Circular arguments, begging the question and the formalization of argument strength
Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Mike and Corner, N. (2005) Circular arguments, begging the question and the formalization of argument strength. In: Russell, A. and Honkela, T. and Lagus, K. and Pöllä, M. (eds.) Proceedings of AMKLC'05, International Symposium on Adaptive Models of Knowledge, Language and Cognition. Helsinki University of Technoloty, pp. 34-40. ISBN 9789512277346.
Abstract
Recently Oaksford and Hahn (2004) proposed a Bayesian reconstruction of a classic argumentation fallacy - Locke’s ‘argument from ignorance.’ Here this account is extended to what is probably the most well-known of all argumen- tation fallacies: circular reasoning or ‘begging the ques- tion’. A Bayesian analysis is shown to clarify when and where circular reasoning is good or bad, and how seem- ing paradoxes about circular reasoning from the informal reasoning literature can be resolved with a more precise notion of argumentation and argument strength.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Additional Information: | Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland, June 15-17, 2005 |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Knowledge Lab |
Depositing User: | Administrator |
Date Deposited: | 22 Sep 2016 08:43 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:26 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16155 |
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