Sibert, Anne (2003) Monetary policy committees: individual and collective reputations. Review of Economic Studies 70 (3), pp. 649-665. ISSN 0034-6527.
Abstract
This paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness. I show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group. But, group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare. Not publishing individuals’ votes, raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare. If the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers, the incentive to build a reputation is greater, but expected social welfare may be higher or lower.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Aug 2013 09:53 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:06 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/8011 |
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