Bove, V. and Brauner, Jennifer (2016) The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes. Defence and Peace Economics 27 (5), pp. 609-625. ISSN 1024-2694.
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Abstract
This paper examines whether there are systematic differences in military spending between different types of autocratic regimes. We view military expenditure as an instrument a dictator can exploit in order to stay in power. How he utilises this instrument depends on the institutional set-up of his regime. We distinguish between military regimes, single party states and personalist regimes, and predict that military regimes should have the highest, whereas personalist dictatorships should have the lowest level of military spending. Using panel data on 64 dictatorships from 1960 to 2000, we find empirical evidence that our hypotheses are not rejected.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
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Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Military expenditure, Authoritarian regimes, Institutions, Political economy |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
Depositing User: | Administrator |
Date Deposited: | 04 Nov 2014 12:12 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:13 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/10876 |
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The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes. (deposited 18 Jan 2013 09:42)
- The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes. (deposited 04 Nov 2014 12:12) [Currently Displayed]
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