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    Wiretapping a hidden network

    Aziz, H. and Lachish, Oded and Paterson, M. and Savani, R. (2009) Wiretapping a hidden network. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) Internet and Network Economics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5929. Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag, pp. 438-446. ISBN 9783642108419.

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    We consider the problem of maximizing the probability of hitting a strategically chosen hidden virtual network by placing a wiretap on a single link of a communication network. This can be seen as a two-player win-lose (zero-sum) game that we call the wiretap game. The value of this game is the greatest probability that the wiretapper can secure for hitting the virtual network. The value is shown to be equal the reciprocal of the strength of the underlying graph. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a linear-sized description of the maxmin-polytope, and a characterization of its extreme points. It also provides a succint representation of all equilibrium strategies of the wiretapper that minimize the number of pure best responses of the hider. Among these strategies, we efficiently compute the unique strategy that maximizes the least punishment that the hider incurs for playing a pure strategy that is not a best response. Finally, we show that this unique strategy is the nucleolus of the recently studied simple cooperative spanning connectivity game.


    Item Type: Book Section
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Computer Science and Information Systems
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 30 May 2013 15:21
    Last Modified: 11 Oct 2016 12:01


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