Besson, Corine (2012) Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning. Philosophical Studies 158 (1), pp. 59-82. ISSN 0031-8116.
(3)_Logical_knowledge_and_ordinary_reasoning.pdf - Published Version
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This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||logical knowledge, change in view, dispositions, propositions|
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Depositing User:||Corine Besson|
|Date Deposited:||22 Nov 2012 17:25|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:33|
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