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Eliciting ambiguous beliefs under α-Maxmin preference

Bose, S. and Daripa, Arup (2016) Eliciting ambiguous beliefs under α-Maxmin preference. Working Paper. Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.

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Abstract

We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent’s preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by α-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation mechanism such that truthful reporting of beliefs is the agent’s unique best response. The mechanism uses knowledge of the preference parameter α and we construct a mechanism that truthfully elicits α. Finally, using the two as ingredients, we construct a grand mechanism that elicits ambiguous beliefs and α concurrently.

Metadata

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: ISSN 1745-8587: BWPEF 1601
Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Ambiguity, α-maxmin preferences, maxmin preferences, elicitation of beliefs and α
School: Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School
Depositing User: Administrator
Date Deposited: 20 May 2016 08:46
Last Modified: 14 Jul 2025 13:20
URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/15263

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