Darby, George and Landes, J. (2014) There is more to a paradox than credence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2), pp. 99-109. ISSN 2161-2234.
Abstract
Besides the usual business of solving paradoxes, there has been recent philosophical work on their essential nature. Lycan characterises a paradox as “an inconsistent set of propositions, each of which is very plausible.” Building on this definition, Paseau offers a numerical measure of paradoxicality of a set of principles: a function of the degrees to which a subject believes the principles considered individually (all typically high) and of the degree to which the subject believes the principles considered together (typically low). We argue (a) that Paseau's measure fails to score certain paradoxes properly and (b) that this failure is not due to the particular measure but rather that any such function just of credences fails to adequately capture paradoxicality. Our analysis leads us to conclude that Lycan's definition also fails to capture the notion of paradox.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | paradox, measure, credence |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2014 12:21 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:13 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11049 |
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