Ruben, David-Hillel (2013) Traditions and true successors. Social Epistemology 27 (1), pp. 32-46. ISSN 0269-1728.
Abstract
How can different parties to a dispute in aesthetics, history, politics or religion, either individuals or groups, each claim, apparently with at least some justification, that it, but not its rival(s), is the true or authentic successor or later representative for some earlier group or individual, or that it, but not its rival(s), stands in the same authentic tradition as the earlier one? Such social disputes seem essentially endless and interminable. Is this so? Can the disputes receive a rational resolution? I try and illustrate these disputes with numerous specific examples. I focus on the two concepts of tradition and true succession for my analysis. The idea of qualitative similarity of beliefs and practices can illuminate social disputes over true succession or membership of a tradition. (Causal connexion has a necessary role to play.) Other analyses frequently identify the vagueness or ambiguity in the concepts of the specific traditions as the source of dispute. On the contrary, I argue that the vagueness inherent in the question of how similar beliefs and practices need to be is what explains these apparently endless disputes that social groups have with one another over these questions.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | traditions, true succession, social disputes |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Dec 2014 17:34 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:14 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11260 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
