Uninformative equilibrium in uniform price auctions
Daripa, Arup (2007) Uninformative equilibrium in uniform price auctions. Working Paper. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK.
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Official URL: http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ems/research/wp
Abstract
I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects information.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | BWPEF 1701 |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Costly information acquisition, uniform price auction, uninformed bidders, uninformative equilibrium |
| School: | Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Mar 2019 15:29 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Jul 2019 13:44 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26904 |
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