Huddleston, Andrew (2014) Nietzsche's meta-axiology: against the skeptical readings. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2), pp. 322-342. ISSN 0960-8788.
Abstract
In this paper, I treat the question of the meta-axiological standing of Nietzsche's own values, in the service of which he criticizes morality. Does Nietzsche, I ask, regard his perfectionistic valorization of human excellence and cultural flourishing over other ideals to have genuine evaluative standing, in the sense of being correct, or at least adequate to a matter-of-fact? My goal in this paper is modest, but important: it is not to attribute to Nietzsche some sophisticated meta-axiological view, because I am doubtful that he has one. It is, however, to show that Nietzsche's texts do not necessitate the sceptical meta-axiological positions that have been attributed to him in the recent secondary literature. And it is thereby to suggest that we need not give up on the idea that Nietzsche takes the values he champions to have genuine evaluative standing – not because he has some sophisticated realist theory to this effect, but in a more philosophically unreflective way.
Metadata
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Nietzsche, meta-axiology, meta-ethics |
School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2014 11:21 |
Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:13 |
URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/10946 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.