Eliciting ambiguous beliefs under α-Maxmin preference
Bose, S. and Daripa, Arup (2016) Eliciting ambiguous beliefs under α-Maxmin preference. Working Paper. Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.
|
Text
15263.pdf - Published Version of Record Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (304kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent’s preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by α-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation mechanism such that truthful reporting of beliefs is the agent’s unique best response. The mechanism uses knowledge of the preference parameter α and we construct a mechanism that truthfully elicits α. Finally, using the two as ingredients, we construct a grand mechanism that elicits ambiguous beliefs and α concurrently.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | ISSN 1745-8587: BWPEF 1601 |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Ambiguity, α-maxmin preferences, maxmin preferences, elicitation of beliefs and α |
| School: | Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 20 May 2016 08:46 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Jul 2019 17:27 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/15263 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
 |
Edit/View Item |