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    Monetary policy committees: individual and collective reputations

    Sibert, Anne (2003) Monetary policy committees: individual and collective reputations. Review of Economic Studies 70 (3), pp. 649-665. ISSN 0034-6527.

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    Abstract

    This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals’ votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2013 09:53
    Last Modified: 15 Aug 2013 09:53
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/8011

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