Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Mike and Corner, N. (2005) Circular arguments, begging the question and the formalization of argument strength. In: Russell, A. and Honkela, T. and Lagus, K. and Pöllä, M. (eds.) Proceedings of AMKLC'05, International Symposium on Adaptive Models of Knowledge, Language and Cognition. Helsinki University of Technoloty, pp. 34-40. ISBN 9789512277346.
Abstract
Recently Oaksford and Hahn (2004) proposed a Bayesian reconstruction of a classic argumentation fallacy - Locke’s ‘argument from ignorance.’ Here this account is extended to what is probably the most well-known of all argumen- tation fallacies: circular reasoning or ‘begging the ques- tion’. A Bayesian analysis is shown to clarify when and where circular reasoning is good or bad, and how seem- ing paradoxes about circular reasoning from the informal reasoning literature can be resolved with a more precise notion of argumentation and argument strength.
Metadata
Item Type: | Book Section |
---|---|
Additional Information: | Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland, June 15-17, 2005 |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Knowledge Lab |
Depositing User: | Administrator |
Date Deposited: | 22 Sep 2016 08:43 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:26 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16155 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.