Hamann, K. and Johnston, A. and Katsanidou, A. and Kelly, John and Pollock, P.H. (2014) Sharing the rewards, dividing the costs? The electoral consequences of social pacts and legislative reform in western Europe. West European Politics 38 (1), pp. 206-227. ISSN 0140-2382.
Abstract
Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments’ pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Centre for British Political Life |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jan 2015 12:26 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:14 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11477 |
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