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    Eliciting ambiguous beliefs under α-Maxmin preference

    Bose, S. and Daripa, Arup (2016) Eliciting ambiguous beliefs under α-Maxmin preference. Working Paper. Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.

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    We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent’s preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by α-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation mechanism such that truthful reporting of beliefs is the agent’s unique best response. The mechanism uses knowledge of the preference parameter α and we construct a mechanism that truthfully elicits α. Finally, using the two as ingredients, we construct a grand mechanism that elicits ambiguous beliefs and α concurrently.


    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: ISSN 1745-8587: BWPEF 1601
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Ambiguity, α-maxmin preferences, maxmin preferences, elicitation of beliefs and α
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 20 May 2016 08:46
    Last Modified: 28 Jul 2019 17:27


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