Besson, Corine (2012) Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning. Philosophical Studies 158 (1), pp. 59-82. ISSN 0031-8116.
![[img]](https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text (Refereed)
(3)_Logical_knowledge_and_ordinary_reasoning.pdf - Published Version of Record Restricted to Repository staff only Download (240kB) |
Abstract
This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | logical knowledge, change in view, dispositions, propositions |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Corine Besson |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Nov 2012 17:25 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 16:58 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/5186 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
