology', *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6, no. 1 (1 June 2014): 1–66.

[257] Teschke.

CHAPTER 3

Sovereignty without Statehood:[258] A Marxist Theoretical Re-construction of the Moroccan Case

1. Introduction

The narrative that this thesis weaves is one that aims to go beyond the impact of sultanic traditions on state-building, beyond perceptions of historical dynastic continuities, and beyond an analysis that focuses on the nature and origins of the Makhzen, towards one which prioritises investigating the tensions between the personal relations of the central tributary state and the personal-collective relations of non-state actors, whether they are slaves, pirates, clan members, or merchants. In this narrative, sovereignty is not an indivisible ideological construct of European history and statehood, it is not the manifestation of an unproblematic, linear sultanic statehood, and it is not a dynamic emerging from an existential tension between the qabila (clan) and the central tributary state, as the previous chapter has elucidated. Instead, it is the product of the relationship between a distinctive political and juridical superstructure and social relations of domination under which exist different cultures, layers, levels and claims of sovereignty working above or below and with or against the central tributary state – which form the long-term and multi-layered process of stateness as a whole. I argue that this is a historically specific and peculiar path to (territorial) statehood which is contextualised by the processes that I will refer to as *ecosystems of sovereignty* and *ecocide*. This chapter makes the key theoretical contributions of the thesis; it introduces and theoretically expands the concepts of 'ecosystems of sovereignty' and 'ecocide', arguing why both terms are particularly useful in understanding socio-political development in the Moroccan context. In addition to that, these terms help stretch and challenge International Relations' approaches to statehood. In recasting sovereignty as historically specific, and yet, a dynamic and evolving practice, key insights are gained where the extra-European periphery is not merely a passive recipient of the spread of European history, but a space that is rife with people who enact agency and have their own visions of politics. The working hypothesis of this thesis is that the terms of 'ecosystems of sovereignty' and 'ecocide' are the '… light with which all the other colours are tinged and are modified through [the] peculiarity' of the forces of political production and contention.[259] The historicist conceptualisation of political rule through the long-term process of ecosystems and ecocide helps to better capture the nuances and

---

[258] The title of this chapter and thesis is borrowed from: Cris Shore, '"Government Without Statehood"? Anthropological Perspectives on Governance and Sovereignty in the European Union', *European Law Journal* 12, no. 6 (2006): 709–24. Many thanks to my PhD supervisor, Alex Colás, for suggesting it.

[259] Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Nahum Isaac Stone (New York: International Library Publishing Co, 1904), p. 302.

complexities of agency and the sociohistorical development of political forces in the social formation of Morocco.

Sovereignty is a complex and abstract category to grasp; therefore, the task is achieved by isolating the key material processes and outcomes of sociohistorical development as a means of overcoming this abstraction. Through this exercise, this chapter seeks to transcend some arguments in the post-structuralist approach, which conceptualise sovereignty through the lens of a statehood that 'denies alternative [political] possibilities by locking historical development within 'statist political communities',[260] and arguments within the constructivist approach which posit statehood as a structural process of performativity through which the entity of the state is legitimated.[261] These approaches are deficient and provide little insight into the trajectories and forms of political rule in Moroccan milieu. While they provide useful insights into the historical production of 'state sovereignty', they also bestow analytical primacy on the modern nation-state, or in Marxist terms, the 'state as such' (in the global North) and fail to take into account the variegated forms of political expression (and by extension, agencies) preceding the birth of the modern territorial nation-state. Crucially, these approaches mystify the extent to which the ideological production of sovereignty on a global scale and its subsequent denial in much of the Global South – conceptualised as a space unable to effectively govern itself and as a space with no government and perennial 'tribal' structures – functioned as a fig leaf for imperial expansion and subjugation. What then is sovereignty? What are the material ways in which it has been historically produced?

This chapter aims to achieve two objectives. Both of these objectives are rooted within a historical sociological approach that speaks to the broader direction and aims of this thesis. The first is to stretch the conceptualisation of sovereignty beyond capitalist modernity and European statehood while being attentive to the risks of anachronism. The second is to conceptualise sovereignty beyond the confines of cultural nationalism ascribing it a transhistorical character, as well as beyond a colonial framework whose epistemological foundations are a reified fragmentation punctuating various levels of political rule and social organisation. Thus, the first objective of this chapter is to make a scholarly contribution to alternative conceptions of sovereignty in the International Relations literature through the Moroccan case and, more specifically, to develop a theoretical construction of *sovereignty without statehood*. From this perspective, sovereignty is a *social relation* – constantly labouring to reinvent and reproduce itself in the face of social, political, and economic pressures. It is the product of a dialectical movement of social forces, political actors, and historical contingencies; internally, it contains a political and legal superstructure operating as a means of coercion that is differentially practiced by different groups (such as the establishment of an army and tribute/tax collection), and externally, as a mechanism through which political actors and entities need to

---

[260] R. B. J. Walker, 'Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics', *Alternatives* 15, no. 1 (1990): 3–27.
[261] Kevin C. Dunn, 'There Is No Such Thing as the State: Discourse, Effect and Performativity', *Forum for Development Studies* 37, no. 1 (2010): 79–92.

reproduce themselves when confronted with crises within the global political system. In this context, sovereignty is not merely a product of European modernity, manufactured in the historical and ideological factories of the global North and exported to the amenable laboratories of the extra-European periphery. Instead, it is made differently in the latter and remade through the historical pressure of the former. The specific contributions of this chapter – and of the thesis as a whole – are to make the case for a sovereignty that was forged separately from the 'political state', a sovereignty that developed as a practice and a happening, manifested in the course of everyday political doing and undoing, and taking place at the intersection of the practices of who governs what, whom, and where; the nature of the forms of social organisation and the relations of production locally; and the dominant nature of the international system. In other words, the ways in which people organised themselves within the economic sphere did not take place in a vacuum; they structured their own lives and the political communities in which they were members within the material constraints of their contexts. In this context, the essence of sovereignty lies not in the ways in which the central tributary state reproduced itself, expanded, and adapted to a range of political and economic challenges contesting its power internally and externally, but rather in the means of reproducing political life itself. This chapter argues that the terms through which sovereignty was experienced, understood, and practiced in Morocco were transformed as a specific outcome of collusion with modern empire and the expansion of capitalist social relations into the Moroccan landscape. The second objective of this chapter is to expand the theoretical construction of sovereignty in the specific Moroccan context. Building on the literature on state development in Morocco, this chapter shows the ways in which the blurring of the parameters between sovereignty and statehood, as well as between tributary statehood and modern statehood, presents a serious hurdle towards understanding the complex and contradictory ways in which sovereignty was expressed in the Moroccan context. Hence, the various ecosystems of sovereignty and layers of actors making up the central tributary state are flattened. In contrast, this chapter shows the ways in which sovereignty materialised, the functioning of the ecosystems of sovereignty in Morocco, and its contradictions (in the sense of the social antagonisms contextualising it) as a category produced on political and historical levels. In doing so, this chapter aims to disturb IR narratives in which socio-historical development in the Global South is seen either as a subordinate extension or as an anomaly of European history. In other words, the focus here is not on the absences and 'failures' of the development of state and capitalism, but rather on highlighting the agencies of Moroccan context and the dynamics of the historically specific social relations of sovereignty. Following from that, this chapter is divided into three sections: The first section provides a brief overview of the debates on state formation and sovereignty in the Political Marxist (PM) tradition. The second section builds on the ways in which PM question the connections between capitalism and sovereignty in Europe to lay out the theoretical framework of ecosystems/ecocide in the Moroccan context, and the third section delves further into the forms of accumulation structuring the processes of ecosystems/ecocide.

2. Sovereignty and state formation in Political Marxism

Despite the vast number of exercises and long-held debates aiming to define it and to grapple with its meaning(s), origins, and genealogy, sovereignty remains one of those ephemeral and esoteric concepts which represents a serious theoretical challenge to scholars of International Relations. For centuries, philosophers, lawyers, diplomats, statespersons, and scholars have exhausted themselves in trying to delineate, define, and trace the origins of the concept and its historical development. Sovereignty is – as Bartelson argues – a 'sponge'[262] concept that represents a theoretical givenness as a result of the state being given 'ontological primacy' in International Relations. [263] As such, this is not merely another exercise in defining and genealogising sovereignty. The previous chapter helped situate the thesis outside the confines of Eurocentrism in IR, outside the epistemic constraints of positivism, and outside the ontological shortcomings of the segmentary model and its divisionist perception of socio-historical development in Morocco. Chapter 2 reviewed the International Relations literature on sovereignty in the Arabic-speaking world and the literature on state formation and statehood in Morocco to provide an overview of the ways in which state formation is constructed, identify key issues within the literature, and theoretically situate the contribution of this thesis. As such, this section of the chapter focuses neither on testing the applicability of Political Marxism in the periphery nor on evaluating its usefulness in the Moroccan context. Instead, it takes some of the key contributions from the critical toolkit of the stream of state formation in PM as a means to interrogate the entanglements of capital, empire, and political rule in the Moroccan landscape. Here, an important clarification should be made. While this work is positioned as a contribution to Political Marxism that questions the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality in non-capitalist contexts and draws heavily from this cannon, it is framed as a historical materialist body of work, as a Marxist historical sociology of International Relations rather than a specifically Political Marxist thesis. On a surface level, this might seem contradictory: how can one draw heavily from a body of literature(s) but not test its applicability? However, this framing is rooted in a methodological effort to rescue and revitalise the liberatory power of the Maghrib not as a 'regional' space in which theoretical frameworks would be tested and applied, but as a space in which *historicising* history itself yields theoretical insights. A broader historical materialist approach help identify long-term socio-historical change taking place at a macro level, in addition to the transformations taking place within the specific political dynamics of the Moroccan context. In this thesis, while PM helps critically examine the relationship between territoriality and capitalism, the approach of epochal transitions provides a limited insight into the complex evolution of social antagonisms in the Moroccan context.

In a way, therefore, this thesis shows both the strengths and limitations of Political Marxism. To make sense of race and class during Morocco's extended Middle Ages (or the period that

---

[262] Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, @Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 15.
[263] Bartelson, p. 24.

European scholarship would refer to as 'early modern history'), as well as the relationship between capitalism and the extra-European periphery in the nineteenth century, this thesis draws heavily from the work of Marxists from the Maghrib such as Mohamed Bouzidi, Abdelaziz Belal, Driss Benali; and the pan-African Marxist scholarship of Guyanese historian Walter Rodney. In other words, this is a thesis in which historical materialisms (and adjacent scholarship such as the critical historicism of Laroui and Hubayda) of different traditions, generations, and disciplinary backgrounds have conversations about capitalism, territoriality, and sovereignty. Thus, the framing of this thesis as a Marxist historical sociology of International Relations is rooted in, on the one hand, a citational praxis of recognising the historical materialist literatures from the Global South which have helped shape conceptions about evolving social, economic, and political processes of differentiation; and on the other, in a vigilant historicist approach towards classness, social antagonisms, and exploitation/domination in Morocco that is attentive to the traps of theoretical super-imposition. It is in recognition of the variety of Marxist literatures (within and outside IR) that have shaped this work – an approach which aligns with the general anti-Eurocentric and historicist ethos of this thesis.

The construction of sovereignty is simultaneously a dialectical historical process and an ideological one; it is an externally projected internal (uneven) relationship of power. On the one hand, it encapsulates the hierarchies and social distinctions between *rulers* and *ruled* in the context of a geographically defined social formation. On the other hand, it represents the principles of power that structure the dynamics of the international system. In other words, the making of sovereignty involves both a process through which it is produced internally as a mechanism of politico-legal coercion and externally as a mechanism of survival and recreation in times of crisis. In pointing out internal/external dynamics, it is essential to highlight that these domains of political practice are not conceptualised as binary opposites; instead, it is used as a designation to highlight the discontinuities and linkages between political dynamics over different spatial contexts. This usage is attentive to the dangers of anachronising and essentialising the internal and external. It recognises that the relationship between the 'internal' and 'external' is contentious, complicated and blurred, and the practices of internal/external are imprinted within their own historical times. For example, would we categorise the actors in the Republic of Salé as part of 'internal' or 'external' dynamics? They did not see their rules as 'internal' but autonomous, and the social composition of Slaoui society gives us insights into the expansive category of the Salétin – which included actors 'external' to the geographies of Morocco such as Europeans, who immigrated to the Maghrib '… as the wealth of Morocco was irresistible…' and were incorporated in Salé on the basis of their maritime skill.[264] What about ʿAbid al-Bukhari, the army of soldier-slaves, being centralised around the figure of the sultan and morphing into a force of dissent following Moulay Ismail's passing? Where would we situate actors in the desert caught in the web imperialism, such as Sheikh Mohammed Bayrouk? Bayrouk's agency was trans-imperial and crossed different political realms, operating within the institutional

---

[264] Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), p. 25.

level of the Makhzen, the personal relations of the sultan, the macro structural level of British capitalism and imperial expansion, and the social level of social relations in the desert. While offering an expansive conceptualisation of sovereignty, this argument helps *historicise* the concept of sovereignty outside the realm of the European nation-state and challenges the perception of modern statehood as a coherent, organic body politic. Furthermore, this historicist approach to understanding sovereignty also extricates it from the confines of histories of the global North into spaces in which both colonial and imperial expansion and bourgeois economic thought have sought to negate the former.[265]

In IR, Political Marxism – or 'capital-centric Marxism'[266] – intervened through the literature on state formation and sovereignty to address these conceptual problems and to challenge economic determinism and structuralist tendencies in IR.[267] In historicising the emergence and development of the state within the *historically specific* social relations and imperatives of capitalism and unpacking the trans-historicisation of historical conducts, Political Marxism seeks to challenge and transcend the foundational ideological myths upon which sovereignty rests (namely the Westphalian model) which serves to obfuscate hierarchies of power and abstracts them from the processes within which they are shaped.[268] In challenging the 'myth of 1648' –Teschke argues that sovereignty and capitalism are not separate processes, and that the modern sovereign state was born out of the transition to capitalism in England. According to Teschke,[269] the separation between the political functions of rule and the economic modes of appropriation was the catalyst for this process as it turned sovereignty into a purely political mechanism of rule. [270] Teschke argues that the distinctive geopolitical transformations of that period symbolised shifts in property regimes and authority relations. Hence, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 reflected a divergent trajectory of French absolutist sovereignty and not the emergence of a modern interstate system and capitalist sovereignty as was the case in England.[271]

Gerstenberger argues that the 'political nation' was not the historical norm, and that once sovereignty was transferred unto nation states, it became the basis of international law.[272] Bachand and Lapointe echo this view of territorially defined entities in creating legal jurisdictions and

---

[265] Abdel Aziz. Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques* (Rabat: SMER Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1980), p. 11.

[266] Charles Post, *The American Road to Capitalism : Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620 -1877*, vol. 28, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden: Brill/Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011).

[267] Maïa Pal, 'Radical Historicism or Rules of Reproduction? New Debates in Political Marxism', *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2021): 33–53.

[268] Thierry Lapointe, 'Beyond a Historicism without Subject: Agency and the Elusive Genealogies of State Sovereignty', ed. Jamie Halsall, *Cogent Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2015).

[269] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, p. 47.

[270] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States*, 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2015), p. 28.

[271] Teschke, *The Myth of 1648*, p. 78.

[272] Heide Gerstenberger, *Market and Violence: The Functioning of Capitalism in History*, trans. Niall Bond, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden: Brill, 2023), p. 592.

diplomatic practices. Indeed, they describe sovereignty and the state as 'a legal creation'.[273] Gerstenberger puts forth that the transformation from the practice of general rule (from an absolutist dynastic sovereignty of the English crown) upon which the 'ancien-régime' of Europe rested[274] to 'public impersonal power' (a sovereignty of the crown and the two Houses of Parliament) occurred within the transition to capitalism.[275] According to Gerstenberger, it was a process of double transition: the transition to capitalism and the transition to 'impersonal power'.[276]

Zmolek also sees the Roman feudal order as one which is characterised by a fractured system lordly rule denoting the 'parcellisation of sovereignty'.[277] According to Zmolek, however, England had a unique path in its transition from feudalism to capitalism – one which did not involve a parcellized sovereignty as England was conquered as a 'unitary state in which all men, free and unfree, were the subjects of a single sovereign'.[278] While English lords extracted surplus from dependant tenants, this relationship was 'private' and the former's legal status equated that 'of a private proprietor of land whose tenure was recognised by the royal courts'.[279] In this sense, sovereignty has emerged within the distinctive historical development of capitalism. In contrast to France, where social development had a distinctively political character personified in the absolutist state and the French Revolution, the jurisdictional and economic social relations necessary for the emergence of capitalism in England were forged within a peculiar form of English feudal-class society: manorial lordship.[280]

Hence, the distinctiveness of 'statehood' and 'sovereignty' is not so much about the creation of an artificial sense of collective identity, but rather about the tensions between the state and 'corporate parcellisation' (in the case of France) and the tensions between the English crown and the manorial lordly feudal class of England.[281]

From these interpretations, a pattern of historicist analysis emerges: One in which sovereignty is the by-product of specific historical circumstances in which various European feudalisms transition to a capitalist mode of production. This approach helps to critically examine and historicise the linkages between capitalism and sovereignty. At the same time, a tale of two historicisms or 'a

[273] Rémi Bachand and Thierry Lapointe, 'Beyond Presentism: Rethinking the Enduring Co-Constitutive Relationships between International Law and International Relations1', *International Political Sociology* 4, no. 3 (2010): 271–86.

[274] Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, vol. 15, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 653.

[275] Gerstenberger, p. 666.

[276] Gerstenberger, p. 603.

[277] Michael Andrew Zmolek, *Rethinking the Industrial Revolution: Five Centuries of Transition from Agrarian to Industrial Capitalism in England*, Historical Materialism Book Series (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014), p. 55.

[278] Zmolek, p. 796.

[279] Zmolek, p. 796.

[280] George C. Comninel, 'English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism', *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 27, no. 4 (2000): 1–53.

[281] Wood, *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism*, p. 31.

spectrum' of historicising can be observed.[282] Moreno Zacarés rightly argues that within PM, there are two strands of inter-related historicisms: the first is 'structural historicism' and the second is 'institutional historicism'. The former is rooted in a methodological approach privileging macro-historical change and structures whereby the autonomy of actors is restricted through pressures that '…impose laws of their own until the social system in question exhausts itself of its own accord, resulting in cyclical breakdowns that require systemic restructurings.'[283] By contrast, 'institutional historicism' adopts a methodology which emphasises strategy and contingency. In turn, this approach enables thinking expansively about the extent to which 'creative agencies and institutions' are manifested in different socio-historical situations,[284] while interrogating the historically specific contexts of different forms of geopolitical domination.

This thesis draws from this tradition of institutionally historicising sovereignty, and more broadly, from various Marxist traditions, to conceptualise it in the space of Morocco, which saw a different historical trajectory. Morocco neither saw a clear separation between the economic and the political, nor a clear formation of classes and class consciousness until the twentieth century. This raises a crucial question: What does – if at all – sovereignty look like in places which have not experienced these historical transformations? How can we theorise sovereignty in spaces that have been structured neither by essentially political absolutist sovereignty nor by a feudal manorial class system? In other words, how can sovereignty be understood in non-capitalist spaces and in spaces within which political power is not parcellized, and where social property relations were different than those of the English or the French case study? The working hypothesis is that in the case of Morocco, sovereignty materialised in a historically contingent opening outside the realm of the political state; it was forged both at the intersection of the politics of contention and consensus and at the intersection of political practice from above and below. The process through which the transition towards the political state, or 'the state as such' begins takes place within the tension between class and geopolitics within the framework of the collusion between non-capitalist structures and European capital and empire in the Moroccan arena.

Despite its rich contributions, PM has epistemological and ontological implications for the understanding of capitalist social relations in the extra-European periphery. PM falls into the trap of a geographical determinism which overlooks analysing and theorising long-term sociohistorical development outside of Europe, particularly in predominantly Muslim societies where the ideological and sociological construction of the Umma (Muslim Community) has historically involved decentralised forms of rule which run in opposition to the territoriality of capitalism and the modern nation-state.

---

[282] Javier Moreno Zacarés, 'Two Historicisms: Unpacking the Rules of Reproduction Debate', *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2021): 175–98.
[283] Zacarés.
[284] Zacarés.

Thus, the deficiency of Political Marxism is *not* due to the historical construction of capitalism, primarily within England in time and space. There is a critical spectrum of thought within PM addressing the ways in which Eurocentric modes of reasoning are reproduced within the tradition and how they can be challenged; and a tension can be noticed between the key contributions that PM advances and a pressing need to take Eurocentrism more seriously. For example, Knafo and Teschke propose adopting 'radical historicism' as 'an approach that uses agency as a framing device; a means to specify what the work of historicisation should consist in.'[285] According to them, in showing the differences that people make to history, even when that does not seem to be the case, this method is a starting point for transcending the Anglo-Saxon case study of capitalist history. Salgado argues that Teschke and Knafo's methodological framework of 'radical historicism' provides a useful lens for a historical materialist analysis where anti-Eurocentric praxis is at the centre. With its inclination towards uncovering the specificity of historical processes, not of episodic historical 'moments', it is an approach that emphasises the connections between geopolitics and the (re-)making of subjectivities through the agency of collective actors beyond structural determinations and explanations.[286] By filling the gap between post-colonial and decolonial traditions on the question of Eurocentrism, Salgado defines Eurocentrism on the basis of three elements: teleological linearity, diffusionism of European progress, and subjective assumptions of Europe's rationality. According to Salgado, relying on reified, universal conceptions of class struggle and modes of production as analytical frameworks obscures the inter- and intra-societal processes of differentiation. Instead, prioritising an approach which takes geopolitical space seriously involves accounting for the ways in which geopolitical domination fashions different forms of subjectivities and collective agencies as a continuous process of structural differentiation.[287] In other words, these processes of anti-positivist historicisation and conceptualisation '… are always part of a collective, dialogical, and contested wider process.'[288] Pal contends that the critical toolkit of anti-Eurocentric historicism involves both challenging the universalising myths of European historical development and the primacy given to European institutional trajectories, and '… being able to incorporate analyses that reveal in some cases the central role played by European institutions, without this creating or reproducing a methodological standard that mistakenly erases non-Western agency.'[289]

As argued in the introduction, attempting to solve Eurocentrism by digging for traces of the origins of capitalism where they do not exist in the extra-European periphery is yet another form of Eurocentrism itself which both divorces capitalism from its specific historical context, while assuming

---

[285] Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke, 'Political Marxism and the Rules of Reproduction of Capitalism: A Historicist Critique', *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2020): 54–83.

[286] Pedro Dutra Salgado, 'Anti-Eurocentric Historicism: Political Marxism in a Broader Context', *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (20 September 2021): 199–223.

[287] Dutra Salgado.

[288] Pal, 'Radical Historicism or Rules of Reproduction?'

[289] Maïa Pal, *Jurisdictional Accumulation: An Early Modern History of Law, Empires, and Capital*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 54.

a fatalist lens that both normalises and mystifies capitalism as a trajectory in all spatio-temporalities. Instead, the deficiency in PM is a result of the overreliance on the 'origins' of capitalism as a starting point for theoretical construction. On the one hand, it does not account for the wider variety of social formations and the much more prolonged transitional stage which characterised most African societies, including Morocco.[290] Thus, relying on the origins of capitalism as an analytical framework limits the extent to which PM could 'travel' to spaces such as Morocco; it does not allow a full exploration of the ways in which the expansion of capitalism in the extra-European periphery took on a different function and form, violently reversing the totality of non-capitalist modes of life. How do we make sense of societies which have not experienced a transition to capitalism, as was the case in seventeenth to nineteenth century Morocco? And how do can understand societies in which there were 'classes' but no decisive class struggles?'[291] As Knafo and Teschke argue:

> But how then can we determine the moment when a country shifts from one system to another so as to establish that a society is approximating the ideal sufficiently that we can grant the label of capitalism? We thus end up with a largely impressionistic conception of the transition, which locates it at some point in time when, on the basis of a series of signs and indicators, we get the impression that a society is sufficiently close to the ideal to merit the denomination. Ultimately, this procedure leads to a largely arbitrary decision, more or less impossible to substantiate, with the result that capitalism remains a highly diffuse historical object with no clear lineage in most of the literature.[292]

In this regard, Campling and Colás provide a compelling definition of capitalism, in which it is neither the exclusive product of class struggle and the commodification of agriculture in the English countryside, nor the exclusive product of an all-encompassing system of warfare and overseas trade within which the extra-European periphery would be absorbed. According to them, capitalist social relations are 'born in the countryside but nurtured through international trade'. This definition helps understand capitalism 'as a mode of production emerging out of feudal class antagonisms which subsequently developed by latching onto pre-existing money and commercial circuits of capital.'[293] Crucially, this definition helps historically situate societies and social formations which have experienced capitalism in ways *other than* a transition to capitalism from feudal class antagonisms, such as Morocco.

In seventeenth to nineteenth century Morocco, socio-economic organisation was hierarchical; and while there were 'classes' (i.e., 'ruling classes' and 'oppressed classes'), class consciousness itself was not concrete. To posit these 'ruling classes' as conscious – whether they be the merchants of Fes and Essaouira, or the *umana*, the Makhzen's merchants – would be to exaggerate their socio-

---

[290] Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, p. 38.
[291] Onimode, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria : The Dialectics of Mass Poverty*, p. 14.
[292] Knafo and Teschke, 'Political Marxism and the Rules of Reproduction of Capitalism'.
[293] Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, *Capitalism and the Sea* (London: Verso, 2021), p. 60.

economic role, their homogeneity, and position within Moroccan society.[294] Therefore, when class is used in this context, it is used with some caution; it is used in an anthropological and sociological sense denoting societal 'positions' and 'categories'.

There are two reasons for these dynamics, one pertains to the nature of the question of property, and the other, to the nature of production. While property rights, in European context, emerged from '… legal concepts elaborated on the basis of Roman law',[295] the situation in nineteenth century Morocco was drastically different. Here, the vast majority of agricultural land in Morocco formed part of what is referred to as 'terres collectives' [collective lands], that is, land owned by clans, fractions of clans, *douars* or hamlets, who collectively made use of them.[296] The second type of land ownership was mediated by sultanic rule, in which certain *caïds* and political communities were offered tax-free possession of distinctive lands. As a result, a new domain and social relation came into being, that of *Guich* lands (literally, army lands). This form of collective land ownership could be divided into three categories: *Raqaba*, when the sultan has eminent right over the land, *Manfa'a*, a form of collective disposition, *Intifa'a*, a form of individual usage. The third type of land ownership is *Melk*, that is, lineage-based private and exclusive property, which is characterised by an individual and/or familial mode of appropriation and is primarily found in urban and sedentary zones.[297] Thus, this system of 'property relations' was distinct, in that middle farming did not invest capital or use it to expand into industrial production or to entirely dispossess direct producers. Land ownership in the countryside in particular was organised primarily along communal and collective lines, with a main proprietor making decisions and taking advantage of the land, in combination with 'associates' who are relegated to a secondary position.[298]

Second, the goal of production was not the expansion of capital but first, production for consumption and immediate use, and in the nineteenth century, for exportation. In other words, the relationship to the means of production here was one in which '… they owned them, and production was carried on chiefly for immediate use.'[299] In this case, the 'social surplus was small and based … on the appropriation of nature.'[300] Indeed, herein lies the contradiction: Fes had abundant wealth that was premised on artisanal production, but that wealth was reinvested in production for immediate use.[301] In this regard, let us take a look at the production of *Balghat* [Babouches]. This intricate and

---

[294] Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain,1830-1912*, p. 88.

[295] Rémy Leveau, "Public Property and Control of Property Rights: Their Effects on Social Structure in Morocco," in *Property, Social Structure, and Law in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Ann Elizabeth Mayer (University of New York Press, 1985), p. 61.

[296] Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques*, p. 19.

[297] Belal, p. 20.

[298] Mohamed Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial* (Casablanca: Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales, 1982), p. 135.

[299] David Konstan, 'Marxism and Roman Slavery', *Arethusa* 8, no. 1 (1975): 145–69.

[300] Onimode, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria : The Dialectics of Mass Poverty*, p. 11.

[301] Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*, p. 227.

colourful type of footwear was made from morocco leather – leather exported as far as to England,[302] Baghdad,[303] Istanbul and Safranbolu[304] – processed in the tanneries of Fes, Rabat, and Marrakech by debbāġin [tanners]. Exported to Senegal, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Algeria, and Gibraltar, the babouches were sold for 2 to 4 francs each.[305] Up to 1855-56, Rabat and Salé were important centres for the production of Babouches. In 1855, in these two cities alone, there were 150 types of work related to this form of artisanry, employing 1,500 workers to produce more than 2,4448,000 francs of products. In 1865, we see a stark difference: 150 jobs, with 2025 workers producing only 452,000 francs' worth of Babouches.[306] The combination of these dynamics, of production for immediate use and for exportation of raw materials in the non-capitalist space that is Morocco, alongside the technological, industrial, and infrastructural expansion of capitalism,[307] meant on the one hand, that there was a superabundance of cheap European commodities and lower-quality chemicals for production purposes. On the other hand, the echoes of the Industrial Revolution were palpable; by the nineteenth century, morocco leather itself, which was previously exported to England from Morocco, was substituted with 'locally produced imitations' in England.[308] It is these dynamics of the dialectical relationship in the extra-European periphery, between capitalist social relations and non-capitalist social formations, between empire and capital, that are key to understanding the drastic changes taking place in 19th century Morocco. In this sense, the undercutting of the artisan industries took place in a space where there is no industrialisation.[309] Unlike the wool weavers of Lancashire and Yorkshire in the 19th century,[310] the artisans in Morocco had no to factory-system to turn to; which is why I refer to these dynamics as a prolonged transition to under-development.

Thus, the key antagonism here between the opposite spectrums of these social hierarchies is the tendency of the 'ruling classes' to gradually erode the relationship of different people to land,

[302] Nat Cutter, 'Morocco Leather in Early Modern Britain: Towards a Transcultural History of Fine Leather Bookbindings', *Parergon* 41, no. 2 (2024): 103–32.

[303] Roger Le Tourneau and L. Paye, 'La Corporation Des Tanneurs et l'industrie de La Tannerie à Fès', *Hespéris-Tamuda* Tome XXI, Fascicules I-II (1935): 167–240.

[304] Heidemarie Doğanalp-Votzi, 'Histories and Economies of a Small Anatolian Town: Safranbolu and Its Leather Handicrafts', in *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi Deguilhem (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 308–37.

[305] Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial*, pp. 178-82.

[306] Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial*, p. 182.

[307] Coastal cities were especially effected due to the rise and expansion of steam-powered navigation, with Casablanca, Safi, and El Jadida witnessing a rapid increase of commercial traffic, and Rabat and Tanja's traffic decreasing significantly. Jean Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe: Les difficultés Tome III* (Paris: Editions La Porte, 1989), p. 39.

[308] Cutter, 'Morocco Leather in Early Modern Britain'.

[309] It is notable that artisans and artisanal corporations were involved in various rebellions in Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century, one of which is the year-long Tanners' Revolt in Fes in 1873. The artisanal revolts must be conceptualised within the broader patterns of socio-historical change taking place in Morocco through the reverberations of capitalism. Thompson explains the linkage between the artisan and the revolt in the following manner: 'It was this experience which underlay the political radicalisation of the artisans and, more drastically, of the outworkers. Ideal and real grievances combined to shape their anger – lost prestige, direct economic degradation, loss of pride as craftsmanship was debased.' E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 262.

[310] E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 280-1.

forcing them into various situations of dependency. This pattern was most clearly evident in the case of ʿAbid al-Bukhari, whose deployment as an enslaved and professional military corps rested upon the reproduction of their sociological condition as landless and unfree. It was also the case for the Ikhommassen (khammas-peasants) who were in a semi-permanent situation of peonage via their relationship to land whereby a fifth of their produce was appropriated by the landowner.[311] Hubayda describes these patterns of the erosion of the relationship of people with land in the following manner:

> The Dawla, while seeking to break the power of clans and reduce the influence of the [clan] chiefs, on the one hand, and bolster its [own] power on the other hand, was forcing clans to migrate from their lands and move to other distant lands.[312]

Following from that, socio-economic hierarchies included individuals who exercised political agency in various ways and had various economic positions: (sultans), functionaries of the central tributary state, clan-based and merchant classes, the lineage of the *chorfa* (saints),[313] theologians and people in the legal profession, and lastly, at the bottom of the pyramid of hierarchies we find artisans, nomads, peasants, and the landless.[314]

Additionally, PM's focus on the origins of capitalism as a theoretical framework leaves the dynamics of racialisation inherent to imperial expansion and transplantation of capitalism on the margins of that theoretical construction. Put differently, the inattentiveness of PM towards the ways in which capitalism relied on the simultaneous production of difference and the reinforcing of sameness[315] in the extra-European periphery has prevented it from fully 'travelling' to the Global South. As such, I use the term 'reverberations of capitalism' throughout this thesis to overcome some of these problems in two inter-connected ways: first, to refer to the socio-economic structures of

---

[311] Khammas peasants form an unequal 'partnership' with a landowner beginning with an advance payment to the latter, immediately putting them in a situation of debt bondage. They then work on the proprietor's land and get remunerated in kind (up to a fifth of grain crops, hence the name Khammas which comes from Khamsa [five]). Thus, not only is the khammas peasant entirely economically dependent on the private proprietor, they are also in a situation of debt bondage which could last for generations. Jacques-Meunié likens this situation to slavery: 'The ikhommassene are a rather poor people who have neither palm trees nor gardens, or do not have enough to survive on; some are foreigners who have come to seek work and earn a living. The fact that they don't have private property (or only own a few palm trees) and their status as foreigners can explain their political non-existence. The condition of the akhommass is close to that of the slave, but the former is free in the sense that they can change masters and that their children are not, like those of the slave, the property of the master.' However, the situation within which the khammas peasants exist can be better contextualised as a form of peonage and political non-existence; while ikhommassen were economically and socially dependent, they were nonetheless legally and sociologically free. Djinn Jacques-Meunié, 'Hiérarchie Sociale Au Maroc Présaharien', *Hespéris* 45 (1958): 239–69.

[312] Hubayda, *Bu's al-tārīkh : murāja'āt wa-muqārabāt [The Misery of History: Reviews and Approaches]*, p. 99.

[313] Julia A Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters: Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Ernest Gellner and Gianni Albergoni, *Les Saints de l'Atlas* (Saint-Denis, 2012).

[314] See : Abdel Aziz. Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques* (Rabat : SMER Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1980); Abdel-Aziz Belal, *L' Investissement au Maroc (1912-1964) et ses enseignements en matière de développement économique* (Casablanca: Les Editions maghrébines, 1980).

[315] Satnam Virdee, 'Racism and State Formation in the Age of Absolutism', *Historical Materialism* 31, no. 2 (2023): 104–35.

societies which have not experienced a capitalist transition, second, to explain the dynamics through which capitalism has drastically altered and reordered the Moroccan sociopolitical fabric in the nineteenth century, without changing the economic base of society, that is, without capitalism fully reproducing itself. While in certain cases and societies there was a passage to capitalism; in others, there was a prolonged transition to 'under-development'.[316] Here, under-development does not merely refer to a permanent and fixed condition of poverty; nor does it refer to culturalist conceptions of authoritarian rule or reified categories of global colonial difference. Instead, it refers to a society in a prolonged transition and a socio-historical condition and process denoting the violent confrontation with capitalist social relations in the extra-European periphery through imperial expansion.[317] It points out to the ways in which capitalism has affected different spaces in an uneven manner, and in the case of spaces in the Global South, the effect was both 'superficial' and 'deforming'.[318] On this point, Benali remarks that Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco began to experience capitalism since the second half the nineteenth century; while in places like Germany, Italy, and Russia, this took place much later (both via specifically English capitalism and other capitalisms). According to him, this unevenness (of the ramifications of capitalism) can be explained through the distinct nature of pre-capitalist social formations in each space.[319]

Thus, when we speak of the 'reverberations of capitalism' (whether in the Moroccan arena or elsewhere) it is to refer to the dynamics of capitalism expanding without fully reproducing itself; it is also to explain the dynamics of 'surplus appropriation from abroad'.[320] Through these dynamics of appropriation, merchant's capital '… (including both commerce and credit) is not somehow 'external' to capitalist reproduction, but is one movement in the constant metamorphosis of capital.'[321] For Europe, the economic demands of capitalism at home (the search for land and raw materials to be processed) led to attempts to gain control of various sectors in the extra-European periphery. In Morocco, one example is the aggressive ways in which capitalism affected different artisanal sectors. It not only cut off the trade routes to other parts of the African continent which were vital to Morocco's economy for centuries; it transformed Morocco into a transit zone for European commodities in such a way that the Makhzen became heavily reliant on the European marketplace of capitalism to reproduce itself and fulfil its basic needs; thus, the Makhzen became dependent on Europe for acquiring '… weapons and textile products necessary for its army and the clothing of its government personnel.'[322]

Benali describes this situation in the following manner:

---

[316] Driss Benali, 'Nécessité d'interroger Le Passé Pour Comprendre Le Présent', *Al Asas* 27 (n.d.).
[317] Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques*, p. 2.
[318] Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*, p. 11.
[319] Benali, pp. 10-1.
[320] Onimode, *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria : The Dialectics of Mass Poverty*, p. 7.
[321] Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, *Capitalism and the Sea* (London: Verso, 2021), p. 60.
[322] Benali, p. 223.

In fact, what characterizes commercial capital and usury capital is that they do not penetrate [the process of] production; they limit themselves to transforming an ever-increasing part of the products into commodities. They ensure profits by appropriating a part of the surplus value of the direct producers.[323]

Thus, through the circulation of money and commodities, colonial capitalism becomes the mediator between different spheres of production in a Maghribi society in which the production process is still geared towards use-value.[324] The amalgamation of the expansion of empire and capitalism helped '… commercial capital to appropriate for itself a preponderant part of the product.'[325] In other words, unlike under capitalist social relations, the circulation of money and commodities here is independent from the production process.[326] In turn, this dynamic creates a structural imbalance and '… dissolves old relationships' by on the one hand, dominating surplus production, and on the other, making '…entire branches of production dependent on it.'[327] This structural imbalance can be described in the following way:

Commercial capital, when it holds a dominant position, is thus in all cases a system of plunder, just as its development in the trading peoples of both ancient and modern times is directly bound up with violent plunder, piracy, the taking of slaves and subjugation of colonies…[328]

To further illustrate this argument, below is a table detailing the nature of Morocco's imports from Europe between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries:

---

[323] Benali, 'Nécessité d'interroger Le Passé Pour Comprendre Le Présent'.
[324] Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, p. 445.
[325] Marx, p. 448.
[326] Marx, p. 445.
[327] Marx, p. 448.
[328] Marx, pp. 448-9.

Period	Imported commodities
1600-1625	oil, linen, iron, steel, medicine, dye, textiles, and weapons.
1625-1650	iron, tin, lead, weapons, fabrics and linen
1650-1675	tobacco, cotton, powder, gum, lacquer, linen, iron, fabrics, red caps, paper, opium, glass, coral, and weapons.
1675-1700	tobacco, iron, steel, weapons, tartar, paper, linen, fabrics, hardware, cochineal, vermilion seed, alum, silk, cotton, opium, ginger, mercury, sulfur, realgar opium, grains of paradise, and Guatemalan indigo.
1700-1750	linen, fabrics, iron, sulfur, powder, weapons, lead, tea.
1750-1800	tea, sugar, weapons, linen, fabrics, tin, lead, iron, textiles, medicine, cutlery, tartar, silk, cotton, paper, coffee, sulfur.

Table 1: Imports of Morocco (1600-1800)[329]

This table acts as a microscope of the commodification of production as capitalism entered its industrial stage, showing the long-term increase in the importation of '… 'colonial goods' … sold by the grocers of the developed worlds: sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa and its derivatives.'[330]

However, the expression of 'reverberations of capitalism' not only refers to the confrontation, but also to the ways in which these rapid changes were resisted on a fundamental level. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as capitalism was expanding into the Moroccan milieu – through debt, through merchant's capital, the creation of commodity-specific trading monocultures, through colonial ownership of land by proxy, through extraterritorial rights and a wide range of diplomatic interferences – there were also political strategies of resistance (both from above and below) towards this expansion. During the rule of Hassan I (1873-1894) which Chapters 5 and 6 are centred upon, there was a stronger effort (as Chapter 6 shows) of centralisation of power that focused on adopting a stricter project of territorialisation vis-a-vis peripheral regions. At the same time, there were also financial, military, economic, and industrial reforms. Let us take a closer look at the military element by way of example. In the seventeenth century, the move towards centralising power relied on creating an army of soldier-slaves based on the personal political power of Moulay Ismail. At the same time, before the nineteenth century, all Moroccans were conceptualised as potential soldiers to be summoned for war at point,[331] i.e., a reserve army of military labour. As Morocco did not have a standing army, anybody in possession of a rifle, a sword, and a horse was a potential soldier. Moreover, the social formation of the clan itself – working with or against the central tributary state – acted as a 'military unit' whereby the clan chief provided military protection for members:[332]

---

[329] Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*, p. 224.

[330] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, p. 64.

[331] Bahija Simou, *Āl Iṣlāḥāt Āl'askrya Bilmaġrib 1844-1912 [Military Reforms in Morocco 1844-1912]* (Rabat: ālmaṭbaʿa ālmalakya ārribāṭ, 2000), p. 115.

[332] Simou, p. 115.

The Moroccan army remained until the middle of the 19th century an army reminiscent of that of Europe in the early Middle Ages where each lord, with their escort of vassals, came to take part in the fight under the supreme command of the suzerain. Each governor, caïd or Sheikh, came at the head of their clan (Guich or Naïba clan) to fight alongside the sultan either against the foreign [threats] or against the rebelling clans (through the Harkas).[333]

Thus, before the nineteenth century, Morocco's military corps comprised permanent troops (such as ʿAbid al-Bukhari) and regiments drawn from the city and the countryside alike (nawayeb). Following the death of Moulay Ismail, ʿAbid al-Bukhari revolted against successive sultans: Mohammed Ben Abdallah (1757–1790) and Al-Yazid bin Mohammed (1790–1792). With the colonisation of Algeria and the growing threat of European imperialism in the Maghribi space, Morocco was all too aware it was imperative to move away from military arrangements based on personal power. Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Moulay Abderrahman created Morocco's first standing army, with a conscription system inspired by the Turkish tanzimat to gradually replace the core of the previous military system.[334] This professional standing army called the *Nizam* was composed of several units: infantry, cavalry, artillery, and 'gendarmes'. Gendarmes is a military unit tasked with surveillance and 'maintaining public order'; they were especially in charge of monitoring patterns, networks, and routes of smuggling.[335] Thus, in 1869, the army included three thousand infantry. By 1893 and under Hassan I's rule, that number had grown to '…sixteen thousand infantries, around nine thousand cavalry and some one thousand artillery.'[336]

In addition to these military reforms, Hassan I founded a rifle factory called the *Makina* in Fes in 1895. Further, he revived the gunpowder factory established in Marrakesh following the Tetouan War (1859-60). The latter factory was heading towards collapse due to its heavy reliance on importing expensive and inferior European weapons. Thus, this factory saw a range of reforms in 1886 which included introducing:

Five pestles, an engine, and a monitoring machine. Sulphur, which is an essential material for making gunpowder, was brought from Italy; while charcoal was extracted from oleander wood, which is stored.[337]

Further, there were various 'missions' of Moroccans sent to Europe (England, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium) totalling eight missions of approximately 350 people between 1874 and 1888.[338] Thus, some were language students, some trained in artisanry, and others interned in military technical knowledge,[339] and upon their return, most were hired as garrisons of fortresses in Larache,

---

[333] Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*, p. 215.
[334] Simou, p. 135.
[335] Simou, pp. 139-47.
[336] C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2013), p. 118.
[337] Simou, p. 251.
[338] Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain,1830-1912*, p. 286.
[339] Laroui, p. 286.

Rabat and Tanja, and in the Makina, the rifle factory of Fes.[340] Crucially, in establishing the Makina in Fes, Sultan Hassan I – conscious of the danger of imperial expansion coming from France, England, and Germany in particular; that is, that these countries would, via sending personnel, broaden their sphere of (imperial) influence – sought to use the technical knowledge of a different place which was, at the time, less threatening to Morocco, and thus, Hassan I resorted to Italy instead for training.[341] From these historical details, a few things can be observed. During the age of imperialism, Morocco professionalised its military apparatus and moved toward having a standing army. It also took a few measures aiming to revitalise or inaugurate the weapons manufacturing sector. The totality of these measures must be contextualised as the natural conclusion of state-building during the age of empire. In this sense, this particular historical juncture was a clear manifestation of the breaking down of military arrangements as personal political power towards the military as a professional corps and lasting institutional power. Through imperial expansion, Europe provided its own answer to the Moroccan context: an increase in the centralisation of power (whether within or outside military institutions) served as a direct response to European encroachment. Thus, the expression of 'the incipience of territoriality' used throughout this thesis refers to this dual complementary process whereby, on the one hand, the totality of society was modified by imperialism; and on the other, imperialism itself was modified by Moroccan society through its own societal and political structures. The incipience of territoriality in Morocco refers to a dialectical relationship between cause and effect, whereby a revitalised form of the conventional politics of statecraft, premised on centralising power, reforming military institutions away from personal political power, and having '… the capacity to produce [weapons] on a wartime scale' so that the rifle industry '… maintained a capacity far in excess of any peacetime requirements.'[342]

3. The transition from ecosystems to ecocide

In response to the questions posed earlier in this chapter, I propose the concept of an *ecosystem of sovereignty* and *ecocide* to better capture these historical tensions. I use ecosystems of sovereignty as a conceptual tool which goes beyond the Eurocentric application of the model of statehood, goes beyond bureaucratic institutions of the state, the normative behaviours of individual actors, and beyond the ideological construction of 'Moroccanness' and nation that started to emerge in the 19th century elite discourse. This tool transcends the confinement of sovereignty to statehood, and interrogates the social relations through which sovereignty is forged, negotiated, and reinforced outside the state system. It aims to determine the ways in which various socio-political groups worked above and below one another, with and against each other, at various times, and in various spatial contexts at the centre of the analysis. Sovereignty itself is, as the remainder of this chapter argues and demonstrates, a *social relation* embedded in wider long-term socio-economic and historical change.

---

[340] Laroui, p. 287.

[341] Simou, *Āl Iṣlāḥāt Āl ʿaskrya Bilmaġrib 1844-1912 [Military Reforms in Morocco 1844-1912]*, p. 254.

[342] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, p. 308.

However, conceptualising sovereignty – beyond the risk of trapping the analysis in a container of the development of European international law on territory – also comes with a risk of anachronism which would extricate it out of its specific historical context and render it a transhistorical category. As such, it is essential to emphasise that the framework of ecosystems is not rooted in a transhistorical, linear, or evolutionary vision of historical time or space. Instead, ecosystems refer to the historically specific and contingent expression of dominant political forms that occurred between 1666 and 1727 which were the product of their own time and circumstances. As Pal argues:

> … The conventional ideas that territoriality ties together jurisdiction and sovereignty, and that jurisdiction is a neutral, apolitical, and transhistorical concept are modern constructs linked to the specific conditions of the sovereign states system. These constructs need to be broken down for the early modern period, before relations between states and sovereigns became fully impersonal, abstract, territorial, and based on the illusory separation between political and economic, public and private spheres.[343]

Thus, the contention here is not that an ecosystem of sovereignty existed in a trans-historical manner, running cyclically in opposition to the evolving and contingent historical laws of motions. Moulay Ismail's project of centralisation of power that took place in the late seventeenth century – through the creation of a powerful, organised military institution of enslavement separate from society and the social bonds within which the enslaved existed – must be understood as an 'exceptional [chapter] in the history of Morocco.'[344] It is exceptional not merely as a result of the introduction of legal and sociological conditions of unfreedom from above, but it is exceptional as it is premised on the contradiction of diverting agricultural labour in a society reliant on subsistence-based modes of living toward military institutions; and on a centralised form of political rule that doesn't grant its own representatives, apparatuses, and bureaucratic institutions room for political manoeuvre beyond the remit of what the central tributary state allows.[345] Under this political arrangement, the relationship between the sovereign and the central tributary state was reflective of abstract territorial rule, but on distinct method of the reproduction of political power via non-economic mechanisms of coercion.

Why, then, is it an ecosystem of sovereignty, and not merely sovereignty? Indeed, why is it not absolutist or capitalist sovereignty? Blair et al define an ecosystem as 'a biological community (all of the organisms in a given area) plus its abiotic (nonliving) environment'.[346] In an ecosystem, living and non-living organisms or entities are a continuum of systems in the natural arena, which form part of an integral whole, one which could either be geographically defined (a rainforest, a puddle, a lake,

---

[343] Maïa Pal, *Jurisdictional Accumulation: An Early Modern History of Law, Empires, and Capital*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 101.

[344] Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*, p. 215.

[345] Aberzaq, *šamāl ġarb ālmaġrib fy ʿahd ālsulṭān ālmawla ismāʿyl (1672-1727) ǧawānib min āltāryḫ ālsyāsy wālāǧtmāʿy*, p. 46.

[346] John M. Blair, Scott L. Collins, and Alan K. Knapp, 'Ecosystems as Functional Units in Nature', *Natural Resources & Environment* 14, no. 3 (2000): 150–55.

or a range of mountains) or have fluid and less distinct geographical boundaries. The structure of an ecosystem not only refers to the dimension of geographical space, whether physical or conceptual, fluid or defined, but also to the nature and dynamics of the relationship between these various organisms or entities and the ways in which they interact, connect, and function as a community. In fact, an ecosystem is defined less by its components or geographical boundaries than by the nature of its functioning.[347] Moreover, ecosystems are complex dynamic entities that evolve and change in their own contexts, including through human influences. In this case, an ecosystem can be defined as 'the meeting grounds' on which various species interact. An ecosystem represents the sum of the relationships between *separate but overlapping* realms of environmental living and non-living organisms which provide key services and functions essential to the reproduction of political life.

While this thesis is not based on an ecological framework, it borrows the concept of ecosystem as a tool of historicism and a means of creating new theoretical possibilities and illustrating the peculiar historic criteria of long-term statecraft and the articulation of socio-political agency in the Moroccan context. Such a 'creative borrowing' of the term, however, acknowledges the risks involved in the 'circulation of ideas' (or travelling theories) from one context to another – a risk which, as Edward Said warns us, could impoverish the original idea.[348] However, Said also recognises the potentially rejuvenating capacities of theories travelling from one field to another and from one locality to another. He tells us that:

> This movement suggests the possibility of actively different locales, sites, situations for theory, without facile universalism or over-general totalising. […] To speak here only of borrowing and adaptation is not adequate. There is in particular an intellectual, and perhaps moral, community of a remarkable kind, affiliation in the deepest and most interesting sense of the word.[349]

To avoid the traps that come with travelling theories, this thesis uses the concepts of an 'ecosystem' and 'ecocide' in a metaphorical sense as an allegory of the complex ways in which political blocks and social relations in the Moroccan space have shaped, challenged, or reinforced one another. It uses the first concept in a manner that highlights dynamism, interaction, and function within and without the central tributary state as core themes of socio-political development – themes which have emerged organically from empirical and archival research forming the backbone of the three case studies of this thesis. In this context, I define ecosystems of sovereignty as a system within which *separate but overlapping* realms of politics reproduce, maintain, or challenge each other. This ecosystem represents a variety of political arrangements that are both centralised and non-centralised.

---

347 Brian D. Fath, 'Ecosystem Ecology', in *Ecosystem Ecology: A Derivative Encyclopedia of Ecology*, ed. Sven Erik Jørgensen (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009), 6–11.
348 Edward W. Said, 'Traveling Theory', in *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), 226–47, p. 226.
349 Edward Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 452, cited in Salem, '"Stretching" Marxism in the Postcolonial World'.

Crucially, this system is premised on the symbiotic and contentious relationship between various political blocks (within or outside the boundaries of the tributary state) and the social relations of the geographical space within which they exist, whether in the maritime or in the terrestrial space. Here, the nature and role of the inhabited physical space determined the ways in which the processes of tribute extraction and political strategies of the centralisation of rule took place. For example, in spaces nearing Meknes – the capital of the Ismaili polity – Moulay Ismail drew inspiration from the model of the 'military clan' to create a 'professional army made up of professional soldiers.'[350] These professional military corps were exempted from taxation, extricated from the social bonds that structured the Moroccan milieu, and embedded within a relationship of individual and collective dependence on the figure of the sultan. Thus, this strategy relied on exploiting conditions of difference, whether they were social hierarchies, religious or racial differences, as well as the relationship to land, as a means through which to socially reinvent the socially detached figure of the soldier-slave. As such, this army is distinguished from occasional and intermittent political alliances through a juridical 'official military status', which enabled Ismail to call upon its members 'to fight for him at any time, and in any space in the territory.'[351] However, Ismail's strategy of governance in geographical spaces distant from the centre of his dominions was different and relied on the politics of disarmament. In *Al-istiqṣā,* Annassiri provides several examples:

> Then came the year one thousand ninety-one [Hijri, Gregorian 1680], and on Jumada al-Thani [sixth month of the Islamic calendar] of that year, the Sultan [Ismail] left the city with soldiers, heading for Aït Iznassen, who had persisted in disobedience. He stormed against their mountains, invaded their quarters, blew up their crops and udders, burned their villages, killed their men, and took their offspring captives. They were asked for safety, but the rest secured it on the condition that they paid with horses and weapons. They pushed it back without stopping and forcibly invited him. He then came down to Angad and brought with him … [other] clans, so he dismounted them from their horses, stripped them of their weapons, and forced their sheikhs to collect for him what remained of their clothes, which they did.[352]

Further, the nature of the geographical space also determined the forms of political organisation and claims made. For example, Salé, which is the subject of the case study on piracy in Chapter 4 – by virtue of its location and adjacency to the Atlantic – required establishing a harbour and base so that inhabitants could defend their space. In turn, this led to social groups morphing into organised political communities; they made territorial claims and created a polity within a sphere of multi-layered and differentiated systems of rule. There were various reasons behind the emergence of

---

[350] Magali Morsy, 'Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier', *Revue d'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine* 14, no. 2 (1967): 97–122.

[351] Morsy.

[352] Mohammad Annassiri, *Al-istiqṣā li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣá. Volume 7.* (Casablanca: Dār ālkitāb, 2001), p. 62.

the Republic of Salé, including the fall of al-Andalus, the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from Spain, and the structuring of a culture and economy around maritime activities and navigation. However, as the example of Sicilian *repubbliche marinare* (maritime republics) shows, the geographical position of these communities, as remote and defensible societies, helped enable and reproduce a particular relationship between geographical spaces and the ways in which Slaoui people politically organised the totality of their lives. According to Marx:

> Whatever the form of the process of production in a society, it must be a continuous process, must continue to go periodically through the same phases… When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as flowing on with incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction … As a periodic increment of the capital advanced, or periodic fruit of capital in process, urplus-value acquires the form of a revenue flowing out of capital.[353]

Thus, this dialectical process of production and reproduction 'of the society as a whole' takes place within a capitalist system mediated by a collective division of labour in which 'each class or class fraction has a specific form of activity, oriented towards specific goals and values within this overall organization, which constitutes its collective project.'[354] In this sense, when this thesis refers to 'production' and 'reproduction' during the eighteenth century, it does not do so to generalise about a mode of production that defies history and exists in all times and geographical spaces or to denote a capitalist transition. In other words, the terms here neither refer to the process of the production of society in its totality, nor do they refer to a clear forming of classes with set objectives and activities and oppositions between them. Instead, the terms are used to refer to a specific political process of the 'production' and 'reproduction' of the totality of political life (in its conventional, alternative, and imperial dimensions), the (re-)production of social antagonisms and a sociopolitical *contract* of rulership, both by consent and coercion, both from above and below, through which the agency of various political actors in the Moroccan context was practiced.

The term *ecocide*, on the other hand, is used to refer to a long-term process which saw the reversal of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty and the societal narrowing down of legitimacies. Overseeing this process was a move away from negotiating political rule with a variety of actors towards negotiating territoriality claims with the commercial and political agents of empire. Here, territoriality refers both to the 'condition, or status of territory' and the 'mode of operating towards that territory.'[355] Thus, key to this process is the gradual and brutal erosion of non-capitalist life and non-capitalist forms of socio-political organisation, as well as their subjugation to the politics of European expansion. In discussing these historical complexities in relation to Egypt, Salem locates the

---

[353] Karl Marx, *Capital: Volumes 1 & 2* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2013), pp. 396-7.
[354] Terence Turner, 'Class Projects, Social Consciousness, and the Contradictions of "Globalization"', in *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, ed. Jonathan Friedman (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003), 35–66, p. 39.
[355] Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 4.

process of subjugating the colonised world to the capitalist system in systemic violence that prevents the flourishing of social and political consent. According to Salem:

> What we see, in the end, is a project that embraced capitalism within state-defined limits, rather than anti-capitalism or socialism; state control over public space, rather than democracy; and the co-optation of many movements, rather than ruling alongside them.[356]

Thus, under the long-term process of ecocide, political rule became structured through the 'cartels' and 'superprofits'[357] of imperialism in a dynamic which saw non-state actors either working *with* or *against* the central tributary state. In other words, the process of ecocide saw a transition from a system of separate but overlapping and often mutually recognising forms of societal organisation towards a vertical system within which clearer political hierarchies began to form around territoriality. Ecocide is strictly located within the vortex of imperialism and reverberations of capitalist pressure in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a result, this process forced the central tributary state to work against, absorb, or neutralise independent components of the ecosystem within which it has existed. This strategy acted both as a means of confronting the imperial tide (survival through crisis) and as a means for the central tributary state to produce and reproduce itself, in a spatial and temporal sense. Crucially, under this regime of rule, a tension emerged for the central tributary state, whose role was reduced to the mediation and arbitration between different interests between its own sphere of rule and that of imperial merchant and diplomatic classes.

In nineteenth-century Morocco, the unfolding of a series of crises systematically and gradually resulted in *an ecocide*. According to this interpretation, ecocide is mediated by the compulsions of capitalism and European expansion. The key to this process was the pattern of economic accumulation which took place through the creation of debt, market, and socio-diplomatic dependencies. As Walter Rodney tells us, this process of accumulation stimulated Europe's growth. In fact, Rodney and Williams make the case for the various ways in which the satellisation of economies and societies in the South have contributed to the development of European economic forces. Rodney's insight into the *dialectical* relationship between the process of 'development' and that of 'underdevelopment' provides crucial insight into these dynamics. According to him: 'Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to underdevelop Africa.'[358] Williams shows the extent to which accumulation in the African continent fed the development of economic forces in Europe:

> These economic changes are gradual, imperceptible, but they have an irresistible cumulative effect. Men, pursuing their interests, are rarely aware of the ultimate results of their activity.

---

[356] Sara Salem, 'Gramsci in the Postcolony: Hegemony and Anticolonialism in Nasserist Egypt', *Theory, Culture & Society* 38, no. 1 (1 January 2021): 79–99.

[357] Vladimir Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986).

[358] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 86.

The commercial capitalism of the eighteenth century developed the wealth of Europe by means of slavery and monopoly.[359]

Thus, the economic mechanisms of the process I call ecocide are patterns that enable European capitalism to expand and establish distinct colonial regimes of accumulation in the Moroccan space. They are the dynamics through which Morocco became embroiled, not merely in the international market but in the marketplace of capitalism without transitioning to capitalism itself. Together with the economic crisis of the Makhzen which saw its coffers emptied, and the ecological crisis which saw an increase in death, displacement, and dispossession, this has resulted in a general pressuring and dislocation of non-capitalist ways of being. Additionally, the imperial project of ecocide was *classed*. While Morocco was a non-capitalist society, various social and economic hierarchies existed, as shown in the introduction. The composition of Moroccan society was not premised on a clear delineation of classes but rather on one's position within the process of production. Therefore, the contradiction that existed was primarily between the 'vertical' forces of producing and non-producing groups, with the social power of the latter premised on political and/or religious roles.[360] Although we cannot discuss clear opposing classes, there were nevertheless social codes and languages that reflected an understanding of hierarchies and social antagonisms. For example, in archival, historical documents and the scholarly literature produced by Moroccans, the socially and religiously powerful classes are referred to 'al-khassa' [literal translation: the private, i.e.: the minority] and the lower classes and the marginalised were referred to as al-'amma [the public, i.e.: the majority]. Both of these terms denote an understanding of the ways in which wealth functioned, the modes of differentiation upon which society was based, and the role of these social forces within their wider historical and spatiotemporal contexts. Simultaneously, however, the arrival of European expansionism in the Moroccan space helped sharpen internal societal contradictions and create new social forces through trans-imperial alliances between Morocco and Europe.[361] In other words, while the Moroccan milieu itself was not unambiguously classed, the meeting ground upon which Morocco's non-capitalist structures colluded with the quest for *exogenous* capitalism to expand and reproduce itself was classed.

The outcome of these imperially driven dynamics of economic accumulation is the disturbance and dislodging of an established ecosystem of sovereignty, particularly with regard to the politics on the margins of the central tributary state, that is, all the layers and cultures of political rule that operated in separate but overlapping spheres of influence than those of the Makhzen and its military apparatuses. The creation of the British Northwest African Company provides crucial insights into these patterns. It shows the ways in which British expansionism – and more broadly, the looming

---

[359] Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1966), p. 210.
[360] Ahmad Amalek, 'Ālmuǧtmaʿ Ālmaġriby ʿinda Nihāyat Ālqarn Āttāsiʿ ʿašar [Moroccan Society at the End of the Nineteenth Century]', *Maǧalat Tāryḫ Ālmaġrib [Journal of Moroccan History]* 1 (1981): 93–99, p. 94. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[361] Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,* p. 92.

threat of European imperialism – entered the sphere of a multi-layered system of political rule and treated its components as separate entities and not part of a wider ecosystem. Here, the strategy of British imperialism relied on a scheme of *dualism*. The first aspect of this scheme is the creation of rifts within different spheres of influence through trans-imperial alliances; and the second aspect of this scheme is the chipping off and legitimising of the social bonds of 'overlordship' as separate and territorially-defined sovereignties in and of themselves. Ecocide, therefore, is a defining historical juncture in which the ecosystems of sovereignty begin to break down as the relationship between those who rule and those are ruled, between people and land or the space which they inhabit, and between various social forces. As Morocco's position in the geopolitical domain begins to change, the distinction between 'internal' and 'external' political structures and social forces become sharper, and thus, the Moroccan political terrain is re-oriented towards a stricter conception of territoriality, centralisation of power, and the intensification of political hierarchies as a means through which to ward off imperial scheming. Britain's engagement in diplomatic disputes with Morocco over which territory the latter holds, over which population it controls, and over what trading and private property rights should be given to the British is symptomatic of imperialism's 'economic roots in a new phase of capitalism',[362] through which opposing territorial interests were replicated.

The peculiar characteristic of the form of political organisation in Morocco was that it neither fits the mould of one indivisible (territorial) sovereignty nor does it fit the mould of parcellised or fragmented political communities, as was in various places under feudalism. Instead, Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty are one in which different cultures, layers, levels, and claims of politics collide, exist, challenge, or mutually reinforce each other. In other words, these diverse expressions and forms of political rule fell within the remit of the totality of an ecosystem in which they were fought over, contested, and negotiated, thus showing the reciprocal relationship between agency, material life, institutions, and processes in the long-term. To illustrate, while the maritime cosmopolitan workers of the Republic of Salé did not claim sovereignty in a sultanic manner, that is, they did not rely on the bayʿa[363] as a form of political legitimation. Nevertheless, they constituted a separate realm of politics, one which recognised the sultan and was mutually recognised by him, that is, until political imperatives dictated otherwise and the maritime republic became gradually subsumed under the wings of the sultanate.

In the colonial and colonially-tinged segmentary literature on Morocco, the nature of political organisation is understood in a deterministic sense that contradicts Ibn Khaldoun's[364] expansive

---

[362] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (London: Abacus, 1997), p. 60.
[363] See Chapter 6 for a full explanation.
[364] According to Ibn Khaldun, ʿassabiyah is the political adhesive that binds social and political forces. It is a shared sense of 'solidarity' and collective political consciousness through which a political community is socialised into oneness. This applies especially to political communities outside the remit of the central tributary state, such as the clan. Thus, according to Ibn Khaldun, ʿassabiyah is key to understanding the rise and fall of new powers; a collective force conquers at the beginning of a historical cycle at the expense of another, and then hands over power to a different force as a result of their weakness and descent into the

conception of temporality. Under this conception, the expansion of ʿassabiyah [political solidarity or social cohesion] translates into a difficulty in keeping and exercising political power over conquered spaces.[365] Often depicted as 'makhzen-based' and 'sultanic', the Moroccan case of socio-political governance is theorised as centred around the figure of the sultan, the 'ultimate ruler' and sovereign whose power includes the temporal, political, religious and spiritual realms. At the same time, the extent of the sultan's political power is explained through a schism between power in *theory* and power in *practice* – that is, the sultan is conceptualised as the sole spatio-temporal sovereign figure;[366] while the agency of socio-political actors falling outside the purview of the tributary state is conceptualised as incidental, or as an appendage on the periphery of the central tributary state which is difficult to control, either because of the geographical landscape or due to the distance from the sultan's dominions. In other cases, clans are viewed as socio-political units whose alliances, functions, and tensions have been permanent fixtures that shaped Moroccan statehood, thus presenting a picture in which Morocco is an example of the development of historical continuities, i.e., as an example of a so-called 'tribal' statehood and social order.[367] This interpretation absorbs the cyclical approach to the extent that the equation of political rule as sovereign and yet not entirely becomes a transhistorical formula through which the Moroccan case can be understood. However, these interpretations ignore a key element of historical change in predominantly Muslim societies: that the very nature of political practice was premised upon a multiplicity of *Dawlas* [polities] and a wider-scale collective practice of sovereignty encapsulated in the non-territorial notion of the Umma. Abdou describes this dynamic in the following manner:

> During Islām's early pre-modern period there were a multiplicity of Dawlas within one
> Dawla, loosely resembling a decentralized confederacy and Qurʾānically referred to as an

---

decadence of the 'luxuries' of life. In this sense, Ibn Khaldun's work can be interpreted as a key work of historical sociology and Realism: while his conception of power is inflexible and relies on an implicit conceptual framework of an eternal, anarchical and cyclical struggle over power; the ability to conceptualise the big picture of the politics of power, and the long-term patterns of socio-historical change (not just in the Maghrib, but in medieval Europe) is an approach should be conceptualised as historical sociology and treated more seriously in IR.

[365] I translate ʿassabiyah as political solidarity or social cohesion. However, in this translation of the Muqqadimah, ʿassabiyah is translated as 'group feeling', which in my view is not only an inaccurate translation of Ibn Khaldun's concept but also which does not fully capture the nuances of the term. If ʿassabiyah is indeed 'group feeling', then it becomes transhistorical and can be extended to all socio-political forces beyond those that Ibn Khaldun has referred to (those of the clan and the community). As such, it is important to point out that this translation includes a lot inaccuracies, omissions, and anachronisms projecting modern historical categories into Ibn Khaldun's work. For example, according to the author, Ibn Khaldun uses Dawla and state to mean the same thing. This is inaccurate as state is an anachronistic translation of Dawla; it runs in direct opposition to the Khaldunian historical sociologist construction of temporalities. Instead, I translate Dawla as polity. Ibn Khaldun, *An Introduction to History: The Muqqadimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. xi.

[366] El Hadi Lharoui, *Ālqabyla, Āl Iqṭāʿ Wālmaḥzan: Muqāraba Susyulouǧya Lilmuǧtamaʿ Ālmaġriby Ālḥadyṯ: 1844-1934 [The Tribe, Feudalism and the Makhzen]:* (Casablanca: Afriqyia as-Sharq, 2005), p. 21.

[367] Mohammed Meziane, 'Āddawla Fy Ālmaġrib Wa Masār Āṭṭawur: Min Āddawla Āssulṭānya Ila Āddawla Ālḥadyta [The State in Morocco: From the Sultanic to the Modern State]', *Ālmustaqbal Ālʿaraby* 42, no. 490 (2019): 70–87.

Umma. Within pre-colonial Muslim usage, sovereignty lay with the Umma and not the Dawla, because a "Dawla, by definition, cannot form an Umma seeing that the Umma, as an idea, is the purpose beyond the Dawla, not in defining matters of worship, but in defining matters of political identity and relation with the other."[368]

In other words, there is a distinction between the medieval conception of Dawla (often mistranslated as 'state') and the political state, or the state as such. Essential criteria of the Dawla, therefore, are 'temporality, change, and rotation…' rather than the fixed organised order of the nation-state.[369] The Dawla is not an immutable, unchanging entity. Here, the concept of Dawla does not refer to borders as an embodiment of a project of 'isolation-separation-exclusion',[370] but is used in its Khaldunian sense systematised and cemented through two distinctions in *al-Muqaddimah*:[371] on the one hand, a spatial level where exists a Dawla khassa [particular polity] which is defined by the power of a regional 'asabiyya recognising the sovereignty of a larger political entity, [372] or global *Dawla*, and on the other hand, a temporal level in which exists a *Dawla shakhsiyya* [personal Dawla] as the reign of a sovereign, forming one part of a Dawla kulliya [total Dawla], or the reign of the entirety of the dynasty.[373]

Thus, in perspectives where territoriality is an anachronistic fixture (through the figure of the sultan) of Moroccan politics, the multi-layered dynamics of non-territorial multiplicities of spheres of rule are relegated to the background of the analysis. In other words, while the *actual* extent to which territoriality assumed a central role in other sovereignty models is either downplayed (no government, no state, no territory, and no sovereignty) or exaggerated (there has always been a state); the role and agency of socio-political actors outside the remit of the central tributary state, such as pirates and the enslaved. These actors whose agency this thesis analyses are limited to a clumsy conceptual box: either they are passive extensions of the state or awkward additions that sometimes challenge it, but still cannot be conceived as collective political formations in their own right. As will be shown in the case study chapters, socio-political actors outside of the conceptual and geographical remit of the tributary state are practitioners of political rule and political imaginaries in different geographical settings. In the maritime space, they formed their own polity on the basis of maritime skill and warfare; they reproduced their rule on the basis of cosmopolitan maritime labour (including raiding) and a collective politics of consensus. In the desert space, however, the agency of actors was shaped both by the specific social relations of the space within which they existed (the relationship with the

[368] Mohamed Abdou, *Islam and Anarchism: Relationships and Resonances* (London: Pluto Press, 2022), p. 39.
[369] Abdou, p. 150.
[370] Calderón Vázquez and Francisco José, 'Boundaries in Time and Space: Spanish "Minor Sovereign Territories"', *Frontera Norte* 26, no. 51 (June 2014): 113–36.
[371] Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Bruce B. Lawrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
[372] This concept refers to clan-based alliances and their context- and time-specific social and material forces.
[373] Abdelahad Sebti, "Présence des crises dans la chronique dynastique marocaine : entre la narration et les signes," *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 30, no. 119 (1990): 237–50.

commons), and the global geometries of imperial expansion. In other words, the desert space was a dynamic unit of power for various agencies: of imperial and trans-imperial agents, of the Makhzen and its apparatuses, and of everyday inhabitants of the space.

Thus, the framework of ecosystem/ecocide framework aims to better equip us with a critical toolkit through which to approach socio-historical change in Muslim societies. In other words, it aims to fill the gap that invisibilises the various levels of political power where 'sovereignty' was a social relation premised on collective will at times, and on individual rule at others, and rooted in historically contingent material circumstances. In approaching sovereignty as historically specific, evolving and dynamic, it ceases to be the exclusive (but not quite) realm of the Makhzen and sultan. It also ceases to be conceptualised through the immutable cultural characteristics of 'tribalism', instead becoming the product of distinctive social relations producing different forms of political rule. It becomes something *more* and *other than* European case studies of legal codification and capitalist territorialisation of rule.

4. Accumulation within ecosystems and ecocide

The major theoretical question that arises, therefore, is how Eurocentrism which posits Moroccan statehood either as a permanent 'tribal' or sultanic fixture or as a mere extension and importation of the 'civilisation' of the so-called west, can be transcended? While charges of Eurocentrism have provided powerful critiques of the epistemological conception of sovereignty and statehood in International Relations, including in Marxist International Relations, mapping a clear alternative or pathway out of the conundrum of Eurocentrism is a task that is difficult to achieve. This thesis does not claim to offer a magical formula or advance a grand theoretical narrative through which Eurocentrism can be remedied. Instead, it focuses on investigating the 'totality of interconnected processes' through which sovereignty can be re-imagined.[374] Throughout this thesis, this totality is conceptualised through case studies in which Morocco is not a 'single' unit of study but part of a wider network of the international providing a fresh empirically grounded perspective. To investigate the mode of the articulation of Morocco's political rule into the capitalist system, this thesis looks at various historical moments, places, and processes: piracy, slavery, different forms of accumulation under imperialism, detailing the sum of social, political and economic relations structuring the political and unfinish/interrupted character of long-term stateness. In doing so, it offers a range of fresh reinterpretations of the dialectical relationship between state, society, and the international, where Morocco is neither a mystical place of epistemological hermetism nor a space of historical incomprehensibility which acts as a container for a self-fulfilling reified present. This reinterpretation prioritises the enquiry of spatiotemporally diverse contexts where different forms of accumulation (of political power, of money, people, and extraterritorial privileges) helps contextualise

---

[374] Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2010), p. 3.

the dynamics of ecosystem/ecocide. More specifically, this guiding framework helps understand all the ways in which the political and legal spheres both reformulated social relations and, in turn, have been reformulated by them. The Moroccan case posits sovereignty without (modern and political) statehood. Here non-capitalist sovereignty is an ecosystem shaped by a variety of local and global actors, historical processes, and agencies. This flexible theoretical construction of sovereignty, therefore, serves to question the dominance of western cannons of knowledge and power in the international system and the necessity of addressing the unequal relations of power underpinning the epistemic construction of statehood in the Global South. Such an inequality not only suppresses the multidimensional imaginaries of politics beyond the model of European socio-political development but also fails to conceptualise the manifestations of sovereignty in non-capitalist spaces that are not feudal, and away from culturalist interpretation of 'tribalism'.

The task of 'provid[ing] a framework to reconstruct the transition to nationalist social and international practices' in the Moroccan milieu is a complex one.[375] Decades ago, Marxist scholar Eric Wolf identified the problem of abstraction, through which the spaces of the Global South either become separate units of analysis locked into a permanent condition of 'distinctiveness'. As a result, the international becomes a space of 'bounded systems' comprising cultures and societies which are, in essence, static. According to Wolf:

> Concepts like "nation," "society," and "culture" name bits and threaten to turn names into things. Only by understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding.[376]

Saouli and Hinnebusch aptly describe the process of state building in the Arab world as 'a bell-shaped curve rather than a linear approximation of Weberian or Westphalian notions of statehood.'[377] To Saouli and Hinnebusch, the process of the formation of Arab states is a dynamic and evolving process, one of doing and undoing, of what they call 'formation' and 'deformation' within the context of social fields structured by territorial, material, and cultural structures, as well as the sphere of politics and institutions of the state.[378] While this thesis adopts different methodological and conceptual approaches, thinking about long-term statecraft as a dynamic and evolving process helps conceptualise the intricacies of political rule. In Morocco, the conceptual biographies of sovereignty are mediated by the dynamics of the (post-)colonial context. On the one hand, the colonial project rested on constructing Morocco as a barren, fragmented space where the forces of the Makhzen were in eternal conflict with dissident sociopolitical forces, namely 'tribes' – as a space which needed

---

[375] Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, 'Social-Property Regimes and the Uneven and Combined Development of Nationalist Practices', *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (2007): 583–604.
[376] Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History*, p. 3.
[377] Adham Saouli and Raymond Hinnebusch, 'The Arab State: A Historical Sociology Approach', *AlMuntaqa* 5, no. 1 (2022): 8–28.
[378] Saouli and Hinnebusch.

'protection' from its inability to govern effectively and to control its own population. However, the fiction of perpetual dissidence, and the structural process of social fragmentation and racialisation that was embodied in so-called protectionist colonial politics and the 'attempts to reorder the ostensibly corrupt'[379] Moroccan space served as an ideological pontifical tool through which to justify and sugarcoat the material realities of imperial expansion.[380] On the other hand, the post-colonial project was faced with the colossal task of decolonising history, of deconstructing and challenging the historical revisionism of the empire – that is, challenging the ideological premises of the colonial project in Morocco which relied on the politics of denying sovereignty and population control as a means through which to expand and search for new markets. These dynamics of the colonial and post-colonial ebb and flow create a complex situation in which the protagonists are the opposing poles of colonialist and nationalist historiography, with the latter focusing on the end result of state formation in Morocco.[381]

Thus, the contention here is that while sovereignty and capitalism are intertwined in the European case, the expansion of imperial/colonial capitalism[382] into the Moroccan space not only altered the base and superstructure of society but also altered political imaginaries and the ways in which Moroccans were able to imagine their own future.[383]

This is not to say that history stopped in the Moroccan context and that sovereignty itself is a transhistorical category that has existed at all times and in all spaces defying the motions of history. Rather, the aim here is first, to question the normalising conceptualisation of modern territorial statehood as a benchmark for political 'development'; and second, to emphasise the analytical primacy of existing social relations and relations of production and exploitation in producing political structures and processes and the ways in which they function together as a system. Viewed in this light, sovereignty is forged by the contradictions and connections between specific forms of political claim-making and political contracts and distorted through colonial expansion. In relying on modern territorial sovereignty as an analytical tool through which to historically theorise state formation in spaces outside the Euro-American sphere, there is a risk of producing accounts of the state and

---

[379] M'hamed Oualdi, *A Slave Between Empires: A Transimperial History of North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), p. 69.
[380] Barnaby Crowcroft, 'The Problem of Protectorates in an Age of Decolonisation: Britain and West Africa, 1955–60', in *Protection and Empire: A Global History*, ed. Lauren Benton, Adam Clulow, and Bain Attwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 228–44, p. 229.
[381] Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 11.
[382] I define imperialism as the political, economic, ideological, and territorial extension of capitalism, combining domination with territorial expansion and surplus appropriation from abroad. This denotes a different historical process and entity than the term Iyyala [empire]. The latter is the expression used to refer to the social formation of Morocco in Moroccan archival sources. I specifically use this term in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century to refer to a strategy of domination of direct rulership, whereby a dominant polity or political community (in this case, sultanic rule) expands its power at the expense of another. Thus, this concept of different from the 'empire' which appears in Chapters 5 and 6 in the nineteenth century, denoting specifically British (and broadly, European) imperialism.
[383] Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, p. 282.

sovereignty that 'privileg[e] epistemological formulations at the cost of marginalising or negating the ontologically divergent ground realities.'[384] Thus, a 'legal' understanding of sovereignty that is tied to capitalist modernity in the case of Morocco has a more serious implication: the assumption that sovereignty in the extra-European periphery is an 'unfulfilled promise' and an 'unrealised aspiration' that only takes into consideration its history from the colonial period, and further entombs the political and economic articulations of social relations over the longue durée. It does so while simultaneously creating and falling into the trap of Eurocentric periodisation. In the face of the challenge of 'sovereignty', a focus on various processes and strategies of accumulation and forms of agencies not only helps overcome these binaries but also helps capture the nuances of stateness and political practice in the periphery. Most importantly, it demystifies the political character of extraterritoriality and the ways in which European states did not simply claim a Weberian 'monopoly of violence' over their own geographically delineated territory – whether following a transition from absolutism or feudalism to a capitalist mode of production – but deployed various economic and extra-economic strategies of coercion embedded within the nature of imperial expansion into other territories, exploiting the nature of the relationship between people, non-state actors, and the geographies of land or physical space; and the relationship between the centres and peripheries of political power. This was the case with the British chartered company in Tarfaya, whose founding during the age of imperialism epitomised an incipience of territorial rule and a transformation of social relations in communities accustomed to a different geographical area, and a distinctive ecological environment, that of the desert.

The peculiar case of Morocco puts a challenging theoretical dilemma before us: a case of sovereignty that is neither strictly tied to modernity nor strictly tied to capitalism. The hypothesis is that Morocco presents a case of sovereignty with no political state, where the material archaeologies of sovereignty are separate from the emergence of capitalist relations. Indeed, it is these capitalist social relations that generate a decline of this phenomenon and begin to transplant the seeds of the political state. Thus, an understanding of sovereignty as a practice and a social relation beyond fragmentation and towards layering; and beyond parcellisation towards pluriversality as an ontological framing, helps bring to light the development and fluctuations of political rule and the diverse trajectories and formulations of agency in the Moroccan space. A conceptual framework of ecosystem and ecocide helps capture the nuances and tensions of statecraft, the dynamics of agency and counter-agency, and the social relations through which they take place. It also helps situate the dynamics of diffusion, tension, and interconnectedness, shaping different practices of statecraft in the Moroccan social formation in their specific historical context while delineating the nature of rule and power not as parcellised but as diffused and pluripotent. In turn, this diffusion of power and agency turns into a structural weakness for the central tributary state once capital and empire become protagonists. Thus, the framing of ecosystem/ecocide not only helps understand the conventional

---

[384] Chadha Behera, 'State and Sovereignty', p. 143.

layers of political practice – through the ways in which the Makhzen and clan-based social formations have reproduced themselves; but also sheds light on the alternative forms of agency enactment which took place in Morocco. For example, the Republic of Salé is an exceptionally novel historical experience. The novelty lies in the fact that the Republic was premised on completely different ideas. First, the economic base of the republic was the maritime sector; its social base was racial and religious difference. Second, leaders were elected by collective consensus in a manner that was alien to the Makhzen's political scene, which relied on the submission-protection contract of *bay'a* instead.

The material construction of sovereignty that this thesis offers follows three stages. This conception of 'stages' is not based on ideas of transition from one form of political rule to another. Rather, it maps out broader structural changes and focuses on the degree of incompleteness and overlap between them. The first stage is located within the period 1666-1727 – a period which is taken to be the highest point of a fully formed ecosystem of sovereignty. It is described as such, not merely by virtue of the different political claims made, or the various political strategies and cultures of sovereignty pursued in distinctive geographical spaces. It is described as such because of the relationship between actors in different spheres of politics and the distinctive dynamics of *trans-sovereignties*, through which actors crossed political realms, exercised different forms of agency, and existed in more than one structure of rule. This period was characterised by a *specific* form of political accumulation which took place through warfare, commerce, and raiding in maritime and land-based spaces. In other words, slavery and piracy enabled a distinctive process of accumulation. In Moulay Ismail's sphere of rule, this process separated a section of the population – and inserted a new population through raiding and enslavement in other societies – from existing social bonds and the social relations of production, recreating them as soldier-slaves and dependent military labourers who would not only carry out warfare for the sultan and protect his rule at all costs, but also extract tribute on his behalf. However, in the Republic of Salé, this abstraction from social bonds and knowledge of the maritime sector enabled Moroccans to carve a unique space of consensus-based politics, a space within which various other peoples, including Europeans, were welcomed and incorporated. Meillassoux's argument in this regard is insightful. According to Meillassoux:

> Slavery enabled, through the transfer of individuals, an accumulation process which was not possible under serfdom. Accumulation and growth under slavery depended on capacities for capture and purchase – that is, on variables (warfare and commerce) which made possible a more flexible and faster rate of reproduction and increase in numbers than demographic growth.[385]

During the period 1666-1727, there were various attempts by different actors to accumulate political power and overcome the ecosystem. At the internal level and within the Moroccan social

---

[385] Claude Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold*, trans. Alide Dasnois (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 93.

formation, this period saw the unfolding of a political situation tinged by constant conflict over the rights of rulership. As a result, several autonomous political structures began to crystallise. In Part II: Piracy, Chapter 4 provides several examples of these political formations, including the Zawiya Dila'iya in the Middle Atlas and the Empire of Tazeroualt in the region of Souss, in the south. Despite these attempts, breaking the ecosystem was not a viable project in this space. For instance, the relationship between Morocco and various European states was entirely different from that which followed the French colonisation of Algeria in 1830. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, this relationship was primarily concerned with the question of piracy: exchanging and freeing captives on both sides, dealing with maritime hostilities or collaboration, and matters of trade.[386] Even in the early nineteenth century, the relatively reciprocal nature of this relationship persisted, as we could gather from glimpses into the archives. For example, a letter from al-Salawi to J. Green dated 17 September 1806 provides details of the liberation of Muslim captives held in Lisbon, and a letter from Sultan Sulaiman to Green, dated 10 May 1807 declined British demand for permission to export provisions from Essaouira.[387] Furthermore, a letter dated 19 September 1816 from Sultan Sulaiman to Lord Exmouth commented on the English absence in the port of Algiers.[388]

The second stage began in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the arena of politics became wider and new social forces were at play. In this second stage, the social fabric of Moroccan political spaces and society began to witness unprecedented structural transformations. In the age of empire, external powers – although representing a relatively small internal actor – gradually became entrenched in the social fabric of Morocco. Thus, while the same sphere of politics continues to exist, new players join the centre stage. Not only do these players upset the cumulative balance that exists within the system of political accumulation, they also create severe imbalances within the ecosystems of sovereignty and produce new forms of agencies. From this perspective, the 'breakdown of the traditional, social, economic and political order' in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the gradual dismantling of Morocco's ecosystems and the subjugation of non-capitalist structures to the imperatives of European expansionism.[389]

This brings us to the third stage, ecocide and the incipience of the political territorial state. The case of the British North West African Company in Chapter 6 explains the transformations that occurred as a result of imperial expansion. The tensions surrounding territoriality and the question of who governs what and where was not simply a matter of futile diplomatic skirmishes between Britain

---

[386] Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*, 2nd ed. (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009), p. 240.
[387] Moroccan British Relations (1597-1860). Box Th-218, number 33749. The Royal Archives, Rabat.
[388] Moroccan British Relations (1597-1860). Box Th-218, number 16642. The Royal Archives, Rabat.
[389] Mohammed Kenbib, 'Changing Aspects of State and Society in 19th Century Morocco', in *The Moroccan State in Historical Perspective 1850-1985*, ed. Abdelali Doumou, trans. Ayi Kwei Armah (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1990), p. 26.

and Morocco. These skirmishes are symptomatic of new relations, dynamics, and pressures that enter the Moroccan realm of politics. Indeed, these diplomatic disputes provide crucial insight into an emerging contradiction on two inter-related levels: the first is the tension between Morocco and the ways in which some of its inhabitants conceived and managed the commons, and the second is the tension between Morocco and imperial forces. This stage was characterised by what I would call *defensive accumulation* – a dynamic through which the central tributary state attempts on the one hand, to extend its power, and on the other hand, to accumulate further political power to protect itself from imperial expansion. As such, this stage, and more broadly, this thesis does not conceptualise this process as final, but rather conceptualises it in terms of contingent incomplete processes through which territoriality was produced as a response to imperial scheming and as a result of the expansion of capitalism in the Moroccan political space.

As such, the dynamics of ecosystems and ecocide are mediated by different forms of accumulation: the accumulation of political power, money, and extraterritorial rights. This helps us understand the coercive element of the introduction of capitalism in Morocco, the function of the central tributary state in mediating between different capitals and interests, and the role of non-state actors in challenging and/or reinforcing these dynamics. For instance, in describing the dynamics between capitalism and the periphery, Brewer argues that:

> Capitalism first emerged in Europe. It was transplanted, partly grown, to colonies of European settlement … and developed independently in Japan. In the rest of the world capitalism from outside was an alien growth introduced, frequently, at the point of a gun.[390]

Marx explains the economic process of accumulation of money as one which involves two forms. The first is what he refers to as 'hoarding', defined as a process through which accumulation of money occurs within the condition of a 'hoard', that is, without functioning as capital, and indeed, without creating surplus value. According to Marx, this is a sum of money that grows '… only by virtue of the fact that other money, existing without the initiative of the hoard, is thrown into the same safe.' Additionally, Marx argues that hoarding as an end in itself is typical of undeveloped pre-capitalist modes of production, and that the money involved in this process is a form of 'latent money-capital', as it takes place outside of the circuit which transforms the surplus value into really functioning capital.[391] The second is what Marx refers to as reserve funds. In the process of production, a large quantity of commodities is sold while others are not; and some money capital is circulated, while some remains in 'reserve' to be circulated at a later stage. Hence, reserve funds form 'a part of capital in a preliminary stage of its accumulation, of surplus-value not yet transformed into active capital'.[392] In other words, these processes of economic accumulation in nineteenth-century

---

[390] Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, 2nd ed. (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012), p. 37.
[391] Karl Marx, *Capital: Volumes 1 & 2* (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2013), pp. 612-13.
[392] Marx, p. 614.

Morocco were framed within the tension between the non-capitalist forms of accumulation of money and the process of European accumulation in the extra-European periphery which occurred within the historically specific context of the capitalist mode of production, a key element of which was the European bourgeoisie utilising the political power of the state to expand into new territories and markets and create surplus value (for themselves).[393]

According to Marx, the relationship between domination and exploitation, that is, between those who rule and those who are ruled, is determined by the specific economic form in which surplus labour is extracted from direct producers by non-producing classes. In other words, the economic configuration of the relationship between those who produce directly and those who are in control of the means and conditions of production determines on the one hand, the nature and basis of the social structure, and on the other hand, 'the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of state in each case.'[394] Thus, the character of sovereignty is not merely about the functional or institutional character of the state, but is shaped by the relationships of economic domination within the existing societal structure, in its abstract sense, and within the entirety of production as a social process, in a material sense. This synergy and tension – between the economic and the political, between production and non-production, between various types of social formations, and between domination and exploitation – are key to understanding and historicising the political character of sovereignty in the Moroccan context.

Thus, framing the long-term processes of ecosystem/ecocide within the context of accumulation helps understand those 'processes that reflect strategies of expansion of authority as transplants, transports, and extensions.'[395] In this context, both the agents of imperial expansion (whether diplomats, consuls, or early colonists adopting a warlike business model) and the agents of the extra-European periphery embedded within a system of non-capitalist social relations of subsistence (whether slaves, pirates of Salé, merchants, or clan members) form a unique context within which are articulated the political, ideological, cultural practices of statecraft, alongside the accumulation of money prior to and during imperial expansion. In summary, the historical and social processes of accumulation in the Moroccan context have both created and reproduced the particular dynamics of ecosystems, while the forms of accumulation taking place on a global scale have launched their sociopolitical undoing of ecocide (through a gradual shift from dynamism to territoriality).

On the one hand, the encounters of accumulation shaped within the motives of power and profit through expansion that put European states at the global stage, and on the other hand, shaped within a non-capitalist context where productive forces within the social formation of Morocco were

---

[393] Marx, p. 516.

[394] Karl Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 927.

[395] Maïa Pal, *Jurisdictional Accumulation: An Early Modern History of Law, Empires, and Capital*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 66.

underdeveloped, a context within which co-existing diverse forms of antagonisms, extraction and domination. While the Ismaili polity controlled commercial exchange and extracted surplus revenue from the population by means of taxation, its impact on productive forces was minimal. The relationship between the Makhzen, capitalism, and local industries and artisanry stands out as a sharp example of the reversal of this pattern. More specifically, the advent of capitalism in the Moroccan scene generated irreversible changes in the totality of Morocco's social, economic, and political fabric, without capitalism fully reproducing itself in the Moroccan milieu. For example, the methods of production primarily relied on human and animal labour, while technological advances were minimal and ignored,[396] as they did not fit existing social structures.[397] The production of rugs – beautiful handmade tapestries of colour garnishing the alleyways of medinas and homes of Maghribis – traditionally relied on plant-based colouring. As Morocco became swept up in the imperatives of capitalist social relations through the triple process of marketisation, monetisation, and commodification,[398] the prices of agro-pastoral raw materials – including the plant-based colouring used in the making of traditional rugs – grew exponentially both because Europe needed them (export) and because Morocco became the terrain of a European capitalist competition (import).[399] As a result, rug artisans turned to the chemical colouring of aniline, translating into rugs of poorer quality.[400] Another example is grain milling, which primarily took place through human labour In the Haouz of Marrakech, the few hydraulic mills that existed prior to colonial expansion were owned by qaids (local rulers) or by the Makhzen.[401] Even Sidi Mohammed's attempt to create a sugar cane refinery in Marrakech was an utter failure as 'the refinery never produced a single grain of sugar!'[402] Hence, relying on different forms of accumulation as a means through which to theorise sovereignty in the Moroccan milieu not only aims to highlight the global dynamics of imperial expansion but also the relationship between agents of empire and non-state actors in European and Moroccan contexts. The reverberations of capitalism, therefore, is an expression denoting a historical process of a long-term and unfinished transition, the confrontation between capitalist social relations and non-capitalist societies, and the ways in which agency is articulated and contested within the context of these dynamics.

5. Conclusion

Historically, the international referred to interactions between states/polities as well as their limitations and outcomes. The international, however, is category that reflects western anxieties and the west's ongoing attempts to construct grand historical and ideological narratives. Theorising 'the

---

[396] Mohamed Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial* (Casablanca: Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales, 1982), p. 157.

[397] Paul. Pascon, *Le Haouz de Marrakech* (Rabat; Tanger: Editions marocaines et internationales, 1983), p. 43.

[398] See chapter 5.

[399] Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial*, p. 164.

[400] Bouzidi, p. 163.

[401] Pascon, *Le Haouz de Marrakech,* p. 41.

[402] Pascon, p. 45.

international' only in terms of relationships between states reifies the concept of statehood – which, in itself, is not always understood in its context due to the global relations of coloniality. In this context, Morocco appears as a space which has historically witnessed 'differentiated claims to a sovereign existence', where hierarchy and differentiation shape both its local context and the international system within which it is embedded.[403] In the periphery, colonial dynamics are externalised by viewing it either as a space in which modernity is inseparable from the west, or as a space in which a distinctive form of colonial modernity resulted in an anomalous capitalism and form of statehood with a 'structural fault'[404] in the system of social classes. But what if the so-called modernity of the west was not something that the Maghrib aspired to but a gradual historical and long-term superimposition? Indeed, what if the Maghrib had its own vision of modernity and its own historical trajectory that was altered and disrupted?

This chapter provided the theoretical base for re-imagining Morocco not as a 'region' or part of 'region', and not as a space from which to extract raw empirical data. Instead, it sought to reconceptualise Morocco as a space with the agency to make, shape, and contribute to theoretical debates and the re-imagining of the international system. As a whole, Morocco has received very little attention in scholarly IR literature, except by means of being positioned as an example or a case study, or within the context of debates on democratisation, securitisation, authoritarianism, and foreign policy and the relationship with Europe – rendering Morocco a mere appendage of the 'rules-based order'. This raises questions not only about the relevance of dominant IR frameworks in the Moroccan landscape, but also the nature of the debates and the epistemic assumptions which posit the Maghrib as a space of 'regional' politics and reactionary practices, within which dominant 'global' conceptions of IR could be applied but from which they cannot be inferred.

As such, reimagining the politics of Morocco involves approaching sovereignty as a historical form of incorporation and differentiation – as one which is neither fixed by histories of European law and the universalizable ideas and experiences of the west nor merely by the political power and internal struggles of the Makhzen. At the core of decentring IR from the shackles of Western modernity is questioning the concepts, practices, and ideas which are central to the discipline.[405]

In The *German Ideology*, Marx identifies the state not merely as an exemplification of political power, but also as one in which that very power is organised in an external manner. For Marx, the social structure of the state develops out of the individual, but not the individual, in the sense of independent free will, but rather in the context of what those individuals produce and the conditions within which they exist.[406] Marx emphasises the contradiction between the individual and the community as the nexus of state formation, a process in which the collective interests of the latter

---

[403] Amy Niang, 'The International', in *International Relations from the Global South: Worlds of Difference*, ed. Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith (Oxford: Routledge, 2020), 97–114, p. 99.

[404] Vivek Chibber, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital* (London: Verso, 2013), p. 46.

[405] Meghana Nayak and Eric Selbin, *Decentering International Relations* (London: Zed Books, 2010), p. 4.

[406] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 11.

are morphed into an entity that is distinctive from both the individual and the collective from which it emerged. Hence, the struggles that take place within the context of the state, whether they be struggles about the extent of political power or the form of political rule, 'are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another.'[407] From this perspective, the state reflects a dominant will rooted within the material modes of life and the existence of societal actors. External changes in the state reflect changes in the material circumstances of individuals.[408] The conceptual framework of this chapter – and of this thesis – does not explore the separation of the individual from the collective, as it is beyond both the conceptual and historical contours of this research. Instead, it focuses on the incipience of this process through capitalist expansion.

In formulating a narrative about sovereignty in Morocco, this chapter opposed framings that exclusively prioritise the continuity of the sultanic institution, the clan origins of the state, or the military and administrative facets of the Makhzen. It also opposed historiographical nationalist and colonialist debates trapped in a spatio-temporal loop with the purpose of either proving the trans-historicity of the Moroccan state and mapping sovereignty or ones which are trapped in the box of barrenness, imagining Morocco as a stagnant place with neither state nor a discernible form of political rule. Indeed, focusing on the internal institutional and functional dynamics of state-building or the will of individuals in abstraction from the contexts shaping their course of action conceals the social relations producing the form of sovereignty. The next chapter begins with the task of historicising sovereignty in the Moroccan context and explains the nature, function, and form of the ecosystems of sovereignty.

---

[407] Marx and Engels, p. 19.
[408] Marx and Engels, pp. 66-67.

CHAPTER 4

Slavery and Piracy in the Maghrib (1666-1727)

1. Introduction

Addressing some aspects of the poverty of peripheral historical dynamism and agency in IR, this chapter offers a theoretically-based and historically-controlled reimagination of 'piracy' and slavery as practices of *alternative* and *conventional* politics (respectively) which have framed Morocco's distinct sovereignty model. This chapter argues that these practices of politics – slave-based military strategy under Ismaili rule, and the cosmopolitanism of the maritime Republic of Salé – embody different traditions of sovereignty, in which agency is practiced through a plethora of actors positioned at different levels and systems of political rule. These actors were not mere operators of violence, submission, or receptacles of the political authority of sultans but themselves practitioners of stateness as socio-political groups against which the central tributary state was ideologically constructed internally and extra-territorially, whether they were perceived as enemies and outlaws (pirates) or as potentially disloyal members of society that can be kept in check through enslavement (soldier-slaves). While many scholars have addressed the intricacies and development of historical processes, the role and agency of pirates and the enslaved in the production of sovereignties and the long-term process of statecraft – both in a material and ideological sense – have been overlooked, especially in the Maghribi sphere. In historicising the forms of political rule through connections between various forms of exploitation, this chapter aims to remedy these shortcomings. In particular, by viewing slavery-piracy as signifying a long-term process of political claim-making, this chapter helps reconceptualise the interplay between local transfigurations of sovereignty and global processes of accumulation, thus cementing the importance of theorising qualitative geographical differences and boundaries. This chapter asks the following questions: What insight does the empirical phenomenon of empire-building and accumulation in the periphery provide about spatiality and temporality in the international system? How did slaves and pirates reinforce, shape, or alter globality and the construction of the Atlantic/Maghribi geographical space? How has the political economy of slavery and piracy found expression in the *peripheral* geopolitical space of the Maghrib?[409] To address these questions through this case study, this chapter stretches conceptions of agency in the field of International Relations to include actors whose portrayals are injected with powerful doses of submission, alterity, and violence. Crucially, this chapter challenges the epistemological conception of

---

[409] Throughout the thesis, I use the term 'periphery' to refer to the Maghrib, and more specifically, to Morocco. I use it to refer to two processes: the first is a historicist diachronic-synchronic approach that refers to this space as being on the periphery of capitalism; and the second is a long-term process of epistemological peripheralization through which the Maghrib is constructed in a permanent state of historical muteness and linearity. This is distinct from my usage of expressions such peripheral zones or region within the context of Morocco, which refers to spheres of politics which were, on the one hand, outside the remit of the central tributary state; and on the other, spaces targeted by strategies of centralisation of power such as the *Mahalla*.

the 'state' as a fixed, permanent political entity. The diverse ways in which agents in the Moroccan milieu have politically structured their own communities underscores the limitations of the reliance on the modern sovereign state as a metric against which socio-political development is measured in the extra-European periphery. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to historically foreground the complex and dynamic nature of Morocco's distinctive *ecosystems of sovereignty* – showing that these actors did not exist in spatio-temporalities eternally structured by abstracted fixed categories of 'fragmentation', 'no government' or 'statehood'. Indeed, the social bonds within which pirates and slaves were embedded helped form different practices of statecraft and different layers of stateness. While working with and above/below each other, they also reflected diverse political and 'legal cultures' of sovereignty,[410] which operated as tools of organising society – both in a long-term and temporary sense.

Drawing on a range of sources, this chapter focuses specifically on 1666-1727 as a timeframe that highlights two such instances of international encounters: the institutionalisation of slavery in 1699 and the formation of the Abid al-Bukhari [slaves of al-Bukhari] army and piracy in the Moroccan port of the Salé Republic.[411]

Through this choice of periodisation, this chapter seeks to move beyond formal colonisation as the catalyst which has irrevocably changed the social fabrics of the African continent, instead shedding light on gradual, long-term processes of dispossession, extraction and the pre-lives of colonialism[412] – processes which saw the Moroccan milieu vacuumed into the age of empire and capital. By viewing the relationship between 'state' and society and between empire and society as variable phenomena, a radical historical materialism forms the backbone of the method through which this research is conducted. It is the approach that is deemed most appropriate to understand and analyse the 'totality' of the social formation that is Morocco. Through this method, the cartographies of agency (*being*, *becoming*, and *acting sovereignty)* are displaced outside of the sealed parameters of Europe, while emphasis is placed on the interactions of social formations and empires to produce different cultures of sovereignty.

At this stage, it is important to note what this chapter does and does not. The chapter's focus is not to dig for capitalism within the co-constitutive causality of the piracy-slavery episode; in other words, the aim of this chapter is not to advance an argument for a distinct racial pirate capitalism that emerged in seventeenth century Morocco. Instead, it relies on the episode of slavery-piracy to analyse the dialectical relationship between different modes of domination and different forms of political rule within the same spatio-temporal context. A chief element of this chapter is to challenge arguments

---

[410] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 22-23.

[411] To gain a wider perspective however, when suitable and useful, material from outside this time period shall be employed.

[412] See: Jason W. Moore, 'Madeira, Sugar, and the Conquest of Nature in the "First" Sixteenth Century: Part I: From "Island of Timber" to Sugar Revolution, 1420–1506', *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 32, no. 4 (2009): 345–90; Michael Levien, 'From Primitive Accumulation to Regimes of Dispossession: Six Theses on India's Land Question', *Economic and Political Weekly* 50, no. 22 (2015): 146–57.

which presuppose the existence of a distinctive Moroccan capitalist system in this period on the basis of slave-based relations of domination or thriving markets and diverse forms of labour (including piracy). In doing so, it relies on the contradictions within systems of racialisation and domination as tools of analysis through which practices of statecraft can be understood. Furthermore, this chapter does not position the external impetus of social relations in opposition to the internalist dimensions of socio-historical change. In other words, in relying on the concept of 'accumulation' as a conceptual tool through which to analyse the dynamics of slavery and piracy at play during this particular period of Moroccan history, the aim is to transcend the dichotomous and binary conceptions of internalism and externalism towards a fresh re-interpretation which, instead, highlights – from a materialist perspective – the intimate relationship between social structures and agents. In this sense, accumulation, on the one hand, refers to the accumulation of money, the accumulation of political power, of labour, of racial hierarchies, of space, and of extraterritorial rights; and on the other hand, the concept refers to processes underpinning the linkages between various vectors of socio-historical change and the ways in which they have challenged and/or reinforced the dynamics of accumulation. Thus, the analysis in the slavery-piracy chapter is centred on destabilising ontological singularity, arguing that piracy and the institution of slavery are but one piece in a mosaic of differentially developed, temporally distinct, and yet intricately connected societies and systems of social relations and political organisation – hence the use of the word 'encounter' throughout this chapter. At a conceptual level, the analysis in this chapter is premised on two foundations. First, investigating piracy-slavery is essential in weaving a narrative about the history and development of productive and non-productive forces in Morocco, and their relationship to the polity. Yet, it is a dimension which has been overlooked in analyses of capitalist development in Morocco, which in turn, leaves the nature of the ruling classes (both inside and outside the Makhzen) unspecified.[413] Through this conceptual framework, this chapter shows the ways in which different forms of socio-political and economic organisation co-existed in the long term while simultaneously producing a range of social antagonisms, such as with the *landless* through enslavement or within the political economy of piracy itself. Second, that understanding the inner mechanisms of piracy as a practice of statecraft and a social relation requires bringing slavery in its various forms at the centre of the analysis, and that an account that renders them into separate units of analysis, separate moments of history, clouds the socio-economic and political connections that have shaped them. In this sense, Samir Amin's conception of the centre-periphery is more useful when used in this instance, as a way of capturing the volatile nature of the political economy underpinning the regencies of the Maghrib – which is not a parasitic marginal trade, but rather a flourishing political economy that oscillates between centre and periphery according to the nature of actors and the nature of the international system, while military slavery was the non-economic expression of political accumulation, and at times the dominant form of extraction that succumbed to other forms of extraction within the same space and the same social

---

[413] Noureddine Saoudi, 'Hawla Al-Tashkila al-Ijtima'iyyah al'maghribiyyah al-Ma Qabl Ra'assmaliyyah [On the Moroccan Pre-Capitalist Social Formation]', *Al-Jossour [Bridges]* 4, no. 1 (1982): 115–23.

system. In this chapter, this is shown through an analysis of the evolving relationship between the Republic of Salé and Moulay Ismail's project of centralisation of power through military enslavement, with the political economy of the former becoming gradually incorporated into the sultanate. Thus, military slavery in Morocco is a form of social stratification and political centralisation of power aiming to create a military institution that is on the one hand, detached from land, and on the other, detached from loyalties or belonging to *qaba'il* (clans) [414] – which is '… a rural community based on the collective ownership and usage of collective property, combined with individual ownership of land.'[415]

---

[414] In English, instead of 'tribe', I use the term clan to refer to the political superstructure of Moroccan pre-capitalist society and the amalgamation of collective and individual ownership of land in the countryside. I borrow this term from Alex Colás, 'International Political Sociology through the Colonial Mirror: A Contrapuntal Reading of the Spanish Civil War', *International Political Sociology*, 2024. Although the term 'tribe' refers to distinctive socio-historical formations, it also carries the risk of promoting a myth of Moroccan timelessness. Qabila is normally translated as 'tribe'. In Maghribi historiography, the terminology of 'qabila' [plural: qaba'il] refers to distinctive self-autonomous political units. While Munson argues that the term was originally used to denote socio-political formations defined in terms of genealogy to a patrilineal ancestor and that following the Arab conquest of North Africa in the late 7th century, the term significantly broadened and became a reference point for political and administrative units with no particular genealogical definition. See Henry Munson, 'The Mountain People of Northwestern Morocco: Tribesmen or Peasants?', Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (1981): 249–55. Laroui departs from this view, arguing that tribes are neither genealogical nor ethnically defined (in terms of Amazigh groupings). Laroui, however, does not provide a clear definition of 'tribes' but relies on disrupting colonial and state-centric narratives about its formation. See Abdallah Laroui, Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912), 2nd ed. (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009); David Montgomery Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History* (Tuscon: University of Arizona, 1976).
[415] Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*, p. 67.

In other words, while the practices of slavery and piracy relied on fluid concepts of race and religion as modes of domination and social exclusion, the ways in which these practices were structured did not fall under the remit of a 'slave-based mode of production' or a slave society in which slavery provided the main source of economic surplus; rather, they served a variety of socially reproductive functions (in households, for instance) and formed part of a military strategy through which the legitimacy of the sultan could be established, and his personal and political power expanded and semi-centralised, albeit in a precarious manner, as evidenced by the crises following his death in 1727. More crucially, both piracy and slavery acted as articulations of political agency, taking place within the ephemeral and shifting nature of the global maritime and local socio-political milieu of Morocco.

Therefore, the argument proceeds as follows: This chapter is divided into two main sections: the first is entitled *Slavery* and the second is *Piracy*. The first part of the argument engages with the literature on race and slavery as a means of contrasting the different forms and functions of slavery and further situating the Moroccan case in its historical context. The second part of the argument delves into complex layers of the attempt at institutionalising slavery in 1699, showing the ways in which the production of racialised hierarchies through the figure of the soldier-slave was a form of military state-making and a form of political accumulation. It resulted both in the centralisation of political power and in the ethnicisation of some forms of labour – a dynamic that is discernible in the enslavement of the *suud* [black people]. Meanwhile, the *Piracy* section focuses on presenting an overview of the political economy of piracy and the forms of antagonisms which took place within it. It also highlights the connection between the Salé Republic and the Ismaili project of enslavement in 1699, showing, in particular, how actors tied to the republic operated at diplomatic and political levels within two cultures of sovereignty, one tied to the political authority of the sultan and the other tied to the political experimentation of the republic. As such, this chapter argues for the effectiveness of an analysis that links both moments and spaces, one which highlights the linkages between the political economies of slavery and piracy and the ways in which societal relations shaped these practices of statecraft. In particular, it demonstrates that subsuming the political economy of piracy in Salé under the Ismaili institution of slavery was not merely an attempt to appropriate its revenues, that is, to accumulate money, but was also an attempt to accumulate power through the projection of an internal, centralised and geographically delineated authority outwards at sea, in the midst of a global context in which the relationship between the Maghariba and the sea became increasingly marked by apprehension and European domination.[416] With little to no political experience, pirates built a robust (albeit short-lived) alternative society in Salé with its own legal, political, and economic ecosystem.

---

[416] Matar, 'The Maghariba and the Sea : Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period'.

Indeed, pirates created and experimented with methods of self-governance that were both independent from and collaborating with the Makhzen, collaborating with and posing a challenge the despotism of sultanic soldier-slave statecraft.

Part I: Slavery

1. Racial capitalism? The debates on slavery in Morocco

To set the scene for the argument weaved into this chapter – an argument which investigates the dynamics of various forms of sovereignty through slavery and piracy as case studies – this section begins with bridging the theoretical gap between broader debates on slavery and debates of slavery in Morocco. Specifying the nature, function, and terms through which the enslavement of people was conducted shows the ways in which the slaves themselves were deployed as a military and administrative arm of the central tributary state to overcome the weakness of political structures and the challenges of centralisation. In other words, this section seeks to conceptualise slavery in Morocco as a distinctive process within its own historical context, countering narratives which juxtapose slavery in Morocco with the Euro-American context, while drawing on wider debates on slavery. It is crucial to note his line of enquiry neither intends to diminish the violence and long-term impact of European and USian slavery, nor does it seek to put forth an argument based on the unlogic of 'whataboutery' which promotes and deploys a historical revisionism which not only justifies slavery and anti-blackness but blurs the lines between its various forms, histories, and functions and obscures the historical and geographical specificity of racially based chattel slavery. In conceptualising slavery and piracy not as mere practices of rulers and romantic rebels, nor as expressions of cultural despotism, but as political economies of world ordering, new lines of enquiry are opened, which, as Sharman and Zarakol point out, highlight the divergent trajectories of state-making in the global South.[417] This section, therefore, aims to answer the following questions: How can we understand slavery in a theoretical fashion in which historical specificity is retained and conceptualised? What terminology might be useful in this case? How can the concept of racial capitalism be a useful analytical tool to explain the contradictions and context of slavery in Morocco? Does the mode of social stratification based on racial exclusion necessarily imply the emergence or reproduction of capitalism?

---

[417] J. C. Sharman and Ayşe Zarakol. 'Global Slavery in the Making of States and International Orders'. *American Political Science Review* 118, no. 2 (2024): 802-814.

The liveliness of the debates around the distinctions between slavery and serfdom attests to the importance of historicising slavery in Morocco.[418] While it may be helpful to draw a (theoretical) distinction between the two concepts, there is a risk of falling into the trap of considering these terms as trans-historical and nomological tools of analysis when theorised in abstract terms that universalise specific forms of slavery. Further, these concepts are rooted in a particular western understanding of 'slavery' in contrast to 'freedom' which would only shed ambiguity on the questions posed earlier. In this understanding, the enslaved can only be commodities or property and would thus form a 'class'. Kopytoff and Miers argue that the conceptual and historical marginality of various iterations of slavery on the African continent is rooted in trends which sought to understand it as an extension of the plantation system in the southern United States and the Caribbean. According to them, such an understanding of slavery is premised on a distinctively European trajectory of modernity, and that 'these images of slavery and freedom are … stereotypes – and modern ones at that … They nevertheless have provided a frame of reference, a yardstick against which institutions in non-Western societies have been identified, named, measured, and compared."[419] Similarly, Blackburn points out that although slavery took place in Africa prior to Atlantic trade, its context and 'social meaning' are differentiable from enslavement practices and slave trading elsewhere.[420] Slavery in Africa, Kopytoff and Miers argue, forms part of a complex set of social relationships which, if only slightly altered, could turn into a completely different context, that is, marriage, debt bondage, or kinship relations.[421] To move beyond the binaries of freedom/unfreedom and the Anglo-American lens through which slavery in Africa has been scrutinised, Kopytoff and Miers suggest using qualifiers which refer to the 'structural context' and 'institutional settings' of slavery on the continent (office, state, palace, or individual slavery) and its various socio-political and economic functions (sharecropping, agricultural, plantation, bureaucratic, and military slavery).[422] Similarly, Phillips distinguishes between 'small-scale slavery' such as slaves who occupy the positions of domestic labourers, artisans, and assistants

---

[418] Marx clearly delineates the differences between slavery and serfdom. While both perform surplus labour and are thus in a situation of subordination, each is rooted in a specific relation of production and has a specific historical meaning. Marx states that: 'The direct producer in this case [serfdom] is by our assumption in possession of his own means of production, the objections conditions of labour needed for the realization of his labour and the production of his means of subsistence; he pursues his agriculture independently, as well as the rural-domestic industry associated with it … Under these conditions, the surplus labour for the nominal landowner can only be extorted from them by extra-economic compulsion, whatever the form this might assume… This differs from the slave or plantation economy in that the slave works with conditions of production that do not belong to him, and does not work independently. Relations of personal dependence are therefore necessary, in others personal unfreedom, to whatever degree, and being chained to the land as its accessory – bondage in the true sense.' See : Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, pp. 926-7.

[419] Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers, 'African "Slavery" as an Institution of Marginality', in *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 3–84.

[420] Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800* (London: Verso, 1998), p. 5.

[421] Kopytoff and Miers, 'African "Slavery" as an Institution of Marginality'.

[422] Kopytoff and Miers, p. 77.

in the system of medieval Christian slavery in the Mediterranean, and 'large-scale slavery' such as the plantation system. Phillips further argues that there is a distinction between slavery as 'productive labour' and slavery as 'unproductive labour'. Taking domestic slavery as an example, Phillips posits that it was 'independent of the normal mode of labour in the society.'[423] While classifying domestic enslaved labour as 'non-economic' is a fallacy, using concepts that distinguish between various forms and functions of slavery help indicate the historical specificity of slavery as practiced by Moroccans. As Walter Rodney points out, although slaves existed in the African continent before the arrival of Europeans, slavery was not the prime economic mover, and the exploitation of enslaved black people as agricultural labourers occurred on a limited scale, and largely in the south of Morocco.[424] Instead, Rodney emphasises the impact of slavery on African (under-)development and the significance of the creation of 'international trade' as a mechanism of 'the extension overseas of European interests'.[425] More specifically, he argues that 'Europeans used the superiority of their ships and cannon to gain control of al] the world's waterways, starting with the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of North Africa.'[426] Rodney argues that Africa's historical trajectory prior to the arrival of Europeans was, albeit situated in a global arena, distinctive:

> It should also be re-iterated that slavery as a mode of production was not present in any African society, although some slaves were to be found where the decomposition of communal equality had gone furthest.[427]

Therefore, in discussions of slavery in Morocco, the specificities of the African space are particularly important, as overlooking them, on the one hand, leads to using the histories of Anglo-American and European slaveries as general historical models through which historical development in Africa (and more specifically, Morocco) is viewed and against which it is measured, and on the other hand, eclipses Maghribi history itself, rendering it a mere extension of occurrences and historical processes elsewhere.

Nevertheless, Anglo-American centrism which permeates scholarship on slavery in Africa (albeit being challenged), is also present to a certain extent in scholarship on slavery in Morocco. Over the last two decades, interest in research on slavery (and by extension, anti-blackness) in this part of the Maghrib has grown sharply. With canonical and innovative work published (and translated) by scholars such as Rahal Boubrik, Chouki El Hamel, Fatima El Harrak, and Abdellah Ben Mlih, the questions which were asked about slavery in other contexts were asked in the case of

---

[423] William D. Phillips, 'The Old World Background of Slavery in the Americas', in *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System*, ed. Barbara L. Solow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 43–61.

[424] Basil Davidson, *The African Slave Trade* (Boston: James Currey Publishers, 1980), pp. 100-1.

[425] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 116.

[426] Rodney, p. 117.

[427] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 82.

Morocco: What were the origins of slavery in Morocco? What was its context, scale (in numerical and economic terms), functions, and dynamics? What social formations and structures of oppression are at play? What, if any, were the material and intangible afterlives of slavery in Morocco? Naturally, the answers to these questions varied, despite broad agreement on the 'shame' and 'collective guilt', which it is argued has for so long been at the core of overlooking slavery in scholarly debates. Both Frantz Fanon and Karl Marx recognised shame as a revolutionary sentiment.[428] They distinguished between shame as inertia and shame as a political and psychological mover, a form of action and a collective dialectical movement. While it is important to reflect on the causes of slavery in Morocco being under-studied – at least in comparison to histories of slavery involving the global North – an over-reliance on a culturalist conception of shame as an epistemic justification might not help to fully understand the form of 'class' society within which slavery took place and the conditions determining this societal form.

Writing about slave markets in nineteenth-century Morocco, Boubrik provides a compelling account of the nature and scale of the slave marketplace and the various internal and external forces which actively encouraged and/or benefited from the trade. Some of these actors include the sultan, the House of Illigh, Sheikh Mohammed Bayrouk,[429] and the British Anti-Slavery Society. Rahal Boubrik demonstrates the ways in which slavery was an 'established social institution' in Morocco. He argues that 'the slave trade is not slavery' and yet, in simultaneously arguing that 'the slave trade … became outlawed while slavery as such persisted, and persists', Boubrik relies on the legal context to distinguish between these two categories. Indeed, these terminologies become ambiguous in the absence of an explanation of the material conditions under which slavery becomes a 'trade' in a slave society. In a hidden footnote, however, Boubrik provides crucial insight into the fluidity of constructions of race in Morocco, unlike rigid biological conceptions of race in the Euro-American context. In this footnote, Boubrik explains why the article focuses on slaves brought to Morocco from West Africa, insisting that broadly, in Arab societies, slavery was not linked to skin colour, as white people were also enslaved from Europe, Asia, and North Africa. Furthermore, he argues for the usage of the expression of 'Black slaves' as opposed to 'African slaves' as some of the 'white' slaves in Morocco were brought from other parts of the African continent, such as from Cairo. In other words, although they were not 'white' according to modern conceptions of race rooted in the rise and expansion of capitalism, at that particular point in history, they were *racialised* as such. Thus, Boubrik reminds us that 'racecraft'[430] – that is, the process through which race is understood, practiced and reproduced – is a multi-layered one. It does not take place strictly or exclusively on the basis of skin colour but rather functions as a fluid dialectical production of human difference, wherein otherness

---

[428] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 14.
[429] For more details, see Chapter 6.
[430] This is a term which I borrow from Karen Fields and Barbara Fields. Karen E. Fields and Barbara J. Fields, *Racecraft* (London: Verso Books, 2012).

could also be produced on the basis of religious differences and geographical boundaries. This contextualisation of otherness allows us to distinguish racism from race historically, as well as the ways in which race and racism are not products of transitions of ideas of race, but are rather shaped by the material consequences and contradictions of historical events.[431]

In writing about slavery in Morocco, Errazouki argues that 'it is not that the Muslim leaders of the Maghrib lacked the capabilities of invading West Africa, but it was that religious difference served as the primary marker of otherness and as the most common justification for war'.[432] However, in presupposing 'racial capitalism' as a category that explains slavery in the Moroccan landscape, Errazouki falls into the very same trap Kopytoff and Miers warn against the application of a Euro-American lens in a different context and the conceptualisation of anti-blackness as a trans-historical continuum which has permeated Moroccan history, starting from regimes of enslavement during the Sa'adi state to modern formations of anti-blackness in Morocco. In turn, such an account results in producing an inflexible view of race which contradicts the socio-historical realities of Morocco. Whilst it is important to theorise the *origins* and modern *manifestations* of anti-blackness in Morocco, it is equally important not to perceive processes of racialisation through the lens of teleological assumptions[433] in which '… blackness [is] unmoored from time and space by a ruthless disregard for material historical processes.'[434] Furthermore, the assumption that historical slavery in the Moroccan context can be accurately explained through 'racial capitalism' – without explaining the social relations of production, that is, what makes it capitalist – renders capitalism, 'as a particular form of commodity production',[435] and as a 'unique system of market dependence'[436] which regulates both economic transactions and social relations – ambiguous as a historically specific process by mystifying its distinctive nature from other forms of coercion.

Such an account is reflective of a pattern in which, simultaneously, the past serves to explain the present and the present serves to explain the past. In other words, anti-blackness – not merely as a form of racial exclusion or interpersonal prejudice but as a structural form of racism rooted in historically specific conditions: the dynamics of capitalism inside and outside of Morocco and the (present-day) violence of the outsourcing of European borders to Morocco – becomes a transhistorical phenomenon characterising Moroccan society which can both explain and be explained by slavery. As

---

[431] Virdee, 'Racism and State Formation in the Age of Absolutism'.

[432] Samia Errazzouki, 'Between the "Yellow-Skinned Enemy" and the "Black-Skinned Slave": Early Modern Genealogies of Race and Slavery in Sa`dian Morocco', *The Journal of North African Studies* 28, no. 2 (2021): 258–268.

[433] See: Louise Seamster and Victor Ray, 'Against Teleology in the Study of Race: Toward the Abolition of the Progress Paradigm', *Sociological Theory* 36, no. 4 (1 December 2018): 315–42.

[434] Annie Olaloku-Teriba, 'Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness', *Historical Materialism* 26, no. 2 (2018).

[435] Anthony Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*, 2nd ed. (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012), p. 26.

[436] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (Verso, 2002), p. 7.

Annie Olaloku-Teriba rightly demonstrates, such an Afro-pessimistic perspective not only mystifies the conceptions of race, blackness and anti-blackness; they also incorporate global socio-historical development under the broad banner of the 'slave relation' and understand 'Africanness' through a rigid 'Americanised conception of Blackness'.[437] Gross-Wytrzen, for instance, sets out to investigate the connections between specifically North African historical conceptions of blackness and racialised border violence against black African migrants in the region. blackness, Gross-Wyrtzen argues, is 'a category of difference [that] is the result of multiple intersecting ideologies, events, struggles, and exchanges that produce it as *inferior, non-indigenous,* and *wedded to histories of racial slavery.*'[438] At the same time, slavery is argued not to have been 'entirely racialised' (due to the enslavement of people from various backgrounds including 'Slavs' and North Africans) and to have been both the product of religious and racialised regimes of exclusion.[439] These arguments, I would argue, represent two contradictory conceptions of race: one in which blackness is a self-evident, ascriptive, and rigid marker of exclusion transcending historical bounds and based on a 'phylogenic' category, and another one in which blackness and more broadly, slavery in North Africa, is rooted in historically specific circumstances. Thus, a fundamental ambiguity belies this analysis: what are the concrete conditions which have turned the regime of religious and racial exclusion found in Morocco from an abstract psychology of transhistorical 'not-from-hereness' of the kind Gross-Wyrtzen analyses, to a form of distinction and a mode of exploitation which is 'socially pertinent, historically active'?[440] This question is, certainly, not to propose an analysis of race of blackness and race in Morocco which reduces both to the abstractions of the social relations of production or the forms of extraction, but to rather argue that an understanding of the concrete historical conditions of race necessitates investigating ideological, cultural, as well as the articulating mechanisms of the social relations of production and relations of domination, that is, the existence of race as a stratification which is closely intertwined with the relationship to land and broader socio-political hierarchies.

Conversely, El Hamel notes that the case of slavery in Morocco is a 'curious' one which represents an inversion of slavery in the Euro-Americas. According to El Hamel: 'The main difference between the Moroccan and Euro-American systems, rather than emphasizing racial purity (white versus black) as defined by skin color, emphasized descent: either from Arab lineage or, more prestigiously, from the Prophet or his lineage.'[441] While El Hamel compelled the case in the book for the importance of not exclusively relying on social relations as explanatory tools for race and slavery

---

[437] Olaloku-Teriba, 'Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness'.

[438] Leslie Gross-Wyrtzen, '"There Is No Race Here": On Blackness, Slavery, and Disavowal in North Africa and North African Studies'. The Journal of North African Studies 28, no. 3 (2022): 635-665.

[439] Gross-Wyrtzen.

[440] Stuart Hall, 'Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance [1980]', in *Essential Essays. Vol. 1. Foundations of Cultural Studies*, ed. David Morley (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 172–221, p. 212.

[441] Chouki El Hamel, *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam*, African Studies Series (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 96.

in Morocco, racial and religious markers of exclusion (in separate from the social property relations within which they are rooted) cannot account for their long-term structural transformations. Indeed, in the words of Stuart Hall: 'One needs to know how different racial and ethnic groups were inserted historically, and the relations which have tended to erode and transform, or to preserve these distinctions through time-not simply as residues and traces of previous modes, but as active structuring principles of the present organization of society.'[442] Thus, these racial differences need to be contextualised not in terms of biological, presentist, essentialist conceptions of race and colour denoting a transhistorical anti-blackness which functions as an analytical *'fourre-tout'*, but as historically contingent and particular to the historical time within which they are produced.[443] As Aouragh reminds us: '… it is key to repeat that there is not one black or one white epistemology; our political differences are in essence ideological and not biological.'[444]

If blackness (as a racial category) and slavery (as a 'social condition') in Morocco,[445] then, are neither reducible to transhistorical and fixed features of society, nor to merely the social relations of production, how can their historically specific transformations be conceptualised? The answer to this lies in two inter-related processes: the first is a 'legal dualism' of the Ismaili polity which relied on a conception of race at times rigid, and at times fluid (both for whiteness and blackness) and religion as markers of exclusion or inclusion; the second is a distinctive regime of 'political accumulation' whose primary mover was not class struggle, but statecraft and military conflict between different social groups over political power. In this context, I define slavery in Morocco as the economic, social, legal, and sociological condition of unfreedom. While this definition is broad and encompasses various situations, it is also one which allows us to distinguish between slaves and people who were in non-permanent, but long-lasting situations of labour bondage or peonage.[446] Thus, while conflict over territory permeated this period of Moroccan history, class struggle in this historical period neither developed nor appeared in a clear manner.[447] The deployment of the enslaved in particular institutional settings (state, place) and to undertake specific socio-political and economic functions (domestic, military) denotes on the one hand, enslavement[448] as an act of violence aiming

---

[442] Hall, 'Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance [1980]', p. 214.

[443] Leila Tayeb, 'What Is Whiteness in North Africa?', *Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association* 10, no. 1 (2021).

[444] Miriyam Aouragh, '"White Privilege" and Shortcuts to Anti-Racism', *Race & Class* 61, no. 2 (1 October 2019): 3–26.

[445] Chouki El Hamel, 'The Register of the Slaves of Sultan Mawlay Isma'il of Morocco at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century', *The Journal of African History* 51, no. 1 (2010): 89–98.

[446] This definition helps draw a distinction between soldier-slaves and the economic dependence of ikhoummassene [khammas peasants] on the land proprietor.

[447] Yves Lacoste, *Ibn Khaldun: The Birth of History and the Past of the Third World* (London: Verso, 1984), p. 5.

[448] Here, enslavement specifically refers to slave-taking as form of military aggression. For the purposes of this research, this chapter does not address other forms of slavery, including domestic enslavement.

appropriate the 'caring labour'[449] of other societies for military purposes through which one elite would enter into a rivalry with another, and on the other hand, the creation of a centralised military force which generated the conditions for further exploitation, expropriation, and tribute extraction. The next section delineates these specific dynamics of slavery as a form of intra-Moroccan political accumulation.

2. Slavery in Morocco: the case of the ascetic with a whip and ʿAbid al-Bukhari[450]

After briefly discussing the question of race and slavery in the Moroccan literature and the ontological and epistemological challenges they pose, this section demonstrates the ways in which the attempt of the institutionalisation of slavery in 1699 was a watershed historical moment rooted in different temporalities, one which signalled processes of racialisation from within and without, distinct tensions between institutions, and the emergence of alternative mutually-reinforcing and competing modes of sovereignty. Specifically, this section delineates the contours of the conventional politics of the Ismaili tributary state, which relied on enslavement as a strategy of reproducing and centralising political power.

Sultan Moulay Ismail (1672-1727) of the 'Alawite dynasty[451] [Sulālat al-ʿAlawiyyīn al-Fīlālīyn] was an interesting historical figure. Sultan Ismail is described as an extremely intelligent person, but his reading and writing capabilities were rudimentary to the point he could hardly write his own signature. Sultan Ismail was pious; he never missed a prayer.[452] He dressed modestly and ate frugally – couscous and lamb – which he was served on the floor, in a wooden plate. His drink of choice was one which he himself made: water mixed with opium, cloves, and nutmeg.[453] While these historical details may seem fortuitous, they provide an important historical context for the complex

---

[449] David Graeber and David Wengrow, *The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity* (Toronto: Signal, 2023), p. 188.

[450] In archival sources, the soldier-slave is referred to as ʿabd maḫzny [Makhzen slave] and is distinguished from ʿabd ḥarṭāny [Hartani slave] with the latter denoting race and/or the relationship to land.

[451] The dynasty of the 'Alawites originally settled in the Sijilmassa region and have imposed their authority through their status as sherifian warriors, however; up until the fifteenth century, they had no political role as such due to the 'inferior' perception of their lineage in comparison to other dynasties. The 'Alawites have set out to make profit and gain political control over Morocco through warfare. Unlike the Sa'adi dynasty before them – politically fragmented due to tensions between clans, regions, religious groups, as well as foreign intervention – the 'Alawites did not have to deal with the advancing threat of the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Turks. In what follows, the same three contending powers who have posed a challenge to the declining Sa'adian reign – warlord ʿAli Abu Hassun al-Samlali in the region of *Souss*, the zawiya al-Dilaʾiya in the Middle Atlas, and Muhammad al-ʿAyashi in the *Gharb* – hinder the 'Alawites from gaining power until 1668 when they rose to power. This was not only due to warfare with different groups challenging their rule and a gradual conquest of Morocco; the centralisation of the 'Alawite rule was also a result of (re-)opening and reinvigorating trade routes between Sijilmassa and the Mediterranean, which has provided them with the funds to expand the scope of their power. See Aomar Boum, 'Morocco: 2. Later Empire (from the 16th Century)', in *The Encyclopedia of Empire*, 2016, 1–7.

[452] Defontin-Maxange, *Le Grand Ismail : Empereur du Maroc* (Paris: Marpon & cie, 1929), p. 28.

[453] *La Petite histoire du Maroc*, pp. 185-188.

character of Sultan Ismail. The nature of Sultan Ismail – as a man who was both a modest religious ascetic and cruel ruler, or an 'ascetic with a whip' as I call him – provides insight into the contradictions within his own rule.

Sultan Ismail challenged the consensus of the *ulamas*[454] and gave orders to enslave black people in al-Maghrib. The reference to the army as ʿAbid al-Bukhari' (slaves of al-Bukhari) throughout this thesis is a deliberate choice that challenges its conventional English translation into the 'Black Guard army'. On the one hand, the translation deviates from the original naming which refers to the slaves being made to swear on al-Bukhari's book (hence their naming as 'the slaves of al-Bukhari'), and on the other hand, projects external dynamics of race into the Moroccan context. While racialism (pertaining to blackness) was one of the elements of enslavement, blackness was also a flexible category showing the historically shifting conditions of racial constructions. Reference to the army as 'the Black Guard army' overlooks other factors of exclusion (such as social bonds) and denotes a particular USian conception of race which, in turn, overlooks the epistemological premises of the creation of these army slaves.[455] In making soldier-slaves swear on al-Bukhari's book as ʿAbid al-Bukhari' [slaves of al-Bukhari], Sultan Ismail told them, 'You and I are slaves to the Sunnah and law of the Messenger of God…, which are written in this book. We do whatever he commands, and we relinquish whatever he forbids, and for that we fight.'[456] Further, the distinct complexities of the institution and practices of slavery in Morocco translated a situation of contradictions. While ʿAbid al-Bukhari were racialised and enslaved to form a professional military corps for the sultan, they were also paid a wage of 100,000 mithqals each.[457] Thus, they were simultaneously slaves whose labour is extracted, slaves who extracted taxation from the general population, and dependent military labourers with a wage.

Although the army of slaves was created at some point between 1674 and 1676, the legalisation and regulation of slavery as a practice happened much later.[458] This was an unprecedented move, not because al-Maghrib al-Aqsa was more benign in its attitudes towards slavery, but rather because it has triggered a discernible split between the *ulamas* and the Sultan while introducing a gradual politically oriented justification of the legality of slavery in Islam[459] through the use of

---

[454] Scholars of Islamic scripture and law.

[455] Fatima Harrak, ''Abid al-Bukhari and the Development of the Makhzen System in Seventeenth-Century Morocco', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 38, no. 2 (2018): 280–95.

[456] Mohammad Annassiri, *Al-istiqṣā li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣá. Volume 7.* (Casablanca: Dār ālkitāb, 2001), p. 58.

[457] Annassiri, p. 120.

[458] Allan R. Meyers, 'Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery: The Origins of the Moroccan 'Abid', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no. 3 (1977): 427–42; Allen R. Meyers, 'Slave Soldiers and State Politics in Early 'Alawi Morocco, 1668 - 1727', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 16, no. 1 (1983): 39–48.

[459] Chouki El Hamel, '"Race", Slavery and Islam in Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: The Question of the Haratin in Morocco', *The Journal of North African Studies* 7, no. 3 (2007): 29–52.

religious texts,[460] including the enslaving of Muslims which is prohibited in Islam. Most importantly, this move has further cemented the contradiction between Islam *Populaire*,[461] as a religious representational tool for social groups ranked lower in the pyramid of social stratification, and the institutional Islam of the central tributary state.[462] Sultan Ismail's racialist military project which attempted to institutionalise slavery, however, received fervent opposition from the majority of ulamas who refused to sign the sultan's decree regarding enslavement. Al-Youssi, for example, a learned Sufi scholar and writer, expressed strong opposition to the enslavement of black people. In a letter sent to Sultan Ismail, he argued that all people, including the Sultan, were equal and slaves before God; that the Sultan's rule should be premised on justice, not on oppression and tyranny; and that taxation should not be extracted from the poor to the benefit of the wealthy.[463] Similarly, Abdessalam Jassus was another scholar who vociferously opposed the sultan's demands and argued that collecting and enslaving the *suud* [black people] was a violation of Islam.[464] According to Jassus, the sultan's position of 'collecting the Haratins and his desire to perfect that, is reflective of his … opinion and effective determination to expand the army upon which religion is founded and through which the purity of Islam and Muslims is maintained…'.[465] Jassus saw the enslavement of the *suud* to be in direct contradiction with the ethics, principles of justice, and liberation which are key to Islam.[466] For this reason, Jassus was repeatedly imprisoned, tortured, and murdered.[467]

Islam has introduced a significant change in ancient practices of slavery through the notion of the presumption of freedom, and the ban of the enslavement of free persons except in specific

---

[460] The collected reports of the Hadith further problematise Islam's position towards slavery due to the difficulties of ascertaining their veracity. Despite the development of various critical tools to analyse their accuracy, the Hadith remains a point of contention within different schools of Islam, despite the fact that Muslim scholars have delineated through a legal-epistemological perspective that perceives the content of the Hadith either through probability or through certainty – as opposed to complete and absolute certainty – depending on the modes of transmission of the reports. The Hadith's position on slavery, as result, is distinguished from that of the Qur'an.

[461] An earlier example of these tensions is the Kharijite Mouvement [al-Khawārij] which emerged during the first century of Islam. See: Carolyn Baugh, 'Revolting Women? Early Kharijite Women in Islamic Sources', *Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies* 2, no. 1 (2017): 36–55.

[462] For more on the modern enunciations of the contradiction between 'official' and 'counter-official' Islam, see: Mohamed Tozy, 'L'évolution du champ religieux marocain au défi de la mondialisation', *Revue internationale de politique comparee* Vol. 16, no. 1 (15 April 2009): 63–81.

[463] For the full letter, see: Mohammad al-Mahdi ibn Mohammad Imrani, *Al-Nawāzil al-ṣughrá al-musammāh al-Minaḥ al-sāmiyah fī al-nawāzil al-fiqhīyah* (Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Shu'ūn al-Islāmīyah, 1992), pp. 406-11.

[464] El Hamel, 'The Register of the Slaves of Sultan Mawlay Isma'il of Morocco at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century'.

[465] Ahmad Ben al-Hajj, *Al-Durr Āl-Muntaḫab Āl-Mustaḥsan Fy Rāyāt Mawlānā Āl-Ḥassan*, vol. 7, n.d, p. 198. Available in Bibliothèque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc, number 12184.

[466] Ben al-Hajj, p. 198.

[467] Omar Soussi al-Alaoui, 'Miḥnat Āl-Faqyh ʿabd Āl-Ssalām Ǧasus Fy Sibāq ʿalāqat Āl-Faqyh Bi al-Sulṭa Fy Āl-Tāryḫ Āl'araby Āl-Islāmy', *Al-Manahil*, no. 85 (2008): 243–59.

circumstances,[468] which applied both to Muslim and non-Muslim (Christian and Jewish) subjects[469] of Muslim polities. In spite of the qualitative differences between slavery as practiced in Morocco and in the Euro-American context, essentialist and culturalist conceptions of slavery in Muslim societies continue to pose a serious hurdle to understanding the forms, functions, and complex historical realities of slavery in this context. For example, despite drawing on extensive and making significant contributions to the debate, the epistemological foundation of Lewis' analysis of race and slavery in Islam were premised upon a teleological view of the social relations of Islam as linear, homogeneous and unchangeable through spatio-temporality – a view guided by a '… concern [about] the inevitable failure of Muslims to adapt themselves to the demands of a modernity that is conceived in Eurocentric terms'.[470]

Though the Qur'an recognises the institution of slavery; it also recognises the uneven relations underpinning its practices and the ways in which the agency of the enslaved is marginalised.[471] This has meant that in addition to the complex set of social relationships which formed the basis of enslavement,[472] a new layer was added to the equation in which enslaved persons were also considered as '… human being[s] with a certain religious and hence a social status and with certain quasi-legal rights.'[473]

In *Black Morocco,* a tour de force on Moroccan and global histories of race, El Hamel elucidates Islam's position on 'concubinage' and slavery. El Hamel painstakingly delineates the number of times the word 'Abd [slave] is mentioned in the Qur'an and problematises the various etymologies and meanings of slavery in the Muslim tradition. El Hamel advances that the word 'Abd was used to refer to God's preferred way of calling Their subjects, prophets for example, before being socialised and racialised to equate blackness.[474] Most importantly, the Quran has consistently taken the position of recommending a gradual end of slavery and in fact, [475] Islam has introduced

---

[468] Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, p. 42; El Hamel, *Black Morocco*; Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 5.
[469] Non-Muslim Maghribis could also enslave people, as long as the latter were not Muslim. If the person enslaved converted to Islam following being enslavement, the enslaver would be legally obliged to free them.
[470] Ihab Shalbak, 'The Roots of Bernard Lewis' Rage', *Postcolonial Studies* 21, no. 4 (2 October 2018): 505–11.
[471] Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 16.
[472] Islamic jurisprudence provided ways for the enslaved to acquire freedom; some of which centred the power of the masters, such as the act of manumission or a contract granting liberty in exchange for freedom, whilst others centred the status of enslaved persons but not their agency, such as *Qadis* [judges] ordering slaves to be freed due to unfair treatment or abuse.
[473] Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 17.
[474] El Hamel argues that in the Quran, there is a clear demarcation between 'abd which is used to refer to the subjects of God, and language which '…designate[s] slaves as personal property', such as fata [boy], fatat [girl], and the expression of ma malakat aymanukum [that which your right hand possesses]. See: El Hamel, *Black Morocco*, p. 21.
[475] This goes in sharp contradiction with the Muslim elite's selective reading of the Hadith and the Quran, gradually replacing the latter's core message. See: El Hamel, p. 46.

fundamental changes to slavery as it existed including the presumption of freedom,[476] deeming children of concubines and their masters free, and banning the enslavement of all Muslim persons.[477] However, the Quran had two competing positions on slavery – an explicit moral teaching which actively encouraged ending slavery practices, and a more ambiguous position which recognised the inequalities between the binaries of slavery and freedom as part of a natural existing order – the ambiguity of the latter was to serve as one of the many 'official' justifications for slavery in Morocco.

1699, therefore, was not only the point at which the sultanate attempted to institutionalise slavery; it was also a point which highlighted the contradictory and complex political-religious constellations and contentions of the Maghribi sphere. Moulay Ismail's modus operandi included the production of the *Jany al-Azhar wa nur al-Azhar,* a document justifying the acquisition of slaves, as well as seeking means to justify slavery from a legal-theological perspective, such as reporting to ulamas in Egypt that the ulamas of Fes have approved of and sanctioned creating an army of enslaved persons, despite that not being the case.[478] Indeed, the ulamas of Fes fervently opposed the creation of Moulay Ismail's extra-economic army of soldier-slaves. In addition to being fearful of the intended and unintended consequences of Ismail's increasing power through centralisation; there were also concerns about increases in taxation.[479] And here, it is important to note that there is significant scholarly disagreement about the composition of the army, whether racially or legally. Whilst El Hamel considers ʿAbid al-Bukhari to be exclusively composed of slaves, Harrak argues the opposite, which is that it included soldiers legally deemed 'free' and this should problematise the prominence of the Atlantic slavery model in historicising slavery in the Maghrib.[480] Nevertheless, despite 1699 a watershed moment in Moroccan history – the institution and creation of the figure of the soldier-slave included a variety of socio-economic transformations over *the longue durée*. For example, the word 'Haratin' which refers to the slaves of Moulay Ismail, originally simply meant black; although a potential etymological background could be the Arabic 'haratha' which refers to cultivators or agricultural workers, has been socialised into becoming the equivalent of 'Black slave'.[481] The scholarly positions on the 'Haratin' vary. For example, it is argued that the Haratin are originally

---

[476] One key difference between the attitudes of Islam and Christianity toward slavery is that Islam formally and explicitly prohibited the enslavement of other Muslims, whereas in Christianity, the idea that Christians should not enslave other Christians did not exist. See: Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery,* p. 42; Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East*, p. 51.

[477] El Hamel, '"Race", Slavery and Islam in Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: The Question of the Haratin in Morocco'.

[478] El Hamel, p. 85.

[479] Simou, *Āl Iṣlāḥāt Ālʿaskrya Bilmaġrib 1844-1912 [Military Reforms in Morocco 1844-1912]*, p. 118.

[480] Fatima Harrak, 'ʿAbid al-Bukhari and the Development of the Makhzen System in Seventeenth-Century Morocco', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 38, no. 2 (1 August 2018): 280–95.

[481] For an in-depth discussion of the origins and etymologies of the words 'Hartani' [singular/masculine] and 'Haratin' [plural], see: El Hamel, *Black Morocco*, pp. 110-11.

slaves who had been freed at some point in history or the descendants of slaves.[482] In other accounts, the Haratin have no history of enslavement but their social position as labourers was akin to slavery.[483] However, the 'Haratin' were not a homogeneous group and it is a fallacy to stretch this socially construed identity in that manner. A better framework would be to conceptualise the *suud* [black people] who were soldier-slaves in terms of their positioning in Maghribi society and their historical status as landless, property-less, herd-less, and their perception as having no material or sentimental attachments to the Makhzen (no loyalties), a system representing a synergic relationship between the political structures and institutions of power, bureaucracy, and administration pertaining to the Moroccan polity.[484] Mohamed rightly challenging the antinomies of the category of 'Haratin' and departs from these views, arguing that the Haratin are ascribed a mistaken, anachronistic identity:

> In the southern Moroccan districts of Wad Noun and Draa, the people it ostensibly describes do not take kindly to being called Haratin. Secondly, its use in discourses on origin and identification could hardly be traced past the eighteenth century. In pre-modern Arabic texts such groups are described as sudan, suud or sumr (sing. sudani, aswad and asmar, respectively) – blacks, brown. Yet, this ensemble becomes intelligible only in juxtaposition to its constitutive other: bidan or bayd (white). In tandem, colonial ethnographers and post-colonial historians of the caravan trade tended to bypass the dubious etymology and historicity of this term and, instead, canonised its use as a portable identity for disparate communities in Northwest Africa– Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania.[485]

Here, it is essential to remind the reader that both whiteness and blackness during this particular historical juncture were not fixed and clearly delineated biological categories; in other words, they were not based on a strict hierarchy of skin difference and colour. Instead, they were relational, fluid and historically contingent. Therefore, these long-term patterns of racialisation must be treated with epistemological and political reflexivity that allows *historicising* race, without trans-historicising or disavowing its existence altogether.

The equation of blackness with slavery and inferiority has meant that Moulay Ismail has sought to legalise racialism (by way of slavery) as a politico-military practice whilst reproducing a tiered economic system with the landless and/or the *suud* are at the bottom of the pyramid. This resulted in a situation in which '… groups were defending the illegality of enslaving other Muslims in

---

[482] El Hamel; Allan R. Meyers, 'Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery: The Origins of the Moroccan 'Abid', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no. 3 (1977): 427–42.

[483] Soussi al-Alaoui, 'Miḥnat Āl-Faqyh ʿabd Āl-Ssalām Ğasus Fy Sibāq ʿalāqat Āl-Faqyh Bi al-Sulṭa Fy Āl-Tāryḫ Āl'araby Āl-Islāmy'.

[484] Mohamed Daadaoui, 'The Makhzen and State Formation in Morocco', in *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power*, ed. Mohamed Daadaoui (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011), 41–70.

[485] Mohamed, 'Africanists and Africans of the Maghrib'.

Islam, rather than defending black people from being in slavery'.[486] This has led to a gradual exclusion of black people from the definition of Islam, as well as the suffusion of society with racialised forms of prejudice. The racialisation underpinning slavery practices in this case do not simply refer to individual forms of prejudice or biological categories reflecting social hierarchies, they specifically point out to a 'regime of power'[487] that is constitutive of economic and politico-military domination.[488] Thus, seen in this context of social antagonisms, Ismaili slavery was the historic expression of a project which on the one hand, sought to reduce a layer of free citizens in society into dependent soldiers, and on the other, aimed to centralise power through the creation of a political force along clanless and landless lines which would act as the military and administrative arm of the central tributary state.[489]

At this stage, it is important to emphasise that 1699 was not the first time black people were enslaved in the Maghrib.[490] Viewed in historical sociological perspective, the Almohad and Almoravid Empires had enslaved a wide range of people during wars. However, the distinctions between these (early) forms of enslavement are salient on two levels: firstly, the variety of the ethnic backgrounds of enslaved persons during the Almohad and Almoravid Empires reflected the proximity to frontiers that connected the '… the European, Middle Eastern and African commercial [and maritime] zones'.[491] Thus, the enslaved were of many ethnicities and geographical settings: Nubians, Turks, Europeans, Slavs, Armenians, and North and West Africans who were captured through

---

[486] El Hamel, '"Race", Slavery and Islam in Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: The Question of the Haratin in Morocco'.
[487] Alana Lentin, *Why Race Still Matters* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), p. 26.
[488] Throughout the thesis, I draw a distinction between the distinct processes of 'exploitation' and 'domination'. I use the term of domination to refer to the hierarchical relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled; that is, the unequal political distribution of power between various groups and across time and space. Exploitation, on the other hand, is a term I use to analyse inequalities occurring within the economic realm. More specifically, I use it to refer to a specific set of relations of production in which non-producers extract surplus value from the direct producers. See: Emmanuel Terray and Joseph Serrano, 'Exploitation and Domination in Marx's Thought'. *Rethinking Marxism* 31, no. 4 (2019): 412–424.

[489] Ismaili times saw the development of a penal system and a multiplication of prisons, including the founding of the underground vaulted prison Habs Qara (Qara Prison) in Meknes, the capital of Ismaili rule. This prison was founded to absorb the population of European slaves in captivity as well as the outlaws and misfits of Morocco. It continues to survive today as a tourist site. According to Annassiri, throughout Ismaili rule, there was an estimated 25,000 European captives who performed indentured labour building palaces and infrastructure for the sultan, as well as performing duties as 'marble workers, engravers, carpenters, blacksmiths, astrologers, engineers, and doctors.' There was also an estimated 30,000 Moroccan outlaws and misfits, including 'thieves, warlords, and murderers.' Annassiri points that the number of outlaws in Ismaili prisons was so significant that 'the people of corruption in Morocco no longer had a beating vein.' See: Annassiri, *Al-istiqṣā li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣá. Volume 7*, p. 103.
[490] Moroccans were both practitioners and targets of enslavement. From the fifteenth century, the Portuguese, armed, would enslave Moroccans and their cattle from Cape Bojador, Black people from other parts of the African continent, and native Canarians, taking them to the Madeiras to perform slave labour in sugar cane plantations. See: Phillips, 'The Old World Background of Slavery in the Americas', pp. 50-4.
[491] Amira K. Bennison, 'Economy and Trade Within and Beyond Imperial Frontiers, 1050–1250', in *The Almoravid and Almohad Empires* (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 177–226, p. 197.

raiding, warfare, and diplomatic transactions, although during the 11th century ṭā'ifa period of al-Andalus.[492] The enslavement and importation of black people from other parts of the continent to Morocco, however, was 'extremely rare' before the thirteenth century.[493] Furthermore, economic demands have also resulted in the decrease of the enslavement of 'Slavs' in the western Mediterranean. With the Portuguese and the Castillians pioneering sugar production the fifteenth century with the exploitation of Black Sea Slavic labour, and with the rising Ottoman-Russian competition over Slavs' labour[494]– a competition culminating in the Ottoman invasion of Eastern Europe and the conversion of Slavs to Islam – Maghribis shifted towards the wider African space for enslavement. Slavery practices during this time period were premised on a stronger sense of religious identity. As such, enslavement in predominantly Muslim societies targeted anybody (regardless of skin colour) who would be classified as 'infidels'[495] and indeed, slavery served as a mode of conversion of outsiders to insiders.[496] To put it in other words, the distinctiveness of the institution of slavery within the Ismaili polity is that for military purposes, it deployed and relied on the earliest manifestations of antagonistic forms of production – that is, the social and legal status of the *suud* and people racialised as such – as a means of accumulating, extending, and reproducing political power, both through tax collection and warfare. While the figure of the soldier-slave was built on foundations of fluid racial, religious differences and inconsistently applied legal categories of freedom, it was also premised on rudimentary contradictions present within some Moroccan social formations, the denouement of which was assumed to be the subsumption of clan-less people under the military banner of the sultanate.

The enslaved had different gendered roles and positions including private ownership in which enslaved women were household-workers, concubines, courtesans,[497] cooks, or bakers – who, in addition to physical and economic exploitation, were subjected to sexual violence and the exploitation of reproductive abilities – whilst enslaved men were soldiers, agricultural workers, and eunuchs for wealthy families. Although the output of the enslaved was under the full control of the enslavers in the Almohad-Almoravid case, labour-power itself was more ambiguously ethnicised as in the Ismaili case of slavery. A second significant distinction between Almohad-Almoravid and Ismaili slavery practices is that the 'bread and butter' of the former's economy relied on local and global trading in cheap commodities and an impetus to have a monopoly over trans-Saharan trade routes that was

---

[492] al-Saqati Muhammad ibn Abi Muhammad, *Un Manuel Hispanique de Hisba*, 1931, pp. 49-50.

[493] Denise Jacques-Meunié, 'Notes sur l'histoire des populations du sud marocain', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 11, no. 1 (1972): 137–50.

[494] Noël Deerr, *The History of Sugar* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949).

[495] Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, p. 80.

[496] Blackburn, p. 42.

[497] Matthew Gordon and Kathryn A. Hain, *Concubines and Courtesans: Women and Slavery in Islamic History* (Oxford University Press, 2017).

exemplified in the need for grain;[498] the trading of gold and enslavement of human beings were less prominent. Nevertheless, the fourteenth century had begun to witness a shift in which a significant portion of the political economy of southern African states relied on obtaining North African horses in exchange for slaves,[499] as 'symbols of [economic,] political and military strength'.[500] That the trans-Saharan slave trade was essential to the economy and political survival of Maghribi ruling dynasties is shown in the work of El Hamel, who argues that even Ibn Battuta's mission to West Africa was not an innocent voyage through space but was as much about gauging sources of gold as it was about finding slave supplies. Hence, on his return from Takkada to Morocco in September 1353, Ibn Battuta has brought approximately 600 enslaved women to the use of wealthy merchants of the Maghrib.[501] Additionally, the creation of ʿAbid al-Bukhari necessitated not only using slave-soldiers for tax collection, but also undertaking tax-collection expeditions as far as Timbuktu and raising legal taxes significantly.[502] In other words, therefore, ancient slavery practices have emerged within the particularities of their political and socio-economic contexts and need not be 'anathemized',[503] anachronised and seen through a lens of superimposed modernity. In the Almohad-Almoravid case, slavery practices were based on multi-ethnic and multi-religious servility, on the one hand, and were not generationally reproduced, and on the other, were premised upon a variety of causes, including ethnic differentiation, religious and legal considerations, economic imperatives, culminating in a uniquely cosmopolitan social formula which denotes the absence of a coherent structure of racial otherness.[504] Therefore, an analysis of slavery and race in peripheral societies necessitates avoiding the fallacies of anachronism, whilst simultaneously identifying and theorising the circularity and non-linearity of race as a political project which was '… assembled over a period of time'.[505]

As has been argued in the previous section, situating slavery within its own historical context and that of the Ismaili polity helps transcend the reliance on epistemological frameworks that superimpose linear and anachronistic conceptions of race into the Morocco context. Moulay Ismail formed the army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari for political and military purposes. Before the creation of this army, political power relied both on the production of the individual as a potential source of military labour, and on the support of various social forces such as clans, which has meant that soldiers were

[498] Bennison, 'Economy and Trade Within and Beyond Imperial Frontiers, 1050–1250', p. 197.
[499] Barton C. Hacker, 'Firearms, Horses and Slave Soldiers: The Military History of African Slavery', *Icon* 14 (2008): 62–83; James Webb, 'The Horse and Slave Trade between the Western Sahara and Senegambia', *The Journal of African History* 34, no. 2 (1993): 221–46.
[500] Hacker, 'Firearms, Horses, and Slave Soldiers'.
[501] El Hamel, *Black Morocco,* p. *131*.
[502] For non-Muslims, these included tax on property, land, and the practice of their of faiths, and taxes aimed as a contribution to warfare and attempts to ward off European expansion. See El Hamel, p. 205.
[503] Tarek Ladjal, 'The Christian Presence in North Africa under Almoravids Rule (1040–1147 CE): Coexistence or Eradication?', ed. John Caruana, *Cogent Arts & Humanities* 4, no. 1 (2017).
[504] Pierre, *The Predicament of Blackness,* p. *20*.
[505] Barnor Hesse, 'Raceocracy: How the Racial Exception Proves the Racial Rule' (Irving K. Barber Learning Centre, University of British Columbia, 7 March).

recruited from the general population and from distinct social forces in exchange for favours such as exemption from taxes and land ownership. What this has also meant, however, is the creation of diverse clan and religious loyalties within the army, which Moulay Ismail has perceived as a threat to his reign. The combination of dynastic rule and clan-based social relations have resulted in distinct uneven configurations in the local and global domain and the dissemination of different cultures of sovereignty through merchants,[506] privateers, pirates, slaves, soldiers, renegades, and travellers. The project of slavery was thus a centralisation and consolidation of the 'Alawite dynasty's power as it aimed (and later, unsuccessfully claimed) to diminish competing loyalties through the construction of an army of landless, clan-less soldiers, whose origins remains contentious between theories of their capture from parts of the African continent outside of the North African context,[507] and theories arguing that they were all Moroccan-born.[508] Furthermore, the compulsory recruitment system within army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari was intertwined with the nature of agricultural farming and agricultural production.[509] In the eighteenth century, the Moroccan milieu was shaped by a range of socio-political and economic conditions. The food production process, for example, was reliant on the vagaries of environmental changes, leading to years of drought, famine, disease, and the deaths of animals and humans alike. However, other factors have also impacted agricultural production: while the development of productive forces and agricultural technologies was weak,[510] and the technical and economic organisation of agricultural production relied on rudimentary tools,[511] agricultural methods in this period were intertwined with nomadic life in areas with significant agricultural potential.[512] As a result of these dynamics, there was a contradiction between the idea of recruitment for an army and the material conditions shaping the Moroccan milieu: the constant need for labour in agriculture confronted the sultanate's military objectives, leading to the adoption of different strategies of social and labour control in different areas.

The Ismaili project of slavery also had strong ideological foundations and its strategies of political accumulation were premised on the creation of two-tiered regimes of social control. First, due to their status as landless, the army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari were not only used to collect taxes; they

[506] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 20.

[507] Louis de Chénier, *The Present State of the Empire of Morocco* (London: Unknown, 1788); James Grey Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco, and the District of Suse* (Philadelphia: Francis Nichols, 1810).

[508] Allan R. Meyers, 'Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery: The Origins of the Moroccan 'Abid', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no. 3 (1977): 427–42.

[509] Jalal Yahya, *ālmawla ismāʿyl wa taḥryr ṯuġuwr āl-maġrib* (Alexandria: āl-maktab āl-ǧāmiʿy āl-ḥadyṯ, 1983), p. 47.

[510] See: Benali, *Le Maroc précapitaliste*; Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial*; Jean Le Coz , *Le Rharb, fellahs et colons: Etude de géographie régionale* (Rabat: Imframar, 1964); Jacques Berque, *Etudes d'histoire rurale maghrébine* (Tanger: Les Editions Internationales, 1938).

[511] Abdel Aziz. Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques* (Rabat : SMER Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1980), p. 19.

[512] Mohammed Hali, 'Intāǧ Wa Tadbyr Āl-Aqwāt Fy Maġrib Āl-Qarn Āl-Ṯāssiʿ 'ašar (1727 – 1757)', *Kan Historique Périodique* 5, no. 17 (2012): 67–71.

were also economically dependent on the central tributary state. This has led to fermenting animosity towards them as they were seen as the embodiment of the violence and tyranny of the Makhzen,[513] despite their status as slaves. In other words, soldier-slaves – by virtue of the institutional settings within which they were incorporated and the labour which they were performing – were ideologically separated from the very population from which they were drawn, that of the lower classes and the socially disadvantaged. Second, the strategy of ideological partition permeated the ranks of the enslaved themselves. On the one hand, slaves of al-Bukhari were trained as soldiers, carpenters, craftsmen, tax collectors and future wives as per the gendered dimensions of social reproduction within the slave army; they were also agricultural workers and builders, and thus were responsible, under the orders of Moulay Ismail, for constructing villas, palaces, fortification walls in Fez and Rabat, and *Mellahs* (Jewish quarters).[514] On the other hand, Christian slaves were largely deployed in physical labour pertaining to newly acquired weaponry and had little to no stable income. They were assigned tasks such as pulling artillery and moving bombs, under the supervision of the soldier-slaves of ʿAbid al-Bukhari, who disciplined them.[515] Indeed, this was with the deliberate intent of creating hierarchies between Muslim and non-Muslim slaves, and diminishing the latter in comparison to the former.[516] Thus, the strategy of political accumulation which underpinned the creation of an army of slave-soldiers heavily drew on the institution of ideological and social partition within the ranks of slaves, as well as between various lower social groups, as a means of gaining power within a context of military rivalries.

A comparison between ʿAbid al-Bukhari with the Ottoman Janissaries [yeñiçeri: new soldier] is fitting; however, despite the ways in which the Ottoman case galvanised the creation of ʿAbid al-Bukhari and beyond the shared Maghribi and Ottoman empires' goal of a centrifugal expansion of military power through slave armies, the Janissaries and the ʿAbid al-Bukhari had as many dissimilarities as they had resemblances. While the Ottomans have 'institutionalized mechanisms involving military recruitment, socialisation, and career advancement that then created a strong corporate identity within the corps, an identity grounded in an extreme form of group cohesion',[517] the Ismaili project of slavery was radically different as slaves were primarily, but not solely, recruited locally and were enslaved both by virtue of being perceived as black and of belonging to an underprivileged social class of the landless. Indeed, throughout this chapter, the expression of

---

[513] Meyers, 'Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery'.

[514] Mellah is a walled Jewish quarter in Darija; it is a word that originates from the word 'Milh' [salt] and has been arguably used due to the involvement of many Jews in the salt trade, or due to the salty stream that was in the city of Fez Mellah [the first one which was built in 1438]. See: C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2013), p. 101.

[515] Jalal Yahya, *ālmawla ismāʿyl wa taḥryr ṯuġuwr āl-maġrib* (Alexandria: āl-maktab āl-ǧāmiʿy āl-ḥadyṯ, 1983), p. 47.

[516] Yahya, p. 47.

[517] Burak Kadercan, 'Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation: Civil-Military Relations and the Diffusion of Military Power', *International Security* 38, no. 3 (2013): 117–52.

'attempt at institutionalisation' is utilised when referring to this army of slaves, because Isma'il's ʿAbid al-Bukhari was in fact a personal army. Although it was created with the intent of being a 'state' army – the individualisation of politico-military practices has meant that ʿAbid al-Bukhari played marginal roles in battles against European encroachment, and therefore served as a reminder of 'the shortfalls of the Moroccan political system – that the centralization of the society was impossible without a strong military base'.[518] In this sense, the slave army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari did not signify a qualitative change in the Moroccan economic landscape. Instead, it acted as '… a function of the non-economic, essentially extortive accumulation of wealth at the center of the empire.'[519]

Nevertheless, European sources have primarily focused on European captives. There are several reasons that have guided that approach. The first is the exceptionalist approaches towards people racialised as white and held in captivity in the Maghrib. On the one hand, they exaggerated the numerical scale of these practices on the basis of a fictionalised, homogenous conception of whiteness in captivity narratives and diplomatic correspondence; and on the other hand, they flattened historical difference in the heterotopic maritime space of the Maghrib.[520] The second is the bifurcation between analyses that sought to justify slavery in Muslim societies and those which projected other histories of slavery unto it at the expense of analysing the specific historical and material conditions within which it emerged, to viewing Maghribi history merely as an extension of *other* histories, whether European colonial or Ottoman. Adam Beach rightly contends that 'rather than study white European and black African slaves in isolation from each other, scholars need an integrative approach to slavery in Morocco, and in Muslim societies more generally, that accounts for the ways different groups of slaves interacted with each other and with their masters'.[521] After all, the creation of an army of slave-soldiers happened at the height of a period of privateering in al-Maghrib al-Aqsa, which begs a question of the nature and complexities of the dynamics of their historical interaction. Beach further argues that a significant part of the Ismaili project of slavery included a form of 'ideological indoctrination'[522] which has inculcated dynamics of inter-group antagonism between different groups of slaves. Most importantly, Beach proclaims that making a comparison between black African slaves

---

[518] El Hamel, *Black Morocco,* p. 208.

[519] Konstan, 'Marxism and Roman Slavery'.

[520] For example, these narratives ignore the Europeans who migrated to the Maghrib at this particular historical juncture to improve their economic and social conditions. Matar notes the large number of European migrants in the North African space in the seventeenth century: 'There were so many European émigrés in Algiers during the early seventeenth century that they constituted a "lobby", and before the beginning of the Great Migration to North America at the end of the 1620s, there were more Britons in North Africa than in North America, as men were drawn to the Barbary States in search of work, livelihood, and settlement.' Nabil Matar, 'Introduction: England and Mediterranean Captivity, 1577–1704', in *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England*, ed. Daniel Vitkus and Nabil Matar (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 2.

[521] Adam R. Beach, 'African Slaves, English Slave Narratives, and Early Modern Morocco', *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 46, no. 3 (2013): 333–48.

[522] Beach.

and white English slaves with the purposes of finding out who has 'suffered' more perpetuates the divisions that have formed the foundations of the Ismaili project, and that efficient 'anti-slavery critiques and practices' should avoid asking that question.[523] Indeed, as this section has previously argued, the antagonism that Beach refers to is embedded in the very nature of the division of labour within different enslaved groups. As such, over-emphasising one group at the expense of the other leads to falling into the conceptual trap of that same ideological separation upon which the Ismaili strategy of political accumulation was premised.

However, the ideological partition and antagonisms structuring enslavement, there are crucial distinctions to take into consideration. The structural analysis of common experiences of the enslaved does not stand in opposition to understanding the various ways through which those experiences are articulated. One consideration, for example, is the numerical scale of enslavement for different groups. Produced in 1705, *Jany al-Azhar wa Nur al-Abhar* is a register of slaves documenting and outlining their gender, their lineages, their physical features, and biographies. El Hamel notes that at the time the document was written, the number of slaves totalled 221,320.[524] As the production of this document did not signal the end of slavery, El Hamel argues that the 'ultimate total' could be anywhere between 230,000 and 240,000 black Moroccans in slavery.[525] However, other sources argue that by the death of Moulay Ismail in 1727, the army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari consisted of approximately 150,000 slave-soldiers.[526] Meanwhile, Christian prisoners did not exceed 2000,[527] including at the height of the privateering period in 1691.[528] These statistical inferences and generalisations are further undermined by the nature of treaties between European and North African states, which not only focused on trade but on port protection and military alliances between Muslims and Christians.[529] Producing estimates of the exact number of European slaves in captivity in different North African regencies is complicated due to the scarcity and geographical scattering of resources, and also, due to the origins and producers of the estimates themselves: resident consuls and merchants who were commissioned by their countries of origin.[530] This, in addition to the various captivity narratives body of literature – insightful, essential in understanding both the horrific mistreatment of white slaves and

---

[523] Beach.

[524] El Hamel, *Black Morocco*, p. 174.

[525] El Hamel, p. 188.

[526] Bakari Kamian, *Des tranchées de Verdun à l'église Saint-Bernard: 80000 combattants maliens au secours de la France, 1914-18 et 1939-45* (Paris: Karthala Editions, 2000); Cynthia Becker, 'Hunters, Sufis, Soldiers, and Minstrels: The Diaspora Aesthetics of the Moroccan Gnawa', *RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics*, no. 59/60 (2011): 124–44.

[527] Whiteness, much like blackness during this historical period, was a fluid rather than a fixed racial category. North Africans enslaved outside of Morocco, for example in Egypt, were at times considered white.

[528] Pennell, *Morocco*, pp. 101-2.

[529] Guillaume Calafat, 'Ottoman North Africa and Ius Publicum Europaeum: The Case of the Treaties of Peace and Trade (1600-1750) (', in *War, Trade and Neutrality : Europe and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011), 171–87.

[530] Robert C. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800*, 1st ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 6.

their relations of animosity and solidarity with black slaves; and yet, it also illuminates the ways in which different narratives have been distorted and magnified into equating uncontested truth through a mixture of 'inflexible ethnocentrism and ecclesiastical historiography'[531]—providing a dubious and one-sided view of a capture that represents a fictionalised conflict between civilisation and barbarity. As Guillaume Calafat argues, 'attempts at establishing a clear-cut opposition between Islam and Christendom in the Mediterranean are … completely misleading: in military as in political terms, alliances were both cross-religion and variable'.[532] However, the suffering of Europeans enslaved in North Africa was also real and not merely a product of fictitious tales and political propaganda. Post-colonial scholarship that focuses on dissecting the historically situated forms of racialisation within the socio-political and ideological construction of 'Barbary pirates' overlooks this fact. To overcome these conceptual problems, throughout this thesis, this segment of the population is referred to as 'European slaves in captivity'. This helps, on the one hand, delineate slavery in this case as a process that 'began in an act of expropriation … [and] compelled violent exploitation...'[533] On the other hand, it also helps draw a clear distinction between the enslavement of Europeans (as a non-permanent practice for the purposes of ransoming),[534] and other forms of coercion such as the quasi-total dependence of khommass peasants via debt and peonage, or enslavement for military purposes such as the case of ʿAbid al-Bukhari that this chapter investigates.

These distinctions bring about questions about the distinctive nature of forced labour in these contexts. The enslavement of Europeans occurred within the context of ransoming and coerced conversion: physical artillery-related labour, exploitation, and barely sufficient sustenance. In the bagnos, those who refused to convert could practice Christianity and attend mass at least three times a week,[535] they were not forced to reproduce, and their situation of slavery was one which was not permanent and required paying a ransom in exchange for freedom. The slavery of ʿAbid al-Bukhari was defined by a variety of institutional settings and functions including elite military, state and menial positions, physical labour, forced social reproduction, a situation of economic dependence and a semi-permanence of slavery with potential routes to freedom (that is to say, the conditions of servility were not total). Slavery in Morocco had a different social setting and meaning that it did in the Americas or in Europe. It neither had an explicitly commercial character, nor denoted a distinctive slave mode of production. It was an institution which was not entirely reliant on total exclusion, but

---

[531] Rejeb, 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514-1830'.

[532] Calafat, 'Ottoman North Africa and Ius Publicum Europaeum: The Case of the Treaties of Peace and Trade (1600-1750).

[533] Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. 111.

[534] European slaves in captivity were 'rented' out to Christian missionaries and consuls to perform domestic labour; and were thus in a situation akin to that of servants in Europe. Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters*, p. 109.

[535] Davis, p. 121.

on 'correctional inclusion' and ideological partition,[536] within the ranks of the enslaved as well as between the slaves of the army and the broader lower classes. This begs the serious question of whether both forms of slavery were indeed 'chattel slavery'. The institution of militaristic slavery was premised upon a distinctive form of political accumulation which, on the one hand, capitalised on ambivalent identities and fluid racial categories, and on the other hand, served as a means through which to curb intra-political rivalries while expanding the personal wealth and power of the ruler. While Isma'il created ʿAbid al-Bukhari with the intention of it being a state army, in reality, it was his personal property – a dynamic which is conspicuously discernible in the aftermath of his death and the collapse of ʿAbid al-Bukhari as a military institution. In this sense, it is not an exaggeration to argue that a perspective which views black and white enslavement through the lens of evenness and statistical (dis)similarities dissipates the distinctiveness and intersections of different historical trajectories and perpetuates salient features of the Ismaili project: a hierarchisation of labour and slavery.

This chapter section has demonstrated how the establishing of the army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari that slavery was a form of political accumulation. As such, Isma'il's polity was a tribute-taking empire that deployed a distinctive strategy of despotism and enslavement to reproduce and maintain itself. The following section – by focusing on the Salé Republic – elaborates on the connections between the Ismaili project of slavery and privateering, arguing that the previously mentioned strategy of political accumulation resulted in a milieu where non-state actors had greater levels of autonomy.

Part II: Piracy

1. **Slavery and the case of the Salé Republic**

On a sunny 4 July 2022 I made my way from Salmia 2 in Casablanca towards ālẖizāna ālʿilmya āsṣabyẖya [The Sbihi Library] – a private library and archive in Salé. I had called them weeks before to check that they would be open at the time I planned to go there. However, to my surprise, once I arrived, I found a note hanging on the main door, stating that they would close for weeks. To make the best use of my limited time in Morocco, I decided to head to the Royal Archives in Rabat. While trying to get back from Salé to Rabat, I could not find any *taxi kbir* (big sharing taxis), and it is illegal for the petit taxi to drive from the former to the latter. Walking past me was a stranger who we will call Rachid, as he never told me his name. Rachid could sense that I was not from the area and offered to walk with me to where the sharing taxis were. I thank him and ask him

---

[536] Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, p. 53.

not to trouble himself. He smiles and says, 'Just two years ago, we could not walk alone in this part of town after sunset. You'd get mugged. This is the city of pirates and *chmakria* (thugs). Let me take you there.' Nearly two years later, I find myself thinking about this brief and pleasant encounter with Rachid because it made me think of the extent to which Salé's pirate history still holds a place in the collective imagination of its local population. Although described as a city of 'thugs' now, historically, Salé was a space of radical political optimism and experimentation. It was a space where people of multiple backgrounds (races, religions, and spatial belonging) came together in a single political entity united by their passion for and knowledge of the maritime world. This part of the chapter tells the story of this republic and, most importantly, it shows the unique relationship between this political experiment and Moulay Ismail's practices of accumulation through enslavement.

Rather than unstructured historical episodes, the second part of this chapter problematises piracy and slavery as the other side of the coin of statecraft through social bonds. More specifically, it demonstrates the ways in which the Ismaili strategy of political accumulation – with its own forms of *conventional* political claim-making – worked with and above a political entity of a different kind, one which saw *alternative* agencies enacted and a distinctive form of cosmopolitanism and a more fluid enactment of agency: the republic of Salé (or of 'pirates with papers') that Rachid has spoken about. I do this to open a more critical and conflicted understanding of piracy and slavery in Moroccan history as an embodiment of politico-religious and socio-economic ingredients that have highlighted the contradictions of the global arena – a contradiction which gives a clearer image of the nature of long-term statecraft in Morocco as well as the nature of inter-spatial relations. Crucially, this approach illustrates the dynamic nature of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty – the ways in which they operated, challenged or reinforced one another; and the tension and synergy between the conventional and alternative reproduction of political life that expressed itself in a historical time and space allowing different forms, visions, and practices of rule to emerge.

Parcellized globalities and particular local dynamisms of the emergence of the practices of privateering merit conceptualisation. The so-called 'Barbary' Coast was not a unified and homogeneous political entity. Bound by Egypt to the east, the Atlantic to the west, the Sahara to the south, and the Mediterranean to the North, these political communities comprised several regencies of the Ottoman Empire, modern-day Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, who were ruled by Dey, Bey, and Pasha, respectively. Morocco, however, was the only place not to be subjected to Ottoman suzerainty, a fact which warrants attention, and yet, accounts of these communities either homogenise *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa*, called the the *garb odjaklar* in Ottoman Turkish, thus giving little attention to the dynamics of piracy, privateering, and corsairing in Moroccan ports such as Tangiers, Salé, and Essaouira, or portray the period in terms of religious hostilities and unjustified violence against Christendom. 'How was it possible for the inhabitants of this coast, century after century, to plunder the commerce and evade or defy the navies of the most powerful states of Europe?', Clark laments. Clark continues:

They had little commerce; they had no industry worth mentioning; indeed, they had no serious 'war potential' at all. The inland tribes, over which they tried to exercise control, were in a state of perpetual anarchy and mutual warfare. These states did not, to be sure, threaten the independence of European states, and they never stopped the Levant trade altogether, but they constantly molested it and probably somewhat restricted its development.[537]

Clark is far from being the only one who advances a theory of an almighty clash between Islam and Christendom as the backdrop of the political economies of piracy. Corsairs, pirates, and privateers alike were referred to as early 'terrorists' or 'terrorists by another name'.[538] This view is not only problematic for the ways in which it racialises and declasses the rise and persistence of piracy as a political economy and a diplomatic 'terraqueous' activity;[539] it is equally questionable for the ways in which it conceals the entangled workings of the global arena. Further, this perspective also obscures the dynamics of terraqueous sovereignty, as the dialectical relationship between nature and forms of extraction, and between the terrestrial and the maritime, whose expressions have varied spatiotemporally.[540]

In contrast, the global context of the practices and historical contexts of piracy and, by extension, of North African social forces have received significant attention. Coller, for instance, evidences that the turbulence of the French revolutionary age is one which has brought France and North Africa closer on various political and economic grounds, an age which has seen a shift from a growing North African interest in land, towards an internationalisation of maritime warfare and diplomacy.[541] Similarly, Windler argues that the self-conception of French and American revolutionary societies and contradictory patterns of juridical law informed the ways in which Maghribi corsairs could simultaneously be viewed as pirates, corsairs, and privateers.[542] More specifically, Windler argues that the normative Eurocentric self-perception of these societies relies

---

[537] G. N. Clark, 'The Barbary Corsairs in the Seventeenth Century', *Cambridge Historical Journal* 8, no. 1 (1944): 22–35.

[538] For an analysis of the connections between ideological constructions of barbarity, to the epistemological framing of pirates as 'terrorists', see: Paul A. Silverstein, 'The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier', *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 179–212.

[539] I borrow the term 'terraqueous' from Campling & Colás, which they define as 'consisting of land and water'. See: Campling and Colás, 'Capitalism and the Sea', 2018; Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, *Capitalism and the Sea* (London: Verso, 2021), p. 3.

[540] The term that Campling and Colás is 'terraqueous sovereignty', which they define as 'the distinctly capitalist articulation of sovereignty, territory and appropriation in the capture and coding of maritime space and how environmental conditions matter to these.' While I borrow this term, I do not use it in the context of capitalist social relations but rather in the context of pre-capitalist social formations. See: Campling and Colás, 'Capitalism and the Sea', 2018.

[541] Ian Coller, 'Barbary and Revolution: France and North Africa 1789-1798', in *French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories*, ed. Patricia Lorcin and Todd Shepard (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2016).

[542] Christian Windler, 'Towards the Empire of a "Civilizing Nation": The French Revolution and Its Impact on Relations with the Ottoman Regencies in the Maghreb', in *International Law and Empire: Historical Explorations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 201–24, p. 205.

upon the '… aggressive rejection of the plurality of norms that had been constitutive of intercultural relations and which had shaped the process of legal regulation of relations with the regencies throughout the eighteenth century'.[543]

The late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed meaningful political upheavals globally. Euro-Ottoman and Ottoman Safavid relations were marked by confrontations reflecting the unevenness of modes of production: one in which the tributary system of the Ottoman Empire allowed the creation of a relatively stable and consistent army, while European feudalism necessitated taking extreme measures to secure military financing, a situation which has created intra-societal tensions and instability.[544] The Ottomans also utilised the complexities and concomitant trends in information systems and 'covert' diplomacy as a way to achieve political ends in a situation of intra-imperial tensions and power imbalance.[545] The Spanish imperial strategy in the Mediterranean was enhanced with the success of Genoese merchants, epitomising a geographically and socially adaptable, yet heterogeneous group, whose effectiveness in forming an imperial mercantile power relied heavily on networks and structures of local kinship and favour-based reciprocity which formed the basis of the pre-capitalist Mediterranean economy.[546] During this period, trade and diplomacy were intertwined and the distinctions between them were often blurred. In the case of Anglo-Venetian relations, for example, Italian noblemen such as Grogery di Casale and his brother were able to forge a diplomatic career as ambassadors for England in Rome and Venice, respectively, in the sixteenth century.[547] Di Casale's case is but one example which demonstrates the significance of commercial activities and political economy to the development of diplomatic practice.[548] Further, di Casale's influence was not only limited to his wealth, his position in the commerce sphere, and a close relationship with Henry VIII in which he offered 'four kilderkins of wine, duty free';[549] the impact of his political dominion extended to the role he has played in Henry VIII's and Catherine of Aragon's divorce.

Meanwhile, in *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa*, the Wattasids established a polity in Fez, under the control of Muhammad al-Shaykh, in 1472. Nevertheless, despite their political control over Fes and

---

[543] Windler, p. 208.

[544] Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, 'The Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry over the Long Sixteenth Century', in *How the West Came to Rule*, The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2015).

[545] Emrah Safa Gürkan, 'The Efficacy of Ottoman Counter-Intelligence in the Sixteenth Century', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 65, no. 1 (2012): 1–38.

[546] Céline Dauverd, *Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 3-18.

[547] Maria Fusaro, *Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England, 1450–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[548] Donna Lee and David Hudson, 'The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (2004): 343–60.

[549] "Venice: November 1522," in *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 3, 1520-1526*, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1869), 284-289. *British History Online*, accessed March 28, 2020, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol3/ 284-289.

the support of *ulamas*, the Wattasids faced difficulties in centralising territorial rule as a result their inability to protect Morocco from the encroachment of the Portuguese. The latter viewed Morocco as a 'frontier',[550] a gateway in which they could engage by proxy whilst benefitting from the unique trading routes and openings to West Africa that Morocco would offer.[551] In Tagmadart in the Darʿa Valley, a *sharifian* entity with Sufi ties fought off the Portuguese, who have gradually encroached on some parts of Northern and Southern Morocco. This entity later emerged as the Sa'adian dynasty, thus entering direct competition with the Wattasids. Thus, the Portuguese were driven out of their areas of control in Southern Morocco, in Massa, eventually withdrawing their forces from the north as a result of a serious defeat in Agadir, a city which came to occupy an important place in Sa'adian rule as a result of its trade connections with Western Sudan, in 1541.[552] Since Sa'adian political legitimacy was tied to their *Sharifian* background and legacy, Mohammed al-Shaykh liberated Agadir from the Portuguese and Fes from the Wattasids, attempted to centralise political rule and diminish the power of *ulamas*, particularly in Fes and Marrakech, previous strongholds of the Wattasid dynasty which continued to exhibit the heterogeneity and divisions of political agencies.

The fall of al-Andalus adds to the transformational fervour and sweeping socio-political storm as the spectre of profound socio-political transformations was haunting northwestern Europe. After having survived a ceaselessly changing geopolitical environment and the tumultuous nature of *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa* through the interaction of pillars of diplomacy and commerce à travers the relations between the Renaissance Italian states and the Western Mediterranean,[553] the fall of al-Andalus in 1492 crystallised the intertwinement of Catholic monarchy with territorial sovereignty.[554] In cities such as Salé and Rabat, the reach of this historical rupture extends beyond the movement of people and goods. As the Atlantic became a key arena of (mis)demeanour and conflict, '… the revitalisation [of Rabat in the seventeenth century] symbolized the extent to which Morocco had become detached from the rest of the Islamic world, and the extent to which it had been increasingly drawn into the hardened conflict between a Christian North and an Islamic South'.[555]

It is against this background of turmoil – local, transregional, and global, situated within a context of empire-building from Europe to the Mediterranean and southeast Asia, strategic political

---

[550] Paul A. Silverstein, 'The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier', *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 179–212.

[551] Aomar Boum, 'Morocco: 2. Later Empire (from the 16th Century)', in *The Encyclopedia of Empire*, 2016, pp. 1–7.

[552] Boum.

[553] Raúl González Arévalo, 'Italian Renaissance Diplomacy and Commerce with Western Mediterranean Islam: Venice, Florence, and the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in the Fifteenth Century', *I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance* 18, no. 1 (2015): 215–32.

[554] Alejandro Colás, 'Barbary Coast in the Expansion of International Society: Piracy, Privateering, and Corsairing as Primary Institutions', *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 5 (December 2016): 840–57.

[555] Janet L. Abu-Lughod, 'The Origins of Salé and Rabat: False and True Beginnings', in *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 52–74.

alliances, trade routes mediated by networks of merchants or 'cross cultural brokers'[556] in which commodities such as metal, spices, sugar, coffee and tobacco were at the heart of the global imperial project – that privateering and piracy in the Maghrib have risen to prominence.

2. Royass al-Bahr: Commanders of the sea or pirates with papers?[557]

The term 'Barbary' originates from the Ancient Greek word *Barbarus* and came to English through Latin. Barbarus is a word that was used to designate non-Greeks and non-Romans, a word reflecting aspects of foreignness, uncivilization, and crudeness.[558] According to Boulahnane, the term of Barbary 'dovetails in large with fictionalized representations of these areas as a latter-day Wild West' and thus, could also denote the inherent 'barbarity' of North Africans, a label which it is argued might be representative of a presupposition about Africans' being less inclined to engage in commerce and communication.[559] Correspondingly, Bejjit argues that 'Barbary Pirates' is a phrase containing 'immense prejudice and inaccuracy'.[560] Bejjit criticises Edward Said for using it in his writings, omitting North Africa from the conceptualisation of the 'Orient',[561] and overlooking its intellectual and philosophical encounters with Europe in his critique of the imperialist connections of knowledge production.[562] Both Bejjit and Boulahnane make a strong case against the usage the term, pointing out its racialised connotations and the ways in which it had been deployed to place North African society – its people, its agency, its political practices – within a fixed condition of racialised 'barbarity'. As such, the terms 'Barbary',[563] 'Barbary States', and 'Barbary pirates' are not used in

---

[556] Jonathan Curry-Machado, ed., *Global Histories, Imperial Commodities, Local Interactions*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013).

[557] I would like to thank Liam Campling and Alex Colás, who suggested the phrase of 'pirates with papers' at the Capitalism and the sea: Origins, connections, divergences workshop, which took place at Birkbeck, University of London in November 2021.

[558] Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514-1830: An Ideological Prelude to Colonization', *Dialectical Anthropology* 6, no. 4 (1982): 345–55.

[559] Saad Boulahnane, '"Barbary" Mahometans in Early American Propaganda: A Critical Analysis of John Foss's Captivity Account', *Arab World English Journal for Translation & Literary Studies* 2, no. 1 (2018).

[560] Karim Bejjit, 'Refashioning Barbary: American Discourse on North Africa', in *Beyond Colonial/Postcolonial Interventions: Revising the Debate of Morocco in English Writings and Moroccan Writings in English*, ed. Abderrazzak Essrhir and Khalid Amine (Tetouan: Faculty of Letters and Humanities, Abdelmalik Essaadi University, 2013), 141–60, p. 142.

[561] Karim Bejjit, 'Edward Said and Orientalism: A Reappraisal', in *Moroccan American Studies*, ed. Mohamed Benzidan (Casablanca: Laboratory of Moroccan American Studies, Faculty of Letters Ben M'sik, 2010), 67–78.

[562] Paul A. Silverstein, 'The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier', *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 179–212.

[563] Here, it is crucial to make a distinction between the medieval term of 'Barbary' and the term of 'Berbérie' which gradually replaced the former in colonial times. According to Hannoum: 'The name Barbary, signifying barbarism, indicated the land of a race (and, notably, not of a civilization). However, Barbary was a land imagined to be part and parcel of Africa and thus opposed to Europe, as savagery is to civilization. By contrast, Berbérie was constructed in colonial times as the land of the Berbers, disconnected from Arabia (and by extension the Levant) and even disconnected from Africa itself. Yet, it is racially connected to Europe in terms of both its whiteness and its religiosity.' Thus, the articulations of race around these terms must be contextualised within the distinct and material production of race before and during the advent of colonial subjugation. While the term of Barbary conceptualised the wider African space as opposed to the civilisation of

this thesis. Not only are they racially coded terms invented by Europeans to refer to the Maghribi space as the antithesis of civilisation, but they also offer no conceptual value and are completely detached from the ways in which people – and by extension, 'pirates' – operating in these spaces have historically perceived themselves. One example of the unhistorical ways in which European sources have framed the practices of piracy, raiding and trading is the usage of the term of 'pirate' itself. Hassan Amili shows that as was the case in piracy regencies of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers, people who partook in Slaoui piracy have never actually referred to themselves as 'pirates' but as *royass al-bahr* [commanders of the sea].[564] According to Amili, the term of 'pirate' emerged as a reflection of the maritime tensions between the Maghrib and Europe at this historical juncture, where Slaoui – and more broadly, Maghribi – piracy portrayed these actors either as 'lone adventurers' or as organised maritime gangs and uncivilised outlaws, whose sole purpose was to enrich themselves via the targeting of Christians and European vessels.[565]

Instead, similar to the method pursued in the Slavery part of this chapter, which focused on using context-specific terminologies, the second part of this chapter does the same, through the usage of terms such as 'Slaoui piracy'.[566] However, further clarification is required. First, the repertoire of 'barbarity' was not exclusive to Europe and Europeans; it also existed in different societies and schools of thought, including medieval Arabic social and political thought which conceived of barbarity as the antithesis of normality,[567] and conceived of cannibalism as a natural outcome of residing in warmer climates.[568] Second, the usage of terms such as 'pirates', 'privateers' and 'corsairs' by European states was often paradoxical. 'Piracy' and 'Barbary' were summoned at different times not merely as terminologies denoting individual racial prejudice, but as reflections of structures located within a *specific* Eurocentric legal and jurisdictional interpretation of sovereignty which assumed ontological and epistemological universality.[569] While tracing intellectual *liaisons* and

---

Europe, the latter term of Berbérie was a premised on a different form of racialisation rooted in a racialist schism between the Maghrib and those spaces in the Global South to which it has been historically connected. See: Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, p. 174.

[564] Hassan Amili, *ālmaġāriba wālmaġāl ālbaḥry fy ālqarnayn 17 wa 18 [Les Marocains et l'espace maritime aux 17ème et 18ème siècles]* (Rabat: Dār Abī Raqrāq lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 2011).

[565] Hassan Amili, *al-Jihād al-baḥrī bi-Maṣabb Abī Raqrāq : khilāl al-qarn al-sābiʻ ʻashar al-Mīlādī [Maritime Jihad at the Mouth of the River Bou Regreg in the 17th Century]* (Mohammedia: Hassan II University, Mohammedia Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2006), pp. 50-51.

[566] Slaoui is the Darija word for: of Salé. Thus, Slaoui piracy means piracy of Salé.

[567] Al-Azmeh points out that "th[e] fashioning of ethnological stereotypes through natural scientific determinism coexisted, without any apparent sense of unease, with detailed ethnographic descriptions of various African and northern societies, not only in the same cultural ambience, but also within one and the same text …"[567]. See Aziz Al-Azmeh, 'Barbarians in Arab Eyes', *Past & Present* 134, no. 1 (1 February 1992): 3–18.

[568] Aziz Al-Azmeh, 'Barbarians in Arab Eyes', *Past & Present* 134, no. 1 (1 February 1992): 3–18.

[569] See: Nat Cutter, 'Peace with Pirates? Maghrebi Maritime Combat, Diplomacy, and Trade in English Periodical News, 1622–1714', *Humanities* 8, no. 4 (December 2019): 179; Calafat, 'Ottoman North Africa and Ius Publicum Europaeum: The Case of the Treaties of Peace and Trade (1600-1750) ('; Matar, 'The Maghariba and the Sea : Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period'; Windler, 'Towards the Empire of a

tensions between the Maghrib and Europe is indeed important and necessary, it is equally important to consider the *Mare Nostrum* political, economic, legal, and social history – and the ways in which these regimes of power and state-building have racialised distinct groups, including North Africans, into ambiguous racial categories at this particular period. The point being made here, therefore, is that the discourse surrounding 'Barbary' states and pirates is both reflective of an othering, ideological project and of an historical and a material one. Indeed, with reference to the Maghrib, the term 'pirate' itself has been used in contradictory ways denoting the influence of European ideas of Laws of Nations,[570] and the oscillation of European states and courts between collaboration, recognition of sovereignty, and castigation. In other words, an adequate materialist account of the social and political constitution of Slaoui piracy must take into account the dimensions of their class character, and, most crucially their form.

Pierre Hubac notes that history cannot position itself as impartial, particularly when it comes to corsairs in the North African space.[571] As Colás demonstrates,[572] in any substantial materialist analysis of the commerce and mercantile practices underpinning privateering in the Maghrib, it is essential to distinguish between terminologies of 'pirate', 'privateer', and 'corsair' as they cannot be used interchangeably, as well as the specific ethnic groups involved in these practices. Originating from the Greek word *peiratēs*, which means 'brigand', the term pirate can be used to refer to a wide range of nautical activities including raiding coastal areas, seizing ships, kidnapping, enslaving, and robbing. A major differentiation, though, is that piracy was a universal phenomenon in which activities were directed against all and any form of authority, and in which the actors were performing tactics of maritime naval warfare. As commissioned by governments to undertake semi-military naval activities, privateers have enabled states to expand their maritime power in the process of capital accumulation. In other words, privateers were state-sanctioned pirates, or, more aptly, pirates with papers. The ideological construction of corsairs, however, was tied to the frontiers of the Mediterranean Sea; they were often regarded through the lens of 'Crusades' and 'al-Jihad al-Bahri' (maritime religious warfare), carrying out activities for economic purposes. In other words, theoretically, corsairs are state-sanctioned executives of sea banditry who are not in possession of a *lettre de marque*, carrying out attacks against vessels deemed as belonging to territorial enemies for religious purposes while often benefiting from implicit and covert government support. Thus, a pirate is envisioned as a person who commits depredation according to their whim and choice, and a corsair as someone with explicit permission to attack designated enemies. Thus, pirating is deemed a warped

"Civilizing Nation": The French Revolution and Its Impact on Relations with the Ottoman Regencies in the Maghreb'.

[570] Calafat, 'Ottoman North Africa and Ius Publicum Europaeum: The Case of the Treaties of Peace and Trade (1600-1750) ('; Cutter, 'Peace with Pirates?'.

[571] Pierre Hubac, *Les Barbaresques* (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 1949).

[572] Alejandro Colás, 'Barbary Coast in the Expansion of International Society: Piracy, Privateering, and Corsairing as Primary Institutions', *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 5 (December 2016): 840–57.

form of corsairing and a supplementary element to the maritime economy and naval military activities. For example, Robert Surcouf (1773-1827) was a slave trader and corsair who operated in the Indian Ocean between 1789 and 1801 and then between 1807 and 1808. Surcouf amassed wealth from his involvement in piracy, trade, and slavery.[573] Surcouf is often referred to as a privateer, yet he was in no possession of a *lettre de marque*.[574] Surcouf's trajectory and involvement with piracy and slavery are particularly important, because they demonstrate blurred delineations and distinctions between the three terminologies. Indeed, European states, in referring to people involved in trade, oscillated between using the terminologies of pirates, privateers, and corsairs depending on the extent to which the trade of piracy aligned with state interests, as well as depending on the background and religious identity of those involved in it.

Although the definitions of piracy, privateering, and corsairing activities fall within the binary axes of legality and illegality, they are not merely representative of the agencies of stateness but of the human agencies (of cosmopolitan pirates) shaping the maritime world. The abstract and generic character of this claim regarding the differentiations between privateers, pirates, and corsairs renders it of little use in understanding and analysing the historically-varying forms of the relations between forms of mercantile political economies and their practices. After all, although these terms are not conceptually interchangeable; historically, they were not mutually exclusive either and articulated distinct conceptions of race. For example, one can be a privateer who carries out corsairing and/or pirating activities. Thus, the idea that legitimacy of sea warfare arises from the 'state' invisibilises the contradictions within the state and the intricate mechanisms through which it intermittently acted both in favour of and in opposition to such tactics. Colás suggests that 'corsairs and privateers were protagonists in all the major sea battles of the early-modern Mediterranean from Algiers to Lepanto, and they formed the socioeconomic and political backbone of many of the Barbary states that proved so central to the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry ... ''.[575] Furthermore, Braudel elucidates how piracy itself is not merely a matter of nautical misdeeds, but an act which 'often tended to re-establish a natural balance which had been disturbed by history.'[576] This is crucial context that – as we will see in the next section of this chapter – helps view the Salé republic in a different light.

3. Salé: The emergence of an unlikely republic

---

[573] Surcouf's involvement in the slave trade was fraught with controversy as the *Convention Nationale* of the French Republic in 1793 made a legal distinction between slavery in the colonies and slavery on French soil – the former being rendered illegal in a move in which a concoction of citizen and empire-building informed the French revolutionary age. See Manuel Covo, 'Race, Slavery, and Colonies in the French Revolution', in *The Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution*, ed. David Andress (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[574] Roger Vercel, 'Deux Corsaires et Une Ville : IV : Surcouf', *Revue Des Deux Mondes (1829-1971)* 75, no. 2 (1943) : 113–35.
[575] Colás, 'Barbary Coast in the Expansion of International Society'.
[576] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Volume I. Trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 117.

So where does Salé stand in the equation – was the port symptomatic of a form of piracy, privateering or corsairing? What was the political context within which it emerged? Was it a case of a sacrosanct Jihad Bahri against Christianity? How did these naval geopolitical transfigurations and interactions with the sea reorient the transregional and the international system?

The Republic of Salé in the seventeenth century was a hotbed of maritime activities. Established roughly in 1627 by river of Bou Regreg, Salé's emergence as a republic must be situated in the broader context of many local struggles for power and political authority.[577] Unlike their Sa'adi predecessors, potential rulers were not faced with having to constantly fight off the Portuguese, Turks, or Spaniards, they nevertheless were confronted with a situation akin to 'civil war'. As a result, several polities and spheres of political rule emerged, some via warlords, and others via Sufi brotherhoods. An example of this is the Zawiya Dila'iya, or the zawiya or sultanate of Dila,[578] an important maraboutic state in the Middle Atlas which was formed around 1566 and only concerned itself with religious and spiritual matters at the start,[579] but had, by 1650, become 'the largest centre of political power in Morocco, although it never came near to taking over the whole country.'[580] In the region of Souss in the south, following the collapse of Sa'adi rule, an empire or a 'kingdom' was formed under the leadership of Abou Hassoun Semlali, with Illigh as its capital. Through the port of Agadir, this polity developed strong commercial and diplomatic relations with Europe. And in Tafilalt, in south eastern Morocco, Mohammed Ben Chrif had himself proclaimed as ruler in 1641 after chasing out warlord Abou Hassoun Semlali.[581] And in the outskirts of Salé, a collective social force emerged under the leadership of Mohammed Ben Hmed al-Ayashi – also known as 'warlord al-Ayachi'.

These historical details are crucial to understanding how Salé was formed. Thus, In Salé, a collective social formation also emerged. The premise of these social forces – and of Al-Ayachi's polity – was to defend the maritime space from foreign infiltration. As such, the existence of a harbour and a base along the maritime space resulted not only in the necessity of defending it from external threats, but also in the making of territorial and political claims, or in other words, in the creation of a polity within a sphere of sovereignties.

Salé attracted Moriscos from Hornachos in Spain, and renegades from different parts of Europe who would continue to form the renowned 'Salé Rovers', a group of pirates with or without papers who utilised infrastructure from Qasbas to fortified walls and palaces to their advantage – as a

---

[577] Mohamed Said Maaninou, *Salā fī al-qarn al-sābi' 'ashar : jumhūrīyyah al-qurāṣinah* (Cairo: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2020), p. 32.

[578] Mohammed Hajji, *Āzzāwya Āddilāʾya Wdawruhā Āddyny Wālʿilmy Wāssyāsy [The Zawiya of Dila: Religious, Scientific and Political Roles]* (Rabat: Imprimerie Nationale de Rabat, 1964), p. 30.

[579] Hajji, p. 131.

[580] Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 90.

[581] Annassiri, *Al-istiqṣā li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣá. Volume 7*, p. 15.

place in which to store ammunition and gain protection from the bombarding of European ships and European expansionism.[582] Crucially, Salé saw the unfolding of a fascinating history. First, it grew into an important maritime political entity in the Moroccan Atlantic, a space which experiences moderate wind currents, but violent sea swells.[583] Second, Salé was a multi-ethnic and multi-faith society, 'a compound culture of heretics and religious radicals (Ranters and Sufis).'[584] This dynamic was unique to its space, not only locally, but globally. During this period, the social composition of Slaoui and Bou Regreg society included Jews, Muslims, Christians, and people of no faith. It comprised of Moroccans from various regions, Turks, Europeans – especially the Dutch, French, British, and Spanish – and, in stark contrast to the Ismaili project of racialised enslavement, it also included Black people who were not enslaved.[585] Maziane argues that the 'class' and population compositions of Salé were by no means homogeneous, and yet, far from being diverse. Although precise statistics regarding the demographics of Salé in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are lacking, Maziane argues that the population was primarily made up of Moriscos, whilst Turks, European renegades, black and white Christian slaves in captivity, were minorities in the Salé urban milieu.[586] Following the fall of al-Andalus, the expulsion of 1609 was a significant naval military operation, constituting substantial migratory movements leading to a complete reshuffling of the population of cities like Fes and Tetouan, whilst in Salé, the Hornacheros would eventually form the base of the population and the nucleus of hispano-Moriscos migration to Morocco.[587] The Salé Republic came to life in 1627 after the Moriscos ceased to recognise the political authority of the Sultan Moulay Zidan for reasons of taxation on income,[588] and thus, the Republic detached itself from the *Makhzenian* and economic hold of the central tributary state. The period of 1627 to 1641 was thus period in which Salé was a 'real' republic with a government beyond the remit of the Makhzen. 1641 marks the beginning of the collapse of the Salé Republic as a result its gradual subsumption within the central tributary state, and following violent confrontations between the Hornacheros and the Andalusians, as well as between the Hornacheros and al-Ayachi's allies and social forces.[589] Maziane argues that interactions between Moroccans and the sea have remained marginal throughout history as a result of a generational 'ancestral fear' that associates the sea with darkness,[590] mystery, and the unknown, and which has prevented Moroccans from developing the political, social, and economic

---

[582] Leila Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain au XVIIe siècle* (Caen : Presses Universitaires de Caen - Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2007), pp. 46-7.

[583] Leila Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain* (Caen: Press Universitaires de Caen - Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2007), p. 39.

[584] Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*, p. 63.

[585] Maziane, p. 96.

[586] Maziane, p. 143.

[587] Abu-Lughod, 'The Origins of Salé and Rabat: False and True Beginnings'; Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*; Hubac, *Les Barbaresques*.

[588] Pierre Dan, *Histoire de Barbarie et de Ses Corsaires* (Paris: Rocolet, 1637).

[589] Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, pp. 59-60.

[590] Maziane, p. 32.

aspect of the advantageous position in relation to the Mare Nostrum. Through this articulation, Maziane falls into the trap of what Jean Devisse refers to as the '*complot du silence*'[591][conspiracy of silence] of European research regarding the history of oceans and seas bordering the African continent in its entirety – a silence which uses fear of the ocean as a justification for a portrayal of African nautical activities only insofar as they interact with people from the outside. A similar approach is also reflected in the works of Ibn Battuta and al-Mas'udî who offer accounts of an Africa *vue d'en haut*, an Africa seen through the sea.[592] Likewise, Jean-Pierre Chauveau attributes this pronounced lack of deprovincialised historiography on African maritime history not to perceived ideas about intergenerational trauma about the ocean, but to sharp distinctions made between the realms of the shore and the offshore[593] – distinctions which overlook the connections between maritime history and African historical sociology, social economy, and anthropology, as well as the co-constitutive relations and the radical possibilities offered by a pluri-verse of geographical elements.

This partition between the '*maritime*' and the '*littoral*' is especially important as it seeps into conceptions of the global system of politics. The Republic of Salé, and more broadly, North African polities and regencies were located on the fringes of a Eurocentric conception of sovereignty which overlooked the multi-layered, pluriverse forms self-governance and socio-political organisation – from European renegades to slaves and pirates. Thus, the brief historical opening within which overlapping forms of sovereignty existed was a product of its own historical circumstances; a non-economic function and a political expression of the methods of accumulation in a non-capitalist society. It does not denote a distinctive prelude to capitalist social relations, but a distinct political form that mediated between different kinds of social antagonisms – particularly those based on the relationship to land and religious differentiation. Indeed, existing connections between institutional geometries of capitalism do not imply that capitalism is a *mimesis* of modernity, and recasting modernity certainly does not imply doing so in the shadows of capitalism. Neither are the social relations of capitalism a product of nothingness, a result of a 'pristine' emergence, for arguing so 'miss[es] the historical antecedents of certain institutional forms that retain structuring force within capitalism'.[594] The history of the piracy encounter, in Salé in particular, solidifies the theoretical and historical tensions and pluriverse manifestations of the agency of non-state actors within a society that is not only global due to its distinctive geographical positioning, but also due to the very fabric of its population and the nature of sea diplomacy and warfare taking place on its shores. A focus on the

---

[591] Jean Devisse, 'Les Africains, la mer et les historiens.', *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 29, no. 115 (1989): 397–418.

[592] Devisse.

[593] Jean-Pierre Chauveau, 'Une histoire maritime africaine est-elle possible? Historiographie et histoire de la navigation et de la pêche africaines à la côte occidentale depuis le XVe siècle.', *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 26, no. 101 (1986): 173–235.

[594] Lacher, p. 475.

legal definition of sovereignty as *territorial*,[595] muddies how different sovereignties existed in the same space through a combination of dynastic rule and piratical agency, an amalgam of sea and land diplomacy. Indeed, the autonomy which enabled the Salé Republic to flourish was the by-product both of the absence of a legally-defined and rigid conception of sovereignty, and of the nature of the socio-political and economic milieu which comprised tribute-paying polities where rule was premised upon political accumulation as a means to build personal wealth and power. Furthermore, the Salé Republic had a curious position: one in which initially, it acted as a completely independent and autonomous polity, and at other times, some of its practices started to fall under the suzerainty of the sultan. Initially, the Republic had a functioning legal and educational system, an elected council, was signing treaties and was operating relatively independently of the central tributary state. For example, a treaty signed with the governor of Salé stipulated endings sea acts of hostility, freeing French slaves, and allowing French ships to move and trade as they please.[596] The majority of diplomatic correspondence and treaties between European states and the Salé Republic revolved around the questions of piracy and captives. However, as the central tributary state gained more power, treaties and diplomatic correspondence became the product of relations between European states and the sultan, not with the governor or elected council of the republic.[597] This transition in the position of Salé, I argue, is connected to both the nature and outcome of strategies of political accumulation, as well as to the form of the relations of exploitation which have led to two different (and uneven) paths of socio-historical development.

Pirates in Salé utilised maritime innovations of the seventeenth century to their own advantage.[598] 'A poor English[man]', John Ward who had adopted a Muslim name and become Youssef Rais, made his fortune in Algiers, then decided to return to England where he was murdered. Similarly, Morat el-Rais, a European renegade and pirate in Salé, transmitted his knowledge of sailing and manoeuvering *pinques*, tartans, and polaccas – which were widely in use in Salé – only to forge a career as an Admiral in Algiers.[599] Despite the imagery of savagery and barbarity ascribed to pirates of the Maghrib, according to Youssef Biscaino, Ambassador of Morocco in Holland in 1624, pirates

---

[595] Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, vol. 15, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).

[596] Archives of Moulay Ismail (1682-1696). Box A04 – 002. Number 10.910.223. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[597] Mohamed Said Maaninou, *Salā fī al-qarn al-sābi' 'ashar : jumhūrīyyah al-qurāṣinah* (Cairo: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2020), pp. 52-3.

[598] It is important to restate here that not all the European commanders of the sea or 'pirates' of Salé were captured; many willingly came to different ports of the Maghrib as immigrants with maritime skill and knowledge to improve their social condition and economic situation: 'These renegades included Henry Chandler (later Ramadan Rais), a former Somerset farm laborer; Peter Easton, who commanded forty vessels in 1611; and John Ward, born ''a poore fisher's brat'' in Faversham, Kent, who led a mutiny in 1603, stole a ship, renamed it *Little John,* and commenced pirating.' Linebaugh and Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*, pp. 62-3.

[599] Roger Coindreau, *Les corsaires de Salé*, 1ere ed., Publications de l'Institut des hautes études marocaines (t. XLVII) (Paris : Société d'éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1948).

of Salé were strictly prohibited from beginning their journeys without authorisation from the Admiral of Salé or the governor.[600] Equally, the *rais* was required to have a 'laissez-passer' or an identification document issued by representatives of other polities either in Salé or in Tetouan; in this way, ships and their crews could be protected from warfare of powers and territories not deemed as the enemy. Thus, the pirates were in fact privateers. The Salé Rovers' tactics centred on 'ambushing' and the surprise effect as forms of guerrilla sea-warfare rather than on conspicuously attacking. Despite their limited resources, the Salé Rovers have reached Newfoundland in 1624, Wales in 1626, and Ireland in 1631.[601] In a letter dated 10 October 1671, it was stated that the people of Salé were trying to capture French merchants whose ship had sunk, as an act of retaliation for the murder of corsairs in a French campaign against them which was led by the count of Estrées.[602] And, according to a letter from François-Louis Rousselet, marquis of Châteaurenault, on 28 May 1691, the Salé Rovers captured 'La Catherine', a ship which was heading to Cayenne for the French West India Company.[603]

For these reasons, the political economy of piracy in Salé was portrayed as a 'barbaric' practice whose sole purpose was to enslave Europeans in the name of Muslim 'jihad' against Christianity. As argued earlier, this position was reflected in narratives about 'white Christian slaves', which emphasised a fictionalised and sensationalist encounter between the supposed barbarianism of North African pirates and the 'civilisation' of the enlightened Europeans. Through the confusion of the chattel slave and the racialised slave with the non-permanent indentured servitude of Europeans captured for ransom, for labour or in the context of sea-warfare, the ideological drive of such narratives was to minimise and obfuscate the scale, extent, gravity and brutality of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This is a severely flawed and unhistorical way of viewing piracy in Salé. In relying on the figure of the 'unruly' North African, not only does it ignore the ethnic formation of Slaoui society and the ways in which Europeans became *Salétins* also participating in maritime raiding and capture against other European states. It also ignores the fact that piracy and enslavement were common practices of accumulation through warfare and raiding. Indeed, they also targeted Moroccans. A letter dated 23 April 1682 and sent to Moulay Ismail from Moroccans enslaved in Marseille, gives us a vivid picture of their situation:

> We … take the liberty of telling you about our miseries and the great desolation to which these French dogs reduce us. No, sire, never have we experienced such great torments in hell as these pitiless dogs subject us to: hunger, nudity, execrable insults against our holy religion and our prophet, contempt for our king and for our nation, beating with sticks, chains,

[600] Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, p. 205.

[601] C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2013), p. 94.

[602] Archives nationales de France – Maroc. Number AE/B/I/825. Paris ; Archives of Moulay Ismail (1682-1696). Box A04 – 001. Number 10.820.606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[603] Archives of Moulay Ismail (1682-1696). Box A04 – 002. Number 10.820.427. Royal Archives, Rabat.

weighing more than a hundred pounds, and the excessive difficulty of rowing are but ordinary torments that we have to endure.[604]

Year	Captain
1670	Jean d'Estrées
1671	Jean d'Estrées
1672	Chateaurenault
1680-81	Panetié
1700	Baron de Pointis
1716	La Rochalard
1721	M. d'Avaugour
1722	M. de Sainvilliers
1726	M. le marquis d'O

Table 2: French maritime attacks against Salé[605]

Furthermore, archival sources point out to multiple cases where captive exchange was negotiated – the captured Salétins against Europeans. This was the subject of a letter from Louis XIV to Moulay Al-Rachid (1666 – 1672) where details of the exchange of captives taken by the Salétins were negotiated.[606] Ironically, some of these exchanges show the European ideological boxes of inconsistencies within which the Salétins were imprisoned. For example, in an exchange between Pierre Formont and Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the captured French are referred to as 'French slaves' and the captured Salétins as 'captives'.[607] Here, in light of the plight of the Moroccans enslaved in France which was vividly depicted in the above letter to Moulay Ismail, one must wonder whether Europeanness is the criterion through which someone becomes a 'slave', a 'captive' or a 'pirate'. Matar reflects on the paradoxes of these classifications in reproducing the view that only 'native' North Africans engaged in piracy:

> There is no denying the extensive North African piracy and privateering against Britons and other Europeans in the early modern period. But finding the price of the European empires—specifically the British, and, by the same token, the Spanish, Portuguese and French—chiefly in the suffering of Christian captives seized by the "natives" is to invoke a Eurocentrism that produces an inaccurate and lopsided view of historical development…[608]

---

[604] A letter of enslaved Moroccans to Moulay Ismail. Marseille, 23 April 1682. Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04 – 001. Number 10930115. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[605] French attacks were mainly focused on capturing and enslaving the Salétins, and extended to other maritime bases such as El Oualidia, Larache, and Tetouan. See : Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, p. 253.

[606] A letter from Louis XIV to Moulay Al-Rachid. Box: Colonies, B, f. 26. Archives Nationales, Paris; Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04.001-001. Number 10820606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[607] Mémoire de Pierre Formont à Colbert. Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04.001-001. Number 10820606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[608] Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689*, pp. 111-2.

Even so, the agents of Slaoui piracy sought to disrupt the maritime networks of European commerce, and at times, targeted European ships as a response. A letter from Henri Prat to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, dated 10 October 1671, states that:

The Salétins wanted to seize the French merchant ships drowned in their port, in retaliation for the corsairs destroyed during the last Estrées campaign.[609]

Piracy in Salé could be divided into two periods: pre-1666 and the period between 1666 and 1727.[610] The former period represents the pinnacle of seafaring activities originating from Salé, the golden age – a period which saw a distinctive form of cosmopolitanism where different ethnic and social groups had different roles in the process. While crew members would produce an inventory of the journey, the rais would clear out and divide the spoils, some of the Jews of Salé would then arrange for them to be transported and sold and Europe. The crew however, did not have fixed wages as that was dependent on the 'prizes' acquired.[611] During this time period, the distribution of the wages of piracy was uneven, between the central tributary state, the shipowners, as well as the rais and the crew – however, the lower ranks of the latter were paid primarily through food and accommodation, as the shipowners and crew members shared the spoils and the money.[612]

The period between 1666 and 1727, however, represents a significant shift as the Ismaili interest in privateering had grown stronger. Through an exegesis and (re)appropriation of Quranic verses – stating as a form of justification the increasingly blurred lines between legality and illegality in seafaring, Moulay Ismail had taken a different strategy to the distribution of the wages of piracy. Before Ismaili rule, 10% of the revenues went to his predecessor, Moulay Zidane until 1627. That percentage remained the same when after that period, it was given to the Salé Diwan [council] and then to the Zawiya of Dila.[613] However, between 1666 and 1727, sultans had initially claimed 20% of the total revenues, and that was then extended that to 50%, alongside ownership of all the captives who became personal property of the sultan.[614] As previously stated in this chapter, they would be deployed in menial tasks pertaining to weaponry. As a result, piracy has all been reduced to decay following Moulay Ismail's appropriation of Mare Nostrum prizes, the further decrease of wages, and as a result, the disintegration of the collective imaginary surrounding the 'promised land' of the republic and the sea within and between crews.[615] Whilst initially, the political structures of the pirate republic was primarily located within the ranks of the Salétins themselves – as active agents in the

---

[609] A letter from Henri Prat to Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Marseille, 10 October 1671. Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04.001-001. Number 10820606. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[610] Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, pp. 218-9.
[611] Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, p. 219.
[612] Maziane, p. 219.
[613] Maziane, p. 218.
[614] Maziane, p. 219.
[615] Maziane, p. 220; Coindreau, *Les corsaires de Salé*.

making and reproduction of their own polity – the economic aspect was similarly firmly located within the space of the ships and their human motors, albeit, at the higher ranks. The 'hands-on' approach that the sultanate has taken to politicise the political economy of piracy through an instrumentalisation of religious factors, whilst changing the nexus of agency and the 'alternative social order' structuring the social relations of the sea.[616] Thus, the agency being left to pirates is one of mutiny, refusal to work, and gradual disinterest in the sea.

These two periodical classifications of piracy in Salé highlight the ways in which the Ismaili strategy of political accumulation was no longer about the mere creation of an army to curb intra-polity and intra-class military conflict, the hierarchisation of social bonds, and the disruption of clan-based allegiances, but that it has also acquired a 'diffusionist' dimension. After all, the Salétins commanders of the sea were targeting ships of polities that had a 'friendly' relationship with the sultan. This is a structural shift that highlights 'the broader relationship between state-building, political economy and violence'.[617] The centralisation of personal wealth was both *internal* and *external*, through the sultanate attempting to control the practices and revenues of sea-warfare. While territoriality was not fundamental to these political forms of rule, the development of the strategy of political accumulation from containing conflict on land to containing conflict at sea served not only to reverse the cosmopolitanism which formed the basis of the republic, but also to reduce its autonomy in various ways. On the other hand, the 'legal posturing' of empire and its agents – as per Benton's words – laid the ground for a unique system of rewards under which the agents of empire expanded their individual interests and those of their respective crowns through piracy, while simultaneously invoking elements of European maritime law.[618]

The sharp distinctions between these differentiated periods in the Salé history of piracy help illustrate a key point that would have an implication for one's understanding of the global system of politics: Diplomacy is not limited to one realm; nor does it follow a linear path of development. If anything, the Maghribi space showcases diplomacy as a multi-actor, multi-ethnic, and multi-class mosaic into which are embedded practices of diplomacy through 'guerrilla' seafaring, as well as through treaty-based diplomatic practice. The Maghrib was a vibrant space of *alternative* political practice whose actors are marginalised through racialised narratives of 'barbarity' or through their perception as an extension of European history. Within this space existed diverse and multiple agencies: pirates negotiating ransoming practices of slaves, the distribution of the wages of piracy, i.e., crews negotiating wages and working conditions as part of a project of resistance 'from below', *Royass al-Bahr* [commanders of the sea] negotiating their share of the spoils, sultans bargaining their

---

[616] Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. 159.
[617] Bryan Mabee, 'Pirates, Privateers and the Political Economy of Private Violence', *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21, no. 2 (1 June 2009): 139–52.
[618] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty,* pp. 24-25.

political power through the Quran to legitimise slavery and monopolise corsairing, and consuls negotiating the extraterritorial production of state-sanctioned piracy and the legitimacy of piracy within and between polities. A serious analytical and theoretical conception of the global system must bear in mind the nuances of distinct spaces, distinct trajectories, distinct histories, and distinct social relations without reducing them to analytical frameworks based on European case studies.

Most importantly, the dialectic between piracy and slavery in this unique historical juncture has resulted in a peculiar phenomenon which could be referred as *trans sovereignties*. Through this dynamic, actors existed in more than one form of political rule. For example, Abdallah Ben Aicha, nicknamed the 'Admiral of Salé' was one of the most prominent pirates in the republic.[619] He was captured and taken to England as a captive, where he remained for three years. In 1685, Ben Aicha was designated as Moulay Ismail's ambassador to England and was sent there to congratulate James II on ascending the throne.[620] In 1698, a French squadron attempted to block the shores of Salé, following which Moulay Ismail sent Abdallah Ben Aicha on an ambassadorial mission to France to mediate between him and Louis XIV. Indeed, Moulay Ismail referred to Ben Aicha as 'our very dear admiral of our seas, who holds high favour and dignity.'[621] Additionally, Saad Allal Boulaawam is elected twice as caid of Salé, in 1682 and in 1686.[622] In other words, Boulaawam and Ben Aicha are actors who crossed political realms. Not only they exist within separate, but overlapping realms of political rule, one autocratic (Moulay Ismail's rule) and one built by consensus (the pirate republic); they also practiced different kinds of politics: conventional politics within the boundaries of the Makhzen, and alternative politics within the maritime republic of Salé.

Period in the yearly calendar	Number of captures (of ships)
Active season (March-September)	21
Inactive season (October-February)	6
Unknown	4

Table 3: Abdallah Ben Aicha's captures (1686-1698)[623]

4. Conclusion: Slaves and pirates in the 'promised land' as vectors of agency

The dual nature of inter- and intra-spatial relations in this period, structured by diffusion of politics, antagonism and alliance, was therefore a key element in the socio-historical development of

---

[619] *La Petite histoire du Maroc: Première série: Des origines à Moulay Ismaïl* (Casablanca: Chérifienne d'Édition et de Publicité, 1950), p. 233.

[620] *La Petite histoire du Maroc,* p. 233.

[621] *La Petite histoire du Maroc*, p. 237.

[622] Maziane, *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*, p. 95.

[623] Maziane, p. 207.

Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty. By utilising the tensions between mercantilist global economies and different articulations of agency, pirates in the Salé republic – with all the richness and complexity of their ethnic and religious constitutions, from European renegades to Maghribis and Moriscoes in the urban space – helped craft their own political space. Indeed, the creation and subsequent development of ʿAbid al-Bukhari, an elite army of soldier-slaves, denotes a turn towards a racialist strategy of political accumulation geared towards controlling military and political tensions on land. This multi-dimensional historical context enabled autonomous agents and polities – such as the Salé Republic – to flourish for brief periods. With the extension of the strategy of political accumulation on sea, however, the autonomy of these agents became gradually restricted as a result of the appropriation of the trade of piracy. As such, the Salé Republic is not a 'pirate utopia' as Lamborn Wilson argues,[624] but a product of contingency and specific historical circumstances. In other words, both the slave-army and the Republic were forged within a political context of tension and synergy. Thus, the Republic flourished as there were no political or economic imperatives preventing its rise.

More importantly, through Morocco's positioning as an important source of raw materials, exchanging sugar and saltpetre expropriated from clans for weapons and cloths, the English have established direct trade with the Moroccans in a shift away from Portuguese hegemony.[625] These factors have provided the Maghrib with multiple ways through which to enact agency. Specifically, these relations have given rise to the development of variegated conglomerates within different social groups, and forms of resistance amongst enslaved people, which were crucial factors in the making of alternative agencies. An important part of analysing slavery practices is doing so in a way that centres the thought of abolitionists,[626] and the daily individual and collective struggles of enslaved people. The attempt at institutionalising the racialist Ismaili project in 1699, with all the forms of violence it entailed, has pushed many of the enslaved to flee and those who were enslaved to go on 'strikes' until they were paid. Despite their limitations and theological-humanistic formulations, the opposition of Ahmad Baba al-Timbukti to slavery in Mauritania,[627] and Al-Hajj 'Abdal-Salam Jassus' repeated protests to Moulay Ismail against slavery, which he has described as an 'ignominious (crime) [which] engendered evil deeds', an opposition which has led to his imprisonment and execution by hanging – are powerful historical moments that delineate the complex nature of race, slavery, and the opposition to it, in the Maghrib. The connections of the private and the public realm through the creation of al-

---

[624] Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs & European Renegadoes* (New York: Autonomedia, 1996), p. 17. For a more systematic challenge of this argument, see: Maaninou, *Salā fī al-qarn al-sābiʿ ʿashar : jumhūrīyyah al-qurāṣinah [Salé in the Seventeenth Century: The Republic of Pirates]*.

[625] Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653* (London: Verso, 2003), p. 12.

[626] With the recognition that there has been no consistent abolitionist movement in Morocco, unlike in Tunisia and Mauritania. See: El Hamel, *Black Morocco*.

[627] Timothy Cleaveland, 'Ahmad Baba Al-Timbukti and His Islamic Critique of Racial Slavery in the Maghrib', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 2015.

ʿAbid Bukhari, which functioned not as a state army but as a personal army, has had significant reverberations throughout Maghribi history after the death of Moulay Ismail.

Following the death of Moulay Ismail in 1727, the army of ʿAbid al-Bukhari was in a long-term state of revolt against successive sultans. Sultan Abdelmalik was briefly suzerain from March 1728 to March 1729. During his short-lived rule, he lowered the wages of the soldiers of ʿAbid al-Bukhari from the 100,000 mithqals they had received under Ismail's rule, to a mere 4,000 mithqals.[628] Despite swiftly raising this wage by an amount of 50,000 and asking the army to follow the rule and ways of the sultan, they rebelled against him and attacked the city of Meknes to depose him, forcing him to flee to Fes.[629] Additionally, ʿAbid al-Bukhari were opposed to the military reforms of Moulay Abdelmalik, and so they sought to disrupt them by aligning with opposing forces within the former administration of the Ismaili sultanate.[630] Thus, in addition to being a century of famine, of epidemiological disease, and drought, the eighteenth century was also a historical time of prolonged military and political instability. What does this mean for Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty? I interpret these contentious military dynamics not as a sign of the collapse of that sovereignty model, but as an outcome of the fundamental issues with a personal slave army conceptualised as an organised institutional army. While the soldiers are waged, they are also enslaved. While they are enslaved, they also discipline other groups of captives.[631] The army itself is centred upon the personal relations with the ruler and draws from existing social relations of this segment of the population being without land or clan affiliation; at the same time, the enslaved soldiers are reinserted in society as an extension of the central tributary state, performing tasks such as the extraction of tax from the wider population, maintaining civil and public order, and protecting the infrastructure and rule of the sultanate. In other words, it is that military system's own contradictions which lead to this prolonged state of dissent within the ranks of ʿAbid al-Bukhari after Moulay Ismail's passing, as these historical changes and tensions did not bring about qualitative changes in territoriality in the Morocco. Political turmoil was rife as there was no person around whom the army was centred. The signing of a treaty with France in 1767 – the first one in which diplomatic protection was introduced, gave both the French consuls and the Moroccans working with them extraterritorial rights of 'being free from all personal impositions.'[632] Our next chapter begins almost a century later, when the ramifications of that treaty begin to alter the Moroccan social fabric.

---

[628] Annassiri, p. 120.
[629] Annassiri, p. 121.
[630] Ahmed Louarith, 'Āl-Azma Fy Ālmaġrib Baʿd Wafāt Ālsulṭān Mawlāy Ismāʿyl Ālʿlwy Wa Muḥāwalat Taʾsys Ṭabāʾiʿ Ğadyda Lilmulk [The Crisis in Morocco after the Death of Sultan Moulay Ismail]', *Āltāryẖ Ālʿaraby: Mağala ʿilmya Muḥkama* 18 (2001): 59–78.
[631] Beach, 'African Slaves, English Slave Narratives, and Early Modern Morocco'.
[632] Bouzidi, *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial*, p. 121.

CHAPTER 5

Crises of Imperialism

1. Introduction

The previous chapter focused on providing a vivid illustration of Morocco's distinctive ecosystems of sovereignty, showing the ways in which political claim-making was contested and negotiated in the period of 1666-1727, as well as the dynamics between different levels, claims, layers, and cultures of political worldmaking. Specifically, in investigating the practices of piracy and slavery, the previous chapter demonstrated the divergent outcomes of extrication from social bonds in different spaces. Although both slaves and pirates existed outside of social bonds and social relations, their sociopolitical positions diverged, and as a result, their agential power took on different forms. The position of the enslaved, as a landless social group having no clear clan-based attachments, or the position of persons captured and enslaved from other societies – with their labour appropriated for the purpose of establishing a military apparatus – and their social conception as 'outsiders' whether that be in a spatial and cultural sense, or in a social hierarchal sense, served as a basis and a justification for their enslavement. In other words, the exploitation of the enslaved – both in an individual and a collective sense – relied on the reproduction of social relations within which they were constructed simultaneously as outsiders and insiders, as well as the production of social relations within which they were inserted as soldier-slaves. The latter dynamic took place via the enslaved forming of the corps of the sultan's military and carrying out duties of military protection and tribute extraction for the tributary sultanate. However, in the case of the maritime pirate Republic of Salé, the same dynamics yielded completely different results. Many (but not all) of the Salétins had no affiliation to land or clans; they came from other geographical spaces, bringing their own social hierarchies. However, although the Salétins too had existed on the periphery of dominant social relations, the very category of Salétins was expansive and challenged existing socio-political structures. As shown in the previous chapter, belonging to the republic was centred on neither ethnic, religious, nor dynastic affiliations, but rather on maritime skill and ambition.[633] This applied to both the social composition of the republic and the hierarchies structuring the political economy of maritime raiding and commerce. The social composition of the Salé population included not only various groups of Maghribis and people with historic Salé lineage, black people from other parts of the African continent, Andalucians, and other Europeans, including the Dutch and the British, but also various religions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity with some evidence of agnostic or non-religious

---

[633] Mohamed Said Maaninou, *Salā fī al-qarn al-sābi' 'ashar : jumhūrīyyah al-qurāṣinah* (Cairo: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2020), p. 107.

affiliation.[634] Thus, the social condition of the non-Moroccan and non-Maghribi Salétins as 'outsiders' did not result in their enslavement. In contrast, their existence outside social relations led to a unique historical experiment of autonomous political rule, which included the establishment of distinctive legal, educational, diplomatic, and economic structures within the boundaries of Salé's maritime pirate republic.

This chapter focuses on analysing the socio-historical and economic contradictions of imperial politics in the nineteenth century. It provides contextual empirical evidence for a historical epoch which the author views as the point of historical convergence of crises and transformations and the beginning of the long-term process of ecocide, which capitalises on the diffused nature of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty and gradually leads to their decline. These transformations not only changed the terms through which Moroccans have thus far engaged with external actors and pressures but also reconfigured key elements in the economic base and political juridical superstructure which have determined the political forms of the Moroccan milieu. These transformations would propel a departure from a diffused realm of politics, from an ecosystem of rule in which different forms of political organisation worked with or against, and above or below one another, to one where the tributary state becomes the arbiter of the newly emerging social forces within its boundaries and of the expansion of imperialism. This chapter focuses on tracing the genealogies of the interaction between capitalism and non-capitalist life through specific forms of accumulation in the Maghrib in the second half of the nineteenth century. It does so by looking at the cumulative '… emergence of capitalism as a value-added process gaining in complexity as it moved along a chain of inter-related sites'.[635] Focusing on the intertwinement of the local and global vagaries of the market, environmental, and economic crises, this chapter asks the following questions: How did the Moroccan tributary state experience and respond to this period of crisis? To what extent has the international system and its tide of imperialism shaped such responses? What were the material manifestations of this critical juncture and how did they (re)arrange existing forms of political organisation, social relations, and structures?

Drawing on a range of primary (including archival) and secondary resources, this chapter focuses on 1860-1895 as a timeframe that highlights distinct manifestations of these crises: the restructuring of the market, the taxation system, and social relations through the system of diplomatic protection. While the previous chapter focused on illustrating strategies of political accumulation pursued by different actors, and the dynamic nature of their relationship through the case-studies of statecraft through piracy and enslavement, this chapter provides an overview and an analysis of some the contextual strategies not of the transformations of political rule, but of the transformations of the

---

[634] Maaninou, p. 108.
[635] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (Verso, 2002), p. 48.

economic context which saw Morocco increasingly dragged into the global system of capitalism. The shift from a political form of accumulation towards one manufactured by a new player entering the scene – imperialism – involves hoarding, the accumulation of reserve funds, and the accumulation of extraterritorial rights through European diplomacy. These strategies took place within the age of empire and capital, which saw Morocco under various forms of economic pressure. As such, this chapter focuses on showing the layers of interference of capital and empire in the Moroccan social fabric. In turn, internal contradictions, as this chapter demonstrates, began to crytallise, notably through the emergence of a new 'class' of diplomats and merchants extricated from the Moroccan juridical structures through the diplomatic protection system. Through the focus on the market, taxation, and diplomatic protection as tools of analysis, this chapter argues that this context of accumulation is key to understanding the structural changes in Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty – from a system of sovereignty based on political claims and rights of rulership (plurality) to a system of sovereignty with a stricter approach towards territoriality (semi-singularity). As the next chapter will evidence, under the latter stage, the central tributary state sees a new double-pronged tension emerge: a tension between its *raison d'être* and the relationship of some its inhabitants with the commons, and a tension between itself and the expansion of specifically British imperialism. These structural changes in the political milieu, this thesis argues, must be conceptualised within the context of capitalism and imperial plunder, which have helped set up qualitatively different socio-political and economic conditions in the Moroccan milieu through the reinforcement of structural dependencies and the creation of a system that binds the peripheral (Moroccan) ruling 'classes' with existing capitalism and imperial interests.

Challenging the theorisation of capitalist development as a tunnel history of modernisation and as a process of 'European diffusionism',[636] this chapter argues that the 'secret of accumulation' neither lies in an eclipsing of class analysis nor in account of capitalism where the rest follows the west in a linear manner– the secret of accumulation, it is argued, is located at the nexus of struggle and alliance between distinct European and Moroccan groups of merchants and diplomats, in which both the city and the countryside are prominent sites of contention, as well as at the heart of the increasingly prominent differentiations of class, labour, and geography. Whilst these struggles unveil simmering tensions that have altered the political trajectory of Moroccan statecraft, they also bolster the position of a nascent class of producers and entrepreneurs operating at the vestiges of a traditional society largely reliant on a subsistence agriculture and a system of crops and animals as taxation. The secret of (imperial) primitive accumulation is explored in three dimensions combining a range of endogenous and exogenous tensions which propelled Morocco at the heart of imperial capitalist expansion without directly leading to the emergence of its *own* capitalism; the three dimensions analysed in this chapter are marketisation (through the commodity of tea), monetisation (of the

---

[636] J. M. Blaut, 'Colonialism and the Rise of Capitalism', *Science & Society* 53, no. 3 (1989): 260–96.

taxation system), and commodification (of social relations through the emergence and acceleration of the diplomatic protection system).

In answering the questions posed, this chapter provides context for the accelerated transformations of the latter nineteenth century. It proceeds from the hypothesis that these transformations generated a transition from a regime of political accumulation to a regime of social and economic accumulation in response to both the changing local dynamics of social relations and the echoes of capitalism seeping into the Moroccan context. This reorganisation of the social relations of production, it is argued, provides crucial insight into the development of a semi-territorial conception of sovereignty in Morocco, which emerged not only from 'internal' transformations in political rule, but more crucially, from the reverberations of capitalism in Morocco. This dynamic, I argue, is distinct from the development of sovereignty in England and France. As such, analysing these social relations is key to understanding the emergence of tensions around territoriality and rulership. The argument proceeds in the following steps. First, it delves into complex layers of market dynamics, notably through the tea trade and international treaties. During the Ismaili epoch, the Moroccan tributary state focused on creating a military apparatus whose members (the enslaved soldiers) had affiliations and allegiance to no groups or social forces other than the sultan. As shown in the previous chapter, whilst the tributary state strove to contain practices of sea-piracy at times, disabling Maghribi maritime power through advanced European technologies,[637] it also worked *with* the Salétins on various diplomatic and political fronts. However, as the Moroccan economy became increasingly reliant on a merchant capital whose gains '… stand in inverse proportion to the general economic development of [Moroccan] society',[638] this particular juncture is a manifestation of a growing form of marketisation. Third, the argument explores the connections between the former and the restructuring of the trade system through the introduction of cash taxation which continues to co-exist with traditional, primitive currencies. This system of monetisation, it is argued, has both entrenched class distinctions and atomised existing traditional societal structures. Fourth, this chapter explores the commodification of social capital through a system of consular 'protection' which enabled Europeans to become producers through ownership of cattle and land, whilst their Moroccan allies obtained extraterritorial rights and escaped the jurisdiction of the Makhzen, including in matters of taxation. The last part of the argument focuses on delineating the connections between these systems of marketisation, monetisation, and commodification, and a series of environmental and health crises which plagued this period, as well as distinct emerging social relations and forms of agency and counter-agency.

---

[637] Matar, 'The Maghariba and the Sea : Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period'.

[638] Karl Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 223.

2. Marketisation: Morphologies of Atay in the Moroccan Landscape

Atay, or as Moroccans, would jokingly call it at times, 'Berber whiskey', is an essential feature of every Moroccan and Maghribi home. *Tinariwen* sang about it in *Iswegh Attay*. *Nass El Ghiwane* have poetically extolled the pleasure of making and sharing it in *Siniya*, singing: 'How difficult it is to be addicted to and easy it is to love a glass [of tea]'. Making it is both an art form and a methodical endeavour. It involves washing the tea to remove the bitterness, extracting its essence, reusing the essence with additional hot water and copious, diabetes-inducing amounts of sugar, and putting it to boil for a few minutes. The final step is to infuse the golden elixir of tea with herbal flavours. There is a wide selection to choose from: most commonly and traditionally spearmint, shiba, dried zaatar (thyme) if you feel poorly, or *timijja* if you have connections with the Atlas regions, which your aunties and grandmother would lovingly handpick and dry for you. Then, there is a science to the act of pouring tea. It has to be poured – and without spillage – from the correct height and in the correct glass of tea to achieve a sufficient amount of what we call *dekka*, or the froth that majestically sits on top of a Moroccan glass of tea. The act of pouring tea itself is an act of love, an act of solidarity, a symbol of hospitality, a cultural form of kindness to the self, practiced to cope with the difficulties of *ghorba* which Algerian Raï singers have often sang about.[639] Today, tea is consumed by all social classes. However, while it is unthinkable to go into a Moroccan home without being offered *atay*, this was not always the case historically. Indeed, the transformation of tea from a luxury good and an 'artificial but imperative need' to a commodity and a staple in Moroccan homes was a long-term process.[640] It reveals a story about the instruments and dynamics of long-term structural changes in the circuits of trade and the ways in which they have dramatically altered the social and economic superstructures both in the city and countryside.

Thus, in using tea as a microcosm for interrogating the transformations of market geographies and the role of individual merchants in the process, this section of the chapter provides a glimpse of the dynamism of tensions within the Moroccan context. It does so by exploring the relationship between the central tributary state and capitalism through the flavours of tea.

---

[639] *Ghorba* both is the physical condition of exile and immigration, and the existential feeling of alienation and non-belonging that comes with the process.

[640] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century. Volume II: The Wheels of Commerce*, trans. Siân. Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 178.

The importance of the Battle of Isly (1844)[641] and the Battle of Tétouan (1859-1860)[642] as two critical junctures in the modern history of Morocco which have restructured state-society relations whilst highlighting the fragile nature of a Moroccan economy has been amply demonstrated. Naciri, for example, argues that the Battle of Isly laid bare the vulnerabilities of a state [Morocco] bound in the shackles of a particular system of resource exploitation, administrative structures, and territorial forms of organisation which have left it ill-equipped to face the tides of imperialism.[643] Furthermore, the Battle of Isly transformed the sphere of trade and treaties between Morocco and Europe,[644] notably through a treaty with the United Kingdom in 1856.[645] In addition to British military interference in the Mediterranean to guarantee the passage to India,[646] the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856 represented the moment at which international trade and the diffused, multi-layered nature of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty became intricately intertwined.

While in the previous period of 1666-1727, international trade treaties have taken on the form of regulating and disabling piracy/privateering and containing the sea-faring practices of the republic's citizenship, the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856 stands at the opposite spectrum as a treaty which broke the 'isolationism' and monopoly of the sultanate[647] over trade by interfering on three levels: 1) the establishment of a new customs tariff in Morocco; 2) the enshrinement of the legal right to establish quotas for the entry of goods into Morocco; 3) the enforcing of the principle of 'reciprocity' as a way of controlling Moroccan ports and opening up the economy to the international market. It is important to note that Article 7 of the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty has only been abrogated after independence in 1957 following diplomatic negotiations between Charles Duke, the United Kingdom's then-diplomatic representative in Morocco, and Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which of series of letters were exchanged to guarantee the 'most-favoured-nation treatment' between Britain and Morocco,[648] particularly in matters of importation, wherein the taxation of British exports

---

[641] Raphaël Danziger, 'The Attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd El-Rahman towards the French as Reflected in His Internal Correspondance (1844 - 1847)', *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée* 36, no. 1 (1983): 41–50.

[642] Itzea Goikolea-Amiano, 'Hispano-Moroccan Mimesis in the Spanish War on Tetouan and Its Occupation (1859–62)', *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 1 (2019): 44–61.

[643] Mohammed Naciri, 'L'évolution de l'économie Marocaine En Longue Période : Crise Des Modèles Ou Crise Des Élites ?', *Critique Économique* 24 (2009).

[644] Adam Barbe, 'Public Debt and European Expansionism in Morocco from 1860 to 1956' (Paris School of Economics, 2016).

[645] James A. O. C. Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, with Particular Reference to the Role of Gibraltar' (University of Cambridge, 2009).

[646] Khalid Ben Srhir, 'Britain and Military Reforms in Morocco During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century', *Oriente Moderno* 23, no. 84 (2004): 85–109.

[647] This treaty also guaranteed to the Sultan the right to ban exports of grain in cases of shortage.

[648] United Nations, *Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations*, vol. 310, 1958, p. 6.

to Morocco was capped at 10%.[649] This clause culminated in the subordination of the entirety of Moroccan external commerce to the policy.

Notwithstanding the modern adaptations of this treaty, Morocco witnessed successive unequal treaties with European powers in this new era of trade history, including a treaty with the Netherlands in 1858, and *Tratado de Wad-Ras* with Spain in 1860.[650] Thus, throughout this period, British traders arrived at the ports of Essaouira[651] and Tanja,[652] dominating trade through the commodities of tea and sugar, two products which would become staples and simultaneously drastically weaken the Moroccan economy by undermining local crafts and artisanry.[653] Pennell notes, for example, that in Salé alone, 'there had been fifty-three workshops weaving cloth or wool in 1858; those trades had almost vanished by the mid-1880s'.[654]

Map 1: Map of Essaouira designating the city's two Mellahs as 'old' and 'new Jews town'[655]

---

[649] Germain Ayache, 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860', *Revue Historique* 220, no. 2 (1958): 271–310.

[650] Goikolea-Amiano, 'Hispano-Moroccan Mimesis in the Spanish War on Tetouan and Its Occupation (1859–62)'.

[651] Essaouira in historical archival sources is āssawyra with س not with ص as it is written in Arabic our present time. The naming originates from āssur which means wall.

[652] Tangier.

[653] Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 120.

[654] Pennell, p. 120.

[655] Arthur Leared, *Morocco and the Moors : Being an Acount of Travels, with a General Description of the Country and Its People* (London: Darf Publishers, 1985), p. 68.

Essaouira was founded in 1764, and within ten years, it not only became Morocco's primary trading port with Europe, but also the bridge that connected the Jewish community of Morocco with that of England.[656]

In modern Morocco, tea, similar to flour and oil, is an essential commodity. To provide a glimpse of its importance, it is necessary to point out statistical evidence. Moroccans consume an average of 1 kg of tea per year;[657] whereas the local production of green tea, particularly in the early 1980s in the city of Larache, produced an average of 127 tonnes.[658] Indeed, national tea consumption moved from 20200 tonnes in 1980 to 27200 tonnes in 1990.[659] This prompts a critical question. In an important historical work on tea in Morocco, Miège asks:

> Is Morocco not one of the only countries in the world with a national drink that is entirely imported? That the purchases of sugar and tea weigh so heavily on a deeply lopsided commercial balance only adds to the paradox.[660]

To address this question, it is crucial to trace the global context which gave prominence to the tea trade and consumption in Morocco. The abolition of the *Companie des Indes Orientales* in 1833 and the revolutionising of transport through the advent of faster and more efficient clippers represented a significant turn in the history of commerce, disrupting England's monopoly over the tea trade and lowering the prices of tea globally. The market dynamics that have established tea as a global commodity correspond with the opening of the Maghribi sphere to international trade and the graduate subordination of its economy to the vagaries, laws of motion, and fluctuations of capitalism. As London continued to be the centre of tea distribution, Gibraltar gained increasing importance as the tea redistribution centre in the western Mediterranean. Thus, while Gibraltar received an equivalent of 500,711 francs of tea in 1828, this amount tripled within the next 15 years.[661] However, to further illustrate the significance of 1856 in propelling Morocco at the heart of tea market competition, the protectionist policies of the Sherifian sultanate were reflected in tea entering Morocco, not only being taxed at 10%, but also being subject to a specific duty of a piastre per pound.[662] During this period, the Makhzen enjoyed full monopoly over commodities of tea, coffee,

---

[656] Daniel Schroeter, 'Anglo-Jewry and Essaouira (Mogador), 1860—1900: The Social Implications of Philanthropy', *Transactions & Miscellanies (Jewish Historical Society of England)* 28 (1981): 60–88.

[657] Abdelahad Sebti and Abderrahmane Lakhsasi, *Min Al-Shāy Ilá al-Atāy: Al-'ādah Wa-al-Tārīkh [From Tea to Atay: Tradition and History]*, 25 (Rabat: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1999), p. 22.

[658] Sebti and Lakhsasi, p. 23.

[659] Sebti and Lakhsasi, p. 22.

[660] Miège, *Origine et développement de la consommation du thé au Maroc*, p. 458.

[661] Jean-Louis Miège, *Origine et développement de la consommation du thé au Maroc* (Rabat: Société d'études économiques, sociales et statistiques, 1956), pp. 383-384.

[662] Miège, p. 384.

and sugar, as Moroccan exports to Britain were 66% higher than imports from Britain to Morocco.[663] Thus, as tea – served with mint or basil – became the drink of Jewish *mellahs* and Muslim *medinas* alike,[664] it connected rural and urban spaces from Essaouira to Fes, Marrakech, Larache, and Assfi,[665] whose trade routes simultaneously extended into the desert, with groupings of *Reguibate* and *Ouled Dlim*, extending to Mauritania, trading for tea, sugar and salt as a means of subsistence. This echoes Leriche's argument which stipulates that tea was in fact introduced to Morocco through the British, not the Portuguese, and subsequently travelled across the desert, beginning with Sudan and Mauritania.[666] In this sense, the desert was not the space of barrenness which Orientalist fiction suggests, but rather a 'sea of sand' which acted as a space of connectivity and protection for different communities,[667] with the intricacies of this trade system having only been shattered during the French conquest – the only point at which a single state ruled the Sahara,[668] despite Morocco's previous attempt to expand into the Songhai Empire and monopolise the salt trade.[669]

In the southwest of Morocco, in the Souss region, the confederation of Aït Baamrane witnessed unsweetened tea-centred dynamics of turbulence.[670] In February 1883, the port saw the arrival of vessels of the British North West Africa company,[671] thus emptying its cargo of grains, tea, and sugar, as the English negotiated treaties with the local governors of the confederation without consulting the central tributary state.[672] This provoked the wrath of Sultan Hassan I, who proceeded to carry out a military operation in the region as a form of subjugation and a way of demonstrating Aït Baamrane's subservience to the state authority.[673] From here on, a different picture emerges from the dynamics which structured the dialectic of the state, society, and the international during the eighteenth century – a picture where commerce began to take on a more systematic, large-scale, and commercial form involving a variety of luxury goods. To illustrate this point further, let us return to the eighteenth century and examine the mechanisms of commerce.

---

[663] Miège, *Origine et développement de la consommation du thé au Maroc*.

[664] Roger Le Tourneau, *Histoire du Maroc moderne* (Aix-en-Provence : Université de Provence, 1992).

[665] Safi.

[666] Albert Leriche, 'De l'origine Du Thé Au Maroc et Au Sahara', *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire* 15, no. 2 (1953) : 731–36.

[667] M'hamed Oualdi, *A Slave Between Empires: A Transimperial History of North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), p. 7.

[668] Ghislaine Lydon, *On Trans-Saharan Trails : Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 12.

[669] Ibiang Oden Ewa, 'Pre-Colonial West Africa: The Fall of Songhai Empire Revisited', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 26 (2017): 1–24; E. Ann McDougall, 'Salt, Saharans, and the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade: Nineteenth Century Developments', *Slavery and Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies* 13, no. 1 (2008): 61–88.

[670] David Montgomery Hart, 'The Ait Ba 'Amran of Ifni : An Ethnographie Survey', *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée* 15, no. 1 (1973) : 61–74.

[671] The company was founded by Donald Mackenzie in 1874. For more details, see Chapter 6.

[672] Sebti and Lakhsasi, *Min Al-Shāy Ilá al-Atāy: Al-'ādah Wa-al-Tārīkh [From Tea to Atay: Tradition and History]*, p. 27.

[673] Sebti and Lakhsasi, p. 27.

The eighteenth century in Morocco can be described as a maritime golden age. Maritime activities and trading with a variety of countries, including Europe, were vibrant. During this period, Morocco formed large-scale commercial links with the Iberian Peninsula,[674] the English Chanel, Scandinavia, and islands of the Mediterranean Sea. Trading and commerce via mountain, sea, and desert routes in local daily and weekly markets has flourished. However, during this period, the central tributary state held a monopoly over trade, sometimes with unintended catastrophic consequences. For instance, following the proliferation of civil wars between 1727 and 1757, in the aftermath of Sultan Ismail's death, Morocco began to witness internal stability, better climatic conditions, and significant agricultural production. As a result, this improvement in climate and internal politics encouraged Sultan Mohammed Ben Abdellah (1757-1790) to issue a decree commanding the export of wheat, the profit from which would be used to purchase weapons and ammunition. As the Ismaili project was costly – in political, economic, and military terms – Sultan Mohammed Ben Abdellah sought to reverse that pattern by creating 'independent fiscal resources' through maritime trade.[675] Thus, Sultan Mohamed Ben Abdellah invited English, Spanish, French, and Danish merchants to conduct commerce in the ports of Morocco, especially in Essaouira, while initially relying on elite Moroccan merchants, both Muslim and Jewish, as intermediaries. In turn, this encouraged the elite merchants to move to port cities.[676]

This level of turbulence was also reflected in the emerging social history of tea of Morocco, which witnessed two positions in the nineteenth century: on the one hand, the first position focused on opposition to the consumption of tea, not on religious grounds, but on the grounds of a 'moral political economy' which perceived tea as yet another symbol of encroaching European imperialism.[677] For example, Muhammed al-Kattani (1873-1909), a Moroccan poet, reportedly forbade his Sufi brotherhood from consuming tea, arguing that it was a commodity through which European interference and colonialism were to take place.[678] The second position on tea consumption was more complex and was exemplified in the popular culture emerging around tea; it was a position which alternated between condemning its use and encouraging it,[679] also reflecting anxieties about colonialism as well as about the fast-paced socio-political, economic, and cultural metamorphoses taking place in the nineteenth century Moroccan landscape. Representative of this ambivalence is the

---

[674] Similarly, Algeria, Tunisia and Western Tripoli saw the flourishing of vibrant trading and commerce practices in the eighteenth century. For an explanation of the local and global dynamics that hampered their development, see: Mahfoud Saidani, 'āttiğāra bi aqṭār ālmaġrib ālʿraby fy ālʿhd ālʿuṭmāny mā bayn ālqarnayn (18-19) [The trade in the Maghreb Arab region during the Ottoman Empire in 18th - 19th century]', *The Algerian Historical Journal* 5, no. 2 (2021): 567–88.

[675] Mohammed Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun* (Casablanca: Edition Porte d'Anfa, 2011), p. 39.

[676] Kenbib, p. 39.

[677] Graham Haugh Cornwell, "Sweetening the Pot: A History of Tea and Sugar in Morocco, 1850-1960" (Washington, Georgetown University, 2018), p. 44.

[678] Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 122.

[679] Cornwell, "Sweetening the Pot: A History of Tea and Sugar in Morocco, 1850-1960", p. 44.

poetry of Brahim ou'Lahcen ou'Adi n'Aït Yakhlef, who is reportedly descended from the clan of Aït Yakhlef, in which he details the rituals of tea-making and the necessary conditions of preparation of the drink. Aït Yakhlef gives allegorically compares this process to the universe which we inhabit, thus, the tea tray represents the sun, the teapot represents the axis in the midst of the sky, the glasses are the stars, and the flames are hell.[680] Most importantly, Aït Yakhlef provides a crucial socio-economic context for the consumption of tea in his poetry by pointing out that tea is a drink of the elites, not only because it is expensive but also because ordinary people do not have access to the utensils required to make the drink. He further warns against the 'collective addiction' as a subtle European stratagem designed to (symbolically) bombard Morocco with cannons of tea as a distraction from the impending colonialisation and dispossession that awaits.[681]

It could hardly be argued that Aït Yakhlef's argument was an exaggeration because of the diffusion of new commodities in the Moroccan market and the global drop in tea prices as a result of infrastructural advances and cheaper production costs. Moroccan families were led into severe debt for the sake of this novel commodity, reaching 30% of their budget in some cases.[682] It could be argued, therefore, that the combination of socio-historical and economic changes engendered by the acceleration of a structurally uneven form of European trade and the imperial tide, through the marketisation of tea, has resulted in the creation of a structural crisis in rural spaces by creating 'a class of debt-ridden peasants',[683] specifically in port cities such as Essaouira, Tanja, and Larache, where those forms of trade were rife. In turn, this prompted significant demographic changes, as peasants started migrating towards port cities. Thus, between 1856 and 1900, the population in Tanja grew from 10,000 to 45,000 and from 1,600 to 21,000 in Casablanca.[684]

3. Primitive Currencies, Cash, and Taxation

However, the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty 1856 was not the only determining factor in restructuring the Moroccan *Iyyala* [empire] – the Spanish occupation of Tetuán and the subsequent war of 1859-1860 were similarly critical, and according to Ayache, one of the historical events which marks a shift and a new beginning modern Moroccan history.[685]

With the conceptual reconfiguration of Spanish-Maghribi territoriality through the outsourcing of penal state functions to Ceuta,[686] and the Melilla crisis in 1859, the Makhzen

---

[680] Sebti and Lakhsasi, *Min Al-Shāy Ilá al-Atāy: Al-'ādah Wa-al-Tārīkh [From Tea to Atay: Tradition and History]*, p. 27.
[681] Sebti and Lakhsasi, p. 28.
[682] Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*, Studies in Imperialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 24.
[683] Burke III, p. 24.
[684] Burke III, p. 24.
[685] Ayache, 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860'.
[686] Vázquez and José, 'Boundaries in Time and Space'.

guaranteed Spain a neutral zone '… in the form of half a circle whose circumference and extensions will be fixed on the basis of the reach of a cannon shot derived from a piece of 24 old model' – the result of which was a cementing of a Spanish 'social unit' and the eruption of a crisis in Morocco.[687]

Additionally, the period between the 1840s and the 1910s saw significant manifestations of growing competition between Britain, Spain, Germany, and France for expansionism in Morocco.[688] Thus, Britain, alarmed of losing power as a result of Spanish occupation, pressured both sides to come to an agreement. As a provisional condition of withdrawal, Spain demanded that Morocco pays a heavy indemnity of 100 million pesetas,[689] or the equivalent of '… $4 million in 1861 U.S. dollars'.[690] Thus, the Moroccan sultanate was faced with two choices: rejecting Spain's offer and returning to war or accepting the offer at the risk of causing the collapse of the entire economy.

The crisis was imminent upon the acceptance of the agreement conditions: after an initial instalment of twenty-five million pesetas,[691] the treasury was completely emptied, as even reserves of old silver and gold coins accumulated in the past had to be used. Indeed, the payment of war indemnities to Spain was a twofold process of accumulation: on the one hand, Spain took half of the customs revenue for the next twenty-five years for compensation,[692] and on the other, Morocco's lack of material means had forced it to go into debt for the first time in its history, upon borrowing from Britain.[693] Economic domination, therefore, went hand in hand with a military defeat and restructuring of the political milieu. However, the debt problem would not be short-lived, as it continues to constitute a structural element of the Moroccan economy.[694]

---

[687] Alfonso Iglesias Amorín, "The Hispano-Moroccan Wars (1859–1927) and the (De)Nationalization of the Spanish People," *European History Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (2020): 290–310.

[688] Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p 22.

[689] Ayache, 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860'.

[690] Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, p. 25.

[691] Ayache, 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860'.

[692] See Table 1.

[693] Naciri, 'L'évolution de l'économie Marocaine En Longue Période : Crise Des Modèles Ou Crise Des Élites ?'

[694] Naciri.

Year	Reales vellones	Francs
1860	139 177 750	36 186 215
1861	59 400 187	15 444 048
1862	11 063 505	2 876 511
1863	9 740 294	2 532 476
1864	8 194 082	2 130 461
1865	10 312 852	2 681 341
1866	7 637 707	1 985 803
1867	4 991 069	1 297 677
1868	6 041 968	1 570 911
1869	5 605 655	1 457 470
1870	6 750 985	1 755 256
1871	9 604 444	2 497 155
1872	12 170 506	3 164 331
1873	15 962 440	4 150 234
1874	9 217 789	2 396 625
1875	9 464 381	2 460 739
1876	13 736 227	3 571 419
1877	11 191 132	2 909 694
1878	5 609 244	1 458 403
1879	5 658 017	1 471 084
1880	7 083 939	1 841 824
1881	4 937 889	1 283 851
1882	13 182 825	3 427 534
1883	10 473 624	2 723 142
1884	5 726 030	1 488 767
1885	1 405 379	365 398
Total	404 339 920	105 128 379

Table 4: Moroccan payments of Spanish war compensations (1860-1885)[695]

In a letter to Moulay Abbas dated 13 October 1860,[696] that clearly demonstrates the scale of the anxieties about the debt and a looming crisis, as well as the hope for help from Britain, Sultan Sidi Mohammed (1859-1873) ponders:

We ask God … to facilitate the negotiation of the loan in order to free us from the Spanish who harass us, so that we can face all the other problems. But if the loan fails, there is no doubt that the Spanish would declare the agreements made null, after having achieved their goal of taking and seizing money out of our hands. What then could we say to the people if they asked us: "you have delivered our money to the infidels, and yet they are still here, with

---

[695] Source: Crédit Lyonnais, DEEF 734741 cited in Barbe, 'Public Debt and European Expansionism in Morocco From 1860 to 1956'.
[696] Moulay Abbas is Ismail's uncle.

us?" We no longer have the money to defend ourselves against them. But the purpose for which it was given was not achieved either. It would be, in a way, a betrayal on our part.[697]

However, the Sultan's hopes were to no avail as the Makhzen had only received the loan from a reluctant England on 10 March 1862. Therefore, in addition to the indemnity to Spain, Morocco now owed ten million pesetas in debt to Britain, with an interest of 5% (the equivalent of nine million) and a commission of 15%.[698] The debt was utilised in two ways: half of the revenues were customs from Moroccan ports taken by British civil servants, and the other half was dedicated to Spain.[699] However, the transformation of ports into spaces of imperial control and expansion did not only take place through debt accumulation and the European creation of new forms of structural dependencies; the sultan's own approach towards trade and maritime infrastructure helped accelerate such dynamics. In fact, Sultan Mohammed's strategy rested upon reviving seaside towns and creating port cities for trading purposes, to the extent of inviting all nations to trade in these ports. For instance, Sultan Mohammed equipped and revived the maritime infrastructure of Dar al-Bayda (Casablanca) and created the Port of Essaouira in the early 1760s.[700] At play here is a trade system which, on the one hand, was premised on the creation of localised trading monocultures, unwittingly serving the quest for European capitalism to expand into new markets and reproduce itself. On the other hand, it relied on the socio-economic production of an artificial need for commodities through which emerged a group of commercial agents whose monopoly of trade relied on the extraction of extra-territorial rights. This process took place at the expense of the poor, who found themselves at a further risk of poverty, debt, dispossession, and taxation despotism. In Volume III of Capital, Karl Marx describes the parasitic nature of such a trading system in the following manner:

> But this monopoly of the carrying trade disintegrates, and with it this trade itself, proportionately to the economic development of the peoples, whom it exploits at both ends of its course, and whose lack of development was the basis of its existence.[701]

As a result of these double-pronged dynamics – that is, European accumulation in Morocco through debt and 'treaty-port imperialism' and the asymmetrical Makhzen relationship with commerce – a dynamic of contradictions emerges in which the texture of society and the nature of economic relations begin to transform. In other words, the opening up of trade widened the social, political, and economic gap between Morocco and Europe. Here, the port becomes a geopolitical and a geographical focal point for the inequalities of capitalism. On the one hand, the newly-created

---

[697] Ben Zidane Abdul-rahman Ben Mohammed Sijilmassi, *Ithaf a'alam al-Nass, Volume III* (Cairo: Library of Religious Culture, 2008). The translation is the author's own.

[698] Ayache, 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860'.

[699] Barbe, 'Public Debt and European Expansionism in Morocco From 1860 to 1956', p. 21.

[700] Charles-André Julien, *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes: 1415-1956* (Paris: J.A, 1978), p. 27.

[701] Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, p. 224.

maritime infrastructures of ports acted as sites of the reproduction of a 'feudal commercialism'[702] which saw seaside towns such as Essaouira transform into 'corporate bodies'[703] and trading centres. Accompanying this development of imperial *négoce* emerged a new form of differentiation – one which was not based on differentiation in the roles of production but rather crystallised the incipience of class differentiation: a 'trading oligarchy' or a merchant social force who extracted socio-economic and political concessions.[704] On the other hand, ports reflect the dynamism and revolutionary character of the capitalist mode of production as one which breaks out of Europe in search of new markets and raw materials.[705] Thus, for Europe and the Europeans, the port presented an opportunity: it acted as a site of extraction through debt accumulation, capitalist expansion, and the circulation of capital. For Morocco and its inhabitants, the function and role of the port had a different historical character. Here, the port became an imperial unit of power and symbolised an accelerated pattern of socio-historical transformations which altered the social structures of cities and towns alike. In this sense, the reverberations of capitalism into the Moroccan sphere of social relations reveal *qualitative* differences in the ways in which social and political conditions are (re-)produced in distinctive spatiotemporal contexts.[706] At a theoretical level, the implications of these contradictory forms of social relations are significant. It demonstrates the existence of different and prolonged paths to capitalism – ones based on visions that are 'not reliant on a singular national model based on the English experience'.[707]

However, to argue that the specific instance of debt mentioned earlier directly led to a European domination of Morocco would be an exaggeration, as '… the payment represented actually approximately 12% of the customs revenues which were not the only government revenues at that time.'[708] Instead, the implication is that European patterns of accumulation through debt coincided with a structural weakening of the political structures of Morocco, involving a series of endogenous and exogenous crises, as well as increased foreign subjugation, both through diplomatic practice and the expansion, but not spread, of capitalism.

As a result of this monetary dysfunction, cracks started to appear. In Morocco, this happened through two instantiations of internal crisis: the introduction of a new tax that 'monetised' the trade system, and an overhaul of the monetary system through the depreciation of the *mithqal* and the

---

[702] Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, *Capitalism and the Sea* (London: Verso, 2021), p. 51.

[703] Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1946), p. 70.

[704] Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1946), p. 72.

[705] Satnam Virdee, 'Racialized Capitalism: An Account of Its Contested Origins and Consolidation', *The Sociological Review* 67, no. 1 (1 January 2019): 3–27.

[706] Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*, trans. Russell Moore and James Membrez, 2nd ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), p. 193.

[707] Harry Harootunian, *Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 38.

[708] Barbe, p. 23.

subsequent introduction of a new currency. The Tetuán War indemnity, for instance, generated many tensions in Morocco between a variety of groups. While Sultan Sidi Muhammed wanted to introduce significant reforms in different spheres, including the *tartib*[709] taxation system [translated literally as arrangement or organisation], reminiscent of the Ottoman *tanzimat*,[710] the *ulamas* (scholars) were vehemently opposed to this plan. This opposition was a serious complication as the support of the *ulamas* was critical, as they were a social group deemed as a threat to the 'institutional Islam' that Morocco has been trying to establish before colonialism.[711] Of note, however, is the symbiotic relationship between the state and the ulamas which changed considerably across time and space, rendering the ulamas a visible threat and grouping with limited historical influence in Morocco.[712] This was not an accidental situation, but one which merits analysis beyond the scope of this chapter; the ulamas were not merely conveyors or receptacles of tributary state power, but were rather a movement of intellectual and social inaugurators, as well as a movement of anti-colonial struggle against French imperialism.[713] Nevertheless, in Morocco their role was less distinct from the role of the ulamas of the Middle East due to '… the lack of an institutionalized and hierarchical body'[714] and 'the characteristics of Moroccan society which determined that the Moroccan ulama would tend to act less as a corporate group, and more in terms of the conflicting pulls and strains of Moroccan popular Islam'.[715] Thus, with the reign of Muhammed IV (1859–1873), a new form of indirect taxation on trade called *al-Maks* was established, culminating in an outburst of structural dissent after his passing.

Due to the wide range of existing administrative, sovereign, and religious forms of taxation in Morocco during this period,[716] this section only focuses on the taxes of al-Zakat[717] (poor tax/alms) and

---

[709] Tartib is a general tax on income, which Sultan al-Hassan made mandatory for anyone carrying out activities of production in Morocco, no matter their nationality, especially in rural areas, that is, the majority of Moroccan soil. For more on the reasons which have led to the failure of this tax system, see Tayeb Bayad, *Ālmāḫzān Wā Ḍḍārybā Wā-l Īstiʿmār: Ḍārībāẗ Āttārtyb* [The Makhzen, Taxes and Colonialism] *1880 - 1915* (Casablanca: Africa Sharq, 2011). The arrangement with these specifications is a man-made tax, approved by Moulay Hassan in 1881 and signed by the representatives of the western powers along with Morocco on March 30 of the same month.

[710] Kevin Goodwin, "The Tanzimat and the Problem of Political Authority in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1876" (Rhode Island College, 2006).

[711] Meryem Akabouch, "Islam, National Identity and Social Cohesion: The Case of Morocco" (Rome, Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali, 2014), p. 40.

[712] On the historical role of 'ulamas in the Middle East, see: Meir Hatina, ''Ulama and National Movements in the Middle East: Between Harmony and Dissent', in *Community, Identity and the State* (London: Routledge, 2004), 116–31.

[713] Edmund Burke, 'Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912', *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 1 (1972): 97–118.

[714] Akabouch, "Islam, National Identity and Social Cohesion: The Case of Morocco", p. 39.

[715] Edmund Burke III, 'The Moroccan Ulama, 1860-1912: An Introduction', in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 93–125.

[716] For a wider overview of forms of taxations, including those for subjects of the sultanate of other Abrahamic faiths and their societal implications, see: Edouard Michaux-Bellaire, 'Les Impôts Marocains', *Archives Marocaines: Publication de La Mission Scientifique Du Maroc* Tome Premier (1974): 56–96.

[717] See Suliman Bashear, 'On the Origins and Development of the Meaning of Zakāt in Early Islam', *Arabica* 40, no. 1 (1993): 84–113.

al-Achour which follow the Islamic tradition and operate as the main, but by no means the only, tools of taxation for the Treasury.

Al-Zakat is a yearly tax on capital to be paid to the treasury by every Muslim, it constitutes 2.5% of the yearly revenue, whilst al-Achour, similarly an obligatory tax, constitutes 10%.[718] The capital in this situation is represented by herds, whereas income refers to crops. In this sense, herds and crops functioned as agricultural taxes, but most importantly, as 'primitive' and non-capitalist currencies the purpose of which was not to buy and sell commodities, but to '… rearrange relations between people' and distinct social groups.[719] This form of taxation guarantees food security for producers and the continuity of production necessary for the payment of taxes.[720]

The payment of al-Achour takes into consideration environmental factors and is halved for inhabitants of irrigation-dependent regions.[721] According to Michaux-Bellaire. the payments for al-Zakat are structured as follows:

Mares and camels: The owner of fewer than six animals do not pay anything, while six camels require a tax of one sheep. Twenty-five camels for a young camel, forty-five for a camel capable of carrying weights, 90 camels for two camels, and so on.

Oxen: 30 animals for one calf, above 40 for a calf aged more than one year, two calves for 80, and so on.

Goats and mussels: lamb from forty to three-hundred animals. A sheep or a goat for more than 300 animals, and so on.[722] Archival sources detailing taxes and 'gifts' received by Sultan Abd al-Rahman (1822-1859) from the region of Souss, between the the years of 1836 and 1838, show that non-monestised forms of taxation did not only include mares, camels, mule, and grain, but crucially, mukaḥlāt, or rifles.[723]

However, these were by no means the only forms of taxes mandated by the Makhzen, as people were required to also pay a tax for the sultan, and as a result of the structural weakness of the central tributary state, these taxes were often subject to the whims of local governors – thus rendering taxes the burden of the most destitute social classes.[724] With a sultanate struggling financially through a heavy debt and ever-increasing restrictions on port revenues, Sultan Mohammed IV turned to rural

---

[718] Michaux-Bellaire, 'Les Impôts Marocains'.
[719] David Graeber, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years* (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2011), p. 60.
[720] Tayeb Bayad, *Ālmāḫzān Wā Ḍḍārybā Wā-l Īstīʿmār: Ḍārībāẗ Āttārtyb* [The Makhzen, Taxes and Colonialism] *1880 - 1915* (Casablanca: Africa Sharq, 2011), p. 167.
[721] Michaux-Bellaire, 'Les Impôts Marocains'.
[722] Michaux-Bellaire.
[723] Kunnāš [register] Number 15. Archives du Maroc, Rabat.
[724] Madia Thomson, 'A Morbid Affair: Epidemics and Famine in Morocco, 1860–1888'. *Journal of the Institute for African Studies* 2, no. 47 (2019): 86-98.

areas, particularly the coastal plains between Casablanca and Safi, the Chawia, Doukkala, and Abda, where some of the most important lineage-based social formations are located. Thus, Sultan Mohammad IV abolished the old Quranic taxes based on the size of the harvest and replaced them with a fixed sum for each clan faction imposed on trade entering distinct spaces.[725] Despite the contested (il)legality of these taxes, the sultan invoked the notion of *maslaha*, a legal Islamic principle which stipulates extraordinary measures in times of difficulty so long as they benefit the wider community.[726] This was a significant change, as the traditional system of taxation took into consideration the adversities of ecological and geographical circumstances, while the new system of taxation ignored patterns of social organisation that have relatively contained the impact of famine.[727] In a subsistence economy where production became increasingly impacted by the vagaries of capitalist expansion, and where, as taxes became significantly higher and harsher, the balance of power and the synergic relationship between institutions of the central tributary state (the *Makhzen*) and non-state political actors began to incline towards the former,[728] as peasants who formerly paid their taxes in traditional non-monetary currencies could not afford to pay monetised taxes and consequently lost their lands to money creditors.[729] This caused an increase in rural resistance movements and had dire uneven geospatial consequences.[730] Indeed, the taxes imposed upon various social forces had significantly increased in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly after the Tetouan War; the taxes of Doukkala increased from 70000 rials in 1861, to 90000 rials in 1862, then 100000 rials in 1863,[731] echoing Ayache's argument that the tax revenues from 'Abda alone have quadrupled between 1864 and 1865.[732]

Below is a table that details fluctuations in the amount of tax in cash extracted from the same lineage-based social formations in the province of Larache between 1831 and 1852:

---

[725] Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, p. 33.
[726] Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 110.
[727] Miller, p. 33.
[728] Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*, Studies in Imperialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p 34.
[729] Burke III, p. 22.
[730] Thomson, 'A Morbid Affair'.
[731] Bayad, *Ālmāḫzān Wā Ḍḍārybā Wā-l Īstīʿmār: Ḍārībāẗ Āttārtyb 1880 - 1915*, p. 166; Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun*, p. 109.
[732] Germain Ayache, *Études d'histoire marocaine* (Rabat: Société Marocaine des Éditeurs Réunis, 1983).

Year	Clan	Amount of tax or tribute (in rials)	Ālǧizya[733]	Total extracted from the province (in rials)
1831	Bni Youssef	1800		85,183
	Bni Zkar	1200		
	Bni Gorfet	6160		
	Soumata	587		
1832	Bni Youssef	61,866	3681	159,663
	Bni Gorfet	7900		
1833	Bni Youssef	2000	3680	166,384
	Bni Zkar	1000		
	Bni Gorfet	10,000		
1834	Bni Youssef	2000	3680	1,222,080
	Bni Zkar	500		
	Bni Gorfet	9000		
1835	Bni Youssef	2000	3680	127,680
	Bni Zkar	500		
	Bni Gorfet	9000		
1836	Bni Youssef	2000	10,000	168,300
	Bni Zkar	5800		
	Bni Gorfet	11,000		
1842	Bni Youssef	3000	15,400	320,100
	Bni Zkar	2000		
	Bni Gorfet	16,000		
	Bni Ouadras	14,000		
1852	Bni Youssef	5000	5400	245,100
	Bni Zgar	5000		
	Bni Gorfet	16,000		

Table 5: Cash payments to the Makhzen in the province of Larache (1831-1852)

Source: Kunnāš [register] Number 15. Archives du Maroc, Rabat.

As the table shows, the income generated for Makhzen's coffers from the region of Larache has undergone significant changes. It increased from 6160 for Bni Gorfet in 1831 to 16,000 by 1852;

---

[733] Tax on the non-Muslim population, that is, the people of the book.

while Ālǧizya – the tax on the non-Muslim population – has been relatively stable between 1832 and 1835, and then has increased to 15,400 by 1842, with a percentage of 318.5%.

Moreover, the financial precarity of this period did not leave the monetary system intact. Indeed, the traditional structure of the subsistence economy operated as a buffer against the global exchange rate, as the currency of the gold *mithqal* used in North and West Africa[734] had a fixed value for centuries.[735] In 1859,[736] the value of gold *mithqal* was estimated at 12.5 francs.[737] Nevertheless, this quickly changed at the turn of the nineteenth century. As the market was flooded by European currencies, Moroccans started making everyday use of them; and as a result, as mithqal prices continued to collapse, coins with higher silver and gold content were depreciated and gradually started to disappear from the market, rendering goods expensive for the poorest.[738]

As nineteenth-century Spanish novelist Pedro Antonio de Alarcón y Ariza demonstrated in his *Diario de un testigo de la guerra de África*, the currency was so volatile that it witnessed drastic changes from one day to another.

> Our currencies are traded between us in Morocco like paper. The hard coins are today worth twenty-five reales; tomorrow they will be eighteen, and the day after tomorrow thirty, according to their abundance or scarcity…[739]

In this sense, monetisation, both as a means of pushing taxation further into the cash economy realm, without entirely precluding traditional forms of taxation, and as a means of 'currency manipulation',[740] played a crucial role as a tool that '… want[s] transforming into capital'.[741] The introduction of administrative means of power, new forms of taxation, and the subsumption of Moroccan trade, currency, and industries within the global system of capitalism culminated in '… the breakup of traditional social relations of production, the atomization of society…'.[742] In debt and currency manipulation, the European aristocracy established a medium of accumulation, and the Moroccan tributary sultanate a medium of taxation which would increase revenue, relieve the

---

[734] Marion Johnson, 'The Nineteenth-Century Gold "Mithqal" in West and North Africa*', *The Journal of African History* 9, no. 4 (October 1968): 547–69.

[735] Naciri, 'L'évolution de l'économie Marocaine En Longue Période : Crise Des Modèles Ou Crise Des Élites ?'

[736] It is important to note that the mithqal (whether weighed in gold or grain) had different values in distinct regions – one instance of this being that the mithqal, when exchanged for goods in Morocco, supposedly had a slighter greater value than the mithqal of Timbuktu. Additionally, there are two types of mithqal, a legal one (collected for taxation purposes) and a commercial one for which goods are exchanged.

[737] Johnson, 'The Nineteenth-Century Gold "Mithqal" in West and North Africa'.

[738] Naciri, 'L'évolution de l'économie Marocaine En Longue Période : Crise Des Modèles Ou Crise Des Élites ?'; Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, p. 32.

[739] Pedro Antonio de Alarcón, *Diario de Un Testigo de La Guerra de África* (Gaspar y Roig, 1859), p 531. The translation is the author's own.

[740] Gurminder K. Bhambra, "Colonial Global Economy: Towards a Theoretical Reorientation of Political Economy," *Review of International Political Economy* 0, no. 0 (October 20, 2020): 1–16.

[741] Marx, *Capital: Vol I*, p. 521.

[742] Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 2.

economic crisis, and gradually dislocate traditional economic structures. The shift of taxation towards cash, as a result, restructured spatial rural-urban dynamics, leading to an increase in migration trends, the burgeoning of a 'native' trading class whose interests collided with the European bourgeoisie, as well as the transformation of seaside towns into cities (like the case of Essaouira) and their unequal incorporation into the wider market of capitalism.[743]

4. Consuls and Diplomats: The Commodification of Social Relations

After 1860, as the relationship between Moroccans and Europeans radically transformed, diplomacy, social stratification, and the political textures of society also witnessed changes. While Morocco is a non-capitalist subsistence economy, the expansion of capitalism has translated into the expansion of commercial infrastructure in the Moroccan space, in terms of transport, banks, postal systems, and commercial companies.[744] Navigation records show the scale of Morocco's exportation phenomenon. In 1875, in Casablanca alone, Morocco exported 252,000 kilos of chickpeas with a value of 1,260,000 francs to England, 67,500 kilos with a value of 337,500 francs to Spain, and 800 kilos with a value of 4000 francs to France.[745]

Despite the sharpness of previous Moroccan negotiators in matters of international law, referred to in diplomatic texts as *huquq al-bahr* or *tariq al-bahr* (laws or ways of the sea),[746] the system of protection intensified with the increase of European influence in Morocco. There are various causes for the deterioration of the situation in Morocco. At a global stage, the unification of German states following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the imperial expansion of France into Africa and Asia, and the increase in British-French imperial rivalries all had an impact on the terms defining Morocco's relationship with Europe.[747] At an internal level, the increase of rebellions and despotism/dissent related to military and tax reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century posed an unprecedented problem for ālʾiyyāla ālmaġribya [empire of Morocco].[748]

In particular, the Treaty of Madrid (1880) had serious ramifications regarding the socioeconomic status of the Moroccan milieu. For example, Article 1 of the Treaty states that the system of protection remains the same following the British and Spanish treaties established in Morocco, while Article 6 defines people who would benefit protection as the protected person as well

---

[743] Jairus Banaji, *Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity: Gold, Labour, and Aristocratic Dominance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 216.

[744] *Le Maroc et l'Europe: (1830 - 1894). Tome III: Les difficultés* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962), p. 481.

[745] Consulat. Casablanca 144PO/1/1. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, France.

[746] C. R. Pennell, 'The British Consular Courts and Moroccan Muslim Identity: "Christian" Justice as a Tool'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 1, no. 2 (1996): 172–191.

[747] Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun*, p. 95.

[748] Iyyala is the historical term used for Morocco in Moroccan archival sources; the author of this thesis translates it as empire.

as '… their family [which] is to consist only of the wife, the children, and the minor relatives dwelling under the same roof'.[749] In practice, however, the typologies of 'protection' went beyond these designated categories – as they both extricated European settlers and a significant number of natives from Morocco's fiscal and legal dominions. Protection or 'diplomatic' immunity began in the eighteenth century in an effort to stimulate trade through the exemption of foreigners from Moroccan jurisdiction, including the payment of taxes; however, it has morphed into a practice of local and global corruption further accentuating the economic crisis and the fragile, and at the risk of being presumptuous, volatile nature of the socio-political fabric. Its basic initial premise is that it is a relationship mediated through consuls, through which wealthy European merchant settlers with a Moroccan business partner or semsar [broker] have created a parallel system of extra-territorial rights in various sectors (agriculture, trade, export, and import) and various areas of life, such as housing and land.[750] Under this system, European settlers and Moroccan natives were taken under the wing of consuls through diplomatic immunity. In practice, however, the protection system expanded to such a degree that it attracted a large number of poor Europeans searching for a better life – or as John Drummond Hay called them, 'les misérables of Europe'[751] – to Morocco. As a result, the end of the nineteenth century saw tensions not only between the central tributary state and the 'protected' class, but also within the ranks of the latter and between poor European settlers and poor Moroccans.

This pattern of diplomatic subjugation of the totality of Moroccan society to 'capitalist gangsterism' was inescapable,[752] in light of Morocco's internal situation and the growing tide of imperialism. Bouchaara describes the helpless situation within which Morocco found itself:

> Thus, the Makhzen cannot reject a fait accompli, and Morocco cannot violate a bilateral or international treaty that it has ratified, voluntarily or involuntarily. Nor can it confront or threaten with its fleet, or escalate hostilities.[753]

Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, 20% of the population of Tanja was Spanish,[754] while the English formed the second largest community of protégé-settlers – mainly located in Essaouira. The French protégé population was slightly smaller in comparison: 31 people in Dar al-Bayda (Casablanca) in 1872 and 77 people in Tanja in 1886.[755] In 1894, the European population

[749] 'Treaty Between France and Spain Regarding Morocco', *The American Journal of International Law* 7, no. 2 (1913): 81–99.

[750] Mustafa Bouchaara, *Āl Istyṭān Wālḥimāya Bil Maġrib, 1280-1311/ 1863-1894* (Rabat: ālmaṭbaʿa ālmalakya ārribāṭ, 1984), p. 144.

[751] Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun*, p. 111.

[752] I borrow this expression from: *Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis* (New York: Verso, 2023), p. 69.

[753] Bouchaara, *Āl Istyṭān Wālḥimāya Bil Maġrib, 1280-1311/ 1863-1894*, p. 145.

[754] Bouchaara, p. 148.

[755] Bouchaara, pp. 150-152.

exceeded 500 people in Casablanca and 400 in Essaouira.[756] In 1882, some of the protégés included El Gandour ben Mohammed el Bidaoui from Casablanca, Mohammed ben Charkia from Tanja, Jacob and Haim Corcos, and ben Said Doukkaly. In 1883, protégés included Hadj El Khiat ben Fikri in Marseille and Salomon Miloul in Essaouira.[757] The table below provides an overview of the number of Europeans in Casablanca between 1891 and 1895:

	1891	1893	1895
Spanish	249	270	289
English	50	58	56
French	17	22	30
Other	70	65	80
Total	386	415	455

Table 6: Europeans in Casablanca (1891-1894)[758]

As such, the late nineteenth-century Moroccan landscape saw an important rise in the number of European merchants, reaching at least 9000 in 1894.[759] The Moroccan protégé population included merchants, secretaries, domestic servants, security staff, gardeners, bankers, translators, students at the consulate, and brokers.[760] In short, the only requirement for protection was procuring a sufficient amount of money to purchase a licence of ālmuḫālaṭa,[761] i.e., protection. Some pursued a process of European naturalisation, claiming extra-territorial rights for themselves and their children in a climate in which various segments of the Moroccan social fabric became increasingly concerned about the agents of Europeans seeking diplomatic protection. For example, in 1872 in Essaouira, there were 25 French protégés, 11 of whom were women. Out of this total number, seven men, eight women, and six children were in fact Moroccan-born and naturalised as French in 1869.[762] There are many examples of large-scale corruption patterns enabled by the protégé system. One such case is American Consul Felix Matthews, who sold certificates of naturalisation to wealthy Moroccans and was reported to have had at least 100 Moroccans under his protection by 1877.[763]

[756] Jean-Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830-1894). Tome IV* (Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 298-300.
[757] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 675PO/A/174. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, France.
[758] Consular registrations and the archives of the Franciscan Mission. Cited in Miège, p. 300.
[759] Pennell, 'The British Consular Courts and Moroccan Muslim Identity'.
[760] Affaires Étrangères, 675PO/A/174. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, France.
[761] ālmuḫālaṭa [literal translation: association or close relationship] is the term used in Moroccan archival sources to refer to the relationship between Moroccans and Europeans under the protection system.
[762] Affaires Étrangères, 675PO/A/174. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, France.
[763] Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 122.

Merchants and their agents were faking contracts and accusations of theft of money, cattle, and property to receive damages which would then be used as capital, such as in the case of Abdelaziz al-Kattani.[764] The protégé system also enabled Europeans to extract structural propertied privileges, and the consuls to gain political concessions from the Makhzen. They were taking ownership of land, cafés, mills, shops, and hotels without authorisation.[765] On 24 October 1889, a protégé from France – Dawlat ālfranṣyṣ ālfaḫyma[766] – in Casablanca wrote to Fadoul Gharneet,[767] claiming that he was evicted from his residence and demanded that the latter interfere with asking the Moroccan government to build him a 'modest' home and a shop.[768] Furthermore, a Moroccan protégé peasant was arrested due to not paying taxes and claiming that the real proprietors of his herd of animals were the Europeans. In response, the French consul of Casablanca swiftly interferes and forces his release.[769] This situation is therefore entirely different from that which shaped Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty in the early eighteenth century. Merchants no longer needed permission to conduct commerce or arrive to Moroccan ports;[770] instead, they were embedded within a wide network of imperial corruption.

Crucially, this 'protection' system had intricate ties with the Décret Crémieux (1870) established in colonial Algeria, which, on the one hand, gave Algerian Jews naturalisation rights in France and entrenched an inherent qualitative distinction between Arab and Jewish Algerian *indigènes*, and on the other hand, simultaneously subjugated Algerian Jews to colonial antisemitism. This situation resulted in an imperial collision of social forces in the Maghribi space, as Algerian Jews naturalised as French began to migrate to Morocco and a merchant 'bourgeoisie' that is increasingly reliant on Europe emerged from Morocco.[771] While different means of subjugation were used in Algeria and Morocco in the process of turning them into laboratories of colonialism, in both cases, the outcome was societal fragmentation, not only through the institutionalisation of legal distinctions

---

[764] Bouchaara, *Āl Istyṭān Wālḥimāya Bil Maġrib, 1280-1311/ 1863-1894*, p. 145.

[765] Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun*, p. 140.

[766] Dawlat ālfranṣyṣ ālfaḫyma translates to 'the magnificent state of the Fransis' and it is how France and its agents were addressed in Moroccan diplomatic correspondence.

[767] Fadoul Gharneet, real name Mohammed Lamfaddel ben Mohammed Gharrit (referred to in French and British diplomatic correspondence as 'Sid Gharneet' or 'Cid Gharneet') held ministerial positions both under the rule of Hassan I (1873-1894) and the rule of his successor, Abdelaziz (1894-1908).

[768] Tanger Légation et Consulat, 675PO/A/84. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, France.

[769] Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun*, p. 110.

[770] A Makhzen document, dated 16 February 1706, shows that all foreign merchants were given explicit authorisation to operate in the port of Salé and guaranteed that there would be no interference with their ships. Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04-004. Number 11171103-A04-004-002. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[771] Charlotte Courreye, Augustin Jomier, and Annick Lacroix, *Le Maghreb par les textes. XVIIIe-XXIe siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2020), p. 57.

between settlers and natives on the basis of their racial background or social class,[772] but also through the creation of different classes of inter-imperial subjects.[773]

The Makhzen was all too aware of the disastrous consequences of the protégé system. A letter from Mohammed ben Larbi Torres to the Sultanic Deputy for Foreign Affairs [ānnāʾib āssulṭāny fy āššuʾun ālḫāriǧya], dated 22 March 1880 shows the precarious position of Morocco with regard to foreign commerce. Torres warned against transgressions by foreign merchants and diplomats.

> Our Sultan [Hassan I] … issued his honourable order to us that associations [ālmuḫālaṭa] between Moroccans and Europeans should only take place at the hands of governors, because they know best who is fit for that and who is not, so we stood by the requirements of his honourable order, and the merchants began complaining … so that they are not prevented from trade, claiming that the latter depends on their association with people. … We recounted this to our honourable sultan… who told us that there should be no association except at the hands of the governors, and he said that his predecessor [Mohammed IV], may God have mercy on him, had agreed with the consuls that the consuls should not be merchants because they mix with the weak and the bankrupt…[774]

Thus, the protection system had a significant implication, as it supported and bolstered an informal empire that emphasised above all relentless expansionism, and yet was presented as a choice purely based on tactics aimed at establishing peace and order.[775] It also created tensions within Moroccan society as some of the protégés became creditors.[776] For instance, in 1870, Qaid[777] ben Omar from Abda and Qaid El Gorieb from Doukkala owed 4625 francs and 3520 francs respectively,

---

[772] Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, 'The Exception and the Rule: On French Colonial Law', *Diogenes* 53, no. 4 (1 November 2006): 34–53.

[773] Jean Laloum and Jean-Luc Allouche, *Les Juifs d'Algerie* (Paris: Editions du Scribe, 1987).

[774] *al-Wathā'iq: maǧmuʿāt waṯā'iqyah dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]*, vol. 7 (Mudīrīyat al-Wathā'iq al-Malakīyah, 1989), p. 112. See also : Box of Foreigners and Consular Protection. Number 13.335. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[775] Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians'.

[776] One of the contradictions of money-lending in Morocco is that Muslims willingly ceded non-Muslim minorities the societal position of moneylenders; they did so while simultaneously engaging in lending practices that returned high rates of interest but were socialised into legality through shra'. This is similar to the contentions surrounding the justifications of enslavement and the legal-social methods of camouflage used to justify the practice. According to Rodinson: 'It will be seen that this was the common situation in Morocco, although the Jews there formed a substantial minority who were very willing to relieve the Muslims of the burden of any sin of that order. This fact did not in the least prevent some Muslims of Morocco from indulging on a wide scale in transactions which in practice brought them in a very high rate of interest, even though, strictly speaking (but only strictly speaking), they were legal from the standpoint of the *shari'a*.' Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism*, pp. 37-8.

[777] The Qaid is a military chief, but one who has penal administrative functions, both in the city and the countryside. Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*, p. 86.

in unpaid debt to Mordecay Ben Ayer.[778] In addition to that, people under 'protection' were often accused of treason, corruption, and opportunism, which created a layer of tensions between them, the Makhzen, and locals from lower social classes. For instance, there is an infamous case of a Frenchman who reportedly proceeded to sell fake naturalisation certificates and protection for Araucania-Patagonia.[779]

Naciri refers to the system of protection as 'symbolic capital'.[780] However, this argument addresses only one aspect of the equation: the accumulation of social capital is one element of the protégé system, in which promotion takes place not only via money but also via familial connections.[781] The other element is a material dimension in which this symbolic capital was turned into *really existing* capital through ownership of property, whether land or cattle. It was commodified into a form of imperial accumulation and a bridge that not only propelled a 'class' of merchant-diplomats and protégé-settlers of all kinds – granting them structural extraterritorial rights with regard to land and tax – but helped forge trans-imperial alliances (between European and Moroccans). These imperial encounters shaped and unsettled the history of the poorest classes, which not so long after that would become colonial subjects.

For Europe, the Makhzen presented the perfect opportunity to obtain extraterritorial rights combined with economic privileges. As the protection system allowed Europeans to turn Moroccans into associates of their 'proto-entrepreneurial' ventures,[782] markets were dominated and rural spaces infiltrated by proxy. For example, in 1867, it was estimated that six French merchants from Casablanca owned 16000 head of cattle in Ouled Hriz alone, almost entirely sheep, which were in the hands of 81 protected Moroccan business partners, or more accurately, brokers.[783] In this sense, Europeans have transformed their position from one of purchase to one of production. Thus, the imperial ownership of cattle by proxy both enabled and legitimised the making of claims to settle land which it turned into private property for Europeans. By the end of the colonial period, settlers comprised 6-10% of the population, a seemingly small number, yet a critical one, as settlers were concentred in the most agriculturally productive lands.[784]

For Moroccans, protection also meant exemption from the jurisdictions of law and taxes. The appointment of merchants from wealthy, prominent Muslim families as *wuzara* (ministers) coincided

---

[778] Correspondence avec agence consulaire de Safi (1862-1869), Am 41. Tanger Légation et Consulat, 675PO/A/964. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, France.

[779] Pennell, p. 123.

[780] Naciri, 'L'évolution de l'économie Marocaine En Longue Période : Crise Des Modèles Ou Crise Des Élites ?'

[781] Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, p. 33.

[782] Miller, p. 43.

[783] Ayache, 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860'; Ayache, *Études d'histoire marocaine*.

[784] Leon Carl Brown, 'The Many Faces of Colonial Rule in French North Africa', *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée* 13, no. 1 (1973): 171–91.

with the creation of new (uneven) economic, political, and military linkages with Europe. This is evident in the nature of Moroccan diplomacy as of 1845, whereby Moroccan diplomats were sent on mission either to deal with questions of territory or to ask for financial assistance.[785]

These Maghribi agents, nevertheless, did not merely act as 'bearers of ulterior structural determinations' but as decision-makers whose actions are the product of their own limited time and thinking, however favourable or unfavourable their outcomes.[786] They are social agents who were historically positioned in a specific set of social relations,[787] in which their interests collided with those of the European propertied classes.

5. Accumulation and Ecologies of Disaster

Marx defines the process of primitive accumulation as '… the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production' through the transformation of modes of subsistence and production into capital. In the nineteenth century,[788] Morocco continued to be a non-capitalist subsistence economy. However, this society was altered by the protection system which allowed the European propertied classes to acquire more land and cattle in rural geographies which the Makhzen could not fully subsume under its own jurisdiction, and reproduce them by proxy (through the protected Moroccan 'partners'), whilst simultaneously rearranging traditional societal structures in the countryside. In essence, this process created surplus value for the central tributary state via the taxation system. Crops and cattle which functioned both as a means of taxation and subsistence became embroiled in the complex dynamics of imperial expansion and were transformed into capital. In turn, land, crops, and cattle formed the basis of trans-imperial agricultural partnerships of āl-muḫālaṭa.

Thus, the processes of marketisation through the evolvement of the tea trade and the opening of Morocco to international trade, monetisation through the shifting of taxes towards cash, and the commodification of social capital through the 'protection' system, have had dire ramifications felt most acutely among the poorest layers of society.

During this period, cholera and famine not only affected Moroccans but also Spanish troops during the invasion of Tetuan. Britain, however, guaranteed safe withdrawal for the Spanish before indemnity was demanded. There were several public health crises that generated various outcomes

---

[785] Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*, 2nd ed. (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009), pp. 214-15.

[786] Teschke, 'IR Theory, Historical Materialism, and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology', 1 June 2014.

[787] Clemens Hoffmann and Can Cemgil, 'The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the Social-Historical Roots of Foreign Policy', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (1 October 2016): 1279–1302.

[788] Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: Bordollo, 1887), p. 521.

that highlight the nature of traditional statecraft and the agency of actors outside of the confines of the sultanate, as well as the structural and material conditions shaping the spread of diseases and famine. On the one hand, during this period, sultans used increased taxation as part of a famine relief programme where small farmers were left destitute and paid the highest taxes. Specifically, as Thomson states, 'a tenth of their produce was given to the caid and another percentage given to the sultan and religious authorities in the form of zakat; they were also expected to provide corvée labor for the sultan'.[789] On the other hand, the cumulative impacts of this crisis in the Souss region in particular were multifaceted, affecting the domains of food production;[790] in-country migration trends away from Souss towards urban centres as the search for food, water, and work has increased, and the reinvention of new forms of labour exploitation by landowners through corvée labour, especially in Makhzen-controlled lands where the sultan and his family extracted labour in this manner, drawing on the nature of the relationship with land.[791] Thus, in 1878, the Moroccan Famine Relief Fund was established in London to aid both the Jewish and Muslim populations of Essaouira,[792] an initiative in which consul John Drummond Hay played an important role.[793]

As the taxation system shifted away from taking into account the vicissitudes of nature, as the environmental conditions between the 1860s and the 1880s were unstable, the cash economy continued to expand as a crucial means of protection against famine.[794]

While the sultanate had no control over the vagaries of natural circumstances, public health measures relied on Sufi practices and the process of prevention and relief through food production and distribution.[795] After 1860, however, the epistemologies of racial science, the language of public health, and the French civilising mission became inextricably intertwined as the social sciences of the likes of Émile Durkheim provided a language and rationale which would separate the French from Maghribi Muslims, while othering Muslims, specifically Sufi practice and knowledge production.[796]

---

[789] Thomson, 'A Morbid Affair'.

[790] Especially flour and grain; for instance, grain exportation grew with the scarcity of cotton during the American Civil War.

[791] F El Aissaoui, 'Kalaf Al-Bawadi Fi al-Qarn al-Tassi' 'ashar', in *La Campagne a Travers l'histoire Du Maroc*, ed. Brahim Boutaleb (Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines), 133–48.

[792] Schroeter, 'Anglo-Jewry and Essaouira (Mogador), 1860—1900'.

[793] For a more detailed account of the role of John Drummond Hay, see Khalid Ben Srhir, *Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845-1886*, trans. Malcolm Williams and Gavin Waterson (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005).

[794] Thomson, 'A Morbid Affair'.

[795] Allan R. Meyers, "Famine Relief and Imperial Policy in Early Modern Morocco: The Political Functions of Public Health.," *American Journal of Public Health* 71, no. 11 (November 1, 1981): 1266–73.

[796] Ellen. Amster, *Medicine and the Saints : Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877-1956* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2013), p. 61.

The monetary crises of this period intersected with a prolonged period of famine and crop failure, which have occurred from 1867 to 1869 and 1878 to 1884.[797] This does not suggest that political unrest and economic crises have caused these disasters per se, but that the ecological, political, and economic dimensions mutually reinforced one another. Smallpox, famine, and cholera epidemics metastasised, causing a rural exodus to port cities and further impoverishment of the rural population. Mortality rates during this period are estimated to be a fourth to a third of the rural population,[798] with half of the population of the Souss and Haha region estimated to have succumbed to the disease.[799] As a result, the system of protection, either through Makhzen or consular immunity, has enabled European merchants and propertied classes, as well as the rising Moroccan bourgeoisie, to come out of this situation unharmed, while making the distinctions between the rich and poor more pronounced.[800] Public health crises were intermittently ongoing with the expansion of imperial capitalist gangsterism and the formalisation of the colonial project in 1912. In Marrakesh in 1906, for example, a reported third of the population boiled and ate locusts in an attempt to mitigate starvation, resulting in an epidemic and 1500 deaths, of which Jews averaged 12 on a daily basis.[801]

The Makhzen's food policies relied almost entirely on practices of collection and storage, which were facilitated by a climate that enables the preservation of local products such as grapes and figs.[802] Louis de Chenier notes on the connection between the climate and food preservation in Morocco:

> Corn can only be preferred in such kind of pits in hot countries; and it appears probable that the reason is because the corn, there, is firm and hard. The wheat reaped in the northern countries of Europe, which is called soft corn, could not be so preferred. However, this difference in the grain is accidental and relative to the nature of the soil and the climate, and not to its own inherent qualities.[803]

De Chenier's illustration is echoed in some of the disaster and pre-capitalist societies literatures, in which 'pre-disaster social fabric[s]' are seen as a survival mechanism and the linkages

---

[797] Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 22-23.

[798] Burke III, p. 23.

[799] Daniel Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 198.

[800] Schroeter, 'Anglo-Jewry and Essaouira (Mogador), 1860—1900'.

[801] Amster, *Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877-1956*, p 95.

[802] Meyers, 'Famine Relief and Imperial Policy in Early Modern Morocco'.

[803] Louis de Chénier, *The Present State of the Empire of Morocco: Its Animals, Products, Climate, Soil, Cities, Ports, Provinces, Coins, Weights, and Measures. With the Language, Religion, Laws, Manners, Customs, and Character, of the Moors; the History of the Dynasties Since Edris; the Naval Force and Commerce of Morocco; and the Character, Conduct, and Views, Political and Commercial, of the Reigning Emperor · Volume 1* (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1967), p. 299.

between ecological disasters and traditional societies are perceived to be based on a substitution,[804] reinforcement, and simplification of already-existing food practices, rather than being constrained by mystical modes of thinking.[805]

While the Makhzen had a larger ability to store food due to the quantity of granaries, it neither monopolised the ownership nor the creation of these granaries, as they were both owned collectively and by individual households.[806] However, the Makhzen's power and ownership of other resources proved advantageous when confronted with complex climatic conditions. For example, *Harka* tax, collected through military expeditions of the Sultan and his army, served both as a means of disarming clan-based formations and collecting taxes from them to support the various state institutions,[807] and as a means to guarantee a surplus of animals and grain for the Makhzen, which could then be stored or sold.[808]

[804] Jean-Christophe Gaillard, 'Resilience of Traditional Societies in Facing Natural Hazards', *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* 16, no. 4 (1 January 2007): 522–44.

[805] William I. Torry, 'Natural Disasters, Social Structure and Change in Traditional Societies', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 13, no. 3–4 (1 January 1978): 167–83.

[806] Meyers, 'Famine Relief and Imperial Policy in Early Modern Morocco'.

[807] Michaux-Bellaire, 'Les Impôts Marocains'.

[808] Meyers, 'Famine Relief and Imperial Policy in Early Modern Morocco'.

Map 2: A map of the spread and territories of cholera in Morocco in 1868[809]

The century of scarcity and ecological hardship (1795-1895) has proven to be a significant factor in the restructuring of rural – urban population trends. The movement of populations was therefore not only connected to the expansion of trade and the increase in taxation, but also to the intersections of rural crises, natural circumstances, and economic exigencies.[810] The population of Essaouira, for example, increased from 16000 to 27000 in 1879 as a result of the movement of the refugees of hunger and epidemics.[811]

The Makhzen also used different methods of containment and confinement. During the third wave of cholera in the mid-1860s, Morocco decided to impose confinement for seven days on ships arriving from Gibraltar and the Mecca pilgrimage.[812] While these measures might have contained Mare Nostrum contamination, cholera spread from Oran, reaching the entirety of Morocco in 1868.[813] However, containment methods varied and took place within different realms of political rule, reflecting the nature of Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty. In 1878, Tanja, for example, set up barriers and confined visitors in booths outside for at least eight days, while simultaneously confining their goods and herds for a minimum of two weeks – measures which were also taken by the neighbouring cities of Tetouan and Larache.[814] Despite all these measures, typhoid alone claimed three million lives.[815]

This period also led to new trends in the relationship between landless/poor peasants and cattle. To survive the famine and epidemic, people from Souss, for example, purchased new animals. This was often done in three ways: through work in exchange for an animal or through a loan from a powerful lender or local governor. Cattle were the focus of these exchanges, as they were not considered a source of food, but were used for work on soil. Mutton was the preferred meat that peasants used for food, in addition to game animals such as partridge, when, and where available. Furthermore, cattle were not only used as draught animals (in tilling); they were also used to supply British garrisons in the straits of Gibraltar and the wider Mediterranean region.[816] Between 1850-

---

[809] A. Beaumier, *Le choléra au Maroc : sa marche au Sahara jusqu'au Sénégal en 1868* (Paris : Librairie de Ch. Delagrave et cie, 1872).

[810] Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886*, p. 197.

[811] Schroeter, p. 198.

[812] Mohammed Amine El Bezzaz, *The History of Epidemics and Famines in Morocco in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences, 1992), p. 219.

[813] Amine El Bezzaz, p. 219.

[814] Amine El Bezzaz, p. 271.

[815] Amine El Bezzaz, p. 288.

[816] Ben Srhir, *Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845-1886*.

1938, Moroccan exports to Europe comprised almonds, cattle, barley, maize, wheat, eggs, fresh fruit, rubber, hides, leather, seeds, beans, and wool.[817]

The crisis of disaster, with all containment and confinement measures, food distribution and storage practices, and urban hygiene methods aiming to contain it, was exacerbated by a series of economic and political crises which marked the nineteenth-century landscape. The grave consequences of these ecological and natural crises not only re-arranged the relationship between people and nature, but also between those who rule and those who are ruled. Thus, populations were redistributed and rearranged as refugees sought to flee hunger, poverty, and contagious illnesses; the central tributary state created new forms of hierarchies to reproduce itself; people resorted to new forms of labour (akin to bondage) for survival. These dynamics of agency and 'counter-agency'[818] – whether they be strategies of the rulers to achieve mastery over nature via containment methods, or tools of survival pursued by everyday agents of socio-historical change – have resulted in introducing new social antagonisms: classed differentiations between settlers and natives, and between the Moroccan merchant-diplomatic classes and the poor and destitute, who resorted to practices of self-commodification, in the form of submitting oneself to slavery in exchange for food rations.[819]

6. Conclusion

The nature of European and Moroccan relations during the nineteenth century, characterised by ambivalence, expansion, domination, and resistance, is therefore essential to conceptualising the rise of incipient classes and the (pre-)conditions of capitalist development – a development which is not merely a corollary of an inevitable linear diffusionism, but one which is multi-dimensional, and above all, heterogenous and multi-spatial. Extraterritorial class alliances and everyday forms of populace resistance – in all their complexities, originating in groups of various faiths, the peasantry, the enslaved, or the 'protected' Europeans and associates – represented a critical departure from a society marked by the rapid transformations it was witnessing, society whose temporal and spiritual mechanisms of political agency were fractured through imperial expansion. Most importantly, while certain traditional structures were retained, the essence of political and economic life drastically changed during the age of *imperial* politics, thus paving the way for France to create a colonial system of puppet governance and either dismantle or exploit tributary structures during the colonial period.[820] An important aspect of the discussion therefore, ought to be the various forms of resistance 'from

---

[817] Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena-Junguito, 'World Trade, 1800-1938: A New Data-Set', *EHES Working Papers in Economic History* 93.
[818] Teschke, 'IR Theory, Historical Materialism, and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology', 1 June 2014.
[819] Thomson, 'A Morbid Affair'.
[820] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 225.

below' that these monetary, political, and economic crises have engendered. The Haha and Shiadma, clans and rural populations at the edge of Essaouira, have consistently expressed their discontent throughout the mid to late 1800s, for which they have suffered dire consequences. Following the bombardment of Essaouira in 1844 and the application of the Makhzen's carceral logic in retaliation, thousands of clan members collaborated to free many prisoners.[821] In the midst of a drought, a famine, and an epidemic in 1866-1868, they again rebelled against qaidal structures; however, this time, the Qaid's vengeful side emerged as villages were set on fire, leading to hundreds of deaths and refugees,[822] and yet, simultaneously threatening Essaouira's position as a locus of international trade and mercantilist practices.

Moreover, for all the multi-dimensional manifestations of socio-economic change and discontent that the processes of marketisation, monetisation, and commodification in this long-durée episode of crisis have culminated in, this ultimately challenges the narrative of capitalism as diffusionist, but as having a multiplicity of *origins* which, despite having their own historical specificities, colluded in a cross-border economic constellation combining the classic role of merchants in the 'circulation' of goods and the role of European capital in the reproduction of cattle and land for the market. This sheds light on the tensions between external and internal mechanisms of power, the collusion between empire and colony and contradictions emerging within society, intra-state dynamics of conflict and agency, and the incipience of a colonial system premised on accumulation and dispossession. Combined with a mosaic of changing social relations and mechanisms of local and global restructuring of states and societies, these dynamics have provided important context for the transformation of visions, practices, and forms of political rule.

---

[821] Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886*, p. 120.
[822] Schroeter, p .165.

CHAPTER 6

Ecocide and Agents of Empire in the Desert Hinterlands: The Case of the British North West African Company

1. Introduction

The previous chapter investigated the contradictions of imperial politics during the nineteenth century. It focused on the nature of socioeconomic transformations in the second half of the nineteenth century and the ways in which they altered diplomatic practices, modes of consumption, and the societal fabric of Morocco. This period resulted in the production of new regimes of accumulation that are distinguished from *political accumulation* via enslavement, warfare, and maritime trade, which flourished under Ismaili rule (1672-1727). As Sultan Ismail's iyyāla [empire] was not economic in and of itself, opportunities arose for smaller social forces and powers for movement and self-organisation. Under this regime of accumulation, the nature of geographical space and social bonds structured the ways in which socio-political forces materialised. In the case of Salé, being outside of social relations resulted in the political experiment of a pirate republic that both checked and worked with the political power of the central tributary state. Simultaneously, with the Ismaili sphere of rule, being outside of social relations – through having no clan-based affiliations – served as an ideological and juridical basis upon which people were racialised and enslaved. While the commercial agents of piracy had social and political recognition and were contracted to the central tributary state when necessary, they also acted independently within their own polity in a juridical, political, diplomatic, and economic sense. As Chapter 4 has demonstrated, within this unique *ecosystem of sovereignties*, and despite existing in separate realms of politics, a dynamic of trans-sovereignties emerged, in which actors both in the Salé Republic and in the Ismaili polity crossed political realms and blended political power from both. Abdallah Ben Aicha, pirate in the republic and diplomat for the sultan, and Saad Allal Bulwa'm, an enslaved Bukhari for the sultan and qaid (local notable) in Salé stand out as examples of these dynamics. Chapter 5, on the other hand, focused on giving a broad image of the large-scale and accelerated transformations that took place within the socioeconomic fabric of the Moroccan milieu. It demonstrated the nature of the internal and external socio-economic transformations through three forms of accumulation taking place under imperialist expansion: the marketisation of tea, the monetisation of tax, and the commodification of social interpersonal relations through diplomatic practice. These transformations provide a crucial context for understanding the ways in which imperialism begins to exploit these different spheres, cultures, and political claims for its own expansionist ends. As such, this chapter showcases transformations in the political rule that accompany the former during the age of imperial politics. Tarfaya and, more broadly, the desert space, it is argued, provide key insights into the transformation from negotiating

multiple forms of *political rule* to negotiating and reproducing *territoriality*. The Sahara, the 'second face of the Mediterranean',[823] and Tarfaya came to encapsulate the incipience of territoriality and the gradual disintegration of the multi-layered ecosystem of sovereignties in two ways. First, through the global reverberations of capitalism and empire in Morocco; capitalism expanded into the Moroccan sphere without fully reproducing itself, resulting in a dynamic that has both altered and hindered the multi-layered political trajectory of Morocco. Second, through internal societal changes and the creation of new trans-imperial alliances as a result. These changes occurred *within* capitalism and triggered a Moroccan turn towards indivisible territoriality as a response to British imperial scheming. In other words, this chapter provides a detailed account of the ecocide process and the ways in which capitalism changed the foundations of Morocco's ecosystem of sovereignty, leading to its gradual decline. Thus, the arguments in this chapter proceed by asking the following questions: What is the nature of political rule at this particular time in Morocco? How did European expansionism and the Makhzen deploy the characteristics of the perceived impenetrable space of the Sahara? What function(s) did the desert play in the transformation of social relations that Morocco experienced in the nineteenth century, and how did the local population react and adjust to these changes? This chapter aims to address the following questions by focusing on the creation and development of the British North West African Company – a case that, it is argued consolidated on the one hand, the complex *dialectic* between state, society, and empire, and on the other hand, marked the beginnings of ecocide, that is, a shift from an ecosystem of sovereignties towards a stricter form of territoriality.

Over the past decade and a half, much has been written about British and Moroccan relations[824] and convergence during the nineteenth century.[825] However, little attention has been dedicated to investigating the role of company states in the Moroccan context and their role in shaping international relations. In the second half of the century, Morocco was subjected to the imposition of the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty 1856, which had severe, long-term consequences. In addition to creating patterns of dependency through the control of commercial relations with the West, the treaty was one of the many factors which led to the alteration of the social fabric through the advent of the spectres of capitalism into different structures of social formations. Indeed, following the treaty, British policy mediated the Franco-Spanish process of colonialism by '… putting pressure on the Makhzen to make

---

[823] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 171.

[824] For a compilation of archival sources about Morocco in the British archives, see (in Arabic): Khalid Ben Srhir, *Ālmaġrib Fy Ālʾaršyf Ālbryṭāny [Morocco in the British Archives]* (Rabat: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2009).

[825] See: Karim Bejjit, *English Colonial Texts on Tangier 1661-1684: Imperialism and The Politics of Resistance.* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015); Ben Srhir, *Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845-1886*; Ben Srhir, 'Britain and Military Reforms in Morocco During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century'; Khalid Ben-Srhir, 'British Documents on the Spanish Moroccan War in Mellila (1892-1894) Part I', *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 2015, 175–295; Nabil I. Matar, 'The Last Moors: Maghāriba in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 14, no. 1 (2003): 37–58.

important concessions to other European countries interested in Morocco … in order to preserve Britain's vital interests in the region'.[826]

In Morocco, socio-political hierarchies are mobilised at various levels as means through which to challenge political rule and as tools through which to accentuate or maintain economic interests. Thus, the British sought to take advantage of the particular relationship to land, to the central tributary state, and the nature of trade and commerce in the desert as a gateway to building empire. Nonetheless, the active agency of these actors was not conditioned but shaped within the extant political and economic relations taking place within Morocco, as well as through the global developments which framed Morocco's position within the international system. Second, for much of Moroccan history, the organisation of the social relations of production is one of '… a history in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles.'[827] During the nineteenth century, the nature of the economic system could best be described as a 'subsistence economy' [iqtiṣād ālkafāf], a term coined by Ahmed Toufiq to refer to the structural weakness of the relations of production.[828]

This chapter demonstrates that through the dynamics of imperial expansion, the desert acted as a hub for British strategic interests and informal imperialism, and as a metaphor for competing projects of supranational territorial sovereignty: those of the Makhzen and Europe. Morocco's ecosystem of sovereignties, comprising multiple layers, cultures, and claims of socio-political rule, provided rife grounds for Europeans to circumvent, pick off, and exploit different forms of agency as a means of expansion. Indeed, the desert areas surrounding Tarfaya and the surrounding areas functioned as a space for both the reproduction of the empire and the social relations of colonial capitalism and as a space for the subversion of such patterns, notably through the very forms of diffused social and political organisation shaping the Moroccan milieu. Donald Mackenzie, a Scottish explorer guided by the idea of the capitalising on trans-Saharan trade routes, founded the British North West African Company in Cape Juby in 1875. The company's founding goal was to use the trading station and port in Tarfaya as a means to gain access to different parts of the Maghrib and the broader African continent, from the Atlas Mountains to Timbuktu and Sudan. Drawing on four volumes of the Foreign Office and British North West African Company correspondence and publications, this chapter shows that, on the one hand, Tarfaya and the British company were at the heart of the formulation of a project of territoriality in Morocco – one in which the material territorial boundaries of Morocco became contested and negotiated. On the other hand, despite the capitalist nature and motive behind founding the company, it was confronted with modes of societal

---

[826] Ben Srhir, *Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845-1886*, p. 62.

[827] Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,* p. 20.

[828] Ahmed Toufiq, *ālmuğtamaʿa ālmaġriby fy ālqrn āttāsiʿ ʿašar (ynultān min 1850-1912) [Moroccan Society in the Nineteenth Century: Inoultan 1850-1912]*, 3rd ed., (Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat ānnağāḥ ālğadyda, 2011).

organisation which challenged its premises, including the relationship with the commons and the relationship with the desert itself.

This chapter proceeds in three steps to illustrate this argument. First, it zones in the case of the British North-West African Company (1875-1895), provides a historical overview of its development and highlights the competing visions of land and sovereignty within which it was contextualised. The (pre-)Saharan regions are considered to have played a particular role in this process: they acted as a conduit for British informal imperialism (in the form of commercial dealings) through the collaboration of local notables of influence and social mediators looking to barter, while simultaneously acting as an agent for the territorial claims of Morocco, based on the sociopolitical contract of *bay'a*. Second, the chapter delves into the question of private property in relation to the British North West African Company, highlighting the positions of both Moroccan and British actors in Mackenzie's industrialist imperial ventures. This section of the chapter also shows the intricate and intertwined relationship between imperial expansion and capitalist social relations in the Moroccan landscape. The imperial project of one individual's company-state – and the concomitant racial and colonial motives of the exploitation of the desert space and its people – served to create surplus value for the British state. To conclude, the last section of this chapter offers some critical reflections on the ways in which the territorial projects of both imperialists and rulers were at odds with Morocco's socio-political configurations.

2. The tale of two sovereignties

The rise of company states as a tool of informal imperialism has been the subject of vibrant debates in International Relations literature and beyond.[829] While providing a general history of an under-studied company-state, this section of the chapter focuses on the ways in which such an imperial venture – tied to European sovereign territorial statehood – complicates our understanding of agency as a realm in which the local and global both compete and cooperate at various intervals. Indeed, the British North-West African Company exemplifies the historical role of England's overseas as agents of British extra-territorial and capitalist expansion and the diffusion of capitalist social relations. The Cain and Hopkins thesis describes this process of expansion as 'gentlemanly capitalism' – a process in which the new post-1850s upper class from the southeast of England came

---

[829] Philip J. Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Andrew Phillips and JC Sharman, 'Company-States and the Creation of the Global International System', *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 4 (1 December 2020): 1249–72; Philip J. Stern, 'The Ideology of the Imperial Corporation: "Informal" Empire Revisited. Chartering Capitalism: Organizing Markets, States, and Publics. Special Issue', *Political Power and Social Theory* 29, no. 1 (2015): 15–43; Steven Press, *Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe's Scramble for Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017); Michael Wagner, *The English Chartered Trading Companies, 1688-1763: Guns, Money and Lawyers* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

to prominence not only locally, but globally, acting as a 'carrier to the world's commerce and trade'.[830] Besides the problematic epistemological and historical implications that come with *masculinising* and *sanitising* capitalism, there was nothing 'gentlemanly' about this process. Capitalism – as a historically distinctive social relation – relies on different forms of violence to suppress non-capitalist modes of living, to expand, and to reproduce itself, '… not only as a mode of class rule but also as a form of imperial domination.'[831]

Before delving into an analysis of the commercial agents of the empire and the periphery, and the socio-political contexts which have shaped the formation and trajectory of the British North-West African Company, it is important to provide a brief historical overview.

In an attempt to capitalise on trans-Saharan trade,[832] Donald Mackenzie founded a commercial trading post in Tarfaya (Cape Juby) in 1875. Praised as a venture which opened up further for British trade in correspondence with the Foreign Office,[833] British expansion into the Maghribi space through the North-West African Company not only (at least theoretically) provided an opportunity to control important trans-Saharan trade routes and gain access to other parts of the African continent via commercial colonial conquest, it also provided a way out of business troubles.[834] In British archival sources, the company was simultaneously referred to as a 'trading post' and a 'fully recognised British settlement'.[835] Thus, after obtaining financial support from merchants and businessmen in Manchester and Bradford,[836] and drawing on the accounts of previous colonial 'explorers', Mackenzie founded the company with two goals in mind: the first of which, in the long-term, is to open up a maritime canal for European commerce into Central Africa, and the second of which rested upon the short-term goal of establishing a station between Cape Bojador and Cape Noun as a gateway to Timbuktu. Thus, in typical British empire-building fashion, this trading post, initially

---

[830] P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945," *The Economic History Review* 40, no. 1 (1987): 1–26.

[831] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (Verso, 2002), p. 156.

[832] However, Donald Mackenzie was not the first person to take an imperial interest in trans-Saharan commerce and the desert space as a gateway into West and Central Africa. In 1883, a French mission had plans underway for a trans-Saharan railway. See: Jean Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe: Les difficultés Tome III* (Paris: Editions La Porte, 1989), p. 294.

[833] In this chapter, four volumes of Foreign Office and North West African Company correspondence, held at the National Archives, were used: FO 84/1500 (1875-1880) held at the Records of the Slave Trade and African Departments series; FO 99/261 (1881-1884); FO 99/262 (1885-1887); FO 99/263 (1888). The last three volumes are all held at Foreign Office: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Morocco, Series II. Additionally, the chapter uses the Tarfaya Box Th-90 available in the Royal Archives in Rabat, Morocco.

[834] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (London: Abacus, 1997), p. 45.

[835] Memorandum of the North West African Company, 9 September 1875, National Archives FO 99/262.

[836] F. V. Parsons, 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95', *The Historical Journal* 1, no. 2 (1958): 136–53.

called named *Port Victoria*,[837] came to be called the *British North West African Company* in 1879. Mackenzie was no novice in matters of imperial conquest; before he marched purposefully in the desert to civilise its peoples and save them from their inherent backwardness, he was both a member of the French Sociétés évangéliques and of the British Anti-Slavery Society. Thus, in the search for new markets, new customers, and new commodities in the desert, Mackenzie grouped together a vast array of people – in business, engineering, politics, banking, and colonial utopianism – to whom this expansionist commercial project was a way to spread Christianity and civilisation to the broader African population, and an opportunity to acquire commodities that Britain needed.[838] Donald Mackenzie, in the introduction to his 1877 proposal *Flooding of the Sahara*, addresses the Presidents and Members of the Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain and argues the following:

> Europeans strove for more than three centuries to open communication with Central Africa from the west coast; but its deadly climate, hostile tribes, swamps and high mountain ranges frustrated every attempt. Africa still remains unopened and uncivilized; its vast resources lost to the commercial world; its inhabitants victims to the slave-trade; and to every kind of tyranny and vice that follows in the wake of ignorance and superstition. It would be unreasonable to expect improvement in the condition of these races until inland communication is established. If the rivers of Africa were navigable from the sea, its interior would be practically open to Commerce.[839]

Indeed, the *Flooding of the Sahara* serves both to introduce Mackenzie's plans to his intended audience of funders and the British government and to document his travels. In great detail, and with colonial capitalist motives, Mackenzie describes the various facets of African societies that his mini-capitalist project of imperial expansion targeted. From Songhay to Western Sahara and Sokoto, he delineated geographies, political structures, local forms of production, trade routes, religion, dress customs, and even marriage traditions.

The process of establishing the British North-West African Company, however, was a long-term project aided by several expeditions, the first of which departed from Liverpool in June 1876 on a steam-ship called Volta in order to 'explore' Cape Bojador and Cape Noun.[840] In the following

---

[837] In Foreign Office correspondence, the denomination of Port Victoria was rarely used. Instead, the trading post was commonly referred to as Cape Juby, and occasionally as Tarfaya (the Arabic term) and Port St. Bartholomew.

[838] The British plan was to exchange cotton, tea and sugar for gold, gum, and ostrich feathers coming via Saguia el-Hamra. Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, p. 301.

[839] Donald MacKenzie, *The Flooding of the Sahara: An Account of the Proposed Plan for Opening Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the North-West Coast* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1877), p. 7.

[840] Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 1989, p. 301.

years, trips to the south of Morocco and the broader Sahara region multiplied alongside a fervent publicity campaign in Britain in search of funders.

Map 3: A map of 'Atlantic West Africa' that extends from Cape Ghir (in Agadir) to Cape Bojador[841]

In a December 1877 issue of the *Bradford Observer*, the project of the flooding of the Sahara was praised as a novel idea and Donald Mackenzie depicted as 'an enthusiast'. The article proceeds to present a defence of Mackenzie's project as beneficial to both the European and African continents in the following argument:

> Give water to the Sahara, and the man who plants the date palm will soon be plucking its golden fruits and resting under the shadow of its broad leaves. […] And what would be the effects of such a transformation on the climate of Europe […]? Spain, France and Italy would doubtlessly be benefited, but what of Switzerland and the North Countries? […] If communication by water can be established with the Soudan and the Sahara tribes, commerce and trade will equally benefit. Mr Mackenzie argues very wisely that it is necessary to join trading with exploration, because the Sahara tribes, and those beyond them, suspect all

---

strangers who are not traders … The idea is so great, its realisation would be so important to Africa […] [842]

In essence, Mackenzie's strategy rested upon capitalising on pre-existing social relations and political structures in the desert space:

To attain this object, all that is necessary is to form a commercial station at Port St. Bartholomew, Cape Juby, where the climate is equal to that of Madeira and Canary; obtain the protection of the Berber chiefs of Western Sahara, under whose protection the present trade is carried on; and place agents in the principal towns on the road to Timbuctoo. [843]

However, Mackenzie's Africa-wide expansionist project in the Maghrib was put under great strain because its location in Cape Juby undermined the very tenets of the project in conquering Central Africa as he intended. In fact, 'Cape Juby … was not well placed geographically for tapping the trade of the interior, being separated by hundreds of miles of desert from the less arid Western Sudan proper which, rather than the Sahara itself, was the area whose wealth had been indicated by [those][844] various travellers' which inspired the founding of this company-state.[845]

Furthermore, the creation of the North-West African Company created tensions not only with other imperial powers but also within various segments of the Moroccan political and socioeconomic sphere.

First, in the context of Morocco becoming a terrain for growing European inter-imperial rivalries, its political trajectory became marked by a structural disequilibrium.[846] To France, the establishment of the North West African Company in that particular area by 'a group of capitalists from London' is a direct threat to its commercial and political interests in Morocco. A letter dated 12 August 1883 sent from Montfraix from the French Legation in Morocco to Challemel Lacour (French Minister of Foreign Affairs), shows France's commerce-related anxieties as well as the ways in which the company presented a learning opportunity for the French imperialist project:

Through the creation of the trading posts of Cap Juby and Erkchich, destined to become two centres of important transactions between the coast and the Saharan populations, English trade could divert, for its part, the caravans of Mogador [Essaouira] and, at the same time,

---

[842] *The Bradford Observer*, 11 December 1877. The British Newspaper Archive.

[843] MacKenzie, *The Flooding of the Sahara: An Account of the Proposed Plan for Opening Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the North-West Coast*, p. 11.

[844] It is worthy of note that Mackenzie's physical presence in the region was minimal, including during the formulation of the project proposal. His plan was based on the work of prior self-proclaimed explorers in North-west, West and Central Africa, such as Heinrich Barth, Friedrich Gerhard Rohlfs, René Caillié, Henri Duveyrier, and Hugh Clapperton.

[845] Parsons, 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95'.

[846] Ahmed Farouk, 'Consulats et Activités Consulaires Britanniques Au Maroc Durant L'époque Dite de Pacification', *Maghreb Review* 39, no. 3 (2014): 292–310.

destroy this port whose traffic had, until now, been acquired almost exclusively by France. By recording this new attack on the integrity of his Empire, perhaps Moulay Hassan will finally convince himself that if the language of the British Minister [John Drummond Hay] is always decisive, his actions are sometimes less so. As for us, we will have to take note of the rights and example that England provides for the future.[847]

While other European powers shared France's position,[848] the North West African Company also threatened the interests of the Makhzen whose position is already precarious, and the merchant 'class' of Essaouira. Meanwhile, British diplomat John Drummond Hay, who held office in Morocco between 1845 and 1886, took on a contradictory position premised on safeguarding the interests of British imperialism and placating the Makhzen with platitudes. Indeed, the disquietude of the Makhzen regarding English commerce had already been brewing to the extent that Mohamed Bargach, Moroccan Minister of External Affairs, on 19 January 1882 sent a letter to John Drummond Hay requesting that the latter publishes in gazettes and journals in England a 'warning' to all English companies not to conduct their business in Souss in a manner that infringes upon the customs and laws of the Moroccan government, arguing that Souss is '… the regency of the Sultan, and if any of the subjects of Great Britain go there and break the laws of this regency, they put themselves in a position of danger and wrongdoing …'.[849] Furthermore, Sultan Hassan I found out that an English ship arrived to Souss in agreement with the son of Bayrouk from Oued Noun, and a letter was sent on 25 May 1879 stating that the sultan does not accept their arrival in his iyyāla [empire]. Therefore, the apprehensions were both the result of a complex set of circumstances and a reflection of different interests within and without the Moroccan sphere of rule. First, at the economic level, the merchant class of Essaouira was concerned with seeing its monopoly of commerce diverted towards Cape Juby through the British North West African Company, while the Makhzen understood the fragility of its position in the context of inter-imperial rivalries and feared a decrease in revenue accrued from taxation. Second, at the political level, the Makhzen was confronted with the potential to increase tensions between English merchants and subjects in a vast stretch of land over which its control was temporal, and neither spatial nor social. For instance, the arrival of the British to the Moroccan trading scene saw an increase in the prices of various commodities, especially salt and sulphur, as well as an increase in networks and practices of smuggling. In turn, this prompted Hassan I to introduce price

---

[847] *al-Wathā'iq: maǧmuʿāt waṭā'iqyah dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]*, vol. 14 (Mudīrīyat al-Wathā'iq al-Malakīyah, 2010), pp. 133-135.
[848] See : 'Le Cap Juby', *Le Constitutionnel: Journal Politique*, 5 January 1893; 'Les Établissements Anglais Du Cap Juby', *Journal Des Débats Politiques et Littéraires*, 15 January 1894.
[849] Archives of Great Britain. Number 36.533. Royal Archives, Rabat.

controls on both commodities: seven rials per quintal[850] of sulphur and nine rials per quintal of salt.[851] In other words, the Makhzen saw the North West African Company as a conspicuous sign of the growing tide of British imperial scheming, while France saw the British and Spanish presence in Morocco as a threat that could weaken its position. For example, in a letter dated 30 March 1883 that French consul to Morocco, Ladislas Ordega, sent to Challemel Lacour (French Minister of Foreign Affairs), the former states that as Britain and France are 'united' on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco – their 'common ground' – so too, they will unite and compete over the Atlantic coast to diminish French influence.[852]

In fact, Mackenzie's plan about Africa – that 'great continent'[853] – that he sought to claim as a British settlement through his chartered company, was severely miscalculated. Mackenzie failed to take into account the competing European interests over the region, thus placing the British North West African Company in an awkward placement in '[…] the territory between Drâa, the Spanish frontier at Cape Bojador, and also the territory between the Spanish and French frontiers lower down […].'[854]

Europe and the Makhzen's competing visions of territoriality were summarised in an article about Cape Juby, published in the journal *Le Progrès de Bel-Abbès*, which states that:

> To the south of Cape Ghir, and up to Cape Juby, east of the archipelago of the Canary Islands, the coast draws a wide curve inward. We arrive here at the borders of the territories subject to the authority of the Sultan of Morocco. The border is formed along Draa River, which divides the land of Tekna in two: to the north is the Moroccan Tekna, and to the south is the independent Tekna, although the Moroccans lay claims there.[855]

Similarly, the Foreign Office considered that 'Draa is the meridional frontier of Morocco' and refused to acknowledge 'the pretence of considering Cape Juby as part of the territory of the Sultan'.[856] The Makhzen, on the other hand, firmly proclaimed that 'all of the Sahara inhabited by Muslims and which belonged to no sovereign belonged, by virtue of shra',[857] to the Sultan of

---

[850] A weighing measurement equalling 4 kilos.

[851] A letter from Sultan Hassan I sent in response to a letter from amyns [secretaries] Bennasser Ghannam and Abdessalam Aherdan. *Al-Wathā'iq: Maǧmuʿāt Waṯā'iqyah Dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]*, vol. 17 (Rabat: Mudīrīyat al-Wathā'iq al-Malakīyah, 2013), pp. 406-407.

[852] Fonds de la légation de France au Maroc. Direction politique number 54. Archives diplomatiques de Nantes.

[853] MacKenzie, *The Flooding of the Sahara: An Account of the Proposed Plan for Opening Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the North-West Coast,* p. 28.

[854] Archives of Tarfaya. Th-90. Number 25615. Royal Archives, Rabat.

[855] A.J. Wauters, "Chronique Documentaire : Le Maroc et Le Congo Belge," *Le Progrès de Bel-Abbès: Journal de l'arrondissement de Sidi-Bel-Abbès*, August 1911.

[856] Letter from John Drummond Hay to Mohammed Bargach, Tangier, 8 December 1879. National Archives, FO 636/5.

[857] Islamic law.

Morocco'.[858] Indeed, in correspondence of the Foreign Office, the Sultan's claims are described to be 'of a shadowy nature'.[859] In a letter dated 21 September 1877 from Sir Joseph Lee to Henry Herbert, Secretary of State for the Colonies, it was stated that '… the Sultan of Morocco claims sovereignty over the district, but his territory is held generally to terminate at the river Draa, HM's foot[860] have not recognized his claims to Cape Juby […].'[861] Britain made use of this very context: of the abstract and unfixed relationship between the person of the sultan and the jurisdiction of the Makhzen,[862] on the one hand, and on the other, of competing forms of political rule and sovereignties. For British imperialism, this context of political abstraction and contention further helped buttress claims upon which the founding of the British North West African Company rested, even proposing presenting the recognition of Tarfaya, the territory in which the British North West African company is stationed, as well as neighbouring territories in the desert beyond, as formal British colonies to The Colonial Office.[863]

Hannoum clearly explains these dynamics, arguing that it was during this particular historical juncture of the nineteenth century that a relationship of people with territory was introduced; marking a shift from a Hobbesian contractual relationship between the sovereign and the ra'iya [subjects], with the taxation system representing the core of that relation:

> The relationship of people to territory was introduced in Morocco by the nineteenth century, as is evident in a letter of Hassan I responding to ongoing negotiations between France, Great Britain, and Spain with tribes in the region of Sous over the possible building of a port at the Canary Islands and possible damage to the port of the city of Essaouira. Hassan I protests the British negotiation with tribes (supposedly outside the realm of his political control and the jurisdiction) in the area of Sous, where agents of the makhzen (mkhazniya) were absent. Yet, he refers to the population as raʿiya and orders Donald Mackenzie not to engage in negotiations with the population until Hassan I comes to the region of Houz, which is next to Sous (implying that negotiation can happen between him and European powers).[864]

---

[858] FO 636/4. National Archives.

[859] Memorandum of the North West African Company, 9 September 1875. National Archives FO 99/262.

[860] The terminology of 'H.M.'s foot' appears frequently in Foreign Office correspondence. In this context, it is understood as 'Her Majesty's boot' or as infantry.

[861] Letter from Sir Joseph Lee to Henry Herbert, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 September 1877. FO 99/262. National Archives.

[862] Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, p. 152.

[863] Letter from Sir Joseph Lee to Henry Herbert, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 September 1877. FO 99/262. National Archives.

[864] Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb*, p. 152.

However, French concerns about the imperial British-Spanish front were not unprecedented: Britain also sought to reassure Spain that there was no official support for Mackenzie's company and that the region in which it was meant to be set up was far removed from Moroccan territory and in an 'independent' region. Likewise, Britain's ambivalent position towards the company was exemplified by John Drummond Hay's handling of the question. While Hay did not directly oppose Mackenzie's project, he argued that the British government that undermined Morocco's sovereignty would harm Britain's economic interests and, potentially, Hay's position as a diplomat.[865] Nevertheless, the British government did in fact support the North-West African Company, through the consul of Britain in Tenerife, J.J Copham, who accompanied Mackenzie on his expeditions.[866] In this context, Britain played both sides of the game: it sought to safeguard its economic interests in Morocco and maintain its relationship with the Makhzen by adopting a supposedly neutral position of Mackenzie's chartered company, all whilst providing diplomatic and economic support to the British North-West African Company via other means. This British strategy of imperialism was distinctive and unlike the direct imperial expansion pursued by Spain and France in the Maghribi space. In a newspaper article in *Maǧalaẗ ṣaḥrāʾ ālmaġrib*,[867] this strategy of Britain is described as one which 'did not wage an [explicit] war against the downtrodden but grabbed them [people] with a hand of iron covered with a velvet glove'.[868]

A statement from the British North West African Company dated July 1887 elucidates the tension between the Sultan's government and Britain regarding the question of sovereignty:

> Our representative was informed by the Moorish Government that the statements referred to in the letters received by the Company from Her Majesty's Government […] relative to the boundaries of Morocco were without authority, and that as Cape Juby is, and has always been, part of the Empire of Morocco, they consider the Company as smugglers, who by contraband dealings cause serious loss to the Sultan's exchequer.[869]

Sultan Hassan I (1873 – 1894), like many of his predecessors, derived authority from *bay'a* [pledge of allegiance] in a conception of population control and sovereignty that is distinctive from the European legally-coded modern formulation which relies on control over a specific legally delineated territory. This form of political rule in Morocco, at the time, still reflected an older understanding of imagined communities, one '… in which states were defined by centres, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another.'[870] The *bay'a* is an

---

[865] Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 1989.
[866] Parsons, 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95'.
[867] The Journal of the Sahara of Morocco
[868] Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. The Journal of the Sahara of Morocco, p. 2. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[869] Statement by the North West African Company, July 1887. FO 99/262. National Archives.
[870] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), p. 19.

exchange of political vows in a manner similar to a contract of purchase, a 'sociological Hobbesian contract' between two forces: the people must have unshakeable conviction in and submit to the authority of their ruler out of a sense of religious duty; in return, the ruler protects them from harm, whether it be internal conflict or external war.[871] In other words, this sociological contract was premised on the exchange of 'absolute authority against guarantee of security'.[872]

In this sense, the relationship of subservience (of the people) and protection (by the sultan) through which bayʿa was framed formed the basis of this particular form of sovereignty, including in spaces which were beyond the reach (that is, a monopoly of violence in its totality) of the Makhzen's jurisdiction. A peculiar dynamic emerges here, one in which sovereignty and jurisdiction are not separate constructs.[873] The contradiction between Britain's project of imperial sovereignty – which the British North West African company encapsulates – and the Makhzen's Hobbesian vision of territoriality not only disturbs, but also atomises Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty. In this context of imperial rivalries and internal dissent, the various cultures and layers of political rule that had existed had receded in favour of a project of territoriality which is in direct and explicit opposition to the multiplicities of agency and the diverse ways in which different social forces have organised themselves.

Despite Spanish and French anxieties about the quick development of the North-West African Company, a 'charter of concession' in April 1879 was signed with Sheikh Mohammed Bayrouk, giving the English company a monopoly over maritime commerce with the territories of Oued Noun.[874] Mohammed Bayrouk, referred to as 'an independent sheikh'[875] was a member of the prominent Bayrouk family,[876] a key socio-political and commercial force in the area extending from Oued Noun to Guelmim. In fact, Bayrouk, alongside Mohamed Tazi, was key to diplomatic negotiations before the establishment of the company and following its demise.[877] Most importantly, Bayrouk was able to act autonomously and form an alliance with the British for economic reasons. He received gifts and was offered access to an English warehouse in Tekna. On 26 July 1879 he signed a treaty with Mackenzie's British North West African Company which delineated the rights of the company and the British associated with it and the obligations of the locals towards it in exchange for

---

[871] Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*, 2nd ed. (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009), p. 73.
[872] Laroui, p. 73.
[873] Abdelmajid Hannoum, *The Invention of the Maghreb: Between Africa and the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 152.
[874] Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 1989, p. 309.
[875] Parsons, 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95'.
[876] Hassan Mohamed Mohamed, "Born in the Text: The Bayrouk of Southern Morocco, a Study in History and Identity." (University of Alberta, 2004).
[877] Abdelhadi Tazi, *Rassa'il Makhzaniyah: 'ala 'Ahd as-Sultan Mawlay al-Hassan Wa Ibnihi as-Sultan Mawlay al 'Aziz 1875-1904* [Makhzen Correspondence: on the era of Sultan Hassan I and Mawlay Aziz] (Rabat: The Higher Education Institute of Scientific Research, 2008).

compensation. The treaty stipulated that the British had the right to build warehouses and ports and the right to control trade in the area, while the sheikhs of local clans had to respect and protect British lives and private property, and protect commercial caravans that came to Tarfaya to conduct trade with the British – all in exchange for financial compensation which would be given in instalments, and its value would depend on the rank of individuals within the hierarchy of their clan.[878]

The anxieties of Makhzen and John Drummond Hay were not misplaced, and the operations of the British North-West African company were compromised by tensions between clan chiefs of the south, a prolonged boycott of the company itself, and a wave of famine that ravaged the southern Moroccan region from 1878 to 1883.[879] The Makhzen attempted to outmanoeuvre the company. For example, Sultan Hassan I positioned a Sheikh from Souss (to the south of Essaouira) against Mohamed Bayrouk; as a result, the latter demonstrated the extent of his commitment to the *bay'a* and did not abide by the treaty signed with the company, preventing neighbouring commercial caravans and communities from visiting the station in Cape Juby for trade. However, this was far from the first time that the Bayrouk family attracted the attention of the Makhzen as a result of collaborating with Europeans. In 1862, Mohammed Ben Abderrahman – predecessor of Hassan I and ruler of Morocco between 1859-1873 – wrote a Dahir in which Bayrouk (son and father) were denounced.[880] The Dahir stated that Bayrouk (the father) collaborated with Europeans to build establishments in the area; he was made to swear on the Quran that he would no longer undertake those dealings with kuffārs [disbelievers] in exchange for being offered a house in Essaouira and was exempted from paying taxes. His sons, however, stated in the same decree, did not honour the agreement by 'selling their religion for worldly life' and collaborating with the Spanish, which, in turn, generated strife and infighting between the Bayrouk family and the local social forces that disapproved of Spanish presence.[881]

Thus, in attempting to territorialise the relationship between people and land, on the one hand, and the relationship between people and the sovereign, Morocco's position within imperial ecocide becomes clearer. While ecocide functioned as the long-term subordination of different forms of political rule to abstract, territorial rule; it also symbolised the incipience of territorial rule which can be observed both from the change in the relationship between people, commons, and rulership, as well as from the methods of resistance to the expansion of British imperialism pursued from above. For example, Chapter 3 listed examples of these methods including the creation of Morocco's first institutionalised standing army, the institution of various taxation reforms, the increasing number of

---

[878] Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. The Journal of the Sahara of Morocco, p. 14. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[879] Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 1989, p. 308.
[880] Decree.
[881] Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. Dahir of Mohammed Ben Abderrahman (1862). Royal Archives, Rabat.

Moroccans sent on missions to Europe, in addition to the creation of the Makina, a rifle factory, in Fes in 1895. These reforms, therefore, can be understood as strategies of defensive accumulation. Under these newly territorialised political arrangements, the Makhzen sought to extend and centralise its power to become something more than the protection-submission contractual relationship of *bay'a*, while simultaneously revitalising key political and economic institutions as a means of protecting its existing rule from imperial expansion. Thus, when I refer to the incipience of territoriality in this context, I do so to explain the nature of a dialectical relationship between the conventional politics of statecraft, which prioritises extending and centralising power, and the politics of imperial expansion, which focused on capitalising on the relationship of people with the commons in the desert space. Here, the very functions and nature of the desert – a space in which the legal and political conceptions of space, power, and territory were different, and a space of an elusive sovereignty serving the purposes of inhabiting and circulating people and goods – formed the ideological and political backbone of British imperialism in that area. It can therefore be argued that while British imperialism modified Moroccan political rule (through imperially-driven territoriality); the Moroccan space too, modified British imperialism through the existing social relations of the desert and the Makhzen's strategies of defensive accumulation placing a limit on the extent to which British imperialism can entrench itself and how long it can survive in the desert. This dialectical pattern of reciprocal socio-political modification can be discerned from the actual profits and trade dealings of the company, as well as from the context of its eventual collapse.

In 1881, only 100 tons of merchandise were shipped from the station of the British Northwest African Company.[882] The factory circulated commodities from Manchester, namely sugar and tea, and wool shipments did not exceed 1000 quintals.[883] The most important commodities exchanged in Tarfaya were camels, sheep, and guns, which communities in the whereabouts of Tarfaya were acquiring prohibitive costs prior to the advent of the company.[884] Accordingly, trade in guns worried that the French authorities of clans in the Algerian south-west arming themselves to resist the French coloniser. It also alarmed the Makhzen as it was argued that Mackenzie was 'readying a group of armed people [from Tarfaya] to descend on the shores of Souss…'.[885]

However, despite the Makhzen's strategy which consisted of 'winning time… and avoiding entering serious negotiations about [economic] liberalisation',[886] internally, the central tributary state had to contend with serious challenges to its political authority. For example, Fez was a hub for the rebellion against Hassan I. On the one hand, Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-Kattani painstakingly worked

---

[882] Miège, p. 309.
[883] Miège, pp. 308-309.
[884] Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. Number 25.617. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[885] Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. Number 25.614. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[886] Khalid Ben-Srhir, 'Rivalités Européennes Au Maroc Précolonial (1844-1890): Intrigues, Compromis, Resistances, Enjeux Politiques et Économiques', *The Maghreb Review* 39, no. 3 (2014): 266–91, p. 285.

for decades to form a large group of opponents from various social backgrounds, culminating in the Hafiziyya uprising of 1907-1908.[887] On the other hand, in 1873, Fez saw a year-long uprising led by craftspeople and poor/popular segments of society, referred to as intifāḍat āddabāġyn, or the Tanners' Revolt.[888] The uprising lasted for a year and contested the rule of Hassan I.[889] Following this revolt, the sultan deployed the military apparatus and squashed the rebellion with cannons and a renewal of the *bay'a* submission-security pact.[890] Indeed, tax dissent continued to pose a problem for the central tributary state, even after this revolt. A letter dated 6 December 1887 from *amins* Abdelhamid Tazi and Mohammed ben Abdellah shows the extent to which the local authorities were concerned about the creative methods shoemakers were pursuing to dissent, such as hiding to escape inspection, buying and reselling shoes while bypassing brokers, and using their own stamp for the final product instead of that of the Makhzen.[891] Reflecting on the nature and challenges of political rule in Morocco, Gilson Miller posits that Morocco had a unique set of problems in the countryside, due to the nature of 'the premodern makhzan [as] a patchwork of jurisdictions that operated with minimal coordination'.[892] Nevertheless, the binaries of modernity and tradition do not accurately explain the nature of this political system, nor do they account for the causal relations between the latter, the social relations of local production, and more broadly, the international system. Instead, this thesis adopts the framing of diffusion to uncover, interrogate, and historicise the articulations of the political forms taking place before and during imperialism.

To counter these waves of discontent, from clan-based and urban insurrection to the opposition of *zawiyas* (religious brotherhoods), in Fez and Cape Juby (Tarfaya), Hassan I's *mahallas* strategically targeted these hubs of contention, indeed operating as tools through which the sultan's claims of sovereignty and political-religious legitimacy were externalised. El Moudden describes this strategy of political centralisation in the following manner:

> The mahalla or harka is characterized by a precarious central [political power], and this is … what we concluded …, that the Makhzen's centre was a sharp head and a scattered base, moving through the gaps of local life [in the countryside].[893]

---

[887] See: Sahar Bazzaz, *Forgotten Saints: History, Power, and Politics in the Making of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[888] For a full account of the rebellion in Arabic, see: Mohammed Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun* (Casablanca: Edition Porte d'Anfa, 2011), pp. 132-139.

[889] Sahar Bazzaz, 'Heresy and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Morocco', *The Arab Studies Journal* 10/11, no. 2/1 (2002): 67–86.

[890] Mohammed Kenbib, *Ālmaḥmyoun* (Casablanca: Edition Porte d'Anfa, 2011), pp. 134-135.

[891] *Al-Wathā'iq: Maǧmuʿāt Waṯā'iqyah Dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]*, number 2183, pp. 182-184.

[892] Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 35.

[893] Abderrahmane El Moudden, *Ālbawādy Ālmaġribya Qabl Āl-Istiʿmār: Qabāil Innāwen Wālmaẖzan Bayn Ālqarn Āl-Sādis ʿašar Wā Attāsiʿ ʿašar [The Moroccan Countryside before Colonialism: The Inaoun Clans and the Makhzen between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Rabat: Mohammed V University, 1995), p. 308.

Here, the mahalla is a 'spatial or relational' method of centralising political authority;[894] it acted as a means of centralising peripheral regions (such as Tarfaya) and their population.[895] Aiming to impose submission and project the image of a fully functional, well-run, and cohesive sultanate, the *mahallas* of the ambulatory Makhzen served to widen the theoretical boundaries of political power.[896] In Souss, the mahalla of 1886 eventually forced Donald Mackenzie out of his company in Tarfaya while restricting the influence of Mohamed Bayrouk; and in 1893, a military expedition to Tafilalt aimed at halting French advances into the Sahara.

The case of the British North-West African Company illustrates the complexities of the dialectic between state and society, empire-building, traditional forms of statecraft, as well as the context-specific and changing political roles of the symbols of legitimacy.[897] It also symbolises the pinnacle of a transition from a tribute-taking empire and a multi-layered ecosystem of sovereignty comprising various forms, traditions, and layers of sovereignty, and within which the agency of non-state actors was flexible, towards a stricter regime of territorial sovereignty impacted by the advance of empire. On one hand, the rise (and subsequent fall) of the British North-West African Company highlighted the informal mechanisms of the British Empire and the quest of the European bourgeoisie to constantly expand and search for new markets, even in spaces they construct as 'uncivilised' and 'barren' via their Orientalist lens such as the desert. On the other hand, it accentuated and reproduced the tensions between two competing projects of territorial rule: that of the Makhzen (the central political authority) and that of Britain (representing the imperial advances of Europe into the Moroccan space). In the first conceptualisation, sovereignty forms the basis of international law;[898] it is derived from the European experience, in which '… the social transformations that brought about capitalism, with its characteristic separation of economic and political spheres, were the same ones that brought the nation state to maturity'.[899] The second (Makhzen) conceptualisation of sovereignty, contrarily, derives from *bay'a* which equates jurisdiction and sovereignty and seeks to rule politically and sociologically via the pact of submission and protection. Furthermore, the Makhzen's supranational dynastic sovereignty model was more concerned with the rights of rulership. In fact,

---

[894] According to El Moudden, there is a distinction between the perceptions of the central tributary state and the perceptions of people regarding what constitutes a mahalla. To the Makhzen, the mahalla is an act of occupying and dominating peripheral spaces; while to people, the mahalla represents a looming military threat or danger. Thus, I use 'mahalla' to refer to large-scale, slowly moving military campaigns centred around the person of the sultan; while the 'harka' refers to much smaller movements or campaigns of the Makhzen throughout the countryside -- movements are not tied to the sultan but are representative of the Makhzen. For more on the etymological origins and historical manifestations of the harka and mahalla, see: El Moudden, pp. 307-13.

[895] Zarakol, *Before the West*, p. 14.

[896] Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 36.

[897] Sami Zubaida, "Is There a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner's Sociology of Islam," *Economy and Society* 24, no. 2 (May 1, 1995): 151–88.

[898] Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*, vol. 15, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007), p. 666.

[899] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View* (Verso, 2002), p. 171.

both the European and the Makhzen's sovereignty projects were in sharp contradiction with the very nature of the boundaries of Moroccan society and within it, the nature of political rule, which was '… fluid, expanding or contracting with the reach of … the monarch's personal rule, his propriety domain and family alliances'.[900] Following a historical overview of the emergence of the British North West African Company, the next section delves into the specific social relations of production and private property contextualising the company's venture.

3. British lives and private property in Tarfaya

The emergence of the British North West African Company must be contextualised within the scramble for Africa and the unequal dynamics which structured Morocco's interactions with Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Not only did a distinctive form of racialism[901] – bifurcating Moroccan society into the ranks of Imazighen who are seen as civilised, good-looking, and knowledgeable traders, and the ranks of bigoted and uncivilised 'Moors' – hold a key role in determining where to place the company. The trading port (or British settlement) itself was specifically chosen for its strategic location, connecting different parts of the African continent and providing access to a range of commodities (minerals,[902] Argan produce, dates, and gold) which would be diverted to the European market,[903] and offering a pathway to the Atlas Mountains through the *Haha* region.

At this point, it is crucial to point out that Mackenzie had never actually travelled to the 1,200m² area within which his company was settled apart from a brief tour in Khnifiss and Laayoune. Thus, Mackenzie's project of 'flooding of the Sahara' was primarily based on Mackenzie's reading about a desert 'depression' in Cape Juby and the wider Maghrib. Indeed, Mackenzie fervently believed that the African climate allowed for such an imperial 'flooding' venture.[904]

---

[900] Wood, *The Origin of Capitalism*, p. 168.

[901] On this particular point, this passage from Mackenzie's report published in a December 1876 issue of The Times is revealing: 'The tribes who inhabit these regions are not of the negro race, but seem to belong to the Berbers, who were the original inhabitants of the Atlas Mountains, and were driven south by the Moors. Their occupation is keeping flocks, cultivating the land, and hunting. They are also eager traders. Many of them are tall and handsome, having good features and of simple habits, and not so bigoted as the Moors of Morocco.' Thus, the material articulations of race associated with the categories of Moors and Berbers were distinct; while the Moors were conceptualised as the epitome of barbarity and the antithesis of civilisation; Berbers were conceptualised in a different manner.

[902] In the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain showed a growing interest in mineral resources in Morocco. In a letter dated 1 July 1883, Minister Mohammed ben Larbi Jamai responds to merchant Mohammed ben Mustapha Doukkaly – who informed him of Captain Warren's (an English merchant) interest in exploiting mineral resources. In this letter, the Minister clarifies that minerals in all the land of the Makhzen belong to the treasury and that that is the 'final word' regarding this matter. *al-Wathā'iq: maǧmuʿāt waṯā'iqyah dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections Volume 14]*, number 1637, pp. 104-105.

[903] Mackenzie, *The Flooding of the Sahara: An Account of the Proposed Plan for Opening Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the North-West Coast*, p. 43.

[904] Mackenzie, p. 16.

In an exploration report published in *The Times*, Mackenzie stated the following:

> The importance of the port at Cape Juby as a trading station will at once be seen when we consider the tedious system of transport between North Africa and Soudan. Soudan, the country with which it is proposed to hold direct commercial intercourse from Cape Juby, is the most important portion of the great African continent […] It is bounded on the south by Equatorial Africa, on the west by the Kong mountains, on the east by Kordofan, on the north by the Sahara Desert.[905]

The British North West African Company was an attempt to charter capitalism in the Maghribi space through the use of the 'characteristically modern' attributes of firms,[906] ranging from access to capital and relying on wage labour to having bureaucratic and administrative structures. For instance, the company's capital relied on a grouping of *provincial* merchant funders, most of whom were from Bradford and Manchester. These particular dynamics of England's overseas imperial trade community challenge the somewhat limited perception of eighteenth-century merchants as primarily based in the southeast of England, notably in London. Maw rightly pinpoints and explains the obscuring of the role of merchant communities beyond the capital in the following argument:

> While inland merchants based in industrial towns may not have controlled vast fleets of ships, or have invested heavily in appetising or eye-catching consumer imports, they were able to exploit their local contacts in rapidly maturing provincial markets for specialist manufactured goods to make inroads, at the expense of port-based merchants, into some of England's foremost export trades.[907]

As previously argued in the first section of the chapter, despite the expansionist nature of the British North West African Company, it faced difficulties in implementing its project of having '[…] an opening for British trade' due to the political entanglement of competing territorialities.[908] Simultaneously, it highlighted the transition from a regime of accumulation under which sovereignty was a non-territorial social relation, constantly shaped and reproduced within the contentious relations of actors practising traditional and alternative forms of agency, towards a regime of social and economic accumulation in which non-state actors negotiate a limited agency that falls within the boundaries of empire, on the one hand, and within the boundaries of the sultan's political authority, on the other. Under the ecosystem, non-state actors had a wider opportunity for manoeuvre and self-

---

[905] Donald Mackenzie, "Report of the Visit to North-West Africa," *The Times*, 23 December, 1876.

[906] Emily Erikson and Valentina Assenova, 'Introduction: New Forms of Organization and the Coordination of Political and Commercial Actors', in *Chartering Capitalism : Organizing Markets, States, and Publics* (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015), 1–13.

[907] Peter Maw, 'Provincial Merchants in Eighteenth-Century England: The "Great Oaks" of Manchester*', *The English Historical Review* 136, no. 580 (juin 2021): 568–618.

[908] Memorandum of the North West African Company, 9 September 1875. FO 99/262. National Archives.

organisation. Imperial ecocide reversed this dynamic as an autonomous form of political organisation – even those that abide by the sociological contract of bayʿa – became embedded *within* the networks of empire (for economic rather than ideological reasons) and thus were explicitly aligned *against* the interests of the central tributary state. However, the British conception of territorial sovereignty in relation to the sultan's dominions shifted over the long term. John Drummond Hay's position initially assumed neutrality in the sense of safeguarding British economic interests in Morocco and pointed out the risks to Britain in opposing the sultan's territorial claims. John Drummond Hay's position was initially one in which he considered the coast of Tarfaya beyond the authority of the Sultan. He penned a letter to the Sultan in which he stated that '[...] the Moroccan government has no right to interfere in the affairs of Europeans who settle in the areas south of Wadi Noun [...].'[909] However, the position of the British government changed. A letter dated 26 June 1886 addressed by John Drummond Hay to Vizier Gharneet or 'Gharrit',[910] states the following:

> I have received a telegram from H. M.'s Government informing me that the agent of the North African Company, which has a factory at Cape Juby (Tarfaya) situated a day and a half's journey to the south of Wad Draa, has acknowledged the boundary of the dominions of the Sultan […].[911]

With the threat of British expansion, Sultan Hassan I utilised the contradictions of social modes of organisation to his own advantage, pitting one clan against another. Thus, the Sultan used his political influence to target Mohammed Bayrouk, the independent Sheikh who was more supportive of Mackenzie's company and signed treaties with the British approving their use of the territory, with the enlisted help of a Sheikh from the south of Essaouira. In this context of increasing hostility, Bayrouk was coerced to take on the position of preventing neighbouring commercial caravans and communities from visiting Cape Juby for trading purposes.[912] Nevertheless, the newly seized support of Mohammed Bayrouk did not prevent significant hostilities against the company, as in 1888, '[…] the new local manager was lured inland from the Company's now fortified trading post to be murdered by nomadic Moors, acting apparently under the orders of Mulai Hassan.'[913] Thus, both the trading station and factory in Tarfaya, referred to as 'British private property' in archival sources, were eventually dismantled. A July 1887 statement by the North West African Company stated the following:

---

[909] P. G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1991), p. 258.
[910] In British archival sources, his name is anglicised as 'Cid Garnett'.
[911] Letter from John Drummond Hay to vizier Cid Garnett, 26 June 1886. National Archives, FO 99/262.
[912] Parsons, 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95'.
[913] Parsons.

The Sultan of Morocco, finding his revenues at Mogador injured by the progress of the new port, began to assume an unfriendly attitude. His officials caused attacks to be made, on territory belonging to the Company, upon caravans coming to the Company's station, bribed the surrounding tribes to prevent access to the port, and threatened the Company's traders and servants. […] Despite [Her Majesty's Government's] steps, the violent interference with the Company in its ordinary course of business still continued, and the Company, seeing no immediate prospect of any improvement, and their trade being at a standstill asked Her Majesty's Government if they would sanction the disposal of their rights and claims to a foreign Company or government.[914]

A letter dated 19 February 1891 from Moroccan Minister of External Affairs Mohammed Gharrit, shows the parasitic role of the company not only in acquiring commodities but also in extracting surplus money. Here, the Makhzen acquiesced to pay £50,000 (divided into five equal amounts over five years) to compensate for the 'losses' incurred from the Makhzen interfering with Mackenzie's trading plans.[915] Despite the unproductive nature of its trading post and factory, the British North West African Company eventually extracted an estimated total of £100.000 from the Moroccan government through the demand for fines for violating 'British lives and private property'.[916]

4. Conclusion

The dynamics of British company-state expansionism in Tarfaya were mired by historical contradictions. On the one hand, English capitalism – 'the quintessential disrupter, dismantling and unravelling the social relations of everyday life and endlessly generating new antagonisms'[917] – drove the founding of the North West African Company in its quest to find a new market. Industrialists and merchants dominated the company's financing. Henry Lee, then President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (MCC) and key partner in cotton company Tootal, Broadhurst, Lee & Co,[918] alongside his brother Sir Joseph, chairman of the MCC were crucial in providing capital for the company's establishment. Indeed, as Henry Lee was elected as a Member of Parliament for the Port of Southampton in 1880, both brothers used their influence in the government sphere, the trading and banking sector to advocate for the interests of the company.[919] However, the expansionist project of the North West African Company did not succeed in *reproducing* (English) capitalist social relations in that specific region of the Maghrib. This outcome could be explained by the fact that the British did

---

[914] Statement by the North West African Company, July 1887. National Archives, FO 99/262.
[915] Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. The Journal of the Sahara of Morocco, p. 8. Royal Archives, Rabat.
[916] Parsons, 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95'.
[917] Satnam Virdee, 'Racialized Capitalism: An Account of Its Contested Origins and Consolidation', *The Sociological Review* 67, no. 1 (1 January 2019): 3–27.
[918] Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 1989, p. 305.
[919] Also, Henry Lee was Director of Williams Deacon's Bank ant the Manchester and Salford Savings Bank.

not have a monopoly over private property, labour, or desert commerce over what was deemed 'British territory'.

Ellen Wood argues that '[…] for the English colonization became an end in itself, and no other imperial power depended on white settler colonies to the same degree.'[920] 'It was […] England that first saw the emergence of a capitalist system, and it was England that first created a form of imperialism driven by the logic of capitalism',[921] she continues. As such, it can be argued that the North West African Company was a British colonially driven reaction to the imperatives of capitalism in England. Donald Mackenzie was to 'fill the blank spaces on the map of world trade with vast numbers of potential customers' in an area that he conceived as barren, uncivilised and unexplored.[922] In drawing upon the funds and social capital of an influential group of Manchester and Bradford industrialists, and in founding the North West African Company, the British had effectively sought to transplant an English-style mini-factory in Tarfaya, and by extension, a capitalist form of wage labour that is reliant on non-capitalist modes of life. In other words, despite the capitalist tendencies of the North West African Company, it was faced with the paradox of attempting to implement a project that was not only in sharp contradiction with a distinctive local conception of sovereignty, but also with existing social relations of production and labour, which, on the one hand, relied on cattle and local commodities as a means of social reproduction; on the other hand, had a distinctive relationship with the commons and the desert space which they inhabited. Here, the notion of 'nomadic empire' is especially insightful. Kradin defines a nomadic empire as a society which is '… organized on the military-hierarchical principle, occupying a quite large space and exploiting the nearby territories, as a rule, by external forms of exploitation'.[923] In the case of Tarfaya, two dynamics could be observed in this context: the first of which is inhabiting, that is, the appropriation of the desert space, and the second of which is circulating, in addition to a wide range of practices (distinct from one region and one community to another) that facilitate the circulation of people and goods.[924] In transplanting a British settlement in the commercially strategic area of Tarfaya, Donald Mackenzie sought to exploit the nature of commerce and social relations in the desert as a means through which to accumulate profit. Indeed, in forming the company with the blessing of Mohammed Bayrouk and the British

---

[920] Ellen Wood, *Empire of Capital* (London: Verso, 2005), p. 73.

[921] Wood, p. 73.

[922] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, p. 66.

[923] Nikolay N. Kradin, 'Nomadism, Evolution and World-Systems: Pastoral Societies in Theories of Historical Development', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 2002, 368–88.

[924]*Kafilat*, or big caravans, grouped 1000 to 1500 camels in an itinerary leading either from Guelmim, the demi-desert town to Agadir, from Taroundant via Marrakech towards Eglab and Taoudeni, or from Tafilalt via the south of Morocco, towards the oases of Touat and Timbuktu. Twice a year, in April and December, Essaouira saw the arrival of two important caravans, headed by a conductor who, in a role similar to that of a *Rais* on a ship, enforces journey discipline. In these maritime-desert connections, an estimated 18 to 25.000 camels make the journey, whether in smaller or bigger expeditions. See: Jean-Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830-1894): L'ouverture Tome II* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), pp. 146-150.

government, Mackenzie demonstrated the 'quintessence of British imperialism' in extraction by expansion,[925] and in the process, disrupting social relations and non-capitalist forms of life and political organisation.

Thus, diplomatic debates about where Morocco's territory begins and ends, about the extent of the sultan's political authority, and the 'rights' of British lives in Tarfaya were not senseless diplomatic skirmishes. Understood in their wider historical context, these written exchanges provided insights that transcended the founding of the British North West African Company. They symbolise a *qualitative* change that took place in the Moroccan terrain through reverberations of capitalist social (class) relations and imperialist expansion. The political forces that operated on the margins of Morocco's ecosystem of sovereignty made local deals with the British while simultaneously working with the central tributary state. Mohammed Bayrouk held sociopolitical power and thus offered the British concessions which were within the realm of the central tributary state. Bayrouk used his position as a 'trustee' of a space that is collectively and 'corporately owned' to make trade deals and sign treaties with Mackenzie.[926] In doing so, he effectively extracted the land upon which the company was set up from the sphere of the rule of dynastic tributary sovereignty. In other words, the relationship between the Moroccan terrain and the global tempests within which it was incorporated was dialectical. The new social realities of British imperialism and capitalism entering the scene of Tarfaya and coming into an ecosystem of sovereignty both shaped the Moroccan context and were shaped by them; they rendered political entities forming part of an ecosystem as separate units by creating a new *class* and political antagonism.

---

[925] Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1966), p. 121.
[926] Kenneth Onwuka Dike, *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 6.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Future Realms of Sovereignty

In *Metro 2033*, Dmitry Glukhovsky, inspired by Arkady and Boris Strugatsky's iconic Russian science fiction classic *Roadside Picnic*, takes us to a dystopian post-apocalyptic and post-nuclear world situated in the Moscow underground system. In 2033, beyond the metro, the world is destroyed, the impact of radiation is tangible and all engulfing. Yet, survivors found a way to carry on, to seek refuge and reproduce life in the damp, dark and dreary underground system. The metro is divided into different stations and spheres of rule, at times warring, and at times working together. In the metro, there is a range of powerful and smaller factions. While Polis has the strength of an army and of historical knowledge, Hansa controlled much of the station through its economic and technological advantages. The faction of Brahmins were academics and librarians, and fortunately, the communists of the Red Line were there to defeat the Nazis of the Fourth Reich faction. The metro is a space in which different practices of politics, different levels of rule, different relations of production, and different forms of social organisation existed. In this context, the protagonist, Artyom from VDNKH, is tasked with carrying and delivering a message that can save the metro from destruction. Chaos, menace, fear, surrealism, and solidarity punctuate the voyage to achieve this task. Throughout his journey, Artyom meets traders, knowledge producers, mutant hunters, and armed communists, who each in their own way, help him get one step closer to his goal. Unlike Artyom's objective, this thesis neither claims to save the world from further destruction nor does it claim to save or revolutionise that of International Relations. Instead, this thesis walked through different historical and conceptual stations and became immersed in the lives of different historical figures, all of whom have shaped its contours and contributions. Crucially, this thesis set out to demonstrate the various structures, imaginaries, and horizons of political rule, the various layers of agencies and practices of statecraft, the various modes of social organisation, and the ways in which all these analytical components have shaped the Moroccan historical path.

The journey of this thesis began by questioning the relationship between sovereignty and non-capitalist social relations in Morocco and dissecting the extent to which they are intertwined beyond early modern European case studies. Thus, it posed the following historical and theoretical questions: What are the historical and material manifestations of sovereignty, if at all, in the Moroccan realm of politics between the lower/extended Middle Ages? What is the nature of the transformations that occurred and how did they inform the practices of statecraft? In what ways can we capture both the historical essence and specificity of sovereignty; and the agency of actors and the variety of their political imaginaries, whether from above or below?

This thesis builds on an IR and International Historical Sociology framework to provide a transdisciplinary analysis of the geopolitical historical relations between (non-)capitalism and the articulations of political rule in Morocco. This thesis began with the hypothesis that sovereignty was an altogether different entity in the Moroccan landscape, rooted in different historical circumstances. According to this hypothesis, Morocco challenges the foundational epistemological and ontological premises of IR by presenting a case of sovereignty with no political state where its material archaeologies of sovereignty are shaped and formulated separately from the emergence of capitalist relations.

To test this hypothesis, the thesis set out to historicise and analyse patterns of broader transformations and the connections between political rule and processes of accumulation within these two periods: 1666-1727 (representing ecosystems) and 1860-1895 (representing ecocide). The backbone of this historicist effort consisted of digging into the nature, historical context, and outcomes of various forms of political rule before and under imperialism as a means through which to gain insight into which agencies were articulated. The selection of these historical periods denotes a particular approach towards *historicising* the long-term process of political rule – one which focuses on transcending the binaries of internal/external, history/theory, and structures/agents. Thus, the selection of these case studies was the outcome of a specific approach which, on the one hand, sought to centralise Maghribi history both *before* and *during* imperial expansion and highlight the point at which uneven relationships with the Europeans have entered the picture; on the other hand, conceptualised political practice in its conventional dimension (through the Makhzen and the soldier-slaves of al-Bukhari), in its alternative dimension (through piracy in the Republic of Salé), and in its imperial dimension (through diplomacy and the creation of the British North West African Company).

Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between institutional military enslavement, piracy, and existing social bonds. It not only showed the ways in which piracy practices – up to a certain point – put a check on the despotic rule of the Ismaili polity, but that both formed part of an ecosystem with tensions and synergies, within which actors from both sides crossed political realms. In Chapter 5, this thesis maps out the structural societal and economic transformations that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. In tracing changes that occurred within the market, the system of taxation, and at the level of interpersonal relationships, this chapter shows how the structures of diplomacy and trade became embroiled in, and gradually subjugated to, the imperatives of capitalism and imperial expansion. In showing the multi-faceted forms of imperial accumulation taking place within the Moroccan milieu, this chapter conceptualised debt itself as a form of accumulation, which, alongside others, had gradually weakened the social fabric and propelled a new class and a new antagonism: that of the protégés. Chapter 6 demonstrates the political outcomes of the large-scale transformations that took place in the second half nineteenth century. It does so by zoning the case of the British North West African Company as one which demonstrates the beginning of the transition from personal rule

towards an imperially situated form of territoriality. In historicising the context of the emergence of the company, this chapter discusses the tensions between two forms of political rule (imperial and sultanic), as well as the tension between sultanic rule and the social structures and relations within the desert space.

This thesis is premised on a dynamic conception of 'historical change'. In it, sovereignty is not romanticised as a progressive societal and political happenstance that was equally also forged in the Global South. In other words, this thesis did not rely on a strategy of reversing Eurocentrism as a means to dig and anachronistically prove that sovereignty was formulated outside of Europe. Instead, the focus here was on conceptualising sovereignty as a historically specific, dynamic, and evolving entity rooted in conjunctural material circumstances and comprising many forms of political rule. This relationship was characterised by synergy and tension, inclusion, and exclusion between various social and political blocks within distinct historical periods.

As such, this thesis adopts a comparative approach which investigates the relationship between the practices of political rule, society, and the wider international system within which they are embedded. Such an approach helped conceptualise local patterns and processes of historical change within which money, labour, racial and religious differences, animals, and interpersonal relationships were commodified while shedding light on the international system as a prominent site of political contention. Marxism formed the backbone of this thesis, both as a method of analysis and historical enquiry. This method places various endogenous and exogenous forms of structural oppression and expressions of political rules that structure the Moroccan space at the front and centre of the analysis. According to this method, sovereignty is embedded in a material reality that is constantly moving. Sovereignty is neither shaped through absolutism nor through cultural criteria alone, such as a fixed conception of 'tribalism' as a form of sociopolitical organisation. In *German Ideology*, Marx described this method in the following manner:

> That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second

method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.[927]

The objectives of this thesis are manifold: First, this thesis contributes to a growing body of literature on state formation in the 'Arab world', which seeks to problematise and reconceptualise trajectories of statecraft in the Global South. It does so by rethinking and questioning the usefulness of the International Relations frameworks through which this process has been studied. Second, this thesis contributes to the literature which challenges the casting of statehood as unproblematic and permanent and challenges the confusion between sovereignty and statehood. It does so by showing the variegated trajectories, levels, and cultures of sovereignty – both from above and from below – which have permeated the Moroccan sphere of politics. Third, this thesis rethinks the relationship between sovereignty and non-capitalist modes of life in the context of a subsistence economy. It uses the Moroccan case not merely as an illustrative case study of permanent ahistorical 'distinctiveness', but rather as the backbone of a theoretical reinterpretation which revisits the epistemological and ontological foundations of IR/IHS.

This thesis therefore, presents a series of contributions – and not 'conclusions' in the scientist or positivist sense. Chapters are connected to one other through an overarching theoretical formulation which punctuates the entirety of the work. First, that in pre-capitalist Morocco (specifically in the extended Middle Ages, or the 'early modern period'), there were different layers, claims and cultures of sovereignty; territoriality was not a fundamental element of Morocco's practice of conventional and alternative politics to the extent that actors were not fixed in single political realm and crossed into other spheres of political rule – a phenomenon which I refer to as trans-sovereignties. This dynamic is conceptualised as ecosystems of sovereignty – a term which I argue helps capture the levels of synergy and tension between various political blocks, and the ways in which they challenged, re-enforced and reproduced one another. Further, this term helps historicise the simultaneously centralised and non-centralised nature of political arrangements, and the contexts within which actors from different backgrounds enacted agency, envisioned, and practiced different forms of political rule. Whether these agents were 'outlaws of the sea' (pirates) and outlaws and/or dependent of labourers on land (soldier-slaves), they were both constrained by the material contexts within which they existed while challenging and subverting European maritime warfare and Moroccan political authority from below. Second, that imperial politics in the latter half of the nineteenth century (re-)shaped the political forms of Morocco; the long-term process of ecocide relied on the gradual disintegration of the relationship of people to land and of the multiplicities of agencies that existed outside the boundaries of the Makhzen, to the extent that political blocks became more explicitly opposed. This process was as much shaped by imperial capitalist expansion as it was by its

---

[927] Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 14-15.

conjunctural outcomes whereby the Makhzen started adopting a stricter form of territoriality as the dominant expression of political rule.

At the same time, each chapter presents its own 'conclusions' and thus provides key insights aiming to challenge mainstream conceptualisations of sovereignty in International Relations, while simultaneously making historicist interventions about various facets of the reproduction of political life and social forms of organisation in Morocco. In other words, in addition to this theoretical thread that runs through the thesis, each chapter includes a range of historicist contributions on race, class, on the population's relationship with physical space (whether it be by the sea in the desert), on the development of a distinct form of 'capitalist gangsterism' through trans-imperial networks of corruption, on territoriality, the centralisation of power, and on power relations between different social and political blocks.

Thus, the contributions of this thesis reflect an approach in which *historicising* the Maghribi space is itself a form of theorising. These contributions can be summarised in the following manner.

The first key contribution of this thesis pertains to re-imagining and re-capturing the essence of sovereignty in the extra-European periphery. This thesis proposes the conceptualisation of sovereignty through the analytical framework of ecosystems/ecocide as means to capture both the distinctiveness of sovereignty in the extra-European periphery, and the ways in which the latter is transformed through the imperial encounter. Thus, I argue that this framework not only helps capture the nuances, tensions, and different forms of political expression in the Moroccan space but also helps to trace and identify capitalism and imperial expansion as the violent and gradual reversal of the former. In doing this, the aim to recover sovereignty not just within the context of inter-state relationships or within the context of dominant political powers, but within the context of the ways in which people themselves shape history. In re-writing the epistemological and ontological premises of IR, this conceptual framework pushes us to think of sovereignty beyond the binaries which limit our understanding of politics in spaces which saw a different historical trajectory to that of Europe. It also reveals new perspectives to think about sovereignty beyond absolute authority or its absence, beyond absolute stateness or its absence, and beyond absolute territoriality or its absence; instead arguing for bringing the people back into our IR analyses by thinking of the manifestations of *syāda šaʿbya* [souveraineté Populaire] and taking seriously the dialectical relationship between the politics of consensus and the politics of coercion.

Second, this thesis rethinks race, racial forms of exclusion, and racial hierarchies in the Moroccan context. Thus, slavery is constructed as the legal, sociological, economic, and social condition of permanent or semi-permanent unfreedom. This definition, on the one hand, helps captures the historical nuances and specificities of the practices of enslavement; and on the other hand, helps distinguish enslaved groups from those in socio-economic conditions of servility and

peonage such as the khammas peasants. Following from that, the construction and reproduction of race is conceptualised not as a transhistorical phenomenon denoting individual prejudices that defy historical time, and not as an element of a racial 'capitalism' in seventeenth century Morocco, but rather as a product of distinct material circumstances. Under these circumstances, the central tributary state enacts a strategy of political accumulation which, on the one hand relies on extracting the enslaved from the communities (and by extension, lands) from which they were drawn and re-inserting them as dependent labourers; i.e., soldier-slaves. Thus, military slavery was coercion via non-economic means, i.e., the non-economic function of a political strategy which not only was premised on deploying already-existing social relations (of landlessness and clanlessness) to create a personal army for the sultan; it was also premised on maintaining and reproducing that relationship to land, and in the process, creating a range of social hierarchies and social antagonisms within the ranks of the enslaved, as well as between them and various segments of the population.

Third, a key contribution of this thesis is to think about what 'class' means and how it was forged and manifested in the Moroccan context. This was a challenging task which sought to balance between different elements: to capture the nuances and historically contingent nature of social relations of a non-capitalist Maghribi space, to go beyond super-imposing early modern European class distinctions into the Moroccan milieu, while simultaneously avoiding the tendency to trans-historicise 'class' and confuse it with explicit social antagonisms.[928] Thus, the historically evolving and dynamic nature of social antagonisms in Morocco must be contextualised, on the one hand, in the long-term structural changes of property relations, and the ways in which the gradual disintegration of the relationship of people to land and physical space went hand in hand with a process through which they were forced into different forms of dependencies; and on the other, to the reverberations of capitalism (via imperial expansion) which accentuated contradictions at various levels. The emergence of the merchant-diplomatic classes, protégé-settlers, and protégé-natives eroded Morocco's ecosystems of sovereignty as this combination of social forces, on the one hand, satellited the Moroccan economy via trans-imperial networks of global corruption, and on the other, opened new global trade routes through Morocco gradually lost the monopoly over long-established commercial routes. In viewing class and social antagonisms in such a historicist manner, an approach puts itself forth whereby 'the dialectic of the universal and the specific' which frame socio-historical change of peoples beyond the Anglo-Saxon context forms the backbone of the analysis.[929] However,

---

[928] While different forms of domination and social antagonisms structured everyday life, there was no class consciousness as such. Thus, conceptualising the wealthier Moroccan merchant classes as a 'bourgeoisie' would be a super-imposition of European history into the Moroccan context; it was not a bourgeoisie in the sense that it did not generate transformations in the socio-economic structures of Morocco. See: Gallissot, 'Au Cœur Du Sous-Développement Des Pays de La Méditerranée', p. 101-2; Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques*, p. 18; Hubayda, *Bu's al-tārīkh : murāja'āt wa-muqārabāt [The Misery of History: Reviews and Approaches]*, pp. 114-17.

[929] Belal, *Développement et facteurs non-économiques*, p. 12.

these reflexive contributions on class in Morocco raise key questions beyond the Moroccan milieu: is there a transition to capitalism? If so, at what point did it occur and how do we determine that transition? What does the former or latter tell us about non-European societies? As stated in Chapter 3, in the nineteenth century, Morocco did not experience a transition to capitalism but a transition to a structural and prolonged condition of under-development. Here, the parasitic nature of European capitalism and merchant's capital had profound effects on the everyday life and economic positions of people (forced into decisions and dependencies beyond their control) without generating structural and qualitative changes in productive forces.

The fourth key contribution of this thesis involves the long-debated and contentious question of agency. In the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx describes the ways in which agency is constrained by material circumstances in the following manner:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.[930]

Thus, in thinking about agency in International Relations beyond the conventional actors of 'glocal' politics, beyond the rights and nature of rulership, and beyond the territoriality of the modern nation-state, a new world of theoretical horizons opens up before us. In this world, agency is pluriverse, liberated from the abstraction of the nation-state, while '… sovereign power is not vested in a person (king) or, an entity (state).'[931] Pirates are not enactors and receptacles of violence; instead, they are a cosmopolitan crew who forge their own political paths and imaginaries – a dynamic which has been amply demonstrated in discussions of Chapter 4 about the social composition of Slaoui society. More so, with this historicist approach toward agency, pirates in the Maghribi space are not just 'enslavers' or 'raiders', they are cosmopolitan maritime workers of the world who have the capacity to envision, create, and shape their own political environments, their own legal systems, their diplomatic interactions with other polities, and their own networks of trade and commerce. At the same time, this seafaring labour force challenged and subverted political authority at various levels. In more specific terms, pirates disturbed the inconsistently applied European Law of Nations and the ever-shifting categories of 'pirate', 'privateer' and 'corsair', which sought to demonise them at times and support them at others (when maritime warfare was carried out on behalf of Europeans). Pirates also performed other forms of subversion of maritime and political norms, including mutiny from below against their own working conditions or against the expanding reach of the Makhzen, which sought to appropriate the harvest of their labour and toil, and increasingly encroach upon the independent, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious space of maritime skill which they forged for

---

[930] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 10.
[931] Shani and Behera, 'Provincialising International Relations through a Reading of Dharma'.

themselves. Thus, adopting a conception of agency in which everyday people are the 'motor' of their historical fate (within the constraints of their environment) helps widen our understanding of political practice beyond European case studies; it helps capture the realms of emancipatory and subversive politics. Yet, capturing the nuances of agency (beyond the limits of structural constraints) requires historicist awareness which centres the ways in which political life was reproduced, challenged, and re-negotiated; the ways in which practices of military enslavement functioned as a strategy of accumulation; crises of famine, hunger and epidemiological disease; the incorporation of the Moroccan milieu into the global marketplace of capitalism; the rise and fall of cosmopolitan maritime workerism; the increasing encroachment of European diplomatic practice upon land and people alike; and the expansion of British imperial strategy (via so-called 'trade' and commerce) even within spaces it deems uninhabitable and hostile, i.e., the desert, were reflective of structural, large-scale socio-historical transformations. However, viewing the actors within the Maghribi space as mere recipients of these changes not only provides a severely restricted understanding of agency, it also silences and obfuscates various forms of resistance from below and strategies seeking to either 'contain' or reproduce these patterns for different ends. In other words, while capitalism and empire have their own 'agency',[932] so too did people at these historical conjunctures. Viewed in this light, how are we then, to conceptualise Mohammed Bayrouk's relationship with the British North West African Company? While Bayrouk was a distant agent of the Makhzen who performed the Hobbesian sociological pact of protection-submission, i.e., the *bay'a*, he also acted explicitly against the former's interests by signing a treaty with Donald Mackenzie's and acting as an intermediary between the latter and the people inhabiting the surrounding desert areas. Furthermore, while Bayrouk was not a formal agent of imperialism, in the sense that he was not formally subsumed under the wings of Mackenzie's company, his actions nevertheless had the unintended consequences of bolstering this commercial imperial venture in ways that enabled the British, on the one hand, to impose their conception of British property relations into the desert space; and on the other, to extract surplus value and accumulate money not so much through the meagre trade and commercial dealings of the company, but rather via enforcing large indemnities and fines. Thus, the key contribution of this thesis with regard to agency is to expand the definitions and categorisations of who is viewed as a *legitimate* actor in politics (whether local or global), and to highlights both the emancipatory and contradictory forms that these agential practices could take.

One of the main challenges faced throughout researching and writing this thesis pertains to the practical questions of mobility, borders, and archival research. I began my Ph.D. in October 2019. Unfortunately, only a few months later, the world experienced upheavals of Covid-19. As such, this thesis was framed by a series of interruptions and hurdles, some of which were related to Covid-19 and lockdowns. This thesis was not only affected by the closures of libraries and archives within

---

[932] Harootunian, *Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism*, p. 194.

Britain but also by even lengthier and stricter closures of both the Moroccan border and research institutions. For example, the Moroccan borders were closed intermittently from March 2020 to February 2022, which meant that I could not conduct archival research in Morocco until the third year of my PhD. Other challenges were related to border closures, difficulties in obtaining visas (to France), and research mobility. More specifically, restrictions on finances and travel (both in terms of border closures and visas) meant that I could only spend a limited time in archives outside Britain, whether in France or Morocco. These hurdles have had a significant impact on my ability to collect and analyse data, despite attempts to adapt to the situation which included re-orienting the thesis and turning to the archives in Britain. As such, the thesis must be contextualised as a product of these constraints. In turn, these dynamics have translated into a shortcoming of archival unevenness between the different case study chapters throughout the thesis. Thus, it is important to restate that the objective of this thesis was neither to provide a general theoretical model acting as transhistorical law nor to provide a general historical framework that would be applied to Morocco at all historical times and in all spatial contexts, that is, a general history of Morocco. As this thesis is the product of research strategies, methods, and research constraints, its aim was to problematise conceptions of sovereignty and statehood in International Relations; to rethink the relationship between sovereignty and historically specific social relations; and to offer fresh reinterpretations of traditional, alternative, and imperial forms of political rule in the Moroccan context.

The second shortcoming of this thesis is that it does not explore the gendered social relations of sovereignty. In other words, it does not interrogate the historically specific material realities of women's lives throughout the transformations in the political and economic forms of society that this thesis has mapped. Indeed, the question of 'where are the women?'[933] is analytically absent from this thesis. Moving gender to the forefront of the analysis of the production of sovereignty would therefore give crucial insights into the gendered dynamics of these processes, as well as the extent to which gender inequality determined the lives of communities and people – a dynamic which was entrenched in all modes of production, at land and sea.[934] Thus, this thesis does not explore the 'masculinist, productive… bias of the maritime world.'[935] In writing about the gendered dynamics of the whaling industry in New England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Norling provides a new socio-historical dimension to seafaring as a gendered practice. Norling explains the inner workings of a maritime culture which was structured both by aggressive and unbridled masculinities distanced from land, and by an objectification and exclusion of women through the feminisation of the 'sea' and the

---

[933] Cynthia H. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014.
[934] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972), p. 226.
[935] Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, *Capitalism and the Sea* (London: Verso, 2021), p. 319.

'ship'.[936] In non-capitalist societies, too, women 'reproduced human beings'.[937] They worked in the field and in the household,[938] in the maritime and in the land-based space, in the city and in the countryside. In subsistence-based economies such as Morocco, women cooked, cleaned, cared for men and children. In the wider Maghrib, women have historically been involved in hunting and in agriculture.[939] In Morocco, women were central to the labour of cultivation and grazing, whether ploughing, harvesting, or caring for animals. They worked in the textile industry and in the trade sector. They held political functions in their communities, such as the women of the Zaer clan who used cannons to warn their community of the approaching Makhzen's mahalla in 1840.[940] In this regard, several questions can be posed: What were women's positions and structural conditions within these ecosystems of sovereignty? What is the relationship between gender and the material dimensions of geographical space? How did women experience transformations within the fabric of Moroccan society? How did women challenge, subvert, produce, or reaffirm these forms of political rule? Adopting a methodological approach towards manifestations of sovereignty in Morocco, one that ontologically places gender at the front and centre would open new horizons of historicist research and would yield new insights into the dynamics of political rule in the Global South and help untangle the complex relationship between political practices and the 'mode[s] of physical and social reproduction'.[941]

The third shortcoming of this thesis is that it does not systematically explore long-term socio-historical changes at the micro level. As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis is neither a history from above, nor history from below. It is also not a work of social or economic history but rather a history-centric work of International Relations which interrogates the manifestations, practices, and material contexts of sovereignty. Although it centres on the lives and agencies of individuals at various points, it does so with the explicit purpose of making broader inferences about the ways in which their actions are the intended or unintended product of their own limited time and circumstances. In other words, this thesis prioritised looking into the agency of actors as a tool through which to analyse the transformations in social relations in broader socio-historical contexts

---

[936] Lisa Norling, *Captain Ahab Had a Wife: New England Women & the Whalefishery, 1720-1870*, Gender & American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 2.

[937] Susan J. Ferguson, *Women and Work: Feminism, Labour, and Social Reproduction*, Mapping Social Reproduction Theory (London: Pluto Press, 2020), p. 12.

[938] Lise Vogel, *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory; New Introduction by Susan Ferguson and David McNally.* Historical Materialism Book Series (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2013), p. 120.

[939] Mustapha Taourirt and Zahia Madhoui, 'The Economic Role of Women in the Ancient Maghreb', *Al-Ibar: Journal for Historical and Archaeological Studies* 4, no. 2 (2021): 83–112.

[940] Younes Bouhssine, 'Ṣafaḥāt Min Tāryẖ Ālmara Ālmaġribya H̱ilāl Ālqarn Āttāsiʿ ʿašar: Ğawānib Ālfāʾilya Wa Aškāl Āttahmyš [Glimpses of the History of Moroccan Women during the Nineteenth Century: Forms of Participation and Marginalisation]', *The Lixus Journal of History and Humanities* 1, no. 41 (2022): 54–64.

[941] See Chapter 2 p. 52-81 Martha Gimenez, *Marx, Women and Capitalist Social Reproduction: Marxist Feminist Essays*, Historical Materialism Book Series (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2019).

within which these actors existed. As such, this thesis replicates the classic omission of those who shaped history and whom history has not forgotten but systematically marginalised – those people who, in the sources, were referred to as ālhamağ [the 'savages'], ārruʿāʿ [the 'rabble'], āssafala [the 'lowlives'], and ādduhamāʾ [the 'mob'].[942] While the thesis did not advance the argument of sovereignty as a progressive and self-evident entity, it focused on various intertwined forms of oppression that took place before and during imperialism, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5 – It also did not explore the oppressive manifestations of these forms of political rule on a wider scale. This exclusion [of the poor] has theoretical, historical, and political implications as it does not provide insight into the ways in which the poorest of society experienced these transformations.

However, the aim of researching and writing this thesis was to contribute to and intervene in various ways of thinking about IR and the Maghrib. In thinking about political forms within the space from and above and below, this thesis challenged the conceptualisations of sovereignty in IR. Crucially, in thinking about territoriality in its connections with capitalism and empire, we start to think about the modern nation-state not only as a recent historical invention but also as one which oppresses people and suppresses these histories. In the Maghrib, this has many political implications. Does it really matter if the caftan, seksou,[943] zellij, or msemmen belong to one country in the Maghrib more than another? Have the identities, territories, and nation-states of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia always existed in the way we now know them, constrained within the box of a fixed history? Laroui tells us that freeing ourselves from colonialism also involves freeing our minds from perceptible and imperceptible shackles.[944] Fanon tells us that this fierce struggle for total liberation can only take place through the exploited making 'the use of all means' to achieve that end.[945] Perhaps one way of doing that is to think of the realms of sovereignty beyond the modern nation-state, past and present, and to visualise different political imaginaries as providing a path towards our collective liberation in the Maghrib. As Hajja El Hamdaouia[946] tells us: ilā ẖyābt dābā tzyān [Even if things get ugly, they will be beautiful again]. I will end this thesis with a poem from Saida Menebhi that I have translated. Saida was a revolutionary Moroccan militant in the Marxist-Leninist organisation of *Ila al-Amam*. She died in prison due to systematic neglect following a hunger strike. She wrote about and believed in liberation for all people – beyond territorial borders – until her last breath:

---

[942] Hassan Akdi, 'Tağalyāt Ālfqr Bimuğtamaʿ Tiṭwān H̲ilāl Ālqarn 19 Min H̲ilāl Āssakan [Housing and Manifestations of Poverty in Tetouani Society during the 19th Century]', *The Lixus Journal of History and Humanities* 46, no. 46 (2023): 54–66.

[943] Couscous.

[944] Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[945] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 61.

[946] A Moroccan singer and song writer.

Dream in Broad Daylight[947]

You know my child

I wrote a poem for you

But do not blame me

If I wrote it in this language

That you still do not comprehend

It is nothing my child

When you grow up

You will seize this dream

That I had in broad daylight

You too will tell

The story of this woman

Arab prisoner

In her own country

Arab up to her white hair

Her verdant eyes

The dream, my child

Begins

When I see a pigeon

The birds that build their nests

On the roofs of prison

I dream of sending a message to the Revolutionaries

Of Palestine

To reassure them of support

---

[947] Written on 26 September 1977. See Saïda Menebhi, *Poèmes, lettres, écrits de prison* (Paris: Comités de lutte contre la répression au Maroc, 1978), p. 63-65.

Of victory

I dream of having wings

Just like the pigeons

And like swallows

Roam the skies

Until Eritrea

Until Dhofar

Arms loaded with rifles

The brain, with poems

I want to be a passenger

On top of the clouds

With my outfit of war

Fight Pinochet

In the bushes of Chile

So that my blood flows

On Chilean land

That Neruda sang about

Oh my dream

Red Africa

Without starving children

I dream

That the moon

From up there will fall down

To snatch it from the enemy

And then the moon would lay me down

In Palestine or the Sahara

Anywhere

I might for the victory

Of all militant people.

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Morocco

Archives du Maroc and Mudīrīyat al-Wathā'iq al-Malakīyah (referred to as Royal Archives)

Moroccan British Relations (1597-1860). Box Th-218, number 33749. The Royal Archives, Rabat.

Moroccan British Relations (1597-1860). Box Th-218, number 16642. The Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail (1682-1696). Box A04 – 002. Number 10.910.223. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail (1682-1696). Box A04 – 001. Number 10.820.606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail (1682-1696). Box A04 – 002. Number 10.820.427. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04 – 001. Number 10930115. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04.001-001. Number 10820606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04.001-001. Number 10820606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04.001-001. Number 10820606. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Moulay Ismail. Box A04-004. Number 11171103-A04-004-002. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Great Britain. Number 36.533. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Tarfaya. Th-90. Number 25615. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. Number 25.617. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Tarfaya. Box Th-90. Number 25.614. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Archives of Foreigners and Consular Protection. Number 13.335. Royal Archives, Rabat.

Kunnāš [register] Number 15. Archives du Maroc, Rabat.

France

Archives diplomatiques de Nantes

Consulat. Casablanca 144PO/1/1.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 675PO/A/174.

Tanger Légation et Consulat, 675PO/A/84.

Correspondence avec agence consulaire de Safi (1862-1869), Am 41. Tanger Légation et Consulat, 675PO/A/964

Fonds de la légation de France au Maroc. Direction politique number 54.

Britain

National Archives

FO 84/1500: Records of the Slave Trade and African Departments.

FO 99/261 (1881-1884).

FO 99/262 (1885-1887).

FO 99/263 (1888).

Bibliography

Aarts, Paul. 'The Middle East: A Region without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?' *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 5 (1999): 911–25.

Abdou, Mohamed. *Islam and Anarchism: Relationships and Resonances*. London: Pluto Press, 2022.

Abdul-rahman Ben Mohammed Sijilmassi, Ben Zidane. *Ithaf a'alam al-Nass, Volume III*. Cairo: Library of Religious Culture, 2008.

Aberzaq, Lbachir. *šamāl ġarb ālmaġrib fy ʿahd ālsulṭān ālmawla ismāʿyl (1672-1727) ğawānib min āltāryḫ ālsyāsy wālāğtmāʿy*. Marrakech: Afaq, 2017.

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 'The Origins of Salé and Rabat: False and True Beginnings'. In *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco*, 52–74. The Autobiography of Arai Hakuseki (Oritaku Shiba No Ki). New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Adler, Emanuel. 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics'. *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63.

Akabouch, Meryem. 'Islam, National Identity and Social Cohesion: The Case of Morocco'. Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali, 2014.

Akdi, Hassan. 'Tağalyāt Ālfqr Bimuğtamaʿ Tiṭwān Ḫilāl Ālqarn 19 Min Ḫilāl Āssakan [Housing and Manifestations of Poverty in Tetouani Society during the 19th Century]'. *The Lixus Journal of History and Humanities* 46, no. 46 (2023): 54–66.

Ake, Claude. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

Alami, Ilias, and Adam D. Dixon. 'The Strange Geographies of the "New" State Capitalism'. *Political Geography* 82 (2020): 102237.

Alarcón, Pedro Antonio de. *Diario de Un Testigo de La Guerra de África*. Gaspar y Roig, 1859.

Al-Azmeh, Aziz. 'Barbarians in Arab Eyes'. *Past & Present* 134, no. 1 (1992): 3–18.

———. 'Nationalism and the Arabs'. *Arab Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 1/2 (1995): 1–17.

Ali Saleh Moula. *Min al-tārīkh al-mansī ilá al-tārīkh al-ʿādil : dirāsāt fī tajribat al-muʾarrikh Ibrāhīm al-Qādirī Būtshīsh [From Forgotten to Just History: Studies on the work of historian Brahim Elkadiri Boutchich]*. Rabat: Dār Nashr al-Maʿrifah, 2021.

al-Wathāʾiq: maǧmuʿāt waṯāʾiqyah dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]. Vol. 7. Rabat: Mudīrīyat al-Wathāʾiq al-Malakīyah, 1989.

al-Wathāʾiq: maǧmuʿāt waṯāʾiqyah dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]. Vol. 14. Rabat: Mudīrīyat al-Wathāʾiq al-Malakīyah, 2010.

Al-Wathāʾiq: Maǧmuʿāt Waṯāʾiqyah Dawrya [The Documents: Periodic Documentary Collections]. Vol. 17. Rabat: Mudīrīyat al-Wathāʾiq al-Malakīyah, 2013.

Amalek, Ahmad. 'Ālmuğtmaʿ Ālmaġriby ʿinda Nihāyat Ālqarn Āttāsiʿ ʿašar [Moroccan Society at the End of the Nineteenth Century]'. *Maǧalat Tāryḫ Ālmaġrib [Journal of Moroccan History]* 1 (1981): 93–99.

Amili, Hassan. *al-Jihād al-baḥrī bi-Maṣabb Abī Raqrāq : khilāl al-qarn al-sābiʿ ʿashar al-Mīlādī [Maritime Jihad at the Mouth of the River Bou Regreg in the 17th Century]*. Mohammedia: Hassan II University, Mohammedia Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2006.

———. *ālmaġāriba wālmaǧāl ālbaḥry fy ālqarnayn 17 wa 18 [Les Marocains et l'espace maritime aux 17ème et 18ème siècles]*. Rabat : Dār Abī Raqrāq lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 2011.

Amin, Samir. *Eurocentrism: Modernity, Religion and Democracy: A Critique of Eurocentrism and Culturalism*. Translated by Russell Moore and James Membrez. 2nd ed. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009.

Amine El Bezzaz, Mohammed. *The History of Epidemics and Famines in Morocco in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Rabat: Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences, 1992.

Amster, Ellen. *Medicine and the Saints : Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877-1956*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2013.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 2006.

Anievas, Alexander, and Kerem Nişancioğlu. 'The Ottoman–Habsburg Rivalry over the Long Sixteenth Century'. In *How the West Came to Rule*, 91–120. The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism. London: Pluto Press, 2015.

Annassiri, Mohammad. *Al-istiqṣā li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣá. Volume 7.* Casablanca: Dār ālkitāb, 2001.

Aouragh, Miriyam. '"White Privilege" and Shortcuts to Anti-Racism'. *Race & Class* 61, no. 2 (2019): 3–26.

Ashley, Richard K. 'The Poverty of Neorealism'. *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (1984): 225–86.

Ayache, Germain. 'Aspects de La Crise Financière Au Maroc Après l'expédition Espagnole de 1860'. *Revue Historique* 220, no. 2 (1958) : 271–310.

———. *Études d'histoire marocaine*. Rabat : Société Marocaine des Éditeurs Réunis, 1983.

———. 'Le Sentiment National Dans Le Maroc Du XIX e Siècle'. *Revue Historique* 240, no. 2 (1968): 393–410.

———. 'L'utilisation et l'apport Des Archives Historiques Marocaines'. *Hespéris-Tamuda* VII (1966): 69–86.

———. 'Société Rifaine et Pouvoir Central Marocain (1850-1920)'. *Revue Historique* 254, no. Fasc. 2 (516) (1975): 345–70.

Ayubi, Nazih. *Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1995.

Bachand, Rémi, and Thierry Lapointe. 'Beyond Presentism: Rethinking the Enduring Co-Constitutive Relationships between International Law and International Relations1'. *International Political Sociology* 4, no. 3 (2010): 271–86.

Bagby, Laurie M. Johnson. 'The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations'. *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 131–53.

Banaji, Jairus. *Agrarian Change in Late Antiquity: Gold, Labour, and Aristocratic Dominance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Baram, Amatzia. 'Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 4 (1990): 425–48.

Barbe, Adam. 'Public Debt and European Expansionism in Morocco From 1860 to 1956'. Paris School of Economics, 2016.

Barnett, Michael. 'Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System'. *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (1993): 271–96.

Barnett, Michael N. *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Bartelson, Jens. *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Bashear, Suliman. 'On the Origins and Development of the Meaning of Zakāt in Early Islam'. *Arabica* 40, no. 1 (1993): 84–113.

Baugh, Carolyn. 'Revolting Women? Early Kharijite Women in Islamic Sources'. *Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies* 2, no. 1 (2017): 36–55.

Bayad, Tayeb. *Ālmāẖzān Wā Ḍḍārybā Wā-l Īstīʿmār: Ḍārībāẗ Āttārtyb 1880 - 1915*. Casablanca: Africa Sharq, 2011.

Bazzaz, Sahar. *Forgotten Saints: History, Power, and Politics in the Making of Modern Morocco*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

———. 'Heresy and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Morocco'. *The Arab Studies Journal* 10/11, no. 2/1 (2002): 67–86.

Beach, Adam R. 'African Slaves, English Slave Narratives, and Early Modern Morocco'. *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 46, no. 3 (2013): 333–48.

Beaulac, Stéphane. 'The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth'. *Australian Journal of Legal History* 8, no. 2 (2004): 181–213.

Beaumier, A. *Le choléra au Maroc : sa marche au Sahara jusqu'au Sénégal en 1868*. Paris: Librairie de Ch. Delagrave et cie, 1872.

Becker, Cynthia. 'Hunters, Sufis, Soldiers, and Minstrels: The Diaspora Aesthetics of the Moroccan Gnawa'. *RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics*, no. 59/60 (2011): 124–44.

Bejjit, Karim. 'Edward Said and Orientalism: A Reappraisal'. In *Moroccan American Studies*, edited by Mohamed Benzidan, 67–78. Casablanca: Laboratory of Moroccan American Studies, Faculty of Letters Ben M'sik, 2010.

———. *English Colonial Texts on Tangier 1661-1684: Imperialism and The Politics of Resistance.* Farnham: Ashgate, 2015.

———. 'Refashioning Barbary: American Discourse on North Africa'. In *Beyond Colonial/Postcolonial Interventions: Revising the Debate of Morocco in English Writings and Moroccan Writings in English*, edited by Abderrazak Essrhir and Khalid Amine, 141–60. Tetouan: Faculty of Letters and Humanities, Abdelmalik Essaadi University, 2013.

Belal, Abdel Aziz. *Développement et facteurs non-économiques*. Rabat : SMER Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1980.

Belal, Abdel-Aziz. *L'Investissement au Maroc (1912-1964) et ses enseignements en matière de développement économique*. Casablanca : Les Editions maghrébines, 1980.

Ben al-Hajj, Ahmad. *Al-Durr Āl-Muntaḫab Āl-Mustaḥsan Fy Rāyāt Mawlānā Āl-Ḥassan*. Vol. 7, n.d.

Ben Ali, Driss. *Le Maroc précapitaliste*. Rabat : Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1983.

Ben Srhir, Khalid. *Ālmaġrib Fy Ālʾaršyf Ālbryṭāny [Morocco in the British Archives]*. Rabat: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2009.

———. 'Britain and Military Reforms in Morocco During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century'. *Oriente Moderno* 23, no. 84 (2004): 85–109.

———. *Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845-1886*. Translated by Malcolm Williams and Gavin Waterson. London: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

Benali, Driss. 'Nécessité d'interroger Le Passé Pour Comprendre Le Présent'. *Al Asas* 27 (n.d.).

Bennison, Amira K. 'Economy and Trade Within and Beyond Imperial Frontiers, 1050–1250'. In *The Almoravid and Almohad Empires*, 177–226. Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

Ben-Srhir, Khalid. 'British Documents on the Spanish Moroccan War in Mellila (1892-1894) Part I'. *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 2015, 175–295.

———. 'Rivalités Européennes Au Maroc Précolonial (1844-1890) : Intrigues, Compromis, Resistances, Enjeux Politiques et Économiques'. *The Maghreb Review* 39, no. 3 (2014): 266–91.

Bentahar, Ziad. 'Continental Drift: The Disjunction of North and Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Research in African Literatures* 42, no. 1 (2011): 1–13.

Benton, Lauren. *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Berque, Jacques. *Etudes d'histoire rurale maghrébine*. Tanger: Les Editions Internationales, 1938.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 'Colonial Global Economy: Towards a Theoretical Reorientation of Political Economy'. *Review of International Political Economy* 0, no. 0 (2020): 1–16.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 'Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (2010): 127–43.

Bieler, Andreas, and Adam David Morton. 'A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations'. *Capital & Class* 28, no. 1 (2004): 85–113.

Biswas, Shampa. 'Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist'. *Millennium* 36, no. 1 (2007): 117–33.

Blackburn, Robin. *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800*. London: Verso, 1998.

Blair, John M., Scott L. Collins, and Alan K. Knapp. 'Ecosystems as Functional Units in Nature'. *Natural Resources & Environment* 14, no. 3 (2000): 150–55.

Blaut, J. M. 'Colonialism and the Rise of Capitalism'. *Science & Society* 53, no. 3 (1989): 260–96.

Bouchaara, Mustafa. *Āl Istyṭān Wālḥimāya Bil Maġrib, 1280-1311/ 1863-1894*. Rabat: ālmaṭbaʿa ālmalakya ārribāṭ, 1984.

Bouhssine, Younes. 'Ṣafaḥāt Min Tāryẖ Ālmara Ālmaġribya Ḫilāl Ālqarn Āttāsiʿ ʿašar: Ǧawānib Ālfāʿilya Wa Aškāl Āttahmyš [Glimpses of the History of Moroccan Women during the Nineteenth Century: Forms of Participation and Marginalisation]'. *The Lixus Journal of History and Humanities* 1, no. 41 (2022): 54–64.

Boulahnane, Saad. '"Barbary" Mahometans in Early American Propaganda: A Critical Analysis of John Foss's Captivity Account'. *Arab World English Journal for Translation & Literary Studies* 2, no. 1 (2018).

Boum, Aomar. 'Morocco: 2. Later Empire (from the 16th Century)'. In *The Encyclopedia of Empire*, 1–7, 2016.

Bouzidi, Mohamed. *Les transformations des structures sociales et économiques du Maroc précolonial*. Casablanca : Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales, 1982.

Braudel, Fernand. *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century. Volume II: The Wheels of Commerce*. Translated by Siân. Reynolds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

———. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Volume I. Translated by Siân Reynolds. New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

Brenner, Robert. *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550-1653*. London: Verso, 2003.

———. 'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism'. *Past & Present*, no. 97 (1982): 16–113.

———. 'The Social Basis of Economic Development'. In *Analytical Marxism*, edited by John Roemer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Brewer, Anthony. *Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey*. 2nd ed. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012.

Brignon, Jean. *Histoire du Maroc*. Casablanca, Paris : Librairie Nationale Hatier, 1968.

Brown, James A. O. C. 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, with Particular Reference to the Role of Gibraltar'. University of Cambridge, 2009.

Brown, Leon Carl. *International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

———. 'The Many Faces of Colonial Rule in French North Africa'. *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée* 13, no. 1 (1973) : 171–91.

Bucher, Bernd. 'Moving beyond the Substantialist Foundations of the Agency-Structure Dichotomy: Figurational Thinking in International Relations'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20, no. 2 (2017): 408–33.

Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Fourth edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

———. 'The State's Positive Role in World Affairs'. *Daedalus* 108, no. 4 (1979): 111–23.

Burke, Edmund. 'Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912'. *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 1 (1972): 97–118.

Burke III, Edmund. *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*. Studies in Imperialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

———. *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

———. 'The Moroccan Ulama, 1860-1912: An Introduction'. In *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis : Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, 93–125. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Buzan, Barry. 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School'. *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 327–52.

———. 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?' In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, edited by Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, and Steve Smith, 47–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Bynkershoek, Cornelius. 'Quaestionum Juris Publici Libri Duo (1773)'. In *Classics of International Law*, edited by James Brown Scott, Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930.

Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins. 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945'. *The Economic History Review* 40, no. 1 (1987): 1–26.

Calafat, Guillaume. 'Ottoman North Africa and Ius Publicum Europaeum: The Case of the Treaties of Peace and Trade (1600-1750)'. In *War, Trade and Neutrality: Europe and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 171–87. Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011.

Calhoun, Craig. 'Book Review: As Sociology Meets History by Charles Tilly'. *The University of Chicago Press* 55, no. 3 (1983): 503–5.

Campbell, Gwyn. 'Africa, the Indian OceanWorld, and the "Early Modern": Historiographical Conventions and Problems'. In *Africa, Empire and Globalization*, edited by Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell, 81–92. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2011.

Campling, Liam, and Alejandro Colás. *Capitalism and the Sea*. London: Verso, 2021.

———. 'Capitalism and the Sea: Sovereignty, Territory and Appropriation in the Global Ocean'. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 36, no. 4 (2018): 776–94.

Certeau, Michel de, Luce Giard, and Pierre Mayol. *L'invention du quotidien. 1. Arts de Faire*. Paris: Gallimard Folio, 1990.

Chadha Behera, Navnita. 'State and Sovereignty'. In *International Relations from the Global South: Worlds of Difference*, edited by Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith, 139–60. Oxford: Routledge, 2020.

Chalcraft, John. 'Middle East Popular Politics in Gramscian Perspective'. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 41, no. 3 (2021): 469–84.

———. 'Revolutionary Weakness in Gramscian Perspective: The Arab Middle East and North Africa since 2011'. *Middle East Critique* 30, no. 1 (2021) : 87–104.

Chauveau, Jean-Pierre. 'Une histoire maritime africaine est-elle possible ? Historiographie et histoire de la navigation et de la pêche africaines à la côte occidentale depuis le XVe siècle.' *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 26, no. 101 (1986): 173–235.

Chay, Jongsuk. *Culture and International Relations*. Connecticut: Praeger, 1990.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. 'The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory'. *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 324–48.

Chénier, Louis de. *The Present State of the Empire of Morocco*. London: Unspecified, 1788.

———. *The Present State of the Empire of Morocco: Its Animals, Products, Climate, Soil, Cities, Ports, Provinces, Coins, Weights, and Measures. With the Language, Religion, Laws, Manners, Customs, and Character, of the Moors; the History of the Dynasties Since Edris; the Naval Force and Commerce of Morocco; and the Character, Conduct, and Views, Political and Commercial, of the Reigning Emperor - Volume 1*. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1967.

Chibber, Vivek. *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*. London: Verso, 2013.

Chowdhry, Geeta. 'Edward Said and Contrapuntal Reading: Implications for Critical Interventions in International Relations'. *Millennium* 36, no. 1 (2007): 101–16.

Clancy-Smith, Julia A. *Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters: Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Clark, G. N. 'The Barbary Corsairs in the Seventeenth Century'. *Cambridge Historical Journal* 8, no. 1 (1944): 22–35.

Cleaveland, Timothy. 'Ahmad Baba Al-Timbukti and His Islamic Critique of Racial Slavery in the Maghrib'. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 23 January 2015.

Coindreau, Roger. *Les corsaires de Salé*. 1ere ed. Publications de l'Institut des hautes études marocaines (t. XLVII). Paris: Société d'éditions géographiques, maritimes et coloniales, 1948.

Colás, Alejandro. 'Barbary Coast in the Expansion of International Society: Piracy, Privateering, and Corsairing as Primary Institutions'. *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 5 (2016): 840–57.

———. *International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.

Colas, Alex. 'International Political Sociology through the Colonial Mirror: A Contrapuntal Reading of the Spanish Civil War'. *International Political Sociology*, 2024.

Coller, Ian. 'Barbary and Revolution: France and North Africa 1789-1798'. In *French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories*, edited by Patricia Lorcin and Todd Shepard. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2016.

Comninel, George C. 'English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 27, no. 4 (2000): 1–53.

Cornwell, Graham Haugh. 'Sweetening the Pot: A History of Tea and Sugar in Morocco, 1850-1960'. Georgetown University, 2018.

Courreye, Charlotte, Augustin Jomier, and Annick Lacroix. *Le Maghreb par les textes. XVIIIe-XXIe siècle*. Paris: Armand Colin, 2020.

Covo, Manuel. 'Race, Slavery, and Colonies in the French Revolution'. In *The Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution*, edited by David Andress. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Cox, Robert W. 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method'. *Millennium* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162–75.

———. *Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. Political Economy of International Change. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

———. 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'. *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.

Crowcroft, Barnaby. 'The Problem of Protectorates in an Age of Decolonisation: Britain and West Africa, 1955–60'. In *Protection and Empire: A Global History*, edited by Lauren Benton, Adam Clulow, and Bain Attwood, 228–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Curry-Machado, Jonathan, ed. *Global Histories, Imperial Commodities, Local Interactions*. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013.

Cutter, Nat. 'Morocco Leather in Early Modern Britain: Towards a Transcultural History of Fine Leather Bookbindings'. *Parergon* 41, no. 2 (2024): 103–32.

———. 'Peace with Pirates? Maghrebi Maritime Combat, Diplomacy, and Trade in English Periodical News, 1622–1714'. *Humanities* 8, no. 4 (2019): 179.

Daadaoui, Mohamed. 'The Makhzen and State Formation in Morocco'. In *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power*, edited by Mohamed Daadaoui, 41–70. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011.

Dan, Pierre. *Histoire de Barbarie et de Ses Corsaires*. Paris : Rocolet, 1637.

———. *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses corsaires, des royaumes, et des villes d'Alger, de Tunis, de Salé et de Tripoly*. Paris: Pierre Rocolet, 1649.

Danziger, Raphaël. 'The Attitude of Morocco's Sultan Abd El-Rahman towards the French as Reflected in His Internal Correspondance (1844 - 1847)'. *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée* 36, no. 1 (1983) : 41–50.

Darby, Phillip, and A. J. Paolini. 'Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism'. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 19, no. 3 (1994): 371–97.

Darwin, John. 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion'. *The English Historical Review* 112, no. 447 (1997): 614–42.

Dauverd, Céline. *Imperial Ambition in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Genoese Merchants and the Spanish Crown*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Davidson, Basil. *The African Slave Trade*. Boston: James Currey Publishers, 1980.

Davis, Muriam Haleh. *Markets of Civilization: Islam and Racial Capitalism in Algeria*. Theory in Forms. Durham: Duke University Press, 2022.

Davis, Robert C. *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800*. 1st ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

De Smet, Brecht. *Gramsci on Tahrir: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt*. London: Pluto Press, 2016.

Deerr, Noël. *The History of Sugar*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1949.

Defontin-Maxange. *Le Grand Ismail : Empereur du Maroc*. Paris : Marpon & cie, 1929.

Devisse, Jean. 'Les Africains, la mer et les historiens.' *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 29, no. 115 (1989): 397–418.

Dike, Kenneth Onwuka. *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Dobb, Maurice. *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1946.

Doğanalp-Votzi, Heidemarie. 'Histories and Economies of a Small Anatolian Town: Safranbolu and Its Leather Handicrafts'. In *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean*, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi Deguilhem, 308–37. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

Donnelly, Jack. 'Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations'. In *Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions*, edited by James Farr and John S. Dryzek, 175–97. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Doutté, Edmond. *En tribu : missions au Maroc*, 1914.

Dufour, Frédérick Guillaume. 'Social-Property Regimes and the Uneven and Combined Development of Nationalist Practices'. *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 4 (2007): 583–604.

Dunn, Kevin C. 'There Is No Such Thing as the State: Discourse, Effect and Performativity'. *Forum for Development Studies* 37, no. 1 (2010): 79–92.

Dupré, Louis. 'Marx's Critique of Culture and Its Interpretations'. *The Review of Metaphysics* 34, no. 1 (1980): 91–121.

Dutra Salgado, Pedro. 'Against Sovereignty: The Colonial Limits of Modern Politics'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 52, no. 1 (2023): 85–108.

———. 'Anti-Eurocentric Historicism: Political Marxism in a Broader Context'. *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2021): 199–223.

Eickelman, Dale F. 'Not Lost in Translation: The Influence of Clifford Geertz's Work and Life on Anthropology in Morocco'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 14, no. 3–4 (2009): 385–95.

El Aissaoui, F. 'Kalaf Al-Bawadi Fi al-Qarn al-Tassi' 'ashar'. In *La Campagne a Travers l'histoire Du Maroc*, edited by Brahim Boutaleb, 133–48. Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines, n.d.

El Hamel, Chouki. *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam*. African Studies Series. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

———. '"Race", Slavery and Islam in Maghribi Mediterranean Thought: The Question of the Haratin in Morocco'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 7, no. 3 (2007): 29–52.

———. 'The Register of the Slaves of Sultan Mawlay Isma'il of Morocco at the Turn of the Eighteenth Century'. *The Journal of African History* 51, no. 1 (2010): 89–98.

El Moudden, Abderrahmane. *Ālbawādy Ālmaġribya Qabl Āl-Istiʿmār: Qabāil Innāwen Wālmaẖzan Bayn Ālqarn Āl-Sādis ʿašar Wā Attāsiʿ ʿašar [The Moroccan Countryside before Colonialism: The Inaoun Clans and the Makhzen between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth C]Enturies*. Rabat: Mohammed V University, 1995.

Elden, Stuart. *The Birth of Territory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

Emirbayer, Mustafa. 'Manifesto for a Relational Sociology'. *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997): 281–317.

Enloe, Cynthia H.,. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, 2014.

Erikson, Emily, and Valentina Assenova. 'Introduction: New Forms of Organization and the Coordination of Political and Commercial Actors'. In *Chartering Capitalism: Organizing Markets, States, and Publics*, 1–13. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015.

Errazzouki, Samia. 'Between the "Yellow-Skinned Enemy" and the "Black-Skinned Slave": Early Modern Genealogies of Race and Slavery in Sa`dian Morocco'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 28*, no. 2* (2021): 258-268.

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Ewa, Ibiang Oden. 'Pre-Colonial West Africa: The Fall of Songhai Empire Revisited'. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 26 (2017): 1–24.

Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, 2004.

Farouk, Ahmed. 'Consulats et Activités Consulaires Britanniques Au Maroc Durant L'époque Dite de Pacification'. *Maghreb Review* 39, no. 3 (2014): 292–310.

Fath, Brian D. 'Ecosystem Ecology'. In *Ecosystem Ecology: A Derivative Encyclopedia of Ecology*, edited by Sven Erik Jørgensen, 6–11. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009.

Fawcett, Louise. 'Alliances, Cooperation and Regionalism in the Middle East'. In *International Relations of the Middle East*, edited by Louise Fawcett, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View'. In *Handbook of International Relations*, 52–72. London: Sage Publications, 2002.

Federico, Giovanni, and Antonio Tena-Junguito. 'World Trade, 1800-1938: A New Data-Set'. *EHES Working Papers in Economic History* 93 (n.d.).

Femia, Joseph V. *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Ferguson, Susan J. *Women and Work: Feminism, Labour, and Social Reproduction*. Mapping Social Reproduction Theory. London: Pluto Press, 2020.

Fields, Karen E., and Barbara J. Fields. *Racecraft*. London: Verso Books, 2012.

Forde, Steven. 'International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism'. *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1995): 141–60.

Fusaro, Maria. *Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England, 1450–1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Gaillard, Jean-Christophe. 'Resilience of Traditional Societies in Facing Natural Hazards'. *Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal* 16, no. 4 (2007): 522–44.

Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson. 'The Imperialism of Free Trade'. *The Economic History Review* 6, no. 1 (1953): 1–15.

Gallissot, René. 'Au Cœur Du Sous-Développement Des Pays de La Méditerranée : Comparatisme Historique et Modes de Production Précapitalistes'. *Peuples Méditerranéens : Revue Trimestrielle*, 1980, 89–106.

Gallissot, René. *L'Algérie précoloniale: classes sociales en système précapitaliste, mise en question du mode de production féodal*. Cahiers du Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes. Paris: Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes, 1968.

Gause, F. Gregory. 'Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East'. *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1992): 441–69.

Gellner, Ernest. *Muslim society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———. *Nations and Nationalism*. 2nd ed. New Perspectives on the Past. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

———. *Saints of the Atlas*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.

Gellner, Ernest, and Gianni Albergoni. *Les Saints de l'Atlas*. Saint-Denis: Editions Bouchène, 2012.

Gerstenberger, Heide. *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State*. Vol. 15. Historical Materialism Book Series. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007.

———. *Market and Violence: The Functioning of Capitalism in History*. Translated by Niall Bond. Historical Materialism Book Series. Leiden: Brill, 2023.

Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C. E., and Frank Schumacher, eds. *Culture and International History*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2003.

Gilbert, Arthur N. 'International Relations and the Relevance of History'. *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (1968): 351–59.

Gimenez, Martha. *Marx, Women and Capitalist Social Reproduction: Marxist Feminist Essays*. Historical Materialism Book Series. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2019.

Go, Julian. 'Capital, Containment, and Competition: The Dynamics of British Imperialism, 1730–1939'. *Social Science History* 38, no. 1–2 (2014): 43–69.

———. 'For a Postcolonial Sociology'. *Theory and Society* 42, no. 1 (1 January 2013): 25–55.

Goikolea-Amiano, Itzea. 'Hispano-Moroccan Mimesis in the Spanish War on Tetouan and Its Occupation (1859–62)'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 24, no. 1 (2019): 44–61.

González Arévalo, Raúl. 'Italian Renaissance Diplomacy and Commerce with Western Mediterranean Islam: Venice, Florence, and the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in the Fifteenth Century'. *I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance* 18, no. 1 (2015): 215–32.

Goodwin, Kevin. 'The Tanzimat and the Problem of Political Authority in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1876'. Rhode Island College, 2006.

Gordon, Matthew, and Kathryn A. Hain. *Concubines and Courtesans: Women and Slavery in Islamic History*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

Graeber, David. *Debt : The First 5,000 Years*. Brooklyn: Melville House, 2011.

Graeber, David, and David Wengrow. *The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity*. Toronto: Signal, 2023.

Gross-Wyrtzen, Leslie. '"There Is No Race Here": On Blackness, Slavery, and Disavowal in North Africa and North African Studies'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 28, no. 3 (2022): 635-665.

Gürkan, Emrah Safa. 'The Efficacy of Ottoman Counter-Intelligence in the Sixteenth Century'. *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 65, no. 1 (2012): 1–38.

Hacker, Barton C. 'Firearms, Horses and Slave Soldiers: The Military History of African Slavery'. *Icon* 14 (2008): 62–83.

Hajji, Mohammed. *Āzzāwya Āddilāʾya Wdawruhā Āddyny Wālʿilmy Wāssyāsy [The Zawiya of Dila: Religious, Scientific and Political Roles]*. Rabat: Imprimerie Nationale de Rabat, 1964.

Hali, Mohammed. 'Intāǧ Wa Tadbyr Āl-Aqwāt Fy Maġrib Āl-Qarn Āl-Ṯāssiʿ ʿašar (1727 – 1757)'. *Kan Historique Périodique* 5, no. 17 (2012): 67–71.

Hall, Stuart. 'Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance [1980]'. In *Essential Essays. Vol. 1. Foundations of Cultural Studies*, edited by David Morley, 172–221. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019.

Hallaq, Wael. *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Halliday, Fred. 'The Third World and the End of the Cold War: An Interim Assessment'. In *After the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Asia and Africa*, edited by William Hale and Eberhard Kienle. London, 1997.

Hammoudi, Abdellah. 'Āl-Inqisāmya Wā-Ttarātub Āl-Iǧtimāʿy Wāssulṭa Āssyāsya Wālqadāsa: Mulāḥaẓāt Ḥawla Uṭrouḥāt Gellner [Segmentarity Social Hierarchy, Political Authority, and Sanctity: Notes on Klenner's Theses]'. *Journal of the College of Arts and Humanities, Mohammed V University* 11 (1985): 193–224.

Hannoum, Abdelmajid. *The Invention of the Maghreb: Between Africa and the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Harootunian, Harry. *Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.

Harrak, Fatima. ''Abid al-Bukhari and the Development of the Makhzen System in Seventeenth-Century Morocco'. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 38, no. 2 (1 August 2018): 280–95.

Hart, David M. *Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco*. History and Society in the Islamic World. Hoboken: Routledge, 2014.

Hart, David Montgomery. *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History*. Tuscon: University of Arizona, 1976.

Haslam, Jonathan. *No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

Hatina, Meir. ''Ulama and National Movements in the Middle East: Between Harmony and Dissent'. In *Community, Identity and the State*, 116–31. London: Routledge, 2004.

Hédi, Timoumi. *Ālkādiḥun Ālḥamāsa Fy Ālʾaryāf Āttunusya 1861-1943: Ālistiʿmār Ārraʾsmāly Wāttškylāt Āliğtimāʿya Mā Qabl Ārraʾsmālya [Khammas Peasants in the Tunisian Countryside 1861-1943: Colonial Capitalism Anmd Pre-Capitalist Social Formations]*. Tunis: Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales de Tunis, 1999.

Hedinger, Daniel, and Nadin Heć. 'Transimperial History - Connectivity, Cooperation and Competition'. *Journal of Modern European History* 16, no. 4 (2018): 429–52.

Heller, Henry. *A Marxist History of Capitalism*. Oxford: Routledge, 2019.

Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Hesse, Barnor. 'Raceocracy: How the Racial Exception Proves the Racial Rule'. Irving K. Barber Learning Centre, University of British Columbia, 7 March. https://ikblc.ubc.ca/barnorhesse/.

Hibou, Béatrice, and Mohamed Tozy. *Tisser le temps politique au Maroc: imaginaire de l'État à l'âge néolibéral*. Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2021.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. 'Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States'. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 1 (2015): 12–30.

———. 'Order and Change in the Middle East: A Neo-Gramscian Twist on the International Society Approach'. In *International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level*, edited by Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, 201–25. Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*. London: Abacus, 1997.

Hobson, John M. 'Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a Post-Racist Critical IR'. *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 91–116.

———. 'Provincializing Westphalia: The Eastern Origins of Sovereignty'. *International Politics* 46, no. 6 (2009): 671–90.

———. 'The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations'. *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 2 (1998): 284–320.

Hoffmann, Clemens, and Can Cemgil. 'The (Un)Making of the Pax Turca in the Middle East: Understanding the Social-Historical Roots of Foreign Policy'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2016): 1279–1302.

Hubac, Pierre. *Les Barbaresques*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949.

Hubaida, Mohammed. *Kitābat al-tārīkh : qirāʾāt wa-taʾwīlāt*. Rabat: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2021.

Hubayda, Mohammed. *Buʾs al-tārīkh : murājaʿāt wa-muqārabāt [The Misery of History: Reviews and Approaches]*. 2nd ed. Rabat: Dār al-Amān, 2016.

Hudson, Michael C. *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Ibn Khaldun. *An Introduction to History: The Muqqadimah*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967.

Ibourki, Omar. *Āssulṭa Wālmuğtamaʿ Ālqāʾid Ālmaġriby: Ālǧuḏur Wāl Imtidādāt*. Rabat: Rabat Net, 2019.

Iglesias Amorín, Alfonso. 'The Hispano-Moroccan Wars (1859–1927) and the (De)Nationalization of the Spanish People'. *European History Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (2020): 290–310.

Jackson, James Grey. *An Account of the Empire of Morocco, and the District of Suse*. Philadelphia: Francis Nichols, 1810.

Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, and Daniel H. Nexon. 'Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory'. *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (2009): 907–30.

Jacques-Meunié, Denise. 'Notes sur l'histoire des populations du sud marocain'. *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 11, no. 1 (1972): 137–50.

Jacques-Meunié, Djinn. 'Hiérarchie Sociale Au Maroc Présaharien'. *Hespéris* 45 (1958): 239–69.

Jervis, Robert. 'Realism in the Study of World Politics'. *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 971–91.

Johnson, Marion. 'The Nineteenth-Century Gold "Mithqal" in West and North Africa*'. *The Journal of African History* 9, no. 4 (October 1968): 547–69.

Journal des débats politiques et littéraires. 'Les Établissements Anglais Du Cap Juby'. 15 January 1894.

Julien, Charles-André. *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes : 1415-1956*. Paris : J.A, 1978.

Kadercan, Burak. 'Strong Armies, Slow Adaptation: Civil-Military Relations and the Diffusion of Military Power'. *International Security* 38, no. 3 (2013) : 117–52.

Kamian, Bakari. *Des tranchées de Verdun à l'église Saint-Bernard : 80000 combattants maliens au secours de la France, 1914-18 et 1939-45*. Paris : Karthala Editions, 2000.

Kenbib, Mohammed. *Ālmaḥmyoun*. Casablanca : Edition Porte d'Anfa, 2011.

———. 'Changing Aspects of State and Society in 19th Century Morocco'. In *The Moroccan State in Historical Perspective 1850-1985*, edited by Abdelali Doumou, translated by Ayi Kwei Armah. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1990.

Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. 'International History and International Relations Theory: A Dialogue beyond the Cold War'. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 76, no. 4 (2000): 741–54.

Khaldūn, Ibn. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Translated by Bruce B. Lawrence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Knafo, Samuel, and Benno Teschke. 'Political Marxism and the Rules of Reproduction of Capitalism: A Historicist Critique'. *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2020): 54–83.

Knox, Robert. 'Valuing Race? Stretched Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism'. *London Review of International Law* 4, no. 1 (2016): 81–126.

Konstan, David. 'Marxism and Roman Slavery'. *Arethusa* 8, no. 1 (1975): 145–69.

Kopytoff, Igor, and Suzanne Miers. 'African "Slavery" as an Institution of Marginality'. In *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*, edited by Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, 3–84. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977.

Kradin, Nikolay N. 'Nomadism, Evolution and World-Systems: Pastoral Societies in Theories of Historical Development'. *Journal of World-Systems Research*, 2002, 368–88.

Krasner, Stephen. 'Problematic Sovereignty'. In *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*, edited by Stephen Krasner, 1–23. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

———. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Krinsky, John, and Ann Mische. 'Formations and Formalisms: Charles Tilly and the Paradox of the Actor'. *Annual Review of Sociology* 39 (2013): 1–26.

La Petite histoire du Maroc : Première série : Des origines à Moulay Ismaïl. Casablanca : Chérifienne d'Édition et de Publicité, 1950.

Lacher, Hannes. *Beyond Globalization: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity*. RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

Lacoste, Yves. *Ibn Khaldun: The Birth of History and the Past of the Third World*. London: Verso, 1984.

Ladjal, Tarek. 'The Christian Presence in North Africa under Almoravids Rule (1040–1147 CE): Coexistence or Eradication?' Edited by John Caruana. *Cogent Arts & Humanities* 4, no. 1 (2017): 1334374.

Laloum, Jean, and Jean-Luc Allouche. *Les Juifs d'Algerie*. Paris : Editions du Scribe, 1987.

Lamborn Wilson, Peter. *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs & European Renegadoes*. New York: Autonomedia, 1996.

Lapid, Yosef, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.

Lapointe, Thierry. 'Beyond a Historicism without Subject: Agency and the Elusive Genealogies of State Sovereignty'. *Cogent Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (2015): 1065949.

Largueche, Dalenda, Julia Clancy-Smith, and Caroline Audet. 'The Mahalla: The Origins of Beylical Sovereignty in Ottoman Tunisia during the Early Modern Period'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 1 (2001): 105–16.

Laroui, Abdallah. *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*. 2nd ed. Casablanca : Centre Culturel Arabe, 2009.

———. *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain,1830-1912.* Paris: Éditions Maspero, 1977.

———. *L'histoire Du Maghreb. Un Essai de Synthèse*. Paris: Maspéro, 1982.

———. 'Nakd Al-Otroha al-Inkissamiya [Critique of Segmentarity]'. In *Al-Antrubūlūjıȳā Wa-al-Tārık̄h: Ḥālat al-Maghrib al-'Arabı [Anthropolgy and History: The Case of the Arab Maghreb]*, translated by Abdelahad Sebti and Abdellatif Alfalag. Casablanca: Dar Toubkal Press, 2007.

———. *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Late Fascism: Race, Capitalism and the Politics of Crisis. New York: Verso, 2023.

Lawson, George. 'The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations'. *International Studies Review* 8, no. 3 (2006) : 397–423.

Le constitutionnel: journal politique. 'Le Cap Juby'. 5 January 1893.

Le Cour Grandmaison, Olivier. 'The Exception and the Rule: On French Colonial Law'. *Diogenes* 53, no. 4 (1 November 2006): 34–53.

Le Coz, Jean, ,. *Le Rharb, fellahs et colons: Etude de géographie régionale*. Rabat: Imframar, 1964.

Le Maroc et l'Europe: (1830 - 1894). Tome III: Les difficultés. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962.

Le Tourneau, Roger. *Histoire du Maroc moderne*. Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence, 1992.

Le Tourneau, Roger, and L. Paye. 'La Corporation Des Tanneurs et l'industrie de La Tannerie à Fès'. *Hespéris-Tamuda* Tome XXI, no. Fascicules I-II (1935): 167–240.

Leared, Arthur. *Morocco and the Moors: Being an Acount of Travels, with a General Description of the Country and Its People*. London: Darf Publishers, 1985.

Lee, Alexander. 'How (and How Not) to Use Archival Sources in Political Science'. *Journal of Historical Political Economy* 2, no. 3 (2022): 499–526.

Lee, Donna, and David Hudson. 'The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy'. *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (2004): 343–60.

Lenin, Vladimir. *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986.

———. *State and Revolution*. New York: International Publishers, 1932.

Lentin, Alana. *Why Race Still Matters*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020.

Leriche, Albert. 'De l'origine Du Thé Au Maroc et Au Sahara'. *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Afrique Noire* 15, no. 2 (1953) : 731–36.

Leveau, Rémy. 'Public Property and Control of Property Rights: Their Effects on Social Structure in Morocco'. In *Property, Social Structure, and Law in the Modern Middle East*, edited by Ann Elizabeth Mayer. Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 1985.

Levien, Michael. 'From Primitive Accumulation to Regimes of Dispossession: Six Theses on India's Land Question'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 50, no. 22 (2015): 146–57.

Lewis, Bernard. *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An Historical Enquiry*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Lharoui, El Hadi. *Ālqabyla, Āl Iqṭāʿ Wālmaḥzan: Muqāraba Susyulouǧya Lilmuǧtamaʿ Ālmaǧriby Ālḥadyṯ: 1844-1934 [The Tribe, Feudalism and the Makhzen:* Casablanca: Afriqyia as-Sharq, 2005.

Linebaugh, Peter, and Marcus Rediker. *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.

Louarith, Ahmed. 'Āl-Azma Fy Ālmaǧrib Baʿd Wafāt Ālsulṭān Mawlāy Ismāʿyl Ālʿlwy Wa Muḥāwalat Taʾsys Ṭabāʾiʿ Ǧadyda Lilmulk [The Crisis in Morocco after the Death of Sultan Moulay Ismail]'. *Āltāryḫ Ālʿaraby: Maǧala ʿilmya Muḥkama* 18 (2001): 59–78.

Luciani, Giacomo, and Ghassan Salamé. 'The Politics of Arab Integration'. In *The Arab State*, edited by Giacomo Luciani. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Lustick, Ian S. 'The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective'. *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 653–83.

Lydon, Ghislaine. *On Trans-Saharan Trails : Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Western Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Maaninou, Mohamed Said. *Salā fī al-qarn al-sābiʿ ʿashar : jumhūrīyyah al-qurāṣinah*. Cairo: Dar Abi Raqraq, 2020.

Mabee, Bryan. 'Pirates, Privateers and the Political Economy of Private Violence'. *Global Change, Peace & Security* 21, no. 2 (2009): 139–52.

MacKenzie, Donald. 'Report of the Visit to North-West Africa'. *The Times*, 23 December 1876.

———. *The Flooding of the Sahara: An Account of the Proposed Plan for Opening Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the North-West Coast*. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1877.

Marchi, Alessandra. 'Molecular Transformations: Reading the Arab Uprisings with and beyond Gramsci'. *Middle East Critique* 30, no. 1 (2021): 67–85.

Marx, Karl. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Translated by Nahum Isaac Stone. New York: International Library Publishing Co, 1904.

———. *Capital*. New York: Bordollo, 1887.

———. *Capital: Vol I*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co, 1906.

———. *Capital: Volume 3*. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin Books, 1981.

———. *Capital: Volumes 1 & 2*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2013.

———. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers, 1967.

Masbah, Mohammed. 'Anglo-Saxon Anthropology in Morocco: Evaluating Gellner's Segmentary Theory'. *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 6, no. 2 (2013): 260–76.

Matar, Nabil. *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005.

———. 'Introduction: England and Mediterranean Captivity, 1577–1704'. In *Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England*, edited by Daniel Vitkus and Nabil Matar. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

———. 'The Maghariba and the Sea: Maritime Decline in North Africa in the Early Modern Period'. In *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Braudel's Maritime Legacy*, edited by Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood, and Mohamed-Salah Omri, 117–38. London: I.B.Tauris, 2010.

Matar, Nabil I. 'The Last Moors: Maghāriba in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain'. *Journal of Islamic Studies* 14, no. 1 (2003): 37–58.

Matin, Kamran. 'Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism'. *European Journal of International Relations* 19 (2013): 353–77.

Maw, Peter. 'Provincial Merchants in Eighteenth-Century England: The "Great Oaks" of Manchester'. *The English Historical Review* 136, no. 580 (2021): 568–618.

Maziane, Leila. *Salé et Ses Corsaires (1666-1727) Un Port de Course Marocain*. Caen: Press Universitaires de Caen - Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2007.

Mbembe, Achille. 'The Power of the Archive and Its Limits'. In *Refiguring the Archive*, edited by Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, Michele Pickover, Graeme Reid, and Razia Saleh, 19–27. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002.

McDougall, E. Ann. 'Salt, Saharans, and the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade: Nineteenth Century Developments'. *Slavery and Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies* 13, no. 1 (2008): 61–88.

Meiksins Wood, Ellen. 'Eurocentric Anti-Eurocentrism'. *Against the Current*, no. 92 (2001).

Meillassoux, Claude. *The Anthropology of Slavery: The Womb of Iron and Gold*. Translated by Alide Dasnois. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Menebhi, Saïda. *Poèmes, lettres, écrits de prison*. Paris: Comités de lutte contre la répression au Maroc, 1978.

Meyers, Allan R. 'Class, Ethnicity, and Slavery: The Origins of the Moroccan 'Abid'. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no. 3 (1977): 427–42.

———. 'Famine Relief and Imperial Policy in Early Modern Morocco: The Political Functions of Public Health.' *American Journal of Public Health* 71, no. 11 (1981): 1266–73.

Meyers, Allen R. 'Slave Soldiers and State Politics in Early 'Alawi Morocco, 1668 - 1727'. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 16, no. 1 (1983): 39–48.

Meziane, Mohammed. 'Āddawla Fy Ālmaġrib Wa Masār Āṭṭawur: Min Āddawla Āssulṭānya Ila Āddawla Ālḥadyṯa [The State in Morocco: From the Sultanic to the Modern State]'. *Ālmustaqbal Ālʿaraby* 42, no. 490 (2019) : 70–87.

Michaux-Bellaire, Edouard. 'Les Impôts Marocains'. *Archives Marocaines : Publication de La Mission Scientifique Du Maroc* Tome Premier (1974) : 56–96.

———. *Quelques tribus de montagnes de la région du Habt*. Archives marocaines .. Paris: E. Leroux, 1911.

Michel, Nicholas. *Une Économie de Subsistances. Le Maroc Précolonial*. Cairo : IFAO, 1977.

Miège, Jean Louis. *Le Maroc et l'Europe : Les difficultés Tome III*. Paris : Editions La Porte, 1989.

Miège, Jean-Louis. *Le Maroc et l'Europe (1830-1894): L'ouverture Tome II*. Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1961.

———. *Le Maroc et l'Europe, 1830-1894. Tome IV*. Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 1963.

———. *Origine et développement de la consommation du thé au Maroc*. Rabat: Société d'études économiques, sociales et statistiques, 1956.

Miller, Susan Gilson. *A History of Modern Morocco*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Mohamed, Hassan Mohamed. 'Born in the Text: The Bayrouk of Southern Morocco, a Study in History and Identity.' University of Alberta, 2004.

Mohamed, Mohamed Hassan. 'Africanists and Africans of the Maghrib: Casualties of Analogy'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 349–374.

Mohammad Imrani, Mohammad al-Mahdi ibn. *Al-Nawāzil al-ṣughrá al-musammāh al-Minaḥ al-sāmiyah fī al-nawāzil al-fiqhīyah*. Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Shu'ūn al-Islāmīyah, 1992.

Montgomery Hart, David. 'The Ait Ba 'Amran of Ifni : An Ethnographie Survey'. *Revue Des Mondes Musulmans et de La Méditerranée* 15, no. 1 (1973) : 61–74.

Moore, Jason W. 'Madeira, Sugar, and the Conquest of Nature in the "First" Sixteenth Century: Part I: From "Island of Timber" to Sugar Revolution, 1420–1506'. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 32, no. 4 (2009): 345–90.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948.

Morsy, Magali. 'Moulay Isma'il et l'armée de métier'. *Revue d'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine* 14, no. 2 (1967) : 97–122.

Morton, Adam David. 'The Age of Absolutism: Capitalism, the Modern States-System and International Relations'. *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005) : 495–517.

Mouline, Nabil. *Le califat imaginaire d'Ahmad al-Mansûr: Pouvoir et diplomatie au Maroc au XVIe siècle*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2009.

Muhammad, al-Saqati Muhammad ibn Abi. *Un Manuel Hispanique de Hisba*, 1931.

Munson, Henry. 'The Mountain People of Northwestern Morocco: Tribesmen or Peasants?' *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 2 (1981) : 249–55.

Naciri, Mohammed. 'L'évolution de l'économie Marocaine En Longue Période : Crise Des Modèles Ou Crise Des Élites ?' *Critique Économique* 24 (2009).

Nayak, Meghana, and Eric Selbin. *Decentering International Relations*. London: Zed Books, 2010.

Niang, Amy. 'The International'. In *International Relations from the Global South: Worlds of Difference*, edited by Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith, 97–114. Oxford: Routledge, 2020.

Nkrumah, Kwame. *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers, 1966.

Norling, Lisa. *Captain Ahab Had a Wife: New England Women & the Whalefishery, 1720-1870*. Gender & American Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Olaloku-Teriba, Annie. 'Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness'. *Historical Materialism* 26, no. 2 (2018).

Onimode, Bade. *Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria: The Dialectics of Mass Poverty*. London; Westport, Conn., U.S.A.: Zed Press ; U.S. distributor, L. Hill, 1982.

Osiander, Andreas. 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth'. *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87.

Oualdi, M'hamed. *A Slave Between Empires: A Transimperial History of North Africa*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020.

Pal, Maïa. *Jurisdictional Accumulation: An Early Modern History of Law, Empires, and Capital*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2020.

———. 'Radical Historicism or Rules of Reproduction? New Debates in Political Marxism'. *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2021): 33–53.

Parsons, F. V. 'The North-West African Company and the British Government, 1875-95'. *The Historical Journal* 1, no. 2 (1958): 136–53.

Pascon, Paul. *Le Haouz de Marrakech*. Rabat; Tanger: Editions marocaines et internationales, 1983.

Pass, Jonathan. 'Gramsci Meets Emergentist Materialism: Towards a Neo Neo-Gramscian Perspective on World Order'. *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 4 (2018): 595–618.

———. '(Re)Introducing World Hegemony into the "Global Organic Crisis"'. *International Affairs* 100, no. 1 (2024): 323–43.

Pennell, C. R. *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2013.

———. 'The British Consular Courts and Moroccan Muslim Identity: "Christian" Justice as a Tool'. *The Journal of North African Studies* 1, no. 2 (1996): 172–191.

Phillips, Andrew, and JC Sharman. 'Company-States and the Creation of the Global International System'. *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 4 (2020): 1249–72.

Phillips, William D. 'The Old World Background of Slavery in the Americas'. In *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System*, edited by Barbara L. Solow, 43–61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Pierre, Jemima. *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

Poncet, Jean. *La colonisation et l'agriculture européennes en Tunisie depuis 1881: étude de géographie historique et économique*. Recherches méditerranéennes (Centre de recherches et d'études sur les sociétés méditerranéennes). Paris: Mouton, 1962.

Post, Charles. *The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620 -1877*. Vol. 28. Historical Materialism Book Series. Leiden: Brill/Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011.

Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. 'Review: Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East'. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, no. 1 (1998): 148–50.

Press, Steven. *Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe's Scramble for Africa*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Rao, Rahul. 'Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism' *Critical Sociology* 43, no. 4-5 (2016): 587-598.

Rejeb, Lotfi Ben. 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514-1830: An Ideological Prelude to Colonization'. *Dialectical Anthropology* 6, no. 4 (1982): 345–55.

Rilla, Jerónimo. 'Hobbes on Rebellious Groups'. *History of European Ideas* 47, no. 1 (2021): 1–16.

Roccu, Roberto. 'Democratization beyond Capitalist Time: Temporalities of Transition in the Middle East after the Arab Uprisings'. *Middle East Critique* 28, no. 3 (2019): 227–41.

Rodinson, Maxime. *Islam and Capitalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973.

Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Dar es Salaam: East African Publishers, 1972.

Rogers, P. G. *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1991.

Rosenberg, Justin. 'Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?' *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2006): 307–40.

Rubin, Barry. *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981.

Said, Edward. *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. 4th ed. Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Said, Edward W. 'Traveling Theory'. In *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, 226–47. Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Saidani, Mahfoud. āttiğāra bi aqṭār ālmaġrib ālʿraby fy ālʿhd ālʿuṯmāny mā bayn ālqarnayn (18-19) [The trade in the Maghreb Arab region during the Ottoman Empire in 18th - 19th century]'. *The Algerian Historical Journal* 5, no. 2 (2021): 567–88.

Salem, Sara. 'Gramsci in the Postcolony: Hegemony and Anticolonialism in Nasserist Egypt'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 38, no. 1 (1 January 2021): 79–99.

———. '"Stretching" Marxism in the Postcolonial World: Egyptian Decolonisation and the Contradictions of National Sovereignty'. *Historical Materialism* 27, no. 4 (2019): 3–28.

Sankara, Thomas. *Women's Liberation and the African Freedom Struggle*. Pathfinder, 2007.

Saoudi, Noureddine. 'Hawla Al-Tashkila al-Ijtima'iyyah al'maghribiyyah al-Ma Qabl Ra'assmaliyyah [On the Moroccan Pre-Capitalist Social Formation]'. *Al-Jossour [Bridges]* 4, no. 1 (1982): 115–23.

Saouli, Adham, and Raymond Hinnebusch. 'The Arab State: A Historical Sociology Approach'. *AlMuntaqa* 5, no. 1 (2022): 8–28.

Schroeter, Daniel. 'Anglo-Jewry and Essaouira (Mogador), 1860—1900: The Social Implications of Philanthropy'. *Transactions & Miscellanies (Jewish Historical Society of England)* 28 (1981): 60–88.

———. *Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Schweller, Randall L. 'Neorealism's Status-quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?' *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): 90–121.

Seamster, Louise, and Victor Ray. 'Against Teleology in the Study of Race: Toward the Abolition of the Progress Paradigm'. *Sociological Theory* 36, no. 4 (2018): 315–42.

Sebti, Abdelahad. āttāryḫ wāḏḏākira: awrāš fy tāryḫ ālmaġrib [History and Memory: Workshops in the History of Morocco]. Casablanca : Markaz Takafi Arabi, 2012.

———. 'Présence des crises dans la chronique dynastique marocaine : entre la narration et les signes'. *Cahiers d'Études africaines* 30, no. 119 (1990): 237–50.

Sebti, Abdelahad, and Abderrahmane Lakhsasi. *Min Al-Shāy Ilá al-Atāy: Al-'ādah Wa-al-Tārīkh [From Tea to Atay: Tradition and History]*. 25. Rabat: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1999.

Seth, Sanjay. 'Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations'. *Millennium* 40, no. 1 (1 September 2011): 167–83.

Shalbak, Ihab. 'The Roots of Bernard Lewis' Rage'. *Postcolonial Studies* 21, no. 4 (2 October 2018): 505–11.

Shani, Giorgio, and Navnita Chadha Behera. 'Provincialising International Relations through a Reading of Dharma'. *Review of International Studies* 48, no. 5 (2022): 837–56.

Sharman, J. C., and Ayşe Zarakol. 'Global Slavery in the Making of States and International Orders'. *American Political Science Review* 118, no. 2 (2024): 802-814.

Shore, Cris. '"Government Without Statehood"? Anthropological Perspectives on Governance and Sovereignty in the European Union'. *European Law Journal* 12, no. 6 (2006): 709–24.

Silverstein, Paul A. 'The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier'. *CR: The New Centennial Review* 5, no. 1 (2005): 179–212.

Simou, Bahija. *Āl Işlāḥāt Ālʿaskrya Bilmaġrib 1844-1912 [Military Reforms in Morocco 1844-1912]*. Rabat: ālmaṭbaʿa ālmalakya ārribāṭ, 2000.

Soussi al-Alaoui, Omar. 'Miḥnat Āl-Faqyh ʿabd Āl-Ssalām Ğasus Fy Sibāq ʿalāqat Āl-Faqyh Bi al-Sulṭa Fy Āl-Tāryḫ Ālʿaraby Āl-Islāmy'. *Al-Manahil*, no. 85 (2008) : 243–59.

Spillman, Georges. *Les Ait Atta Du Sahara et La Pacification Du Haut Dra*. Rabat: Editions Felix Moncho, 1936.

Stern, Philip J. *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

———. 'The Ideology of the Imperial Corporation: "Informal" Empire Revisited. Chartering Capitalism: Organizing Markets, States, and Publics. Special Issue'. *Political Power and Social Theory* 29, no. 1 (2015): 15–43.

Stienstra, Deborah. 'Assessing International Relations Theory: Nonstate Actors, Change and Gender'. In *Women's Movements and International Organizations*, edited by Deborah Stienstra, 1–21. International Political Economy Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1994.

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited'. *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000): 128–61.

Taourirt, Mustapha, and Zahia Madhoui. 'The Economic Role of Women in the Ancient Maghreb'. *Al-Ibar: Journal for Historical and Archaeological Studies* 4, no. 2 (2021): 83–112.

Tayeb, Leila. 'What Is Whiteness in North Africa?' *Lateral: Journal of the Cultural Studies Association* 10, no. 1 (2021).

Taylor, Brian D., and Roxana Botea. 'Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World'. *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (2008): 27–56.

Tazi, Abdelhadi. *Rassa'il Makhzaniyah: 'ala 'Ahd as-Sultan Mawlay al-Hassan Wa Ibnihi as-Sultan Mawlay al 'Aziz 1875-1904*. Rabat: The Higher Education Institute of Scientific Research, 2008.

Terray, Emmanuel, and Joseph Serrano. 'Exploitation and Domination in Marx's Thought'. *Rethinking Marxism* 31, no. 4 (2019): 412–424.

Teschke, Benno. 'Advances and Impasses in Fred Halliday's International Historical Sociology: A Critical Appraisal'. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 87, no. 5 (2011): 1087–1106.

———. 'IR Theory, Historical Materialism, and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology'. *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6, no. 1 (2014): 1–66.

———. 'IR Theory, Historical Materialism, and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology'. *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6, no. 1 (2014): 1–66.

———. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*. London: Verso, 2003.

The Bradford Observer. 11 December 1877.

Thompson, E.P. *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

Thomson, Madia. 'A Morbid Affair: Epidemics and Famine in Morocco, 1860–1888'. *Journal of the Institute for African Studies* 2, no. 47 (2019): 86-98.

Tilley, Lisa, and Robbie Shilliam. 'Raced Markets: An Introduction'. *New Political Economy* 23, no. 5 (2018): 534–43.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Rev. pbk. ed., Reprinted. Studies in Social Discontinuity. Massachussetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990.

———. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime'. In *Bringing the State Back In*, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Tolay, Juliette. 'Inadvertent Reproduction of Eurocentrism in IR: The Politics of Critiquing Eurocentrism'. *Review of International Studies* 47, no. 5 (2021): 692–713.

Tomba, Massimiliano. *Marx's Temporalities*. Leiden, NL: Brill, 2013.

Tomich, Dale. 'The Limits of Theory: Capital, Temporality, and History'. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 38, no. 4 (2015): 329–68.

Torry, William I. 'Natural Disasters, Social Structure and Change in Traditional Societies'. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 13, no. 3–4 (1978): 167–83.

Toufiq, Ahmed. *ālmuǧtamaʿa ālmaġriby fy ālqrn āttāsiʿ ʿašar (ynultān min 1850-1912) [Moroccan Society in the Nineteenth Century: Inoultan 1850-1912]*. 3rd ed. Casablanca : Maṭbaʿat ānnaǧāḥ ālǧadyda, 2011.

Tozy, Mohamed. 'L'évolution du champ religieux marocain au défi de la mondialisation'. *Revue internationale de politique comparee* Vol. 16, no. 1 (2009): 63–81.

'Treaty Between France and Spain Regarding Morocco'. *The American Journal of International Law* 7, no. 2 (1913): 81–99.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Beacon Press, 1995.

Trownsell, Tamara. 'Recrafting Ontology'. *Review of International Studies* 48, no. 5 (2022): 801–20.

Turner, Terence. 'Class Projects, Social Consciousness, and the Contradictions of "Globalization"'. In *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, edited by Jonathan Friedman, 35–66. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003.

United Nations. *Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations*. Vol. 310, 1958.

Valensi, Lucette. *On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest*. New York: Africana, 1977.

Vázquez, Calderón, and Francisco José. 'Boundaries in Time and Space: Spanish "Minor Sovereign Territories"'. *Frontera Norte* 26, no. 51 (June 2014) : 113–36.

Vercel, Roger. 'Deux Corsaires et Une Ville: IV: Surcouf'. *Revue Des Deux Mondes (1829-1971)* 75, no. 2 (1943) : 113–35.

Virdee, Satnam. 'Racialized Capitalism: An Account of Its Contested Origins and Consolidation'. *The Sociological Review* 67, no. 1 (2019): 3–27.

———. 'Racism and State Formation in the Age of Absolutism'. *Historical Materialism* 31, no. 2 (2023): 104–35.

Vogel, Lise. *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory; New Introduction by Susan Ferguson and David McNally*. Published in paperback. Historical Materialism Book Series. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2013.

Wagner, Michael. *The English Chartered Trading Companies, 1688-1763: Guns, Money and Lawyers*. New York: Routledge, 2018.

Walker, R. B. J. 'Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics'. *Alternatives* 15, no. 1 (1990): 3–27.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 'Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science'. *Sociological Bulletin* 46, no. 1 (1997): 21–39.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press, 2010.

Waltz, Kenneth Neal. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press, 2001.

———. *Theory of International Politics*. 1st ed. Illinois: Waveland Press, 1979.

Wauters, A.J. 'Chronique Documentaire : Le Maroc et Le Congo Belge'. *Le Progrès de Bel-Abbès: Journal de l'arrondissement de Sidi-Bel-Abbès*, August 1911.

Webb, James. 'The Horse and Slave Trade between the Western Sahara and Senegambia'. *The Journal of African History* 34, no. 2 (1993): 221–46.

Williams, Eric. *Capitalism and Slavery*. New York: Capricorn Books, 1966.

Windler, Christian. 'Towards the Empire of a "Civilizing Nation": The French Revolution and Its Impact on Relations with the Ottoman Regencies in the Maghreb'. In *International Law and Empire: Historical Explorations*, 201–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Wolf, Eric R. *Europe and the People Without History*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2010.

Wood, Ellen. *Empire of Capital*. London: Verso, 2005.

Wood, Ellen Meiksins. *The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View*. Verso, 2002.

———. *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States*. 3rd ed. London: Verso, 2015.

Yahya, Jalal. *ālmawla ismāʿyl wa taḥryr ṯuġuwr āl-maġrib*. Alexandria: āl-maktab āl-ǧāmiʿy āl-ḥadyṯ, 1983.

Young, Robert. *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. Psychology Press, 2004.

Zacarés, Javier Moreno. 'Two Historicisms: Unpacking the Rules of Reproduction Debate'. *Historical Materialism* 29, no. 3 (2021): 175–98.

Zakaria, Fareed. 'Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay'. Edited by Jack Snyder. *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992): 177–98.

Zarakol, Ayşe. 'A Non-Eurocentric Approach to Sovereignty'. *International Studies Review*, Forum: In the Beginning There was No Word (for it): Terms, Concepts and Early Sovereignty, 3, no. 20 (2018): 27–32.

———. *Before the West: The Rise and Fall of Eastern World Orders*. LSE International Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Zehfuss, Maja. 'Constructivisms in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil'. In *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, edited by Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Zmolek, Michael Andrew. *Rethinking the Industrial Revolution: Five Centuries of Transition from Agrarian to Industrial Capitalism in England*. Historical Materialism Book Series. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014.

Zubaida, Sami. 'Is There a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner's Sociology of Islam'. *Economy and Society* 24, no. 2 (1995): 151–88.