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    Power, luck, and ideology: technological and institutional parameters of the agency problem for CEOs

    Skott, P. and Guy, Frederick (2013) Power, luck, and ideology: technological and institutional parameters of the agency problem for CEOs. Review of Radical Political Economics 45 (3), pp. 323-332. ISSN 0486-6134.

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    Abstract

    We propose an explanation for the growth of executive pay since the 1980s. New information and communication technologies (ICTs) appear to favor winner-take-all markets and to accentuate firm-level volatility of profits. We show, using an efficiency wage model, that these changes lead to higher executive pay. This is an example of what we have called, in other contexts, power-biased technological change (PBTC). The changes in market structure and the power of CEOs, however, are not only technologically but also institutionally contingent.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): information technology, power-biased technical change, inequality, CEO compensation, efficiency wage, winner-take-all
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Management
    Research Centres and Institutes: Innovation Management Research, Birkbeck Centre for
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 18 Jun 2013 09:59
    Last Modified: 06 Dec 2016 10:11
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7473

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