Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability

Pelling, Charlie (2008) Exactness, inexactness, and the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Synthese 164 (2), pp. 289-312. ISSN 0039-7857.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9227-0

Abstract

I defend, to a certain extent, the traditional view that perceptual indiscriminability is non-transitive. The argument proceeds by considering important recent work by Benj Hellie: Hellie argues that colour perception represents ‘inexactly’, and that this results in violations of the transitivity of colour indiscriminability. I show that Hellie’s argument remains inconclusive, since he does not demonstrate conclusively that colour perception really does represent inexactly. My own argument for the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability uses inexactness instead as one horn of a dilemma: the key idea is that there is a class of perceptual experiences which might plausibly be supposed either to represent inexactly or to represent exactly—but which demonstrate the non-transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability either way.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
School:	Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies
Depositing User:	Administrator
Date Deposited:	05 Jun 2013 12:31
Last Modified:	02 Aug 2023 17:05
URI:	https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7257

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