Power, luck, and ideology: technological and institutional parameters of the agency problem for CEOs
Skott, P. and Guy, Frederick (2013) Power, luck, and ideology: technological and institutional parameters of the agency problem for CEOs. Review of Radical Political Economics 45 (3), pp. 323-332. ISSN 0486-6134.
Abstract
We propose an explanation for the growth of executive pay since the 1980s. New information and communication technologies (ICTs) appear to favor winner-take-all markets and to accentuate firm-level volatility of profits. We show, using an efficiency wage model, that these changes lead to higher executive pay. This is an example of what we have called, in other contexts, power-biased technological change (PBTC). The changes in market structure and the power of CEOs, however, are not only technologically but also institutionally contingent.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | information technology, power-biased technical change, inequality, CEO compensation, efficiency wage, winner-take-all |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Innovation Management Research, Birkbeck Centre for |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2013 09:59 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:05 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7473 |
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